William of Ockham, Dialogus,
part 1, book 4, chapters 20-24.

 

Capitulum 20	Chapter 20
Magister Pro assertione praedicta argutum est supra libro 3, quia probatum est ibidem quod non omnis errans contra fidem est haereticus reputandus. Illa autem argumenta ibidem adducta concludunt quod etiam tenens haeresim damnatam explicite non est statim haereticus iudicandus. Ex quo sequitur quod non statim tenetur suam haeresim revocare.	Master The aforesaid assertion was argued for in book 3 above, because it was proved there that not everyone erring against the faith should be regarded as a heretic. The arguments brought forward there conclude, moreover, that even someone holding an explicitly condemned heresy should not be judged a heretic immediately. It follows from this that he is not bound to retract his heresy immediately.
Discipulus Si fundant se in aliqua ratione speciali ad probandum quod tenens haeresim damnatam explicite non sit statim inter haereticos computandus, illam libenter audirem.	Student If they rely on some particular argument to prove that someone holding an explicitly condemned heresy should not be counted among the heretics immediately, I would be pleased to hear it.
Magister Una ratio eorum talis est. Nullus est magis reputandus haereticus propter haeresim explicite damnatam ab ecclesia quam propter haeresim cuius contradictoria in Scriptura Divina sententialiter et vocaliter continetur, nisi talis damnatio sit magis divulgata inter christianos quam veritas Scripturae Divinae. Sed multae sunt haereses damnatae explicite a consiliis generalibus quae non sunt magis divulgatae quam Scriptura Divina. Et non semper est aliquis statim reputandus haereticus si tenet aliquam haeresim cuius contradictoria in sacris literis reperitur, sed examinandus est an scienter vel nescienter, et si nescienter, an pertinaciter vel absque pertinacia teneat haeresim. Ergo similiter licet quis teneat haeresim damnatam explicite non est semper statim haereticus reputandus, sed investigandum est primo an de pertinacia possit convinci per testes vel alia legitima documenta. Et si non potest probari quod fuerit pertinax, examinandus est an paratus sit se corrigere si sibi ostendatur aperte quod haeresis sua est explicite condemnata.	Master One of their arguments is this. No one should be more regarded as a heretic because of a heresy explicitly condemned by the church than because of a heresy the contradiction of which is found in the meaning or words of divine scripture, unless such a condemnation has been more widely published among christians than the truth of divine scripture. But there are many heresies explicitly condemned by general councils which have not been more widely published than divine scripture. And someone should not always be immediately regarded as a heretic if he holds some heresy the contradiction of which is found in the sacred writings, but he should be examined about whether (he holds it) knowingly or unknowingly, and, if unknowingly, whether he holds the heresy pertinaciously or without pertinacity. In a similar way, therefore, even if someone holds an explicitly condemned heresy he should not always be regarded immediately as a heretic, but it should be examined first whether he can be convicted of pertinacity by witnesses or other legitimate proofs. If it can not be proved that he is pertinacious he should be examined about whether he is ready to correct himself if it is clearly shown to him that his heresy has been explicitly condemned.
Secunda ratio est haec. Nullus est statim reputandus haereticus si tenet haeresim cuius contradictoriam non tenetur credere explicite. Haec enim est causa quare si aliquis neget aliquam veritatem contentam explicite in Scriptura Divina non est propter hoc statim reputandus haereticus. Sed nullus vel pauci tenetur vel tenentur explicite credere omnes veritates contradictorias haeresibus damnatis explicite quia multi non habent libros nec habere possunt in quibus damnationes explicite continentur. Ergo licet ignoranter teneat quis haeresim damnatam explicite non est statim haereticus iudicandus.	A second argument is this. No one should be immediately regarded as a heretic if he holds a heresy the contradiction of which he is not bound explicitly to believe. For this is the reason why someone who denies some truth contained explicitly in divine scripture is not thereby immediately to be regarded as a heretic. But no one or few people are bound to believe explicitly all the truths which contradict explicitly condemned heresies because many do not have, nor can have, the books which contain the explicit condemnations. Even if someone unknowingly holds an explicitly condemned heresy, therefore, he should not immediately be judged a heretic.
Discipulus Quomodo potest quis negare veritatem contentam expresse in Scriptura Sacra nisi sit haereticus?	Student How can someone deny a truth explicitly contained in sacred scripture unless he is a heretic?
