CAP. XVIII.Discipulus Ut possim videre profundius an ista aliquam verisimilitudinem habeant contra ipsa obiiciam. Videtur enim per ista quod omnis communitas cui praesiderent plures, et {iam add. &Na} idem habentes officium ita {om. &Na} ut nullus {*unus &NaRe} sine consilio et consensu {trs.321 &Na} aliorum aut valentioris partis {*non add. &NaRe} debet {*debeat &NaRe} aliquid praecipere {percipere &Re} vel statuere seu ordinare aut aliquem coercere, non possent {*essent &NaRe} convenienter nec utiliter statuta {*instituta &NaRe} observare {*om. &MzNaRe}, quia omnia inconvenientia quae deducta sunt ex pluralitate iudicum summorum {*supremorum &NaRe} in communitate fidelium, super eosdem ex pluralitate praesidentium idem habentium officium seu gerentium vicem unius possunt inferri. poterunt {*Potuerunt &Re} enim tales plures praesidenter {*praesidentes &MzNaRe} reos ad diversa loca citare vel mittere familias diversas ut capiantur et ad diversa loca {citare vel ... loca om. &Na} ducantur, sicut processit ratio prima. Poterit {*Poterunt &NaRe} etiam subditos {subiectos &Na} pro eis {*reis &NaRe} plectendis vel quibusdam {*communibus &NaRe} negociis pertractandis ad diversa loca vocare, sicut processit secunda. Frustra etiam regeretur {*regetur &NaRe} quaecunque communitas per plures huiusmodi {huius &Re} praesidentes cum possit regi per unum secundum quod tertia ratio processit. Nemo etiam poterit taliter {*om. &NaRe} diversis dominis contraria iubere volentibus {*valentibus &NaRe} servire {*deservire &NaRe} iuxta auctoritatem Salvatoris, "Nemo potest duobus dominis servire." Talis etiam communitas propinqua erit desolationi et ruinae propter hoc quod plures huiusmodi praesidentes proni sunt ad sibi {*om. &NaRe} {scilicet &Mz} dissentiendum iuxta auctoritatem aliam Salvatoris, "Omne regnum in {*contra &NaReVg} se divisum {*trs.312 &NaReVg} desolabitur" etc. Per exempla etiam Hieronimi, quae ponit 7, q. {7, q. om. &Mz} 1, {*7, q. 1,: in illo &NaRe} capitulo In apibus, potest ostendi quod non expedit esse plures huiusmodi praesidentes. Per hoc etiam quod omnis potestas impatiens est consortis probari potest quod in nulla {illa &Mz} communitate debent plures tali modo praeesse, sicut nec in aliquo episcopatu debent esse plures episcopi quomodolibet praesidentes {praesidentis &NaRe}. Semper enim videtur quod si fuerint plures qualitercunque in eadem communitate praesidentes timor erit de dissensionibus, contentionibus, seditionibus, rixis, pugnis et guerris, si praedicta concludant quod non debent plures esse {*trs. &NaRe} iudices summi {*supremi &NaRe} in communitate fidelium, scilicet ecclesiasticus et secularis, qui habet {*habeant &NaRe} {habent &Mz} eosdem criminosos pro eisdem sceleribus coercere. Etiam et ista concludere videntur contra modum qui nunc in ecclesia esse videtur {*etiam et ista ... videtur om. &MzNaRe}. |
Chapter 18Student So that I can understand more deeply whether those [arguments] have some likeness to the truth I will raise an objection against them. For from them it seems that no community over which many ruled, even when they held the same office so that without the consent of the others or of the stronger part of them one of them should not command, decree or ordain anything or coerce anyone, would have been fitly or beneficially set up, because all the disadvantages which have been brought about by a plurality of supreme judges in a community of believers, can be inferred from a plurality of those who are in charge of the same people holding the same office or acting like one person. For if there were many such men in charge they could summon the guilty to different places or send different retainers to capture them and lead them to different places, just as presented in the first argument. They could also call their subjects to different places to punish them or to deal with common business, just as presented in the second argument. In vain will any community be ruled by many men of this kind in charge when it can be ruled by one man, in the way the third argument presents. Indeed no one will be able to command opposed things of those wanting to serve different lords, [[This does not seem right.]] according to that text of the saviour [Matthew 6:24], "No one can serve two masters." Such a community will also be near to desolation and ruin because of the fact that the many of this kind in charge are inclined to disagree with each other, according to the other text of the saviour [Matthew 12:25], "Every kingdom divided against itself is laid waste" etc. It can also be shown by that example that Jerome posits in the chapter [7, q. 1,] In apibus [c.41, col.582] that it is not appropriate that there be many of this kind in charge. Because of the fact that all power is impatient of sharing too, it can be proved that in no community should there be many in charge in that way, just as there should not be many bishops ruling in any way at all in any episcopate. For it always seems that if there are many men in charge of the same community in any way at all, there will be fear of dissension, struggles, seditions, quarrels, fighting and wars, if the above [arguments] are conclusive that there should not be in a community of believers many supreme judges, namely an ecclesiastical one and a secular one, who have the power to coerce the same criminals for the same crimes. |
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Amplius multae {omnes &Na} communitates sunt bene ordinatae in quibus tamen idem subest pluribus rectoribus. Ergo communitas fidelium poterit esse bene ordinata licet in ipsa plures summi {*supremi &NaRe} iudices praesint eisdem {easdem &Na}. Antecedens patet quia videmus quod idem est vasallus plurium dominorum, et {*etiam &NaRe} regum, quorum nullus est sub alio. Idem etiam clericus subest diversis episcopis pro diversis ecclesiis seu beneficiis et in eadem causa eiusdem possunt esse plures iudices tam ordinarii quam delegati et etiam arbitri, Extra, De sententia et remiss. {*re iudicata &NaMzReZn} in {*om. &NaRe} capitulo ultimo et Extra, De rescriptis {rubricis &Na} Cum contingat. ita {*Ista &NaRe} videtur {*videntur &NaRe} ostendi {*ostendere &MzNaRe} quod allegationes praescriptae non concludunt intentum. Tu autem indica quomodo respondetur ad ipsas {*ipsa &NaRe}. |
Further, many communities are well regulated in which, nevertheless, the same person is under many rulers. A community of the faithful could be well regulated, therefore, even if many supreme judges in it rule over the same people. The antecedent is clear because we see that the same man is the vassal of many lords, even of kings, none of whom is under another. The same cleric too is under different bishops for different churches or benefices, and in the same case of the same person there can be many judges, both regular and appointed and even arbitrary (Extra, De sententia et re iudicata, last chapter [Duobus iudicibus c.26, col.409], and Extra, De rescriptis, c. Cum contingat [c.24, col.28]) These seem to show that the above arguments are not conclusive in achieving their intention. Would you point out how they are replied to? |
