CAP. XXII.
{XXIII &NaRe} Discipulus Cerno quod ratio quam
{allegasti add. &Mz} a 17 c. usque hic {*usque hic: huc usque
&NaRe} tractavimus fundatur in duobus, quorum primum est quod
nulla communitas seu congregatio mortalium, nec universalis nec
particularis, est optime disposita nisi unum caput seu rectorem
summum {*supremum &NaRe} habeat, cui omnes nullo excepto
{*exempto NaRe} quo ad omnia quae pro communi utilitate sunt
necessario facienda sint subiecti. et {*om. &NaRe} Quod multum
apparentiae videtur habere, quia ubi non est unitas non est facile
concordiam conservare. Non est autem una congregatio seu multitudo,
neque universalis neque particularis, quae non habeat {*habet
&MzNaRe} unum caput seu rectorem, quia, ut testatur beatus
Cyprianus, prout legitur 24, q. 1, c. Loquitur, ubi est
unitas oportet quod eius origo ab uno incipiat quia, ut dicit ibidem,
"ab unitate exordium proficiscitur." {*Ergo add. &NaRe}
in quacunque communitate seu congregatione est unitas, illa unitas
{illa unitas om. &Re} ab uno incipit. Ille autem unus non est
nisi caput et rector communitatis. Ergo nulla communitas est vere una
nisi illa {*om. &NaRe} cuius caput et {caput et om. &NaRe}
rector est unus ita ut omnes alii sint membra ipsius. |
Chapter 22
Student I see that the argument which we have
treated from chapter 17 up to here is based on two [points], of which
the first is that no community or gathering of mortals, whether
universal or particular, is best regulated unless it has one supreme
head or ruler, to whom everyone else, with no exception, is subject
with respect to everything that has necessarily to be done for the
common benefit. This seems to have much plausibility, because where
there is not unity it is not easy to preserve harmony. There is not
one gathering or multitude, however, whether universal or particular,
which does not have one head or ruler, because as blessed Cyprian
attests, as we read in 24, q. 1, c. Loquitur [c.18,
col.971], where there is a unity it is necessary that its beginning
springs from one thing, since, as he says there "its beginning
sets out from unity." In any community or gathering in which
there is unity, therefore, that unity begins from one thing. That one
thing, however, is nothing but the head and ruler of the community.
No community is truly one, therefore, unless there is one head and
ruler of it, so that all the others are its members. |
|
Item {iterum &Re} unitas communitatis seu congregatio
{*congregationis &NaRe} non est nisi unitas ordinis secundum
superioritatem et inferioritatem, ut quilibet respectu alterius sit
inferior sive {*vel &NaRe} superior vel plures sint inferiores
respectu unius superioris, quia ubi essent {sunt &Na} [[corrected
to essent margin]] plures superiores respectu unius inferioris non
esset verissia {*verissima &MzNaRe} unitas quae est optima
dispositio communitatis. Oportet igitur {*ergo &NaRe} quod summus
{*supremus &NaRe} {*superior add. &NaRe} in communitate
potissima {*una add. &NaRe} sit unicus, et ita videtur multum
{*trs. &MzNaRe} apparens quod nulla communitas, nec particularis
nec universalis, est optime ordinata nisi habeat unum caput vel {*seu
&MzNaRe} rectorem, cui {*cuius &NaRe} omnes alii sunt {*sint
&MzNaRe} subiecti. Unde et una domus non est optime disposita
nisi habeat unum patremfamilias, nec una villa nec una civitas nec
unum regnum optime gubernatur nisi ab uno summo {*supremo &NaRe}
regatur {fungatur &Mz}. Et ideo omnes volentes secundum rationem
politice vivere unum caput summum {*supremum &NaRe} constituerent
super omnes. |
Again, the unity of a community or gathering is nothing but a unity
of order according to superiority and inferiority, so that everyone
is an inferior or a superior with respect to another person or many
are inferior with respect to one superior, because where there were
many superiors with respect to one inferior there would not be the
most genuine unity which is the best regulation of a community. It is
necessary therefore that the supreme superior in the one most
important community be single, and so it seems quite clear that no
community, whether particular or universal, is best ordered unless it
has one head or ruler, whose subject everyone one else is. Whence one
home also is not best regulated unless it has one head of the family,
nor are one village, one town or one kingdom best governed unless
they are ruled by one who is supreme. And therefore all who have
wanted to live politically according to reason have set up one
supreme head over themselves. |
|
Secundum in quo videtur fundari ista {*illa &NaRe} ratio est quod
imperator et alii laici non sunt, in omnibus quae spectant ad
gubernationem ipsorum et correctionem si deliquerint {delinquerint
&NaRe}, subditi summo pontifici. Quod {quia &Mz}, ut {om.
&Na} videtur, non habet tantam apparentiam sicut primum. Ideo pro
isto alias {*aliquas &NaRe} allegationes {*trs. &Na} adducas. |
The second [point] on which that argument seems to be based is that
the emperor and other laymen are not subject to the highest pontiff
in all matters which pertain to their governing and their correcting
if they transgress. It seems that this does not have as much
plausibility as the first [point]. Would you therefore adduce some
arguments for it? |
|
Magister Pro ista {*isto &MzNaRe} poteris tu
colligere allegationes quamplures ex primo huius {huiusmodi &MzNa}
ac {*om. &NaRe} pluribus capitulis, specialiter. c. 28, et ex
{om. &NaRe} secundo huius {huiusmodi &Na} c. 1 et 12 et {om.
&Na} 14 et 15. |
Master You will be able to assemble very many
arguments for that [point] from many chapters in the first [book] of
this [tractate], especially chapter 28, and from chapters 1, 12, 14
and 15 of the second [book] in this [tractate]. |
|
Discipulus Pro isto secundo {om. &Re} fundamento
praescriptae rationis alias {*aliquas &NaRe} speciales
allegationes adducas vel alias {*aliquas &NaRe} prius tactas
magis exquisite pertracta. |
Student Would you bring forward some particular
arguments for that second basis of the above argument, or consider
more carefully some already touched on? |
|
Magister Primo huius {huiusmodi &Na} c. 28 tacta
est una allegatio quae nonnullis apparet multum fortis, quae talis
est. Ille non est inferior alio quoad illa in quibus ab ipso ad istum
{*illum &NaRe} alium appellare {apparere &Mz} non licet, quia
in omnibus in quibus unus iudex est inferior alio licet appellare
{apparere &Mz} ad illum superiorem vel saltem ad {in &Mz}
superiorem ipso. Sed in multis causis non licet appellare ab
imperatore ad papam. Ergo {*quo add. &MzNaRe} ad multa imperator
non est inferior papa. quod {*Maior &NaRe} {quia &Mz} per
sacros canones probatur aperte. {*Nam add. &NaRe} Fabianus papa,
ut habetur 2, q. 6, c. 1 ait, licet {"Liceat &NaReZn}
appellatori viciatam causam remedio appellationis sublevare."