Magister Sufficit credere omnem veritatem Scripturae Divinae implicite. Sic enim beatus Augustinus aliquas veritates contentas in Scriptura nescienter negavit et ideo non fuit haereticus, sic etiam beatus Hieronimus veritatem evangelii negare videtur cum, loquens de redemptore nostro in quadam homelia, dicit, "Et interrogabat discipulos suos, dicens, 'Quem dicunt homines esse filium hominis?'; non dixit, 'Quem me esse dicunt homines?' ne iactanter de se quaerere videretur." Et tamen Lucas in evangelio suo c. 9 expresse refert quod Iesus interrogavit discipulos suos dicens, "Quem me dicunt esse turbae?" Ecce quod Hieronimus dicit quod Christus non dixit, "Quem me dicunt esse homines?" Lucas autem dicit quod dixit, "Quem me dicunt esse turbae?" Ubi inter Hieronimum et beatum Lucam aperta contrarietas invenitur, et tamen Hieronimus non est reputandus haereticus, quia non pertinaciter, sed quia de textu evangelii Lucae tunc non recordabatur, negavit evangelii veritatem.	Master It is enough to believe every truth of divine scripture implicitly. For blessed Augustine unknowingly denied some truths contained in scripture in this way and therefore was not a heretic. So also blessed Jerome seems to deny the truth of the gospel when, speaking of our redeemer in one of his homilies, he says: "And he began to question his disciples asking them, 'Who do men say the son of man is'; he did not say, 'Who do men say that I am' lest he were seen to ask about himself boastfully." Yet in chapter 9:[18] of his gospel Luke expressly reports that Jesus asked his disciples, "Who do the people say that I am?" Note that Jerome says that Christ did not say "Who do men say that I am?" while Luke says that he did say "Who do the people say that I am?" A clear contradiction is thereby found between Jerome and blessed Luke, and yet Jerome should not be regarded as a heretic, because he did not deny the truth of the gospel pertinaciously, but at the time he did not remember the text of Luke's gospel.
Capitulum 21	Chapter 21
Discipulus Per instantias quas feci discurre.	Student Run through the objections that I made.
Magister Ad primam tuam instantiam respondetur quod non omnis tenens haeresim damnatam explicite est haereticus reputandus, licet multi tenentes haereses damnatas explicite per alia documenta valeant probari haeretici, si posssint videlicet convinci quod pertinaciter tenuerint haeresim damnatam explicite.	Master The answer to your first objection is that not everyone holding an explicitly condemned heresy should be regarded as a heretic, even if many people holding explicitly condemned heresies can be proved by other proofs to be heretics, that is if they can be convicted of pertinaciously holding an explicitly condemned heresy.
Cum vero dicis quod magis est reputandus haereticus qui tenet haeresim damnatam explicite quam qui non tenet doctrinam catholicam, hoc, si debet concedi, verum est de illo qui pertinaciter tenet haeresim damnatam explicite. Si autem nescienter absque omni pertinacia tenet haeresim damnatam explicite, non continet veritatem, loquendo scilicet de illo qui non reputat doctrinam christianam esse veram, de quo loquitur beatus Iohannes in verbis adductis. Non enim loquitur beatus Iohannes de illo qui ignoranter aliquam specialem catholicam veritatem non teneret, quia talis, nisi alias de pertinacia convinceretur, non esset a catholicis evitandus.	When you say that someone who holds an explicitly condemned heresy should more be regarded as a heretic than someone who does not hold to catholic teaching, this (if it ought to be granted) is true of him who holds pertinaciously an explicitly condemned heresy. If he holds an explicitly condemned heresy unknowingly and without any pertinacity, however, it is not true, speaking, that is, in comparison to one who does not consider christian teaching to be true. Blessed John, in the words you adduced is speaking of such a one. For blessed John is not speaking of someone who out of ignorance might not hold some particular catholic truth, because such a person should not be avoided by catholics, unless he were to be convicted of pertinacity in some other way.
Ad decreta quae adducis breviter respondetur quod omnia loquuntur de illis qui scienter labuntur in haeresim iam damnatam.	A brief reply to the decretals which you adduce is that they all speak about people who knowingly slip into an already condemned heresy.
Ad consuetudinem inquisitorum quam allegas dicunt quidam quod inquisitores et nonnulli praelati saepe inique procedunt et iniuste. Nam multi, ut dicunt, sunt illiterati et simplices, cupiditate et avaritia excaecati, qui ideo de haeresi satagunt accusatos condemnare ut bona eorum acquirant. Et ideo in eorum consuetudine nulla assertio est fundanda.	To the practice of inquisitors which you bring forward, some people say that inquisitors and some prelates often proceed unfairly and unjustly. For they say that many are unlearned and simple men blinded by greed and avarice who try to condemn those accused of heresy in order to acquire their goods. And therefore no assertion should be based on their practice.
Ad rationem, quae magis urgere videtur, dicunt quod aliqui tenentes haereses damnatas explicite possunt se per ignorantiam excusare, aliqui vero non possunt, quia quidam diversis modis, sicut ex praedictis apparet et inferius, si interrogationes de hac materia fueris prosecutus, amplius apparebit, convinci poterunt de pertinacia manifesta, illi videlicet qui prius eandem haeresim sciverunt esse damnatam et qui alios ad tenendum eandem quomodolibet coegerunt et qui protestabantur se velle eandem irrevocabiliter defensare, et multi alii de quibus dictum est supra et, si volueris, dicetur inferius. Illi autem qui nullo modo de pertinacia possunt convinci et parati sunt corrigi se poterunt per ignorantiam excusare, dicentes, "Nos ignoravimus tales haereses esse damnatas; imo ignoravimus eas veritati catholicae quomodolibet adversari."	To [the argument from] reason, which seems to be more forceful, they say that some people who hold explicitly condemned heresies can excuse themselves by ignorance, others, on the other hand, can not, because certain people can be convicted of manifest heresy in different ways -- as is clear from what has been said and will be even clearer later if you follow up with questions on this matter -- those, that is, who knew beforehand that the heresy was condemned, and who forced others in any way at all to hold it and who were proclaiming that they would irrevocably defend it, and many others who have been spoken about above and will be spoken about below if you wish. Those who can not in any way be convicted of pertinacity, however, and are ready to be corrected can excuse themselves by ignorance and say: "We did not know that these are condemned as heresies, indeed we did not know that they are opposed in any way to catholic truth."
