CAP. XV.
Discipulus Quomodo {quoniam &Pe} autem {*om.
&MzNaRe} ad rationem istam ultimam potest {*poterit &NaRe}
responderi et qualiter responsio valeat improbari {*patere add.
&NaMzPeRe} potest appetere {*om. &NaMzPeRe} ex his quae
tractata sunt superius 10 c. Ideo ad praesens nolo quod de ista
responsione {*ratione &NaPeRe} et opinione pro qua adducitur hic
amplius te {*trs. &MzNaPeRe} intromittas, sed indica quomodo
respondetur secundum opinionem quae recitata {tractate &Pe} est
supra c. 8 ad rationes pro opinionibus aliis recitatis capitulo {in
&Re} praecedenti et allegationes {*et allegationes om.
&NaMzPeRe} adducas {*adductas &MzPe}. |
Chapter 15
Student How one can reply to that final argument and
how that reply can be rejected can be clear from those things that
were dealt with in chapter 10 above. Therefore I do not want you to
involve yourself any further now with that argument and the opinion
on behalf of which it is brought forward. But indicate how one
replies, according to the opinion recited in chapter 8 above, to the
arguments brought forward for the other opinions recited in the
preceding chapter. |
|
Magister Ad allegationes {*duas add. &MzNaRe}
pro secunda {*prima &MzNaPe} {qua &Re} opinione adductas
{*inductas &MzNa} {inducas &Re} respondetur quod pro omni
favore haereticae pravitatis, quae {qui &Pe} non est in {om.
&Na} favente, absque haeretica pravitate {*trs. &MzNaRe}
essent cardinales privati iure eligendi summum pontificem et
reverteretur ius eligendi ad Romanos. Pro alio favore non essent
privati sed privandi iure eligendi summum pontificem. An autem possit
{posset &Pe} esse aliquis favor haereticae pravitatis absque
haeretica pravitate in favente ex his quae dicta sunt libro 7 primae
partis huius Dialogi advertere poterit studiosus {studiosius &Re}. |
Master To the two arguments brought forward for the
first opinion it is replied that for any support of heretical
wickedness which is not [found] in the supporter cardinals had been
deprived without heretical wickedness of the right to elect the
highest pontiff and the right to elect reverted to the Romans. For
any other support they had not been deprived of the right to elect
the highest pontiff, but should have been. [[These last two sentences
do not seem right.]] Whether anyone can be a supporter of heretical
wickedness without there being heretical wickedness in the supporter,
however, whoever is keen can perceive from what is said in book 7 of
the first part of this Dialogue. |
|
Ad allegationem pro tertia {*secunda &MzNaRe} opinione
respondetur quod licet papa si efficiatur haereticus sit ipso facto
et ipso iure depositus, sicut in prima parte Dialogi huius {*trs.
&MzNaRe} libro sexto per quamplurimas rationes probatum existit,
et ideo licet {*om. &MzNaRe} pro favore haereticae pravitatis
quae {?qui MzNa} est absque haeresi in favente sit papa depositus
ipso facto, tamen pro solo favore haereticorum absque favore errorum
{*erroris &MzNaRe} ipsorum non est papa ipso facto depositus, imo
secundum aliquos nec etiam deponendus nisi incorrigibilis appareat et
de eo scandalizetur ecclesia. Cum autem dicitur quod Anastasius
secundus non fuit depositus nisi pro favore haereticorum, respondetur
quod non est verum; imo fuit depositus pro haeresi et fautoria
haereticae pravitatis, quod ex textu dist. 19 et glossa ut videtur
colligitur evidenter. Ait enim Gratianus eadem dist. para. Hoc autem,
"Anastasius enim secundus {episcopus add. &MzNaRe} favore
Anastasii imperatoris quos Achacius post sententiam in se prolatam
sacerdotes et {*vel &Zn} levitas ordinaverat acceptis officiis
rite fungi debere decrevit" et {*om. &NaRe} erronee
{*erronea &NaRe} supple. Unde in {*om. &MzNaRe} para.
sequenti dicit Gratianus, "Quia ergo illicite et non canonice,
sed contra decreta {dei add. Zn} praedecessorum et successorem suorum
haec rescripta dedit, ut probat Felix et Gelasius qui Achacium ante
{*Anastasium add. &MzNaReZn} excommunicaverunt et Hormisda qui ab
ipso Anastasio tertius eundem Achacium postea damnavit, ideo a Romana
ecclesia repudiatur et a Deo percussus fuisse legitur." |
To the argument for the second opinion it is replied that although a
pope is deposed in fact and in law if he becomes a heretic, as is
proved by very many arguments in book 6 of the first part of this Dialogue,
and therefore is in fact deposed for support of heretical wickedness
which exists without heresy in the supporter, yet the pope is not in
fact deposed solely because of support for heretics unless he
supports their error; indeed according to some he should not even be
deposed unless he seems to be incorrigible and the church is caused
to stumble because of it. When it is said, however, that Anastasius
II was deposed only for the support of heretics, it is said that this
is not true; rather he was deposed for heresy and for promoting
heretical wickedness which seems to be clearly gathered from the text
and gloss of dist. 19. For in the paragraph Hoc autem [c.7,
col.62] of that distinction Gratian says, "For Anastasius II
with the support of the emperor Anastasius decreed that the bishops
or levites whom Achatius had ordained after the sentence published
against him should duly discharge the offices they had received."
Make good the errors: [[is this right?]] Whence Gratian says in the
following paragraph [Quia ergo c.8, col.645], "Therefore
because he issued these rescripts illicitly and not canonically, but
contrary to the decrees of his predecessors and successors, as Felix
and Gelasius, who excommunicated Achatius before Anastasius, and
Hormisda, third in line after Anastasius who later condemned
Achatius, prove, he is as a result repudiated by the Roman church and
was, we read, struck by God." |
|
Item glossa super c. Anastasius super verbo abegerunt
ait, "Hi non recesserunt, scilicet clerici, ab Anastasio ante
sententiam, quia inciderat {*inciderunt Zn} in haeresim iam
damnatam." Tunc {*Item &NaRe} super verbo communicaverat
dicit glossa, "Hic communicavit, scilicet Anastasius, cum {*ei,
scilicet &MzNaRe} Achacio haeretico, in maleficio. Unde potuit
transire, scilicet excommunicatio, ad tertiam personam." Ex
quibus verbis colligitur quod Anastasius fuit haereticus et fautor
haereticae pravitatis. Et ideo fuit depositus ipso iure et fuit
excommunicationis sententia innodatus. |
Again the gloss on the words "drove out" in [dist. 19] c. Anastasius
[col. 87] says, "They, that is the clerics, did not withdraw
from Anastasius before the sentence because they had fallen into a
heresy that was already condemned." Again on the words "had
participated" the gloss says, "He, that is Anastasius,
participated in wickedness with that one, namely the heretic
Achatius. Whence it, that is the excommunication, could pass over to
a third person." We gather from these words that Anastasius was
a heretic and a supporter of heretical wickedness. And he was,
therefore, deposed by that law and was bound by a sentence of excommunication. |
|
Ad allegationem {*allegationes &MzNaRe} pro quarta {*tertia
&MzNaRe} opinione respondetur quod {licet papa si efficiatur ...
quod om. &Pe} non omnes schismatici sunt omni iure privati. {*Sed
omnes schismatici qui sunt heretici quales ut saepe sunt schismatici
sunt omni iure privati add. &NaRe} et de illis loquitur beatus
Cyprianus. Omnes enim {*etiam &NaMzPeRe} schismatici quamdiu sunt
schismatici non sunt capaces ecclesiasticarum {?ecclesiarum &Mz}
{aut add. &Mz} dignitatum. Et ideo Novatianus secundum Cyprianum
non {om. MzPe} potuit esse papa. Schismatici autem {*etiam &NaRe}
non possunt habere executionem alicuius iuris ecclesiastici licet
aliqua iura ecclesiastica possunt {*possint &NaRe} habere dummodo
non sunt {*sint &NaRe} haeretici. Et ideo cardinales propter
solum schisma absque heresi non perdunt ius eligendi summum
pontificem quamvis non debeant {debent &Mz} {deberent &Pe}
eligere quamdiu in schismate perseverant {perseverarent &Pe}. |
To the arguments for the third opinion the reply is that all
schismatics are deprived of every right. But all schismatics who are
heretics, as schismatics often are, are deprived of every right, and
it is about these that blessed Cyprian is speaking. In addition, no
schismatics are fit for ecclesiastical dignities as long as they are
schismatic. And therefore according to Cyprian, Novatian could not be
pope. Schismatics also can not have [the right] to execute any
ecclesiastical right, although they can have some ecclesiastical
rights as long as they are not heretics. And cardinals do not lose
the right to elect the highest pontiff, therefore, although they
should not elect as long as they persist in schism. |
|
Et per idem breviter respondetur ad allegationem pro quarta opinione
adductam. Quamdiu enim in tali malitia et negligentia perstiterint
constat quod de facto sunt tali iure privati. Si autem resipiscant
idem ius eis debetur {*et per idem ... debetur om. &NaMzPeRe}.
CAP. XVI.
Discipulus Quamvis in prima parte nostri Dialogi li.
6 tractaverimus an imperator sit iudex ordinarius summi pontificis,
et cum {*tu &NaMzPeRe} ibidem circa hoc {posuisti add. &Pe}
opiniones contrarias allegationibus pluribus conatus fueris
confirmare, hic tamen de hac materia conferamus ut {et &Pe}
excitemus {exitemus &NaRe} [[correct interlinear Re]] alios
tractatulum {tractatum &Pe} hunc visuros qui primam partem huius
operis forsitan {*trs.312 &NaRe} non habebunt ad solicite
perscrutandum {prescrutandum &Re} an {aut &Mz} imperator
supra papam iam in summo pontificio constitutum aliquam habeat vel
habere valeat potestatem. Investigemus autem primo an imperator
ratione {romani imperii aut add. &Pe} imperatoriae dignitatis
{*maiestatis &NaRe} sit in aliquo casu iudex ordinarius papae. |
[Answer to argument for fourth opinion not given.]
