Copyright © 2008, The British Academy
|[s 1] [Prologus]
|[s 2] “Verba oris eius iniquitas et dolus”, ait Psalmista, per spiritum previdens prophecie protestacionem seu revocacionem vel retractacionem verbalem, fictam et frivolam Iohannis 22i, supersticiosam iniquitatem hereticam, immo et dolum mortiferum continentem, qui in eadem protestacione, retractacione seu revocacione (ut in sequentibus apparebit) per raciones hereticales heresim manifestam probare conatur, et vulpinam maliciam ad simplices seducendos verbis ambiguis et dolosis nititur palliare. Sane ut hoc evidencius ostendatur, ipsam totam protestacionem vel revocacionem, ut reportata a quibusdam extitit, ponemus per particulas, impugnaciones proprias subnectendo.
|"The words of his mouth are wickedness and deception", says the Psalmist [Psalm 35(36):4], foreseeing through a spirit of prophesy the protestation or revocation or retraction---verbal, fictitious and frivolous---of John XXII, containing ?superstitious heretical wickedness and indeed death-dealing deception. In this protestation, retraction, or revocation (as will appear in the following) he tries to prove manifest heresy by heretical arguments and tries to whitewash cunning malice so as to seduce the simple with ambiguous and deceptive words. So that this may be shown more evidently, we will set out piece by piece that whole protestation or revocation, as some have reported it, adding appropriate criticisms.
|[s 3] Capitulum 1
|Reportaciones igitur supradicte in hec verba incipiunt:
|The abovementioned report begins with the following words:
|Anno Domini 1334o, die lune 3a Ianuarii, dominus Iohannes 22us tenuit consistorium publicum, in quo primo fecit legi allegaciones et raciones aliquorum (ut dixit) qui tenent quod anime sanctorum purgate vident nunc clare et facialiter deum. Quibus allegacionibus et racionibus lectis per clericos suos, sicut ipsemet ordinavit et voluit, in eodem consistorio secundo ipsemet verbo et cum magno fervore nisus est probare quod anime sanctorum purgate non vident facialiter deum usque post diem iudicii. Raciones sue, breviter repetendo, fundabantur in quinque viis seu fundamentis.
|On Monday 3 January in the year of our Lord 1334, the lord John XXII held a public consistory in which he first caused to be read the authorities and arguments of certain persons who (as he said) hold that the purified souls of the saints now see God clearly face-to-face. When these authorities and arguments had been read by his clergy, as he himself instructed and wished, secondly in the same consistory he himself, verbally and with great warmth, tried to prove that the purified souls of the saints do not see God face-to-face until after the day of judgment. His arguments (repeating them briefly) were based on five ways or foundations.
|[s 4] Hec sunt verba reportancium, illa que audiverunt et viderunt narrancium.
|These are the words of the reporters, relating what they heard and saw.
|[s 5] Capitulum 2
|[s 6] Prima racio eius fuit quod
|His first argument was that
|cum visione clara sanctorum non stat spes, sed anime sanctorum sperant corporum resurreccionem usque ad diem iudicii, igitur usque tunc non habent claram dei visionem. Maior (ut dicit) patet per beatum Thomam, prima secunde. Minor patet per sacram scripturam, tum quia Iob dicit, “et in novissimo die de terra surrecturus sum”, tum quia in Apocalypsi anime sanctorum martyrum postulant et murmurando implorant vindictam de sanguine proprio.
|Hope is not consistent with clear vision on the part of the saints. But the souls of the saints hope for the resurrection of their bodies until the day of judgment. Therefore until then they do not have clear vision of God. The major is clear (as he says) through blessed Thomas, [Summa theologiae] 1-2. The minor is clear from sacred scripture, first because Job says, "And on the last day I will be resurrected from the earth" [Job 19:25], and second because in the Apocalypse the souls of the holy martyrs demand, and murmuring implore, that their blood be avenged [Apocalypse 6:9-10].
|[s 7] Hec racio preter heresim principalem aliam heresim manifestam includit, que est quod omnis sperans aliquid futurum non videt clare divinam essenciam; quia per hoc quod anime sanctorum sperant corporum resurreccionem probare conatur quod non habent claram dei visionem, que probacio nulla esset nisi teneret quod omnis sperans aliquid futurum non habet claram dei visionem. Quod autem hoc sit hereticum liquet aperte. Constat enim quod Christus ante passionem suam gloriam impassibilitatis et immortalitatis speravit; si igitur qui sperat aliquid futurum non videt divinam essenciam, sequitur quod Christus ante passionem et resurreccionem divinam essenciam minime videret.
|Besides the principal heresy, this argument includes another manifest heresy, which is that all who hope for something to come do not clearly see the divine essence. For from the fact that the souls of the saints hope for the resurrection of the body he tries to prove that they do not have clear vision of God; this proof would be null unless he held that all who hope for something to come do not have clear vision of God. That this is heretical, however, is clearly apparent. For it is certain that Christ before his passion hoped for the glory of impassibility and immortality; if, therefore, one who hopes for something to come does not see the divine essence, it follows that Christ before his passion and resurrection did not at all see the divine essence.
|[s 8] Hec racio confirmatur. Ex persona Christi dicit Psalmista, “In te, Domine, speravi, non confundar in eternum”, dum insultabitur michi habenti similitudinem carnis peccati. Igitur Christus aliquando speravit, et tamen Christus ab instanti sue concepcionis vidit divinam essenciam; igitur non omnes qui sperant aliquid futurum carent visione divina.
|This argument is confirmed. Speaking in the person of Christ, the Psalmist says, "In you, O Lord, I have hoped, let me never be confounded" [Psalm 30(31):2], while insult will be made to me while I have the appearance of sinful flesh [cf. Romans 8:3]. Therefore Christ at some time hoped; and yet from the instant of his conception Christ saw the divine essence; therefore those who hope for something to come do not all lack the divine vision.
|[s 9] Hoc idem patet de angelis, qui hominum resurreccionem futuram sperant, qui tamen vident deum, iuxta illud Matthei 18o, “Angeli eorum semper vident faciem patris”. Non omnes igitur qui sperant aliquid futurum carent visione dei.
|This same is clear of the angels, who hope for the coming resurrection of mankind. Yet they see God, according to the text of Matthew 18 [18:10], "Their angels always see the face of my father". Therefore those who hope for something to come do not all lack the vision of God..
|[s 10] Heresi supradicta breviter reprobata, respondendum est ad racionem sophisticam quam in fulcimentum principalis erroris adducit. Ad cuius evidenciam est sciendum quod, quamvis visio facialis divine essencie et actus sperandi visionem eandem simul stare non possint, visio tamen facialis et actus sperandi aliquid aliud quam illam visionem facialem possunt simul stare in eodem. Anima enim Christi, quia ab instanti sue concepcionis vidit divinam essenciam, visionem illam non speravit, sed speravit resurreccionem corporum que futura est.
|The above heresy having been briefly disproved, answer must be made to the sophistical argument he brings forward to support the main error. To make this clear it must be known that although face-to-face vision of the divine essence and the act of hoping for the same vision are inconsistent, nevertheless face-to-face vision and an act of hoping for something other than that face-to-face vision are consistent in the same person. For the soul of Christ (since from the instant of his conception he saw the divine essence) did not hope for that vision, but hoped for the resurrection of bodies, which is to come.
|[s 11]Porro quia ille in dictis Thome se fundare videtur, ideo, ut pateat evidenter quod ipse Thomam nequaquam intelligit, eciam propter illos qui doctrinam Thome recipiunt, ostendendum est quod predictus Thomas oppositum asserit manifeste. Secunda secunde, q. 18a, a. 2o, in solucione prime racionis, dicit in hec verba: “Christus, etsi esset comprehensor et per consequens beatus quantum ad divinam fruicionem, erat tamen simul viator quantum ad passibilitatem nature quam adhuc gerebat, et ideo gloriam impassibilitatis et immortalitatis sperare poterat”. [s 12] Infra, in solucione tercie racionis: “Non tamen ita quod haberet virtutem spei... sed magis ex virtute caritatis, sicut eciam qui caritatem habet dei eadem caritate diligit proximum”. Infra ait: “Cum spes sit virtus theologica habens deum pro obiecto, principale obiectum spei est gloria anime que in fruicione divina consistit, non autem gloria corporis”.
|Moreover, because he seems to build on statements of Thomas, therefore so that it may appear evidently that he has not understood Thomas, also for the sake of those who accept the teachings of Thomas, it must be shown that Thomas manifestly asserts the opposite. In 2-2, q. 18, a. 2, reply to the first objection, he says in the following words: "Although Christ was a comprehensor [one who comprehends], and consequently blessed in respect of the enjoyment of God, he was at the same time a viator [wayfarer, living in this world], in respect of the passibility of the nature he still bore. And therefore he was able to hope for the glory of impassibility and immortality". Below, in the reply to the third [partly to the first] objection: "Yet not in such a way that he had the virtue of hope. . . but rather from the virtue of charity, as one who has love of God by the same love also loves his neighbour". Below [in the reply to the fourth objection] he says: "Since hope is a theological virtue having God for its object, the principal object of hope is the glory of the soul that consists in the enjoyment of God, not glory of the body".
|[s 13] Ex hiis patet aperte quod iste doctor tenet quod habens talem actum sperandi non habet spem que est virtus theologica. Si autem “spes” accipiatur pro actu sperandi, quemadmodum “fides” quandoque accipitur pro actu credendi (de qua Augustinus dicit, “Fides secundum quam credimus quod non videmus”, secundum quod notatur in glossa, Extra, De summa trinitate et fide catholica, c. Firmiter), sic dicendum est quod cum visione clara non stat actus sperandi respectu visionis divine, sed cum visione clara stat actus sperandi quedam alia futura non habita.
|From these texts it is plainly clear that this doctor holds that one who has such an act of hope does not have the hope that is a theological virtue. But if "hope" is taken for an act of hoping, in the way "faith" is sometimes taken for the act of believing (of which Augustine says, "Faith, according to which we believe what we do not see", as noted in the Gloss, Extra, De summa trinitate et fide catholica, c. Firmiter), in this way it must be said that an act of hoping in respect of the divine vision is not consistent with clear vision, but the act of hoping for other things to come and not yet had is consistent with clear vision.
|[s 14] Cum tamen dicit quod “hoc patet per Thomam prima secunde”, respondetur quod Thomas ibidem intendit quod cum clara visione non stat spes que est virtus theologica. Cum ipsa tamen stat actus sperandi aliquid adhuc futurum, quemadmodum (prout adductum est) exemplificat de Christo, in quo fuerunt simul visio clara et actus sperandi gloriam impassibilitatis et immortalitatis.
|However, when he says that this is clear from Thomas [Summa theologiae] 1-2, it is answered that Thomas there meant that the hope that is a theological virtue is not consistent with clear vision; the act of hoping for something still in the future, however, is consistent with it, just as (as was said) is exemplified concerning Christ, in whom there existed simultaneously clear vision and the act of hoping for the glory of impassibility and immortality.
|[s 15] Cum eciam dicit quod “anime sanctorum sperant corporum resurreccionem usque ad diem iudicii”, hoc conceditur, quia sperant non per spem que est virtus theologica, que primo est respectu glorie anime, sed per actum sperandi — qui secundum quosdam a caritate dei procedit, secundum quosdam a deo et divina essencia, secundum quosdam ab habitu spei acquisito qui non est virtus theologica, secundum quosdam a desiderio corporibus reuniri. Et iste opiniones non sunt discuciende ad presens, sed hic tenendum est quod, absque habitu spei que est virtus theologica, sanctorum anime per actus sperandi sperant corporum resurreccionem, non visionem divine essencie.
|When also he says that "the souls of the saints hope for the resurrection of bodies until the day of judgment", this is granted, because they hope not through the hope that is a theological virtue, which primarily relates to the glory of the soul, but through an act of hoping --- which according to some proceeds from love of God, according to others from God and the divine essence [or according to a variant "from God and the soul itself"], according to others from an acquired habit of hope that is not the theological virtue, according to others from the desire of being reunited with their bodies. These opinions are not to be discussed at present, but it is to be held here that, without the habit of hope that is a theological virtue, the souls of the saints hope by acts of hope for the resurrection of the body, not for the vision of the divine essence.
|[s 16] Cum vero minor probatur auctoritate Iob, “In novissimo die”, et cetera, dicendum est quod per illa verba probatur quod anime sanctorum sperant corporum resurreccionem, sed non probatur per eam quod anime sanctorum habent spem que est virtus theologica vel actum sperandi qui non stat cum visione clara.
|When the minor is proved by the text of Job, "On the last day", etc., it must be said that by those words it is proved that the souls of the saints hope for the resurrection of the body, but it is not proved by that text that the souls of the saints have the hope that is a theological virtue or an act of hoping that is inconsistent with clear vision.
|[s 17] Cum autem eandem minorem probare conatur per hoc quod in Apocalypsi legitur (ut dicit) quod “anime sanctorum postulant et murmurando implorant vindictam de sanguine”, dicendum est quod auctoritatem Apocalypsis non bene allegat. Quamvis enim in Apocalypsi dicitur quod “clamabant voce magna dicentes: Usquequo Domine (sanctus et verus) non iudicas et vindicas sanguinem nostrum de hiis qui habitant in terra?”, ex quibus verbis sequitur quod desiderant, implorant et sperant vindictam de sanguine proprio, [s 18] et ideo habent actum sperandi, non visionem claram sed vindictam, non tamen habetur in Apocalypsi quod anime sanctorum murmurando implorent vindictam predictam. Nomen enim “murmurandi” in scriptura divina vel semper vel frequencius in mala significacione accipitur, et aliquam speciem tristicie videtur annexam habere. Sanctorum autem anime nullum actum malum eliciunt nec aliquam tristiciam habent, et ideo non est concedendum quod murmurant de dilacione vindicte. Videtur igitur iste in verbis predictis, cum dicit, “murmurando implorant” et cetera, novam heresim manifestam invenire, quod scilicet sancti in celo non sunt ab omni malo culpe et pene penitus liberati.
|And when he tries to prove the same minor by the words that we read (he says) in the Apocalypse, that "The souls of the saints demand, and murmuring implore, vengeance for their blood", it must be said that he does not quote the text of the Apocalypse correctly. For although it is said in Apocalypse that "they cry with a loud voice, saying 'How long, O Lord, holy and true, do you not judge and avenge our blood upon these that dwell on earth?'", from which it follows that they desire, implore and hope for the avenging of their own blood, and therefore they have an act of hoping (not for the clear vision but for the avenging), nevertheless we do not find in the Apocalypse that the souls of the saints by murmuring implore that avenging. For the word "murmur" in divine scripture is taken always, or more often, in a bad sense and seems to have some kind of sadness attached to it. But the souls of the saints elicit no bad act and have no sadness, and therefore it should not be granted that they murmur concerning the delay of vengeance. In the above words, therefore, when he says "murmuring implore", he seems to be discovering a new manifest heresy, namely that the saints in heaven are not altogether free from every evil of fault and punishment.
|[s 19] Capitulum 3
|[s 20] Sequitur in revocacione ficta et frivola supradicta secunda racio quam fecit, que fuit talis:
|There follows in the fictitious and worthless retractation abovementioned the second argument he made, which was was as follows.
|[s 21] Ultra visionem claram divine essencie anime non possunt exaltari, quia ultra summum nichil alcius est, et certum est quod illa visio clara est summa exaltacio animarum; sed in die iudicii deus sanctos et illorum animas exaltabit; igitur usque tunc non vident facialiter deum — alias tunc non exaltarentur. Minorem huius racionis probavit, quia usque ad diem iudicii supplicamus et petimus ut nos exaltet “in salutem paratam” et cetera.
|Souls cannot be exalted beyond the clear vision of the divine essence, because there is nothing higher than the highest, and it is certain that that clear vision is the highest exaltation of souls. But on the day of judgment God will exalt the saints and their souls. Therefore until then they do not see God face-to-face; [Ly adds: Because until the day of judgment we pray and ask that he should exalt us to the salvation prepared. Since, as we read in Apocalypse, the souls of the saints will be under the altar until the day of judgment, and after that day above the altar they will see God face-to-face, as blessed Bernard expounds it. It is also proved by a text of blessed Peter, who says (1 Peter 5 [cf. vs. 6], "That he should exalt us to the salvation prepared".] otherwise they would not be exalted then. He proved the minor of this argument: For until the day of judgment, we beseech and plead "that he should exalt us" [1 Peter 5:6] "to the salvation prepared" etc. [1 Peter 1:5].
|[s 22] Hec verba huius protestacionis seu revocacionis, intellecta sicut ipse ea intelligit, plura hereticalia et alia ambigua et disputabilia continent manifeste.
|These words of this protestation or revocation, understood as he meant them, manifestly contain many heretical things and others that are ambiguous and open to dispute.
|[s 23] Primum hereticale est, quod anima videns divinam essenciam ad maiorem gradum perfeccionis exaltari non potest.
|The first heretical point is that a soul that sees the divine essence cannot be exalted to a higher degree of perfection.
