William of Ockham, Dialogus,
part 1, book 3, chapters 6-11

Text and translation by John Scott.

Copyright © 1999, The British Academy

 

Capitulum 6

Chapter 6

Magister Si tibi exponerem quomodo dictam particulam probare nituntur, eorum responsiones ad praedicta melius fortassis intelligeres.

Master If I were to expound to you how they try to prove that element, you would perhaps better understand their replies to the above.

Discipulus Expone.

Student Expound it.

Proof that pertinacity is required

Magister Quod pertinacia requiratur tam in dubitante quam in errante ad hoc quod quis sit iudicandus haereticus multipliciter probare conantur. Primo, auctoritate Augustini quae ponitur 24, q. 3, c. Dixit apostolus; qui ait, "Qui sententiam suam, quamvis falsam atque perversam, nulla pertinaci animositate defendunt, praesertim quam non audacia suae praesumptionis pepererunt, sed a seductis atque in errorem lapsis parentibus acceperunt; quaerunt autem cauta sollicitudine veritatem corrigi parati cum invenerint, nequaquam sunt inter haereticos deputandi". Ex hiis verbis, ut isti dicunt, colligitur evidenter quod potest quis falsam et perversam tenere sententiam et inter haereticos minime computari.

Master They try to prove in many ways that pertinacity is necessary both in someone who doubts and in someone who errs, if he is to be judged a heretic. Firstly, on the basis of the text of Augustine placed in 24, q. 3, c. Dixit apostolus [col.998]; he says, "Those who without any pertinacious vehemence defend their opinion, even if it is false and evil, especially if they have not conceived it with the boldness of their own presumption but have accepted it from their parents who have been led astray and fallen into error and if, moreover, they seek the truth with careful diligence, ready to be corrected when they find it, should not be counted among the heretics." We clearly gather from these words, they say, that someone can hold a false and evil opinion and not be counted among the heretics.

Discipulus Clare videtur mihi probatum quod non omnis dubitans vel errans contra fidem est haereticus reputandus. Sed non est probatum quod omnis haereticus pertinaciter dubitat vel errat contra fidem. Et ideo illam ultimam particulam diffinitionis praedictae isti per praemissa verba Augustini minime probare possunt quia omnis particula descriptionis vel diffinitionis cuiuscunque datae convenienter debet praedicari de descripto universaliter sumpto. Quod autem non probent omnem haereticum pertinaciter dubitare vel errare contra fidem ex verbis beati Augustini patenter apparet. Nam secundum beatum Augustinum ad hoc quod aliquis tenens sententiam falsam atque perversam non debeat reputari haereticus quatuor requiruntur: primo quod sententiam falsam atque perversam nulla pertinaci animositate defendat; secundo quod talem sententiam non audacia suae praesumptionis invenerit sed a seductis parentibus atque in errorem lapsis acceperit; tertio quod quaerat cauta sollicitudine veritatem; quarto quod paratus sit corrigi si invenerit. Cuicunque ergo defecerit aliquod quattuor est inter haereticos computandus. Quamvis igitur quis non sit pertinax, si tamen audacia suae praesumptionis aliquam falsam et perversam sententiam invenerit vel non quaerat cauta sollicitudine veritatem aut non sit paratus corrigi cum invenerit, est inter haereticos computandus iuxta sententiam Augustini.

Student It seems to me clearly proved that not everyone who doubts or errs against the faith should be regarded as a heretic. But it has not been proved that every heretic doubts or errs against the faith pertinaciously. And therefore they can not prove the last element of the aforesaid definition by the above words of Augustine because every element of any description or definition suitably given should be predicated of the thing described taken universally. It is quite clear, however, that they do not prove from the words of blessed Augustine that every heretic doubts or errs against the faith pertinaciously. For according to blessed Augustine four things are required if someone holding a false and evil opinion is not to be regarded as a heretic: firstly, that he not defend his false and evil opinion with pertinacious ill will; secondly, that he has not discovered such an opinion from the boldness of his own presumption but has received it from his parents led astray and fallen into error; thirdly, that he seek the truth with careful diligence; fourthly, that he be ready to be corrected if he finds it. Anyone in whom any of those four is lacking, therefore, should be counted among the heretics. Therefore, even if someone is not pertinacious, nevertheless if he has discovered some false and evil opinion from the boldness of his own presumption or does not seek the truth with careful diligence or is not ready to be corrected when he finds it, he should, according to Augustine's opinion, be counted among the heretics.

Magister Ad istam obiectionem faciliter respondetur. Ad cuius evidentiam dicunt isti esse sciendum quod inter dubitantem et errantem pertinaciter et inter errorem pertinaciter defendentem differentia invenitur, quia multi haeretici dubitant vel errant pertinaciter, eo quod intus in mente in sua dubitatione vel errore persistunt pertinaciter, qui tamen errorem suum vel dubitationem neque pertinaciter neque alio modo defendunt, imo aliquando timore vel ambitione aut cupiditate vel ex alia causa negant exterius quod in mente irrevocabiliter tenent. Multi etiam econverso falsam sententiam atque perversam exterius pertinaci animositate defendunt vel defendere possunt cui tamen nec pertinaciter nec alio modo in corde adhaerent. Nam contingit aliquando scienter defendere falsum, quemadmodum saepe falsi et pessimi advocati cupiditate ducti scienter falsas causas et iniquas pertinacissima animositate defendunt. Et ita non omnis pertinaciter dubitans vel errans falsam sententiam pertinaci animositate defendit nec econverso.

Master That objection is easily replied to. To make it clear they say that it should be known that we find a difference between doubting and erring pertinaciously and defending an error pertinaciously, because there are many heretics who doubt or err pertinaciously, in that internally in their own mind they persist pertinaciously in their doubt or error, yet who do not defend their error or doubt pertinaciously or in any other way; indeed sometimes out of fear, ambition, greed or for some other reason they deny outwardly what they hold irrevocably in their mind. On the other hand many people defend or can defend outwardly and and with pertinacious ill will a false and evil opinion to which nevertheless they do not cling in their heart either pertinaciously or in any other way. For it is possible sometimes knowingly to defend a falsity, just as false and wicked advocates drawn by greed often knowingly defend false and unjust causes with the most pertinacious ill will. And so not everyone doubting or erring pertinaciously defends a false opinion with pertinacious ill will, nor vice versa.

Discipulus Hoc quod nunc declaratum est probabile puto, et ideo ad propositum applica. Dimittamus tamen loqui de dubitante, de errante solummodo loquendo, quia forte dicunt isti quod illa quae de errante dicuntur etiam de dubitante debent intelligi, pro eo quod dubitantes de fide, sicut errantes contra fidem, inter haereticos computantur vel ab haereticorum numero non excluduntur.

Student I think that what you have now made clear is probable, and so would you apply it to the present case. Let us give up speaking about doubting, however, speaking only about erring, because perhaps they say that those things that are said about erring should also be understood about doubting because of the fact that those doubting the faith, like those erring against the faith, are counted among the heretics or are not excluded from the number of the heretics.

Magister Sicut tibi placet solummodo de errante faciam mentionem, et qualiter saepe dicto modo describentes haereticum ad obiectionem tuam per praemissum notabile quod tu approbare videris respondeant declarabo. Dicunt itaque quod beatus Augustinus quatuor conditiones enumerat quae requiruntur ad hoc quod aliquis tenens falsam sententiam atque perversam contra catholicam veritatem non sit per ecclesiam inter haereticos computandus, volens quod cuicunque deficit aliqua conditionum praedictarum est haereticus et etiam pertinax per ecclesiam iudicandus, quamvis non omnis sit reputandus pertinax defensator haereticae pravitatis. Prima est quod taliter errans errorem suum nulla pertinaci animositate defendat. Si enim errorem suum pertinaci animositate defenderet, catholici, qui de exterioribus non de interioribus motibus animae iudicant, debent eum inter haereticos computare, saltem praesumtione violenta contra quam nulla est probatio in contrarium admittenda. Esto enim quod aliquis scienter contra conscientiam haeresim pertinaciter defensaret, et ita in rei veritate apud Deum non esset haereticus quamvis mortalissime peccaret, hoc tamen probare non posset et ideo ecclesia deberet eum inter haereticos computare.

