William of Ockham, Dialogus,
part 1, book 4, chapters 13-19

 

Capitulum 13	Chapter 13
Discipulus Si est alius modus errantem contra fidem de pertinacia convincendi sum paratus audire.	Disciple If there is another way of convicting of pertinacity someone erring against the faith I am ready to listen to it.
Magister Dicunt nonnulli quod ille statim est pertinax et haereticus iudicandus de quo est violenta praesumptio quod negat aliquam assertionem quam scit in Scriptura Divina vel determinatione ecclesiae contineri, puta si probari potest quod prius assertionem quam negat legerit cum intellectu in Scriptura Divina vel determinatione ecclesiae, aut probari potest quod prius eandem quam negat assertionem ex intentione docuerat vel etiam asseruerat publice vel occulte. De tali enim, si non est probabile quod oblitus fuerit illius quod prius didicerat, est praesumptio violenta quod scienter negat catholicam veritatem. Et per consequens pertinax et haereticus est censendus.	Master Some say [fifth way] that he should be judged immediately as pertinacious and a heretic of whom there is a violent presumption that he denies some assertion which he knows is contained in divine scripture or in a determination of the church. If it can be proved, for example, that he has previously read and understood in divine scripture or a determination of the church the assertion he denies, or if it can be proved that previously he had purposefully taught or, even, publicly or secretly affirmed the assertion he denies. For if it is not probable that such a person has forgotten what he had previously learnt there is a violent presumption that he knowingly denies catholic truth. And he should, as a consequence, be considered pertinacious and a heretic.
Discipulus De isto modo ponas exemplum?	Disciple Would you offer an example of that way [of convicting]?
Magister Sunt nonnulli qui de multis modernis ponunt exemplum, de omnibus videlicet illis qui primo docuerunt Christum et apostolos nullius rei proprietatem habuisse, dicentes quod haec veritas ex Scriptura Divina et determinatione ecclesiae manifeste accipitur, et postea veritatem negaverunt eandem. Cum non sit probabile quod Scripturae Divinae et eiusdem determinationis ecclesiae sint obliti propter quod dicunt illos pertinaces et haereticos esse censendos.	Master There are some who put forward an example concerning many moderns, namely of all those who at first taught that Christ and the apostles did not have ownership of anything, saying that this truth is clearly taken from divine scripture and a determination of the church, and later denied that same truth. Since it is not probable that they have forgotten divine scripture and that determination of the church, they say that those people should for that reason be considered pertinacious and heretics.
Discipulus Istud exemplum tangit doctrinam domini Iohannis papae 22 de qua alias tecum exquisite tractabo. Ideo, isto exemplo dimisso, proba si potes quod negantes catholicam veritatem quam prius reputaverunt catholicam statim absque maiori examinatione pertinaces et haeretici sunt censendi.	Disciple That example touches on the teaching of the lord Pope John XXII which I will carefully discuss with you on another occasion. Putting that example aside, therefore, prove, if you can, that those who deny a catholic truth which they had previously considered catholic should be considered pertinacious and heretics immediately and without more questioning.
Magister Hoc probatur primo sic: qui scienter negat catholicam veritatem est pertinax et haereticus reputandus; sed talis scienter negat catholicam veritatem, non enim potest se per ignorantiam excusare cum prius didicerit eandem veritatem ad fidem catholicam pertinere et non est oblitus eorum quae didicit; ergo ex quo negat veritatem quam prius didicerat et tenuerat est pertinax et haereticus reputandus.	Master This is proved firstly, as follows. He who knowingly denies a catholic truth should be regarded as pertinacious and a heretic; but such a person does knowingly deny catholic truth - for he can not excuse himself by ignorance since he has previously learnt that that truth pertains to catholic faith and has not forgotten the things that he learnt; since he denies a truth that he had previously learnt and held, therefore, he should be regarded as pertinacious and a heretic.
Secundo sic: omnis apostata a catholica veritate est pertinax et haereticus reputandus quia talis est apostata a fide; apostata autem a fide inter haereticos computatur; sed negans catholicam veritatem quam prius catholicam reputavit est apostata a catholica veritate, quia talis abicit catholicam veritatem; ergo est inter pertinaces et hereticos computandus.	[See Significant Variants, para. 16.] [It is proved] secondly as follows. Every apostate from catholic truth should be regarded as pertinacious and a heretic because he is an apostate from the faith and an apostate from the faith is reckoned among the heretics; but he who denies a catholic truth which he had previously regarded as catholic is an apostate from catholic truth because he casts aside catholic truth; he should be reckoned, therefore, among the pertinacious and the heretics.
Tertio sic: christianus infidelis inter pertinaces et haereticos computatur; sed christianus qui negat catholicam veritatem quam prius reputavit catholicam est infidelis; ergo est pertinax et haereticus iudicandus. Maior videtur certa. Minor probatur, quia qui negat catholicam veritatem quam prius agnovit esse catholicam est peior infideli qui nunquam novit catholicam veritatem, teste Innocentio 3, qui, ut habetur Extra, De apostatis, c. Quidam, ait, "Cum minus malum existat viam Domini non agnoscere quam post agnitam retroire." Hinc beatus Petrus canonica sua 2 c. 2 ait, "Melius enim erat eis non cognoscere viam iustitiae quam post agnitionem retrorsum converti." Veritas autem catholica est via iustitiae. Ergo maius malum est post agnitam catholicam veritatem retroire quam nunquam veritatem catholicam agnovisse. Sed hoc non est maius malum nisi ratione deterioris infidelitatis. Ergo qui negat veritatem catholicam quam prius novit esse catholicam est infidelis et per consequens pertinax et haereticus est censendus.	[It is proved] thirdly as follows. A faithless christian is reckoned among the pertinacious and the heretics; but a christian who denies a catholic truth that he had previously regarded as catholic is faithless; he should be judged, therefore, as pertinacious and a heretic. The major [premise] seems certain. The minor is proved: he who denies a catholic truth which he previously knew to be catholic is worse than a faithless person who has never known catholic truth -- Innocent III testifies to this when he says, as we find in Extra, De apostatis, c. Quidam [col. 791], "It is a lesser evil not to know the way of the Lord than to turn back after it has been known." Hence blessed Peter says in the second chapter of his second letter [2 Peter 2:21]: "For it had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it to turn back." Now catholic truth is the way of justice and so it is a greater evil to go back after having known catholic truth than never to have known it. But this is only a greater evil by reason of worse faithlessness. He who denies a catholic truth that he previously knew to be catholic, therefore, is faithless and as a consequence should be considered pertinacious and a heretic.