{*Et add. &NaRe} idem eadem {*eisdem &NaRe} causa et q. c. Liceat
ait, "Liceat etiam in criminalibus causis appellare, nec vox
appellandi negatur eo quod {*negatur eo quod: negetur ei quem
&NaRe} in supplicio sententia destinaverit." Ex his {*quibus
&NaRe} colligitur quod ubicunque {ubique &Mz} habet iudex
{*trs. &NaRe} superiorem ad superiorem potest appellare
{*appellari &NaRe}. Minor, scilicet quod in multis causis non est
appellandum ab imperatore ad papam, multis modis probatur. Hoc enim
glossa 2, q. 6, c. {*Omnis add. &Re} [[Na illegible]]
super verbo "sacerdotum" videtur asserere dicens, "Ergo
a seculari iudice ad papam potest appellari, quod verum est vacante
imperio, ut Extra, De foro competenti, {*c. add. Zn} Licet,
alias et {*non &MzNaReZn}, Extra, De appellationibus
{*c. add. Zn} sed {*Si Zn} duobus." |
Master There is an argument touched on in chapter 28
of the first [book] in this [tractate] which seems very strong to
some people, and this is it. One person is not inferior to another
with respect to those matters in which it is not licit to appeal from
the former to the latter, because in all matters in which one judge
is inferior to another it is permitted to appeal to that superior, or
at least to that one's superior. But in many matters it is not
permitted to appeal from the emperor to the pope. With respect to
many matters, therefore, the emperor is not inferior to the pope. The
major premise is clearly proved by sacred canons. For as we find in
2, q. 6, c. 1, [Liceat col.467] Pope Fabianus says, "An
appellant is permitted to alleviate a faulty case by the remedy of an
appeal." And in the same causa and quaestio c, Liceat
[c.20, col.472], the same pope says, "Even in criminal cases it
is permitted to appeal and the voice of appeal is not denied to him
for whom a sentence has resolved on punishment." We gather from
these that wherever a judge has a superior, appeal can be made to the
superior. The minor premise, namely that in many cases there ought
not be appeal from the emperor to the pope, is proved in many ways.
For the gloss on the word sacerdotum in 2, q. 6, c. Omnis
[c.3, col.656] seems to assert this when it says, "Appeal can be
made therefore from a secular judge to the pope, which is true with
the empire unoccupied, as in Extra, De foro competenti, c. Licet,
at other times not, Extra, De appellationibus, c. Si duobus." |
|
Item glossa eodem capitulo super verbo "in commune" ait,
primo {idem &Re} {*"Id est &Na} publice", ut
secularis iudex audiat seculares causas, ecclesiasticus
ecclesiasticas audiat. Et sic planum est quod dicitur in textu, sed
{*scilicet &MzNaRe} cum dicit Anacletus, "coram patriacha
aut primate ecclesiastico {*ecclesiastica &NaReZn} et coram
patricio secularia negotia iudicentur." Ex quibus verbis
colligitur quod in negotiis secularibus a iudice seculari et per
consequens ab imperatore non est appellandum ad papam. |
Again, the gloss on the words in commune in the same chapter
says, "That is publicly", so that a secular judge hears
secular cases and an ecclesiastical judge ecclesiastical cases. And
so what is said in the text is plain, when Anacletus says, that is,
"Let ecclesiastical business be judged before the patriarch or
primate and secular business before a nobleman." We gather from
these words that in secular business there should be no appeal to the
pope from a secular judge, nor consequently from the emperor. |
|
Discipulus Si secundum glossam primam vacante
imperio licet appellare ad papam, ergo papa habet disponere de
imperio, et per consequens imperator ratione imperii est inferior
papa. Et ita etiam non vacante imperio licet appellare ab imperatore
ad {om. &Mz} papam, etiam in secularibus causis. |
Student If in accordance with the first gloss it is
permitted to appeal to the pope when the empire is unoccupied, the
pope therefore has the power to dispose of the empire, and
consequently the emperor, by reason of the empire, is inferior to the
pope. And so even when the empire is not unoccupied it is permitted
to appeal from the emperor to the pope, even in secular cases. |
|
Magister Respondetur tibi quod papa vacante imperio
nihil habet disponere de imperio nisi auctoritate imperatoris
instituentis eum vicarium suum vel auctoritate aliorum, scilicet
Romanorum vel principum quibus concessa {*commissa &NaRe} est
potestas ordinandi quis debeat gerere vicem imperatoris vacante
imperio. Et ideo si vacante imperio contingit appellare ad papam hoc
est inquantum papa gerit vicem imperatoris et locum imperatoris
tenet. Qui autem gerit vices {*vicem &NaRe} alterius et locum
eius tenet est inferior eo in hoc, quia semper vicarius est inferior
eo cuius est vicarius. Ergo papa est in hoc {*trs.231 &NaRe}
inferior et minor imperatore, et per consequens ab ipso {*om.
&NaRe} imperatore non licet appellare ad papam. |
Master The reply to you is that with the empire
unoccupied the pope does not have the power to dispose of the empire,
except by the authority of the emperor appointing him as his vicar or
by the authority of others, that is of the Romans or of princes to
whom the power of arranging who ought to act in place of the emperor
when the empire is unoccupied has been committed. And therefore if it
is possible to appeal to the pope when the empire is unoccupied, this
is in so far as the pope acts in place of the emperor and occupies
the emperor's place. He who acts in the place of another, however,
and occupies his place is inferior to him in this, because a vicar is
always inferior to him whose vicar he is. Therefore the pope in this
is inferior to and less than the emperor, and consequently it is not
permitted to appeal from the emperor to the pope. |
|
Discipulus Licet ista instantia apparenter videatur
{videtur &Mz} {inclusa vel add. &Mz} exclusa, tamen adhuc
videtur posse ostendi quod pro negociis seu causis secularibus liceat
ab imperatore et aliis secularibus iudicibus appellare {*ad papam
add. &NaRe}. Nam ad illum licet appellare qui potest causam
viciatam sublevare. Sed si causa secularis in foro seculari vel coram
iudice seculari fuerit {causa add. &Mz} viciata, quia imperator
{*scilicet add. &NaRe} vel alius iudex secularis non vult facere
iustitiae complementum, papa potest causam taliter viciatam sublevare
et ad ipsum vel alium iudicem ecclesiasticum est recurrendum pro
iustitia obtinenda, Extra, De foro competenti, c. Ex transmissa
et c. Verum et c. Licet et c. Ex tenore.
Ergo licet appellare ab imperatore et aliis iudicibus secularibus ad papam. |
Student Even if that example seems apparently to be
excluded, it still seems showable nevertheless that it is permitted
to appeal from the emperor and other secular judges to the pope for
secular business or cases. For it is permitted to appeal to him who
can alleviate a faulty case. But if a secular case in a secular forum
or before a secular judge is faulty, because, that is, the emperor or
another secular judge does not want to execute justice, the pope can
alleviate a case made faulty like this, and recourse should be had to
him or to another ecclesiastical judge in order to obtain justice (Extra,
De foro competenti, c. Ex transmissa [c.6, col.249],
c. Verum [c.7, col.250], c. Licet [c.10, col.250],
c, Ex tenore [c.11, col.251]). Therefore it is permitted to
appeal from the emperor and other secular judges to the pope. |
|
Magister Respondetur quod etiam in decretalibus quae
maiorem iurisdictionem et auctoritatem papae et iudicibus
ecclesiasticis tribuere videntur {videtur &Na} {*trs. &NaRe}
nunquam {*nusquam &NaRe} invenitur quod si imperator neglexerit
facere iustitiam in causa seculari eo ipso possit papa {om. &NaRe}
auctoritate papalis officii et ex ordinatione Christi in eadem causa
facere iustitiae complementum, licet ex consuetudine in quantum {*in
quantum: quam &NaRe} imperator scit et approbat, vel saltem scit
et non prohibet sed tolorans {*tolerat &NaRe}, hoc faciat papa et
iudices ecclesiastici in quibusdam regionibus, {*sicut in quibusdam
regionibus add. &NaRe} iudicant de aliquibus criminibus pure
secularibus, irrequisito omni iudice seculari, quod tamen eis ex {om.