|Secundum hereticale est, quod si anima alicuius videt divinam essenciam, totus homo compositus ex anima illa vidente divinam essenciam et corpore exaltari non potest. (Quod ista duo contineant verba predicta patet aperte, quia in eis asseritur manifeste quod, si anime sanctorum nunc vident facialiter deum, nec anime sanctorum nec ipsi sancti exaltarentur in die iudicii.)
|The second heretical point is that if someone's soul sees the divine essence, the whole man, composed of the soul that sees the divine essence and a body, cannot be exalted. (That the above words contain these two points is clearly apparent, because in them he manifestly asserts that if the souls of the saints now see God face-to-face, neither the souls of the saints nor the saints themselves would be exalted on the day of judgment.)
|Tercium hereticale est quod anime sanctorum usque ad diem iudicii non vident facialiter deum.
|The third heretical point is that the souls of the saints do not see God face-to-face until the day of judgment.
|Primum autem ambiguum sive multiplex et disputabile est quod ultra visionem claram divine essencie non possunt exaltari,
|The first ambiguous (or multiplex) and disputable point is that [souls] cannot be exalted beyond clear vision of the divine essence.
|secundum quod visio clara est summa exaltacio animarum.
|The second is that clear vision is the highest exaltation of souls.
|[s 24] Quod autem primum, scilicet quod anima videns divinam essenciam ad maiorem gradum perfeccionis exaltari non potest, sit erroneum probatur primo. Si anima beati pauli adepta est beatitudinem, et secundum veritatem (et secundum istum) adipiscetur maiorem et perfecciorem gradum visionis divine quam in raptu habuit, igitur videns divinam essenciam ad maiorem gradum perfeccionis, scilicet visionis divine essencie, poterit exaltari.
|That the FIRST (namely that a soul seeing the divine essence cannot be exalted to a higher grade of perfection) is erroneous is proved  first. If the soul of blessed Paul attained beatitude, and according to truth (and according to him [John XXII]) will attain a greater and more perfect degree of vision of the divine essence than it had in the rapture, therefore someone seeing the divine essence will be able to be exalted to a higher degree of perfection, i.e. of the vision of the divine essence.
|[s 25] Minor est manifesta secundum omnes. Maior probatur primo auctoritate Augustini ad Orosium, qui ait taliter: “Raptus fuerat apostolus Paulus in tercium celum, id est ad intellectualem visionem, ut deum, non per corpus, nec per similitudinem corporis, sed sicut est ipsa veritas cerneret”. Ex hiis verbis patenter habetur quod anima Pauli in raptu vidit deum.
|The minor is manifest, according to everyone. The major is proved, first, by a text of Augustine (To Orosius), who speaks thus: "Paul was taken up into the third heaven [2 Corinthians 12:2] , i.e. to intellectual vision, so that he perceived God not through a body, nor through the likeness of a body, but as he is truth itself". By these words it is clearly established that in the rapture Paul's soul saw God.
|[s 26] Secundo probatur idem auctoritate eiusdem Augustini, libro 12o Super Genesi ad Literam, qui ait: “Quod mente conspicitur ita secreta et remota et omnino abrepta a sensibus carnis atque mundata ut ea que in illo celo sunt et ipsam substanciam dei verbumque deum, per quod facta sunt omnia, in caritate Spiritus sancti ineffabiliter valeret videre et audire: non incongruenter arbitramur et illuc esse Apostolum raptum”. Ex quibus verbis colligitur evidenter quod beatus Paulus raptus fuit ad visionem substancie dei, et tamen anima Pauli post mortem eius ad clariorem visionem extitit exaltata.
|The same is proved, second, by another text of Augustine in Literal Commentary on Genesis, Book 12. He says: [We rightly take the third heaven to be] "what is seen by a mind so secret, remote, altogether removed from the bodily senses and purified that in the love of the Holy Spirit it would be able ineffably to see and hear the things that are in that heaven and the very substance of God and God the Word through whom all things were made: and we judge, not unsuitably, that the Apostle was taken up to there." From these words we gather evidently that blessed Paul was taken up to the vision of God's substance, and yet Paul's soul after his death was exalted to a clearer vision.
|[s 27] Quod eciam Paulus in raptu viderit divinam essenciam habetur in glossa, 2a ad Corinthios 12o, que dicit sic: “Tercium supple celum spirituale, ubi angeli et sancte anime fruuntur dei contemplacione, ad quod cum dicit se raptum”, scilicet Paulus, “significat quod deus ostendit ei vitam in qua videndus est in eternum”. Et post: “‘Scio hominem huiusmodi raptum’, id est contra naturam elevatum, ‘usque ad tercium celum’, id est ad cognicionem deitatis”. [s 28] Et post: “Tercium celum est intellectualis visio, quando nec corpora nec imagines eorum videntur, sed incorporeis substanciis intuitus mentis mira dei potencia figitur. Ad hanc raptus est Apostolus, ut ipsum deum in se, non in aliqua figura videret”. Et post: “Hoc est tercium celum, scilicet visio qua deus videtur facie ad faciem. Et iste est paradisus (si dici potest) eciam paradisorum”. [s 29] Et post: “Ad illud tercium celum raptum se dicit, quasi diceret, ‘non humano sensu vidi’ et si in corpore anima existente viderit, non sit contra illud quod Deus dixit Moysi, ‘Non videbit me homo et vivet’; tunc enim Apostolus non vixit homo, id est secundum usum sensuum corporis, sed ablatus est ei omnis sensus hominis, quia necesse est abstrahi ab hac vita mentem quando in illius ineffabilis visionis lucem assumitur. [s 30] Et non sic incredibile est quibusdam sanctis, nondum ita defunctis ut sepelienda cadavera remanerent, eciam istam excellenciam revelacionis fuisse concessam. Cur ergo non credamus quod tanto Apostolo doctori gencium rapto usque ad istam excellentissimam visionem voluit deus demonstrare vitam in qua post hanc videndus est in eternum. Et cur non dicatur iste paradisus quasi regio, ubi anime bene est, ubi scilicet ipsam dei substanciam verbumque dei et Spiritum sanctum ineffabiliter videt?” [s 31] Post: “Hoc est tercium celum, ad quod raptum se dicit Apostolus, ut scilicet sicut illi”, supple angeli, “deum videret”. Et post: “Tercium, cognicio eciam divinitatis, ad quam raptus est Apostolus”. Et post: “Raptus est in paradisum, id est in eam tranquillitatem qua fruuntur illi qui sunt in celesti patria Ierusalem; et sic potuit videre quod numquam corporeis sensibus impeditus videre posset”. Et post: “Audivit arcana verba, id est percepit intimacionem de secreta dei sciencia”.
|That in the rapture Paul saw the divine essence is found also in the gloss on 2 Corinthians 12[:2], which says this: "The third" (supply: spiritual heaven),"where angels and the holy souls enjoy the contemplation of God, to which, when he" (i.e. Paul) "says that he was taken up, signifies that God showed him the life in which he is to be seen eternally.... 'I know such a man taken up' (i.e. elevated, contrary to nature) 'as far as the third heaven' (i.e. to knowledge of the deity)... The third heaven is intellectual vision, when neither bodies nor images of them are seen, but by the miraculous power of God the mind's gaze is fixed on incorporeal substances. The Apostle was taken up to this, so as to see God himself in himself, not in any figure.... This is the third heaven, namely the vision by which God is seen face-to-face, and this is indeed (if we can speak this way) the paradise of paradises... He says he was taken up into this third heaven, as if he would say, 'I did not see by human sense', and even if he saw while the soul was in the body, this is not contrary to what God says to Moses, 'No man will see me and live'; for the Apostle did not then live as a man, i.e. according to the use of the bodily senses, but every human sense was taken away from him, because the mind must be taken away from this life when it is received into the light of that ineffable vision. And it is not thus incredible for this excellence of revelation to have been granted also to certain saints not yet dead so that their bodies are left for burial. So why should we not believe that God wanted to show to so great an apostle, the teacher of the gentiles, taken up to this most excellent vision, the life in which after this life he is to be seen forever.And why should that not be called paradise, the region (so to speak) where it is well with the soul, i.e. where it sees ineffably God's very substance and the Word of God and the Holy Spirit? ... This is the third heaven, to which the Apostle says he was taken up, that he might see God as they" (supply: the angels) "see God.... The third [heaven], cognition even of the divinity, to which the Apostle was taken up.... He was taken up into paradise, i.e. into that tranquility which they enjoy who are in the celestial fatherland, Jerusalem; and thus he was able to see what he could never see impeded by the bodily senses.... He heard the hidden words, i.e. he received an intimation of the secret knowledge of God".
|[s 32] Ex hiis tria colliguntur aperte. Primum est, quod beatus Paulus vidit divinam essenciam in raptu, quia hoc in verbis predictis pluries sentencialiter et verbaliter replicatur; secundum, quod sancte anime nunc vident deum, cum dicatur tercium celum esse “spirituale, ubi angeli et sancte anime”, “ubi scilicet ipsam dei substanciam verbumque ac spiritum sanctum ineffabiliter” vident. Ex quibus duobus sequitur evidenter quod anima videns deum potest exaltari ad clariorem visionem, quia anima beati Pauli nunc clarius videt deum, et videbit post iudicium, quam vidit in raptu; et anime sancte clarius videbunt eum post iudicium quam modo videant. Tercium quod sequitur ex predictis est quod inventor heresum predictarum frustra et inaniter iactat se studuisse originalia sanctorum, ex quo in communissimis glossis ex originalibus sanctorum acceptis ista tam patenter expressa non vidit.
|From these words we clearly gather three things: First, that blessed Paul saw the divine essence in the rapture, because in the above words this is repeated many times, verbally and in substance. The second is that the holy souls now see God, since the "third" heaven is said to be "spiritual, where angels and the holy souls" ... "where, namely, they see ineffably the very substance of God, the Word, and the Holy Spirit". From these two points it follows evidently that a soul seeing God can be exalted to a clearer vision, because blessed Paul's soul now sees God, and will see God after the judgment, more clearly than he did in the rapture, and the holy souls will see God more clearly after the judgment than they do now. The third point that follows from the above is that the boast made by inventor of the above heresies that he has studied the original works of the saints is vain and empty, since he did not see in the most common glosses drawn from the original works of the saints the things that are expressed so clearly.
sic: Quando aliqua forma eadem secundum speciem participatur ab uno
perfeccius et ab alio minus perfecte, non est dicendum quin deus de
potencia absoluta possit aliquem participantem talem formam minus
perfecte ad maiorem gradum eiusdem forme, si sibi placuerit, exaltare:
talis enim forma potest augeri, igitur non est impossibile de minori
gradu ad maiorem transire. Sed visio divine essencie ab uno
participatur perfeccius et ab alio minus perfecte: unus enim clarius
videt divinam essenciam quam alius. [s 34]
Sicut enim “stella a stella differt in claritate”
Apostolum 1a ad Corinthios 15o, sic una anima clarius videt quam alia.
Quod manifeste asserit Augustinus in libro De Correccione, et recitat
ius De penitencia, dist. 4a, c. In domo, qui ait: “Sic parat
sibi, et se nobis, ut maneat in nobis, et nos in eo, quantum quisque
erit particeps eius plus vel minus, pro diversitate meritorum. Et hec
est multitudo mansionum.” Igitur non est dicendum quod deus
possit animam videntem deum ad clariorem gradum visionis, si voluerit,
|It is proved second  as follows: When some form that is the same in species is shared by one more perfectly and by another less perfectly, it must not be said that God cannot, if he pleases, by his absolute power, exalt the one sharing the form less perfectly to a higher degree of the same form. For such a form can be augmented, therefore it is not impossible for it to pass from a lesser degree to a greater. But the vision of the divine essence is shared by one more perfectly and by another less perfectly; for one sees the divine essence more clearly than another. For just as star differs from star in brightness, according to the Apostle 1 Corinthians 15[:41], so does one soul see more clearly than another. Augustine in his book De Correptione (quoted De Poenitentia, dist. 4, c. In Domo) manifestly asserts this. He says, "Thus he prepares us for himself and himself for us, that he may remain in us and we in him, as far as each will share in him, more or less, according to the difference of merits. And this is the manyness of mansions [John 14:2]". Therefore it must not be said that God cannot, if he wishes, exalt a soul seeing God to a clearer degree of vision.
|[s 35] Secundum hereticale quod continent verba predicta est quod si anima alicuius videt divinam essenciam, totus homo, compositus ex anima illa vidente essenciam divinam et corpore, exaltari non potest. Hoc enim verbis Apostoli ad Philippensos c. 2o apertissime obviat et repugnat. Dicit enim Apostolus, loquens de Christo: “Humiliavit semetipsum, factus obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis. Propter quod et deus exaltavit illum.” Ex quibus verbis patenter habetur, quod Christus post mortem, quando corpus gloriosum assumpsit, a deo extitit exaltatus, et tamen ante mortem et tempore mortis anima Christi vidit divinam essenciam. Igitur homo compositus ex corpore et anima poterit exaltari, licet anima eius prius viderit divinam essenciam.
|The SECOND heretical point contained in the above words is that if someone's soul sees the divine essence, the whole person, composed of the soul seeing the divine essence and the body, cannot be exalted. For this most clearly conflicts with and contradicts the Apostle's words in Philippians 2[:8]. For speaking of Christ the Apostle says, "He humbled himself, being obedient unto death, even death on a cross; for which reason God has also exalted him". These words clearly establish that Christ, after death, when he assumed a glorious body, was exalted by God; and yet before death, and in the time of death, Christ's soul saw the divine essence. Therefore a person composed of body and soul can be exalted, although previously his soul saw the divine essence.
|[s 36] Hereticalis eciam assercio supradicta verbis beati Petri repugnat. Loquens enim beatus Petrus, ut habetur Actuum 2o, de Christo post passionem suam ait: “Hunc Iesum resuscitavit deus, cuius nos testes sumus. Dextera igitur dei exaltatus, et promissione Spiritus sancti accepta a Patre effudit” et cetera. Ex quibus verbis colligitur evidenter quod Christus in resurreccione sua a deo extitit exaltatus, et tamen anima sua antea vidit divinam essenciam. Igitur consimiliter, licet anime sanctorum videant ante diem iudicii divinam essenciam, tamen, cum corpora gloriosa in resurreccione sument, poterunt sancti ex corpore et anima constituti per divinam potenciam exaltari. Et ita assercio supradicta sapit heresim manifestam.
|The above heretical assertion also contradicts the words of blessed Peter. Speaking of Christ after his passion, he says, as we read in Acts 2[:32]: "This Jesus God raised up, and we are his witnesses. Being exalted therefore by the right hand of God and having received the promise of the holy Spirit from the Father, he has poured forth" etc. We clearly gather from these words that Christ was exalted by God in his resurrection, yet before that his soul saw the divine essence. In a similar way, therefore, although the souls of the saints see the divine essence before the day of judgment, yet when they put on their glorious bodies in the resurrection, the saints, composed of body and soul, will be able to be exalted by the divine power. And so the above assertion smacks of manifest heresy.
|[s 37]Amplius, assercio memorata sancto Evangelio contradicit. Glorificacio enim poterit exaltacio nuncupari. Sed Christus postquam anima sua vidit divinam essenciam fuit glorificatus, quod beatus Iohannes evangelista in evangelio suo 7o c., aperte insinuat, dicens: “In novissimo autem die magno festivitatis stabat Iesus et clamabat dicens, ‘Si quis sitit, veniat ad me et bibat. Qui credit in me, sicut dicit scriptura, flumina de ventre eius fluent aque vive’. [s 38] Hoc autem dixit de spiritu sancto, quem accepturi erant credentes in eum. Nondum enim erat spiritus datus, quia ille nondum fuerat glorificatus.” Ex quibus verbis innuitur, quod ille post predicacionem suam et passionem, et per consequens postquam anima sua vidit divinam essenciam, fuit glorificatus. Igitur eciam postea fuit exaltatus. Ex quo sequitur evidenter quod anima alicuius poterit primo videre facialiter deum, et ipse compositus ex corpore et anima poterit postea exaltari; et ita, licet anime sanctorum facialiter nunc videant deum, tamen ipsi sancti in iudicio constituti ex anima et corpore poterunt exaltari.
|In addition, that assertion contradicts the holy Gospel. For glorification can be called exaltation. But after his soul saw the divine essence Christ was glorified, as blessed John the evangelist clearly implies in chapter 7:[37-39] of his gospel when he says, "On the last and great day of the festival, Jesus stood and cried out: 'Let anyone who is thirsty come to me and drink. He who believes in me, as the scripture says, out of his heart shall flow rivers of living water."' Now he said this about the Holy Spirit, which believers in him were to receive. For as yet the Spirit had not been given, because Jesus had not yet been glorified." These words suggest that after his preaching and passion, and consequently after his soul saw the divine essence, he [Jesus] was glorified; therefore also afterwards he was exalted. From which it follows evidently that someone's soul can first see God face-to-face, and he himself, composed of body and soul, can afterwards be exalted; and thus, although the souls of the saints now see God face-to-face, nevertheless the saints themselves, constituted of soul and body, will be able to be exalted in the judgment.