Master Just as you please, I will mention only someone who errs, and I will make clear how those describing heresy in the oft-mentioned way reply to your objection by means of the notable point just made which you seem to approve. And so they say that blessed Augustine enumerates four conditions that are required so that someone holding a false and evil opinion against catholic truth is not to be counted by the church as among the heretics, meaning that anyone who fails to meet one of the aforesaid conditions should be judged by the church as a heretic and also as pertinacious, although not all of them should be regarded as a "pertinacious defender" of heretical wickedness. The first is that someone erring in such a way does not defend his error with pertinacious ill will. For if he were to defend his error with pertinacious ill will, catholics, who judge from externals not from interior motions of the soul, ought to count him among the heretics at least with a violent presumption against which no proof to the contrary should be admitted. For granted that someone might knowingly and pertinaciously defend a heresy against his conscience and so in truth of fact might not be a heretic in the eyes of God, even if he were to commit the most mortal sin, yet he could not prove this and therefore the church would have to count him among the heretics.

Discipulus Magis et magis intelligo differentiam inter haereticum pertinacem et pertinaci animositate haeresim defendentem. Unde videtur quod potest etiam quis aliquam haeresim pertinaci animositate defendere licet non debeant catholici ipsum haereticum reputare, sicut si quis metu mortis coactus ab infidelibus eorum errores contra fideles pertinaci animositate defenderet non esset haereticus iudicandus, quemadmodum beatus Marcellinus, qui metu mortis actum haereticalem commisit, fuit haereticus minime iudicatus.

Student I understand more and more the difference between a pertinacious heretic and someone defending a heresy with pertinacious ill will [see above]. Whence it seems that someone can even defend some heresy with pertinacious ill will although catholics should not regard him as a heretic, as for example if someone were forced by unbelievers through fear of death to defend with pertinacious ill will their errors against believers he should not be judged a heretic, just as blessed Marcellinus who committed a heretical act from fear of death was not judged a heretic.

Magister Dicunt isti quod non bene intelligis quis debeat reputari errorem pertinaci animositate defendere, quia ille solus qui absque metu mortis sponte et voluntarie errorem defendit errorem pertinaci animositate defendit. Et ideo ille de quo tu ponis exemplum, quamdiu nullum errorem defendit nisi metu mortis, nullum errorem pertinaci animositate defendit.

Master They say that you do not understand well who should be regarded as defending an error with pertinacious ill will, because only he who defends an error willingly and voluntarily without fear of death defends it with pertinacious ill will. And therefore as long as he whom you cite as an example does not defend an error except from fear of death, he does not defend an error with pertinacious ill will.

Discipulus Istud non videtur bene dictum. Nam pertinax dicitur quasi impudenter tenax et qui in sententia sua nimis persistit. Aliter enim nequaquam peccaret mortaliter errorem contra conscientiam defendendo. Ergo talis est erroris pertinax defensator, licet propter talem pertinacem defensionem non sit haereticus iudicandus si constat fidelibus quod solummodo pro morte vitanda defendit errorem.

[See Significant Variants, para. 11.] Student That does not seem to be well said. For he is said to be pertinacious who is, as it were, shamelessly tenacious and too persistent in his opinion. But he who defends an error from fear of death is shamelessly tenacious and too persistent in his opinion. For otherwise he would not sin mortally in defending an error against his conscience. Such a person is a pertinacious defender of error, therefore, although he should not be judged a heretic on account of such a pertinacious defence if believers are certain that he is defending the error only in order to avoid death.

Magister Argumentum forte facis contra ipsos, et ideo forte dicerent quod talis esset pertinax reputandus. Sed tamen non esset dicendum quod errorem pertinaci animositate defenderet, quia animositas voluntatem spontaneam nullo metu coactam signare videtur. Et ita talis esset pertinax haeresis defensator sed tamen non esset haereticus nec etiam haeresim pertinaci animositate defenderet propter metum mortis illatum. Aliter dicerent quod sicut animositas ita etiam pertinacia voluntatem spontaneam nullo mortis metu coactam importat. Et ideo talis nec etiam pertinax est censendus.

Master You make a strong argument against them, and so perhaps they would say that such a person should be regarded as pertinacious. But it should nevertheless not be said that he was defending the error with pertinacious ill will because "ill will" seems to signify a free will not forced by fear. And so such a person would be a pertinacious defender of heresy, but yet he would not be a heretic nor, on account of the fear of death that has been introduced, would he also be defending a heresy with pertinacious ill will. In another way they would say that, like ill will, pertinacity too implies a free will unforced by any fear of death. And therefore such a person should not, also, be considered pertinacious.

Discipulus Nunc dicas quid sentiunt isti de secundo quod ponit Augustinus?

Student Would you now tell me what they think about the second point that Augustine puts.

Magister Dicunt quod secundum Augustinum qui audacia suae praesumptionis falsam sententiam atque contra fidem inveniunt, licet quandoque talem sententiam nulla pertinaci animositate defendant, sunt pertinaces et haeretici iudicandi. Si autem non audacia suae praesumptionis sed ex simplicitate vel ignorantia aliquam haeresim invenirent, et factum eorum nihil aliud aggravaret nec per aliquid aliud possent convinci ita non essent pertinaces nec haeretici iudicandi. Qualiter autem innotescere possit quod quis non ex audacia suae praesumptionis sed ex simplicitate vel ignorantia errorem invenerit seu pepererit non potest breviter explicari.

Master They say that according to Augustine those who discover a false opinion against the faith from the audacity of their own presumption should be judged as pertinacious and heretical, even if sometimes they do not defend such an opinion with pertinacious ill will. However, if they did not discover some heresy out of the audacity of their own presumption but out of simplicity or ignorance, and nothing else were to make their deed worse and they could not be convicted of anything else, they should not be judged pertinacious or heretical. It can not briefly be explained, however, how it can become known that someone has discovered or devised an error not out of the audacity of his presumption but out of simplicity or ignorance.

Discipulus De hoc postea diligenter inquiram. Nunc autem isti ab intentione Augustini deviare videntur. Nam in illa particula Augustinus duo simul coniungit ut aliquos errantes a numero haereticorum excludat, videlicet quod sententiam suam falsam non audacia suae praesumptionis pepererint et quod eam a parentibus seductis atque in errorem lapsis acceperint. Ergo quicunque sententiam suam perversam a seductis et in errorem lapsis parentibus non acceperit est haereticus iudicandus, sicut quicunque sententiam perversam audacia suae praesumptionis peperit est secundum istos haereticus reputandus. Confirmatur haec conclusio quia omnis qui non accipit sententiam suam perversam ab alio ipsam ex audacia suae praesumptionis parit quia aut habet eam a se aut ab alio. Sed secundum istos quicunque haeresim ex audacia suae praesumptionis peperit haereticus est censendus. Ergo omnis errans contra fidem qui errorem ab alio non acceperit est inter haereticos computandus. Et ita videtur quod Augustinus ponit quinque ut errantes a numero haereticorum excludat.

Student Later I will inquire into this carefully. Now, however, they seem to deviate from Augustine's intention. For in that clause Augustine joins two things together to exclude some errants from the number of the heretics, namely that they have not devised their false opinion out of the audacity of their own presumption and that they have received it from parents led astray and fallen into error. Therefore whoever has not received his evil opinion from parents led astray and fallen into error should be judged a heretic, just as whoever has devised an evil opinion from the audacity of his own presumption should be regarded as a heretic according to them. This conclusion is confirmed because anyone who does not receive his evil opinion from another discovers it out of the audacity of his own presumption, because he has it either from himself or from another. But according to them whoever discovered a heresy out of the audacity of his own presumption should be considered a heretic. Everyone erring against the faith, therefore, who has not received his error from someone else should be counted among the heretics. And so it seems that Augustine proposes five [conditions] to exclude some errants from the number of the heretics.