&Re} iure divino non competit. Et hinc est quod ex consuetudine
obtinent papa et ecclesiastici iudices quod quando iudex secularis
negligit facere iustitiam ad ipsos recurritur. Quae quidem
consuetudo, si iudices seculares in illis regionibus fuerint
notabiliter negligentes, potest ex causa {*ex causa: esse &NaRe}
rationabili {*rationabilis et &NaRe} praescribi, {et add. &Mz}
praesertim si imperator hoc sciens ipsam {om. &Na} duxerit
tolerandam. Cum ergo dicis quod ad illum licet appellare qui potest
causam viciatam sublevare, respondetur quod hoc non est generaliter
verum, vocando causam viciatam omnem {*causam add. &MzNaRe} quae
iusta sententia minime terminatur, quia appellatio semper debet fieri
ad maiorem. et {*om. &MzNaRe} Causam {*autem add. &NaRe}
taliter viciatam, quae scilicet iuste minime terminatur, potest
quandoque minor supplendo negligentiam maioris sublevare, sicut etiam
in conferendo beneficio {*conferendo beneficio: conferendis
beneficiis &NaRe} et aliis disponendis potest minor supplere
negligentiam superioris, Extra, De electione, Cum in cunctis,
Extra, De concessione praebendarum, c. Nulla et c. Quia
diversitatem, Extra, De institutionibus Grave,
et 9, q. 3, Cum simus et 89. dist. Volumus, ubi
dicit glossa, "Arg. quod si praelatus non vult vel negligit
facere {*ea add. &MzNaReZn} quae debet, tunc {*om. &NaReZn}
ea debent supplere subditi {*supplere subditi:suppleri per subditos
&NaReZn}." Hoc etiam colligitur ex concilio Sardicensis quod
ponitur dist. 65 {trs. &NaRe} c. ultimo ubi dicit glossa,
"{*Arg. add. &NaRe} quod si subditi negligunt facere quod
{*quae &Zn} debent, debeat {*ea debeant &Zn} {debeatur
&MzNaRe} suppleri a maiori, vel per se, vel per alium, et
econverso." Ex quibus aliisque quampluribus patet quod
inferiores possunt supplere negligentiam superioris {*superiorum
&Na} [[MzRe unclear]], cum etiam saepe possunt {*possint
&NaRe} {*trs. &NaRe} {*suos add. &MzNaRe} superiores
corrigere et {*etiam add. &NaRe} cohercere, teste Egino {*Iginio
&NaRe} papa qui, ut legitur 9, q. 3, c. Salvo, ait,
"Salvo in omnibus Romanae ecclesiae privilegio nullus
metropolitanus absque ceterorum comprovincialium episcoporum
instantia aliquorum audiat causas, quia irritae erunt aliter {*actae
add. &Zn}, antequam {*quam &Zn} in conspectu omnium eorum
erunt {*om. &MzNaReZn} ventilatae, et ipse, si fecerit,
coherceatur a fratribus." Cui {qui &Re} concordare videtur
Anitius {*Anterus &NaRe} {Altius &Mz} papa qui eadem {*eisdem
&MzNaRe} causa {capitulis &Mz} 9 {*et q. &MzNaRe} c. Si
autem ait, c. {*om. &MzNaRe} "Si autem aliquis
metropolitanorum inflatus fuerit et sine omnium comprovincialium
{provincialium &Na} praesentia vel consilio episcoporum vel
causas eorum vel eas {*vel eas: aut alias causas, nisi eas causas
&MzNaReZn} tantum, quae ad propriam suam pertinent parrochiam,
agere aut gravare eos voluerit, ab omnibus districte corrigatur ne
talia deinceps praesumere audeat. Si vero incorrigibilis eisque
inobediens apparuerit, ad hanc apostolicam sedem, cui {dum &Mz}
{omnium add. &NaRe} {*omnia add. &Zn} episcoporum iudicia
referri praecepta sunt, eius contumacia referatur ut de eo vindicta
fiat." Ex praedictis {*quibus &NaRe} colligitur quod minor
potest supplere negligentiam maioris. Et ideo non semper ille qui
potest causam vitiatam sublevare est maior, et per consequens non
potest semper {super &Mz} appellari ad ipsum. Quare licet papa
suppleat negligentiam iudicum secularium, et {*etiam &NaRe} si
suppleret negligentiam imperatoris terminando causam quam imperator
terminare negligeret {neglexerit &Re}, non posset per hoc ostendi
{*nec add. &NaRe} quod ab imperatore liceat appellare ad papam
nec quod imperator in talibus sit minor papa. |
Master The reply is that even in the decretals which
seem to bestow greater jurisdiction and authority on the pope and
ecclesiastical judges we nowhere find that if the emperor has
neglected to do justice in a secular case the pope can, by that very
fact, execute justice in that case on the authority of his papal
office and by the decree of Christ, even if by a custom which the
emperor knows and approves, or at least knows and does not prohibit
but supports, the pope and ecclesiastical judges do this in certain
regions, just as in certain regions they judge purely secular crimes,
with no secular judge being sought; nevertheless this does not belong
to them by divine right. Hence it is that by custom the pope and
ecclesiastical judges acquire [the right] that when a secular judge
neglects to do justice recourse is had to them. If the secular judges
in those regions are notably negligent, that custom can indeed be
reasonable and prescribed, especially if the emperor knows this and
incites support of it. When you say therefore that it is permitted to
appeal to him who can alleviate a faulty case, the reply is that this
is not generally true, calling a faulty case any case which is not
concluded with a just sentence, because an appeal should always be
made to one who is greater. Someone who is lesser, however, can
sometimes alleviate a case faulty in this way, that is one not
concluded justly, by making good the negligence of the greater one,
just as in conferring benefits and disposing of other things a lesser
can also make good the negligence of his superior (Extra, De electione,
c. Cum in cunctis [c.7, col.51], Extra, De concessione praebendarum,
c. Nulla [c.2, col.488] and c. Quia diversitatem
[c.5, col.489], Extra, De institutionibus, c. Grave,
[[wrong reference: possibly Extra, De praebendis, c. Grave
c.29, col.478]] 9, q. 3, c. Cum simus [c.3, col.607], and
dist. 89, c. Volumus [col. 426], where the gloss says,
"It is argued that if a prelate does not want or neglects to do
those things that he ought to do, those things should be made good by
his subjects." We gather this also from the Council of Sardinia,
found in the last chapter of dist. 65 [Si forte] where the
gloss [col.340] says, "It is argued that if subjects neglect to
do what they should, those things ought to be made good by one who is
greater, either himself or though someone else, and conversely."