Discipulus Videtur quod istae rationes non concludunt, tum quia potest quis negare veritatem catholicam quam prius putavit catholicam quamvis non agnoverit eam esse catholicam -- rationes autem praedictae videntur procedere de eo qui negat veritatem catholicam quam non solum putavit sed etiam agnovit esse catholicam -- tum quia talis potest esse paratus corrigi, immo potest se offerre paratum corrigi. Ergo licet erret non est inter haereticos computandus.	Disciple Those arguments do not seem to be conclusive. First, because someone can deny a catholic truth that he previously thought to be catholic, although he did not know that it is catholic; the foregoing arguments, however, seem to be valid about someone who denies a catholic truth which he not only thought but also knew to be catholic. Second, because such a person can be ready to be corrected, or rather he can present himself as ready to be corrected; although he errs, therefore, he should not be reckoned among the heretics.
Magister Istae duae instantiae per idem videntur excludi, per hoc scilicet quod non est tali in hoc casu credendum, sive dicat quod licet prius putaverit non tamen agnovit veritatem quam modo negat esse catholicam, sive dicat se paratum corrigi. Quod enim in primo dicto non sit sibi credendum ostenditur quia qui invenitur sibi ipsi contrarius non est credendum, saltem secundo dicto ipsius, teste Innocentio 3, qui, ut habetur Extra, De probationibus, c. Per tuas, ait, "Cum nimis indignum sit iuxta legitimas sanctiones ut, quod sua quisque voce dilucide protestatus est, in eundem casum proprio valeat testimonio infirmare." Et glossa Extra, De praesumptionibus, super c. Literas notat dicens, "Hoc est notabile quod semper standum est primo dicto alicuius si postea contrarium dicat etiam in alio iudicio, supra De testibus, Cum in tua et etiam extra iudicium, supra De probationibus, Per tuas." Ex his aliisque quampluribus patet quod qui invenitur sibi ipsi contrarius non est credendum secundo dicto ipsius. Sed qui negat catholicam veritatem quam prius putavit catholicam invenitur sibi ipsi contrarius quia dum putavit dictam veritatem esse catholicam dixit vel facto aut verbo innuit se agnoscere illam veritatem esse catholicam. Ergo si postea dicit se non agnovisse dictam veritatem esse catholicam non est sibi credendum. Et per consequens per hoc excusari non potest quin sit modo pertinax et haereticus reputandus.	Master Those two objections both seem to be excluded by the fact that in this situation such a person should not be believed, either when he says that even though he previously thought the truth that he now denies is catholic yet he did not know this, or when he says that he is ready to be corrected. That he should not be believed in saying the first of these is shown because he who is found to contradict himself should not be believed, at least with respect to the second thing he says. Innocent III testifies to this when he says, as we find in Extra, De probationibus, c. Per tuas [col. 313], "That it would be quite intolerable according to lawful decrees that what anyone has clearly proclaimed in his own voice he can in the same case invalidate by his own testimony." And the gloss on [the word purgavit in] the chapter Literas in Extra, De presumptionibus [col. 794] says, "It is noteworthy that we should always stand by the first saying of someone if he later says the opposite, even in another court, above [Extra], De testibus, Cum in tua, and also outside court, above Extra, De probationibus, Per tuas." [See Significant Variants, para. 17.] It is clear from these and very many others that what is said second by someone who is found to contradict himself should not be believed. But he who denies a catholic truth which he previously thought to be catholic is found to contradict himself because while he thought that the said truth is catholic he said or implied by deed or word that he knew that that truth is catholic. If he later says, therefore, that he did not know that the said truth is catholic he should not be believed and so he can not be excused in this way but should be now regarded as pertinacious and a heretic.
Quod autem non sit sibi credendum si dicat se paratum corrigi ostenditur sic. Nulli erranti est credendum quod paratus sit corrigi nisi quando praesumitur ignoranter a veritate catholica deviare. Sed iste non praesumitur ignoranter a veritate quae est catholica deviare, sed praesumendum est de ipso quod a fundamento propter quod assertioni priori adhaesit omnino recessit. Fundamentum autem propter quod tali assertioni adhaesit est Sacra Scriptura vel doctrina ecclesiae. Ergo praesumendum est quod nunc reputat Scripturam Sacram vel doctrinam ecclesiae esse falsam, sicut illi qui primo propter doctrinam traditam in decretali Nicolai 3 quae incipit Exiit qui seminat putaverunt et tenuerunt ac docuerunt quod Christus et apostoli omnem proprietatem temporalium abdicarunt et modo tenent assertionem contrariam, reputantes doctrinam traditam in decretali praedicta Exiit esse falsam. Et si dicerent se putare eandem doctrinam esse veram non esset eis credendum quia sibi ipsis contrarii probarentur. Praesumendum est igitur quod negans catholicam veritatem quam primo asseruit esse catholicam nunc reputat Divinam Scripturam vel doctrinam ecclesiae esse falsam. Tali autem non est credendum quantumcunque dicat se paratum corrigi. Ergo et neganti veritatem catholicam quam primo habuit pro catholica non est credendum quamvis dicat se paratum corrigi, et per consequens inter pertinaces et haereticos est censendus. Et ita stant insolutae rationes priores.	Moreover that he should not be believed if he says that he is ready to be corrected is shown as follows. Of no one erring should it be believed that he is ready to be corrected unless it is presumed that he departs ignorantly from catholic truth; but that person is not presumed to depart ignorantly from truth which is catholic; rather it should be presumed of him that he has entirely abandoned the foundation on the basis of which he clung to the earlier assertion; now the foundation on the basis of which he clung to that assertion is either sacred scripture or the teaching of the church. It should be presumed, therefore, that he now regards sacred scripture or the teaching of the church as false, just like those who at first thought, held and taught, on the basis of the teaching passed down in the decretal of Nicholas III which begins Exiit qui seminat, that Christ and the apostles renounced all ownership of temporal goods, and now hold the contrary assertion, regarding the teaching handed down in that decretal Exiit as false. And if they were to say that they think that that teaching is true they should not be believed because they would be proved to be contradicting themselves. It should be presumed, therefore, that one denying a catholic truth which he at first asserted to be catholic now regards divine scripture or the teaching of the church as false. Such a person, however, should not be believed however much he says that he is ready to be corrected; and one denying that a truth is catholic which he at first held to be catholic, therefore, also should not be believed even if he says that he is ready to be corrected; and he should be considered, as a consequence, among the pertinacious and the heretics. And so the earlier arguments stand untouched.