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Magister Ad primam obiectionem {*tuam add. &NaRe} respondetur quod ubicunque {ubique &Mz} in eadem communitate sunt plures praesidentes et {*etiam &NaRe} idem habentes {*trs. &NaRe} officium seu vicem gerentes unius non est optime disposita sed est ab optima dispositione deficiens, quia optima dispositio communitatis est quod sit unicus {*trs. &NaRe} praesidens summus {*supremus &NaRe} in ipsa. Ab ipsa tamen optima dispositione saepe est necesse recedere propter diversos casus, quia aliquando subditi unum {*unicum &NaRe} nullatenus sustinerent, aliquando nullus posset inveniri qui sufficeret solus praeesse. Unde ex multis causis potest contingere quod melius sit plures praeesse quam unum, licet melius esset disposita communitas si unus praesidens posset convenienter haberi, ita ut quaecunque communitas, praecipue notabiliter magna, quae {om. &MzNaRe} gubernatur a pluribus summis {*supremis &NaRe} in eadem communitate nequaquam optimo regimine gubernatur. Sicut tamen saepe periclitantes in mari optimum modum navigandi coguntur dimittere propter pericula evitanda {*evadenda &NaRe} {evacuanda &Mz} et nonnunquam viatores vias {*viam &MzNaRe} meliores {*meliorem &NaRe} compelluntur {compellentur &Mz} relinquere et longiorem ac deteriorem eligere et frequenter {trs. &Mz} multa bona ex causis necessariis omittuntur et multotiens dispensative qui alias essent indigni multiplici ratione ad diversa officia promoventur, sic nonnunquam ex causa rationabili necesse est optimum modum praeficiendi {*praesidendi &NaRe} relinquere scilicet regimen unius solius et praesidentiam plurium acceptare. |
Master The reply to your first objection is that whenever in the same community there are many in charge, even holding the same office or acting like one person, it is not best regulated but falls short of the best regulation, because the best regulation of a community is that there be a single supreme person in charge of it. It is often necessary because of different occurrences, however, to retreat from that best regulation, because sometimes the subjects would not support that single person, sometimes no one could be found who alone would be adequate to rule. So for many reasons it can happen that it is better for many to rule than for one, although a community would be better regulated if one person could suitably be had to be in charge, in the sense that any community at all, especially a large one, which is governed by many who are supreme in the same community, is not governed according to the best form of rule. [[mss seem corrupt here and the addition of `quae' from G seems a good solution.]] Yet, just as often those who are in danger at sea are forced to abandon the most direct route to sail in order to avoid the dangers, and sometimes travellers are forced to leave the best path and to choose and longer and poorer one, and frequently many good things are given up for necessary reasons, and very often by way of dispensation those who would at another time be unworthy are promoted for a multiplicity of reasons to different offices, so sometimes it is necessary for a reasonable cause to abandon the best way of ruling, namely the rule of one person, and to accept the rule of many. |
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Discipulus Per istam rationem {*responsionem &NaRe} responderi {non add. &Re} [[interlinear]] potest {poterit &Na} ad omnes rationes {*allegationes &NaRe} praecedentis capituli inquantum probant {probat &NaRe} quod in communitate fidelium non debent esse plures iudices summi {*supremi &NaRe}, scilicet {om. &Na} ecclesiasticus et {om. &Re} secularis, quia solummodo probant, ut dicit ista responsio, quod si esset {esse &Mz} communitas fidelium optime disposita unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} caput seu iudicem habere deberet. Non autem est {*trs. &NaRe} necessarium quod communitas fidelium quae obnoxia est variis tribulationibus et pressuris semper sit optime disposita. Poterit {?potest &Na} ergo plures iudices summos {*supremos &NaRe}, scilicet ecclesiasticum et secularem, habere ita ut fideles omnes {*trs. &MzNaRe} sint eisdem pro eisdem delicits subiecti. |
Student That reply can be made to all the arguments in the preceding chapter, in so far as they prove that in a community of believers there should not be many supreme judges, that is an ecclesiastical and a secular one, because they only prove, as that reply says, that if a community of believers were to be best regulated it ought to have supreme head or judge. It is not necessary, however, that a community of believers which is subject to different tribulations and afflictions be regulated in the best way. It can therefore have many supreme judges, that is an ecclesiastical and a secular one, so that all the believers are subject to the same people for the same crimes. |
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Magister Ad hoc respondetur quod propter tribulationes et adversitates quas sustinere posset communitas fidelium ex singulari malitia Christianorum posset contingere quod pro aliquo tempore expediens esset quod tota esset subiecta duobus supremis iudicibus. Tunc tamen nimis {*et add. &NaRe} perculosissime ab optima dispositione recederet, et ideo non debet tale regimen nisi in {om. &Na} casu singularissimo sustineri {*sustinere &NaRe}. Quare quantum potest conari tenetur ut habeat solummodo unum iudicem summum {*supremum &NaRe} qui omnes malefactores pro quibuscunque criminibus per se vel per iudices inferiores ipso a quibus ad ipsum licet {*liceat &NaRe} rationabiliter {rationaliter &Mz} appellare habeat coercere. Iste autem iudex non potest nec debet {*trs.321 &NaRe} esse papa, quia {*cum &NaRe} papa ex ordinatione Christi quantum potest se debet {*debeat &NaRe} a negociis secularibus sequestrare. Ergo si optime sit ordinata communitas fidelium unum {*unicum &NaRe} iudicem secularem summum {*supremum &NaRe} habebit qui non debet esse alius quam imperator Romanus, quando est catholicus. Sane ut intelligeres {*intelligas &NaRe} quod {*quantum &NaRe} allegationes praecedentis capituli concludunt sed {*secundum &NaRe} allegationes {*allegantes &MzNaRe} addunt unum quod nullus Christianus debet negare, ut eis videtur, quod scilicet nec per ordinationem Christi nec per ordinationem apostolorum nec per ordinationem {Christi nec ... ordinationem om. &Re} summorum pontificum Christianae fidei zelatorum nec per ordinationem generalium conciliorum rite celebratorum nec per ordinationem {ordinem &NaRe} quorumcunque iustorum optimus modus {om. &Mz} regendi fideles, quantum permittit status vitae praesentis, qui {quid &Mz} et {*etiam &NaRe} servatus est inter multos fideles et inter {*multos &MzNaRe} infideles laudatur {*laudabiliter &NaRe} secundum rationem vivere cupientes, hoc esse utile communitati {*hoc esse utile communitati: excluditur /om. Mz\ a tota et universali communitate &MzNaRe} fidelium, licet quandoque tota communitas fidelium talem optimum modum regendi propter malitiam {*malitias &MzNaRe} hominum non valeat adipisci. ergo {*om. &NaRe} Ex isto inferunt quod ex ordinatione Christi papa non habet iurisdictionem universalem pro omni crimine super totum populum Christianum. Et per consequens ordinationi Christi non repugnat quod aliquis alius super {*totum add. &NaRe} populum Christianum habeat potestatem. Et hoc concludunt allegationes praescriptae in capitulo praecedenti vel saltem {*hoc add. &MzNaRe} videntur necessario concludere allegationes illae quod tota communitas seu congregatio fidelium non optime regitur si habeat plures iudices {*supremos add. &NaRe} qui eosdem pro eisdem criminibus habeant cohercere, et {*quod add. &MzNaRe} talis modus regendi per diversos huiusmodi summos {*supremos &NaRe} iudices {*trs. &NaRe} non fuit ordinatus a Christo. |