It is clear from these and very many others that inferiors can make
good the negligence of their superiors, especially since they can
often correct their superiors and even coerce them, as Pope Iginius
attests when he says, as we read in 9, q. 3, c. Salvo [c.4,
col.607], "Saving the privilege of the Roman church in all
matters, let no archbishop, except at the insistence of the rest of
the bishops of his province, hear the cases of some of them, because
the ones dealt with will be void unless they are discussed in the
sight of all of them, and let him be coerced by his brothers if he
does so." Pope Anterus seems to agree with this. In the same causa
and quaestio c. Si autem he says, "However, if
any metropolitan is haughty and, without all his provincials present
or without the advice of his bishops, wants to treat either their
cases or other cases, with the exception only of those cases which
pertain to his own parish, or wants to oppress them, let him be
severely corrected by all of them so that he will not dare to
undertake such things thereafter. Certainly if he appears
incorrigible and disobedient to them, let his contumacy be referred
to this apostolic see, to which all the judgements of bishops have
been ordered to be referred, so that punishment may be inflicted on
him." We gather from these that a lesser can make good the
negligence of a greater. And it is not always the one who is greater,
therefore, who can alleviate a faulty case, and consequently there
can not always be appeal to him. Even if the pope makes good the
negligence of secular judges, therefore, even if he were to make good
the negligence of the emperor by concluding a case which the emperor
neglected to conclude, it could not be shown by this either that
appeal is permitted from the emperor to the pope or that the emperor
is less than the pope in such matters. |
|
Discipulus Quod minor valeat supplere negligentiam
superioris, hoc non est nisi auctoritate canonis conditi a concilio
quod est superiius illo inferiori qui potest supplere negligentiam
superioris, Extra, De concessione praebendarum, Quia diversitatem.
Sed papa auctoritate talis canonis vel legis non supplet
negligentiam iudicum secularium vel imperatorum {*imperatoris Re} sed
auctoritate propria. Ergo ex officio maior est imperatore in talibus
et etiam {*om. &NaRe} omnibus aliis iudicibus secularibus. |
Student That a lesser can make good the negligence
of his superior is only by the authority of a canon produced by a
council which is superior to that inferior who can make good the
negligence of his superior (Extra, De concessione praebendarum,
c. Quia diversitatem [c.5, col.489]). But it is not by the
authority of such a canon or law that the pope makes good the
negligence of secular judges or of the emperor, but it is by his own
authority. He is, therefore, by virtue of his office greater than the
emperor in such things and than all other secular judges. |
|
Magister {om. &Re} Respondetur tibi quod sicut
inferiores auctoritate legis supplent negligentiam superioris, ita
papa virtute consuetudinis quae {qui &Mz} aequipollet
{*aequivalet &NaRe} legi supplet negligentiam iudicum secularium.
Et ideo {*et ideo: quare &NaRe} auctoritate officii sui non
supplet negligentiam talem. Et ideo non est maior in huiusmodi {huius
&Re} causis {*iudicibus add. &MzNaRe} secularibus. |
Master The reply to you is that just as inferiors
make good the negligence of their superior by the authority of law,
so it is by virtue of custom, which is equivalent to law, that the
pope makes good the negligence of secular judges. Therefore he does
not make good such negligence by the authority of his office. And
therefore he is not greater in cases of this kind than secular judges. |
|
Discipulus Cuius auctoritate vel consensu potest
introduci talis consuetudo quae tribuat papae huiusmodi {huius
&Re} potestatem? |
Student By whose authority or consent can such a
custom, which bestows on the pope power of this kind, be introduced? |
|
Magister Ad hoc tibi {*tripliciter &NaRe}
respondetur: uno modo quod potest introduci huiusmodi {*om. &NaRe}
consuetudo auctoritate vel consensu tacito vel expresso imperatoris
et iudicum secularium quibus potest placere quod papa negligentiam
suppleat eorundem aut possunt scienter tolerare quod hoc faciat papa.
Aliter diciter quod potest introduci auctoritate populi qui velint
vel consentiant {*velint vel consentiant: velit vel consentiat
&NaRe} quod papa huiusmodi habeat potestatem. Aliter dicitur quod
potest introduci auctoritate sive ratione {*sive ratione om.
&NaRe} naturalis rationis {*trs. &NaRe} quae dictat quod
iustitia est nullatenus negligenda quin {quando &Mz} semper in
communitate servetur. |
Master This is replied to in three ways: in one way,
that such a custom can be introduced by the tacit or express
authority or consent of the emperor and the secular judges, to whom
it can be soothing that the pope makes good their negligence, or they
can knowingly tolerate the pope's doing this. In another way it is
said that it can be introduced by the authority of the people who
want the pope to have or agree to his having power of this kind. In
another way it is said that it can be introduced on the authority of
natural reason which prescribes that justice should not be neglected
but rather is always preserved in a community. |
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Discipulus Nunquid possent imperator et iudices
seculares talem consuetudinem tollere? |
Student Could the emperor and secular judges abolish
such a custom? |
|
Magister Respondetur quod secundum istam {*illam
&NaRe} assertionem quae ponit quod talis consuetudo potest
introduci de consensu tacito vel expresso imperatoris et iudicum
secularium, imperator posset eam tollere sed non alii iudices
seculares. Quia enim praescriptio est a iure imperiali et non {*est
add. &NaRe} ab inferioribus iudicibus, ideo enim {*in &MzNaRe}
hoc non potest papa praescribere contra imperatorem si expresse et
ex certa scientia tolerat {*tollat &NaRe} huiusmodi
consuetudinem. Sed contra alios iudices seculares inferiores
praescribere potest {trs. &Na} papa. Si tamen imperator revocaret
{trs. &Na} huiusmodi consuetudinem aut {*et &MzNaRe} aliquo
modo {*aliquo modo om. &NaRe} {aliquo modo: nullo modo &Mz}
negligeret facere iustitiam vel {*ac &MzNaRe} etiam permitteret
alios iudices inferiores negligere iustitiam et nullatenus sustineret
quod papa vel alius suppleret tam perniciosam negligentiam et omnibus
{*omnino &NaRe} verisimiliter huiusmodi {omnibus verisimiliter
huiusmodi om. &Mz} confusio {*verisimiliter huiusmodi confusio
om. &NaRe} incorrigibilis appareret, esset tanquam destructor et
perversor iustitiae de dignitate imperiali deponendus.
CAP. XXIII.