Discipulus Ista tantummodo probant quod talis praesumitur pertinax et haereticus. Propter praesumptionem autem non est aliquis damnandus nec graviter puniendus.	Disciple They prove only that such a person is presumed to be pertinacious and a heretic; on account of a presumption, however, no one should be condemned or severely punished.
Magister Saepe propter solam praesumptionem violentam sententia etiam diffinitiva profertur. Unde et Salomon, ut legitur 3 Regum 3, contendentibus duabus mulieribus pro puero coram eo ex sola praesumptione diffinitivam dedit sententiam. Sic dicunt quidam in proposito quod ex praesumptione violenta negans veritatem catholicam quam prius asserverat esse catholicam est damnandus et tanquam haereticus puniendus.	Master A sentence, even a definitive sentence, is often pronounced solely on the basis of a violent presumption. And thus Solomon, as we read in 3 Kings 3:[16-27], gave a definitive sentence on the basis of a presumption alone when two women were arguing before him over a child. So some people say in the present case that one denying a catholic truth which he had previously affirmed as catholic should, on the basis of a violent presumption, be condemned and punished as a heretic.
Capitulum 14	Chapter 14
Discipulus Ad alios modos convincendi errantes de pertinacia et haeretica pravitate procede.	Disciple Go on to other ways of convicting of pertinacity and heretical wickedness those erring.
Magister Alius modus de pertinacia convincendi dicitur esse cum quis scienter negat doctrinam sanctorum. Quidam enim affirmant quod talis est statim pertinax et haereticus reputandus, aliis dicentibus quod talis quamvis corrigi nolit non est pertinax nec haereticus iudicandus.	Master Another [sixth] way of convicting of pertinacity is said to be when someone knowingly denies the teaching of the saints. For some people assert that such a person should be regarded immediately as pertinacious and a heretic, while others say that even if he refuses to be corrected such a person should not be judged as pertinacious and a heretic.
Discipulus Haec difficultas dependet ex illa quam supra tractavimus, an scilicet tenere assertiones sanctorum sit necessarium ad salutem. Ideo circa eam hic nolo insistere, sed ad alium modum de pertinacia quempiam convincendi festina.	Disciple This difficulty depends on the [question] which we discussed above, namely, whether it is necessary to salvation to hold to the assertions of the saints. I do not want you to follow that up here, therefore, but hurry on to another way of convicting someone of pertinacity.
Failure to accept lawful correction
Capitulum 15	Chapter 15
Magister Ille de pertinacia convincitur manifeste qui correctus legitime se non corrigit nec emendat, suam videlicet haeresim revocando. Hoc ex verbis Augustini superius allegatis quae ponuntur 24, q. 3, c. Qui in ecclesia colligitur evidenter. Quod etiam talis sit pertinax iudicandus probatur aperte quia qui non est paratus corrigi debet pertinax reputari; qui autem correctus legitime haeresim suam non revocat non est paratus corrigi; ergo talis est pertinax reputandus.	Master He is openly convicted of pertinacity [seventh way] who does not correct and amend himself once he has been corrected lawfully, namely by retracting his heresy. This is clearly gathered from the words of Augustine cited above and quoted in 24. q. 3. c. Qui in ecclesia [col.998]. That such a person should also be judged pertinacious is clearly proved because he who is not ready to be corrected should be regarded as pertinacious; he who does not retract his heresy once he has been legitimately corrected, however, is not ready to be corrected; such a person should be regarded, therefore, as pertinacious.
Discipulus Quia istum modum de pertinacia convincendi saepe audivi et alii sunt mihi omnino novi, cupio istum modum exquisitius pertractari. Duo autem peto ut circa hunc modum discutias, ad quem videlicet spectat errantem corripere, et qualis debet esse ista correctio quae est sufficiens et legitima reputanda.	Disciple Because I have often heard about that way of convicting of pertinacity and the others are quite new to me I want that way investigated more carefully. I ask you to discuss two [questions] about this way, namely to whom does it belong to correct someone erring and what kind of correction should it be that is to be regarded as sufficient and legitimate.
Magister Videndum primo est de correctione, secundo de corripiente.	Master We should see about correction first and secondly about the one correcting.
Discipulus Tene ordinem in procedendo quem vis.	Disciple Proceed in whatever order you wish.