|[s 39]Tercium hereticale contentum in verbis predictis est quod anime sanctorum usque ad diem iudicii non vident facialiter deum. Hoc autem in diversis operibus est multipliciter improbatum. Ideo hoc pro nunc brevissime improbabo. Per unicam enim auctoritatem Apostoli demonstrabo quod anime sanctorum in celo facialiter vident deum. Ait enim Apostolus 2a ad Corinthios 5o: “Dum sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a Domino; per fidem enim ambulamus et non per speciem”. Ex quibus verbis liquide constat quod Apostolus probat quod dum sumus in corpore a Domino peregrinamur per hoc, quod ambulamus per fidem et non per speciem. [s 40] Ex qua argumentacione Apostoli ista proposicio patenter accipitur: quicumque ambulat per fidem et non per speciem peregrinatur a Domino. Sed Apostolus desiderabat ante diem iudicii esse presens ad deum et non peregrinari a Domino, ipso testante, qui post verba predicta subiungit: “Audemus autem et bonam voluntatem habemus magis peregrinari a corpore et presentes esse ad Deum”. [s 41] Ex quibus verbis patenter habetur quod Apostolus desiderabat non peregrinari a Domino, sed esse presens apud deum, ante diem iudicii: quia hoc desiderabat dum esset peregrinus in corpore ubi erat ante diem iudicii; igitur desiderabat non peregrinari a deo, sed esse presens apud deum, ante diem iudicii. Sed, sicut acceptum est ab Apostolo, quicumque ambulat per fidem, et non per speciem, peregrinatur a deo; et per consequens quilibet qui non peregrinatur a deo ambulat per speciem et non per fidem. Igitur Apostolus desiderabat ambulare per speciem, et non per fidem, ante diem iudicii: quod minime desiderasset, si scivisset animas sanctorum ante diem iudicii divinam essenciam non visuras.
|The THIRD heretical point contained in the above words is that the souls of the saints do not see God face-to-face until the day of judgment. This has been disproved in many ways in various works. Therefore I will disprove it for now very briefly. By a single text of the Apostle I will show that the souls of the saints in heaven see God face-to-face. For the apostle says, 2 Corinthians 5[:6 ff], "While we are in the body we wander from the Lord, for we walk by faith and not by sight." It is quite clear from these words that the Apostle proves that "while we are in the body we wander from the Lord" from the fact that "we walk by faith and not by sight". From this argument of the Apostle this proposition is clearly taken: whoever walks by faith and not by sight wanders from the Lord. But the Apostle desired before the day of judgment to be present to the Lord and not to wander from the Lord, as he himself testifies; after the above words he adds, "But we are confident and have a good will to wander rather from the body and to be present to God". These words clearly establish that the Apostle desired not to wander from the Lord, but to be present to God, before the day of judgment; for he desired this while he was wandering in the body, where he was before the day of judgment. Therefore he desired not to wander from God but to be present before God before the day of judgment. But, as the Apostle takes as a premise, whoever walks through faith and not by sight wanders from God; and consequently, whoever does not wander from God walks by sight and not by faith. Therefore the Apostle desired to walk by sight and not by faith before the day of judgment---which he would not at all have desired if he had known that the souls of the saints would not see the divine essence before the day of judgment.
|[s 42]Primum ambiguum sive multiplex et disputabile contentum in verbis predictis est quod ultra visionem claram divine essencie anime non possunt exaltari. Hoc enim potest habere multiplicem intellectum. Unus est, quod ultra claram visionem divine essencie anime non possunt exaltari ad quemcumque gradum clarioris visionis, nec ad aliquam perfeccionem vel gaudium vel honorem quam vel quod vel quem nunc minime habent. Et iste sensus est erroneus, [s 43] quia ultra claram visionem quam nunc habent anime sanctorum, exaltabuntur in iudicio ad clariorem visionem, quia clarius videbunt divinam essenciam post iudicium quam nunc videant. Tunc enim exaltabuntur ad aliquod gaudium actuale quod nunc minime habent; tunc enim gaudebunt de complecione civitatis celestis et de unione sua cum corporibus gloriosis, et ideo tunc exaltabuntur ad aliquam perfeccionem quam modo non habent. [s 44] Sic enim anima Christi post resurreccionem quodammodo extitit exaltata, quia tunc recepit gaudium de impassibilitate et immortalitate corporis Christi. Tunc enim ipsa anima Christi ab omni dolore et tristicia fuit penitus aliena, et ita exaltata: quem statum non habuit ante resurreccionem Christi, teste Christo, qui dicit, “Tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem”.
|The FIRST ambiguous or multiplex and disputable point contained in the above words is that souls cannot be exalted beyond clear vision of the divine essence. For this can have multiple meanings. One is that souls cannot be exalted beyond the clear vision of the divine essence to any degree of clearer vision, nor to any perfection or joy or honour that they do not now have; and this meaning is erroneous, because in the judgment the souls of the saints will be exalted beyond the clear vision they now have to a clearer vision, because they will see the divine essence more clearly after the judgment than they do now. For then they will be exalted to some actual joy that they now do not have; for they will be joyful over the completion of the heavenly city and over their union with glorious bodies; and therefore they will then be exalted to some perfection that they do not now have. For thus Christ's soul after his resurrection was in some way exalted, because then it received joy in the impassibility and immortality of Christ's body; for then the soul of Christ was quite removed from all pain and sadness, and thus exalted; it did not have this status before Christ's resurrection, as Christ attests [Mark 14:34], saying "My soul is sad unto death".
|[s 45]Alius intellectus verborum predictorum est iste: ultra claram visionem divine essencie non possunt anime exaltari ad aliquam perfeccionem, distinctam specie a clara visione dei, maiorem et perfecciorem clara visione et fruicione dei. Et iste sensus conceditur, quia nulla perfeccio anime est maior et perfeccior visione et fruicione dei. Et ideo anime post iudicium, licet exaltabuntur ad clariorem visionem, non tamen ad visionem distinctam specie a visione precedente. [s 46] Gaudium eciam quod habebunt de complecione civitatis celestis et assumpcione corporum gloriosorum non erit maius neque perfeccius visione clara et fruicione quam nunc habent. Et ita iste sensus in nullo concludit intentum istius protestantis seu revocantis. Sed primus sensus, si esset verus, evidenter inferret intentum eius. Et ideo assercionem predictam accipit in sensu primo, propter quod errat aperte.
|Another interpretation of the above words is this: souls cannot be exalted beyond the clear vision of the divine essence to some perfection distinct in species from the clear vision of God, greater and more perfect than clear vision and enjoyment of God, and this sense is granted, because no perfection of the soul is greater and more perfect than the vision and enjoyment of God. And therefore, although souls after the judgment will be exalted to a clearer vision, not however to a vision distinct in species from the preceding vision. The joy, also, that they will have in the completion of the heavenly city and the assumption of glorious bodies will not be greater nor more perfect than the clear vision and enjoyment that they now have. And thus this sense does not in any way prove the point intended by this protestor or revoker; but the first sense, if it were true, would evidently imply his point. And therefore he takes the above assertion in its first sense, and for this reason errs openly.
|[s 47] Sed diceret aliquis quod ille non accipit verba predicta secundum intellectum primum, quia tunc haberet concedere quod videns divinam essenciam nichil posset aliud recipere nec desiderare: quod non diceret, quia tunc anima Christi non potuisset desiderare resumpcionem seu assumpcionem corporis gloriosi. Ad hoc dicendum est quod ipse concedit inconveniens quod infertur, nam alibi dicit hec verba: “Visio facialis predicta non compatitur secum desiderium alicuius alterius rei”. Que apertissime sunt heretica reputanda, quia Evangelio contrariantur, cum Christus, qui vidit divinam essenciam, dicat Luce 22o, “Desiderio desideravi hoc pasca manducare vobiscum”; ex quibus verbis patenter infertur quod visio facialis compatitur secum desiderium alicuius alterius rei.
|But someone might say that he does not take the above words in the first sense, because then he would have to concede that someone seeing the divine essence could receive or desire nothing else---which he would not say, because then Christ's soul could not have desired the resumption or assumption of a glorious body. To this it must be said that he himself grants the unsuitability implied, because elsewhere he says these words: "The abovementioned face-to-face vision is not consistent with a desire for some other thing". These words must most clearly be regarded as heretical, because they contradict the Gospel, since Christ, who saw the divine essence, says (Luke 22[:15]), "With desire I have desired to eat this Passover with you". From these words it is clearly inferred that face-to-face vision is consistent with a desire for some other thing.
|[s 48] Secundum ambiguum et disputabile contentum in verbis predictis est quod visio clara est summa exaltacio animarum. Hoc enim potest habere multiplicem intellectum, quorum unus est iste: inter omnes exaltaciones animarum distinctas specie clara visio est summa. Et de hoc sunt inter modernos opiniones, quibusdam dicentibus quod visio clara dei est summa perfeccio anime, quia perfeccior est fruicione divina, aliis dicentibus quod ideo est summa quia est fruicio divina (non enim ponunt quod visio dei, fruicio aut dileccio patrie realiter distinguantur), aliis asserentibus quod clara visio non est summa, sed fruicio aut dileccio patrie est alcior et perfeccior visione, et ideo negant visionem claram esse summam exaltacionem animarum, dicentes quod fruicio seu dileccio dei est alcior.
|The SECOND ambiguous and disputable point contained in the above words is that clear vision is the highest exaltation of souls. For this can have multiple meanings, one of which is this: among all the exaltations of souls that are distinct in species, clear vision is the highest. Concerning this there are among the moderns [various] opinions. Some say that the clear vision of God is the highest perfection of the soul because it is more perfect than enjoyment of the divine. Others say that it is highest for the reason that it is enjoyment of the divine (for they do not maintain that the vision of God, and the enjoyment or love of the fatherland [heaven] are really distinct). Others assert that the clear vision of God is not highest, but the enjoyment or love of the fatherland [i.e. experienced in heaven] is higher and more perfect than vision, and for that reason they deny that clear vision is the highest exaltation of souls, saying that enjoyment or love of God is higher.
|[s 49] Alius intellectus verborum predictorum est iste: visio clara est sic summa exaltacio animarum quod anime videntes clare deum ad nullam perfeccionem distinctam specie maiorem illa quam habent poterunt exaltari. Et iste sensus verus est, sive visio sit perfeccior sive fruicio, quia numquam habebunt anime in se formaliter aliquam perfeccionem distinctam specie a visione dei perfecciorem visione et dileccione seu fruicione dei.
|Another interpretation of the above words is this. Clear vision is the highest exaltation of souls in this way, that souls seeing God clearly could not be exalted to any perfection distinct in species greater than that which they have. And this sense is true, whether vision or enjoyment is more perfect, because souls never will have in themselves formally any perfection distinct in species from the vision of God that is more perfect than vision and love or enjoyment of God.
|[s 50]Tercius sensus est iste: visio clara sic est summa exaltacio animarum quod anima videns deum nullo modo, neque ad ulteriorem gradum visionis divine neque ad quodcumque aliud perfeccius vel imperfeccius visione dei, poterit exaltari. Et iste est sensus istius protestantis seu revocantis, quia aliter predicta verba nullo modo possunt inferre conclusionem intentam. Sed iste sensus est erroneus, ut ex predictis patet aperte. Nam ex hiis verbis sequitur evidenter quod anima Christi non vidit deum ante resurreccionem vel ante mortem Christi, quia potuit contristari. Postea autem ad statum omnis impassibilitatis extitit exaltata.[s 51] Sensus eciam predictus Magistro Sentenciarum aperte repugnat, qui lib. 2o, dist. 11a, dicit angelos videntes deum in cognicione et beatitudine proficere, dicens in hec verba: “Illud vero quod alii superius dicunt probabilius videtur, quod angeli usque ad iudicium in sciencia et aliis possunt proficere”. Et ita anima videns deum potest ad aliud exaltari. Nec est hoc negandum cum omnis exaltacio sit de minori secundum speciem ad maius secundum speciem, cum eciam sepe in humanis exaltacionibus videamus tales, retentis maioribus dignitatibus, ad minores compossibiles maioribus exaltari; unde et nonnumquam cardinalis ad officium summi penitenciarii postea exaltabitur, cardinalatu retento. Sic anime sancte videntes deum, retenta dei visione, ad aliquid aliud minus visione divina poterunt exaltari, et eciam ad clariorem visionem dei.
|A third sense is this. Clear vision is the highest exaltation of souls in this way, that a soul seeing God can be exalted in no way --- neither to a higher degree of the divine vision nor to anything else more perfect, or more imperfect, than the vision of God. And this is the opinion of this protestor or revoker, because otherwise the words above can in no way imply the intended conclusion. But this sense is erroneous, as is clearly apparent from the above. For from these words it follows evidently that Christ's soul did not see God before the resurrection or before the death of Christ, because it was able to become sad, but afterwards it was exalted to a state of complete impassibility. The above interpretation also clearly conflicts with the master of the sentences, who says (book 2, dist. 11 [PL 192, col. 675]) that the angels who see God make progress in knowledge and in happiness. He says these words: "However, what others say (above) seems more probable, that until the judgment angels can make progress in knowledge and in other respects". And thus a soul that sees God can be exalted in another respect. And this should not be denied on the grounds that every exaltation is from something less in species to something greater in species, since even in human exaltations we often see such [men], with higher dignities retained, exalted to lesser dignities compatible with the higher dignities: thus sometimes a cardinal will be exalted afterwards to the office of supreme penitentiary while retaining his cardinalate. Thus the holy souls who see God, keeping the vision of God, can be exalted to something else that is less than the divine vision, and also to a clearer vision of God.
|[s 52] Hiis visis, ad racionem istius est facile respondere. Cum enim primo dicit, “Ultra visionem claram divine essencie non possunt exaltari”, patet ex predictis quod hec, in sensu quem habet iste de ipsa et ex quo sequitur conclusio quam intendit, est erronea, quia ultra visionem claram non clarissimam divine essencie est visio clarior, ad quam possunt anime exaltari, sicut ultra albedinem non intensissimam est albedo intensior et ultra caritatem non perfectissimam est caritas perfeccior.
|With these matters noted, it is easy to answer his argument. For when, first, he says "They cannot be exalted beyond the clear vision of the divine essence", it is clear from the foregoing that this [proposition], in the sense he has of it and from which the conclusion he intends follows, is erroneous, because beyond a clear vision of the divine essence that is not the clearest there is a clearer vision to which souls can be exalted, just as beyond a whiteness that is not most intense there is a more intense whiteness and beyond a charity that is not most perfect there is a more perfect charity.
secundo dicitur, “Ultra summum nichil alcius est”,
quod hoc eciam potest habere multiplicem intellectum, quia aliquid
dicitur summum multipliciter. Aliquid enim est simpliciter summum, et
sic solus deus est simpliciter summus, et ideo nichil est eo alcius.