{24 &NaRe} Discipulus Diffuse tractata est ratio
prima quam incepi {*incepimus &NaRe} c. 1 {*om. &MzNaRe} 17
ad probandum quod imperator est iudex papae et quod papa est inferior
eo quoad iurisdictionem coactivam. Ideo nunc {*aliquas add. &NaRe}
alias rationes adducas. |
Master The reply is that according to that assertion
which puts it that such a custom can be introduced with the tacit or
express agreement of the emperor and secular judges, the emperor
could remove it but not the secular judges. For because the
prescription is by imperial law and is not from inferior judges, the
pope can not as a result prescribe against the emperor in this
matter, if the latter expressly and with sure knowledge removes a
custom of this kind. But the pope can prescribe against other
inferior secular judges. Nevertheless if the emperor were to revoke a
custom of this kind and were to neglect to bring justice and were
even to permit other inferior judges to neglect justice and were not
to uphold [the right of] the pope or someone else to make good so
baleful a negligence and were to appear wholly incorrigible, he
should be deposed from his imperial dignity as a destroyer and
perverter of justice.
Chapter 23
Student The first argument that we began in chapter
17 to prove that the emperor is the judge of the pope and that the
pope is inferior to him with respect to coercive jurisdiction has
been considered copiously. Would you therefore now bring forward some
other arguments? |
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Magister Ista {*Alia &NaRe} ratio comprehendit
{*comprehendens &NaRe} duas tactas in prima parte istius Dialogi
li. 6 c. 4 et 5 talis est {*trs. &NaRe}. Papa non est magis
exemptus a iurisdictione coactiva imperatoris et aliorum secularium
iudicum quam fuerunt {*fuerint &NaRe} Christus et apostoli. Sed
Christus, inquantum homo mortalis, et apostoli fuerunt ab {*sub
&NaRe} imperatore quantum ad iurisditionem coactivam iudicati
{*om. &NaRe}; ergo consimiliter {*om. &NaRe} et papa. Maior
est manifesta. Minor probatur quantum ad utramque partem. Quod enim
Christus fuerit inferior imperatore et aliis iudicibus secularibus
quantum ad iurisditionem coactivam probatur, quia qui potest accusari
et contra quem possunt alii testificari iudicari {preiudicari &Mz}
potest {*trs. &NaRe}. Sed Christus poterat {malo intellectus
add. &Re} accusari, quod ipsemet testatur cum Ioh. 8:[46] dicit,
"Quis ex vobis arguet me de peccato?" Quibus verbis
concessit Christus {*trs. &NaRe} aliis potestatem accusandi
ipsum. Quod etiam testatur Innocentius III Extra, De haereticis,
Cum ex iniuncto dicens, "Nec quisquam suae
praesumptionis audacia {*audaciam &NaReZn} illo defendat exemplo,
quod asina legitur reprehendisse prophetas {*prophetam &NaReZn},
vel quod dominus ait, `Quis ex vobis arguet me de peccato'" et
infra: "Rursus aliud est quod praelatus sponte de sua confisus
innocentia subditorum se accusationibus supponit, in quo casu
praemissum Domini verbum debet intelligi." Ex quibus verbis
colligitur quod Christus poterat accusari. Ergo et poterat iudicari
ab illo coram quo poterat accusari. |
Master Another argument, which comprises two
[points] touched on in chapters 4 and 5 of book 6 in the first part
of this Dialogue,
is as follows. The pope is not more exempt from the coercive
jurisdiction of the emperor and other secular judges than were Christ
and the apostles; but Christ, as a mortal man, and the apostles were
under the emperor, as far as his coercive jurisdiction was concerned;
therefore the pope is also. The major [premise] is manifest; both parts
of the minor [premise] are proved. For it is proved that as far as
coercive jurisdiction was concerned Christ was inferior to the emperor
and other secular judges, because he who can be accused and against
whom others can testify can be judged. But Christ was able to be
accused, as he himself testifies when he says in John 8:46, "Which of
you convicts me of sin?" By these words Christ granted to others the
power to accuse him. Innocent III also attests to this, saying in Extra,
De haereticis, c. Cum ex iniuncto [c.12, col.784],
"And let no one defend the rashness of his presumption by that
example in which we read that an ass reproved the prophet or that in
which the Lord said, `Which of you convicts me of sin?' ... Another
again is that a prelate relying willingly on his innocence submits
himself to the accusations of his subjects; the above words of the
Lord should be understood as such a case." We understand from
these words that Christ was able to be accused. Therefore he was also
able to be judged by that one before whom he could be accused. |
|
Discipulus Istud non concludit {includit &Mz}
intentum, imo contrarium ex ipso colligitur quod {*quia &NaRe}
Christus solummodo sponte, sicut innuunt praemissa verba, se
supposuit accusationibus subditorum. Et ita Christus non potuit
iudicari nisi quia voluit. Et per consequens iudices non erant
superiores Christo. Ex quo infertur quod exemplo Christi non potest
concludi de papa quod teneatur subire iudicium imperatoris. Sed quod
papa sponte potest se subiicere {*submittere &NaRe} {*trs.
&NaRe} accusationibus aliorum, ut plures sacri canones {*trs.
&NaRe} testantur. |
Student That is not conclusive for its purpose;
indeed from it we gather the opposite, because, as the above words
imply it was only of his own free will that Christ submitted himself
to the accusations of his subjects. And so Christ could be judged
only if he wanted to be. And consequently the judges were not
superior to Christ. From this we infer that from the example of
Christ it can not be concluded of the pope that he is bound to submit
to the judgement of the emperor, but that the pope can submit of his
own free will to the accusations of others, as many sacred canons attest. |
|
Magister Videtur aliis quod verba praemissa probant
intentum, scilicet quod Christus poterat accusari, ita quod iudices,
qui accusatores audire debebant, non poterant repellere volentes
accusare Christum nisi ex causa, puta si non apparerent {apparent
&NaRe} legitimi accusatores vel alio modo repellerentur ab
accusatione secundum iura, ex quo Christus dedit iure {iura &Mz}
{*om. &NaRe} volentibus accusare potestatem accusandi. Et per
consequens ex tali potestate data {*a add. &MzNaRe} Christo erant
iudices {*trs. &NaRe} superiores Christo, in quantum erat homo
mortalis, et Christus sic fuit eis inferior, licet sponte, {*sicut et
sponte add. &NaRe} fuit passibilis et mortalis. |
Master It seems to others that the above words do
establish their purpose, namely that Christ was able to be accused,
in this way, that the judges, who were bound to listen to the
accusers, could not reject those wanting to accuse Christ unless for
a reason, (if, for instance, they did not seem to be legitimate
accusers or they were rejected in some other way by an accusation
according to the laws) because Christ gave power to accuse to those
wanting to accuse him. And consequently, by virtue of that power
given by Christ the judges were superior to Christ, in so far as he
was a mortal man, and Christ was thus inferior to them, although by
his own free will, just as also by his own free will he was mortal
and able to suffer. |
|
Et haec de tertia parte Dialogorum pro nunc tibi sufficiant {*Et haec
... sufficiant om. &MzNaRe}.
[[The text for the rest of chapter 23 is printed from ...]]
Discipulus Quomodo probatur quod alii poterant
testificari contra Christum? |
Student How is it proved that others were able to
testify against Christ? |
|
Magister
Hoc asserit ipsemet Christus, ut videtur {dicens add. &NaRe}
[[crossed out Re]] danti sibi alapam et male {*om. &NaRe} dicenti,
sic respondens pontifici, "Si male locutus sum, testimonium perhibe
{perhibere &NaRe} de malo." Ioh. 18:[23] Hoc etiam Gracianus
sentire videtur, qui, ut legitur 2, q. 7, # Ecce ostensum est, ait, "Christus, quamvis
esset pastor suorum {*suarum &NaReZn} ovium, quas verbo et exemplo
pascebat, tamen quantum ad officiorum distributionem, ex qua hodie in
ecclesiis {*ecclesia Zn} alii presunt aliis, unde quidam prelati,
quidam subditi vocantur, in populo illo pastorale officium non gerebat.