Chapter 16
Student Although we considered whether the emperor
is the regular judge of the highest pontiff in book six of the first
part of our Dialogue, and in that place you tried with many
arguments to establish the opposed opinions about this, let us
nevertheless confer here about this matter in order to stimulate
others, who will see this tract but perhaps will not have the first
part of this work, to investigate carefully whether the emperor has
or can have any power over a pope already established in his
pontificate. Let us first investigate, however, whether by reason of
his imperial dignity the emperor is the regular judge of the pope on
any occasion. |
|
Magister Circa hoc sunt diversae assertiones {*trs.
&MzNaPeRe} et adversae. {opinio add. &Mz} Una est quod
imperator ratione imperatoriae dignitatis non est iudex ordinarius in
quocunque casu summi pontificis. |
Master There are differing and opposed assertions
about this. One is that on no occasion is the emperor the regular
judge of the highest pontiff by reason of his imperial dignity. |
|
Discipulus Pro ista assertione allega. |
Student Argue for that assertion. |
|
Magister Pro ista assertione potest taliter
allegari. Si imperator inquantum imperator {inquantum imperator om.
&Pe} esset iudex ordinarius papae aut esset suus iudex {*trs.
&MzNaPeRe} in causa ecclesiastica aut in causa seculari. Non in
{*causa add. &NaMzPeRe} ecclesiastica, quia {*causa ecclesiastica
add. &NaMzPeRe} solum {*om. &MzNaRe} ad iudicem
ecclesiasticum {*solummodo add. &MzNaRe} spectat. Ideo enim
dicitur causa ecclesiastica [[quia ... ecclesiastica: margin Pe]]
{?nisi add. &Mz} quia debet coram ecclesiastico iudice agitari.
Nec in causa seculari quia nec in causa {*om. &NaRe} criminali
nec {*in causa add. &NaMzPeRe} civili. Quod non {om. &Mz} in
criminali {om. &Na} causa seculari {*om. &NaPe} {causa
seculari om. &Re} probatur, quia, sicut legitur dist. 40, c. Si
papa, ex gestis Bonifatii papae martyris habetur {*trs.231
&MzNaPeRe}, "huiusmodi {*om. &NaMzPeReZn} {*Huius add.
&Zn} culpam {*culpas &Zn} istic {istinc &NaMzPeRe} idem
{*om. &PeReZn} {et /est Na\ /om. MzPe\ in hac vita add.
&NaMzPeRe} redarguere nullus {om. &Pe} mortalium praesumit
{praesumat &NaMzPeRe} {*trs.321 &MzNaReZn}, quia cunctos {est
add. &MzNaRe} ipse {in ipsa &Pe} iudicaturus a nemine est
{ipse add. &MzPe} [[interlinear Pe]] iudicandus, nisi
deprehendatur a fide devians {*devius &NaMzPeReZn}." Ex
quibus verbis colligitur quod papa pro sola deviatione a fide est ab
aliquo iudicandus; deviatio autem {*a fide add. &NaMzPeRe} non
est culpa secularis. Ergo pro nulla culpa seculari est papa ab
imperatore vel ab {*om. &NaPeRe} alio iudicandus. Nec imperator
est iudex ordinarius papae in causa seculari civili cum etiam in tali
causa sicut neque in causa criminali sit iudex ordinarius cuiuscunque
episcopi, teste Bonifacio qui, ut habetur 11, q. 1, c. {11, q. 1, c.:
dist. 11, c. 1, &Pe} Nullus, ait, "Nullus episcopus
neque pro civili neque pro criminali causa apud iudicem quemlibet
{*iudicem quemlibet: quemvis iudicem sive &NaMzPeReZn} civilem
sive militarem producatur {perducatur &Mz}." Relinquitur
ergo {*igitur &MzNaRe} ex praedictis quod imperator inquantum
imperator in nulla causa est iudex ordinarius papae. |
Master It can be argued as follows for that
assertion. If the emperor were the regular judge of the pope as
emperor he would be his judge either in an ecclesiastical case or in
a secular case. [He is judge] not in an ecclesiastical case because
an ecclesiastical case belongs only to an ecclesiastical judge. For
it is called an ecclesiastical case because it should be treated
before an ecclesiastical judge. Nor [is he judge] in a secular case
because he is not one in either in a criminal or a civil case: that
he is not one in a criminal case is proved because, as we read in
dist. 40, c. Si papa [c.6, col.146], we find in the deeds of
Pope Boniface the martyr, "No mortal presumes to contradict his
faults because he who is to judge the rest should be judged by no one
unless he is detected as being inconsistent with faith." We
gather from these words that the pope should be judged by someone
only for an inconsistency with faith; inconsistency with faith,
however, is not a secular fault. Therefore for no secular fault
should the pope be judged by the emperor or by another person. Nor is
the emperor the regular judge of the pope in a civil secular case
since even in such a case, as in a criminal case, he is not the
regular judge of any bishop, as Boniface attests who says, as we find
in 11, q. 1, c. Nullus [episcopus] [c.8, col.628], "No
bishop is to be brought before any civil or military judge either in
a civil or a criminal case." From the above we are left with the
conclusion that as emperor, the emperor is in no case the regular
judge of the pope. |
|
Discipulus Ut mihi {*detur add. &NaRe} occasio
sit {*om. &NaRe} intelligendi profundius istam materiam pro ista
assertione multas auctoritates {*trs. &MzNaRe} adducas, etiam
illas quas in prima parte {*istius add. &MzNaRe} dialogi
tetigisti, quia nolo {*volo &NaRe} {om. &Mz} ut {*quod
&MzNaRe} postea mihi {multipliciter &Mz} referas exquisite
qualiter assertio contraria ad ipsas nititur respondere. Per hunc
enim modum incitabimus alios ad veritatem acutius indagandam et nobis
ipsis intellectus auctoritatem {*auctoritatum &MzNaRe}
adducendarum clarius {intellectus ... clarius om. &Pe} apparebit. |
Student To give me an opportunity to understand that
matter more deeply would you bring forward many authorities for that
assertion, even those that you cited in the first part of this Dialogue,
because I want you afterwards to set forth for me carefully how the
opposite assertion tries to reply to them. For in this way we will
incite others to explore the truth more intelligently and our own
understanding of the authorities brought forward will appear clearer. |
|
Magister Pro ista opinione auctoritates quamplurimae
adducuntur {*inducuntur &NaRe}. Gelasius enim papa, ut habetur 9,
q. 3, c. Cuncta {per mundum add. &Pe}, ait, "Cuncta
per mundum novit {in omni &Pe} ecclesia quoniam {quam &Mz}
quorumlibet sententiis ligata pontificum sedes {fide &Pe} beati
Petri apostoli ius habeat resolvendi {solvendi &NaRe} {absolvendi
&Pe} utpote quae de {om. &Pe} omni ecclesia fas habeat iudicandi." |
Master Very many authorities are brought forward for
that opinion. For as we find in 9, q. 3, c. [18] Cuncta
[c.18, col.611] Pope Gelasius say, "The whole church throughout
the world has known that, bound by the sentences of every pontiff,
the seat of the blessed apostle Peter has the right to loose, that
is, that it has the right to judge every church." |
|
Item Melchiades {*papa add. &MzNaRe} ut habetur 12, q. 1, c.
futura {*Futuram &NaRe} ait, "Idem praefatus
princeps," scilicet Constantinus, "donaria immensa contulit
et fabricam templi primae sedis beati Petri instituit, adeo ut sedem
imperialem relinqueret et {etiam &Mz} beato Petro suisque
successoribus profuturis {*profuturam &NaMzPeReZn} concederet.
Idem {item &Na} vero praesidens sanctae {sancto &Mz} synodo,
quae apud Nicenam congregata est, cum {et &Pe} querelam {cum
querelam: conquerelam &Mz} quorundam coram se conspiceret
{trs.312 &MzNaRe} deferendam ait, `Vos a nemine iudicari
{*diiudicari &MzNaReZn} potestis, quia Dei solius iudicio
reservamini. Dii etenim vocati estis et idcirco non potestis ab
hominbus iudicari.'" |
Again, as we find in 12, q. 1, c. Futuram [c.15, cols 682],
Pope Melchiades says, "That same prince," namely
Constantine, "bestowed immense gifts and constructed the fabric
of the temple of the first seat of blessed Peter; moreover, he
abandoned his imperial seat and resigned it to the use of blessed
Peter and his successors. And presiding over the holy synod that
gathered at Nicena and perceiving that the complaint to him of
certain people should be deferred the same man said, `You can be
judged by no one because you are reserved for the judgement of God
alone. For you are called gods and therefore you can not be judged by men.'" |
|
Item Gelasius papa, ut habetur 9, q. 3, c. Cuncta, ait,
"Cuncta per mundum novit ecclesia quod {quia &Mz}
sacrosancta Romana ecclesia {trs. &Na} fas habeat de omnibus
{*trs.231 &MzNaReZn} iudicandi neque cuiquam {quicquam &Mz}
de eius liceat {trs.312 &MzNaRe} iudicare iudicio. Siquidem ad
illam de qualibet mundi parte appellandum est; ab illa autem nemo est
appellare permissus. Sed nec illa praeterimus {praetermittimus
&NaRe}, quod apostolica sedes sine ulla synodo praecedente et
solvendi quod {*quos &MzNaReZn} synodus inique {*iniqua &Zn}
damnaverat {trs. &MzNaRe} et damnandi, nulla existente synodo,
actus {*om. &MzNaReZn} quos oportuit habuit {*habuerit
&MzNaReZn} facultatem." |
Again, as we find in 9, q. 3, c. Cuncta [c.17, col.611],
Pope Gelasius says, "The whole church throughout the world has
known that the most holy Roman church has the right to judge everyone
and that no one is permitted to judge its judgement. Moreover, an
appeal can be made to it from any part of the world; however, no one
is permitted to appeal from it. But let us not omit the fact that
without any preceding synod the apostolic see had the power both of
releasing those whom an unjust synod had condemned and of condemning
those whom it ought, without there being a synod." |
|
Item Gelasius papa, ut habetur dist. 96. {*c. Duo add.