Discipulus Antequam procedas ulterius dicas an in sacra pagina et iure canonico eruditi valeant, si tenent haereses damnatas explicite, se per ignorantiam excusare.	Disciple Before you proceed further would you say whether those who are well informed about the sacred page and canon law can excuse themselves by ignorance if they hold explicitly condemned heresies.
Magister Dicitur quod sic, quia eruditi non tenentur habere noticiam de omnibus haeresibus quae sunt explicite damnatae, et ideo si ignoranter teneant eas parati corrigi non sunt haeretici reputandi.	Master It is answered yes, because the well informed are not bound to have knowledge of every heresy that has been explicitly condemned. They should not be regarded as heretics, therefore, if they hold them in ignorance and are ready to be corrected.
Discipulus Quomodo respondetur ad illa per quae probavi quod ignorantia non excusat?	Disciple How is reply made to those [arguments] by which I proved that ignorance does not excuse?
Magister Ad primum dicitur quod ignorantia iuris est duplex. Quaedam enim est ignorantia iuris quod oportet scire, et illa non excusat; alia est ignorantia iuris quod non oportet scire, et illa excusat a peccato, licet forte in quibusdam aliis non excuset. Ille igitur qui tenet haereses quarum contradictorias oportet eum explicite credere non potest per ignorantiam excusari. Et ideo quicunque inter christianos convenienter enutritus teneret fidem christianam esse falsam vel Christum non fuisse crucifixum vel non fuisse incarnatum vel aliquid huiusmodi cuius nullus Christianus debet esse ignarus non potest per ignorantiam excusari, quia explicite tenetur credere quod fides Christiana est vera et quod Christus fuit crucifixus et huiusmodi quae facile est scire et inter omnes catholicos divulgantur. Qui autem teneret haereses quarum contradictorias non tenetur credere explicite posset per ignorantiam excusari, dummodo pertinaciam nullam adiungeret.	Master To the first it is said that ignorance of the law is two-fold. For one ignorance is of a law which it is necessary to know and that [ignorance] does not excuse. Another ignorance is of a law which it is not necessary to know, and that does excuse one of sin, although in certain other cases it may not excuse. He who holds heresies the contradictions of which it is necessary for him explicitly to believe, therefore, can not be excused by ignorance. Anyone brought up suitably among christians, therefore, who might hold that the christian faith is false or that Christ was not crucified or was not made flesh or something of this kind of which no christian ought to be ignorant can not be excused by ignorance, because he is bound explicitly to believe that the christian faith is true and that Christ was crucified and things of this kind which it is easy to know and which are published among all catholics. He who might hold heresies the contradictions of which he is not bound explicitly to believe, however, could be excused by ignorance as long as he did not add any pertinacity.
Ad secundum, de constitutione sedis apostolicae, dicitur quod omnes astringit postquam est publice divulgata ita quod nemo potest ignorantiam allegare. Si autem non fuerit ita publice divulgata, non astringit ignorantes qui non laborant ignorantia crassa et supina. Quod ergo dicitur, quod omnes astringit post duos menses, verum est omnes scientes et omnes ignorantes damnabili ignorantia laborantes. Alios autem non astringit ut facientes contrarium peccent coram Deo, licet forte aliquando astringat eos ad poenam per ecclesiam infligendam. Durum enim videtur nonnullis dicere quod omnes Christiani tenentur scire omnes decretales summorum pontificum, cum nonnulli studentes in eis aliquando 20 annis et amplius multas earum ignorent. Multi etiam ad earum copiam nullatenus attingere possunt.	To the second, about a constitution of the apostolic see, it is said that it does oblige everyone after it has been so widely published that no one can claim ignorance. If it has not been widely published in this way, however, it does not oblige those who do not know it, if they are not labouring under a crass and lazy ignorance. The statement that it obliges everyone after two months is true, therefore, of everyone who knows it and everyone who does not know it because of the burden of their reprehensible ignorance. It does not oblige others, however, in such a way that those acting contrary to it sin before God, though perhaps it may sometimes bind them to a punishment to be imposed by the church. For it seems hard to some to say that all christians are bound to know all the decretals of the highest pontiffs, when some people who study them, sometimes for 20 years and more, do not know many of them. Many can not even obtain a copy of them at all.