Magister Dicunt quod Augustinus illa duo simul iungit non ut secundum eorum, scilicet quod a seductis atque in errorem lapsis parentibus errantes suam sententiam perversam acceperint, necessario requiratur ad hoc quod errantes de numero haereticorum minime sint censendi; sed illud secundum ponit volens per ipsam assignare unum modum probandi aliquos sententiam suam falsam ex audacia suae praesumptionis minime peperisse, quia si a parentibus suis vel aliis quibuscunque sententiam suam falsam acceperunt constat quod eam ex audacia suae praesumptionis nullatenus pepererunt. Addit etiam illud secundum volens innuere quod pluribus modis possunt errantes errorem a suis accipientes parentibus se excusare quam alii. Et ideo Augustinus non ponit ibi quinque sed quatuor, per quorum quodlibet potest quis probari et convinci haereticus. Et quod quatuor eis contraria requiruntur ad hoc quod aliquis errans non sit inter haereticos computandus. Cum autem dicis quod omnis qui non accipit sententiam suam perversam ab alio ipsam ex audacia suae praesumptionis parit et invenit, respondent quod hoc non continet veritatem. Quidam enim absque praesumptionis audacia ex ignorantia sola errores a seipsis inveniunt; quia tamen non sunt pertinaces inter haereticos minime numerantur.

Master They say that Augustine joins those two things together not in the sense that the second of them, namely that they have received their evil opinion from parents led astray and fallen into error, is necessarily required for errants not to be considered among the number of the heretics; but he proposes that second point because he wants to convey by means of it one way of proving that some people did not devise their false opinion out of the audacity of their own presumption because, if they received their false opinion from their parents or from any one else at all, it is certain that they did not devise it out of the audacity of their own presumption. He also adds that second point because he wants to imply that those errants who have received their faith from their parents can excuse themselves in more ways than others can. And so Augustine does not propose five points there but four, through any one of which someone can be proved and convicted as a heretic; and [he proposes] that the four points opposed to them are required for anyone erring not to be counted among the heretics. When you say, however, that everyone who does not receive his evil opinion from someone else devises and discovers it out of the audacity of his own presumption, they reply that this does not contain the truth. For some people discover errors by themselves out of ignorance alone without the audacity of presumption; nevertheless because they are not pertinacious, they are not numbered among the heretics.

Discipulus Expone quomodo declarant tertium quod ponit Augustinus.

Student Explain how they make clear the third point that Augustine proposes.

Magister Secundum eos Augustinus intendit quod ad hoc quod aliquis errans contra fidem non sit haereticus requiritur quod quaerat cauta sollicitudine veritatem. Non est autem intelligendum oportere errantem omni tempore cauta sollicitudine quaerere veritatem si velit catholicus reputari; sed tunc oportet eum cauta sollicitudine quaerere veritatem, si cupit a numero haereticorum excludi, quando sibi a catholicis cum debitis circumstantiis nunciatur quod errat contra catholicam veritatem et ipse non habet impedimentum legitimum quare tunc non possit vel non debeat quaerere veritatem. Alias enim haberetur contra ipsum praesumptio violenta quod non ex simplicitate vel ignorantia sed ex pertinacia suo adhaereret errori.

Master According to them Augustine means that for someone erring against the faith not to be a heretic he is required to seek the truth with diligent care. It should not be understood [as meaning], however, that it is necessary for someone erring to seek the truth all the time with careful diligence; but if he wants to be excluded from the number of the heretics, it is necessary for him to seek the truth with careful diligence at that time when it is announced to him under appropriate circumstances by catholics that he is erring against catholic truth and when there is no legitimate hindrance because of which he can not and ought not at that time seek the truth. Otherwise a violent presumption would be held against him that he was adhering to his error not out of simplicity or ignorance but out of pertinacity.

Discipulus Dic de quarto.

Student Tell me about [Augustine's] fourth [point].

Magister Quartum quod et sufficit ad hoc ut errans non sit hereticorum numero aggregandus est quod paratus sit corrigi cum invenerit veritatem. Qui enim non est paratus corrigi cum invenerit veritatem pertinax et per consequens haereticus est censendus.

Master The fourth, which also suffices for an errant not to be added to the number of the heretics, is that he be ready to be corrected when he discovers the truth. For he who is not ready to be corrected when he discovers the truth should be considered pertinacious and, consequently, a heretic.

Discipulus Ista sola particula quarta reddit errantem pertinacem et haereticum. Aliae ergo praecedentes videntur esse superfluae.

Student That fourth clause alone renders an errant pertinacious and heretical. Therefore the other preceding ones seem superfluous.

Magister Licet secundum istos ista ultima particula reddat errantem pertinacem et non aliae, tamen ex aliis habetur violenta praesumptio quod errans pertinaciter suo adhaeret errori, quia ex eis habetur praesumptio, cuius contrarium probari non potest, quod talis errans non est paratus corrigi et per consequens inter pertinaces et haereticos est habendus.

Master Although according to them that last clause, and not the others, renders an errant pertinacious, yet from those others we have a violent presumption that an errant is adhering pertinaciously to his error, because from them we have a presumption, the opposite of which can not be proved, that such an errant is not ready to be corrected and, consequently, should be held to be among the pertinacious and the heretical.

Capitulum 7

Chapter 7

Discipulus Ad probandum nullum errantem contra fidem esse haereticum nisi pertinaciter suo errori adhaereat verba praemissa beati Augustini satis prolixe tractasti. Nunc ad eandem conclusionem alias probationes adducas, si quas alias cogitasti?

Student You have discussed copiously enough the words of blessed Augustine set out above to prove that no one erring against the faith is a heretic unless he clings pertinaciously to his error. Would you now adduce other proofs for the same conclusion, if you have thought of others?

Magister Haec eadem conclusio auctoritate Augustini contra Manicheos quae recitatur 24, q. 3, c. Qui in Ecclesia Christi probatur. Ait enim, "Qui in ecclesia Christi morbidum aliquid pravumque sapiunt si correcti, ut sanum rectumque sapiant, resistunt contumaciter suaque pestifera et mortifera dogmata emendare nolunt, sed defendere persistunt, haeretici sunt." Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi non omnes qui in ecclesia Christi morbidum aliquid pravumque quid sapiunt esse statim haereticos iudicandos, sed antea sunt de pertinacia convincendi secundum quod in verbis praescriptis innuit Augustinus.

Master This same conclusion is proved by a text of Augustine against the Manichees which is recorded in 24, q. 3, c. Qui in ecclesia Christi [col.998]. For he says, "Those in the church of Christ who think something unwholesome and perverse and contumaciously resist if they are corrected that they might think something wholesome and sound and refuse to correct their pestiferous and deadly teachings but persist in defending them are heretics." We are given to understand by these words that not all those in the church of Christ who are inspired by something unwholesome and perverse should immediately be judged heretical, but, according to what Augustine implies in the above words, they should be convicted of pertinacity first.

Discipulus In verbis praedictis Augustinus insinuare videtur quod non omnes errantes in ecclesia Christi pertinaciter pro haereticis sunt habendi, cum videatur innuere quod tria requiruntur ad hoc ut illi qui in ecclesia Christi morbidum aliquid pravumque quid sapiunt sint haeretici. Primum est quod correcti ut rectum sanumque sapiant resistant contumaciter. Secundum est quod suos errores emendare nolint. Tertium est quod eosdem errores persistant defendere. Si autem ista tria requiruntur ad hoc quod aliquis sit haereticus, ut Augustinus insinuare videtur, et multi suis erroribus adhaerent pertinaciter qui tamen eos non defendunt, immo quandoque negant, sequitur quod non omnes suis erroribus pertinaciter adhaerentes haereticorum numero aggregantur.

[See Significant Variants, para. 12.] Student Augustine seems to imply in the above words that not all those in the church of Christ who err pertinaciously should be held to be heretics, since he seems to imply that three things are required for those in the church of Christ who are inspired by something unwholesome and perverse to be heretics. The first is that they resist contumaciously when corrected that they might be inspired by what is wholesome and sound. The second is that they refuse to correct their errors. The third is that they persist in defending those same errors. If those three are required, however, for someone to be a heretic, as Augustine seems to imply, and many people cling to their errors pertinaciously who nevertheless do not defend them - indeed sometimes they deny them - it follows that not all those pertinaciously clinging to their errors should be added to the number of the heretics.

Magister Dicunt isti quod Augustinum male intelligis. Non enim vult Augustinus quod illa tria requirantur ad hoc quod aliquis sit haereticus, imo vult quod quodlibet ipsorum haereticum facit errantem. Illa autem tria sic distinguuntur. Primum est quasi commune et duo sunt quasi minus communia exponentia quodammodo primum. Nam quod correcti ut rectum sanumque quid sapiant contumaciter resistant dupliciter potest contingere, vel quia emendare, id est revocare, nolunt vel quia defendere persistunt. Et ita quodlibet illorum trium errantem reddit haereticum et etiam pertinacem. Quare omnis pertinax haereticus est censendus.