Master The reply to this is that it could happen because of the tribulations and hostility which a community of believers could undergo from the singular malice of christians that it would be expedient for some time for the whole [community] to be subject to two supreme judges. Yet this would then be to withdraw too far and too dangerously from the best regulation and so it should not support such a way of rule except in the most extraordinary case. As far as possible, therefore, it is bound to try to have only one supreme judge who has the power to correct all evil-doers for any crimes at all either himself or through judges inferior to him, from whom reasonable appeal is allowed to him. However, that judge can not and should not be the pope, because by Christ's decree the pope should as far as possible remove himself from secular affairs. If a community of believers is ordered in the best way, therefore, it will have one supreme secular judge who should be none other but the Roman emperor, when he is a catholic. So that you truly understand how conclusive the arguments of the preceding chapter are, those who put them forward add one thing that no christian can deny, as it seems to them, namely that neither by Christ's decree, nor by a decree of the apostles, or of the supreme pontiffs zealous for christian faith, or of general councils duly celebrated or of any of the just at all, is the best way of ruling believers, as far as the status of this present life allows, a way which has indeed been preserved among many believers and among many unbelievers wanting laudably to live according to reason, forbidden to the whole universal community of believers, although sometimes the whole community of believers can not lay hold of this best way of ruling because of the wickedness of men. They infer from this that by Christ's decree the pope does not have universal jurisdiction over the whole christian people for every crime. And consequently it does not conflict with Christ's decree for some one else to have power over the whole christian people. And the above arguments in the preceding chapter come to this conclusion, or at least this seems to be the necessary conclusion of those arguments that the whole community or congregation of believers is not best ruled if it has many supreme judges who have the power to correct the same people for the same crimes and that such a way of ruling through different supreme judges of this kind was not decreed by Christ. |
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Discipulus Indica quomodo ad secundam obiectionem {*meam add. &NaRe} respondetur. |
Student Point out how my second objection is replied to. |
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Magister Conceditur quod multae communitates sunt bene ordinatae in quibus idem subest pluribus rectoribus. Sed istae {*illae &NaRe} non sunt optime ordinatae in quibus idem subest pluribus rectoribus non habentibus superiorem. Licet igitur aliquis possit esse vasallus plurium dominorum et in hoc aliquam habeat {habet &Mz} utilitatem quia plura feuda tenet, tamen maiorem utilitatem haberet si pro omnibus feudis illis esset vasallus unius solius, licet in casu utilius sit sibi habere plures dominos quam unum solum. Sed hoc est propter {*aliquam add. &MzNaRe} malitiam domini unius vel aliquorum aliorum inquantum ab optima ordinatione mortalium aliquis vel aliqui recedit vel recedunt. Qualia etiam {*autem &NaRe} {et &Mz} damna patiantur saepe illi qui plures dominos habent magis quam illi qui {*uni add. &MzNaRe} soli domino sapienti et iusto sunt subiecti experientia {*certa add. &MzNaRe} docere videtur {*videretur &NaRe} {*trs. &NaRe}. |
Master It is granted that many communities in which the same person is under many rulers are well ordered. But those in which the same person is under many rulers not having a superior are not best ordered. Therefore although someone can be the vassal of many lords and have some benefit from this because he holds many fiefs, yet he would have greater benefit if he were the vassal of only one lord for all those fiefs, although in a particular case it may be more useful to have many lords than to have only one. But this is because of some wickedness in one or other lords, in that some depart from the best arrangement of mortals. Reliable experience would seem to teach, however, what greater harm those who have many lords often endure than those who are subject only to one wise and just lord. |
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Cum {*vero add. &NaRe} secundo accipis ibi pro exemplo quod idem clericus est subiectus diversis episcopis pro pluribus ecclesiis vel {ecclesiis vel: ecclesiasticis &Re} beneficiis, respondetur quod illud exemplum {exemplare &Na} est ad oppositum quia quod idem clericus sit subditus {*subiectus &NaRe} pluribus episcopis pro diversis beneficiis est contra ius commune et per dispensationem solummodo fieri potest. Quare licet in casu ex aliqua speciali causa cum ordinatione bona clericorum stet quod talis {*alquis &NaRe} sit subditus {*subiectus &MzNaRe} pluribus episcopis, hoc tamen non stat cum optima ordinatione ipsorum, quia melius clerici regerentur si posset semper servari ius commune ut nullus clericus haberet plura {*om. &NaRe} beneficia in pluribus episcopatibus. |
Now when you take as your second example in that argument [["ibi"]] that the same cleric is subject to different bishops for many churches or benefices, the reply is that that example proves the opposite because it is against common law for the same cleric to be subject to many bishops for different benefices and can only be done as a dispensation. Although in a particular case for a special reason, therefore, it may be consistent with the good ordering of clerics that someone be subject to many bishops, this is nevertheless not consistent with their best ordering because clerics are better ruled if the common law could always be preserved and no cleric have benefices in many bishoprics. |