Mistica enim et visibili unctione nec in regem nec in sacerdotem unctus
erat, que sole in illo populo persone prelati veri {*prelati veri:
prelature &NaReZn} nomen sibi vendicabant." Ex quibus verbis
colligitur quod Christus, in quantum homo mortalis, erat subditus illis
qui preerant {erant &Re} in populo illo. |
Master
Christ himself asserts this, it seems, to the one who struck his face
and spoke to him, speaking as follows to the priest, "If I have spoken
wrongly, testify to the wrong." (John 18:23) Gratian also seems to
think this. As we read in 2, q. 7, # Ecce ostensum est [c.39, col.495], he says, "Although
Christ was the shepherd of his sheep, whom he fed by teaching and
example, yet he did not as far as the distribution of offices was
concerned carry on a pastoral office among that people, as a result
of which [distribution] some people are above others in the church
today, with some called prelates and some called subjects. For he had
not been anointed with a mystic and visible anointing either as a
king or a priest, which persons alone laid claim to the name of a
prelature among that people." We gather from these words that as
a mortal man Christ was subject to those who were in command among
that people. |
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Discipulus Hoc Graciano repugnare videtur, qui ubi
primo {*prius &NaRe} ait, "Christus Iudeos ad se arguendum
admisit perfectione humilitatis, non severitate iuris. Si enim legis
rigore essent admissi, hac auctoritate criminosi et {etiam &Na}
infames in accusatione religiosorum recipiendi essent, cum essent
sceleratissimi, qui de morte {*nece &NaReZn} Christi tractantes
innocentem condempnare volebant." Ex quibus verbis
comprehenditur {om. &NaRe} [[add. interlinear Re]] quod Christus
ex rigore iuris accusari non poterat, sed tantummodo ex perfectione humilitatis. |
Student This seems to oppose Gratian who says at
this same place [col.495], "Christ allowed the Jews to accuse
him out of the perfection of his humility, not out of the strictness
of the law. For if they had been allowed out of the rigour of the
law, the guilty and notorious on this authority would have been
accepted in an accusation against the religious, because they were
very wicked men who in discussing the death of Christ wanted to
condemn an innocent man." We understand from these words that
Christ could not be accused out of the strictness of the law, but
only out of the perfection of his humility. |
|
Magister Ad hoc respondetur quod Christus non
poterat accusari ex severitate iuris, que Christo necessitatem
imponeret, quia Christus, in quantum deus, supra omnem talem legem
fuit, et tamen, in quantum homo, ex perfectione humilitatis sponte se
subdidit huiusmodi iuri, ut posset accusari ab illo, qui erat
recipiendus in publico, et ita Christus subdidit erat {*iuri add.
&NaRe}, in quantum homo. Quia tamen sponte, etiam in quantum
homo, erat subditus huiusmodi iuri {trs. &Na}, ideo quodammodo
fuit supra huiusmodi {huius &Re} ius, quia in potestate sua fuit
posse accusari et non posse accusari {et non posse accusari om.
&Na}; et tamen quamdiu ex perfectione humilitatis voluit, poterat
accusari. Ex quo sequitur quod quamdiu voluit ex perfectione
humilitatis, fuit subditus iudicibus illis qui erant iudices in populo. |
Master The reply to this is that Christ could not be
accused out of the strictness of the law imposing its necessity on
him, because, as God, Christ was above every such law, and yet, as a
man, he willingly subjected himself to such a law out of the
perfection of his humility, with the result that he could be accused
by him who should have received him in public, and so, as a man,
Christ subjected himself to the law. Yet because, even as a man, he
willingly subjected himself to a law of this kind, he was as a result
to a certain extent above that law because it was in his power to be
able to be accused and not to be able to be accused; and yet just as
long as he consented out of the perfection of his humility, he could
be accused. It follows from this that just as long as he consented
out of the perfection of his humility he was subject to those judges
who were judges among the people. |
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Discipulus Istud est multum pro papa; quia sicut
Christus fuit subditus, quamdiu voluit, iudicbus illis, qui
iudicabant in partibus illis, ita etiam papa potest se submittere, si
voluerit, iudicio laicorum. Set non est necessarie, quod se
submittat, et ita cum sit vicarius Christi, non est subditus
alicuius, nisi sponte vellet {*velit &NaRe}. |
Student That is very much for the pope [too],
because, just as Christ was subject, just as long as he consented, to
the secular judges who used to judge in those parts, so also, if he
consents, can the pope submit himself to the judgement of laymen. But
he does not submit himself necessarily, and so, since he is the vicar
of Christ, he is not subject to anyone unless he consents willingly. |
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Magister Non est omnino simile de Christo et de
papa. Quia enim papa est vicarius Christi, ideo non habet omnem
potestatem, quam habuit Christus, etiam in quantum homo. Christus
enim etiam in quantum homo instituit sacramenta et sponte instituit,
ita quod potuit dispensare contra ipsa quod tamen papa non potest.
Papa ergo, cum sit solummodo vicarius Christi, servare tenetur ea que
Christus verbo et exemplo docuit servanda. Cum ergo Christus subdens
se aliis exemplo docuerit subiectionem exhibendam iudicibus, papa
huiusmodi subiectionem servare tenetur. |
Master There is not a complete similarity between
Christ and the pope. For because the pope is the vicar of Christ, he
does not, as a result, have all the power that Christ, even as a man,
had. For even as a man Christ established the sacraments and so
established them of his own free will that he could make a
dispensation against them; yet the pope can not do this. Since the
pope is only the vicar of Christ, therefore, he is bound to preserve
those things which by teaching and example Christ taught should be
preserved. Therefore since in subjecting himself to others, Christ
taught by this example that subjection should be tendered to judges,
the pope is bound to maintain subjection of this kind. |
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Discipulus Potestne probari aliter, quod Christus
fuit subditus imperatori et aliis iudicibus? |
Student Can it be proved in another way that Christ
was subject to the emperor and to other judges? |
|
Magister Hoc probatur aliter per hoc, quod Christus
fuit subditus matri et patri putativo, sicut legitur Luc 2:[51]. Ergo
fuit subditus illis qui fuerunt superiores et domini patris putativi
et matris {matres &Na}, quales fuerunt Romani. Unde et Ioseph, ut
legitur Luc 2:[4-5], ascendit de Galilea in Bethleem, ut profiteretur
et faceret {faceretur &Na} se subiectum imperatori cum Maria
desponsata sibi uxore. Ergo Christus fuit subditus, in quantum homo
mortalis, imperatori, licet sponte et voluntarie, sicut et sponte
fuit portatus a diabolo in montem et etiam in Ierusalem, ubi statuit
eum supra propinaculum templi. |
Master This is proved in another way by the fact
that Christ was subject to his mother and his putative father, as we
read in Luke 2:51. Therefore he was subject to those who were the
superiors and lords of his putative father and his mother, and the
Romans were such people. Whence too, as we read in Luke 2:4-5, Joseph
went up from Galilee to Bethlehem to be registered and to make
himself and Mary, to whom he was engaged, subject to the emperor. As
a mortal man, therefore, Christ was subject to the emperor, although
of his own free will and voluntarily, just as of his own free will
too he was carried by the devil to a mountain and even to Jerusalem
where he stood upon the pinnacle of the temple. |
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Discipulus Adduxisti aliquas allegaciones ad
probandum quod Christus, in quantum homo mortalis, fuit sub
imperatore, quantum ad iurisdictionem coactivam. Nunc nitere probare
hoc de apostolis. |
Student You have adduced some arguments to prove
that, as a mortal man, Christ was under the emperor, as far as his
coercive jurisdiction was concerned. Now try to prove this of the apostles. |
|
Magister Quod apostoli et omnes alii christiani et
discipuli Christi fuerunt sub imperatore, quantum ad iurisdictionem
coactivam, multipliciter videtur posse probari. Nam religio
christiana et per consequens Christus neminem, eciam secularem et
infidelem, privavit iure suo. Sed apostoli {*antequam essent apostoli
add. &NaRe} fuerunt subiecti imperatori et aliis potestatibus
secularibus et infidelibus; ergo postquam fuerunt apostoli, fuerunt
eisdem et in eisdem subiecti. Minor istius racionis videtur
manifesta, quia non plus erant apostoli ante conversionem et
apostolatum exempti a iurisdictione imperatoris, quam alii Iudei, qui
tamen erant subiecti imperatori et aliis potestatibus secularibus.