Aliquid autem dicitur summum secundum speciem, sicut inter omnes
species coloris albedo potest dici summa, et inter omnia genera
visionum visio intellectualis dicitur summa. [s 54]
potest aliquid dici summum quadam aggregacione, quod scilicet omnia
possibilia ad perfeccionem aliquam spectancia comprehendit; secundum
quem modum beatitudo que est status omnium bonorum aggregacione
perfectus potest dici summa. Aliter dicitur aliquid summum in una
specie; per quem modum intensa albedo potest dici summa, et
anime Christi est summa inter omnes [visiones,
Christi est summa inter omnes]
caritates creatas; sic eciam
reges unus potest dici summus et maximus.
|When, second, he says, "beyond the highest there is nothing higher", it must be said that this also can have multiple senses. For something is called "highest" in several ways. For [i] something is simply highest, and in this sense only God is simply highest, and therefore nothing is higher than him. And [ii] something is called highest according to its species, as among all species of colour whiteness can be called the highest, and among all kinds of visions intellectual vision is called highest. In another way [iii] something can be called highest by a kind of aggregation, namely that it comprehends all possibilities relevant to some perfection; in this way the blessedness that is "a state perfect by the aggregation of all goods" [Boethius] can be called the highest. In another way [iv] something is called highest in the one species, and in this way an intense whiteness can be called the highest [whiteness], and the vision of Christ's soul [i.e. Christ's vision of the divine essence] is the highest among all [visions, and Christ's love the highest among all ] created loves; thus also among kings one can be called highest and greatest.
|[s 55] Accipiendo igitur summum primo modo, sic summo nichil est alcius.
|So taking "highest" in the first way, in that sense nothing is higher than the highest.
summum secundo modo, sic summo nichil distinctum specie est alcius. In
genere virtutum nulla virtus distincta a caritate est alcior caritate;
una tamen caritas est alcior alia. Sic in genere cognicionum dei nulla
cognicio distincta a visione clara est alcior visione clara; una tamen
visio clara divine essencie est alcior alia — visio enim qua
videt deum anima Christi est clarior visione qua angelus videt
deum. [s 56]
Et ideo quamvis visio clara dei sit summa inter cogniciones quibus deus
cognoscitur, non est tamen inconveniens quod anime primo videant deum
minus clare et postea exaltentur ad clariorem visionem. Sic summo
nichil est inter illa que possunt eidem rei competere alcius, licet
deus sit alcior tali summo.
|Taking "highest" in the second way, in that sense nothing distinct in species is higher than the highest---in the genus of the virtues no virtue distinct from charity is higher than charity; however one charity is higher than another. Thus in the genus of cognitions of God no cognition distinct from the clear vision of God is higher than the clear vision of God; however, one clear vision of the divine essence is higher than another, for the vision by which Christ's soul sees God is clearer than the vision by which an angel sees God. And thus, although the clear vision of God is the highest among the cognitions by which God is known, it is nevertheless not unsuitable that souls should first see God less clearly and afterwards be exalted to a clearer vision. [The next sentence must be the conclusion to a treatment of the third way, the rest of which has been lost.] Thus nothing among the things that can belong to the same thing is higher than the highest, though God is higher than such a highest.
|Accipiendo autem summum ultimo modo, sic summo nichil est alcius in illa specie. Unde intensissima nigredine nullus color niger est alcior; ipsa tamen est aliquis alius color alcior.
|Taking "highest" in the last way, in that sense nothing is higher than the highest in that species. Whence no black colour is higher than the most intense blackness, yet there is some other colour that is higher than it.
|Sic igitur patet, quod summum multipliciter accipi potest. Et ideo ista, “summo nichil est alcius”, habet varios sensus, quorum aliquis est verus et alius falsus.
|Thus, therefore, it is clear that "highest" can be taken in many senses, and therefore the statement "Nothing is higher than the highest" has various senses, of which one is true and another false.
vero accipit tercio quod “visio clara est summa exaltacio
animarum”, patet per predicta quod ista varios habet sensus
falsos. Quia ista falsa est accipiendo summum tercio modo. Accipiendo
eciam summum quarto modo falsa est: quia visio clara quam nunc habent
anime sancte non est summa exaltacio animarum, pro eo quod non est
clarissima visio quam habebunt; habiture enim sunt post iudicium
autem summum primo modo, sic non est ad propositum. Accipiendo autem
summum secundo modo, sic sunt diverse opiniones, sicut dictum est,
quibusdam dicentibus quod clara visio est perfeccior dileccione seu
fruicione dei, et illi dicerent quod visio clara est summa exaltacio
animarum sic accipiendo summum, aliis dicentibus, quod dileccio seu
fruicio est perfeccior et alcior visione, et illi dicerent quod visio
non est summa exaltacio animarum, sed fruicio.
|But when, third, he takes as a premise that "clear vision is the highest exaltation of souls", it is clear from the above that this has various false senses, because it is false taking "highest" in the third way. It is also false, taking "highest" in the fourth way, because the clear vision that the holy souls now have is not the highest exaltation of souls, because it is not the clearest vision they will have, for they will have a clearer after the judgment. But taking "highest" in the first way, in that sense it is not to the point. Taking it in the second way, in this sense there are various opinions, as was said: some say that clear vision is more perfect than love or enjoyment of God, and they would say that clear vision is the highest exaltation of souls, taking highest in this sense. Others say that love or enjoyment is more perfect and higher than vision, and they would say that vision is not the highest exaltation of souls, but enjoyment is.
|[s 59] Cum vero quarto dicit quod “in die iudicii deus sanctos et illorum animas exaltabit”, ista conceditur sub isto intellectu, quod anime sanctorum tunc habebunt clariorem visionem dei, et eciam gaudium de resurreccione corporum gloriosorum et de complecione civitatis celestis Ierusalem et aliis multis. Et ista erit exaltacio animarum. Sanctos vero, id est personas integras, compositas ex corpore et anima, exaltabit, quod tunc dabit eis beatitudinem perfectam, quam ipsi prius non habuerunt: immo nec ipsi prius videbant deum, licet anime eorum, et non ipsi, modo videant deum.
|And when, fourth, he says that "on the day of judgment God will exalt the saints and their souls", this is conceded under the interpretation that the souls of the saints will then have clearer vision of God, and also joy in the resurrection of glorious bodies and in the completion of the heavenly city of Jerusalem and in many other things, and this will be the exaltation of souls. And he will exalt the saints, i.e. their whole persons composed of body and soul, because he will then give them perfect beatitude, which previously they did not have---indeed neither did they previously see God, though their souls (and not themselves) at present do see God.
|[s 60] Cum vero quinto infert, “Igitur usque tunc non vident facialiter deum”, dicendum est quod male infert, si proposiciones precedentes sane intelligantur; si autem intelligantur sicut iste intelligit, secundum quod dictum est, sic ex proposicionibus hereticalibus infert conclusionem hereticam. Intelligit enim quod visio clara sic est summa exaltacio animarum quod anima videns deum nichil potest ultra acquirere, nec aliquo modo proficere, nec aliquid non habitum desiderare. Et iste sensus est erroneus, quia sequeretur quod anima Christi non vidisset deum ab instanti concepcionis Christi.
|And when, fifth, he infers, "therefore until then they do not see God face-to-face", it must be said that his inference is bad, if the preceding propositions are soundly understood. But if they are understood as he means them (as has been said), in this way he infers an heretical conclusion from heretical premises. For he means that clear vision is the highest exaltation of souls in this way, that a soul seeing God can acquire nothing further, nor make progress in any way, nor desire anything it does not have. And this sense is erroneous, because it would follow that Christ's soul would not have seen God from the instant of Christ's conception.
|[s 61] Cum autem sexto dicit, “Alias tunc non exaltarentur”, hoc non sequitur ex precedentibus, sicut ostensum est, quia, sicut dictum est, quamvis anime sanctorum videant deum, tamen anime ad clariorem visionem poterunt exaltari, et ipsi sancti, quando resurgent in corpore, ad visionem divine essencie et impassibilitatem et alias dotes corporis et anime poterunt exaltari.
|And when, sixth, he says, "Otherwise they would not be exalted then", this does not follow from the above, as has been shown, because (as has been said), although the souls of the saints see God, nevertheless their souls will be able to be exalted to a clearer vision, and the saints themselves, when they rise again in the body, will be able to be exalted to a vision of the divine essence, to impassibility and to other gifts of body and soul.
|[s 62]Cum vero conatur probare minorem, scilicet quod deus in die iudicii sanctos et illorum animas exaltabit, per hoc quod “usque ad diem iudicii sunt sub altare, et post diem iudicii videbunt deum facie ad faciem”, dicendum est quod iste textum libri Apocalypsis male intelligit. Non enim ideo anime martyrum dicuntur esse sub altare usque ad diem iudicii quia non vident deitatem Christi sed tantum humanitatem, sicut ille textus false exponitur; [s 63] sed ideo dicuntur sub altare quia, absconse nobis et existentibus in inferno et in purgatorio (saltem multis), ab omni malo protecte, clare deum vident et ipso fruuntur. Porro, quia quantum ad hoc motivum in beato Bernardo nititur se fundare: verba eiusdem beati Bernardi non intelligit, quia non intendit nisi quod sancti secundum animas collocantur sub Christo, et deum vident, donec ipsi sancti, integri et perfecti secundum corpus et animam, “procedant, completo numero fratrum, et participent regnum” et cetera.
|And when he tries to prove the minor, namely that on the day of judgment God will exalt the saints and their souls, by the statement [not found in text above] that "the souls of the saints are under the altar until the day of judgment, and after that day they will see God face-to-face", it must be said that he misunderstands this text from the book of the Apocalypse [6:9, "I saw under the altar the souls of them that were slain for the word of God"--not quoted in text above]. For the reason the souls of the martyrs are said to be under the altar until the day of judgment is not that they do not see the deity of Christ but only the humanity, as the text is falsely expounded, but they are said to be under the altar for the reason that, hidden from us and from those who are in hell and those in purgatory (many of them, at least), having been shielded from all evil, they clearly see God and enjoy him. Moreover, because in respect of this argument he tries to base himself on blessed Bernard [not found in text above], he does not understand Bernard's words, because Bernard meant only that the saints according to their souls are put together under Christ and see God, until those saints, whole and perfect according to both body and soul, "go forth, the number of the brethren being complete, and share in the kingdom", etc.
|[s 64] Sed forte diceret aliquis: si sancti tunc participant regnum, et regnum est visio dei, igitur antea non habebunt visionem dei. Ad hoc dicendum est quod, licet quandoque regnum vocetur clara visio dei, sicut eciam regnum dei nonnumquam vocatur ecclesia presens, tamen interdum regnum dei appellatur beatitudo consummata comprehendens anime et corporis beatitudinem; et istud regnum dei de communi lege sancti ante diem iudicii nequaquam percipient — immo ipsi ex anima et corpore constituti non habebunt de communi lege prius visionem dei, sed anime ipsorum tantummodo. Et de isto regno quod est gloria anime et corporis loquitur ibi Bernardus.
|But perhaps someone would say: if the saints then share in the kingdom, and the kingdom is the vision of God, therefore before that they will not have vision of God. To this it must be said that although sometimes clear vision of God is called the kingdom, just as also the present Church is sometimes called the kingdom of God, nevertheless consummate beatitude comprehending the beatitude of soul and body is sometimes called the kingdom of God, and the saints will not receive that kingdom of God, in the common course of events, before the day of judgment---indeed (in the common course of events) as constituted of soul and body they will not before then have the vision of God, but only their souls will have it. And Bernard speaks there of this kingdom that is the glory of soul and body.
|[s 65] Sed adhuc quereret aliquis, quomodo sancti erunt super altare post iudicium secundum beatum Bernardum, cum numquam erunt super Christum? Ad hoc potest responderi dupliciter, uno modo, quod in scriptura divina non legitur quod anime sanctorum post iudicium erunt super altare, nec memini me legisse quod hoc Bernardus dicat. Aliter potest dici quod ideo possunt dici anime super altare post iudicium quia tunc non erunt quibuscumque electis abscondite. Nunc autem dicuntur sub altare quia videntes deum quasi absconse consolantur et gaudent in deo: gloria enim earum latet plures electos et eciam existentes in inferno, et ideo possunt dici sub altare, quasi ibidem abscondite.
|But still someone might ask, how, according to Bernard, will the saints be "above the altar" after the judgment, since they will never be above Christ? This can be answered in two ways, in one that we do not read in divine scripture that the souls of the saints after the judgment will be above the altar, and I do not remember reading that Bernard says this. In another way it can be said that souls can be said to be above the altar after the judgment for the reason that then they will not be hidden from any of the elect, but now they are said to be under the altar because, seeing God, as being in some way hidden they are consoled and rejoice in God, for their glory is hidden from many of the elect and also from those in hell, and therefore they can be said to be under the altar as being hidden there.
|[s 66] Cum autem ultimo allegat beatum Petrum dicentem, “Prout nos exaltet in salutem paratam”, et cetera, dicendum est quod auctoritas Petri non facit pro isto, quia beatus Petrus loquebatur hominibus integris ex anima et corpore constitutis, et verum est, quod illi exaltabuntur ad visionem claram in die iudicii, et non ante, de communi lege, quia, licet anime multorum antea clare videant deum, tamen homines compositi ex corpore et anima de communi lege antea non videbunt deum.
|When, finally, he quotes blessed Peter's saying, "that he should exalt us to the salvation prepared", etc., it must be said that Peter's text does not support him, because blessed Peter was speaking to whole men, constituted of soul and body; and it is true that they will be exalted to clear vision on the day of judgment and not (in the common course of events) before then, because, although the souls of many clearly see God before then, nevertheless men composed of body and soul will not (in the common course of events) see God before then.
|Et per istum modum omnes fere auctoritates quas pro heresi supradicta in duobus maximis tractatibus et prolixis adducit solvuntur, quia loquuntur de electis compositis ex corpore et anima, qui de communi lege deum ante diem iudicii non videbunt.
|And in this way almost all the texts are resolved that he brings forward for the above heresy in the two biggest and most lengthy tracts, because they speak of the elect composed of body and soul, who (in the common course of events) will not see God before the day of judgment.
|[s 67] Capitulum 4
|[s 68] Sequitur tercia via super qua se fundavit. Est quia, prout dicit,
|There follows the third way upon which he based himself. It is that, as he says,
|[s 69] visio beata non stat cum doctrina, quia quicumque clare videt deum videt et omnia, secundum Gregorium dicentem: “Quid est quod non videt, qui videntem omnia videt?” Et per consequens secundum beatum Gregorium, [qui vident facialiter deum non ignorant aliqua que hic apud viventes fiunt, nec docentur de aliquo, nec revelatur eis aliquid quod prius non viderint.] Sed secundum beatum Augustinum, De cura pro mortuis agenda, anime sanctorum ea que fiunt hic apud viventes ex se non cognoscunt, sed eis innotescunt aut per animas noviter decedencium seu moriencium aut per revelaciones angelorum qui curam habent de viventibus aut per revelacionem immediate a deo. Cum igitur non videant omnia, et per consequens non facialiter clare vident deum.
|the blessed vision is not consistent with learning [i.e. coming to know new things]. For whoever clearly sees God also sees all things, according to Gregory, who says, "What does he not see who sees the one who sees all things?" And consequently, according to blessed Gregory, [whoever sees God face-to-face is not ignorant of any things that happen here among the living, nor are they taught about anything, nor is anything revealed to them that they did not see before.] But according to blessed Augustine, De cura pro mortuis agenda, the souls of the saints do not of themselves know things that happen here among the living, but they become known to them either through souls newly deceased or dying, or through the revelations of the angels who have care of the living, or through immediate revelation by God. Since, therefore, they do not see all things, consequently also they do not clearly see God face-to-face.
|[s 70] Hec racio eius tercia in una heresi manifesta est fundata, quod scilicet clara visio dei sine omnisciencia esse non potest, vel saltem non est sine omnisciencia. Quia asserit manifeste quod videntes deum nulla ignorant; igitur omnia sciunt. Sed hec heresis scripture divine aperte repugnat. Ait enim Apostolus ad Ephesios 3o: “Michi autem omnium sanctorum minimo data est gracia hec: in gentibus evangelizare investigabiles divicias Christi, et illuminare omnes que sit dispensacio sacramenti absconditi a seculis in deo, qui omnia creavit, ut innotescat principibus et potestatibus in celestibus per ecclesiam multiformis sapiencia dei”. Ex quibus verbis manifeste colligitur, quod angeli sancti ante incarnacionem et passionem Christi nonnulla secreta de incarnacione Christi ignorabant. Angeli autem tunc viderunt deum. Igitur non omnes videntes deum omnia sciunt; immo multa ignorant.
|This third argument of his is based on a manifest heresy, namely that clear vision of God cannot exist without omniscience, or at least does not exist without omniscience, because it manifestly asserts that those who see God are ignorant of nothing, therefore they know everything. But this is a heresy openly in conflict with divine scripture. For the Apostle says, Ephesians, 3[:8-10], "To me, however, the least of all the saints, is given this grace, to preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ, and to enlighten everyone, so that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which has been hidden from eternity in God who created all things, that the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the princes and powers in heavenly places through the Church". From these words we gather manifestly that the holy angels before Christ’s incarnation and passion were ignorant of some secrets concerning the incarnation of Christ; but the angels at that time saw God; therefore not all who see God know everything, indeed they are ignorant of many things.
vero secundum intencionem Apostoli, angeli sancti videntes deum aliqua
de incarnacionis mysterio ignorabant, glossa super verba premissa
asserit manifeste, dicens in persona beati Pauli et exponens verba eius
prescripta: “Quia datum est michi
‘illuminare’. Et videte quantum hoc est, quia per
aliquid accrevit angelis, qui multa secreta in hiis didicerunt. Et hoc
est quod ait ‘evangelizare’: dico ita ut
sapiencia dei’ de reparacione hominum ‘innotescat
ecclesiam’, que dona dei recipit, id est per apostolos in
ecclesia predicantes ‘principibus et potestatibus’,
diversis ordinibus angelorum qui sunt ‘in
est in celo, ubi et nos erimus. [s 72]
Dicit namque beatus Ieronimus angelicas dignitates supra memoratum
mysterium aliquid pure non intellexisse, donec impleta est passio
Christi et apostolorum predicacio per gentes dilatata. Unde in Isaia
angeli admirantes dixerunt: ‘Quis est iste qui venit de
Edom?’ et in Psalmo: ‘Quis est iste rex
solum igitur patriarchis et prophetis sed eciam potestatibus celestibus
multiformis sapiencia dei per ecclesiam est
revelata.” Et post: “Multiformis ergo dicitur dei
quasi multiplex, multas species et formas habens, quam principes et
potestates per ecclesiam agnoverunt”. Ex hiis colligitur
evidenter quod angelis videntibus deum aliquid accrevit per ecclesiam,
et quod aliquid didicerunt per apostolos predicantes, et mysterium
redempcionis humane, quod ante redempcionem et passionem et
predicacionem apostolorum non [s 73]
intellexerunt ad purum seu plenum, et quod multiformis sapiencia est
per ecclesiam angelis deum videntibus revelata, et quod angeli
multiplicem sapienciam non cognoverunt. [s
74] Ex quibus omnibus patenter
concluditur quod visio beata stat
cum doctrina, et quod non omnes qui clare vident deum vident omnia, et
quod aliqui qui facialiter vident deum ignorant aliqua, atque aliqua
eis docentur, et quod eis aliquid revelatur, et quod non sequitur,
igitur non vident facialiter clare deum, que omnia iste negat aperte in
|But that according to the Apostle’s meaning the holy angels who saw God were ignorant of some matters concerning the mystery of the incarnation is manifestly asserted by the Gloss upon the above words, which says, in the person of blessed Paul and explaining his words written above: "'Because it has been given to me to preach', and 'to enlighten' --- see how great this is, because through this something is added to the angels, who learnt many secrets in these matters. And this is what 'preach' says: I speak in such a way that the 'manifold wisdom of God' concerning the restoration of mankind 'may be made known through the Church', which receives God's gifts, i.e. through the apostles in the Church preaching 'to princes and powers', i.e. to the various orders of angels who are 'in heavenly places', i.e. in heaven, where also we will be. For blessed Jerome says that the angelic dignities did not understand anything purely concerning the mentioned mystery until Christ's passion was fulfilled and the apostles' preaching spread among the peoples. Thus in Isaias 63[:1], the angels marveling said, 'Who is this, who comes from Edom?', and in the Psalm [23:10], 'Who is this king of glory?'. Therefore, the 'manifold wisdom of God' is revealed through the Church not only to the patriarchs and prophets but also to the celestial powers... Therefore the wisdom of God is called 'manifold' as being multiplex, having many species and forms, which the principalities and powers recognize through the Church." From these words we gather evidently that something was added through the Church to the angels who see God, and that they learnt something through the apostles' preaching, especially the mystery of human redemption, which before the redemption and the passion and the apostles' preaching they did not understand in its purity or fullness, and that manifold wisdom was revealed through the Church to angels who see God, and that the angels did not know the multiplex wisdom. All this plainly implies that the blessed vision is consistent with learning, and that not all who clearly see God see everything, and that some who see God face-to-face are ignorant of some things, and some things are taught to them, and that some things are revealed to them, and that it does not follow, "therefore they do not clearly see God face-to-face" --- all of which he openly denies in the words above.
diceret aliquis quod premissis Augustinus obviare videtur, qui super
Genesim ait, loquens de angelis, “Non eis latuit
regni celorum, quod opportuno tempore revelatum est pro salute nostra,
quo, ex hac peregrinacione liberati, eorum cetui
Sed ad hoc respondet glossa, ubi prius, et Magister Sentenciarum, lib.