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Cum autem pro tertio exemplo dicis quod in eadem causa possunt esse plures iudices etc, respondetur quod iudices illi habent superiorem iudicem et non sunt summi {*supremi &NaRe}. Ideo aliquando utile est quod sint {sicut &Re} plures non summi {*supremi &NaRe}, praesertim cum illi iudices non sunt {*sint &NaRe} diversi ut unus pro libito possit absque alio in casu procedere imo vicem unius gerunt, et tamen quod sint plures hoc {*om. &NaRe} accidit ex aliqua causa speciali quae non haberet locum quando litigantes essent optime dispositi quantum permittit {promittit &Mz} conditio litigantium. Propter quod melius disponi {dispositioni &Na} videntur {videretur &Mz} litigantes quando concorditer eligunt {eliguntur &Mz} sive compromittunt {*committunt &NaRe} in unum quam quando in unum {*in unum: ita &NaRe} discordant et quam quando {*et quam quando: quod &NaRe} {et quam quando: quia &Mz} omnino diversos volunt habere. Et sic est de omnibus litigantibus quod illi minus a bona dispositione recedunt qui nisi alia {*aliqua &NaRe} causa specialis impediat sub uno {*unico &MzNaRe} iudice cupiunt litigare. CAP. XIX.Discipulus Visum est de secundo modo ponendi communitatem fidelium non habere unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem qui ponitur {*qui ponitur: positum &NaRe} supra c. 17. Nunc videamus de tertio qui dictus est ibidem. |
However, when you say for your third example that there can be many judges in the same case, etc., the reply is that those judges have a superior judge and they are not supreme. It is sometimes useful, therefore, that there are many who are not supreme, especially when those judges are not conflicting, so that one can without the other proceed in a case at his own pleasure, but rather act in unity; and yet that there are many happens for some particular reason, which would not arise when litigants were regulated as well as their condition permits. For this reason litigants seem to be best regulated when they choose harmoniously or commit themselves to the one judge [[or is it just `thing'?]] rather than when they so differ that they want to have completely different judges. And so it is with all litigants that those who want to litigate under a single judge, unless some particular reason prevents that, depart less from good regulation. Chapter 19Student We have reflected on the second way of putting [the case that] the community of believers does not have one supreme judge which was put in chapter 17 above. Let us now reflect on the third [way] which was set down there. |
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Magister Qualiter {poterit add. &Na} ille modus discuti {discutere &Mz} valeat ex illis {*hiis &MzNaRe} quae tractata sunt primo huius c. 1 usque ad c. 13 patere poterit studioso. |
Master How that way can be investigated can be quite clear to the studious from what was dealt with in chapters 1 to 13 of the first [book] of this [tractate]. |
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Discipulus Hoc non obstante de isto {*illo &NaRe} modo ponendi aliquid specialius videamus, an scilicet optimae ordinationi communitatis fidelium obviet et repugnet ut {*quod &NaRe} clerici pro omni crimine iudicentur a papa vel aliis iudicibus ecclesiasticis inferioribus {*eo add. &NaRe} et etiam {*om. &NaRe} omnes laici a iudice seculari quia contra istum modum ponendi totam communitatem fidelium non habere unum iudicem summum {*supremum &NaRe} rationes c. 17 adductae non videntur concludere, quia {quod &Na} secundum istum modum nec aliquis deberet {debet &NaRe} {*debebit ??} citari aut vocari a diversis ad diversa loca nec aliquis cogetur duobus dominis servire nec super eosdem plures potestatem habebunt nec aliqua potestas consortis erit impatiens secundum quae rationes istae {*illae &NaRe} processisse videntur. Vel ergo declara secundam {*secundum &MzNaRe} opinionem supra c. 17 recitatam quomodo allegationes istae {*illae &NaRe} concludunt contra tertium modum de quo nunc quaero loqui vel aliquas alias allegationes conaris adducere {*inducere &NaRe}. |
Student Notwithstanding that, let us see something particular about that way of putting it, whether, that is, it conflicts with and opposes the best regulation of the community of believers for clerics to be judged for any crime by the pope or other ecclesiastical judges inferior to him and for all laymen to be [judged] by a secular judge, because against that way of putting it that the whole community of believers does not have one supreme judge the arguments adduced in chapter 17 do not seem to be conclusive. This is because on that way [of putting it] no one will have to be cited or called by different people to different places, no one will be forced to serve two masters, many men will not have power over the same people and there will be no power impatient of a partner, and it is on the basis of these points that those arguments seem to have proceeded. Therefore either make clear how according to the opinion recorded in chapter 17 above those arguments are conclusive against that third way about which I now wish to speak, or try to bring forward some other arguments. |
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Magister Licet secundum opinionem supra {sic &Mz} c. 17 recitatam modus regendi communitatem fidelium de quo capitulo praecedenti et c. 17 tractavimus sit multo perniciosior {et periculosior add. &Na} isto modo de quo nunc vis conferre, et ideo istae {*illae &NaRe} allegationes multo patentius concludunt {*concludant &NaRe} contra illum modum quam contra istum, cum {*tamen &NaRe} [[cum in margin but crossed out Re]] eaedem {illae &Re} allegationes {trs. &Re} vel aliquae {aliqua &Re} illarum {*earum &NaRe} convincunt {committunt &Mz}, ut videtur, istum modum regendi communitatem fidelium ab optimo modo {*regendi add. &NaRe} et puniendi reos deficere. Primae autem duae allegationes contra istum modum inefficaces apparent. Sed tertia contra ipsum aliquam apparentiam habere videtur {videretur &Mz} eo quod tota communitas fidelium posset regi per unum. Frustra autem fit per plures quod fieri potest {*trs. &NaRe} per pauciores. Ergo tales duo rectores, scilicet ecclesiasticus et secularis, illo {illo add. &Na} modo frustra ponuntur. Quarta allegatio, fundata in auctoritate Salvatoris Matt. 6, nequaquam videtur concludere contra istum modum. Sed {*quinta add. &NaRe} [[gap left in Mz]] fundata in auctoritate salvatoris Matth. 