Master They say that you understand Augustine wrongly. For he does not mean that those three things are required for someone to be a heretic; rather he means that any one of them makes an errant heretical. However, the three are distinguished in this way. The first is as it were common and the [other] two are as it were less common and spell out the first to some extent. For it can happen in two ways that those who are corrected that they might be inspired by what is right and sound resist contumaciously, either because they refuse to change, that is to revoke [their error], or because they persist in defending it. And so any one of those three renders someone erring heretical, and also pertinacious, because everyone who is pertinacious should be considered a heretic.

Capitulum 8

Chapter 8

Discipulus Si adhuc sunt aliae auctoritates vel rationes ad probandum quod nullus errans nisi pertinax est censendus haereticus libenter auscultabo.

Student If there are still other authorities or reasons to prove that no one who errs should be considered a heretic unless he is pertinacious I will willingly listen to them.

Magister Adhuc rationes aliquae allegantur quarum prima est haec. Illi qui non sunt a catholicis repellendi non sunt inter haereticos computandi. Sed errantes et non pertinaciter non sunt a catholicis repellendi. Ergo qui non sunt pertinaces non sunt inter haereticos computandi. Maior posset per sacros canones aperte probari cum omnes haeretici sint excommunicationis sententia innodati. Minor etiam clare probatur quia errantes qui quaerunt veritatem non sunt a catholicis repellendi, teste Pelagio papa, qui, ut habetur 24. q. 1. c. Schisma, loquens de abundantibus in suo sensu et per consequens de errantibus, ait, "Si etiam ipsi, licet in suo sensu abundantes, intra materna tamen positi viscera quaererent veritatem a nobis repellendi non erant." Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod quamdiu errantes, in suo sensu abundantes, quaerunt veritatem, praetendentes se velle corrigi si veritatem invenerint, non sunt a catholicis repellendi. Et per consequens quicunque non sunt pertinaces non sunt a catholicis repellendi, quia quicunque non est pertinax quaerit veritatem pro loco et tempore quibus tenetur quaerere veritatem. Aliter enim pertinax est censendus.

Master Some further arguments are brought forward, and the first of them is this. Those who should not be rejected by catholics should not be counted among the heretics. But errants who are not pertinacious should not be rejected by catholics. Therefore, those who are not pertinacious should not be counted among the heretics. The major [premise] could be proved clearly by the sacred canons because all heretics are bound by a sentence of excommunication. The minor [premise] is also proved clearly, because those who err but seek the truth should not be rejected by catholics, as Pope Pelagius attests who, speaking about those fully persuaded in their own mind and consequently about those who are in error, as we find in 24, q. 1, c. Schisma [col.979], says, "If they too, though fully persuaded in their own mind, were seeking the truth while yet placed in the maternal womb it would not have been necessary for us to reject them." We are given to understand by these words that even if errants are fully persuaded in their own mind, as long as they are seeking the truth and showing themselves willing to be corrected if they discover the truth, they should not be rejected by catholics. And consequently those who are not pertinacious should not be rejected by catholics because whoever is not pertinacious is seeking the truth in [the appropriate] place and time from those from whom he is bound to seek it. For otherwise he ought to be considered pertinacious.

Secunda ratio est haec. Quicunque paratus est corrigi non est censendus haereticus. Sed quicunque non est pertinax paratus est corrigi. Ergo quicunque non est pertinax non est censendus haereticus. Minor est evidens de se. Maior probatur per glossam 24, q. 3, c. Dixit apostolus quae ait, "Licet ergo teneat aliquis ea quae sunt contra fidem dummodo paratus sit corrigi non est habendus haereticus." Et glossa eadem causa q. 1, super c. A recta ait, "Licet quis erret si tamen paratus est corrigi non est haereticus."

A second argument is this. Whoever is ready to be corrected should not be considered a heretic. But whoever is not pertinacious is ready to be corrected. Therefore whoever is not pertinacious should not be considered a heretic. The minor [premise] is self-evident. The major [premise] is proved by the gloss on 24, q. 3, c. Dixit apostolus [col.1429] which says, "Therefore even if someone holds things against the faith, he should not be held to be a heretic as long as he is ready to be corrected." And the gloss on the same causa q. 1, c. A recta [actually c.14, Haec est fides, col.1388] says, "Even if someone errs he is not a heretic if he is prepared to be corrected."

Tertia ratio est haec. Qui firmiter credit omnia quae docet universalis ecclesia esse catholica, sana et vera, et nulli errori adhaeret pertinaciter est catholicus reputandus. Et per consequens non est habendus haereticus. Sed qui errat et non est pertinax credit firmiter omnia quae docet universalis ecclesia esse catholica, vera et sana et nulli errori adhaeret pertinaciter. Ergo talis non est haereticus iudicandus.

A third argument is this. He who firmly believes that everything which the universal church teaches is catholic, sound and true and who clings pertinaciously to no error should be regarded as catholic. And consequently he should not be held to be a heretic. But he who errs and is not pertinacious believes firmly that everything which the universal church teaches is catholic, true and sound and he does not cling pertinaciously to any error. Therefore such a person should not be adjudged a heretic.

Quarta ratio est haec. Non est maior ratio quod unus errans contra fidem non pertinaciter sit haereticus quam alius, quia de similibus simile est iudicium. Sed multi contra fidem erraverunt qui tamen quia nequaquam pertinaciter erraverunt non fuerunt haeretici reputati. Ergo nec aliquis errans contra fidem, si non est pertinax, debet inter haereticos computari. Maior est manifesta. Minor multis probatur exemplis. Augustinus enim in multis erravit quae postea retractavit et per hoc se non fuisse pertinacem patenter ostendi. Et ideo non fuit haereticus iudicatus. Idem patet de Hieronymo et beato Cypriano de quibus constabat quod pertinaces nullatenus extiterunt. Et propter hoc quamvis erraverint pro haereticis habiti non fuerunt.

A fourth argument is this. There is no better reason why any one person not erring pertinaciously against the faith should be a heretic than any other person, because there is a similar judgement about similar things. But many people have erred against the faith who have nevertheless not been regarded as heretics because they did not err pertinaciously. Neither should anyone erring against the faith, therefore, be counted among the heretics if he is not pertinacious. The major [premise] is obvious; the minor is proved by many examples. For Augustine erred in many ways that he later retracted and by this clearly showed that he was not pertinacious; and therefore he was not adjudged heretical. The same is clear about Jerome and about blessed Cyprian about whom it was clear that they were by no means pertinacious; and for this reason although they erred they were not held to be heretical.

Capitulum 9

Chapter 9

Discipulus Ad probandum quod solus errans pertinaciter est censendus haereticus nolo ad praesens plures rationes audire quia tecum post opus praesens iterum omnia perscrutabor. Et ideo quomodo respondetur ad illa quae adduxi in contrarium manifesta.

Student For the moment I do not want to hear more arguments to prove that only someone erring pertinaciously should be considered a heretic because I will investigate with you all of these things again after this present work. And therefore make clear how reply is made to those points that I adduced to the contrary.

Reply to objections to including "pertinacious"

Magister Prima auctoritas quam in contrarium allegasti est Innocentii 3 Extra, De verborum significatione, c. Super quibusdam verbis, ubi Innocentius 3 enumerat sex genera hominum quos asserit esse haereticos manifestos, videlicet contra fidem publice praedicantes, profitentes errorem, defendentes errorem, coram praelatis convictos, confessos, et ab eis condemnatos de haeretica pravitate. Verba autem Innocentii sane debent intelligi quia aliter ex eis laberetur quis faciliter in errores.

Master The first text which you brought forward to the contrary is Innocent III, Extra, De verborum significatione, c. Super quibusdam verbis [col.923], where Innocent III enumerates six kinds of men whom he asserts to be manifest heretics, namely those preaching publicly against the faith, those professing an error, those defending an error, those convicted before prelates, those who have confessed before them, and those condemned for heretical wickedness by them. Innocent's words have to be understood soundly, however, because otherwise someone would easily slip into errors because of them.