Magister Quantum ad correctionem dicitur quod illa sola correctio sufficiens est censenda et legitima qua aperte erranti ostenditur quod assertio sua catholicae obviat veritati ita quod iudicio intelligentium nulla possit tergiversatione negare quin sibi sufficienter et aperte ostensum quod error suus catholicae veritati repugnat. Verbi gratia si quis ex ignorantia evangelii textum ignorans diceret, sicut et quidam in Avinione publice praedicavit, ut fertur, quod milites fregerunt crura Christi, et sibi per textum evangelii Iohannis 19, (ubi sic legitur, "Venerunt ergo milites et primi quidem fregerunt crura et alterius qui crucifixus erat cum eo. Ad Iesum autem cum venissent ut viderunt eum iam mortuum non fregerunt eius crura.") ostenderetur contrarium, ista correctio deberet sufficiens reputari quia iudicio cuiuslibet intelligentis talis nulla posset tergiversatione negare quin esset sibi aperte probatum quod assertio sua evangelicae obviat veritati.	Master With respect to correction it is said that only that correction should be considered sufficient and legitimate by which it is openly shown to the one erring that his assertion conflicts with catholic truth, so that in the judgement of those who understand he cannot by any evasion deny that it has been sufficiently and openly shown to him that his error is contrary to catholic truth. An example would be if someone, not knowing the text of the gospel, were to say out of ignorance, as indeed someone in Avignon did publicly preach, so I have heard, that soldiers broke Christ's legs, and the contrary were shown to him from the text of the Gospel of John 19:[32-3] where we read: "The soldiers therefore came and they broke the legs of the first and then of the other that was crucified with him. But after they were come to Jesus, when they saw that he was already dead, they did not break his legs." That correction would be bound to be regarded as sufficient because on the judgement of anyone at all who understands, such a person could not deny by any evasion that it had been clearly proved to him that his assertion conflicts with the truth of the gospel.
Si quis etiam ex ignorantia dogmatizaret duas personas sicut duas substantias fuisse in Christo et sibi per textum synodi Ephesinae ostenderetur quod est haec Nestorii haeresis per eandem synodum condemnata, nulla posset tergiversatione negare quin esset sibi aperte probatum quod assertio sua est haeresis condemnata et per consequens quod veritati catholicae adversatur. Et ideo talis correctio est sufficiens et legitima reputanda.	Also if anyone were to dogmatise out of ignorance that there had been two persons as two substances in Christ and it were shown to him from the text of the Synod of Ephesus that this is the heresy of Nestorius condemned by that synod, he could not deny by any evasion that it had been openly proved to him that his assertion has been condemned as a heresy and that it is as a consequence opposed to catholic truth. And such correction, therefore, should be regarded as sufficient and legitimate.
Secundo videndum est de corripiente, de quo sic distinguatur. Quidam corripiunt increpando et poena debita puniendo, quidam charitative monendo et errorem tantummodo reprobando. Primo modo pertinet ad praelatos et iurisdictionem habentes errantes corripere. Secundo modo hoc spectat ad quemlibet christianum.	Secondly we should see about the one correcting and this is distinguished as follows. Some people correct by rebuking and punishing with the due penalty, some by warning charitably and only disapproving of an error. In the first way [correction] pertains to prelates and those having jurisdiction to correct those who err; in the second way this pertains to any christian at all.
Capitulum 16	Chapter 16
Discipulus Ex quo intelligo quae est correctio sufficiens et legitima reputanda secundum multos, et distinctionem de corripiente errantem considero. Cupio scire an omnes sentiant literati quod errans, correctus a praelato suo vel habente iurisdictionem super ipsum, teneatur suum errorem revocare, licet non fuerit sibi patenter ostensum per eundem quod error suus catholicae obviat veritati, utrum scilicet ad solam admonitionem vel increpationem praelati sui errorem suum debeat revocare.	Student From this I understand what, according to many, should be regarded as sufficient and legitimate correction, and I am thinking about a distinction concerning one who corrects someone erring. I want to know whether all the learned believe that someone erring, who has been corrected by his prelate or someone having jurisdiction over him, is bound to retract his error, even if it has not been clearly shown to him by that person that his error conflicts with catholic truth, whether, that is, he ought to retract his error solely on the advice or rebuke of his prelate.
Magister De hoc diversi diversimode opinantur. Dicunt enim nonnulli quod nullus correctus a praelato vel iurisdictionem habente tenetur errorem revocare antequam fuerit sibi patenter ostensum modo praedicto quod error suus est contrarius veritati.	Master On this question different people have different views. For some say that no one corrected by a prelate or one having authority over him is bound to retract his error before it has been clearly shown to him in the aforesaid way that his error is contrary to the truth.
Hoc probant primo sic. Illi qui in expositione Scripturae Divinae et per consequens in traditione eorum quae ad fidem pertinent orthodoxam praeferuntur praelatis et iurisdictionem habentibus non tenentur nec debent, si erraverint ignoranter, opiniones suas tanquam haereticas, licet sint in rei veritate erroneae, revocare, quamvis correcti fuerint a praelatis vel aliis, nisi eis fuerit patenter ostensum quod opiniones suae veritati obviant orthodoxae, quia qui maioris auctoritatis est in aliquo nequaquam in hoc minori subicitur.	They prove this first as follows: those who, in the exposition of divine scripture, and consequently in the passing on of those matters that pertain to orthodox faith, are preferred to prelates and those having jurisdiction, are not bound and ought not, if they have erred unknowingly, to retract their opinions as heretical -- although they may in point of fact be erroneous -- even if they have been corrected by prelates or others, unless it has been clearly shown to them that their opinions conflict with orthodox truth. This is because whoever is of greater authority in some matter is not subjected in this matter to one of lesser authority.
Ergo qui praeferuntur praelatis in expositione Scripturae Divinae non subiciuntur eis in hoc; sed doctores et tractatores Scripturae Divinae praeferuntur praelatis et iurisdictionem habentibus in expositione Scripturae Divinae, et per consequens in traditione illorum quae ad fidem pertinent orthodoxam; ergo doctores non tenentur opiniones suas, licet sint erroneae, revocare si fuerint a correcti praelatis, nisi probatum eis fuerit evidenter quod eorum opiniones obviant veritati.	Those who are preferred to prelates in the exposition of divine scripture, therefore, are not subjected to them in this; but doctors and commentators on divine scripture are preferred, in the exposition of divine scripture, and consequently in the handing down of those matters that pertain to orthodox faith, to prelates and those having jurisdiction. If doctors have been corrected by their prelates, therefore, they are not bound to renounce their opinions, even if they are erroneous, unless it has been clearly proved to them that their opinions conflict with the truth.