Ad tertium dicunt quod etiam in his quae publice fiunt contingit quandoque allegare ignorantiam, secundum quod ex sacris canonibus 9. q. 1. c. Ordinationes et 1. q. 1. c. Si qui a simoniacis et aliis aperte colligitur. Et nonnunquam talem ignorantiam sufficit solo iuramento probare. Et ita dicunt in proposito quod quamvis quondam fuerint aliquae haereses publice condemnatae, tamen possunt nunc etiam literati ignorantiam allegare, dicentes se nescire tales haereses fuisse damnatas. Et si petatur ab eis probatio quod ignorant, sufficit quod iurent se ignorare. Et sic a pravitate haeretica per ignorantiam excusantur.	To your third they say that even in connection with those things that are done publicly it is possible sometimes to claim ignorance, according to what is clearly gathered from the sacred canons, 9, q. 1, c. Ordinationes [col.601; see especially gloss on nisi probare, col.866], 1, q. 1, c. Si qui a simoniacis [col.400] and others. Sometimes it is enough to prove such ignorance by an oath alone. And so they say, on the present topic, that even if some heresies have been publicly condemned in the past, even the learned can, nonetheless, claim ignorance now by saying that they do not know that such heresies have been condemned; and if proof of their ignorance is sought from them, it is enough for them to swear that they do not know; and in this way they are excused of heretical wickedness by ignorance.
Capitulum 22	Chapter 22
Discipulus Adhuc de ista materia unam difficultatem discutias? an videlicet sciens aliquam haeresim esse damnatam, quam putat esse ambiguam, duos sensus habentem, si teneat eam sub senso damnato, quem non putat esse damnatum, valeat de pravitate haeretica per ignorantiam excusari?	Disciple Would you discuss one further difficulty about this matter? Whether, that is, someone who knows some heresy has been condemned which he thinks is ambiguous and has two significations can be excused of heretical wickedness through ignorance if he holds it in the condemned signification but does not think that it is condemned?
Magister Ad hoc respondetur quod si sciens haeresim esse damnatam non tenetur scire sub quo sensu est damnata, licet tenuerit sensum damnatum, non est statim haereticus iudicandus. Si autem tenetur scire sub quo sensu est damnata, non potest per ignorantiam excusari.	Master It is replied to this that if someone who knows a heresy has been condemned is not bound to know what signification of it has been condemned, he should not be judged immediately to be a heretic even if he holds to the condemned signification. If he is bound to know what signification of it has been condemned, however, he can not be excused through ignorance.
Primum sic probatur. Damnata aliqua assertione, nullus per illam damnationem astringitur ad negandum aliam assertionem quae ex sola assertione damnata inferri non potest. Sed ex assertione ambigua diversos sensus habente sensus determinatus inferri non potest. Ergo, damnata assertione ambigua, non astringitur quis negare determinatum sensum quia potest probabiliter dubitare in quo sensu sit damnata. Ergo si quis ex ignorantia absque omni pertinacia tenet haeresim ambiguam condemnatam in illo sensu in quo secundum intentionem damnantium est damnata, si illum sensum minime expresserunt, non est statim pertinax et haereticus iudicandus; sed antea est sibi ostendendum aperte quod non solum assertio ambigua est damnata sed etiam quod talis sensus determinatus veritati obviat orthodoxae.	The first is proved as follows. When some assertion has been condemned, no one is obliged by that condemnation to deny another assertion unless it can be inferred solely from that condemned assertion; but from an ambiguous assertion which has several significations a fixed signification can not be inferred. If an ambiguous assertion has been condemned, therefore, no one is obliged to deny any fixed signification because he can with probability doubt what signification of it has been condemned. If anyone out of ignorance and without any pertinacity, therefore, holds an ambiguous condemned heresy in that signification which its condemners intended to condemn, he should not be judged immediately to be pertinacious and a heretic, if they have not described that signification; but it should first be clearly shown to him not only that the ambiguous assertion has been condemned but also that with its signification defined in that way it conflicts with orthodox truth.
Discipulus Isti videntur errare cum dicunt assertionem ambiguam esse damnatam, cum assertio ambigua damnari non debeat, praesertim si habeat aliquem sensum catholicum.	Disciple They seem to err when they say "an ambiguous assertion has been condemned" because an ambiguous assertion ought not be condemned, especially if it has some catholic signification.
Magister Respondetur tibi quod tu erras aperte. Nam nonnunquam assertio ambigua habens aliquem sensum catholicum est damnata. Unde et aliquando assertiones contradictoriae secundum vocem sunt damnatae; ex quo tamen contradictoriae sunt secundum vocem, altera illarum vel utraque habet sensum verum.	Master You are answered that it is you who plainly err. For sometimes an ambiguous assertion with some catholic sense has been condemned. Indeed sometimes even assertions that are literally contradictory have been condemned; yet because they are literally contradictory one or other of them has a true signification.
Discipulus De isto ponas exemplum si potes?	Disciple Would you give an example of that if you can?