12:[25], "Omne regnum contra se divisum {trs.312 &NaRe} desolabitur" etc, contra istum modum tali modo adducitur. Non solum illa societas est propinqua desolationi et ruinae quae est contra se divisa sed etiam illa quae ex modo regendi est {*ad divisionem add. &NaRe} disposita {*et add. &NaRe} {est add. &Mz} divisioni propinqua iuxta {*praedictam add. &NaRe} {propinquam add. &Mz} auctoritatem Salvatoris. Sed si communitas fidelium habeat duas partes, quarum una habeat {*unum add. &NaRe} iudicem summum {*supremum &NaRe} et alia alium, communitas illa {*fidelium &NaRe} est disposita ad divisionem et divisioni propinqua, {iuxta praedictam auctoritatem salvatoris. Sed si communitas fidelium habeat duas partes quarum una habeat unum iudicem supremum et alia alium communitas fidelium est disposita ad divisionem et divisioni propinqua add. &Na} [[Re has same repetition but it has been crossed out - suggests same exemplar]] quia propter assiduam {*om. &NaRe} mutuam communionem subditorum et summorum {*supremorum &NaRe} iudicum, qui sicut omnes mortales sunt proni ad dissentiendum, contra se faciliter dividerentur {*dividentur &Na} {videntur &Re} {divideretur &Mz}. Ergo si tali modo regatur communitas fidelium periculosa est censenda. Alia {*Sexta &NaRe} autem allegatio, fundata in auctoritate beati Hieronymi, videtur efficaciter concludere contra illum {*istum &NaRe} modum quia per exempla quae adducit Hieronymus non solum probatur unitas prelati super unum populum sive supra unam multitudinem hominum sed etiam probatur unitas praelati super unum locum in quo subiecti {*subditi &NaRe} morantur ut in una dioecesi quae certam regionem comprehendit sit tantum unus episcopus et {om. &Re} in una provincia sit tantum unus archiepiscopus. Ergo per eadem exempla non tantum probatur unitas iudicis summi {*supremi &NaRe} super {*aliquam multitudinem hominum sed etiam probatur unitas iudicis supremi super add. &NaRe} aliquem locum in quo sibi subiecti morantur ut in eodem loco nullus alius sit iudex summus {*supremus &NaRe} quorumcunque in illo loco morantium, sicut in dioecesi Parisiensi est unus solus episcopus et in provincia Mediolanensi est unus solus archiepiscopus {et in provincia ... archiepiscopus om. &Re}. Sequens {*Septima &MzNaRe} allegatio {*trs. &NaRe} etiam contra istum modum videtur concludere quod {*quia &NaRe} potestas non solum est impatiens consortis super eosdem subiectos sed etiam impatiens est consortis in eodem loco. Sicut enim iudex aliquis nollet quod subditi sui essent alterius subditi {*trs. &MzNaRe}, ita nollet quod aliquis alius haberet potestatem in loco ubi subditi sui morantur. Ergo non solum est {*erit &NaRe} periculosa societas fidelium si sint plures iudices super eosdem populos vel subditos {*subiectos &NaRe} sed etiam periculosa {*erit add. &NaRe} {est add. &Mz} societas fidelium si in eodem loco etiam super diversos subditos fideles fuerint plures summi {*supremi &NaRe} iudices constituti. Et ita non expedit quod clerici habeant unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem ecclesiasticum, scilicet papam, et laici unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem {*secularem add. &MzNaRe}, scilicet imperatorem, cum clerici et laici in eisdem locis simul commaneant. |
Master Although according to the opinion recorded in chapter 17 above the way of ruling the community of believers which we treated in the preceding chapter and in chapter 17 is much more destructive than that way about which you now wish to confer, and therefore those arguments are more obviously conclusive against the former than against the latter, yet the same arguments or some of them demonstrate, it seems, that that way of ruling a community of believers departs from the best way of ruling and punishing the guilty. The first two arguments, however, seem ineffectual against that way [of ruling]. But the third seems to have some plausibility against it due to the fact that the whole community of believers could be ruled by one person; that which can be done by fewer people, however, is done in vain by many; therefore two such rulers, namely an ecclesiastical and a secular one, are proposed to no purpose in that way [of ruling]. The fourth argument, based on the text of the saviour in Matthew 6:[24] does not seem to be conclusive against that way of ruling. But the fifth, based on the text of the saviour in Matthew 12:25, "Every kingdom divided against itself will be laid waste" etc, is adduced against that way of ruling in the following way. Not only is that society which is divided against itself near to desolation and ruin, but also, according to the same text of the saviour, that one which, due to its way of ruling, is organised towards division and is near to division. But if the community of believers has two parts, one of which has one supreme judge and the other another, the community of believers is organised towards division and is near to division, because the subjects and the supreme judges, who are prone to disagreement like all mortals, will easily be divided among themselves because of their reciprocal communion. If the community of the faithful is ruled in such a way, therefore, it should be considered dangerous. The sixth argument, however, based on the text of blessed Jerome, seems to be efficaciously conclusive against that way [of ruling] because the examples that Jerome adduces not only prove the singleness of a ruler over one people or over one multitude of people but also prove the singleness of a ruler over one place in which subjects live, so that in one diocese, which comprises a fixed region, there is only one bishop and in one province there is only one archbishop. Therefore the same examples not only prove the singleness of a supreme judge over any multitude of people but also prove the singleness of a supreme judge over any place in which those subject to him live, so that in the same place there is no other supreme judge of anyone living in that place, just as there is only one bishop in the diocese of Paris and only one archbishop in the province of Milan. The seventh argument also seems to be conclusive against that way [of ruling], because power is not only impatient of a partner with respect to the same subjects but is also impatient of a partner in the same place. For just as no judge would want his subjects to be subject to someone else, so he would not want anyone else to have power in the place where his subjects live. Not only will a society of believers be dangerous, therefore, if there are many judges over the same people or subjects, such a society will also be dangerous if many supreme judges are established in the same place over different believing subjects. And so it is not appropriate for clerics to have one supreme ecclesiastical judge, that is the pope, and laymen to have one supreme secular judge, that is the emperor, since clerics and laymen live together in the same places. |
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Discipulus Video qualiter praescriptae allegationes adducuntur contra istum modum ponendi {*om. &NaRe}. Ideo contra eundem modum ponendi coneris alias invenire. |
Student I see how the earlier arguments are adduced against that way, so try to find others against the same way of putting it. |
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Magister Videtur quod contra eundem modum ponendi potest aliter allegari. Nam, ut allegatum est 1 huius c. 1, illud regimen est expediens universitati mortalium, et eadem ratione toti congregationi fidelium, per quod iurgia et litigia ad quae prona est natura mortalium aequius et convenientius deciduntur. Sed iurgia et litigia quae oriri possunt ex causis innumeris inter clericos et laicos aequius et convenientius deciduntur si omnes tam clerici quam laici {*trs.321 &NaRe} habent {*habeant &NaRe} unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem sub quo omnes debent {*debeant &NaRe} litigare quam si habeant plures iudices tales, scilicet ecclesiasticum et secularem. Nam si orta materia litis inter clericos et laicos coram ecclesiastico iudice qui non sit summus {*supremus &NaRe} iudex laicorum debeant litigare merito laici habebunt eum suspectum. Consimiliter si {om. &Na} debeant litigare coram iudice seculari qui non est iudex clericorum non indigne clerici habebunt eum suspectum. Ergo absque rationabili suspicione {*trs. &MzNaRe} non dirimetur litigium aliquod inter clericos et laicos si non est omnium unus iudex summus {*supremus &NaRe}. |