&MzNaRe}, scribens Anastasio imperatori ait, "Nosti itaque
inter haec ex illorum te pendere iudicio, non illos ad tuam posse
regi {*redigi &MzNaReZn} voluntatem." |
Again, as we find in dist. 96, c. Duo [c.10, col.340], Pope
Gelasius writing to the emperor Anastasius says, "And so know
that, as it concerns these, you depend upon their [priests']
judgement; it is not the case that they can be brought under your will." |
|
Item Innocentius papa, ut legitur 9, q. 3, c. Nemo, ait,
"Nemo iudicabit apostolicam {*primam &NaReZn} sedem
iusticiam temperare desiderantem. Neque enim ab Augusto, neque ab
omni clero, neque a regibus {neque a regibus om. &NaRe}, neque a
populo iudex iudicabitur." |
Again, as we read in 9, q. 3, c. Nemo [c.13, col.610], Pope
Innocent says, "No one will judge the first see when it wants to
temper justice. For that judge will be judged neither by Augustus,
nor by any clergy, nor by kings, nor by the people." |
|
Item Iohannes papa, ut habetur dist. 96. c. Si {sed
&NaRe} imperator, ait, "Si imperator catholicus
est, quod salva pace ipsius dicimus, filius est non praesul
ecclesiae." Lex autem erubescit filios castigatores esse
parentum. Ergo nullo modo imperator {*trs.312 &NaRe} potest esse
iudex papae qui pater est omnium. |
Again, as we find in dist. 96, c. Si imperator [c.11,
col.341], Pope John says, "If the emperor is a catholic, which
we say saving his peace, his son is not a priest of the church."
The law, however, is ashamed if sons are reprovers of their parents.
Therefore the emperor can in no way be the judge of the pope who is
the father of all. |
|
Item Symachus papa, ut habetur 9, q. 3, c. Aliorum, ait,
"Aliorum hominum causas Deus voluit per homines {hominem &Mz}
terminare, {terrarum &Na} sed {*om. &Zn} sedis {sedes
&Mz} istius praesulem {praesulis &Zn} suo sine quaestione
reservavit {reservabit &Mz} arbitrio. Voluit {etiam id est add.
&Mz} beati Petri apostoli successores coelo tantum debere
innocentiam, et subtilissimi {om. &Mz} [[gap left in ms]]
discussoris indagini inviolatam habere conscientiam. Nolite {noli
&MzNaRe} aestimare {*existimare &Zn} eas animas inquisitoris
{inquisitorum &Mz} non habere formidinem, quas Deus prae caeteris
suo reservavit examini." Et infra: "Sanctorum voce {*patet
add. &MzNaRe}, pontificum dignitatem sedis eius {cuius &Mz}
factam toto orbe venerabilem, esse {*om. &MzNaReZn} dum illi {ibi
&MzNaRe} quicquid fidelium est ubique submittitur, dum totius
corporis caput esse designatur." |
Again, as we find in 9, q. 3, c. Aliorum [c.14, col.610],
Pope Symachus says, "God wanted men to determine the cases of
other men; without question he reserved to his own authority the
bishop of that see. He wanted the successors of the blessed apostle
Peter to owe their innocence only to heaven and to have by the most
subtle investigation of the examiner an inviolate conscience. Do not
consider that those souls which above all God reserved for his own
examination do not have fear of an examiner ... It is clear from the
voice of the saints that the dignity of that see of the pontiffs
became venerable in all the world, while anything of the faithful is
everywhere submitted to it, while it is designated as the head of the
whole body." |
|
Item Nicolaus papa, {*ut legitur add. &MzNaRe} dist. 21. c. Nunc
{om. &Mz} [[gap left in ms]] autem, ait, quoniam {*om.
&MzNaRe} "Prima {primas &Na} sedes non iudicabitur a
quoquam." {Item Gelasius papa ... quoquam om. &Pe} |
Again, as we read in dist. 21, c. Nunc autem [c.7, col.71],
Pope Nicholas says, "The first see will not be judged by anyone." |
|
Item Anterius papa, ut habetur 9, {23 &Pe} q. 3, c. Facta,
ait, "Facta subditorum iudicantur a nobis, nostra vero a Domino
{divino &Mz} iudicantur {a nobis nostra vero a domino iudicantur
add. &Re}. |
Again, as we find in 9, q. 3, c. Facta [c.15, col.610], Pope
Anterus says, "The deeds of subjects are judged by us; truly,
ours are judged by the Lord." |
|
Item Sixtus {om. &Mz} papa, ut habetur 2, q. 5, {6 &Pe} c. Mandastis,
cum fuisset {fuisse &Pe} accusatus {*criminatus &NaMzPeRe} a
quodam scriba {*scribens &NaRe} {scribere &Pe} episcopis
{episcopo &Mz} ait, "Facto consilio, cum magna examinatione
satisfaciens omnibus, licet evadere aliter satis potuissem,
suspicionem tamen fugiens, coram omnibus me purgavi, et me {*et me
om. &MzNaRe} scilicet {me scilicet om. &Pe} a suspicione a
{*et &NaMzPeReZn} aemulatione {*me add. &NaMzPeRe} liberans,
sed non aliis qui noluerint {voluerint &MzPe} aut sponte hoc
{haec &NaRe} non {om. &Pe} elegerint faciendi formam
dans." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod papa in nullo casu
tenetur se purgare si fuerit diffamatus. Ex quo infertur quod nullius
{nullus PeRe} [[corrected interlinear Re]] tenetur {infertur &Na}
subire iudicium. Unde glossa ibidem {om. &Na} super verbo
potuissem ait, "Papa autem {*a &NaRe} nullo modo {*om.
&NaRe} potest iudicari." |
Again, as we find in 2, q. 5, c. Mandastis [c.10, col.458],
when Pope Sixtus had been calumniated by a certain person he wrote to
the bishops saying, "When the council had met, although I could
sufficiently have avoided suspicion in another way, I nevertheless
satisfied everyone by a full examination, and took haste to purge
myself before everyone, that is freeing myself from suspicion and
envy; but not providing a model of acting to others who do not want
to do so or who have not chosen it of their own free will." We
gather from these words that on no occasion is the pope bound to
purge himself if he has been defamed. We infer from this that he is
not bound to submit to anyone's judgement. Whence the gloss on that
text on the words "could have" says [col.644], "The
pope can be judged by no one." |
|
Item Gelasius papa, ut habetur {*legitur &NaMzPeRe} 9, {14
&Pe} q. 3, c. Ipsi {isti &NaRe}, ait {*om. &NaRe}
loquens de sede Romana {*ait add. &NaRe}, "Ab ipsa vero
nunquam {nusquam &NaMzPeRe} prorsus appellare debere sanxerunt
{sanxerint &Pe}," sancti {*scilicet &NaMzPeRe} canones,
"ac per hoc illam {nulla &Na} de tota ecclesia iudicare,
ipsam ad nullius commeare {remeare &NaMzPeRe} iudicium; nec de
eius {numquam add. &Na} unquam praeceperunt {perceperunt &Mz}
iudicio iudicari {iudicare &NaMzPeRe} sententiamque eius
constituerunt non oportere dissolvi, cuius potius sequenda {sequentia
&Pe} decreta mandaverunt {mandaverint &Pe}." |
Again, as we read in 9, q. 3, c. Ipsi [c.16, col.611], Pope
Gelasius speaking about the Roman see says, "They," that is
the canons, "have decreed that on no occasion at all ought there
be an appeal from it, and as a result that it is the judge of the
whole church and does not come under anyone's judgement; and they
have commanded that there be no judgement of its judgement and they
have determined that it is not appropriate that its sentence be
dissolved, rather they have ordered that its decrees should be followed." |
|
{*Item add. &NaMzPeRe} dist. 27 {*17 &MzNaRe} para. Hinc etiam
{et &Mz} {*sic add. &NaRe} legitur {sequitur &Pe},
"Nec antedictae sedis," scilicet Romanae, "antistitem
[[Pe concludes here, omitting the rest of book.]] minorum subiacuisse
iudicio." Et infra: "Episcopi vero in synodo residentes
{trs.312 &Na} congregata auctoritate eiusdem Simachi dixerunt,
`Simachus papa sedis apostolicae praesul ab huiusmodi {huius &Re}
opinionibus {*oppositionibus &Zn} impetitus {impeditus &NaRe}
quantum ad homines respicit, {respicitit &Na} {om. &Mz} [[gap
left in Mz]] sit immunis et liber cuius causam totam Dei iudicio reservamus." |
Again, we read the following in dist. 17, para. Hinc etiam
[c.6, col.52], "Nor has the bishop of the afore-mentioned
see," that is the Roman see, "lain under the judgement of
inferiors. ... Indeed bishops sitting in a synod gathered on the
authority of that Symachus said, `Pope Symachus, bishop of the
apostolic see, who has been assailed by opposition of this kind, is
exempt and free in respect of men because we reserve all his cause to
the judgement of God." |
|
Item Nicolaus papa, ut habetur {*legitur &MzNaRe} 9, q. 3, c. Patet,
ait, "Patet profecto sedis apostolicae, cuius auctoritate maius
non est, iudicium a nemine fore retractandum neque cuiquam de eius
liceat iudicare iudicio, iuxta quod Innocentius papa Rufo et caeteris
{et ceteris: ceterisque &MzNaRe} episcopis per Thessaliam
constitutis scribens ait, `Nemo unquam apostolico culmini, de cuius
iudicio non licet retractari manus obvias audacter intulit nemo in
hoc rebellis extitit nisi qui de se voluit iudicari.' Et beatus
Gelasius papa {*trs. MzReZn}, `Nec de eius {cuius &Mz}, id est
Romanae ecclesiae, iudicio {*om. &MzNaReZn} canones unquam
praeceperunt iudicari iudicio sententiamque illius constituerunt non
oportere dissolvi, cuius potius sequenda decreta {secreta &NaRe}
mandaverunt." Ex praedictis {*quibus &NaRe} omnibus {omnibus
add. &Na} videtur colligi quod nec imperator nec alius iudex
{*om. &MzNaRe} est iudex Romani pontificis. |
Again, as we read in 9, q. 3, c. Patet [c.10, col.609], Pope
Nicholas says, "It is certainly true that the judgement of the
apostolic see, than whose authority there is none greater, should not
be revised by anyone, and no one is permittted to judge its
judgement. This is according to what Pope Innocent, writing to Rufus
and the rest of the bishops appointed throughout Thessalia, says, `No
one has ever rashly raised hostile hands against the apostolic crown,
whose judgement one is not permitted to revise;' and blessed Pope
Gelasius, `The canons have never ordered that its, that is the Roman
church's, judgement be judged and they have determined that it is not
appropriate that its sentence be dissolved, but rather have ordered
that its decrees be complied with.'" We seem to gather from all
these that neither the emperor nor anyone else is the judge of the
Roman pontiff. |
|
Discipulus Post auctoritates aliquas rationes ad
eandem assertionem probandam allega. {Discipulus ... allega om. &Re} |
Student Following these authorities, bring forward
some arguments to prove the same assertion. |
|
Magister Haec assertio ratione probatur. Nam minor
non est iudex maioris, dist. 21. c. Inferior {*et add.