Magister Isidorus, ut habetur 24, q. 3, c. Quidam autem, videtur ad hoc exemplum adducere manifestum, aperte insinuans quod utraque istarum, "Deus creat mala", "Deus non creat mala", est haeresis condemnata. Unde et assertores utriusque haereticos reputat manifestos, dicens, "Coliciani a quodam Colicio nuncupati qui dicunt Deum non facere mala contra illud quod scriptum est, 'Ego Dominus creans malum'. Floriani a Floriano qui econtrario dicunt Deum creasse mala contra hoc quod scriptum est, 'Fecit Deus omnia bona'." Ex his verbis colligitur quod utraque istarum, "Deus creat mala", "Deus non creat mala", est haeresis explicite condemnata. Et tamen ista, "Deus creat mala", est assertio ambigua habens aliquem sensum catholicum, scilicet istum Deus creat mala poenae. Similiter ista, "Deus non creat mala", habet sensum catholicum, scilicet istum Deus non creat mala culpae.	Master Isidore seems to bring forward an obvious example of this, as we find in 24, q. 3, c. Quidam autem [col.1001], when he clearly implies that each of [the assertions] "God creates evil", "God does not create evil" has been condemned as a heresy. And thus he regards those who assert each as manifest heretics, saying: "The Coliciani, named after a certain Colicius, say that God does not create evil, against the words 'I the Lord who creates evil'. The Floriani, from Florianus, say on the other hand that God created evil, against the words 'God made everything good'." From these words we gather that each of those [assertions] "God creates evil", "God does not create evil" has been explicitly condemned as a heresy. And yet the [assertion] "God creates evil" is ambiguous and has a catholic signification, namely that God creates the evil of punishment; similarly that [assertion] "God does not create evil" has a catholic signification, namely that God does not create the evil of fault.
Discipulus Secundum ista videtur quod isti concedunt quod aliquis absque heretica pravitate potest tenere Deum creare mala culpae, quia dicunt quod aliquis potest tenere assertionem ambiguam damnatam in eo sensu in quo est damnata absque haeretica pravitate.	Disciple According to this they seem to grant that someone can without heretical wickedness hold that God creates the evil of fault, because they say that someone can without heretical wickedness hold, in that signification in which it was condemned, an ambiguous assertion that has been condemned.
Magister Male arguis secundum istos, quia arguis a particulari vel indifinita aequipollente particulari ad singularem determinatam. Non enim dicunt quod semper potest quis tenere assertionem ambiguam damnatam in eo sensu in quo est damnata absque haeretica pravitate, sed quandoque, quia, ut dicunt, si tenetur quis scire sensum in quo est damnata assertio esse haereticum, si tenet talem assertionem in tali sensu, statim est haereticus iudicandus; si vero non tenetur hoc scire, non est haereticus reputandus.	Master They say that you argue badly because you are arguing from a particular, or an indefinite equivalent to a particular, to a determinate singular. For they do not say that it is always possible for someone without heretical wickedness to hold, in that signification in which it was condemned, an ambiguous assertion that has been condemned, but sometimes, because, they say, if someone is bound to know that the signification in which an assertion has been condemned is heretical and holds the assertion with that signification, he should be judged immediately to be a heretic; if he is not bound to know this, on the other hand, he should not be regarded as a heretic.
Discipulus Quomodo est ergo procedendum circa talem?	Disciple How, therefore, should action be taken about such a person?
Magister Responsum est supra, quia, ut dicunt, non sufficit ostendere tali quod assertio ambigua est damnata, sed etiam oportet sibi aperte ostendere quod talis sensus catholicae veritati repugnat.	Master This has been answered above because, they say, it is not enough to show to such a person that the ambiguous assertion has been condemned but it is necessary also to show him clearly that such a signification is contrary to catholic truth.
Capitulum 23	Chapter 23
Discipulus Ut cerno, secundum istos, episcopi et inquisitores in vanum errantes corripiunt nisi probaverint eos patenter doctrinae apostolicae adversari. Sed adhuc ignoro quid putant de papa, an scilicet ad simplicem correctionem papae absque tali correctione quam vocant legitimam teneantur nescienter errantes suas haereses revocare.	Disciple According to these people, as I understand it, bishops and inquisitors correct in vain those who err unless they prove that they are clearly opposed to apostolic teaching. But I still do not know what they think about the pope, whether, that is, those who err unknowingly are bound to retract their heresies as the result of simple correction by the pope, without the sort of correction they call legitimate.
Magister Dicunt quod non: tum quia papa saepe est illiteratus et simplex; tum quia papa de fide potest errare contra fidem; tum quia papa de fide tenetur reddere rationem, quia, sicut notat glossa Extra, De rescriptis, c. Si quando, "de omnibus ratio reddi debet si potest"; tum quia in causa fidei a papa licet appellare; tum quia fides nostra non consistit in sapientia papae. Nullus enim in his quae fidei sunt tenetur credere papae nisi per regulam fidei dicti sui rationem ostendat.	[See Significant Variants, para. 18.] Master They say, "no". This is because (i) the pope is often unlearned and simple, because (ii) in a matter of faith the pope can err against the faith, because (iii) the pope is bound to offer a reason for faith -- since, as the gloss on Extra, De rescriptis, c. Si quando [col.35] notes, "a reason ought to be offered for everything if it can be" -- because (iv) in a case concerning the faith it is licit to appeal from the pope, and because (v) our faith does not rest on the wisdom of the pope. For no one is bound to believe the pope in matters of faith unless the latter shows a reason for his statement by the rule of faith.
Discipulus Istud videtur consuetudini ecclesiae repugnare. Nam papa aliquando damnat haereses cuius damnationis suae nullam reddit rationem. Concilia etiam generalia symbola condiderunt articulos distinguentia quos tamen per regulam fidei minime probant. Ergo non videtur quod papa semper teneatur reddere rationem damnationis haereticae pravitatis.	Disciple That seems to be contrary to the custom of the church. For the pope sometimes condemns heresies without offering any reason for his condemnation; general councils too have composed creeds, making a distinction among articles which however they do not prove by the rule of faith. It does not seem, therefore, that the pope would always be bound to offer a reason for his condemnation of heretical wickedness.