Master It seems that it can be argued otherwise against that same way of putting it. For, as was argued in chapter one of the first [book] of this [tractate], that rule is advantageous to the totality of mortals, and by the same argument to the whole congregation of believers, through which quarrels and disputes, to which the nature of mortals is prone, are more equitably and suitably settled. But quarrels and disputes which can arise between clerics and laymen for countless reasons are settled more equitably and suitably if everyone, both clerics and laymen, has one supreme judge under whom all should litigate, than if there are many such judges, that is an ecclesiastical one and a secular one. For if a matter of dispute has arisen between clerics and laymen and they have to litigate before an ecclesiastical judge who is not the supreme judge of laymen, the laymen will justly consider him suspect. Similarly if they have to litigate before a secular judge who is not the judge of clerics, the clerics will not without reason consider him suspect. A dispute between clerics and laymen, therefore, will not be dissolved without reasonable suspicion unless there is one supreme judge of everyone. |
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Amplius ut communiter maiores et plures occasiones discordiarum, contentionum, seditionum, praeliorum et guerrarum ac rixarum emergunt inter morantes simul quam inter distantes si simul morantes non habent unum iudicem summum {*supremum &NaRe} {*trs. &MzNaRe} cuius metu ab huiusmodi {huius &NaRe} refrenentur. Sed inter distantes, valentes ad {*om. &NaRe} invicem {*tamen add. &NaRe} communicationem {*communionem &NaRe} habere, saepe contingunt occasiones malorum huiusmodi {huius &NaRe}. Ergo multo magis timendum est ne talia inter morantes simul emergant nisi habeant unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem qui omnes impedientes tranquillitatem et pacem habeat {*habeant &NaRe} coercere. |
Further, as is commonly known, more and greater opportunities for discord, strife, sedition, battles, wars and brawls arise among those living together than among those who are distant, if those living together do not have one supreme judge by fear of whom they are restrained from things of this kind. But among those who are distant, yet able to have communion with each other, opportunities for evils of this kind often come to pass. It is therefore much more to be feared that such things will arise among those living together unless they have one supreme judge who has the power to coerce those hindering peace and tranquillity. |
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Rursus nulla communitas simul viventium vita politica est {trs.312 &Na} optime ordinata nisi sit civiliter una. Unde {*et add. &MzNaRe} fideles, sicut sunt unum corpus in Christo (ad Romanos {ad Romanos: Joh. &NaRe} 12:[5]), ita etiam debent esse unum corpus seu collegium in vita civili. Sed communitas illa quae habet diversos summos {*supremos &NaRe} iudices seu diversa capita sive rectores non est civiliter una, sicut illi qui non habent unum regem non sunt unum regnum {non sunt unum regnum om. &Re}. Sed communitas seu congregatio fidelium vel est optime ordinata vel laborare debet ut sit optime ordinata et civiliter quia vita civilis pro eo quod includit diversas partes et diversos modos ponendi {*vivendi &NaRe} competit religioni Christianae et vitae gratiae non repugnat. Ergo communitas fidelium si non est una quia non habet unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem qui malefactores omnes per seipsum vel per iudices constitutos ab ipso seu inferiores eo habeat castigare, ad habendum unum huiusmodi {huius &NaRe} {*trs. &NaRe} summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem ut sit optime ordinata civiliter etiam {*et &NaRe} civiliter una debet efficaciter laborare. Et ita non expedit ut in communitate fidelium sint plures iudices summi {*supremi &NaRe}, quorum unus clericos {clericus &Re} et alius laicos {laicus &Re} debeat castigare. CAP. XX.Discipulus Nunc videamus qualiter impugnatur quartus modus ponendi comunitatem fidelium non habere unum iudicem summum {*supremum &NaRe} sicut {*supra &NaRe} ca. 17. recitatur {*recitatus &NaRe}. |
Again, no community of those living together is best regulated in its political life unless it is one according to civil law. Whence also in regard to the faithful, just as they are one body in Christ (Romans 12:5), so also they should be one body or college in civil life. But that community which has various supreme judges or various heads or rulers is not one in civil law, just as those who do not have one king are not one kingdom. But a community or congregation of believers either is best regulated or should take pains to be best regulated, especially in civil law, because on account of the fact that civil life includes different parts and different ways of living it belongs to christian religion and is not opposed to the life of faith. If a community of believers is not one, therefore, because it does not have one supreme judge who has the power to punish all wrong-doers either himself or through judges established by him or inferior to him, it should strive powerfully to have supreme judge of this kind so that it is best regulated civilly and is one in civil law. And so it is not appropriate that in a community of believers there be many supreme judges, one of whom should punish clerics and the other, laymen. Chapter 20Student Let us now see how the fourth way of putting [the view] that a community of believers does not have one supreme judge, as recorded in chapter 17 above, is attacked. |
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Magister Iste {*Ille &MzNaRe} modus tenet sicut dictum est ibi quod una pars fidelium scilicet clericorum habet unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem a quo solo vel a {*om. &MzNaRe} [[add. interlinear Mz]] iudicibus inferioribus eo debet iudicari {*pro quocumque delicto. Alia pars, scilicet laicorum, habet alium iudicem supremum a quo solo pro quibusdam delictis iudicari debet add. &NaRe}, praesertim si circa iustitiam exhibendam non fuerit negligens aut remissus. Pro quibusdam autem delictis iudicari debet, praesertim si circa iustitiam exhibendam non fuit negligens aut remissus {*praesertim si circa iustitiam exhibendam non fuit negligens aut remissus om. &NaRe}, sicut et iudex {*suus add. &NaRe} summus {*supremus &NaRe}, a summo iudice alterius partis, scilicet a papa vel iudicibus ecclesiasticis inferioribus ipso. Sed quibusdam apparet quod talis communitas non est optime disposita civiliter quia ista {*illa &NaRe} communitas non est optime civiliter {*om. &Na} ordinata in qua, quantum permittit status vitae