&MzNaRe} c. Denique. Imperator {*autem add. &MzNaRe} et
quilibet alius est minor Romano pontifice, teste Nicolao papa qui hoc
asserit, ut habetur dist. 116. {*96 &MzNaRe} c. Duo, ubi ad idem
beatum Ambrosium allegat dicens, "Qui {*etiam add.
&MzNaReZn}," scilicet Ambrosius, "in scriptis suis
{*trs. &MzNaReZn} ostendit quod aurum non tam preciosius est
{*sit &MzNaReZn} plumbo quam regia potestate sit altior ordo
sacerdotalis, hoc modo circa principium sui pastoralis scribens,
"Honor, fratres, et sublimitas {sublimans &Mz} episcopalis
nullis {nullus &Mz} poterit comparationibus adaequari. Si regum
fulgori compares et principum {principium &Mz} diademati
{diademate &Re} longe erit inferius quam si plumbi metallum ad
auri fulgorem conferas {*compares &MzNaReZn}. Quippe cum videas
regum colla et principum submitti genibus sacerdotum et osculata
eorum dextera orationibus eorum credant se excommunicari
{*communicari &NaReZn} vel muniri {*vel muniri om.
&MzNaReZn}." Hoc etiam testatur Innocentius tertius qui, ut
legi {*legitur &MzNaRe} Extra, De maioritate et obedientia, c.
{om. &MzNaRe} Solitae, loquens de pontificali dignitate seu
{*dignitate seu om. &NaRe} auctoritate et potestate regali ait,
"Illa quae praeest diebus, id est {id est: in &Re}
spiritualibus, maior est; quae vero carnalibus {cardinalibus &Na}
minor; est {*om. &MzNaRe} ut quanta est inter solem et lunam
{trs.321 &MzNaRe} tanta inter pontifices et reges differentia
cognoscatur." Ex his aliisque quampluribus {*Ex his aliisque
quampluribus: Ex quibus /his Mz\ /verbis add. Na\ et aliis pluribus
&MzNaRe} colligitur quod imperator est minor papa. Ergo non est
iudex eius. |
Master This assertion is proved by argument. For an
inferior is not the judge of his superior (dist 21, c. Inferior
[c.4, col.70] and c. Denique [c.6, col.71]). The emperor and
anyone else at all are inferior to the Roman pontiff, as Pope
Nicholas attests, who asserts this, as we find in dist. 96, c. Duo
[sunt] [c.10, col.340], when he brings forward blessed Ambrose
to this effect, saying, "He," that is Ambrose, "also
shows in his writings that as gold is more precious than lead, so
much more is the priestly order loftier than royal power, writing in
this way about the origin of his pastorship, `The episcopal honour
and loftiness, brothers, can not be equalled by any comparisons. If
you compare [to them] the splendour of kings and the diadem of
princes they will be just as inferior as if you compare the stuff of
lead to the splendour of gold. Indeed when you see the necks of kings
and princes lowered before the knees of priests and the right hands
of the latter kissed, they [the rulers] believe that they are joined
to their [the priests'] prayers.'" Innocent III also attests to
this, as we read in Extra, De maioritate et obedientia, c. Solitae
[c.6, col.196], when he says, speaking about priestly authority and
royal power, "That which rules over the days, that is over
spiritual matters, is greater; that is lesser [which rules over]
carnal matters; as great as is the difference between the sun and the
moon, so great is the difference known to be between bishops and
kings." We gather from these and many other [texts] that the
emperor is inferior to the pope. Therefore he is not the latter's judge. |
|
Amplius nemo est iudex iudicis sui. Sed papa est iudex imperatoris
cum ipsum valeat excommunicare et imperator ei subsit et sibi debeat
obedire, teste beato Clemente qui, ut legitur 2 {*11 &NaRe} {9
&Mz} q. 3, c. Si autem nobis {*vobis &Zn} {*ait,
"Si autem vobis add. &MzNaRe} episcopis non obedierint omnes
presbyteri et reliqui clerici omnesque principes, tam maioris ordinis
quam inferioris, atque reliqui populi non tantum {*solum
&MzNaReZn} infames sed etiam {et &Mz} extorres a regno Dei et
{*a add. &MzNaReZn} consortio fidelium et a liminibus {a
liminibus: alii &Mz} [[gap in ms after alii]] sanctae Dei
ecclesiae alieni erunt." Hoc {*etiam add. &NaRe} asserit
Gelasius papa {trs.231 &Na} {*qui add. &MzNaRe}, ut habetur
dist. 96, c. Duo ait, "Talibus igitur {ergo &NaRe}
institutis talibusque {et talibus &MzNaRe} fulti {suffulti
&MzNaRe} auctoritatibus plures {*plerique &Zn} {plurium
&MzNaRe} namque {*om. &MzNaReZn} pontificum alii reges alii
imperatores excommunicaverunt. Nam si {om. &Mz} speciale aliquid
{*aliquod &Zn} de personis principum requiritur {*requiratur
&NaReZn} exemplum, beatus Innocentius papa Archadium imperatorem,
quia consensit {consenserit &NaRe} ut sanctus Iohannes
Chrysostomus a sua sede {trs. &NaRe} pelleretur, {depelleretur
PeRe} {depelletur &Na} excommunicavit." Ergo nunc {*om.
&NaRe} {tunc &Mz} imperator non est iudex papae cum papa sit
iudex ipsius. Quod etiam papa sit iudex imperatoris ostenditur. Nam
sicut se habet corpus ad animam humanam sic princeps corporis ad
principem animarum. Sed corpus animae subest quantum ad regimen. Ergo
{et add. &Mz} princeps corporum, scilicet imperator, subest
regimini principis animarum, scilicet papae. {Quod etiam papa ...
papae om. &NaRe} |
Further, no one is the judge of his own judge. But the pope is the
emperor's judge, since he can excommunicate him and the emperor is
under him and ought to obey him, as blessed Clement attests when he
says, as we read in 11, q. 3, c. Si autem vobis [c.11,
col.646], "However if all priests, the rest of the clergy, all
princes, both of the greater and lesser order, and the rest of the
people do not obey you bishops, they are not only of ill repute but
are also banished from the kingdom of God and from the fellowship of
the faithful and will be inimical to the threshold of the holy church
of God." Pope Gelasius asserts this too, as we find in dist. 96,
c. Duo [sunt] [c.10, col.340], when he says, "Upheld by
such regulations and such authorities many bishops have pronounced
excommunications, some against kings, some against emperors. For if
some particular example concerning the persons of the emperors is
required, blessed Pope Innocent excommunicated the emperor Achadius
because he agreed in the expulsion of Saint John Chrisostom from his
see." The emperor is not the judge of the pope, therefore, since
the pope is his judge. That the pope is the emperor's judge is shown
again. For as the body is in relation to the human soul, so is the
ruler of the body in relation to the ruler of souls. But with respect
to rule the body is beneath the soul. Therefore the ruler of bodies,
that is the emperor, is beneath the rule of the ruler of souls, that
is the pope. |
|
Rursus imperator non est iudex illius qui legibus imperialibus est
solutus et qui mundanis legibus nequaquam astringitur; {*sed papa
mundanis legibus non astringitur add. &MzNaRe}, teste beato {*om.
&MzNaRe} Nicolao papa qui, ut habetur 23 {*33 &MzNaRe} q. 2,
c. Inter haec, ait, beata {*"Sancta &MzNaReZn} dei
ecclesia mundanis numquam {non &MzNaRe} constringitur
legibus." Et idem, ut habetur dist. 10. c. Lege, ait,
"Lege imperatoris {*imperatorum &NaReZn} non {est add.
&MzNaRe} in ecclesiasticis omnibus controversiis utendum est {om.
&MzNaRe}." Et infra: "Imperiali iudicio non possunt
iura ecclesiastica dissolvi." Ex quibus patet quod papa legibus
imperialibus nequaquam astringitur. Quod et {*etiam &NaRe} patet
ex hoc quod papa non astringitur canonibus papalibus nec etiam
canonibus generalium conciliorum. Ergo nec {*non &NaRe}
astringitur legibus imperialibus quae sunt sacris canonibus
postponendae, teste Gratiano qui 10. dist. {*trs. &MzNaRe} para.