De praedicantibus itaque publice contra fidem oportet distinguere, quia quod aliquis praedicet publice contra fidem quadrupliciter potest contingere. Uno modo quia publice praedicat fidem christianam esse falsam, dubiam, vanam vel incertam, et talis indubitanter est haereticus manifestus quia talis sine pertinacia inveniri non potest. Nam talis non est paratus corrigi per fidem christianam si non reputat eam veram, certam et sanam. Ergo pertinax et manifestus haereticus est censendus. Aliter contingit aliquem praedicare publice contra fidem praedicando aliquem errorem qui fidei obviat christiane protestando quod nunquam ab assertione sua desistet. Et talis est pertinax quia non est paratus corrigi. Et ideo est haereticis sociandus. Tertio contingit aliquem praedicare publice contra fidem protestando quod nihil intendit contra fidem temere defendere vel tenere. Et talis quia ostendit se esse minime pertinacem et quod non errat ex malitia seu pertinacia sed ex simplicitate et ignorantia non est haereticus manifestus nec ex sola tali publica praedicatione debet haereticus reputari. Et propter hoc tales protestationes faciunt his temporibus quibus quamplurimi ex odio, rancore, invidia et malitia moliuntur meliores et sapientiores se de haeresi diffamare quamplures docentes, praedicantes et scribentes ut coram omnibus se ostendant nullatenus pertinaces. Quarto contingit aliquem contra fidem publice praedicare simpliciter absque omni protestatione quod non intendit vel intendit aliquid contra fidem temere defendere vel tenere. Et talis non est censendus haereticus manifestus sed examinandus est diligenter an pertinaciter adhaereat errori quem publice praedicavit. Et si inventus fuerit pertinax debet haereticus iudicari. Ante autem examinationem est catholicus reputandus, quia quilibet reputandus est bonus antequam contrarium sit aperte probatum. Et ideo talis praedicans cum de adhaesione eius mentali constare non possit est catholicus iudicandus quousque probetur contrarium. Sicut enim ea quae dubium est quo animo fiant in meliorem partem interpretari debemus, ut habetur Extra, De Regulis iuris, c. Estote, ita cum nescimus quo animo praedicat quis contra fidem, animo scilicet pertinaciter adhaerendi vel animo corrigendi se si erraverit, in meliorem partem interpretari debemus, suspicando videlicet quod paratus est corrigi cum veritas sibi fuerit manifesta.

And so it is necessary to make a distinction about [the first kind, viz.] those preaching publicly against the faith because it can happen in four ways that someone preaches publicly against the faith: in one way because he preaches publicly that the christian faith is false, doubtful, groundless or uncertain, and such a man is undoubtedly a manifest heretic because such a man can not be found without pertinacity. For such a man is not ready to be corrected by the christian faith if he does not regard it as true, certain, and sound. Therefore he should be considered pertinacious and a manifest heretic. In another way it is possible for someone to preach publicly against the faith, preaching some error which is opposed to christian faith and protesting that he will never desist from his assertion. And such a man is pertinacious because he is not ready to be corrected. And therefore he should be associated with heretics. Thirdly it is possible for someone to preach publicly against the faith while protesting that he intends neither to defend rashly nor to hold anything against the faith. And because such a person shows that he is not pertinacious and that he is not in error out of malice or pertinacity but because of simplicity and ignorance he is not a manifest heretic and he should not be regarded as a heretic only because of such public preaching. And it is for this reason that in these times in which very many people try out of hatred, rancour, envy and malice to defame those who are better and wiser than they are with [an accusation of] heresy those who teach, preach and write make such protestations to show before everyone that they are not pertinacious. Fourthly, it is possible for someone to preach publicly against the faith simply, without any protestation that he does not intend or does intend rashly to defend or to hold anything against the faith. And such a person should not be considered a manifest heretic but he should be carefully examined about whether he clings pertinaciously to the error which he publicly preached. And if he is found to be pertinacious he should be judged a heretic. Before his examination, however, he should be regarded as catholic because anyone at all should be regarded as good before the opposite has been clearly proved. And so when it is not possible to be certain about the mental clinging [to an error] of such a person who preaches he should be adjudged catholic until the opposite be proved. For just as we should interpret in the best way those things about which there is doubt with what intention they were done, as we find in Extra, De regulis iuris, c. Estote [col.927], so when we do not know with what intention someone preaches against the faith, that is with the intention of clinging to it pertinaciously or with the intention of correcting himself if he has erred, we should interpret it in the best way, that is by supposing that he is ready to be corrected when the truth is evident to him.

De secundo genere hominum, scilicet de profitentibus errorem, dicunt quod pertinaces sunt censendi et ideo sunt haeretici manifesti. Professio enim a voluntate firmata solet procedere, et ideo qui profitentur errorem contrarium catholicae veritati sunt reputandi firmati in errore. Quare pro pertinacibus sunt habendi. Et ex hoc sequitur quod omnes iurantes se errorem aliquem fidei christianae contrarium servaturos et abiurantes quamcunque catholicam veritatem inter pertinaces et haereticos manifestos sunt censendi. Sicut enim professio ita iuramentum et abiuratio voluntatem supponunt firmatam.

About the second kind of person, that is those professing an error, they say that they should be considered pertinacious and therefore are manifest heretics. For a profession usually proceeds from a will that has been confirmed, and so those who profess an error opposed to catholic truth should be regarded as confirmed in their error. Therefore they should be held to be pertinacious. And it follows from this that all those who swear that they will preserve some error opposed to christian faith and who abjure any catholic truth should be considered to be among the pertinacious and the manifest heretics. For like a profession, so an oath and an abjuration suppose a strengthened will.

De tertio genere hominum, scilicet qui defendunt errorem, distinguunt, dicentes quod defendere errorem contingit dupliciter: uno modo absque assertione temeraria eo quod tunc ita apparet. Et tales defendentes errorem sive verbo sive scripto non sunt haeretici manifesti quia parati sunt corrigi cum invenerint veritatem. Alio modo defendit quis errorem cum assertione temeraria et talis est pertinax et haereticus manifestus.

About the third kind of person, that is those who defend an error, they make a distinction, saying that it is possible to defend an error in two ways: in one way, without [making] a rash assertion, as it then so appears. And such people who defend an error whether verbally or in writing are not manifest heretics because they are prepared to be corrected when they discover the truth. In another way someone defends an error with a rash assertion, and such a person is pertinacious and a manifest heretic.

De quarto et quinto genere, scilicet de convictis et confessis coram praelatis de haeretica pravitate, distinguunt, quia ista pravitas potest attendi vel ex parte ipsorum convictorum vel confessorum vel solummodo ex parte erroris de quo sunt convicti vel confessi. Si primo modo sint convicti vel confessi de haeretica pravitate sunt haeretici manifesti quia tales de pertinacia sunt convicti vel confessi. Si autem sit pravitas solummodo ex parte erroris non ex parte convictorum vel confessorum sic non sunt haeretici manifesti. Errores enim quos tenuerunt Augustinus, Hieronymus et Cyprianus, de quibus tactum est supra et de quibus poterant convinci, pravi fuerunt, ipsi tamen non fuerunt pravi. Et ideo quamvis de illis erroribus coram praelatis convicti fuissent vel confessi haeretici nullatenus extitissent.

[See Significant Variants, para. 13.] About the fourth and fifth kinds, that is those who before prelates have been convicted of and have confessed to heretical wickedness, they make a distinction, because that wickedness can be reckoned either on the side of those who have been convicted or have confessed or only on the side of the error of which they have been convicted or to which they have confessed. If they have been convicted of or have confessed to heretical wickedness in the first way they are manifest heretics because such people have been convicted of or have confessed to pertinacity. However if the wickedness is only on the side of error, not on the side of those who have been convicted or have confessed, they are for this reason not manifest heretics. For the errors that Augustine, Jerome and Cyprian maintained, which were touched on earlier and for which they could have been convicted, were bad, yet they themselves were not bad. And therefore even if before prelates they had been convicted of or had confessed to those errors, they would not have been heretics.

De sexto genere, scilicet de condemnatis de haeretica pravitate absque distinctione, dicunt quod sunt haeretici manifesti si rite et iuste fuerint condemnati, quia nullus est sententialiter condemnandus de haeretica pravitate nisi inveniatur pravitas non solum in errore sed etiam in errante. Ista autem pravitas in errante est pertinacia. Et ideo soli pertinaces sunt de pravitate haeretica condemnandi.