Maior autem multis modis ostenditur. Ait enim Ambrosius super
epistolam ad Titum, "Admone illos principibus et potestatibus
subditos esse, quasi etsi tu habes imperium spirituale, tamen admone
illos subditos esse principibus, scilicet regibus et ducibus et
potestatibus minoribus, quia christiana religio neminem privat iure
suo." Item Augustinus super Iohannem ait, "Regnum meum non
est de hoc mundo, decepti estis, non impedio dominacionem vestram in
mundo, ne vane timeatis et seviatis." Item Leo papa in sermone
de Epiphania ait, "Dominus mundi temporale non querit regnum;
{qui add. &NaRe} prestat eternum." Item sic canit {ait
&Na} eccelsia, "Non eripit mortalia qui regna dat
celestia." Ex quibus omnibus colligitur quod nec Christus nec
religio christiana alicui etiam infideli tollit ius suum, ut scilicet
per hoc quod aliquis christianus efficitur vel efficiebatur tempore
Christi, sive apostolus sive alius, imperator et alii sub eo nullum
ius quod habebant {habebat &Na} penitus perdiderunt. Quod in
verbis apostoli 1 Timoth. 6:[1] innuitur, cum ait, "Quicumque
sunt sub iugo servi, dominos suos omni honore dignos arbitrentur, ne
nomen domini et doctrina blasphemetur." Ex his enim verbis
videtur haberi quod subiecti dominis infidelibus, quando
efficiebantur christiani, ut prius in omnibus dominis suis servire et
obedire debebant, ne domini dicerent quod religio christiana esset
iniuriosa et iniuriam dominis conversorum facere niteretur. Quod
Augustinus aperte videtur {trs. &Na} asserere exponens verba
predicta; ait enim, "Sciendum est quosdam predicasse communem
omnibus in Christo esse libertatem; quod de spirituali utique
libertate verum est, non de carnali, ut illi intelligebant: ideo
contra eos loquitur hic apostolus iubens servos dominis suis subditos
esse. Non ergo exigant servi christiani, quod de Hebreis dicitur, ut
sex annis serviant et gratis dimittantur liberi, quod misticum est;
et quare hoc precipiat apostolus, supponit, ne blasphemetur nomen
domini quasi aliena invadentis et doctrina christiana {christi
&Na} quasi iniusta et contra leges predicet, sed pocius per
obsequia servorum fidelium domini infideles convertantur." Ex
quibus verbis concluditur quod per conversionem apostolorum et
assumptionem eorum ad apostolatum domini infideles nullum ius in eis
quod prius habuerant amittebant, et ita remanebant subditi eis in
omnibus, sicut prius. |
Master
It seems provable in many ways that the apostles and all other
christians and disciples of Christ were under the emperor, as far as
his coercive jurisdiction was concerned. For the christian religion,
and consequently Christ, did not deprive anyone, even someone secular
and unbelieving, of his right. But before they were apostles, the
apostles were subject to the emperor and other secular and unbelieving
powers; after they were apostles, therefore, they were subject to the
same people and in the same things. The minor [premise] of this
argument seems manifest, because before their conversion and their
apostolate the apostles were not more exempt from the jurisdiction of
the emperor than were other jews; yet the latter were subject to the
emperor and other secular powers. The major [premise], however, is
shown in many ways. For Ambrose says on the letter to Titus [P.L. 17,
530], "Admonish them to be subject to princes and powers, as if,
although you have a spiritual empire, yet advise them to be subject to
princes, that is kings, dukes and minor powers, because the christian
religion deprives no one of his right." Again, writing on John [P.L.
35, 1939], Augustine says, "My kingdom is not of this world; you have
been deceived; I am not impeding your domination in the world, so you
fear and rage vainly." Again, Pope Leo in his sermon on epiphany [P.L.
54, 113] says, "The Lord of the world does not seek a temporal kingdom;
his eternal kingdom surpasses it." Again, the church sings as follows,
"He who gives celestial kingdoms does not snatch at mortal ones." We
gather from all these that neither Christ nor the christian religion
removes anyone's right, even an unbeliever's, that is, neither the
emperor nor others under him completely lost any right which they had
because of the fact that someone, whether an apostle or someone else,
becomes or became a christian in the time of Christ. This is implied in
the words of the apostle in 1 Tim. 6:1, when he says, "Let all who are
under the yoke of slavery regard their masters as worthy of all honour,
so that the name of God and the teaching may not be blasphemed." For
these words seem to hold that when those subject to unbelieving masters
became christians they had to serve and obey their masters in
everything as before, so that their masters would not say that the
christian religion was wrongful and was trying to inflict a wrong on
the masters of converts. Augustine seems clearly to assert this when he
expounds those words. For he says, "It should be known that certain
people preached that in Christ freedom was common to everyone; this is
certainly true about spiritual freedom, not about carnal freedom as
those people meant; therefore the apostle speaks against them, ordering
slaves to be subject to their masters. Christian slaves do not demand
what was said of the Hebrews, therefore, that they serve six years and
be freely released to freedom. This is mystical, and so the apostle
instructs this, he assumes, so that the name of the Lord is not
blasphemed as one who takes possession of what belongs to others and so
that christian teaching does not preach what is as it were unjust and
against the laws, but rather that unbelieving masters are converted by
the obedience of believing slaves." We conclude from these words that
by the conversion of the apostles and their assumption into the
apostolate their unbelieving masters lost no right over them that they
had had before, and so they remained subject to them just as before. |
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Amplius quod omnes apostoli, saltem alii a beato Petro, fuerint
subiecti imperatori et aliis dominis secularibus, probatur per illud
beati Petri canonica sua 1, 7 {*2 &NaRe}:[13], "Subiecti
estote omni creature propter Deum sive regi precellenti sive ducibus
tanquam ab eo missis ad vindictam malefactorum, laudem vero
bonorum." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod beatus Petrus voluit
omnes subditos suos in spiritualibus esse subditos {subiectos
&Na}, sicut ante conversionem, omni creature que super eos ante
habuerat potestatem. Nam, ut testatur Innocentius tertius, Extra,
De maioritate et obedientia, Solite, beatus Petrus
ibidem "scribebat subditis suis et eos ad humilitatis meritum
{om. &Na} provocabat"; sed apostoli erant subditi beati
Petri; ergo beatus Petrus voluit, quod apostoli essent subditi
{subiecti &Na} regibus et ducibus, quibus fuerant, antequam
essent christiani, subiecti. |
Further, that the apostles, at least some apart from [[correct??]]