praesentis, occasiones discordiarum et litium ac seditionum, rixarum, praeliorum et guerrarum minime amputantur. Sed in communitate fidelium, si praedicto modo fuerit ordinata, non amputantur, quantum est possibile pro statu praesentis vitae {*trs. &NaRe}, occasiones malorum huiusmodi {huius &Re}. Nam non minima occasio talium est si diversi iudices simul et eodem tempore eundem reum, praesertim divitem et potentem, ad diversa loca et iudicia trahere moliantur. Poterit autem contingere quod aliquis laicus potens et dives committat diversa scelera, quorum aliqua ad iudicem secularem et alia ad iudicem ecclesiasticum pertineant punienda; quare poterit evenire quod tam iudex secularis quam ecclesiasticus voluerit ipsum trahere ad suum forum quod pro eodem tempore {*pro eodem tempore om. &MzNaRe} est {*erit &NaRe} impossibile. Ergo ex hoc orietur contentio et seditio, rixa et guerra inter iudices ipsos et per consequens inter subditos {*subiectos &NaRe} ipsorum. Quare tali supposita pluralitate iudicum in {et &Re} communitate fidelium pax et tranquillitas subditorum et {*etiam &NaRe} iudicum erunt {*erit &NaRe} leviter dissipata. |
Master As was said there, that way holds that one party of believers, namely the clerics, has one supreme judge by whom, either alone or through judges inferior to him, it should be judged for any crime. The other party, namely laymen, has another supreme judge and by him alone it should be judged for certain crimes, especially if he has not been negligent or remiss in delivering due justice. For certain crimes, however, it should be judged, as also should its supreme judge, by the highest judge of the other party, that is by the pope or ecclesiastical judges inferior to him. But it seems to some people that such a community is not best regulated civilly, because that community is not best regulated civilly in which, as far as the state of this present life permits, opportunities for discord, quarrels, sedition, brawls, battles and wars are not cut off. But if a community of believers is regulated in the aforesaid way, opportunities for evils of that kind are not cut off, as much as is possible for the state of this present life. For not the least opportunity for such things occurs if different judges try together and at the same time to haul the same guilty person, especially if he is rich and powerful, to different places and courts. It can happen, however, that some powerful and rich layman commits different crimes, the punishment of some of which pertains to the secular judge and others to the ecclesiastical judge; as a result it can come to pass that both the secular and the ecclesiastical judge wants to haul him before his court, and this will be impossible. From this will arise, therefore strife and sedition, brawling and war between the judges themselves and consequently between their subjects. Assuming such a plurality of judges in a community of believers, therefore, the peace and tranquillity of their subjects, even of the judges, will easily be overthrown. |
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Contra istum etiam modum ponendi videntur concludere omnes allegationes tam primo {*primi &NaRe} huius c. 1 quam in hoc tertio c. 17 inductae ad probandum quod {ut &Mz} est expediens quod {*ut &NaRe} tota communitas mortalium habeat unum principem qui sit dominus omnium et quod est expediens ut {*quod &NaRe} tota communitas fidelium habeat unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem qui omnes alios fideles habeat si deliquerint {delinquerint &Re} coercere. Quamvis enim plura inconvenientia sequuntur {sequantur &NaRe} [[both unclear]] ad secundum modum ponendi et tertium superius 18 et 19 c. impugnatos quam ad istum, tamen ad istum {tamen ad istum om. &Re} multa {*non /ubi Re\ nulla &NaRe} [[non changed interlinear Re]] sequuntur secundum quod per allegationes illas vel aliquas earum posset ostendi. |
Also seemingly conclusive against that way of putting [the view] are all the arguments of chapter one of the first [book] of this [tractate] and chapter 17 of this third [book] which were brought forward to prove that it is advantageous that the whole community of mortals have one prince who is the lord of all and that it is advantageous that the whole community of believers have one supreme judge who has the power to coerce all other believers if they transgress. For although more unsuitable things follow the second and third ways of putting it, attacked in chapters 18 and 19 above, nevertheless some do follow this way, as could be shown by those arguments or by some of them. |
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Discipulus Breviter tange {*aliquas add. &NaRe} {alias add. &Mz} allegationes per quas alios modos ponendi improbasti {*per quas ... improbasti: supra contra alios modos ponendiadducas &MzNaRe}, quia forte ex deductione earum quam ibi {sibi &Mz} fecisti advertetur {*advertam &NaRe} {adducitur &Mz} an aliquam apparentiam habeant contra istum modum. |
Student Briefly touch on some arguments brought forward [[reading adductas??]] above against other ways of putting [the view], because perhaps from the deduction you made from them there I will observe whether they have any plausibility against this way. |
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Magister {om. &Na} Si laici sint {sunt &Na} subditi {subiecti &Na} tam iudici ecclesiastico quam iudici {om. &Re} seculari {et add. &Re}, quamvis pro diversis casibus, poterit contingere quod uterque istorum iudicum pro casu spectante ad ipsum et pro communibus {omnibus &Na} negociis ad ipsum et laicos spectantibus pertractandis ipsos laicos eodem tempore ad diversa loca vocare voluerint {voluerunt &Mz}. cui {*Qui &Re} ergo {*aut &Re} [[interlinear correction: ergo crossed out]] obedient {*obediunt &NaRe} {*ecclesiastico aut add. &Re} [[marginal addition]] laici {*laico &Re} aut utrique, quod est impossibile, aut neutri, et tunc talis communitas non est {*erit &NaRe} optime ordinata quia illa communitas non est convenienter disposita in qua subditi superiori suo autem {*aut &MzNaRe} non debent aut non possunt obedire. Si obediant uni et non alii {*alteri &NaRe} illi cui non obediunt {*obedient &NaRe} faciunt {*facient &NaRe} iniuriam et ipsum offendunt {*offendent &NaRe} {offenderent &Mz} a quo pro contumacia punientur. |
Master If laymen are subject to both an ecclesiastical judge and a secular one, even if for different cases, it can happen that each of those judges wants to call those laymen to different places at the same time for a case which pertains to him or for some common business pertaining to him and to the laymen which has to be investigated. They obey, therefore, either the ecclesiastic or the layman, or both, which is impossible, or neither, and then such a community will not be best ordered, because that community is not suitably regulated in which subjects either ought not or can not obey their superior. If they obey one and not the other, they will inflict a wrong on the one they do not obey and offend him and he will punish them for contumacy. |