1, ait, "Constitutiones vero principum ecclesiasticis
constitutionibus non praeeminent sed obsequuntur." Et eadem
dist. para. Ecce ait, "Ecce {ait ecce om. &Re} {*quod
add. &MzNaReZn} constitutiones principum ecclesiasticis legibus
postponendae sunt." Et idem, ut legitur 2, q. 3, para. Hinc
autem {*om. &MzNaRe} colligitur, dicit quod seculi leges non
dedignantur sacros canones imitari. Ergo papa legibus imperialibus
est solutus. Et per consequens imperator non est iudex papae. |
Again the emperor is not the judge of him who is free of imperial
laws and is not bound by the laws of the world; but the pope is not
bound by the laws of the world, as Pope Nicholas attests when he
says, as we find in 33, q. 2, c. Inter haec [c.6, col.1152],
"The holy church of God is never bound by the laws of the
world." And as we find in dist. 10, c. Lege [c.1,
col.19], the same pope says, "Imperial law should not be used in
any ecclesiastical controversies. ... Ecclesiastical laws can not be
dissolved by imperial judgement." It is clear from these that
the pope is not bound by imperial laws. This is also clear from the
fact that the pope is not bound by papal canons and not even by the
canons of general councils. He is not, therefore, bound by imperial
laws, which should be esteemed less than sacred canons, as Gratian
attests when he says in dist. 10, para. 1 [col.19], "The
constitutions of princes do not surpass but yield to ecclesiastical
constitutions." And he says in the same distinction, para. Ecce
[col.20], "Note that the constitutions of princes should be
esteemed less than ecclesiastical laws." And as we read in 2, q.
3, para. Hinc colligitur [col.453], [[not a direct quote]]
the same man says that secular laws do not disdain to imitate the
sacred canons. Therefore the pope is free from imperial laws. And
consequently the emperor is not the judge of the pope. |
|
Item imperator non est iudex episcoporum inferiorum et clericorum, ut
ex innumeris canonibus sacris {*trs. &NaRe} colligitur. Ergo non
est iudex papae.
CAP. XVII.
Discipulus Istae allegationes pro assertione
praedicta sufficiant. Ideo ad assertionem contrariam te converte. |
Again, the emperor is not the judge of lesser bishops and clerics, as
is gathered from innumerable sacred canons. Therefore he is not the
judge of the pope.
Chapter 17
Student Those arguments are enough in support of the
above assertion. Therefore turn to the opposite assertion. |
|
Magister Circa assertionem contrariam varii sunt
{*trs. &MzNaRe} modi ponendi. |
Master There are various ways of putting the
opposite assertion. |
|
Discipulus Recita illos modos {*trs. &MzNaRe} varios. |
Student Record those various ways. |
|
Magister Unus modus ponendi est quod imperator
ratione imperatoriae maiestatis {*dignitatis &NaRe} de omni
crimine tam ecclesiastico quam seculari habet iudicare et papam
{*trs. &MzNaRe} ipsum {primum &Mz} si est probatum contra
ipsum crimen dignum depositione deponere. |
Master One way of putting it is that by reason of
his imperial dignity the emperor has the power to judge any crime,
ecclesiastical as much as secular, and to depose the pope himself, if
a charge worthy of deposition is proved against him. |
|
Discipulus Aliquas allegationes adducas ad probandum
quod imperator debet papam pro omni crimine iudicare. |
Student Bring forward some arguments to prove that
the emperor ought to judge the pope for any crime. |
|
Magister Ad hoc plures rationes sunt inductae {*in
add. &Re} [[interlinear]] prima {qua &Re} [[corrected
interlinear]] parte huius dialogi libro 6 c. {*2 et add. &NaRe} 3
{*et add. &NaRe} 4 et 5, quibus {*forte add. &MzNaRe} non
facile erit {*trs. &MzNaRe} invenire fortiores. Ideo non videtur
necesse quod circa alias rationes adducendas me fatiges {fatigeres &Mz}. |
Master Many arguments were brought forward for this
in chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 of book 6 of the first part of this Dialogue,
and it will perhaps not be easy to find stronger ones than these. It
does not seem necessary, therefore, for you to importune me about
bringing forward other arguments. |
|
Discipulus Non est {*erit &NaRe} inutile ut
etiam rationes ibi factas aliter quam ibi tractemus. Ideo alias
{*illas &MzNaRe} tangas et alias coneris inducere. |
Student It will not be useless to consider arguments
made there in addition to others. Would you cite those, therefore,
and try to bring forward others. |
|
Magister Quod imperator possit et debeat papam pro
omni crimine iudicare quampluribus viis ostenditur, quarum una, quae
etiam {*tacta add. &NaRe} {tanta add. &Mz} est in prima parte
tacta {*om. &MzNaRe} istius Dialogi, sumitur ex unitate summi
{*supremi &NaRe} iudicis {*trs. &MzNaRe} quam {quem &NaRe}
omnis communitas bene ordinata habere debet {*trs. &NaRe}. Nam
omne regnum, omnis civitas, omne collegium et omnis communitas debet
habere unum solum iudicem simpliciter supremum vel plures summos
{*supremos &NaRe} idem officium habentes {*trs. &MzNaRe} seu
gerentes vicem unius a {om. &Mz} quo vel a {*om. &MzNaRe}
quibus omnes alii debent iudicari. Ergo tota universitas mortalium,
si fuerit bene ordinata et {vel &Na} gubernata, habet {*habebit
&MzNaRe} unum simpliciter summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem
vel plures habentes idem officium {*seu gerentes vicem unius add.
&NaRe} a quo vel quibus omnes alii debent {*debeant &NaRe}
iudicari. Religio autem Christiana non impedit aut {*nec &MzNaRe}
destruit {*trs.321 &NaRe} bonam dispositionem communitatis
mortalium. Ergo nihil invenitur in ea repugnans optimae dispositioni
universitatis mortalium, {*sed quicquid invenitur in ipsa est
conveniens optimae dispositioni mortalium add. &NaRe}. Ex quo
concluditur quod in nullo obviat religioni christianae quia quicquid
invenitur in ea est conveniens optimae dispositioni {*quia quicquid
... dispositioni om. &NaRe} {*universitatem add. &NaRe}
mortalium et per consequens {*et per consequens om. &NaRe} unum
habere summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem vel plures idem habentes
officium {*seu add. &MzNaRe} tenentes locum {*vicem &NaRe}
unius a quo vel a {*om. &NaRe} quibus alii omnes {*trs.
&MzNaRe} pro omni crimine debeant iudicari non repugnat religioni
Christianae {*non repugnat religioni Christianae om. &NaRe}. Sed
iste {*ille unus &NaRe} summus {*supremus &NaRe} iudex non
est papa nec etiam papa habere potest tale {*trs.321 &NaRe}
officium. Ergo ipse papa debet ab illo summo {*supremo &NaRe}
iudicari. Ille autem summus {*supremus &NaRe} iudex {om.
&NaRe} est imperator qui de iure est princeps et dominus
{*trs.321 &NaRe} totius mundi. Ergo imperator habet iudicare
papam pro omni crimine. |
Master That the emperor can and ought to judge the
pope for any crime is shown in very many ways, one of which, cited
also in the first part of this Dialogue, is taken from the
singleness of the supreme judge which every well ordered community
should have. For every kingdom, every city, every college and every
community should have one single judge who is plainly supreme, or
many who are supreme and hold or manage the same office in place of
that one, and all others should be judged by this one or by these. If
the whole totality of mortals, therefore, is well ordered and
governed it will have one plainly supreme judge, or many holding the
same office or acting in place of one, and by this one or these all
the others should be judged. The christian religion, however, does
not destroy or prevent the good management of the community of
mortals. Nothing is found in it, therefore, which is contrary to the
best management of the totality of mortals, but whatever is found in
it is consistent with the best management of the totality of mortals.
We conclude from this that it does not conflict with the christian
religion that the totality of mortals have one supreme judge, or many
holding or maintaining the same office in place of that one, and that
all others should be judged for any crime by that one or by those.
But that one supreme judge is not the pope and the pope can not even
hold such an office. The pope himself, therefore, should be judged by
that supreme one. That supreme judge, however, is the emperor who is
by right the prince and lord of the whole world. Therefore the
emperor has the right to judge the pope for any crime. |
|
Discipulus Ista {enim add. &Mz} ratio mihi
aliqualiter est obscura. Ideo antequam eam {*ea que assumit &NaRe}
[[gap in Mz after eam]] probes unum declara. Per hoc enim melius
intelligam an aliquid probabilitatis contineat. Dic igitur quid
intelligis {*intelligitur &Re} {intelligit &Na} per unum
iudicem summum {*supremum &NaRe} vel plures idem officium
habentes {*trs. &NaRe}. |
Student That argument is somewhat obscure to me.
Before you demonstrate those things which it assumes, therefore, make
one thing clear. For in this way I will better understand whether it
contains any probability. So tell me what is understood by "one
supreme judge or many holding the same office". |
|
Magister Hoc dicitur propter diversum modum
principandi, scilicet regalem, aristocraticum et politicum, de quibus
in morali philosophia tractatur. Nam in principatu regali unus est
{om. &Mz} solus {*trs. &NaRe} iudex summus {*supremus
&NaRe}; in aliis autem {*vero &MzNaRe} sunt plures summi
{*supremi &NaRe}, a quorum nullo seorsum est aliqua referenda
{*ferenda &MzNaRe} sententia sed ex deliberatione commune
{*communi &MzNaRe} et consensu ipsorum, vel saltem valentioris
partis secundum leges ipsorum et consuetudines approbatas, est
sententia proferenda. Et ita tunc sunt iudices plures {*trs.
&MzNaRe} summi {*supremi &NaRe} idem tamen officium habentes
{*trs. &MzNaRe} et eandem penitus potestatem ita ut saepe in
omnibus sunt {*sint &MzNaRe} aequales. Et ideo gerunt vicem unius
et locum unius tenent. |
Master This is said because of the different ways of
governing which moral philosophy considers, namely royal,
aristocratic and democratic. For in royal government there is one
sole supreme judge; in the others, in truth, there are many supreme
[judges], by none of whom on his own should any sentence be
pronounced, but it should be pronounced after their common
deliberation and consent, or at least of the more active part of them
according to their laws and approved customs. And so then there are
many supreme judges, yet each holding the same office and having
exactly the same power, so that they are often equal in everything.