2o, dist. 11a, ad eandem obieccionem respondet eodem modo sicut
glossa. [s 76]
Dicit enim glossa, “Ne videantur sibi contradicere in
sentenciis sacre pagine doctores”, scilicet Ieronimus et
“ita potest declarari quod factum est, ut illis qui maioris
dignitatis sunt, et per quorum ministerium illa nunciata sunt, cognita
fuerint ex parte utpote familiaribus nunciis; illis vero qui minoris
dignitatis sunt incognita essent”. Ex quibus verbis liquet
quod, licet aliqui angeli secreta ante incarnacionem eandem
quidam tamen angeli videntes deum minoris dignitatis illa minime
cognoverunt, et ita non omnes videntes deum omnia vident.
|But someone might say that the foregoing conflicts with Augustine, On Genesis. He says, speaking of the angels: "The mystery of the kingdom of heaven is not hidden from them, which at an appropriate time has been revealed for our salvation, so that, freed from this pilgrimage, we may be joined to their fellowship". But the Gloss, in the above place, answers this, and the Master of the Sentences, book 2, dist. 11 [para. 6, col. 674], answers the same objection in the same way as the Gloss. For the Gloss says: "In case the doctors of the sacred page, Jerome and Augustine, seem to contradict one another in the above opinions, what was done can be clarified as follows, that to those who are of greater dignity, through whose ministry these things were announced, these things were known in part as to household messengers; to those, however, who are of lesser dignity, they were unknown". From these words it is plainly certain that although some angels knew the secrets before the incarnation, nevertheless some angels of lower rank who see God did not know them at all; and thus not all who see God see all things.
|[s 77] Item, quod non omnes deum videntes omnia sciunt, sed ignorant aliqua, ipse Salvator testari videtur, dicens Matthei 24o, “De die autem illa et hora nemo novit, neque angeli celorum”. Ideo poterunt videre deum licet non omnia sciunt.
|Again, our saviour himself seems to testify that not all who see God know all things but are ignorant of some things. In Matthew 24[:36] he says: "No one knows about that day and hour, neither the angels of heaven...". And therefore they [the angels of heaven] can see God although they do not know all things.
|[s 78] Amplius, apostolus Paulus in raptu vidit divinam essenciam, sicut ostensum est supra; et tamen Paulus non omnia novit, et ita non omnis videns deum scit omnia.
|Further, the apostle Paul in a rapture saw the divine essence, as was shown above, and yet Paul did not know all things, and thus not everyone who sees God knows all things.
|[s 79] Rursus, de Christo singulariter dicit Apostolus, ad Collosenses 2o, “In quo sunt omnes thesauri sapiencie et sciencie absconditi”. Igitur istud nulli alii videnti deum debet attribui. Hoc enim est privilegium singulare anime Christi, quod ipsa sola inter spiritus videntes deum habet prescienciam. Quod ex verbis evangeliste Iohannis 3o posse probari videtur. Soli enim Christo datus est spiritus "non ad mensuram”, igitur solus Christus habuit omnem scienciam, et ita videns deum poterit ignorare.
|Again, in Colossians 2[:3] the Apostle says of Christ individually, "in whom all treasures are hidden of wisdom and knowledge". That should therefore not be attributed to anyone else who sees God, for this is a singular privilege of Christ's soul, that he alone among spirits seeing God has foreknowledge. This seems provable from the words of the evangelist, John, 3[:34]: for only to Christ has the spirit been given "not by measure", therefore only Christ had all knowledge, and thus one seeing God can be ignorant.
|[s 80] Hiis
visis, discurrendo facile est racionem predictam refellere. Cum enim
primo dicit quod “visio beata non stat cum
dicendum est quod hec est erronea, sicut dictum est prius.
|With these matters seen, it is easy to refute the above argument by running through it. For when, first, he says that the blessed vision is not consistent with learning, it must be said that this is erroneous, as was said before.
|Cum vero secundo dicit probans per hoc minorem, “Quia quicumque clare videt deum videt omnia, secundum Gregorium dicentem: ‘Quid est quod non videt, qui videntem omnia videt?’”, dicendum est secundum quod dicit Magister Sentenciarum, lib. 2o, dist. 11a, dicens in hec verba: “Gregorius quoque hoc dicit, loquens de angelis, ‘Quid est quod ibi nesciant, ubi scientem omnia sciunt?’ [s 81] Videtur dicere quod omnia sciant angeli et nichil sit quod nesciant. Sed accipiendum est hoc de hiis quorum cognicio beatum facit cognitorem, ut sunt ea que ad mysterium trinitatis et unitatis pertinent”. Hec sunt verba Magistri Sentenciarum, tenentis quod angeli videntes deum non omnia sciunt, et quod Gregorius non loquitur de cognicione creaturarum sed de hiis que spectant ad mysterium trinitatis et unitatis divine.
|And when, second, he says, proving the minor through this, "For whoever clearly sees God sees all things, according to blessed Gregory, who says, 'What does he not see who sees the one who sees all things?'", it must be said, according to what the Master of the Sentences says, book 2, dist. 11 [para. 8, col. 675], in these words, "Gregory also says this, speaking of the angels: 'What do they then not know when they know the one who knows all things?' He seems to say that the angels know all things, and that there is nothing they do not know. But this is to be interpreted of things of which knowledge makes the knower blessed, as are the things that pertain to the mystery of trinity and unity". These are the words of the Master of the Sentences, who holds that the angels seeing God do not know all things, and that Gregory is not speaking of knowledge of creatures, but of the things that pertain to the mystery of the divine trinity and unity.
|[s 82] Cum vero tercio infert dicens: “Et per consequens secundum beatum Gregorium, qui vident facialiter deum non ignorant aliqua que hic apud viventes fiunt, nec docentur de aliquo, nec revelatur eis aliquid quod prius non viderint”, dicendum est quod ex verbis Gregorii male intellectis (ut ostensum est per Magistrum Sentenciarum) infert tres conclusiones erroneas. Prima est quod qui facialiter vident deum non ignorant aliqua, secunda est quod non docentur ab aliquo, tercia est quod non revelatur eis aliquid quod prius non viderint: quas esse erroneas superius per Apostolum Paulum et glossam est probatum.
he draws the inference,
"And consequently, according to blessed Gregory whoever sees God face-to-face is not ignorant of any things that happen here among the living, nor are they taught about anything , nor is anything revealed to them that they did not see before", it must be said that he infers three erroneous conclusions from the words of Gregory misunderstood (as has been shown from the Master of the Sentences). The first is that those who see God face-to-face are not ignorant of anything. The second is that they are not taught by anyone. The third is that nothing they did not see before is revealed to them. These have been proved above to be erroneous by means of the apostle Paul and the Gloss.
|[s 83] Auctoritas Augustini quam adducit secundum bonum intellectum est concedenda, quia sive dictum Augustini intelligatur de mortuis videntibus deum sive de aliis, concedendum est quod non omnia sciunt omnes mortui que hic aguntur, quia, sicut ostensum est, eciam videntes deum non omnia vident.
|The text of Augustine he quotes must be granted, according to a good interpretation. For whether Augustine's statement is understood of the dead who see God or of others, it must be granted that all the dead do not know all things that happen here, because, as has been shown, even those who see God do not see all things.
|[s 84] Et ideo cum ultimo concludit dicens: “Cum igitur non videant omnia, et per consequens non facialiter clare vident deum”, dicendum est quod non sequitur, sicut nec sequitur, angeli boni non viderunt omnia ante incarnacionem, igitur non viderunt clare deum.
|And therefore, when finally he concludes, "Since, therefore, they do not see all things, consequently also they do not clearly see God face-to-face", it must be said that it does not follow, just as it does not follow, "The good angels did not see all things before the incarnation, therefore they did not clearly see God".
|[s 85] Capitulum 5
|[s 86] Sequitur in protestacione frivola memorata: consequenter dicit quod
|It continues in the worthless protestation mentioned: Subsequently he says that
|[s 87] ad videndam et investigandam veritatem istius conclusionis debetis attendere tria: primum est cui merces clare visionis dei promittitur, secundum est tempus pro quo merces promittitur, tercium est ad quid futurum iudicium generale ordinatur.
|in order to see and investigate the truth of this conclusion you should attend to three things. The first is to whom the reward of clear vision of God is promised, the second the time for which the reward is promised, and the third to what the general judgment to come is ordained.
|[s 88] Hiis premissis, in quibus tres ultimas vias [posuit] super quibus se fundat, statim subiunxit de eo cui promittitur, in quo consistit prima via sue probacionis, sic:
|Once these points have been laid down, in which he put forward the three last ways upon which he bases himself, he immediately added something concerning him to whom it is promised, in which the first way of his proof consists, as follows.
attendamus cui illa merces in sacra scriptura promittitur, certum est
quod toti supposito. Probatur primo, quia Iacobus ait,
vir qui suffert temptacionem”, et cetera, et certum est quod
anima non est vir. Secundo ad idem, quia Christus dicit,
qui reliquerit . . . patrem”, et cetera,
“vitam eternam habebit”, et cetera, et certum est
erant supposita et non anime separate. [s 90]
Ad idem est quod Christus dicit, “Vos qui reliquistis
omnia”, et cetera, et certum est quod illi quibus dixit hoc
beatus Petrus et aliorum supposita, et non eorum anime separate. Item
merces illa reddetur pro operibus misericordie; unde Christus dicet in
iudicio, “Esurivi”, et cetera: sed certum est quod
suppositum, et non anima separata, dedit eleemosynam; igitur supposito
et non anime separate reddetur merces
|If we consider to whom that reward is promised in sacred scripture, it is certain that it is to the whole person. This is proved first: for James, 1[:12], says, "Blessed the man who endures temptation" etc., and it is certain that a soul is not a man. Second to the same [conclusion]: for Christ says, "Everyone who has left . . . father" etc., "will have eternal life" etc. [Matthew 19:29]. And it is certain that those to whom he spoke were persons, and not separate souls. To the same conclusion is what Christ says, "You who leave all" etc [cf. Matthew 19:27-8], and it is certain that those to whom he said this were blessed Peter and the persons of others, and not their separated souls. Again, the reward will be rendered for works of mercy, whence Christ will say in the judgment, "I thirsted” [Matthew 25:42] etc; but it is certain that the person, and not the separated soul, gave alms; therefore the reward will be rendered to the person and not to the separated soul.
tres raciones predictas ponit alias tres sumptas ex tribus notabilibus
que dicit esse attendenda.
|After the three preceding arguments he lays down another three taken from three notable points he says must be attended to.
|Prima autem racio eius que hic ponitur est hec. Visio beata est reddenda toti supposito, et non anime separate; igitur anime sanctorum in celo non vident deum.
|The first argument he lays down here is this. The blessed vision is to be rendered to the whole person, and not to the separated soul; therefore the souls of the saints in heaven do not see God.
racio est quasi principalius motivum ipsius pro heresi supradicta.
Propter quod ipsam sepe replicat, et reputat ipsam irrefragabilem.
Ponit enim ipsam in sermone qui incipit, “Gaudete in
Domino” et cetera, et in tractatu suo qui incipit,
“Queritur utrum anime sanctorum”, et cetera.
ipse probat sic: visio illa, que est merces, reddetur illi cui
promittitur; sed merces promittitur supposito et non anime separate;
igitur et cetera. Minor probatur tribus auctoritatibus et una racione.
|This argument is so to speak his more principal reason in favour of the abovementioned heresy; accordingly he often repeats it and regards it as unbreakable. For he puts it in his sermon beginning "Gaudete in Domino" and in his tract beginning "Queritur utrum animae sanctorum". He proves the premise thus: the vision, which is the reward, will be rendered to him to whom it is promised; but the reward is promised to the person and not to the separated soul; therefore etc. The minor is proved by three texts and one argument.
|[s 92] Sed ista racio fundamento hereticali innititur, quod scilicet merces non nisi supposito et non anime promittitur. Ad cuius evidenciam est primo veritas elucidanda; secundo veritas fundamento hereticali prefato contraria est probanda; tercio discurrendo per auctoritates quas adducit sunt illa que apparent in contrarium repellenda.
|But that argument rests upon an heretical foundation, namely that the reward is not promised except to the person, and not to the soul. To make this clear the truth must first be elucidated, second the truth contrary to the abovementioned heretical foundation must be proved, and third, running through the texts he quotes, the things that seem favourable to the contrary position must be rejected.
|[s 93] Circa primum est sciendum quod ista est catholica veritas, quod merces que includit gloriam anime et corporis soli supposito seu homini integro ex corpore et anima constituto promittitur, et illa de communi lege non dabitur ante diem iudicii generalis. Merces autem que non includit gloriam anime et corporis sed solum gloriam anime, scilicet visionem dei et fruicionem, promittitur anime antequam corpus resumpserit, et ideo ista merces dabitur et datur multis animabus a corpore separatis. (Est tamen advertendum, quod gloria anime datur et dabitur multis animabus ante iudicium respectu quarum non dicitur proprie merces, quia non dicitur merces propter meritum illarum; sed potest dici merces earum quia propter meritum Christi promittitur.)
|Concerning the first, it must be known that it is Catholic truth that a reward that includes glory of soul and body is promised only to the person, or the whole man composed of body and soul, and (in the common course of events) it will not be given before the day of general judgment. However, a reward that does not include glory of soul and body but glory of soul only, namely the vision and enjoyment of God, is promised to the soul before it resumes its body, and therefore that reward will be given, and is given, to many souls separated from their bodies. (However, it must be noted that glory of the soul is given and will be given to many souls before the judgment in respect of which [these souls] it is not properly called a "reward", because it is not called a reward on account of their merit, but it can be called their reward because it is promised on account of Christ's merit.)
|[s 94] Secundum est quod visio divine essencie animabus ante universale iudicium est promissa. Primum sic ostenditur: animabus decedencium nichil purgandum habentibus requies promittitur. Hanc non oportet probare, quia nota est, et inventor heresis memorate ipsam non negaret, cum concedat expresse in multis locis animas separatas esse in quiete. Sed ista requies est quedam merces, que datur multis animabus propter meritum earum; igitur animabus aliqua merces promittitur.
|The second is that the vision of the divine essence has been promised to souls before the universal judgment. This is shown first thus: Rest is promised to those deceased souls with nothing to be purged. This does not have to be proved because it is known, and the inventor of the heresy in question would not deny it, since he expressly grants in many places that the separated souls are at rest. But that rest is a certain reward, which is given to many souls on account of their merit; therefore some reward is promised to souls.