Maior est certa. Minor probatur primo auctoritate Gratiani in decretis (dist. 20. para. 1) qui ait, "Aliud est causis terminum imponere, aliud Scipturas Sacras diligenter exponere." Et infra, "Apparet quod Divinarum Scripturarum tractatores, et si scientia pontificibus praemineant, tamen, quia dignitatis eorum apicem non sunt adepti, in Sacrarum Scripturarum expositionibus eis praeponuntur, in causis vero diffiniendis secundum post eos locum merentur." Ex quibus patenter habetur quod doctores in expositione Scripturarum pontificibus praeferuntur.	The major [premise] is certain; the minor is proved (a) in the first place on the authority of Gratian in the decretals, dist. 20. para. 1 [really, para. 2; col.65]. He says: "It is one thing to impose an end to cases, it is another carefully to expound the holy scriptures." And further on: "It is clear that commentators on the divine scriptures, especially if they surpass pontiffs in knowledge, are put before them in expositions of the sacred scriptures, although they have not acquired their high office. They rank second to them, however, in defining cases." From these words we clearly find that doctors are preferred to pontiffs in the exposition of the scriptures.
Quod etiam ratione eiusdem Gratiani ostenditur quam ponit sub his verbis "Quo quisque maiori ratione nititur eo maioris auctoritatis eius verba esse videntur. Plurimi autem tractatorum, sicut pleniori gratia Spiritus Sancti, ita ampliori scientia aliis praecellentes rationi magis adhaesisse probantur. Unde nonnullorum pontificum constitutis Augustini, Hieronymi atque aliorum tractatorum dicta videntur esse praeferenda." His verbis ostenditur quod in his quae ad fidem pertinent doctores sunt pontificibus praeferendi, et ita, nisi correcti fuerint ab eis legitime modo praeexposito, non tenentur opiniones suas si fuerint erroneae revocare.	This is also shown (b) by an argument of the same Gratian which he expresses in these words [dist 20. para. Decretales; col.65], "Where anyone relies on stronger reason, there his words seem to be of greater authority. But many commentators, surpassing others in ampler knowledge, just as they do in fuller grace of the holy spirit, are shown to have adhered more to reason. Whence it seems that the sayings of Augustine, Jerome and other commentators should be preferred to the constitutions of some pontiffs." These words show that in matters that pertain to the faith doctors should be preferred to pontiffs and so, unless they have been legitimately corrected by them in the previously explained way, they are not bound to retract their opinions if they are erroneous.
Discipulus Ista ratio dupliciter videtur deficere.	Student That argument seems deficient in two ways.
Primo quod Gratianus loquitur de doctoribus ab ecclesia approbatis, sicut de Augustino, Hieronymo et aliis similibus, non de modernis doctoribus. Et ideo licet isti sancti sint in expositionibus Scripturarum pontificibus praeponendi, doctores tamen moderni episcopis et inquisitoribus haereticae pravitatis praeferri non debent.	First because Gratian is speaking about scholars approved by the church, like Augustine, Jerome and others like them, not about modern scholars. Therefore, although those saints should be put ahead of bishops in expositions of the scriptures, yet modern doctors ought not be preferred to bishops and inquisitors into heretical wickedness.
Secundo videtur deficere quia non sequitur: doctores non debent suas opiniones ad correptionem iurisdictionem habentis revocare nisi modo praedicto fuerunt correcti legitime, ergo alii simplices correcti a praelatis non debent revocare suos errores nisi fuerint saepe dicto modo correcti legitime.	Second it seems deficient because this [argument] does not follow: doctors ought not retract their opinions at the correction of someone having jurisdiction unless they have been legitimately corrected in the aforesaid way; others, therefore, simple people, corrected by prelates ought not retract their errors unless they have been legitimately corrected in the way often mentioned.
Magister Ad istas instantias, ut apparet ex praedictis, est facile respondere.	Master It is easy to reply to those objections, as is clear from what has been said.
Unde ad primam dicunt quod Gratianus non loquitur solummodo de doctoribus ab ecclesia approbatis sed etiam loquitur de aliis, sicut et loquitur de aliis pontificibus quam de illis qui fuerunt temporibus doctorum qui nunc sunt ab ecclesia approbati. Comparat enim in genere statum doctorum ad statum pontificum. Et ideo, sicut antiquitus doctores in traditione eorum quae spectant ad fidem fuerunt pontificibus praeferendi, ita et nunc sunt doctores modernis pontificibus praeferendi, dummodo sint doctores per scientiam excellentem et vitam laudabilem non propter munera et preces vel favores humanos ad magisterium sublimati. Unde, ut suam intentionem aperte declarent, dicunt quod Gratianus non loquitur de doctoribus prout his diebus nomen "doctoris" accipitur, sed loquitur de intelligentibus Scripturae Divinae tractatoribus, sive magistri sive discipuli appellentur. Multi enim qui vocantur discipuli in expositione Scripturae Divinae sunt praeferendi magistris, et ideo etiam pontificibus in huiusmodi praeferendi. Unde et ratio Gratiani ita concludit de eruditis modernis sicut de antiquis tractatoribus Scripturarum, quia eruditi his temporibus scientia ampliori praecellunt. Ergo in huiusmodi sunt episcopis et inquisitoribus, illiteratis et simplicibus praeferendi.	So to the first they say that Gratian is speaking not only of scholars approved by the church but also of others, just as he is also speaking of pontiffs other than those who lived in the times of the scholars who are now approved by the church. For he is comparing in general the status of doctors with the status of pontiffs. And, therefore, just as of old doctors should have been preferred to pontiffs in the handing on of those matters which pertain to the faith so also now doctors should be preferred to modern pontiffs, as long as the doctors have been raised to their teaching post by virtue of their excellent knowledge and praiseworthy life, not by virtue of gifts and requests or human favours. And thus, to make their intention quite clear, they say that Gratian is not speaking of doctors, as the word "doctor" is taken these days, but is speaking of perceptive commentators on divine scripture, whether they be called masters or students. For many who are called students should be preferred to masters in the exposition of divine scripture and should also be preferred, therefore, to pontiffs in matters of this kind. And thus Gratian's argument is as conclusive about learned moderns as about ancient commentators on the scriptures because the learned in these times excel in greater knowledge; in matters of this kind, therefore, they are to be preferred to bishops and inquisitors, to the unlearned and simple.