About the sixth kind, that is those condemned without distinction for heretical wickedness, they say that they are manifest heretics if they have been rightly and justly condemned because no one should be condemned by formal sentence for heretical wickedness unless the wickedness is found not only in the error but also in the one erring. That wickedness in the one erring, however, is pertinacity. And therefore only the pertinacious should be condemned for heretical wickedness.

Discipulus Ista probabilia mihi videntur, sed miror quare Innocentius praedicto modo non distinxit.

Student The above seem probable to me, but I wonder why Innocent did not make the above mentioned distinction.

Magister Respondetur quod ideo causa brevitas hic non distinxit, quia quod taliter oportet distinguere ex aliis sacris canonibus evidenter apparet.

Master The reply is that it was for the sake of brevity that he did not make a distinction at this point, because it is perfectly clear from other sacred canons that it is appropriate to make a distinction in the above way.

Capitulum 10

Chapter 10

Discipulus Quamvis ex praedictis colligi possit quomodo ad plures auctoritates quas adduxi isti modo saepe fato describentes haereticum respondent, volo tamen ut discurras per singulas.

Student Although we can gather from the above how those describing heresy in the oft-mentioned way reply to many texts that I brought forward [in ch.5], nevertheless I want you to run through them separately.

Magister Ad auctoritatem Nicolai papae recitantis verba Celestini respondent quod illa verba intelligenda sunt de publice praedicantibus scienter contra determinata a concilio generali et etiam de publice praedicantibus errores ipsos, eosdem errores temere asserendo, vel protestando se nunquam revocaturos eosdem, vel pertinaces quomodolibet se monstrando.

Master To the text from Pope Nicholas quoting the words of Celestine they reply that those words should be understood of those preaching publicly and knowingly against determinations made by a general council and also of those publicly preaching those errors, rashly affirming the same errors, or protesting that they will never revoke them, or showing themselves pertinacious in any way at all.

Auctoritas autem Hieronimi in oppositum allegatur quia idem Hieronimus in verbis adductis insinuare videtur quod reprobans confessionem ab apostolico approbatam non est ex hoc ipso haereticus reputandus quia poterit esse imperitus. Et ita si ex sola imperitia dixerit contra veritatem non est inter haereticos computandus.

Jerome's text, however, is brought forward for the opposite conclusion because in the words adduced he seems to imply that someone rejecting the confession approved by the Apostolic [i.e. the pope] should not be regarded as a heretic because of that fact since he could be unskilled. And so if he speaks against the truth from lack of skill alone he should not be counted among the heretics.

Gelasius etiam, ut dicunt, intelligit de eo qui scienter labitur in haeresim condemnatam. Talis enim est haereticus iudicandus. Et cum dicitur, "Gelasius inter labentem in haeresim pertinaciter et non pertinaciter non distinguit, ergo nec nos debemus distinguere", isti respondent quod ubi papa vel canon non distinguit nec aliqua distinctio neque ex aliis canonibus neque ex Sacra Scriptura nec ex dictis autenticis neque ex ratione evidenti patenter colligi potest, nos non debemus distinguere. Ubi autem ex aliquibus vel aliquo praedictorum distinctio manifeste accipitur et nos debemus distinguere. Sic est in proposito quia ex aliis sacris canonibus et ratione aperta colligitur luculenter quod inter labentem in haeresim damnatam pertinaciter et non pertinaciter est distinctio manifesta.

Gelasius too, they say, means someone who knowingly falls into a condemned heresy. For such a person should be adjudged a heretic. And when it is said, "Gelasius did not distinguish between falling into heresy pertinaciously and not pertinaciously, and so we should not distinguish either", they reply that when a pope or a canon does not distinguish and no distinction can clearly be gathered from other canons or from sacred scripture or from authentic sayings or from evident reason, we should not distinguish. When a distinction can clearly be apprehended, however, from some or one of the above, we should indeed distinguish. It is so in the matter under discussion because we gather very well from other sacred canons and from clear reason that there is an obvious distinction between falling into a condemned heresy pertinaciously and not pertinaciously.

Dicunt etiam quod Gelasius in c. Maiores loquitur de scienter communicatore erroris damnati et etiam de pertinaci sive sciat errorem suum esse damnatum sive ignoret.

They say too that in c. Maiores [24, q. 1, c.2; col.966] Gelasius is speaking about someone knowingly participating in a condemned error and also about someone pertinacious whether he knows that his error has been condemned or not.

Ad auctoritatem Felicis papae respondent quod loquitur de Achatio, qui scienter damnato communicavit facinori. Et ideo fuit pertinax iudicandus quia non erat paratus corrigi per doctrinam ecclesiae.

To the text of Pope Felix they reply that he is speaking about Achatius who knowingly participated in a condemned misdeed; and therefore he should have been adjudged pertinacious because he was not ready to be corrected by the teaching of the church.

Ad auctoritatem beati Hieronimi quae ponitur 24, q. 3, c. Haeresis respondent quod sicut recessus a malis est duplex, scilicet corporalis et spiritualis, prout asserit Augustinus secundum quod legitur 23, q. 4, c. 1, sic recessus ab ecclesia est duplex, scilicet corporalis et spiritualis. Corporalis autem recessus ex multis causis fieri potest. Potest enim quis recedere corporaliter ab ecclesia et ad haereticos corporaliter accedere quia doctrinae suae vel opinioni ecclesia non consentit aut reprobat. Et de isto recessu corporali ad praesens loquimur, non de alio recessu corporali qui ex bona causa posset accidere. Alius est recessus ab ecclesia spiritualis et iste est duplex, scilicet manifestus et occultus, secundum quod haereticus est duplex, scilicet manifestus et occultus. Similiter aliter intelligere Scripturam quam sensus Spiritus Sancti flagitat contingit dupliciter, scilicet cum pertinaci adhaesione et absque pertinaci adhaesione. Quicunque igitur cum pertinaci adhaesione aliter Scripturam intelligit quam sensus Spiritus Sancti flagitat, licet ab ecclesia non recesserit neque corporaliter, propter hoc quod suo sensui ecclesia non consentit vel reprobat eundem, neque spiritualiter manifeste, quia se esse pertinacem nequaquam ostendit aperte, tamen haereticus appellari potest, imo vere est haereticus quia ab ecclesia recessit spiritualiter licet occulte.

To the text of blessed Jerome which is located in 24, q. 3, c. Haeresis [col.997] they reply that just as there is a twofold withdrawal from evil, that is bodily and spiritual, as Augustine asserts according to what we read in 23, q. 4, c. 1 [col.899], so withdrawal from the church is twofold, that is bodily and spiritual. Bodily withdrawal can happen for many reasons however. For someone can bodily withdraw from the church and bodily go to heretics because the church does not agree with or rejects his teaching or opinion. And it is about this bodily withdrawal that we are now speaking, not about another bodily withdrawal that could happen for a good reason. Another withdrawal from the church is spiritual, and that is twofold, namely open or hidden, and in accordance with this there are two kinds of heretic, namely an open or a hidden one. Similarly it is possible to understand scripture otherwise than in the sense the holy spirit demands in two ways, namely with pertinacious adherence or without it. Therefore even if anyone who with pertinacious adherence understands scripture otherwise than in the sense the holy spirit demands does not withdraw from the church, either bodily (because of the fact that the church does not agree with or rejects his perception), or spiritually in a manifest way, (since he does not clearly show himself to be pertinacious), nevertheless he can be called a heretic, indeed he truly is a heretic because he has withdrawn spiritually from the church even if in a hidden way.

Ad auctoritatem Stephani papae respondent dicentes quod Stephanus papa vocat illum dubium in fide qui dubitat fidem christianam esse veram vel sanam, non illum qui dubitat de aliqua veritate catholica in speciali. Talis autem in fide dubius est pertinax seu pertinaciter dubitans quia talis non est paratus corrigi per fidem christianam. Nullus enim paratus est corrigi per doctrinam quam dubitat esse veram, cum nullus nisi per veritatem corrigi velit. Ille autem qui dubitat de aliquo articulo speciali potest esse paratus corrigi per fidem christianam quia per Scripturam Sacram quam totam credit esse veram, licet dubitet de aliquo speciali, nesciens illud in sacris literis inveniri. Et ideo non est statim pertinax reputandus. Aliter est de illo qui in genere vel in universali dubitat fidem esse veram. Et de tali dubio in fide loquuntur glossae, quarum una 24, q. 3, super para. Quia vero ait, "Uno modo dicitur haereticus quicunque est dubius in fide." Et alia eisdem causa et q. super c. Aperte ait, "Nota haereticum esse titubantem in fide." Et post, "Nam et haereticorum vocabulo continetur qui levi etiam argumento a fide deviat." Omnes enim loquuntur de illo qui dubitat fidem christianam esse veram.