|[s 95] Iterum, esse in celo, videre et gaudere de humanitate Christi est merces. Ista enim dabuntur omnibus electis propter meritum Christi et aliquibus propter meritum proprium simul et meritum Christi. Sed ista animabus sanctis promittuntur; igitur animabus separatis aliqua merces promittitur. Quod vero visio dei aliquibus animabus promittitur, salvator noster Iohannis 17o innuit manifeste, dicens: “Pater, quos dedisti michi volo ut ubi sum ego et sint illi mecum, ut videant claritatem meam quam dedisti”, et cetera. Ex quibus verbis innuitur quod Christus predicando promisit quod omnes qui erunt in celo cum Christo videbunt claritatem deitatis eius. Sed anime separate sunt et erunt cum Christo in celo; ergo vident et videbunt claritatem deitatis Christi, et ita illis visio dei promittitur.
|Again, to be in heaven, to see and rejoice concerning the humanity of Christ is a reward; for these will be given to all the elect on account of Christ's merit, and to some on account of their own merit together with Christ's merit. But these things are promised to the holy souls; therefore some reward is promised to separated souls. Our Saviour manifestly suggests that the vision of God is promised to some souls, when he says, John 7 [17:24]: "Father, I will that where I am, they also whom you have given me may be with me, so that they may see my glory which you have given me" etc. These words suggest that in his preaching Christ promised that all who will be in heaven with Christ will see the glory of his deity. But separated souls are and will be with Christ in heaven; therefore they see and will see the glory of Christ's deity, and thus the vision of God is promised to them.
|[s 96] Sed forte diceret aliquis quod Christus loquitur de claritate sua secundum humanitatem, quam vident anime separate in celo. Sed hec evasio nulla est, quia Christus loquitur ibi de claritate quam habuit antequam mundus esset, ipso ibidem dicente ad patrem, “Clarifica me tu, Pater, apud temetipsum claritate quam habui priusquam mundus esset apud te”. Illa autem claritas quam habuit Christus antequam mundus esset est claritas deitatis. Igitur qui sunt in celo cum Christo vident claritatem deitatis eius.
|But perhaps someone might say that Christ speaks of his glory according to his humanity, which the separated souls see in heaven. But this evasion is a nullity, because Christ speaks there of the glory he had before the world was; he says in the same place, speaking to the father [John 17:5]: "And now glorify me, Father, in your presence, with the glory I had in your presence before the world existed." But the glory Christ had before the world existed is the glory of deity. Therefore those who are in heaven with Christ see the glory of his deity.
|[s 97] Hec de ista materia ad presens sufficiant, quoniam non est intencionis mee in hoc opere principalem heresim per exquisita media reprobare, sed motiva hic adducta repellere.
|Let this suffice on this matter for the present, because it is not my intention in this work to disprove the principal heresy through long-drawn-out means, but to reject the arguments here adduced.
ideo tercio per illa que adducit discurram. Cum itaque dicit,
attendamus cui merces illa in sacra scriptura promittitur, certum est
toti supposito”, verum est quod aliqua merces promittitur
supposito, quia illa que gloriam anime et corporis comprehendit. Aliqua
autem promittitur in communi supposito et anime separate, et ille sunt
multe: esse enim in celo cum Christo, similiter videre et gaudere de
humanitate Christi, est merces quedam, que tamen promittitur et toti
supposito et anime separate. Consorcium dei et angelorum est quedam
merces que toti supposito et anime separate promittitur, quia, teste
Ambrosio, “Anime separate ad gaudium transeunt
eciam supposita post iudicium ad angelorum consorcium perducentur. Sic
eciam visio dei est merces, et tamen promittitur et toti supposito et
anime separate purgate. Et ideo licet mille millia auctoritates
adducerentur ad probandum quod merces que est visio promittitur toti
supposito, eadem facilitate diceretur quod [s
posset per eas probare quod merces que est visio non promittitur
animabus purgatis. Immo habitacio celestis et promittitur toti
supposito et promittitur anime separate, sicut est de visione, que
promittitur toti supposito et anime separate.
|And therefore, third, I will run through the things he adduces. So when he says, "If we consider to whom that reward is promised in sacred scripture, it is certain that it is to the whole person", it is true that some reward is promised to the whole person, namely that which includes glory of soul and body. And some is promised in common to the person and to the separated soul, and these [rewards] are many. For to be in heaven with Christ, similarly to see and rejoice in the humanity of Christ, is a reward, which however is promised both to the whole person and to the separated soul. Consorting with God and the angels is a reward promised to the whole person and to the separated soul; for as Ambrose testifies, "Separated souls cross over to the joy of the angels"; and also persons after judgment will be led into the company of angels. Thus also the vision of God is a reward, and yet it is promised to both the whole person and to the purified separated soul. And therefore, even if thousands of texts were brought forward to prove that the reward that is vision is promised to the whole person, just as easily it would be said that he could not prove by them that the reward that is vision is not promised to purified souls---indeed living in heaven is promised both to the whole person and to the separated soul, just as is true of the vision that it is promised to the whole person and to the separated soul.
|[s 100] Cum igitur dicit beatus Iacobus, “Beatus vir qui suffert temptacionem” et cetera, concedendum est quod hic promittitur corona vite toti supposito. Sed ista promissio est pure affirmativa, ideo ex ipsa non sequitur negativa ista, scilicet, corona vite non promittitur anime separate. Esto eciam quod in hiis verbis non promitteretur corona vite anime separate, ex hoc non posset inferri, nisi sophistice, quod alibi non promittitur corona vite anime separate: sepe enim in scriptura sacra aliquid quod in uno loco non promittitur in alio loco promittitur. Verumptamen potest dici quod in hiis verbis promittitur corona vite et toti supposito et anime separate. Ex hoc enim quod promittitur toti supposito post iudicium, promittitur et anime postquam fuerit totaliter expurgata.
|When therefore blessed James [1:12] says, "Blessed the man who endures temptation", etc., it must be granted that here is promised the crown of life to the whole person; but this promise is purely affirmative, and therefore from it there does not follow this negative, namely, "The crown of life is not promised to the separated soul". Also, assuming that in these words the crown of life were not promised to the separated soul, it could not be inferred from this, except sophistically, that elsewhere the crown of life is not promised to the separated soul; for often in sacred scripture something not promised in one place is promised in another. Nevertheless, it can be said that in these words the crown of life is promised both to the whole person and to the separated soul, for from the fact that it is promised to the whole person after judgement, it is promised also to the soul after it has been completely purified.
|[s 101] Cum vero dicit, “Certum est quod anima non est vir”, ista est cavillosa et puerilis deduccio. Si enim vult omnino probare quod anime separate non promittitur corona vite quia anima non est vir, probabitur similiter quod nulli mulieri promittitur corona vite, quia certum est quod nulla mulier est vir. Promittitur autem in auctoritate beati Iacobi corona vite et viris et mulieribus, quia per nomen viri subintellexit et mulieres, quia in multis quod dicitur de viris intelligendum est eciam de mulieribus. Sic eciam, quamvis beatus Iacobus non exprimat nomen anime, tamen intelligendum est quod ex hoc ipso, quod corona vite promittitur viris, intelligitur eciam promissa animabus purgatis.
|And when he says, "it is certain that a soul is not a man", this is a quibbling and childish deduction. For if he seriously wishes to prove that the crown of life is not promised to the separated soul because the soul is not a man, it will be proved in the same way that the crown of life is promised to no woman, because it is certain that no woman is a man. But in blessed James's text the crown of life is promised to both men and women because by the word "men" he implicitly referred to women also, because in many matters what is said of men must be understood also of women. Thus also, although blessed James does not express the word "soul", nevertheless it is to be understood that from the fact that the crown of life is promised to men, it is understood also to be promised to purified souls.
|[s 102] Cum autem dicit quod “Christus dicit, ‘Omnis qui reliquerit patrem’, et cetera, ‘vitam eternam habebit’, et cetera, certum est quod illi quibus loquebatur erant supposita et non anime separate”, totum hoc est concedendum. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod anime non promittitur visio dei, quia ex affirmativa tali non sequitur negativa. Christus enim loquebatur suppositis et aliqua dixit illis non tantum pro suppositis sed eciam pro animabus suis. Ideo cum dixit hoc eciam, “Vitam eternam habebit”, hoc non tantum dixit pro suppositis sed eciam pro animabus postquam fuerint expurgate.
|And when he says that "Christ says, 'Everyone who has left father and mother' etc., 'will have eternal life' etc., it is certain that those to whom he spoke were persons, and not separated souls", all of this must be granted. But from this it does not follow that the vision of God is not promised to the soul, because from such an affirmative a negative does not follow. For Christ was speaking to persons and said some things to them not only for persons but also for their souls. Therefore when he also said "will have eternal life", he did not say this only for the persons but also for the souls after they have been purified.
|[s 103] Cum autem dicit, “Ad idem, quod Christus ait, ‘Vos qui reliquistis omnia’, et cetera, et certum est quod illi quibus loquebatur erant Petrus et aliorum supposita et non eorum anime separate”, dicendum est quod ista verba possunt intelligi de suppositis tantum, quia supposita et non anime separate sedebunt super sedem iudicantes duodecim tribus Israel. Sed non sequitur: iste honor promittitur suppositis et non animabus separatis, igitur et visio clara.
|And when he says, "To the same conclusion is what Christ said, 'You who have left all' etc., and it is certain that those to whom he was speaking were Peter and the persons of others, and not their separated souls", it must be said that those words can be understood of persons only, because persons and not separated souls will sit upon the throne judging the twelve tribes of Israel. But it does not follow: "that honour is promised to persons and not to separated souls, therefore also the clear vision [is promised to persons and not to separated souls]."
|[s 104] Cum vero ultimo dicit quod “merces illa reddetur pro operibus misericordie; unde Christus dicet in iudicio, ‘Esurivi’, et cetera: sed certum est quod suppositum, et non anima separata, dedit eleemosynam, igitur supposito et non anime separate reddetur”, dicendum est quod merces illa multis reddetur non pro operibus misericordie (multi enim salvabuntur qui nullum opus omnino misericordie fecerunt), et licet illa merces sit multis reddenda pro operibus misericordie, non tamen reddetur pro operibus misericordie illis suppositis tantummodo (scilicet que supposita fecerunt opera misericordie), sed eciam pro operibus misericordie reddetur animabus illorum ante diem iudicii generalis. Patet igitur quod racio ista et alie allegaciones prescripte non plus concludunt de visione dei quam de habitacione celesti, quia ita promittitur habitacio celestis toti supposito sicut visio dei.
|When, finally, he says, "the reward will be rendered for works of mercy, whence Christ will say in the judgment, 'I thirsted' etc; but it is certain that the person (suppositum), and not the separated soul, gave alms; therefore the reward will be rendered to the person, and not to the separated soul", it must be said that the reward will be rendered to many not for works of mercy (for many will be saved who have done absolutely no work of mercy), and though that reward is to be rendered to many for works of mercy, it will not, however, be rendered for works of mercy only to the supposita (i.e. the supposita that did the works of mercy), but it will be rendered for works of mercy also to their souls before the day of general judgment. It is clear, therefore, that that argument, and the other arguments reported above, are no more conclusive for the vision of God than for living in heaven, because living in heaven is promised to the whole person in the same way as the vision of God is.
|[s 105] Item, si racio illa concluderet heresim memoratam, sequeretur per eandem racionem quod ante iudicium nulla anima separata salvabitur et nulla anima separata dampnabitur. Nam sicut toti supposito clara visio dei promittitur, et toti supposito Christus dampnacionem, si non crediderit, comminatur, dicens, ut legitur Marci ultimo, “Qui crediderit et baptizatus fuerit, salvus erit; qui vero non crediderit, condempnabitur”; in quibus verbis constat aperte quod Christus loquitur de suppositis, quia totus homo credit et baptizatur. Si igitur propter hoc quod visio clara dei toti supposito promittitur sequeretur quod anime separate non videbunt deum, eadem racione, eo quod salvacio promittitur toti supposito et per hoc quod Christus comminatur dampnacionem toti supposito, contingeret inferre quod anime separate ante diem iudicii nec erunt salve nec dampnate: quod catholicus nullus ignorat esse hereticum.
|Again, if that argument proved the heresy in question, it would follow by the same argument that before the day of judgment no separated soul will be saved and no separated soul will be damned. For just as the clear vision of God is promised to the whole person, so Christ threatens damnation to the whole person if he does not believe, when he says, as we read at the end of Mark [16:16], "Whoever believes and is baptized will be saved, but whoever does not believe will be condemned". In these words it is plainly certain that Christ speaks of persons, because the whole person believes and is baptized. If, therefore, because of the fact that clear vision of God is promised to the whole person it were to follow that separated souls will not see God, by the same argument, since salvation is promised to the whole person and since Christ threatens damnation to the whole person, it would be possible to infer that before the day of judgment separated souls will be neither saved nor damned. Every Catholic knows that this is heretical.
|[s 106] Capitulum 6
|[s 107] Sequitur: Alia via de tempore pro quo merces predicta promittitur, dicit quod
|It continues: In another way concerning the time for which the reward is promised, he says that
|[s 108] si attendatur sacra scriptura, invenitur solum post iudicium: primo, quia post iudicium dicetur, “Venite benedicti patris mei, percipite regnum”, et illud, “Cum sederit filius hominis in sede maiestatis sue, sedebitis et vos”, et cetera, et hoc, “Gaudete, quia merces vestra multa est in celo”.
|if we take note of holy scripture, it [the reward] is found only after the judgment. First because after the judgment it will be said, "Come blessed of my father, possess the kingdom", and also, "When the Son of man shall sit on the throne of his Majesty you will also sit", etc; and this, "Rejoice, for your reward is great in heaven".
|[s 109] Hic ponit secundam racionem ex tempore quo reddetur merces, et potest sic formari: merces predicta, scilicet visio dei, reddetur solum post diem iudicii, igitur anime sancte ante diem iudicii non videbunt deum. Consequencia videtur manifesta, antecedens probatur per illud Matthei 25o, “Venite benedicti patris mei, percipite regnum”, et cetera.
|Here he lays down the second argument, from the time at which the reward will be paid, and it can be formulated as follows. The reward, namely vision of God, will be paid only after the day of judgment; therefore the holy souls will not see God before the day of judgment. The inference seems manifest. The premise is proved by the text of Matthew 25[:34], "Come, blessed of my father, possess the kingdom", etc.
|[s 110] Sed hec racio accipit heresim quam probare deberet, quia accipit quod merces, que est visio, non promittitur nisi pro tempore post iudicium, quod deberet probare.
|But this argument takes as premise a heresy that it was his obligation to prove. For it takes as premise that the reward, which is the vision, is promised only for the time after the judgment, which it was his obligation to prove.
ideo non restat hic nisi respondere ad
probacionem suam, que per precedencia est exclusa. Quia, sicut
dictum est, visio dei promittitur toti supposito, et illa
[ut] de communi lege est facta, non implebitur ante iudicium.