Ad secundam tuam instantiam dicunt quod qua ratione periti correcti a praelatis vel iurisdictionem habentibus non tenentur suas opiniones erroneas revocare nisi legitime fuerint ab eis modo memorato correcti, eadem ratione nec simplices peritorum sequaces tenentur opiniones quas a peritioribus acceperunt aliqualiter revocare nisi fuerint correcti legitime. Ex quo sequitur quod etiam alii simplices non tenentur, nisi legitime correcti, suas opiniones erroneas revocare quia omnes simplices consimili iure censeri videntur.	To your second objection they say that as with the argument by which the learned corrected by prelates or those having jurisdiction are not bound to retract their erroneous opinions unless they have been legitimately corrected by them in the aforesaid way, so by that same argument the simple followers of the knowledgeable are not bound to retract in any way opinions which they have received from those who are more knowledgeable unless they have been legitimately corrected. From this it follows that other simple people too are not bound to retract their erroneous opinions unless they have been legitimately corrected, because all simple people are seen to be assessed by an exactly similar law.
Capitulum 17	Chapter 17
Discipulus Si habes plures rationes pro conclusione praefata illas adducas?	Student If you have more arguments for the above conclusion, please adduce them.
Magister Eadem conclusio secundo sic probatur.	Master The same conclusion is proved in a second way as follows.
Qui in his quae fidei sunt non tenetur alteri fidem indubiam adhibere, non tenetur ad solam assertionem eius vel monitionem aut increpationem opinionem erroneam revocare, quia qui opinionem erroneam revocat debet assertionem contrariam firma fide tenere, et eiusdem rationis videtur esse veritati catholicae firmiter adhaerere et falsitati contrariae dissentire.	Whoever is not bound to demonstrate undoubting trust in another in matters of faith is not bound to retract an erroneous opinion solely on the assertion, advice or chiding of that person, because whoever retracts an erroneous opinion ought to hold the contrary assertion with firm faith, and it seems to be the same in essence to cling firmly to catholic truth and to dissent from an opposing falsity.
Sed subditi in his quae fidei sunt non tenentur praelatis suis fidem indubiam adhibere, tum quia tunc fides subditorum in sapientia hominum consisteret, tum quia prelati tam ex simplicitate vel ignorantia quam ex pertinacia possunt contra fidem errare. Ergo ad solam assertionem eorum vel monitionem seu increpationem non tenentur suas subditi opiniones erroneas revocare. Sed si revocare tenentur oportet quod praelati per regulam fidei eis patenter ostendant quod opiniones suae fidei obviant orthodoxae.	But in matters of faith subjects are not bound to demonstrate undoubting trust in their prelates both because then the faith of subjects would rest on the wisdom of men and because prelates can err against the faith both from simplicity or ignorance and from pertinacity. Subjects are not bound to retract their erroneous opinions, therefore, solely on their [prelates'] assertion, advice or chiding. But if they are bound to retract them, it is necessary that the prelates clearly show them by the rule of faith that their opinions conflict with orthodox faith.
Tertio sic. Ad correctionem illius qui debet esse paratus ad satisfactionem poscenti rationem de fide non tenetur quis opinionem suam erroneam revocare, nisi idem rationem reddiderit quod talis opinio est tanquam erronea revocanda, quia si aliquis absque reddita ratione teneretur opinionem suam tanquam erroneam revocare, alius non teneretur de opinione revocanda rationem reddere. Sed praelati corripientes subditos de erroribus contra fidem debent esse parati ad satisfactionem poscenti rationem de fide, et per consequens debent esse parati ad satisfactionem rationem poscenti de his revocandis quae dicunt fidei adversari, teste beato Petro qui in canonica sua prima c. 3, scribens praelatis singulariter ait, "Dominum autem Christum sanctificate in cordibus vestris, parati semper ad satisfactionem omni poscenti vos rationem de ea quae in vobis est fide." Ergo subditi non tenentur opiniones suas erroneas contra veritatem catholicam revocare propter correctionem praelatorum quamcunque nisi fuerit legitima correctio modo supradicto.	A third [argument proceeds] thus. At the correction of that person who ought to be ready to satisfy someone asking for an argument for faith, no one is bound to retract his erroneous opinion unless that same person has given a reason why such an opinion should be retracted as erroneous. For if someone were bound to retract his opinion as erroneous without a reason being given, the other would not be bound to give a reason why the opinion should be retracted. But prelates correcting their subjects for errors against faith ought to be ready to satisfy someone asking for an argument for faith, and consequently ought to be ready to satisfy someone asking for an argument for retracting those things that they say are opposed to the faith. Blessed Peter, writing individually to his prelates in chapter 3 of his first letter [1 Peter 3:15], testifies to this when he says: "But sanctify the Lord Christ in your hearts, being ready always to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope which is in you." Subjects are not bound, therefore, to retract their erroneous opinions that are against catholic truth because of any correction at all by prelates, unless the correction is legitimate in the aforesaid way.