They reply to the text of Pope Stephen by saying that he calls him a doubter in faith who doubts that the christian faith is true or sound, not him who doubts some particular catholic truth. Such a doubter in the faith, however, is pertinacious or is doubting pertinaciously because such a person is not ready to be corrected by the christian faith. For no one is ready to be corrected by teaching that he doubts is true, since no one wants to be corrected except by the truth. He who doubts some particular article, however, can be ready to be corrected by the christian faith because [he is ready to be corrected] by sacred scripture, the whole of which he believes to be true, although he doubts some particular [article], not knowing that it is found in the sacred writings. And so he should not immediately be considered pertinacious. It is otherwise with him who doubts in general or as a whole that the faith is true. And it is about such a doubter in the faith that the glosses speak, one of which, on 24, q. 3, para. Quia vero [col.1427], says, "In one way a heretic is said be anyone who is doubtful of the faith." The other [gloss], on c. Aperte [col.1404] in the same causa and quaestio, says, "Note that a heretic is one who is unsteady in faith. ... For also comprehended by the word "heretics" is he who deviates from the faith even by a slight argument." For they are all speaking about him who doubts that christian faith is true.

Discipulus Miror quod non plus oportet dubitantem de fide esse pertinacem quam dubitantem de aliquo articulo speciali, praesertim cum ita possit quis absque pertinacia dubitare de universali sicut de singulari.

Student I wonder that it is not more necessary for one doubting the faith to be pertinacious than for one doubting some particular article, especially since anyone can in this way doubt without pertinacity a universal, just as he can a singular.

Magister De hoc non reputant isti mirandum. Sicut enim inter propositiones est ordo, quia alia est prior et alia posterior, una etiam sit nota per aliam et saepe non econverso. Et ideo qui de propositione simpliciter prima in aliquo ordine, quae nullo modo posset fieri nota per aliam, dubitaret non esset praesumendum quod unquam ad illius notitiam esset venturus, licet si dubitaret de propositione posteriori esset praesumendum quod ad eius notitiam per propositiones priores posset attingere. Sic quia primum quod oportet fidelem credere est quod fides christiana est vera, si de hoc quis dubitat nihil remanet per quod ad firmiter credendum valeat revocari. Et ideo taliter dubitans tanquam pertinax et nolens corrigi est censendus. Si autem nullatenus dubitat fidem christianam esse veram, licet dubitet de aliquo articulo speciali, praesumendum est, nisi contrarium manifeste appareat, quod si sibi ostensum fuerit articulum de quo dubitat ad fidem pertinere catholicam absque mora se corriget.

Master They do not regard this as something to be wondered at, for just as there is an order among propositions, because one is prior and the other posterior, one may be also known through the other with the converse often not the case. And therefore it should not be presumed of someone who was to doubt a proposition that was simply first in some system of ordering and which could in no way become known through another [proposition], that he would ever come to a knowledge of it, although if he were to doubt some posterior proposition it should be presumed that he could arrive at knowledge of it through prior propositions. Thus because the first thing that it behoves a believer to believe is that the christian faith is true, if anyone were to doubt this, nothing remains though which he can be recalled to firm belief, and so someone doubting in this way should be considered as pertinacious and refusing to be corrected. If he does not doubt that the christian faith is true, however, even if he doubts some particular article it should be presumed, unless the contrary is clearly apparent, that he will correct himself without delay if it is shown to him that the article which he doubts does pertain to catholic faith.

Discipulus Quid si nullus potest sibi patenter ostendere quod talis articulus ad fidem pertinet christianam?

Student What if no one can show him clearly that such an article pertains to christian faith?

Magister Dicunt quod quousque sibi fuerit evidenter ostensum dictum articulum ad fidem pertinere catholicam, sufficit sibi credere eum implicite, paratus credere explicite cum sibi monstratum fuerit quod ad fidem pertinet christianam.

Master They say that until it has been plainly shown to him that the said article pertains to catholic faith, it is enough for him to believe it implicitly, ready to believe explicitly when it is shown to him that it pertains to christian faith.

Discipulus Procede ad alias auctoritates.

Student Go on to the other texts.

Magister Ad capitulum Aperte respondent quod loquitur de praedicante et titubante in fide quia dubitat fidem christianam esse veram.

Master To the chapter Aperte [24, q. 1, col.980] they reply that it is speaking about a preacher wavering in the faith because he doubts that the christian faith is true.

Ad verba Gratiani eodem modo respondent quod loquitur de praedicante fidem esse falsam vel incertam vel de pertinaci docente aliqua contra fidem. Non autem loquitur de illo qui ex simplicitate vel ignorantia docet aliqua quae fidei obviant orthodoxae.

They reply in the same way to Gratian's words, that he is speaking about someone preaching that the faith is false or uncertain or about someone pertinacious teaching things contrary to the faith. He is not speaking, however, about someone who out of simplicity or ignorance teaches things which are opposed to orthodox faith.

Ad rationem qua innuitur dicunt quod fides debet esse firma in universali, ut cuilibet veritati catholicae firmiter, hoc est per fidem firmam explicite vel implicite, fidelis adhaereat, sed non est necesse quod cuilibet adhaereat firmiter explicite. Et sic intelligendae sunt auctoritates adductae de concilio generali et de symbolo Athanasii. Dubitans autem in fide, hoc est dubitans fidem esse veram, non habet fidem firmam. Et sic loquitur Bernhardus. Et ideo non catholicus sed haereticus est censendus. Dubitans autem de articulo aliquo speciali habet fidem firmam quod tota fides christiana est vera et certa. Habet etiam fidem firmam implicitam de eodem articulo de quo dubitat. Et ideo est catholicus licet de tali articulo non habeat fidem firmam explicitam.

To the argument by which it is implied [that faith ought to be firm] they say that faith in the whole ought to be firm, so that a believer clings firmly to every catholic truth, that is explicitly or implicitly, with a firm faith, but it is not necessary that he explicitly clings firmly to every one. And in this way the texts adduced in connection with a general council and the Athanasian creed should be understood. Someone who doubts the faith, however, that is doubts that the faith is true, does not have a firm faith. And this is the way in which Bernard speaks. And therefore such a person should be considered not a catholic but a heretic. Someone doubting some particular article, however, does have a firm faith that the whole christian faith is true and certain. He also has a firm implicit faith about the very article that he doubts. And therefore he is catholic even if he does not have a firm explicit faith about that particular article.

Capitulum 11

Chapter 11

Another objection to the proposed description of a heretic

Discipulus Adhuc ad unam instantiam quae totam descriptionem haeretici memoratam videtur elidere cupio responderi. Beatus enim Augustinus, ut habetur 24, q. 3, c. Haereticus diffinit haereticum in hunc modum, "Haereticus est qui alicuius temporalis commodi et maxime vanae gloriae principatusque sui gratia falsas ac novas opiniones vel gignit vel sequitur." Ex qua diffinitione colligitur quod qui tantummodo veteres haereses imitantur, quamvis sint pertinaces, non sunt haeretici reputandi. Et ita prior descriptio haeretici non est congrue assignata quia competit multis, scilicet illis qui tantummodo veteres haereses imitantur, qui tamen non sunt haeretici iudicandi secundum diffinitionem Augustini eo quod novas opiniones neque gignunt nec sequuntur.

Student I want the reply to one further objection which seems to shatter the whole preceding description of a heretic. For as we find in 24, q. 3, c. Haereticus [col.998], blessed Augustine defines a heretic in this way, "A heretic is someone who either generates or follows false and new opinions for the sake of some temporal advantage and especially for the sake of his own glory and rule." We gather from this definition that those who only imitate old heresies should not be regarded as heretics even if they are pertinacious. And so the earlier description of a heretic was not suitably ascribed because it applies to many people, namely those who only imitate old heresies, who should nevertheless not be judged as heretics according to Augustine's definition in that they neither generate nor follow new opinions.