Promittitur eciam anime nichil purgandum habenti, et illa
promissio fit pro tempore eciam ante iudicium generale. Promissio
eciam verius promissionis implecio, de qua fit mencio Matthei 25o est
illa que fit toti supposito, et ideo illa nequaquam implebitur ante
iudicium generale. [s
Cum hoc tamen stat quod promissio que fit anime nichil purgandum
habenti ante dictum iudicium impleatur. Et ita patet quod ex illa
auctoritate, “Venite benedicti patris mei”, et
inferri quod anime sancte antea
non videbunt deum, sed potest inferri
quod homines integri ex corpore et anima de communi lege antea non
|And therefore nothing remains here except to answer his proof, which is ruled out by the foregoing. For as has been said, the vision of God is promised to the whole person, and that promise, as is done in the common course of events, will not be fulfilled before the judgment. It is also promised to a soul having nothing to be purged, and that promise is made for the time even previous to the general judgment. The promise, however, or rather, more truly, the fulfilment of the promise that is mentioned in Matthew 25, is that which is made to the whole person, and therefore it will not be fulfilled before the general judgment. However, it is consistent with this for the promise made to a soul with nothing to purge to be fulfilled before the judgment. And thus it is clear that from the text, "Come, blessed of my father", etc., it cannot be inferred that holy souls will not see God earlier, but it can be inferred that whole human beings of body and soul will not, in the common course of events, see God before then.
|[s 112] Sed si queratur, Ubi promittitur dicta merces anime nichil purgandum habenti?, dicendum est quod Christus, ut legitur Luce 23o, illam mercedem promisit omni anime purgate cum dixit latroni, “Hodie mecum eris in paradiso”. Hoc enim non dixit latroni pro supposito sed pro anima eius, et non solum pro anima eius sed pro omni anima purgata. Omnis igitur anima purgata vadit ad paradisum. Per paradisum autem de quo ibi fit mencio intelligitur beatitudo regni celestis, que non est sine visione.[s 113] Et quod de tali visione intellexerit Christus ex serie evangelici textus ostenditur. Nam dicente latrone ad Iesum, “Domine, memento mei, cum veneris in regnum tuum”, Iesus respondit dicens, “Amen dico tibi, hodie mecum eris in paradiso”. Ex quibus datur intelligi quod idem intelligebat Christus per paradisum quod intelligebat latro per regnum Christi; sed latro per regnum Christi intelligebat gloriam Christi, que non est sine visione clara dei. Igitur Christus per paradisum intellexit visionem dei, ut iste sit sensus: “Hodie mecum eris in paradiso”, id est, “Sicut ego video et videbo deitatem, ita tu hodie mecum videbis clare deitatem eandem”.
|But if it is asked, where is that reward promised to the soul with nothing to purge?, it must be said that, as we read in Luke 23[:43], Christ promised that reward to all purged souls when he said to the robber, "Today you will be with me in paradise". For he did not say this to the robber with reference to his person, but with reference to his soul, and not only with reference to his soul, but with reference to every purged soul. Therefore every purged soul goes to paradise. But by the "paradise" that is mentioned there is meant the happiness of the heavenly kingdom, which does not exist without vision. And that Christ meant such vision is shown by the passage of the Gospel text. For when the robber said to Jesus, "Lord, remember me when you come into your kingdom", Jesus replied, saying, "Amen, I say to you, today you will be with me in paradise". From these words we are given to understand that Christ meant by "paradise" the same as the robber meant by Christ's "kingdom"; but by Christ's kingdom the robber meant Christ's glory, which does not exist without clear vision of God. And therefore by paradise Christ meant the vision of God, so that the sense is this: "Today you will be with the in paradise", that is, "Just as I see, and will see, the deity, so you today with me will see clearly the same deity".
|[s 114] Ex hiis aliisque quampluribus, que brevitatis causa omittuntur, patenter habetur quod falsum asserit cum dicit quod in scriptura sacra invenitur quod visio dei promittitur solum pro tempore post iudicium. Quia promittitur animabus purgatis pro tempore ante iudicium ibi (sicut dictum est), “Hodie mecum eris in paradiso”, et Iohannis 17o, cum Christus dixit, “Volo ut ubi sum ego, et illi sint mecum, ut videant claritatem meam”, et 1a ad Corinthios 13o, cum dicit Apostolus, “Videmus nunc per speculum in enigmate, tunc autem” (scilicet quando “prophecie evacuabuntur”) “facie ad faciem”; prophecie autem de quibus loquitur Apostolus non sunt in celo, igitur anime que sunt in celo vident facie ad faciem. Quod eciam dicta visio iam sit data asserit manifeste scriptura divina. Quia Apocalypsis 6o dicit beatus Iohannes, “Date sunt illis”, sanctis, secundum animam, “singule stole albe”, que sunt singule visiones dei.
|From these and many other texts, which for the sake of brevity are omitted, it is plainly established that he asserts something false when he says that it is found in sacred scripture that the vision of God is promised only for the time after judgment. For it is promised to purged souls for the time before the judgment in the text (as has been said), "Today you will be with me in paradise", and in John 17[:24] when Christ said, "I wish that where I am they also may be with me, so that they may see my glory", and in 1 Corinthians 13[:12] when the Apostle says, "We see now through a glass darkly, then, however," (namely when "prophecies are made void" [vs. 8]) "face-to-face"; but the prophecies of which the Apostle speaks do not exist in heaven, therefore souls in heaven see face-to-face. That also this vision has already been given, divine scripture manifestly asserts. For in Apocalypse 6[:11] blessed John says, "Given to each of them", to the saints, according to the soul, "are white robes", which are individual visions of God.
|[s 115] Cum vero dicit, “Post iudicium dicetur, ‘Venite benedicti patris mei, percipite regnum’”, et cetera, verum est quod tunc dicetur suppositis integris. Et ideo istud ante iudicium non implebitur, quia supposita integra de communi lege antea non percipient regnum dei. Cum hoc tamen stat quod anime multorum antea videbunt deum.
|And when he says that it will be said after the judgment, "Come, blessed of my father, possess the kingdom", etc, it is true, because then it will be said to whole persons, and therefore that text will not be fulfilled before the judgment, because whole persons, in the common course of events, will not receive the kingdom of God before then; however, it is consistent with this that the souls of many will see God earlier.
|[s 116] Cum autem allegat illud Christi, “Cum sederit filius hominis in sede maiestatis sue, sedebitis et vos” et cetera, dicendum est quod istud non implebitur ante iudicium generale. Cum hoc tamen stat quod anime apostolorum nunc videant deum. Multa enim et diversa sunt promissa apostolis, quorum aliqua sunt modo impleta, aliqua vero implebuntur in die iudicii sed post diem iudicii cessabunt (sicuti “Sedebitis super sedes duodecim iudicantes duodecim tribus Israel”, nam post diem iudicii minime iudicabunt); aliqua vero implebuntur in die iudicii et sine fine manebunt, sicut quod erunt in anima et corpore gloriosi. Si igitur hoc, quod in die iudicii sedebunt apostoli super sedes duodecim iudicantes, et cetera [text missing], quod constat esse heresim manifestam. [For the last sentence Ly has: Igitur per hoc quod in die iudicii sedebunt apostoli super sedem iudicantes et cetera non poterit probari quod ante diem iudicii anime eorum non videant essenciam divinam cum constet ipsum esse heresim manifestam.]
|And when he quotes the text of Christ, "When the Son of Man shall sit on the throne of his Majesty, you also will sit", etc, it must be said that the text will not be fulfilled before the general judgment; however, it is consistent with this that the souls of the apostles now see God. For many and various things were promised to the apostles, of which some are now fulfilled, others will be fulfilled on the day judgment but will cease after the day of judgment (such as "You will sit upon twelve seats judging the twelve tribes of Israel", for after the day of judgment they will not judge); but others will be fulfilled on the day of judgment and will remain without end, for example that they will be glorious in soul and body. If therefore this, that on the day of judgment the apostles will sit upon twelve thrones judging, etc., [text missing] which is certainly a manifest heresy. [For the last sentence Ly has: Therefore from this, that on the day of judgment the apostles will sit upon the throne judging, it will not be possible to prove that before judgment day their souls will not see the divine essence, since this is certainly a manifest heresy.]
|[s 117] Cum vero ultimo dicit hoc, “Gaudete, quia merces vestra multa est in celo”, hoc non est ad propositum. Quia constat secundum istum quod merces animarum multa est in celo, quia secundum eum vident et gaudent de humanitate Christi; hoc autem gaudium est secundum istum multum. Manifestum est igitur quod non tantum merces suppositorum post iudicium erit multa in celo, sed eciam merces animarum nunc in celo est multa. Et ideo per verba predicta probari nullo modo potest quod anime sancte nunc non vident deum, sicut per ipsa probari non potest quod nunc non vident humanitatem Christi.
|And when finally he says, "Rejoice, because your reward will be great in heaven", this is not to the point. Because it is certain according to him that the reward of souls is great in heaven, because according to him they see and rejoice in the humanity of Christ, and this joy is great, according to him. It is manifest, therefore, that not only will the reward of persons after judgment be great in heaven, but also the reward of souls now in heaven is great, and therefore by the above words it can in no way be proved that the holy souls do not see God now, just as through those words it cannot be proved that they do not now see the humanity of Christ [as he holds they do].
|[s 118] Capitulum 7
|[s 119] Sequitur:
|Si eciam attendatur tercium, scilicet ad quid generale iudicium dei ordinatur, videtur quod frustra fiat iudicium si merces illa ante iudicium animabus reddatur.
|If also the third point is attended to, namely to what end the general judgment of God is directed, it seems that the judgment would happen in vain if that reward is given to souls before the judgment.
|[s 120] Hic ponitur ultima racio eius pro heresi memorata, que ex hiis que dicta sunt contra priores convincitur manifeste. Per ipsam enim probaretur quod anime sanctorum nec sunt in celo nec aliquod gaudium habent, quia secundum illam racionem frustra fieret iudicium generale si anime sanctorum nunc gauderent. Si enim dicat iste quod, quamvis anime sancte aliquod gaudium nunc habeant, tamen illud iudicium tunc non fiet frustra quia anime sancte tunc visionem dei percipient et tota supposita tunc suscitabuntur et in regnum dei intrabunt, [s 121] eadem facilitate diceretur isti quod, quamvis anime sancte nunc videant deum, tamen illud iudicium tunc non fiet frustra quia et anime sancte tunc clariorem visionem habebunt et toti homines integri ex corpore et anima constituti tunc gloriam corporis et anime obtinebunt.
|Here he lays down his last argument for the heresy in question, which is manifestly refuted by things said against the previous arguments. For by it would be proved that the souls of the saints neither are in heaven nor have any joy, because according to that argument the general judgment would happen in vain if the souls of the saints were now rejoicing. For if he says that although the holy souls now have some joy, yet the judgment will not then happen in vain because the holy souls will then receive the vision of God and the whole person will then be raised and will enter into the kingdom of God, it would be said to him just as easily that although the holy souls now see God, yet that judgment will not then happen in vain both because the holy souls will then have clearer vision and because the whole persons composed of body and soul will then attain glory of body and soul.
|Ad racionem igitur breviter est dicendum quod iudicium generale non fiet frustra licet anime sanctorum nunc videant divinam essenciam, quia illud generale iudicium ad multa alia ordinatur. Ordinatur enim ut supposita integra ex corpore et anima constituta gloriam corporis et anime tunc percipiant, quamvis anime quorundam prius perceperunt. Ordinatur eciam ut gloria cuiuscumque anime que prius vidit divinam essenciam augeatur. Fiet eciam ut multe anime que prius non viderunt divinam essenciam, quia purgate non fuerunt, tunc corporibus reunite percipient visionem dei. Fiet eciam ut mali extunc non solum in anima sed eciam in corpore crucientur. Ordinatur eciam ad hoc, quod extunc cesset omnis status merendi et demerendi. Propter ista igitur erronee dicitur quod frustra fieret iudicium generale si animabus separatis visio clara antea redderetur.
|To the argument, therefore, it must be said briefly that the general judgment will not happen in vain even if the souls of the saints now see the divine essence, because that general judgment has many other purposes. For it is ordained so that the whole persons composed of body and soul may then receive the glory of body and soul, although the souls of some have earlier received it. It is also ordained that the glory of every soul that earlier saw the divine essence may be increased. It will happen also so that many souls which previously did not see the divine essence, because they had not been purged, will then, reunited with their bodies, receive the vision of God. It will happen also so that from that time on the wicked may be tortured not only in soul but also in body. It is ordained also to this, that from that time every state of meriting and demeriting may cease. Because of these things, therefore, it is an error to say that the general judgment would happen in vain if clear vision were given to separated souls earlier.
|[s 122] Cum infertur, “Igitur videtur quod frustra fiat iudicium si merces illa ante iudicium animabus reddatur,” de mercede que gloriam anime et corporis comprehendit posset concedi, sed illa merces non redditur animabus separatis, quia gloria corporis ante iudicium de communi lege non reddetur.
|When it is inferred, "therefore it seems that the judgment would happen in vain if that reward is given to souls before the judgment", this could be conceded of the reward that includes glory of soul and body; but that reward is not paid to separated souls because in the common course of events glory of body will not be given before judgment.
|[s 123] Capitulum 8
|[s 124] Sequitur:
quia non est dicendum quod illud
iudicium est solum verbale, inane et ficticium, idcirco super ista
|And because it must not be said that the judgment is merely verbal and empty and fictitious, therefore, we are watchful over that question.
|[s 125] Positis motivis pro heresi sepe fata, hic inventor ipsius atque defensor verbalem, fictam et frivolam ponit protestacionem seu revocacionem. Et in hac parte fiunt sex: quia primo iste ponit motivum quare predictam materiam indagavit; secundo dicit quod conclusioni sue amore veritatis adhesit; tercio manifestat quare ipse predictam assercionem suam voluit promulgare et publice predicare; quarto dicit quod non fuit intencionis sue aliquid dicere contra fidem, et ideo quandam fecit protestacionem seu revocacionem ne de heresi condempnetur; quinto verbis dolosis et ambiguis se non pertinaciter zelare pro assercione predicta pretendit; ultimo narratur quod de revocacione sua petivit fieri publicum instrumentum.
|Having laid down the arguments for the oft-stated heresy, here its inventor and defender puts forward a verbal, fictitious and frivolous protestation or revocation, and in this part six things are done. For first he puts forward the reason why he has investigated the aforesaid matter [chapter 8]. Second he says that he has adhered to his conclusion out of love of truth [chapter 9]. Third he shows why he has wished to promulgate the aforesaid assertion of his and preach it publicly [chapter 10]. Fourth he says that it was not his intention to say anything against faith, and therefore he made a certain protestation or revocation lest he be condemned for heresy [chapter 11]. Fifth, in deceptive and ambiguous words he claims that he is not pertinaciously zealous for this opinion [chapter 12]. Finally it is narrated that he sought that a public instrument of his revocation should be made [chapter 13].
|[s 126] Dicit igitur, quod ideo super ista quescione voluit vigilare quia iudicium generale non est solum “verbale, inane et ficticium”. In hiis verbis ad asserciones suas et motiva eius pro assercione sepe dicta relatis, aperte insinuat quod iudicium generale est frustra, inane et ficticium si anime sanctorum ante iudicium videant deum. Sed hoc in precedentibus evidencius est manifestum.
|He says, therefore, that he wished to be watchful over this question because the general judgment is not only "verbal, empty and fictitious". In these words, related to his own assertions and arguments in favour of the often mentioned assertion, he plainly suggests that the general judgment is pointless, empty and fictitious if the souls of the saints see God before the judgment. But this is more clearly manifest in the preceding material.
|[s 127] Capitulum 9
|[s 128] Sequitur:
|Et in consciencia mea dico, quod libenter essemus pro alia conclusione, et libencius quam pro ista conclusione negativa, si vera ostenderetur et necessaria; et si clarum esset in fide quod anime sanctorum nunc viderent faciem dei, nullus haberet tantum defendere istam fidem, nec defenderet, plus quam nos. Sum enim Christi vicarius, licet indignus, et vicarius generalis plus habet defendere honorem [domini] principalis quam quicumque particularis vicarius. Item, quomodo posset aliquis credere quod, si anima patris mei vel matris mee videret clare faciem dei, quod ego vellem negare? Absit! Unde ubi veritas probaretur clarius, ita libenter et amplius staremus pro conclusione affirmativa [quam negativa].
|And I say in my conscience that we would willingly favour another conclusion, and more willingly than that negative conclusion, if it were shown to be true and necessary. If it were clear in faith that the souls of the saints now see the face of God, no one would as much have the duty to defend that faith, nor would defend it, more than we. For I am Christ's vicar, though unworthy, and the vicar general has a greater duty to defend the honour of the principal lord than any particular vicar. Again, how could anyone believe that, if the soul of my father or mother clearly saw the face of God, I would wish to deny it --- perish the thought! Hence if the truth were proved more clearly, we would stand just as willingly, and more, in favour of the affirmative conclusion than the negative.
|[s 129] Hic dicit quod sue assercioni amore veritatis adhesit. Quod ostendit per hoc, quod libencius esset pro conclusione alia si sibi probaretur esse vera. Si per hoc credit de heresi excusari, turpiter est deceptus. Nam quilibet hereticus amore veritatis (quam credit) sue heresi pertinaciter noscitur adherere, et tamen, hoc non obstante, heretici de pravitate heretica nullatenus excusantur. Igitur quantumcumque iste amore veritatis (quam credit) adhereat conclusioni negative predicte, scilicet quod anime sanctorum in celo non vident deum, tamen per hoc de heresi nullatenus excusatur.
|Here he says that he has adhered to his assertion out of love of truth. He shows this by the fact that he would be more willingly in favour of the other conclusion if it were proved to him to be true. If he believes that by this he is excused from heresy, he is foully deceived. For every heretic is known to adhere pertinaciously to his heresy out of love of (what he believes to be) the truth, and nevertheless, despite this, heretics are in no way excused for their heretical wickedness. Therefore however much he adheres out of love of what he believes to be truth to the abovementioned negative conclusion, namely that the souls of the saints in heaven do not see God, nevertheless by this he is not at all excused of heresy.
|[s 130] Quod autem omnes heretici, immo et Iudei et pagani, amore veritatis (quam credunt) suis adhereant erroribus auctoritatibus manifestis ostenditur. Ieronimus enim, ut habetur 24a, q. 3a, c. Heresis, dicit in hec verba: “Heresis grece ab ‘eleccione’ dicitur, quod scilicet eam sibi unusquisque eligat disciplinam quam putat esse meliorem”. Ex quibus verbis manifeste colligitur quod heretici illas tenent et eligunt asserciones quas reputant veriores, et ita suis heresibus amore veritatis (quam credunt) adherent. Libencius quam multi eorum tenerent contrarias, si eis probarentur esse vere, et tamen per hoc de heresi nullatenus excusantur. Igitur nec iste per hoc poterit de heresi excusari.
|And that all heretics, indeed also Jews and pagans, adhere to their errors out of love of what they believe to be truth is shown by clear authorities. For Jerome, as we read 24, q. 3. c. Haeresis, says in these words: "Heresy is so-called in Greek from 'choice', namely that each chooses for himself the teaching that he thinks to be better". From these words we gather clearly that heretics hold and choose the assertions they think more true, and thus they adhere to their heresies out of love of what they believe to be truth. More willingly very many of them would hold the opposites if those were proved to them to be true, and yet by this they are by no means excused of heresy. Therefore neither can he be excused of heresy by this.