Quarto sic: subditi non tenentur in illo casu ad correctionem praelatorum opiniones quas ignorant esse erroneas revocare, in quo casu licitum est eis a praelatorum sententia appellare, quia qui valet licite ab aliqua sententia appellare non tenetur eidem sententiae obedire. Sed a praelato corripiente aliquem de errore et non monstrante per regulam fidei quod dictus error veritati repugnat licet appellare. Ergo propter talem correctionem non tenetur quis opinionem quam nescit esse erroneam revocare.	A fourth [argument proceeds] thus. At the correction of their prelates, subjects are not bound in the following case to retract opinions which they do not know to be erroneous, namely if it is licit for them to appeal against the sentence of their prelates, because whoever is able licitly to appeal against some sentence is not bound to obey that sentence. But it is licit to appeal against a prelate correcting someone of error and not showing by the rule of faith that the said error is contrary to the truth. No one is bound because of such correction, therefore, to retract an opinion which he does not know to be erroneous.
Maior est manifesta; minor per sacros canones aperte probatur. Ait enim Victor, ut habetur 2, q. 6, c. Si quis, "Si quis putaverit se a proprio metropolitano gravari, apud patriarcham vel primatem dioceseos aut penes universalis ecclesiae apostolicae iudicetur sedem." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod si quis putaverit se a praelato de errore inique correctum sibi licet appellare. Quod etiam multis aliis sacris canonibus posset copiose probari, sed causa brevitatis pertranseo.	The major [premise] is obvious. The minor is clearly proved by sacred canons. For, as we find in 2, q. 6, c. Si quis [("2"), col.468], Victor says: "If anyone thinks that he has been oppressed by his own metropolitan, he may be judged by his patriarch or diocesan primate or in the presence of the see of the apostolic universal church." We gather from these words that if someone thinks that he has been unfairly convicted of an error by his prelate it is licit for him to appeal. This could also be proved copiously from many other sacred canons, but I pass them over for the sake of brevity.
Discipulus Per istam rationem probatur quod correctus legitime de errore non tenetur suum errorem revocare quia licet sibi appellare.	Student By that argument it is proved that someone legitimately convicted of error is not bound to retract his error because it is licit for him appeal.
Magister Ad hoc respondetur quod correctus legitime a praelato de errore, si appellat frustratorie aut frivole, puniri debet per ecclesiam; qui etiam apud Deum peccat, qui videt quam maliciose, ex quo legitime est correctus, appellat.	Master The answer to this is that if someone legitimately convicted by his prelate of an error appeals obstructively or frivolously he ought to be punished by the church. He also sins before God, who sees how maliciously he appeals, because he has been legitimately corrected.
Capitulum 18	Chapter 18
Discipulus Una obiectio quae totum processum praedictum videtur infligere mihi occurrit. Nam cum dicunt isti quod correctus legitime a praelato tenetur errorem revocare, et aliter non, quaeritur ab eis aut errans tenet haeresim damnatam explicite aut tenet errorem damnatum duntaxat implicite.	Student: An objection occurs to me which seems to strike against the whole preceding argument. For when these people say that someone corrected legitimately by his prelate is bound to retract his error, and otherwise is not, one can ask of them whether the one erring holds an explicitly condemned heresy or holds an error condemned only implicitly.
Si tenet haeresim damnatam explicite eam statim revocare tenetur, alioquin poterit eum suus praelatus debitae subdere ultioni. Si autem tenet haeresim damnatam duntaxat implicite, non tenetur eam pro quacunque correctione praelati inferioris summo pontifice revocare.	If he holds an error condemned explicitly he is bound to retract it at once, otherwise his prelate could subject him to due punishment. If he holds a heresy condemned only implicitly, however, he is not bound to retract it on account of any correction by a prelate inferior to the highest pontiff.
Magister Ad hoc respondent quod non tenetur quis statim revocare haeresim damnatam explicite quando ignorat eam esse damnatam explicite. Sed si sibi ostenditur quod est damnata explicite statim eam revocare tenetur. Cum vero dicis quod praelatus potest talem errantem debitae subdere ultioni, verum est ordinem debitum servando, puta ut primo per regulam fidei ostendat erranti quod error suus catholicae obviat veritati, et si tunc errorem nequaquam revocaverit, ipsum poena digna percellat.	Master They reply that no one is bound to retract immediately an explicitly condemned heresy when he does not know that it has been explicitly condemned. But if it is shown to him that it has been explicitly condemned he is bound to retract it immediately. Now when you say that a prelate can subject such an erring person to due punishment, this is true provided due order is observed. For example, by the rule of faith let him first show someone erring that his error conflicts with catholic truth; and if he does not then retract his error, let him (the prelate) strike him with the appropriate punishment.
Capitulum 19	Chapter 19
Discipulus Miror quod isti dicunt tenentem haeresim damnatam explicite non debere statim, quamvis correctus fuerit a praelato, eandem haeresim revocare. Hoc enim Scripturae Divinae, sacris canonibus, consuetudini ecclesiae et rationi repugnare videtur.	Student I wonder that they say that someone holding an explicitly condemned heresy does not have to retract that heresy at once even if he has been condemned by a prelate. This seems to be contrary to (i) divine scripture, (ii) sacred canons, (iii) the custom of the church, and (iv) reason.
Quod enim hoc Scripturae Divinae repugnet probatur. Nam omnis haereticus tenetur suam haeresim revocare; qui autem tenet haeresim damnatam explicite est haereticus; ergo talis statim tenetur de necessitate salutis haeresim revocare.	(i) For that this is contrary to divine scripture is proved. For every heretic is bound to revoke his heresy; he who holds an explicitly condemned heresy, however, is a heretic; such a person is immediately bound, therefore, of necessity for salvation to retract his heresy.
Maior est manifesta, quia qui non tenetur suam haeresim revocare non tenetur eam dimittere, et per consequens non peccat, saltem mortaliter, tali haeresi adhaerendo, ex quo sequitur quod non est haereticus.	The major [premise] is obvious because whoever is not bound to retract his heresy is not bound to put it aside and, as a consequence, does not sin, at least not mortally, by clinging to such a heresy; from this it follows that he is not a heretic.