And therefore they act in place of one and hold the position of one. |
|
Discipulus {*Nunc add. &NaRe} rationem tactam perficias. |
Student Would you now complete the argument you
touched on? |
|
Magister Circa eam non videtur aliquid probandum
nisi quod in nullo obviat religioni Christianae unitate
{*universitatem &NaRe} mortalium unum habere summum {*supremum
&NaRe} iudicem vel plures summos {*supremos &NaRe} idem
habentes officium. Quod ex illis quae dicta sunt primo capitulo huius
{*trs. &MzNaRe} {*1 add. &MzNaRe} videtur posse probari, quia
universitas mortalium nequaquam optime gubernatur nisi uni principi
qui dominetur omnibus sit subiecta. Ad quod probandum plures {*11
&NaRe} {enim &Mz} rationes sunt ibidem adductae. |
Master It does not seem that anything needs to be
proved about that, except that it does not in any way conflict with
the christian religion for the totality of mortals to have one
supreme judge or many supreme [judges] holding the same office. This
seems provable from what was said in the first chapter of the first
[book] of this [tractate], because the totality of mortals is only
best governed if it is subjected to one ruler who has dominion over
everyone. Eleven arguments were brought forward in that place to
prove this. |
|
Discipulus Dimittamus ad praesens loqui de
universitate mortalium, quorum aliqui sunt fideles et aliqui
infideles, et ideo forte nullo modo concordarent in unum iudicem qui
omnes alios de omni crimine iudicaret, et loquamur de tota
communitate fidelium quorum aliqui sunt laici {*et aliqui clerici
add. &NaRe}. Et videamus an ista communitas non possit esse
optime ordinata, quantum permittit status vitae praesentis, nisi tota
habeat unum iudicem solum {*trs. &NaRe} et {*om. &NaRe}
summum {*supremum &NaRe} a quo {*omnes add. &MzNaRe} alii pro
quocunque crimine debeant iudicari. |
Student Let us give up for the moment talking about
the totality of mortals, some of whom are believers and some
unbelievers, who would therefore perhaps not agree at all about one
judge who would judge all others for any crime, and let us speak
about the whole community of believers, of whom some are laymen and
some clerics. And let us see whether it is the case that that
community can not be best regulated, as much as the condition of this
present life allows, unless as a whole it has one sole supreme judge
by whom all others should be judged for any crime at all. |
|
Magister Quia {*Quod &MzNaRe} tota communitas
fidelium non habet {*habeat &MzNaRe} talem unicum {om. &NaRe}
iudicem summum {*supremum &NaRe} potest poni pluribus modis. |
Master That the whole community of believers does
not have such a single supreme judge can be put in many ways. |
|
Discipulus Explica modos illos ut de aliquibus eorum
vel de {*om. &NaRe} singulis conferamus. |
Student Explain those ways so that we can discuss
some of them or each of them. |
|
Magister Unus modus ponendi potest esse ut diversa
regna vel provinciae habeant diversos iudices summos {*supremos
&NaRe} qui {que &NaRe} uni superiori minime sint {sit
&NaRe} {sunt &Mz} subiecti {subiecta vel subiecte &NaRe}.
Alius est ut respectu eorundem sint diversi iudices summi {*supremi
&NaRe} non habentes idem officium secundum modum expositum
{*praeexpositum &NaRe} qui eosdem pro eisdem delictis habeant
iudicare. Alius est ut una pars habeat unum summum {*supremum
&NaRe} iudicem, a quo etiam {*solo &MzNaRe} pro quocunque
excessu {*crimine &NaRe} debeat iudicari, et alia pars habeat
alium summum {*supremum &Na} iudicem {om. &Na} a quo etiam
{et add. &Na} pro quocunque crimine habeat {*debeat &MzNa}
iudicari {et alia pars ... iudicari om. &Re}, sicut secundum
quosdam omnes clerici habent unum summum {*supremum &NaRe}
iudicem talem, scilicet papam, et omnes laici imperatorem. Alius est
ut {quod &Re} [[interlinear addition]] una pars habeat unum
summum {*supremum &NaRe} iudicem a quo solo vel auctoritate
ipsius pro quocunque delicto debeat iudicari, alia autem pars pro
aliquibus delictis debeat iudicari ab uno summo {*supremo &NaRe}
iudice et pro aliis ab alio, sicut secundum quosdam omnes clerici pro
quocunque delicto debent iudicari a papa, {*sed laici pro aliquibus
delictis debent iudicari a papa add. &NaRe} et pro aliis a iudice
seculari. Alius est ut sit unus summus {*supremus &NaRe} {*iudex
add. &NaRe} qui habeat facere iudicium de omnibus, uno vel paucis
exceptis, sicut secundum unam assertionem ex lege humana {*christiana
&NaRe} solus papa {solus papa add. &Mz} est exceptus
{*exemptus &NaRe} a iurisdictione iudicis secularis. Sed omnes
alii clerici sola libertate eis concessa {*trs. &MzNaRe} ab
imperatoribus et regibus a iudicio secularium iudicum sunt exempti. |
Master One way of putting it can be that different
kingdoms or provinces have different supreme judges, who are not
subject to one superior. Another way is that in regard to the same
people there are various supreme judges not holding the same office
in the way explained above, who have the right to judge the same
people for the same crimes. Another way is that one part has one
supreme judge, by whom alone it should be judged for any crime at
all, and another part has another supreme judge by whom it too should
be judged for any crime at all, just as, according to some people,
all clerics have one such supreme judge, namely the pope, and all
laymen have the emperor. Another way is that one part has one supreme
judge by whom alone, or on the authority of whom, it should be judged
for every crime, while another part should be judged by one supreme
judge for some crimes and by another [judge] for other [crimes], just
as, according to some people, all clerics should be judged by the
pope for any crime at all, but laymen should be judged by the pope
for some crimes and by a secular judge for other crimes. Another way
is that there is one supreme judge who has the power to pass
judgement on all, with one or a few exceptions, just as, according to
one assertion, by christian law only the pope is exempt from the
jurisdiction of a secular judge. But all other clerics are exempt
from the judgement of secular judges only because of a liberty
granted to them by emperors and kings. |
|
Discipulus Si sint alii modi ponendi negativam
praedictarum assertionum ad improbandum istos {istas &Mz}
{*praedictarum ... istos: praedictae assertionis &NaRe} puto quod
valeant reduci ad istos. Ideo sufficit {*sufficiat &MzNaRe}
adducere motiva quae allegari possunt pro istis vel {*pro istis vel
om. &NaRe} ad improbandum istos. Dic ergo quomodo improbatur
prima {*primus &NaRe}. |
Student If there are other ways of putting the
negation of the earlier assertion, I think that they can be reduced
to these [just cited]. Let it be enough, therefore, to adduce
arguments that can be brought forward to refute them. So tell me how
the first [way] is refuted. |
|
Magister Quomodo possit ostendi et allegari
{*trs.321 &NaRe} quod non sit expediens diversa regna vel
provincias habere diversos summos {*supremos &NaRe} iudices qui
nulli superiori sint subiecti ex his quae allegata sunt primo huius
cap. 1 potest advertere {*adducere &NaRe} studiosus. |
Master Anyone who is zealous can adduce from what
was brought forward in chapter one of the first [book] of this
[tractate] how it can be argued and shown that it is not expedient
for different kingdoms and provinces to have different supreme judges
who are not subject to any superior. |
|
Discipulus Converte te ad secundum et indica quomodo
potest improbari ille modus dicendi qui tenet quod non est contra
dispositionem bonam {*trs. &MzNaRe} communitatis fidelium ut
respectu eorundem sint diversi iudices summi {*supremi &NaRe} vel
{*om. &NaRe} non habentes idem officium, sicut aliqui ponunt
{*trs. &MzNaRe} de papa et imperatore quia {*quod &NaRe}
uterque seorsum sine requisitione et consensu alterius potest eundem
pro eodem delicto percellere {procellere &Mz}. |
Student Turn to the second and indicate how one can
refute that way of speaking which holds that it is not against good
management of a community of believers for there to be, with respect
to the same people, different supreme judges not holding the same
office, as some posit about the pope and the emperor that each
separately can, without the request or agreement of the other, punish
the same person for the same crime. |
|
Magister Hoc multis rationibus improbatur {probatur
&NaRe}. Primo sic: delinquentes non possunt debito modo puniri
nisi citentur vel capti ducantur ad iudicem; sed si sunt plures
iudices quorum quilibet seorsum absque alio potest iudicare reum
poterit contingere ut {*quod &NaRe} nec citatus valeat comparere
nec captus aut capiendus valeat iudici praesentari. Nam poterit
{poterat &Mz} contingere quod uterque iudex suam iurisdictionem
cupiens exercere citet reum pro eodem tempore vel quod uterque ad
ipsum capiendum mittat familiam. Si autem uterque {*om. &MzNaRe}
citetur {*citatur &MzNaRe} ab utroque, aut comparebit coram
utroque et hoc est sibi impossibile, aut comparebit coram uno solo et
tunc faciet {facit &Mz} alteri {alii &NaRe} iniuriam coram
quo non comparet cum non plus tenetur {*teneatur &Re} comparere
coram isto quam coram illo, et rursum ab illo coram quo non
compareret {*comparet &MzRe} {cum non plus ... compareret om.
&Na} absque culpa illius {*ipsius &NaRe} de {*pro &NaRe}
{quod &Mz} contumacia punietur, aut coram neutro comparebit et
tunc delictum eius {om. &NaRe} erit impunitum. Si etiam uterque
illorum iudicum {*trs. &NaRe} mittat familiam ad capiendum reum,
aut altera illarum familiarum aut utraque erit inobediens domino suo,
aut inter se pugnabunt ut reus per potentiam perducatur ad iudicem.