Peter, were subject to the emperor and other secular lords is proved
by what Peter says in 1 Peter 2:13, "For the Lord's sake accept
the authority of every human institution, whether of the emperor as
supreme, or of governors as sent by him to punish those who do wrong
and to praise those who do right." We gather from these words
that blessed Peter wanted all his subjects to be subject in spiritual
matters, just as before their conversion, to every authority that had
previously had power over them. For as Innocent III attests in Extra,
De maioritate et obedientia, c. Solitae [c.6, col.196]
blessed Peter at that point "was writing to his subjects and
challenging them to the merit of humility"; but the apostles
were subjects of blessed Peter; therefore blessed Peter wanted the
apostles to be subject to the kings and governors to whom they had
been subject before they were christians. |
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Discipulus Adhuc alias raciones ad probandum quod
imperator est iudex adducas? |
Student Would you bring forward even more arguments
to prove that the emperor is the judge [[of the pope: add??]]? |
|
Magister Alia racio que in scripturis fundatur
adducitur, que talis est. Si religio christiana nullum dominum aut
principem infidelem, imperatorem vel alium privat iure suo, sicut
ostensum est prius, multo forcius imperatorem fidelem et alios
dominos fideles non privat iure suo, quod apostolus 1 Timoth. 6:[1-2]
aperte insinuare videtur, qui postquam dixit, "Quicunque sunt
sub iugo servi, dominos suos omni honore dignos arbitrentur, ne nomen
domini et doctrina blasphemetur," statim subiunxit, "Qui
autem fideles habent dominos, non contempnant, quia fratres sunt, sed
magis serviant, quia fideles et dilecti." Imperator ergo fidelis
per religionem christianam nullum ius perdidit; ergo papa in omnibus
est subiectus imperatori, in quibus fuit subiectus ante papatum. |
Master We adduce as follows another argument, which
is based on the scriptures. If, as has been shown above, the
christian religion does not deprive any unbelieving lord, prince,
emperor or other [ruler] of his right, it is much more the case that
it does not deprive a believing emperor and other believing lords of
their right, as the apostle clearly seems to imply in 1 Tim. 6:1-2.
After he has said, "Let all who are under the yoke of slavery
regard their masters as worthy of all honour," he immediately
added, "Those who have believing masters must not be
disrespectful to them on the grounds that they are brothers; rather
they must serve them all the more since they are brothers and
beloved." Therefore a believing emperor lost no right because of
the christian religion; the pope is subject to the emperor,
therefore, in all those things in which he was subject before his papacy. |
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Discipulus Papa etiam ante papatum non fuit
subiectus imperatori, quia fuit episcopus vel clericus, et ideo
imperator non fuit iudex ipsius. |
Student Even before his papacy the pope was not
subject to the emperor because he was a bishop or cleric, and
therefore the emperor was not his judge. |
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Magister Ista responsio excluditur per hoc primo,
quod episcopi sunt subiecti imperatori. Sed de isto forte postea
queres. Ideo secundo excluditur per hoc quod purus servus
imperatoris, etiam si tonsuram clericalem non haberet, possit
{*posset &Re} eligi in papam, et ita cum imperator non debeat
privari iure suo per ecclesiam, papa talis remaneret subiectus
imperatori, et per consequens papa ratione papatus non est exemptus a
iurisdictione imperatoris. |
Master That reply is excluded firstly by the fact
that bishops are subject to the emperor. But perhaps you will ask
about this later. Therefore it is excluded secondly by the fact that
a pure servant of the emperor, even if he were not to have the
clerical tonsure, could be elected as pope, and so, since the emperor
should not be deprived of his right by the church, such a pope would
remain subject to the emperor, and consequently the pope is not
exempt from the jurisdiction of the emperor by reason of his papacy. |
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Discipulus Minor dignitas quam sit papatus, liberat
a patria potestate et etiam a potestate dominica, ergo multo forcius
electus in papam eo ipso est liberatus ab omni iurisdictione imperatoris. |
Student A lesser dignity than the papacy frees one
from paternal power and even from seignorial power; much more is it
the case, therefore, that one elected as pope is by that very fact
freed from all jurisdiction of the emperor. |
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Magister Dicunt alii quod ista obiectio nichil
valet. Quod enim minor dignitas quam papatus liberet a patria
potestate et dominica, est ex ordinacione humana non ex ordinacione
divina, et ita ex ordinacione imperatoris potest electus {electio
&Na} in papam eximi a potestate inferiorum iudicum; sed non
eximitur ex ordinacione divina. Quod et {*etiam &Na} tali racione
probatur: non magis debet aliquis invitus privari iure suo quod habet
in aliquo, ut ei aliqua dignitas ecclesiastica conferatur, sine qua
potest salvari, quam aliquis debeat privari iure suo quod habet in
filio, ut eidem filio conferatur baptismus, sine quo non potest
salvari. Sed Iudei et alii infideles non debent privari inviti iure
quod habent in parvulis, ut baptizentur, nec ipsi parvuli baptizari
debent, ne patres priventur iure, quod habent in eis. Ergo multo
forcius, quandocumque {*quantumcumque &NaRe} aliquis qui erat
servus imperatoris vel aliter sibi subiectus fiat papa, imperator non
privabitur invitus...[[At this point Na and Re break off.]] |
Master Some say that that objection is not at all
valid. For that a lesser dignity than the papacy frees one from
paternal and seignorial power is by human regulation, not by divine
regulation, and so one elected as pope can by the emperor's
regulation be released from the power of inferior judges; but he is
not released by divine regulation. This is also proved by the
following argument. No more should someone who is unwilling be
deprived of the right which he has in someone because some
ecclesiastical dignity, without which he can be saved, is conferred
on the latter, than someone should be deprived of the right which he
has in his son because baptism, without which he can not be saved, is
conferred on that son. But jews and other unbelievers should not be
unwillingly deprived of the right which they have in their children,
because they are baptised, and those children should not be baptised
lest their fathers are deprived of a right which they have in them.
It is much more the case, therefore, that whenever someone who was
the servant of the emperor or was otherwise subject to him becomes
pope, the emperor will not be unwillingly deprived ... . |