Minor probatur, quia magis est haereticus reputandus qui tenet haeresim damnatam explicite quam qui non tenet doctrinam catholicam. Sed qui non tenet doctrinam catholicam est haereticus quia vitandus, teste beato Iohanne, qui in canonica sua secunda ait, "Si quis venit ad vos et hanc doctrinam non affert, nolite eum recipere in domum nec ave ei dixeritis. Qui enim dicit illi ave communicat operibus illius malignis." Ex quibus verbis patet quod qui non tenet doctrinam catholicam est a fidelibus vitandus. Ergo qui tenet haeresim damnatam explicite est vitandus. Sed nullus propter haeresim, antequam sit haereticus, est vitandus. Ergo qui tenet haeresim damnatam explicite est haereticus.	The minor [premise] is proved because he who holds an explicitly condemned heresy should more be regarded as a heretic than he who does not hold to catholic teaching. But he who does not hold to catholic teaching is a heretic because he should be avoided. Blessed John testifies to this, saying in his second letter (2 John 1: 10-11): "If any man come to you, and bring not this doctrine, receive him not into the house nor say to him, 'God speed you.' For he that saith unto him, 'God speed you', communicateth with his wicked works." It is clear from these words that he who does not hold to catholic teaching should be avoided by the faithful. He who holds an explicitly condemned heresy, therefore, should be avoided. But no one should be avoided because of a heresy before he is a heretic. He who holds an explicitly condemned heresy, therefore, is a heretic.
Item quod dicta assertio sacris canonibus adversetur ostenditur. Ait enim Gelasius papa, ut habetur 24, q. 1, c. 1, "Quicunque in haeresim semel damnatam labitur eius damnatione seipsum involvit." Ex quibus verbis clare colligitur quod lapsus in haeresim damnatam explicite est damnatus. Quod etiam idem Gelasius eisdem causa et q. c. Maiores et Felix papa c. Achatius secundo testantur aperte, sed damnatus propter haeresim est haereticus. Ergo lapsus in haeresim damnatam explicite est haereticus. Haereticus autem tenetur statim suam haeresim revocare. Ergo tenens haeresim damnatam explicite tenetur eam statim revocare.	(ii) Again it is shown that the said assertion is opposed to the sacred canons. For, as we find in 24, q. 1, c.1 [col.966], Pope Gelasius says: "Whoever falls into a heresy that has once been condemned involves himself in its condemnation." We clearly gather from these words that he who has fallen into an explicitly condemned heresy is condemned. Gelasius also in the same causa and question, c. Maiores [col.966] and Pope Felix c. Achatius "(2)" [col.966] clearly assert this; but someone condemned because of heresy is a heretic. He who has fallen into an explicitly condemned heresy, therefore, is a heretic. A heretic, however, is bound to retract his heresy immediately. Someone holding an explicitly condemned heresy, therefore, is bound to retract it immediately.
Hoc etiam per consuetudinem ecclesiae declaratur. Nam inquisitores haereticae pravitatis, convicto quocunque quod tenuerit haeresim damnatam explicite, statim contra ipsum sicut contra haereticum manifestum procedunt, et reputant ipsum haereticum quamvis paratus sit corrigi. Si autem est haereticus, tenetur suam haeresim revocare. Ergo, etc.	(iii) This is also made clear by the custom of the church. For once anyone is convicted of holding an explicitly condemned heresy, inquisitors into heretical wickedness proceed against him immediately, as against a manifest heretic, and regard him as a heretic, even if he is ready to be corrected. If he is a heretic, however, he is bound to retract his heresy. Therefore, etc.
Hoc etiam ratione probatur. Nam si tenens haeresim damnatam explicite non tenetur statim suam haeresim revocare, hoc non est nisi quia valet se per ignorantiam excusare, dicendo quod ignorat talem assertionem esse explicite condemnatam. Sed talis ignorantia non excusat, tum quia ignorantia iuris non excusat, ut habetur 1. q. 4. para. Notandum, tum quia constitutio apostolicae sedis omnes astringit postquam publicata est nec aliquis post duos menses valet per ignorantiam excusari, ut habetur Extra, De constitutionibus c. ultimo et notat glossa eodem titulo super c. Cognoscentes. Ergo consimiliter damnatio explicita omnes, saltem post duos menses, astringit, tum quia in his quae publice fiunt non potest quis ignorantiam allegare, ut ex sacris canonibus colligitur evidenter. Cum ergo explicita damnatio haeresis cuiuscunque publice facta sit, non potest quis tenens haeresim damnatam explicite se per ignorantiam excusare. Et per consequens eam statim revocare tenetur et nullo modo poterit excusari quin haereticus sit censendus.	(iv) This is also proved by reason. For if someone holding an explicitly condemned heresy is not bound to retract his heresy immediately this is only because he is able to excuse himself through ignorance by saying that he does not know that such an assertion is explicitly condemned. But such ignorance does not excuse him (a) because ignorance of the law does not excuse, as we find in 1, q. 4, para. Notandum [col.422] and (b) because after a constitution of the apostolic see has been published it is binding on everyone and after two months no one can be excused through ignorance, as we find in the last Chapter of Extra, De constitutionibus [col.16] and as the gloss on the chapter Cognoscentes of the same title [col.15] explains. In a similar way, therefore, an explicit condemnation is binding on everyone, at least after two months. [It does not excuse] (c) because no one can claim ignorance of those things that are done publicly, as is clearly gathered from the sacred canons. Since an explicit condemnation of any heresy is made publicly, therefore, no one holding an explicitly condemned heresy can excuse himself through ignorance. And he is bound, as a consequence, to retract it immediately and can in no way be excused so as not to be considered a heretic.
Haec sunt quae mihi admirationem ingerunt quod viri literati dicunt quod aliquis potest tenere haeresim damnatam explicite, quamvis non sit haereticus, et quod ideo non statim tenetur talem haeresim revocare. Unde qualiter respondeant ad ista non differas reserare?	What astonishes me is that learned men say that someone can hold an explicitly condemned heresy, although he is not a heretic, and that he is not, therefore, bound to retract that heresy immediately. Would you not delay but explain how they would reply to these (arguments)?