Magister Ad ista respondent quod nunquam invenitur quod papa aliquam haeresim damnaverit et damnationis suae non reddiderit rationem, sed aliquando extra damnationem, aliquando in eadem damnatione. Sic enim fecit Alexander 3, sicut patet Extra, De haereticis, c. Cum Christus, sicut etiam Innocentius 3 Extra, De summa trinitate et fide, c. Damnamus. Si autem non reddit rationem in damnatione ipsa, debet in aliis assertionibus suis eiusdem damnationis suae reddere rationem.	Master They reply to these points that the pope has never been found to have condemned some heresy and not offered a reason for his condemnation; but sometimes this [is found] outside the condemnation, sometimes in the condemnation itself. For this is what Alexander III did, as is clear from Extra, De haereticis, c. Cum Christus [col.779], as also did Innocent III, Extra, De summma trinitate et fide c. Damnamus [col.6]. If he does not offer a reason in the condemnation itself, however, he ought to offer a reason for that condemnation in other assertions of his.
De generalibus conciliis condentibus symbola respondetur quod licet in ipsis symbolis non probent per regulam fidei articulos simbolorum, tamen extra ipsa simbola manifeste probantur quia vel condentes symbola ipsos articulos probant vel probationes approbant aliorum tacite vel expresse.	To the question of general councils composing creeds, the response is that although in the creeds themselves they may not prove the articles of the creeds by the rule of faith, they are nonetheless clearly proved outside those creeds because either those who compose the creeds prove the articles or they approve tacitly or expressly the proofs of others.
Discipulus Quid si aliquis defenderet coram papa haeresim quam diceret se putare consonam esse fidei catholicae?	Disciple What if someone were to defend a heresy before the pope and were to say that he thinks that it is consistent with catholic faith?
Magister Dicunt quod si millesies defenderet haeresim nescienter cum protestatione expressa vel tacita quod paratus est corrigi cum cognoverit opinionem suam catholicae fidei obviare etiam coram papa non esset haereticus iudicandus nisi per alia legitima documenta haereticus probaretur quia, sicut prima vice licet sibi nescienter tali modo opinionem erroneam defendere, ita licet secunda vice et tertia et semper quousque fuerit sibi probatum aperte quod sua opinio est inter haereses computanda.	Master They say that if he were to defend unknowingly a heresy a thousand times, even before the pope, with an explicit or tacit declaration that he is ready to be corrected when he learns that his opinion conflicts with catholic faith, he should not be judged a heretic unless he were proved to be a heretic by other legitimate proofs because, just as it is licit for him to defend an erroneous opinion unknowingly in this way the first time, so it is licit a second time and a third, and always until it has been clearly proved to him that his opinion should be reckoned among the heresies.
Discipulus Forte dicet taliter opinionem suam defendens, etiam postquam opinio sua fuerit probata haeretica, quod non est sibi ostensum quod sua opinio fidei obviat orthodoxae, et ita nunquam posset convinci.	Disciple Perhaps someone defending his opinion in this way will say, even after his opinion has been proved heretical, that it has not been shown to him that his opinion conflicts with orthodox faith, and so he could never be convicted.
Magister Non sufficit sibi negare opinionem suam esse probatam haereticam, sed cogetur stare iudicio peritorum; qui, si reputaverint sufficienter esse sibi probatum quod opinio sua est haeretica, tenetur eam revocare, alioquin inter pertinaces et haereticos est censendus.	Master It is not enough for him to deny that his opinion has been proved heretical, but he will be forced to stand by the judgement of the knowledgable. If they think that it has been sufficiently proved to him that his opinion is heretical, he is bound to retract it; otherwise he should be considered among the pertinacious and the heretics.
Discipulus Quid si errant periti et omnes theologiae magistri una cum papa?	Disciple What if the knowledgable and all the masters of theology, together with the pope, err?
Magister De facto damnabunt innocentem. Poterit tamen secundum iura causam suam per remedium appellationis sublevare. Si autem appellationi suae legitimae non defertur, non restat ei nisi ut divinae gratiae se committat et non timeat de hominum societate iudicio iniquo deleri quem de libro viventium conscientia non delet iniqua.	Master They will de facto condemn an innocent person. Nevertheless, according to the laws he will be able to assist his cause by the remedy of appeal. If his legitimate appeal is not granted, however, nothing remains for him but to commit himself to divine grace and not to be afraid of being eliminated from human society by an iniquitous judgement, because a bad conscience does not blot him out of the book of the living.
Discipulus Quid si in scriptis haeresim manifestam defendit?	Disciple What if he defends an obvious heresy in writing?