Quibus pugnantibus {*reus add. &MzNaRe} evadet, et sic in populo
seu communitate periculosa orietur seditio et remanebunt crimina
impunita. Quare communitas in qua {quibus &MzNaRe} talia ex
potestate iudicum orirentur {*oriuntur &NaRe} est pessime gubernata. |
Master This is refuted by many arguments of which
the first is as follows. Those committing a crime can not be duly
punished unless they are summoned or led captive to a judge; but if
there are many judges, each of whom can separately judge a guilty man
without the other, it could happen that he who is summoned can not
appear and he who is or should be captured can not be presented
before a judge. For it could happen that each judge, wishing to
exercise his own jurisdiction, summons the guilty man [to appear] at
the same time, or that each sends his retainers to capture him. If he
is summoned by both, however, either he will appear before each of
them - and this is impossible for him - or he will appear before one
only and then will do a wrong to the other before whom he does not
appear, since he is not bound to appear before the one more than
before the other - and in return without being at fault he will be
punished for being contumacious by the one before whom he does not
appear - or he will appear before neither and then his crime will
remain unpunished. Also if each of those judges sends his retainers
to capture the guilty man, either one or the other group of those
retainers will be disobedient to their lord, or they will fight among
themselves to lead the guilty man back to the judge by force. While
they fight the guilty man will escape, and so a dangerous sedition
will arise among the people or in the community and crimes will
remain unpunished. A community in which such [problems] arise because
of the power of judges, therefore, is very badly governed. |
|
Amplius ex huiusmodi {*hac &NaRe} pluralitate iudicum omnis
utilitas publica et reorum impeditur punitio {*trs. &NaRe}, quia
poterit contingere quod isti iudices voluerint subditos ad diversa
loca pro eodem tempore pro criminosis plectendis vel pro {*om.
&NaRe} tractandis negociis quibus {*communibus &NaRe}
convocare. Non possunt {*autem add. &NaRe} ad diversa loca aut
{*om. &NaRe} eodem tempore convenire. Ergo et punitio
malefactorum et communis utilitas impeditur {*impedietur &MzNaRe}
et de facili seditio orietur. Quare talis communitas est {*esset
&NaRe} pessime et periculosissime ordinata. |
Further, any public benefit and the punishment of the guilty are
hindered by this plurality of judges because it could happen that
those judges wanted to assemble their subjects at different places at
the same time to punish criminals or to discuss common business.
However, they can not assemble in different places at the same time.
Therefore both the punishment of wrong-doers and the common benefit
will be hindered, and sedition will easily arise. Therefore such a
community would be very badly and most dangerously regulated. |
|
Rursus absque necessitate et utilitate est pluralitas fugienda quia
frustra fit per plura {*plures &NaRe} quod fieri potest {*trs.
&NaRe} per pauciora {*pauciores &NaRe}. Sed pluralitas
huiusmodi iudicum omni necessitate aut {*et &NaRe} utilitate
caret quia omnia melius disponerentur {*disponentur &NaRe} per
unum quam per plures. dicitur {*om. &NaRe} Ergo quod {*quia
&NaRe} ex tali pluralitate faciliter orietur {*oritur &NaRe}
{oriretur &Mz} guerra et seditio ac discordia tam inter ipsos
iudices sua potestate uti volentes quam etiam inter ipsos subditos
quorum aliqui ex diversis causis imo innumerabilibus possunt
inclinari ut uni obediant et non {alicui add. &Mz} alteri {*alii
&NaRe}, alii autem poterunt ad alium inclinari, ideo communitas
quae habet diversos iudices summos {*supremos &NaRe} quibus vel
{quibus vel om. &NaRe} quorum {trs.321 &Mz} uno {*om.
&MzNaRe} {*quilibet add. &NaRe} seorsum absque alio valeat
punire eosdem delinquentes pessima et periculosissima est censenda.
Quod veritas etiam {*trs. &NaRe} {*ipsa add. &NaRe}
apertissime testari videtur quae Matthaei 6:[24] ait, "Nemo
potest duobus dominis servire; aut enim unum odio habebit et alterum
diliget, aut unum sustinebit et alterum contemnetur {*contemnet
&MzNaReVg}." Ex quibus verbis habetur quod nemo debet habere
duos dominos vel duos iudices quorum unus non est sub alio. |
Again, if there is no necessity and benefit a plurality should be
avoided because what can be done by fewer people is done to no
purpose by many. But this sort of plurality of judges lacks any
necessity and benefit because everything is better regulated by one
than by many. Because such a plurality easily gives rise, therefore,
to war, sedition and discord, both among the judges themselves
wanting to use their power and among their subjects, some of whom can
be inclined for different, indeed for innumerable, reasons to obey
one and not another, while others could be inclined towards another,
a community which has different supreme judges, any one of whom can
without another punish the same transgressors, should as a result be
considered very bad and most dangerous. The Truth himself seems very
clearly to testify to this when he says at Matthew 6:24, "No one
can serve two masters; for he will either hate the one and love the
other, or be devoted to the one and despise the other." We find
from these words that no one ought to have two masters or two judges,
one of whom is not under the other. |
|
Discipulus Ista auctoritas non videtur concludere
opinioni {*propositum &NaRe} quia Christus loquitur de dominis
contrariis qui actu {*om. &MzNaRe} contraria {communia &Mz} iubent. |
Student That text does not seem to demonstrate the
proposition because Christ is talking about opposed lords who order
opposed things. |
|
Magister Haec responsio ab {*om. &MzNaRe} aliis
minime satisfacit quia Deus {*Dominus &NaRe} loquitur non solum
de dominis contrariis actu {*trs. &NaRe}, hoc est qui actu
contraria {communia &Mz} iubent, sed etiam de illis qui proni
sunt ad iubendum contraria et de quibus est probabiliter formidandum
quod inter se dissentientes iubebunt contraria. Cum ergo nostra {*om.
&NaRe} natura humana sit prona ad dissentiendum non immerito est
timendum quod si eadem communitas habuerit duo capita, {*capita add.
&MzNaRe} ipsa {om. &Mz} {*illa &NaRe} inter se erunt
{*om. &MzNaRe} dissentientia {*dissentient &NaRe}, quia quot
capita tot sententiae et opiniones dist. 19. {*dist. 19: De consecratione &MzNaRe}, dist. 10. {*4 &MzNaRe}, Sicut in sacramentis.
Quare timendum est quod capita illa sive domini iubebunt contraria
{communia &Mz}. Ex quo infertur quod nullus subditus poterit eis
servire. Et per consequens ista {*illa &NaRe} communitas quae
habet plura capita est pessime ordinata. Ex quo concluditur quod si
communitas fidelium habet duos summos {*supremos &NaRe} iudices,
scilicet imperatorem et papam, est periculosa societas reputanda. Et
consimili ratione infertur quod absque periculis manifestis non
possunt in eodem regno vel provincia aut in {*aut in: ac etiam
&Re} [[Na illegible]] civitate esse duo iudices supremi super
eosdem, ecclesiasticus videlicet et secularis, praesertim in illo
regno, provincia vel civitate quod vel quae superiorem de facto in
temporalibus non recognoscit. Ad haec {*etiam add. &NaRe}
roboranda adduci potest assertio veritatis quae Matth. 12:[25] ait,
"Omne regnum contra se divisum {*trs.312 &NaReVg}
desolabitur, et omnis domus vel civitas {*trs.321 &NaReVg} contra
se divisa {*trs.312 &NaReVg} non stabit {sta &Mz}." Ex
quibus verbis colligitur quod omnis communitas et congregatio {est
add. &Re} propinqua divisioni est propinqua desolationi et
ruinae. Cum ergo communitas seu congregatio fidelium sit propinqua
divisioni si habeat {*habet &NaRe} duos {om. &NaRe} iudices
supremos, quia capita diversa sunt prona ad dissentiendum, sequitur
quod communitas seu congregatio fidelium est propinqua desolationi et
ruinae, et per consequens contra bonum commune est ut supra se duos
habeat iudices {trs. &Na} supremos. Ad hoc etiam adducitur
auctoritas Hieronimi qui, ut legitur 7, q. 1, c. In apibus,
ad Rusticum monachum ait {*trs.4123 &NaRe}, "In apibus
princeps unus est; grues unam sequuntur ordine {ordinem &Mz}
literato; imperator {imperatori &Mz} unus, iudex unus provinciae.