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Amplius per talem pluralitatem iudicii {*iudicum &NaRe} communis utilitas laicorum impedietur quia non poterunt obedire utrique iudici summo {*supremo &NaRe} si pro communibus negociis vocati fuerint {fuerunt &Mz} eodem tempore ad loca diversa. |
Further, the common utility of laymen will be hindered by such a plurality of judges because they will not be able to obey both supreme judges if they are called to different places at the same time for common business. |
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Rursus nemo iuxta sententiam Salvatoris potest duobus dominis servire. Ergo laici iudici seculari et ecclesiastico, qui proni sunt ad dissentiendum, servire non poterunt. |
Again, according to the text of the saviour [Matthew 6:24], no one can serve two masters. Therefore they will not be able to serve a secular and an ecclesiastical judge, who are inclined to disagreement. |
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Item {*Iterum &MzNa} iudex secularis et ecclesiasticus {*trs.321 &MzNaRe} ex causis innumeris poterunt dividi contra se. Quare tota communitas fidelium faciliter desolabitur. |
Again, an ecclesiastical and a secular judge will be able to be divided against each other for numberless reasons. Therefore the whole community of believers will easily be laid waste. |
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Adhuc, sicut testatur Hieronimus, in una dioecesi debet esse unus episcopus et in una provincia unus archiepiscopus cuius {*quia &MzNaRe} utilitatem {*unitatem &NaRe} {universitatem &Mz} per multa exempla {*trs. &NaRe} probat. Ergo super laicos debet esse tantum unus iudex summus {*supremus &NaRe} non tantum de {*pro &NaRe} eisdem criminibus sed etiam pro omnibus ut de omnibus criminibus ab uno solo iudice summo {*supremo &NaRe} et aliis iudicibus inferioribus eo debeant iudicari. |
Further, there should be one bishop in one diocese and one archbishop in one province, as Jerome attests, because he proves singleness by many examples. There should be one supreme judge over laymen, therefore, not only for the same crimes but also for all crimes, so that they should be judged for all crimes by one single supreme judge and other judges inferior to him. |
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Rursus omnis potestas est consortis impatiens et praecipue super eosdem subditos et {etiam &Re} pro causis diversis. Ergo iudex secularis erit impatiens si iudex ecclesiasticus super laicos habeat potestatem, etiam {*et &MzNaRe} {in add. &Mz} eodem modo iudex ecclesiasticus habens super laicos aut clericos {*aut clericos om. &NaRe} potestatem erit impatiens si iudex secularis super eosdem {eodem &Mz} habeat potestatem. Quare cito ad iracundiam et per consequens ad contentionem, rixam et {*om. &NaRe}, bellum et guerram provocabuntur. Concluditur ergo quod communitas fidelium non erit optime gubernata {*disposita &NaRe} civiliter, etiam {*et &NaRe} quantum ad vitam politicam, nisi tota et omnis pars eius habeat unum iudicem et rectorem supremum de cuius iurisdictione immediata vel mediata, {*sicut add. &NaRe} {fuit add. &Mz} in omni casu ab eo {*ab eo: vel a quo &Re} {ab eo: vel aliquo &Na} {ab eo: a quo &Mz} vel a {*om. &NaRe} iudicibus inferioribus eo, omnis alius pro quocunque delicto debeat iudicari. CAP. XXI.Discipulus Audivi qualiter secundus modus et tertius et quartus ponendi communitatem fidelium non habere unicum {*unum &NaRe} summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem, sicut {*supra &NaRe} c. 17 recitati sunt {*om. &MzNaRe}, impugnantur; nunc audire desidero quomodo impugnatur quintus. |
Again, all power is impatient of a partner, and especially over the same subjects and for different cases. A secular judge, therefore, will be impatient if an ecclesiastical judge has power over laymen, and in the same way an ecclesiastical judge with power over laymen will be impatient if a secular judge has power over the same men. They will therefore be quickly provoked to anger, and consequently to strife, brawling, war and battle. We conclude therefore that a community of believers will not be best regulated civilly, and with respect to its political life, unless each and every part of it has one supreme judge and ruler under whose immediate or mediate jurisdiction everyone else should be judged for every crime, that is, in every case either by him or by judges inferior to him. Chapter 21Student I have heard how the second third and fourth ways of putting [the view] that a community does not have a single supreme judge, recorded in chapter 17 above, are attacked; now I want to hear how the fifth is attacked. |
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Magister Quintus est quorundam qui ponunt quod imperator est iudex in omni casu omnium Christianorum praeterquam papae, quia papa exceptus {*exemptus &NaRe} est totaliter a iurisdictione imperatoris et cuiuslibet mortalis. Omnes autem alii clerici {*trs. &NaRe} solummodo sunt excepti {*exempti NaRe} {*trs.231 &NaRe} per privilegia imperatorum et regum. Iste autem modus taliter impugnatur. Sicut non absque periculo dissipationis {dispensationis &Re} tranquillitatis et pacis duae multitudines hominum simul in eodem loco morantur si non habent unum summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem qui malefactores coerceat, sic non absque periculo dissipationis {dispensationis &Re} tranquillitatis et pacis moratur aliquis non subiectus cum alio vel cum aliis qui potestatem {*potentem &NaRe} et magnam sequelam potest habere. Talis enim propter sequelem quam potest habere est pro multis non immerito computandus; sed papa propter altitudinem officii quo fungitur potest habere maximam sequelem Christianorum. Ergo si non subiectus {*est add. &MzNaRe} summo {*supremo &NaRe} iudici Christianorum non morabitur cum ipso absque periculo dissipationis {dispensationis &Re} tranquillitatis et pacis. |
Master The fifth is that of some people who maintain that the emperor is in every case the judge of all christians except the pope, because the pope is completely exempt from the jurisdiction of the emperor and of every mortal. All other clerics, however, are exempt only through the privileges of emperors and kings. However, that way is attacked as follows. Just as two multitudes of people do not live together in the same place without the danger of the destruction of tranquillity and peace if they do not have one supreme judge who coerces wrong-doers, so it is not without the danger of the destruction of tranquillity and peace that someone who can have a powerful and great following lives with someone else or with others but is not a subject. For on account of the following that he can have, such a person should not unjustly be reckoned as representing many; but on account of the extent of the office that he administers the pope can have the greatest following of christians. If he is not subject to the supreme judge of the christians, therefore, he will not live with him without the danger of the destruction of tranquillity and peace. |
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