Magister Dicunt quod propter hoc nec pertinax nec haereticus est reputandus, quia quantum ad hoc non refert an verbo vel scripto opinionem erroneam teneat vel defendat. Nam beatus Cyprianus opinionem haereticam in scriptis reliquit, quia tamen eam pertinaciter non defendit non fuit haereticus iudicandus. Sic etiam abbas Ioachim opinionem haereticam scripsit, sicut testatur Innocentius 3, Extra, De summa trinitate et fide catholica, c. Damnamus, et tamen non fuit haereticus iudicandus, glossa super dicto c. Damnamus dicente de eodem Ioachim, "quia paratus fuit corrigi et se correxit, ut sequitur non debet dici haereticus, licet quandoque errasset in fide." Sic etiam Petrus Iohannes, licet opiniones suae quas in scriptis reliquit fuerint tanquam haereticae condemnatae, ipse tamen nec pertinax nec haereticus fuit iudicatus. Sic etiam beatus Hieronimus, licet opiniones erroneas scripserit quas etiam non legitur revocasse, non est haereticus reputatus.	Master They say that he is not to be regarded as pertinacious or a heretic on this account, because with respect to this it does not matter whether he holds or defends an erroneous opinion in speech or in writing. For blessed Cyprian has left behind an heretical opinion in his writings, yet because he did not defend it pertinaciously he should not have been judged a heretic. In the same way the abbot Joachim also wrote an heretical opinion, as Innocent III testifies in Extra, De summa trinitate et fide c. Damnamus [col.6], yet he should not have been judged a heretic, as the gloss on that chapter Damnamus says about Joachim, "that he was ready to be corrected and did correct himself, so that it follows that he ought not be called a heretic, though at some time he erred in faith." [s. v. corrigenda; col.14] So too, although the opinions which Peter John [Olivi] left in his writings have been condemned as heretical, he was, nevertheless, not judged to be either pertinacious or a heretic. In the same way, although blessed Jerome also wrote heretical opinions which also we do not read of his revoking, he was not regarded as a heretic.
Discipulus Secundum illa videtur quod nullus post mortem posset de haeresi accusari, cuius tamen contrarium asserunt sacri canones manifeste.	Disciple It seems from this that no one could be accused of heresy after his death; the sacred canons, however, openly assert the opposite of this.
Magister Respondetur quod propter hoc solummodo quod quis haeresim tenuerit verbo vel scripto non esset post mortem de haeresi accusandus de haeresi. Sed si quocumque modo potest probari quod haeresim verbo vel scripto tenuerit pertinaciter, post mortem poterit de haeresi accusari, quia si per alium modum quam per verba vel scripta solam haeresim exprimentia, puta per verba vel scripta vel facta declarantia pertinaciam, valuerit ostendi pertinax fuisse, est damnandus.	Master The reply to this is that no one should be accused of heresy after his death solely because he held a heresy in speech or writing. But if it can be proved in any way at all that he pertinaciously held a heresy in speech or writing he can be accused of heresy after his death, because if he could be shown to have been pertinacious in some other way than by speeches or writings expressing only a heresy -- by speeches, writings or deeds expressing pertinacity, for instance -- he should be condemned.
Discipulus De hoc ponas exemplum ut quod dicitur magis intelligam?	Disciple Would you give an example of this so that I may understand better what is said?
Magister Si de aliquo post mortem probatum extiterit quod verbo vel scripto tenuerit duas personas fuisse in Christo non est propter hoc solummodo haereticus reputandus, sed per simplicitatem vel ignorantiam poterit excusari. Si autem probatum fuerit quod sciverit dictam assertionem esse damnatam et quod postea eam verbo vel scripto tenuerit, est de pertinacia et pravitate haeretica condemnandus.	Master If it is proved of someone after his death that he held in speech or writing that there were two persons in Christ he should not be regarded as a heretic solely on account of this, but he can be excused by simplicity or ignorance. If it is proved, however, that he knew that that assertion was condemned and that afterwards he held it in speech or writing he should be condemned for pertinacity and heretical wickedness.
Discipulus Ut conicio, secundum istos eodem modo contra vivum et mortuum de haeresi accusatum oportet procedere, inquisitoribus tamen sufficit quod tantummodo probetur aliquem mortuum verbo vel scripto haeresim tenuisse.	Disciple As I surmise, it is necessary, according to these people, to proceed in the same way against the living and the dead accused of heresy, yet it is enough for inquisitors that it be proved only that someone dead held a heresy in speech or writing.
Magister De inquisitoribus dicunt isti quod saepe inique procedunt et quod sunt ecclesiae Dei valde nocivi tanquam lucris temporalibus totaliter inhiantes.	Master They say that inquisitors often proceed wickedly and that they are very harmful to the church of God, by concentrating entirely on their temporal gains.
Capitulum 24	Chapter 24
Discipulus Dicas nunc de correcto a socio vel alio qui super ipsum nullam iurisdictionem penitus noscitur obtinere?	Disciple Would you speak now about someone corrected by a companion or another person who is known to hold no jurisdiction over him at all?
Magister Dicunt praedicti quod correctus legitime de haeresi a socio vel a subdito vel a quocunque alio tenetur statim absque mora haeresim suam dimittere, ita quod, si convincatur post talem correctionem eandem haeresim verbo vel scripto tenere aut veram quomodolibet reputare, est pertinax reputandus.	Master These people say that someone legitimately corrected of heresy by a companion, a subject or anyone else at all is bound to put aside his heresy immediately and without delay, so that if, after this correction, he is convicted of holding that same heresy in speech or writing or of thinking in any way that it is true he should be regarded as pertinacious.