Roma autem condita duos fratres simul reges habere non potuit et
fratricidio {*patricidio &MzZn} dedicatur. In Rebeccae utero Esau
et Iacob bella gesserunt; singuli {singularum &NaRe} ecclesiarum
episcopi, singuli {singuli add. &Re} archiepiscopi, singuli
archidiaconi; et omnis ordo ecclesiasticus suis rectoribus nititur
{innititur &Re}." In quibus verbis Hieronymus probat aperte
per plura exempla quod in eadem ecclesia non debeant {*debent
&MzNaRe} esse plures praelati quorum unus non est sub alio. Per
quem {*quae &NaRe} aeque aperte {*om. &NaRe} vel apertius
potest ostendi quod in eadem communitate non debent esse plures
iudices supremi, quia si per universitatem {*unitatem &NaRe}
principis in apibus potest ostendi unitas episcopi in una dioecesi et
unitas archiepicsopi in uno archiepiscopatu, eadem ratione per
unitatem principis in apibus potest ostendi unitas iudicis supremi
super {per &Na} unam communitatem seu congregationem. Iterum si
ex hoc quod grues unam sequuntur ordine {*om. &NaRe} {ordinem
&Mz} ostenditur {ostendatur quod &Mz} unitas episcopi et
archiepiscopi, in dioecesi {*in dioecesi om. &MzNaRe} consimili
ratione ex hoc ostenditur unitas iudicis supremi super unam
communitatem. Consimiliter si ex hoc quod Roma condita duos fratres
simul reges habere non potuit sed fratricidio {*patricidio &Mz}
extitit dedicata ostenditur unitas episcopi et archiepiscopi et
aliorum rectorum {romanorum &Re} ecclesiae, multo fortius ex
eodem {eadem &Na} potest probari unitas iudicis supremi super
eandem communitatem, ut scilicet non sint duo, scilicet
ecclesiasticus et {vel &Mz} secularis, quia non minus
praesumendum videtur quod iudex secularis adversabitur ecclesiastico
{*etiam add. &NaRe} usque ad interfectionem {interitionem
&Mz}, quemadmodum unus fratrum conditorum Romae alium interfecit,
quam iudex ecclesiasticus alteri iudici ecclesiastico vel unus
episcopus alteri episcopo. Si ergo per exemplum duorum fratrum quorum
unus occidit alterum {alium &NaRe} probari potest quod non debent
esse duo episcopi in eodem episcopatu, multo fortius per idem
exemplum potest ostendi quod super communitatem fidelium non debent
esse duo iudices {*supremi add. &NaRe}, quorum unus sit secularis
et alius ecclesiasticus. Et propter illud {*idem &NaRe} patet
quod si per exemplum de Esau et Iacob qui in utero matris bella
gesserunt potest ostendi quod non debent esse duo episcopi in una
dioecesi, multo fortius probari potest per idem exemplum quod super
communitatem fidelium non debent esse duo iudices summi {*supremi
&NaRe}, scilicet ecclesiasticus et secularis. Hoc etiam verba
Hieronimi sonare videntur qui vult quod unius provinciae debet esse
unus iudex. Non autem dicit quod unius provinciae debet esse unus
iudex {non autem ... iudex om. &Re} [[add. margin]]
ecclesiasticus vel unus iudex secularis, quasi {quia &Re} vellet
solummodo excludere pluralitatem iudicum ecclesiasticorum et non
{*om. &MzNaRe} pluralitatem iudicum secularium, sed dicit
indistincte quod unius provinciae est unus iudex, volens per hoc
pluralitatem omnem {*trs. &MzNaRe} iudicum summorum {*supremorum
&NaRe} quorumcunque excludere. Et ita super communitatem fidelium
non expedit esse plures {trs. &Na} iudices qualescunque summos
{*supremos &NaRe}. |
Master That reply does not satisfy some people
because the Lord is talking not only about lords actually opposed,
that is who actually order opposed things, but also about those who
are inclined to the ordering of opposed things and of whom it is to
be feared with probability that, disagreeing among themselves, they
will order opposed things. Since therefore our human nature is
inclined to disagreement, it should not without cause be feared that
if the same community had two heads, those heads will disagree with
each other because there will be as many opinions and points of view
as there are heads (De consecratione, dist. 4, c. Sicut
in sacramentis [c.151, col.1411]). It should be feared,
therefore, that those heads or lords will order opposed things. From
this we infer that no subject could serve them. And consequently that
community which has many heads is very badly regulated. We conclude
from this that if a community of believers has two supreme judges,
namely the emperor and the pope, it should be regarded as a dangerous
society. And by a similar argument we infer that in the same kingdom
or province and even city there can not be without clear dangers two
supreme judges, that is an ecclesiastical and secular one, over the
same people, especially in that kingdom, province or city which does
not in fact recognise any superior in temporal affairs. To strengthen
this, an assertion of the Truth from Matthew 12:25 can also be
adduced, "Every kingdom divided against itself is laid waste,
and no city or house divided against itself will stand." We
gather from these words that every community and congregation which
is near to division is near to desolation and ruin. Therefore since a
community or congregation of believers is near to division if it has
two supreme judges, because different heads are inclined to
disagreement, it follows that a community or congregation of
believers is near to desolation and ruin, and consequently it is
against the common good that it have two supreme judges over it. The
authority of Jerome is also adduced to this effect. As we read in 7,
q. 1, c. In apibus [c.41, col.582], he says to the monk Rusticus,
"Among bees there is one ruler; cranes follow one of their
number in learned order; there is one emperor and one judge in a
province. When Rome was founded it could not have two brothers as
kings at the same time and is destined for parricide. [[This word to
be broadly interpreted, as the gloss says.]] In Rebecca's womb Esau
and Jacob waged war; single bishops of churches, single archbishops,
single archdeacons; and the whole ecclesiastical order rests on its
rulers." In these words Jerome clearly proves by many examples
that in the same church there should not be many prelates, one of
whom is not under another. It can equally or more clearly be shown by
them that there should not be many supreme judges in the same
community because, if by the singleness of the ruler of bees, the
singleness of a bishop in one diocese and the singleness of an
archbishop in one archdiocese can be shown, by the same argument the
singleness of a supreme judge over one community or congregation can
be shown from the singleness of the ruler of bees. Again, if the
singleness of a bishop and archbishop is shown from the fact that
cranes follow one of their number, by a similar argument the
singleness of a supreme judge over one community is shown from this.
Similarly, if the singleness of a bishop, an archbishop and other
rulers of the church is shown from the fact that once Rome was
founded it could not have two brothers as kings at the same time but
was destined for parricide, the singleness of a supreme judge over
the same community can much more strongly be proved from this, that
is that there not be two, namely one ecclesiastical and one secular,
because it seems that it should not be any the less presumed that a
secular judge will oppose an ecclesiastical one, even as far as
killing him, just as one of the founding brothers of Rome killed the
other, than that one ecclesiastical judge [will oppose] the other or
one bishop [oppose] the other. If it can be proved, therefore, by the
example of the two brothers, one of whom killed the other, that there
should not be two bishops in the same episcopate, it can much more
strongly be shown by the same example that there should not be two
supreme judges, one of whom is secular and the other ecclesiastical,
over a community of believers. And for the same reason it is clear
that if it can be shown from the example of Esau and Jacob, who waged
war in their mother's womb, that there should not be two bishops in
one diocese, it can much more strongly be proved by the same example
that there should not be two supreme judges, that is one
ecclesiastical and one secular, over a community of believers.
Jerome's words also seem to signify this since he thinks that there
should be one judge of one province. He does not say, however, that
there should be one ecclesiastical judge of one province, or one
secular judge, as if he was wanting to exclude only a plurality of
ecclesiastical judges and of secular judges, but he says without
distinction that there is one judge of one province, wanting by this
to exclude every plurality of any supreme judges at all. And so it is
not appropriate that there be many supreme judges of any kind over a
community of believers. |
|
Praeterea ista {*illa &NaRe} ordinatio communitatis non est bona
ex qua provenit quod potentior eiusdem communitatis valentis {*valens
&NaRe} magnam sequelam habere ad impatientiam et iracundiam
provocetur contra alium potentiorem in eadem communitate qui etiam
poterit magnam habere {*trs. &NaRe} sequelam, quia ex tali
ordinatione sequuntur {sequitur &Mz} {*faciliter add. &NaRe}
{facit add. &Mz} dissensiones, seditiones et guerrae. Sed si in
communitate fidelium ordinetur quod sint scilicet {*om. &NaRe}
duo iudices summi {*supremi &NaRe}, scilicet papa et alius, ex
tali ordinatione sequitur {*sequetur &NaRe} [[margin Na]]
faciliter quod unus contra alium ad impatientiam et iracundiam
provocetur quia, sicut dicit poeta, "Omnis potestas impatiens
consortis est." Cui satis videtur alludere Augustinus {*qui add.
&NaRe}, ut legitur 23, q. 7, c. Qui {*Quod Zn} a {*autem &NaReZn} nobis, ait, "Quis enim avarus quaerit
compossessorem? Quis dominandi cupiditate inflammatus vel fastu
dominationis elatus desiderat habere consortem?" quasi diceret,
nullis {*nullus &MzNaRe} talis. Ergo ordinatio communitatis non
est bona nec laudabilis ubi sunt plures iudices summi {*supremi
&NaRe} nullum habentes superiorem {*trs. &MzNaRe}. Ex quibus
{*omnibus &NaRe} supradictis concluditur quod si in communitate
fidelium fuerint plures iudices summi {*supremi &NaRe} sive plura
capita simpliciter prima, qui vel {*seu &NaRe} quae eosdem pro
eisdem criminibus habeant {habent &Mz} coercere et eisdem de
eisdem praecipere, sequitur manifeste quod eadem communitas fidelium
semper {super &Mz} erit disposita {*exposita &Na} discordiis,
dissensionibus, seditionibus, pugnis et guerris tam inter capita ipsa
contraria {*conantia &Na?Re} [[corrected unclearly from contraria
in Re]] {conativa &Mz} invicem {*se praeferre add. &NaRe} {se
potest ferre add. &Mz} quam inter subditos {*subiectos
&MzNaRe}, quorum aliqui adhaerebunt uni et alii alteri. Et ideo
pauci erunt vel nulli quin unum odio habebunt et alterum diligent. Et
per consequens unum sustinebunt et alium {alii &Mz} si poterunt
impugnabunt {*et add. &MzNaRe} ita semper erit timendum quod non
erit pax in communitate seu congregatione {*fidelium add. &NaRe}. |
Moreover, that regulation of a community is not good by which it
comes to pass that a more powerful member of that community who is
able to have a large following is provoked to impatience and anger
against another of the more powerful members in that same community
who is also able to have a large following, because dissension,
seditions and wars easily follow from such regulation. But if a
community of believers is regulated so that there are two supreme
judges, namely the pope and another, it will easily follow from such
regulation that one will be provoked to impatience and anger against
the other, because, as the poet says, "All power is impatient of
a partner." [[Lucan 1, 92-3]] As we read in 23, q. 7, c. Quod
autem nobis [c.3, col.951], Augustine seems sufficiently to
allude to this when he says, "For what greedy man seeks a
joint-possessor? What man inflamed with a desire to rule or puffed up
with the arrogance of domination wants to have a partner?" as
though to say, there is no such person. The regulation of a
community, therefore, is neither good nor praiseworthy when there are
many supreme judges having no superior. We conclude from all of the
above that if in a community of believers there are many supreme
judges or many plainly chief heads, who have the power to coerce the
same people for the same crimes and to command the same things of the
same people, it manifestly follows that that same community of
believers will always be exposed to discords, dissension, seditions,
fighting and wars both between the heads themselves, with each trying
to put himself ahead of the other, and among the subjects, some of
whom will adhere to one and some to the other. And so there will be
few people or none that will not hate one and love the other. And
consequently they will uphold one and, if they can, attack the other
and so it will always be something to be feared that there will not
be peace in the community or congregation of believers. |