Item multi baptizati pertinaciter errant ex sola credulitate vel deceptione non alicuius temporalis commodi nec vanae gloriae nec principatus sui gratia. Et per consequens secundum diffinitionem Augustini non sunt haeretici iudicandi. Et tamen illis competit descriptio saepe fata. Ergo non est vera descriptio.

Again, many who are baptised err pertinaciously only because of credulity or deception, not for the sake of any temporal advantage nor for the sake of vain glory or their own rule. And, consequently, they should not be judged as heretics according to Augustine's definition. And yet that oft-cited description applies to them. Therefore it is not a true description.

Item aliquis certus de fide et in nullo dubitans alicuius temporalis commodi et maxime vanae gloriae principatusque sui gratia contra conscientiam potest novas ac falsas opiniones gignere atque sequi. Ergo certus de fide et in nullo dubitans potest esse haereticus secundum diffinitionem Augustini. Male ergo describitur haereticus cum asseritur quod omnis haereticus est pertinaciter dubitans vel errans contra catholicam veritatem.

Again, someone certain about the faith who doubts nothing can generate and follow new and false opinions against his own conscience for the sake of some temporal advantage and especially for the sake of vain glory and his own rule. Therefore someone who is certain about the faith and doubts nothing can be a heretic according to Augustine's definition. A heretic is badly described, therefore, when it is asserted that every heretic doubts or errs pertinaciously against catholic truth.

Magister Ad ista isti respondent dicentes quod Augustinus non intendit in verbis praescriptis haereticum diffinire sed intendit assignare unum modum cognoscendi haereticum, ut scilicet quicunque alicuius temporalis commodi et maxime vanae gloriae principatusque sui gratia falsas ac novas opiniones gignit vel sequitur censeatur haereticus. Unde licet in propositione quam ponit Augustinus, si intelligatur universaliter, primo ponatur vocaliter haereticus ante copulam et ex hoc possit quis opinari quod haereticus sit subiectum, tamen secundum rei veritatem, ut isti dicunt, haereticus debet esse praedicatum et illud quod sequitur debet esse subiectum. Et isto modo sub bono intellectu concedenda est universalis formata ex verbis Augustini ista, videlicet quicunque alicuius temporalis commodi et maxime vanae gloriae principatusque sui gratia animo pertinaciter defendendi novas ac falsas opiniones contra fidem gignit vel sequitur est reputandus haereticus, licet si contra conscientiam et in corde de aliquo pertinente ad fidem nullatenus dubitans praedicto modo haereses gigneret vel sequeretur non esset apud Deum qui cor intuetur haereticus, quamvis mortalissime coram Deo peccaret.

Master They reply to these by saying that Augustine did not intend to define a heretic in the above words, but intended to mark out one way of knowing a heretic, that is that anyone who generates or follows false and new opinions for the sake of some temporal advantage and especially for the sake of vain glory and his own rule is considered a heretic. Hence although in the proposition which Augustine puts, if it is understood universally, the word "heretic" is verbally placed first before the copula, and someone can form the opinion from this that "heretic" is the subject, yet the truth of the matter is, they say, that "heretic" ought to be the predicate and what follows ought to be the subject. And in that way, under a sound understanding, the following universal formed from Augustine's words should be granted, that is, anyone who generates or follows new and false opinions against the faith for the sake of some temporal advantage and especially for the sake of vain glory and his own rule with the intention of defending them pertinaciously should be regarded as a heretic, although if he were to generate or follow heresies in that way against his conscience, not doubting in his heart anything pertaining to the faith, he would not be a heretic before God, who sees his heart, though he would sin most mortally in God's eyes.

Discipulus Quomodo debet quis reputari haereticus si non est coram Deo haereticus?

Student How should someone be regarded as a heretic if he is not a heretic in God's eyes?

Magister Ad hoc respondetur faciliter quia de exterioribus habemus tantummodo iudicare, occulta autem ad iudicium spectant divinum. Et ideo talis a nobis est censendus haereticus propter illa quae nobis apparent exterius licet apud Deum non sit haereticus, quemadmodum saepe multos bonos arbitrari debemus quia nullum malum in ipsis nobis apparet qui tamen apud Deum sunt pessimi.

Master This is easily replied to because we have the power to judge only about externals, while hidden matters belong to divine judgement. And therefore such a person should be considered a heretic by us because of those things that appear to us externally even if he is not a heretic in God's eyes, just as we should often think many men to be good because there seems to us to be no evil in them who are nevertheless very evil in God's eyes.

Discipulus Discurre per obiectiones quas feci.

Student Run through the objections that I made.

Magister Ad primam earum respondetur quod qui veteres haereses pertinaciter imitantur sunt censendi haeretici. Et ideo non solum illi qui quacunque ex causa novas ac falsas opiniones gignunt vel sequuntur sunt haeretici sed etiam alii. Nam qui modo haeresim Arrii ab antiquo damnatam pertinaciter defensaret esset haereticus iudicandus. Nec obstant verba Augustini qui, ut dictum est, non intendit per illa verba neque diffinitionem neque descriptionem haeretici assignare. Unde dicunt quod multi saepe falluntur de enunciationibus sanctorum et auctorum putantes eos velle diffinitiones vel descriptiones aliquarum rerum vel nominum assignare cum tamen nonnunquam intendant solummodo propositiones particulariter veras asserere.

Master The reply to the first of them is that those who pertinaciously imitate old heresies should be considered heretics. And therefore not only those who generate or follow new and false opinions for any reason at all are heretics, but also others. For he who would now defend Arius's heresy, condemned from of old, should be adjudged a heretic. And Augustine's words do not oppose this because, as has been said, he did not intend to ascribe a definition or description of a heretic by those words. Hence they say that many people are often misled by the propositions of saints and writers thinking that they want to give definitions or descriptions of things or words when sometimes they only intend to affirm propositions as particularly true.

Ad secundam respondetur quod pertinaciter errantes ex sola credulitate vel deceptione sunt haeretici iudicandi quia non soli illi de quibus loquitur Augustinus in verbis praemissis sed etiam alii sunt censendi haeretici.

The reply to the second is that those erring pertinaciously only because of credulity or deception should be adjudged heretical because not only those of whom Augustine speaks in the afore-mentioned words should be considered heretics but also others.

Ad tertiam dicunt quod illi qui in corde non dubitant et tamen alicuius temporalis commodi gratia vel forte pro temporali periculo citra mortem vitando assertiones haereticales sequuntur, quales dicunt esse multos his diebus, et maxime de ordine Fratrum Minorum qui opiniones novas de paupertate Christi et apostolorum ac etiam de animabus damnatorum et sanctorum, quas in cordibus suis putant haereticas et tamen ipsas pertinaci animositate defendunt, sequuntur, non sunt in rei veritate haeretici, et tamen a fidelibus qui non habent de occultis motibus animae iudicare sunt haeretici reputandi et tanquam haeretici feriendi. Et si postea dicerent se dictas haereses in mente minime tenuisse sed pro assequendo aliquo commodo temporali vel pro vitando periculo se finxisse tenere, non esset eis fides aliqua adhibenda sed essent ab omni assertione et testimonio tanquam falsi et duplices repellendi.

To the third they say that those who do not doubt in their heart and yet follow heretical assertions for the sake of some temporal advantage or perhaps in order to avoid some temporal danger short of death, (of whom they say there are many in these days, and especially from the Order of Friars Minor who follow new opinions about the poverty of Christ and the apostles and also about the souls of the damned and of the saints which in their hearts they think are heretical and which they nevertheless defend with pertinacious ill will) are not in truth of fact heretics, and yet they should be regarded as heretics by believers, who do not have the power to judge the hidden movements of the soul, and they should be smitten as heretics. And if they were to say afterwards that they had not held the said heresies in their mind but had feigned to hold them in order to obtain some temporal advantage or to avoid some danger, no trust should be offered to them but they should be repulsed as false and duplicitous from [giving] any assertion in testimony.

Discipulus De illis quos isti adducunt in exemplum alias te interrogabo sollicite et ad probandum quod isti qui sunt sectatores Iohannis papae 22 non sunt haeretici nec errantes sed catholici et fideles fortiter allegabo.

Student I will question you carefully elsewhere about those whom they adduce as an example, and I will strongly bring points forward to prove that those who are followers of Pope John XXII are not heretics or errants but are believing catholics.

Magister Vis ergo quod istius operis hic sit finis?

Master So do you want this to be the end of this [part of] the work?

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