Hoc probant primo sic. Fides nostra non est in sapientia hominum secundum Apostolum 1 ad Corinthios 2. Ergo ad hoc quod quis haeresim suam teneatur dimittere non refert a quo homine sibi per regulam fidei ostendatur quod opinio sua fidei obviat orthodoxae; sed si alicui a prelato suo patenter ostenditur quod opinio sua fidei obviat orthodoxae eam statim tenetur dimittere, alioquin pertinax est censendus. Ergo tenetur ad idem a quocunque sibi hoc extiterit demonstratum.	They prove this first as follows. Our faith does not rest on the wisdom of men, according to the apostle in 1 Corinthians 2[:5]. With respect to anyone being bound to put aside his heresy, therefore, it does not matter by what person it may be shown to him by the rule of faith that his opinion conflicts with orthodox faith; but if it is clearly shown to anyone by his prelate that his opinion conflicts with orthodox faith he is bound to put it aside immediately, or else he should be considered pertinacious. He is bound to act the same, therefore, whoever demonstrates it to him.
Secundo sic. Qui non est paratus corrigi si errat est pertinax. Sed ille qui correctus legitime a quocunque, hoc est cui patenter est ostensum quod opinio sua fidei obviat orthodoxae, non statim opinionem suam dimittit non est paratus corrigi. Ergo talis est pertinax et haereticus iudicandus.	[It is proved] secondly as follows. He who is not ready to be corrected if he errs is pertinacious; but that person who has been corrected legitimately by anyone at all -- that is, if it has been clearly shown to him that his opinion conflicts with orthodox faith -- and does not put aside his opinion immediately is not ready to be corrected; that person, therefore, should be judged pertinacious and a heretic.
Tertio sic. Non minus tenetur quis errorem dimittere si veritatem invenerit per instructionem cuiuscunque alterius quam si veritatem invenerit per se ipsum. Qui autem per seipsum invenerit veritatem statim tenetur errorem dimittere, exemplo venerabilis Anselmi libro 1 Cur Deus homo c. 18 dicentis, "Certus sum si quid dico quod Sacrae Scripturae absque dubio contradicat quod falsum est, nec illud tenere volo si cognovero." Ergo si veritatem invenerit consonam Sacrae Scripturae per informationem cuiuscunque alterius, sive socii sive subditi, errorem contrarium debet absque mora dimittere.	[It is proved] thirdly in this way. No one is less bound to put aside his error if he has discovered the truth by the teaching of anyone else at all than if he has discovered it by himself. He who has discovered the truth by himself, however, is bound to put aside his error immediately, on the example of venerable Anselm, who says in Cur deus homo book 1 ch. 18, "I am certain, if anything I say contradicts sacred scripture without doubt, that it is false and I do not want to hold it once I have learnt this." If he has discovered a truth consistent with sacred scripture, therefore, through the teaching of any other person at all, whether a companion or a subject, he ought to put aside without delay an error opposed to it.
Discipulus Secundum ista nulla videtur differentia inter correctum a praelato et ab alio non praelato, etiam subdito.	Disciple There seems to be no difference, according to that, between someone corrected by his prelate or by someone else not his prelate, even by his subject.
Magister Respondetur quod quantum ad hoc quod error dimittatur non est differentia, sed quantum ad alia multa magna differentia reperitur. Praelatus enim et iurisdictionem habens super alium potest ipsum citare ad rationem ponere, et ut suam informationem audiat coartare, et ad publicam revocationem compellere, ipsumque, si in praedictis et aliis ad suum pertinentibus officium inventus fuerit contumax et rebellis, animadversione condigna punire. Qui autem super errantem iurisdictionem non optinet, in eum praedicta non poterit exercere.	Master The reply is that there is no difference with respect to the fact that the error should be put aside, but with respect to many other things a great difference is found. For a prelate and someone having jurisdiction over another can call him to give an account, compel him to listen to his teaching, force him to recant publicly and, if he has been found to be contumacious and rebellious in these matters and others pertaining to his office, can punish him with a wholly appropriate punishment. He who does not hold jurisdiction over one erring, however, can not exercise any of these over him.
Discipulus Ponunt aliquam differentiam inter papam corripientem et alios praelatos corripientes errantes?	Student Do they lay down any difference between the pope and other prelates correcting those who err?
Magister Quantum ad haereses damnatas explicite conformiter dicunt de papa et aliis praelatis, sed quantum ad haereses damnatas dumtaxat implicite magna differentia invenitur, quia super tenentes haereses damnatas solummodo implicite praelati inferiores summo pontifice nullam iurisdictionem habere noscuntur ut eos punire possint vel ad aliquid coartare. Sed si in suis conscientiis eos putaverint pertinaces debent eos apostolico accusare vel denunciare. Apostolicus autem eos potest examinare et, si pertinaces invenerit, condemnare.	Master They say similar things about the pope and other prelates with respect to explicitly condemned heresies, but a great difference is found with respect to heresies condemned only implicitly, because over those holding heresies condemned only implicitly prelates inferior to the highest pontiff are known to have no jurisdiction that enables them to punish them or compel them to do anything. But if in their own conscience they think that they are pertinacious they ought to accuse or denounce them before the pope. The pope, however, can examine them and condemn them if he finds them pertinacious.