|[s 131] De Iudeis eciam idem probatur auctoritate Christi dicentis Iohannis 16o: “Venit hora ut omnis qui interficit vos arbitretur obsequium se prestare deo”. Ex quibus verbis patenter habetur quod Iudei quodam veritatis amore persequebantur apostolos, nec tamen propter hoc fuerunt excusandi; igitur nec iste est de heresi excusandus propter hoc, quod libencius teneret contrarium sui erroris si sibi ostenderetur esse verum.
|Concerning the Jews also the same is proved by the authority of Christ, when he says in John 16[:2], "The hour will come when everyone who kills you will think he preforms a service to God". By these words it is clearly established that the Jews persecuted the apostles out of a certain love of truth; however they were not to be excused on that account. Therefore neither is he to be excused of heresy because he would more willingly hold the opposite of his error if that were shown to him to be true.
|[s 132] Item Apostolus de Iudeis ad Romanos 10o dicit: “Testimonium enim perhibeo illis quod emulacionem quidem dei habent, sed non secundum scienciam”, ubi dicit glossa, “Pro dileccione dei putant se facere, sed veram dei dileccionem non habent”. Ex quibus verbis potest patenter inferri quod potest quis hereses impie defensare, putans se hoc facere veritatis amore, licet verum veritatis amorem non habeat et ideo de erroris defensione non est excusatus. Et ita per hoc, quod iste credit assercionem suam esse veram et libencius teneret contrariam si crederet eam esse veram, non potest de heresi excusari, licet per hoc possit haberi quod quodam falso veritatis amore.
|Again, the Apostle says of the Jews, Romans 10 [: 2], "For I bear testimony of them, that they indeed have a zeal of God, but not according to knowledge", where the Gloss says, "They think they act for love of God, but they do not have true love of God". From these words it is possible clearly to infer that a person can impiously defend a heresy thinking that he does so out of love of truth, though he does not have true love of truth and is therefore not excused of defending error. And so by the fact that this man believes that his assertion is true, and would more willingly hold the contrary if he believed it to be true, he cannot be excused of heresy (though from this fact it can be established that [he holds it] by a certain false love of truth).
|[s 133] Paulus ante conversionem suam persequebatur ecclesiam dei et negabat incarnacionem Christi, pro qua libencius laborasset si fuisset sibi probata; et tamen, hoc non obstante, de errore dampnabili non potuit excusari. Igitur, licet iste credat assercionem suam esse veram et libencius teneret contrariam si sibi esse vera et necessaria probaretur, non poterit per hoc de pravitate heretica excusari, sed per hoc haberi potest quod quodam falso veritatis amore assentit errori.
|Before his conversion Paul persecuted the Church of God and denied the incarnation of Christ, for which he would have laboured more willingly if it had been proved to him; and yet despite this he was not able to be excused of damnable error. Therefore though this man believes that his assertion is true and would more willingly hold the contrary if it were proved to him to be true and necessary, he cannot be excused of heretical wickedness by this, but by this it can be established that he assents to error from a certain false love of truth.
|[s 134] Rursum: per verba predicta non potest plus haberi nisi quod iste ignoranter errat. Sed ignorancia non semper excusat, et specialiter non excusat in casu isto, sicut inferius ostendetur. Igitur per verba predicta non potest de pravitate heretica excusari.
|Again: by the above words no more can be established than that this man errs ignorantly; but ignorance does not always excuse, and especially does not excuse in this case, as will be shown below; therefore by the above words he cannot be excused of heretical wickedness.
|Quod ignorancia non semper excusat patet manifeste per illud Actuum 3o, quod dicit Petrus perfidis Iudeis: “Fratres, scio quia per ignoranciam fecistis, sicut et principes vestri”. Ex quibus verbis patenter colligitur quod Iudei ignoranter suis erroribus adheserunt, et tamen per talem ignoranciam non poterant excusari. [s 135] Sic, licet iste ignoranter teneat et defendat heresim predictam, et libencius teneret assercionem contrariam si sibi probaretur esse vera, tamen per hoc non poterit de pravitate heretica excusari. Per talem enim modum omnes Iudei, Sarraceni et pagani, idolatre, et heretici, immo universaliter omnes errantes, possent se de suis erroribus excusare. Vix enim posset aliquis inveniri quin diceret quod libencius teneret assercionem contrariam si sibi probaretur aperte esse vera. Quis enim diceret, quod libencius teneret falsum quam verum?
|That ignorance does not always excuse is manifestly clear by what Peter says to the unbelieving Jews in Acts chapter 3[:17]: "Brothers, I know that you did this through ignorance, as did also your leaders". From these words we gather plainly that the Jews adhered to their errors ignorantly, and yet they were not able to be excused by such ignorance. Thus, though he may hold and defend the above-mentioned heresy ignorantly and would more willingly hold the contrary assertion if that were proved to him to be true, nevertheless by this he cannot be excused of heretical wickedness. For in that way all the Jews, Saracens, and pagans, idolaters and heretics, indeed in general all who err, could excuse themselves of their errors. For scarcely anyone could be found who would not say that he would more willingly hold the contrary assertion if it were plainly proved to him to be true. For who would say that he would more willingly hold a falsity than the truth?
|[s 136] Patet igitur ex predictis quod iste inventor heresis memorate per verba predicta et similia non potest de heresi excusari. Est tamen advertendum quod, licet precise per talia verba non possit errans contra fidem de pravitate heretica excusari, non tamen est dicendum quod omnis errans contra fidem nitens se per verba talia excusare est hereticus reputandus, quia potest quis errans contra fidem in casu aliquo satagens se per verba talia excusare de pravitate heretica immunis existere. Sed iste inventor heresis sepe dicte nullo modo valet de pravitate heretica excusari, sicut inferius ostendetur.
|It is clear therefore from the foregoing, that this man, the inventor of the heresy mentioned, cannot be excused of heresy by the words above and others like them. Nevertheless, it must be noticed that although precisely by such words a person who errs against the faith cannot be excused of heretical wickedness, still it must not be said that every person erring against the faith and trying to excuse himself by such words must be regarded as a heretic, because someone erring against the faith attempting to excuse himself by such words can in some cases be free from heretical wickedness. But this man, the inventor of heresy oft-mentioned, can in no way excuse himself of heretical wickedness, as will be shown below.
|[s 137] Cum igitur dicit, “Libenter essemus pro alia conclusione, et libencius quam pro ista conclusione negativa”, non dicit asserendo nec opinando sed tantummodo recitando. Et notatur quod per predicta verba non potest de heresi excusari, sicut ostensum est prius.
|Therefore when he says, "We would willingly favour another conclusion, and more willingly than that negative conclusion ", he does not speak asserting or expressing an opinion, but only reporting. And it is noted that by the above words he cannot be excused of heresy, as has been shown before.
|[s 138] Cum autem dicit, “Si clarum esset in fide quod anime sanctorum nunc vident faciem dei, nullus haberet tantum defendere istam fidem, nec defenderet, plus quam nos”, colligitur evidenter quod ipse non credit animas sanctorum nunc videre faciem dei, quia dicit quod si esset clarum, nullus defenderet plus quam ipse: sed ipse non defendit, immo impugnat; igitur non credit hoc esse clarum in fide. .
|And when he says, "If it were clear in faith that souls of the saints now see the face of God, no one would have a duty to defend that faith as much, nor would defend it, more than we", we gather evidently that he does not believe that the souls of the saints now see the face of God, because he says that if it were clear no one would defend it more than he, but he does not defend it, indeed he attacks it; therefore he does not believe that it is clear in faith.
|[s 139] “Sum enim Christi vicarius”: eciam ista verba sonant quod “si deberet defendere quis”; tamen sepe Christi vicarius generalis defendere honorem domini principalis quam particularis plus debet.
|"For I am Christ's vicar": these words also imply "if anyone should defend"; however, often Christ's vicar general should more defend the honour of the principal lord than some particular [vicar]. [Something may have dropped out of the text. The missing part may have argued that sometimes others besides the general vicar should also defend the lord’s honour — though often it is more the responsibility of the general vicar.]
|[s 140] “Item, quomodo posset aliquis credere quod, si anima patris mei vel matris mee videret clare faciem dei, quod ego vellem negare? Absit!”. Ex hiis eciam verbis notatur quod non credit animam cuiuscumque separatam clare videre faciem dei.
|"Again, how could anyone believe that, if the soul of my father or mother clearly saw the face of God, I would wish to deny it ? --- perish the thought!" From these words also it is noted that he does not believe that the separated soul of any person clearly sees God's face.
|[s 141] “Unde ubi veritas probaretur clarius, ita libenter et amplius staremus pro conclusione affirmativa quam negativa”: hoc insinuat quod non tenet conclusionem negativam nisi amore veritatis, sed per talia verba de pravitate heretica minime excusatur.
|"Hence if the truth were proved more clearly, we would stand just as willingly, and more, in favour of the affirmative conclusion than the negative": this suggests that he holds the negative conclusion only from love of truth, but by such words he is not at all excused of heretical wickedness.
|[s 142] Capitulum 10
|[s 143] Sequitur:
|Sed nos, postquam fuimus in isto statu, studuimus singulariter sanctorum originalia, et attendimus quesciones quas faciunt in ista materia, et frequenter in sermonibus fecimus mencionem; et maxime utile fuit, quia alii vel non habent originalia vel non curant studere in eis. Sunt enim hodie studentes et alii applicati quibusdam scriptis et illa habent pro evangeliis et epistolis, et amplius parum querunt. Et ideo quia ista studuimus in originalibus, ista proposuimus, ista inquisivimus.
|But after we were in that state [i.e. after we became pope] we particularly studied the original writings of the saints and have attended to questions they raise in this material, and have often mentioned them in sermons; and this was very useful, because others either do not possess the original writings or do not take the trouble to study them. For there are today students and others attached to certain writings and regard them as Gospels and Epistles and seek little further. And therefore, because we have studied those matters in the original writings, we have put those things forward, we have investigated them.
|[s 144] Hic assignat raciones quare assercionem predictam voluit promulgare et publice predicare, quia scilicet ipse habuit et studuit originalia sanctorum, ut dicit, et alii vel non habent vel non student, et propter hoc istam assercionem tamquam ignotam aliis voluit tamquam catholicam divulgare. Sed in istis verbis aperte insinuat unde sibi acciderit quod in tot hereses est prolapsus. Quia enim in originalibus sanctorum et in scripturis divinis, absque doctore et sine scolastico exercicio aliisque scienciis que sacre theologie famulari noscuntur nequaquam prius acquisitis, studere presumpsit, non recte intelligens, ex auctoritatibus male intellectis quamplures asserciones hereticales nisus est inferre. [s 145] Et ideo magister erroris existit qui numquam fuit discipulus veritatis, non attendens illud Ieronimi ad Paulinum: “Hec a me prescripta sunt breviter (neque enim epistolaris angustia evagari longius paciebatur), ut intelligeres te in scripturis sacris sine previo et monstrante semitam non posse ingredi” — nec mirum, cum secundum eundem, ibidem, “Qui variam supellectilem et vilia opuscula fabricant, absque doctore non possunt esse quod cupiunt”. Quomodo, igitur, iste inscius primitus, minus eciam peritus, in senectute sua studere incipiens originalia sanctorum, ipsa sine doctore intelligat, cum vix aut numquam valeat unicus reperiri vivens qui metaphysicam sine doctore addiscat? [s 146] Revera iste videtur “delirus senex” quem beatus Ieronimus inter alios temere presumentes scripturas sacras docere antequam discant acriter reprehendit, dicens ibidem: “Sola scripturarum ars est, quam sibi omnes passim vendicant”. Et parum post: “Hanc garrula anus, hanc delirus senex, hanc sophista verbosus, hanc universi presumunt, lacerant, docent antequam discant”.
|Here he gives the reasons why he wished to promulgate and publicly preach the aforesaid assertion, namely because he possessed and studied the original writings of the saints (so he says), and others either do not possess them or do not study them, and for this reason he wished to publish that assertion as Catholic, as being unknown to others. But in these words he clearly suggests how he came to fall into so many heresies. For because he presumed to study the original writings of the saints and the divine scriptures without a teacher and without academic training and without first acquiring the other sciences that are known to minister to sacred theology, not understanding rightly, he has tried to infer very many heretical assertions from authorities badly understood. And therefore he is "a teacher of error" who has never been "a disciple of truth" [Cf. C. 24 q. 3 c. 30, col. 998], taking no notice of what Jerome said to Paulinus [Letter 53]: "I have written the above briefly (for the constraint of a letter does not allow longer wandering), so that you may understand that you cannot make progress in the sacred scriptures unless someone first shows you the way"---and no wonder, since according to Jerome in the same place, "Those who make various furniture and cheap objects cannot be what they desire without a teacher". Being, therefore, at first ignorant and less skilled, how can he, beginning in his old age to study the original writings of the saints, understand them without a teacher, since hardly ever, or never, can a single man be found alive who learns metaphysics without a teacher? Indeed he seems to be the "silly old man" whom blessed Jerome sharply rebukes among others who rashly presume to teach the sacred scriptures before they learn them, saying, in the same place, "Skill in the scriptures is the only art that everyone everywhere claims for himself... This the talkative old woman, the silly old man, the wordy sophist ---this they all take upon themselves, mangle, teach before they learn".
|[s 147] Cum igitur dicit, “Postquam fuimus in isto statu, studuimus singulariter originalia sanctorum”, ostendit unde sibi contingit quod tot hereses dogmatizavit, quod scilicet studuit originalia sanctorum, que nequaquam intelligit, et tamen se intelligere putat, et ideo ad suas hereses, ipsa repugnancia, molitur pertrahere.
|When therefore he says, "After we were in that state, we particularly studied the original writings of the saints", he shows how he came to teach as dogma so many heresies, namely because he studied the original writings of the saints, which he by no means understands, though he thinks he understands them, and therefore labours to drag them, resisting, to his own heresies [an allusion to Jerome, Epistulae, epist. 53 c.6].
|[s 148] Cum vero dicit, “Et attendimus quesciones quas faciunt in materia ista”: Quia etsi a puericia sanctorum originalia studuisset ad multorum contentorum in eis verum intellectum nullatenus pervenisset, quanto magis senex, qui a puericia fluctibus seculi insistebat, et postquam fuit ad istum statum assumptus occupacionibus extitit infinitis implicitus, ad verum intellectum profundarum et subtilium veritatum que in sanctorum auctoritatibus inseruntur nequaquam attinget.
|And when he says, "And we have attended to questions they raise in this material": Since even if he had studied the original writings of the saints from boyhood he would by no means have come to a true understanding of many things contained in them, how much more will an old man --- who from boyhood was applying himself to the commotions of the world and after he was promoted to that state was involved in infinite occupations --- by no means attain true understanding of the deep and subtle truths included in the writings of the saints.
|[s 149] “Et frequenter in sermonibus fecimus mencionem”, verba sanctorum erronee pervertendo.
|"And we have often mentioned them in sermons", erroneously twisting the words of the saints.
|[s 150] “Et maxime utile fuit”: immo perniciosum extitit et nocivum, quia per sermones suos, ambiciosos quamplurimos ad negandam fidei agnite veritatem, et ad predicandam, tenendam, docendam et defendendam hereticam pravitatem induxit, ac inter Christianos dissensiones, emulaciones et scismata seminavit.
|"And this was very useful": Rather, it was pernicious and harmful, because by his sermons he led many ambitious men to deny the truth of known faith and to preach, hold, teach and defend heretical wickedness, and sowed dissensions, envies and schisms among Christians.
|[s 151] “Quia alii vel non habent originalia vel non curant studere in eis. Sunt enim hodie studentes et alii applicati quibusdam scriptis, et illa habent pro evangeliis et epistolis, et amplius parum querunt”: Hoc putant nonnulli veritatem de multis habere, qui ante sunt magistri quam discipuli; sed propter aliorum impericiam et ignoranciam ista determinacio nullatenus excusatur.
|"Because others either do not possess their original writings or do not take the trouble to study them. For there are today students and others attached to certain writings and regard them as Gospels and Epistles, and seek little further": Some think that this is true of many, who are teachers before they are disciples, but that determination [John's dogmatic teaching] is by no means excused by the unskilfulness and ignorance of others.
|[s 152] “Et ideo quia ista studuimus in originalibus, ista proposuimus, ista inquisivimus”: Male studuit originalia, et ideo hereticalia multa proposuit et defendit
|"And therefore, because we have studied those matters in the original writings, we have put those things forward, we have investigated them": He has studied the original writings badly, and therefore has put forward and defended many heretical statements.
|[s 153] Capitulum 11
|[s 154] Sequitur:
|Numquam tamen mee intencionis fuit dicere aliquid contra fidem, et si aliquid diximus, totum ex nunc revocamus.
|However, it was never my intention to say anything against the faith, and if we have said any [such] thing, we revoke the whole from this moment.
|[s 155] Hic ponitur protestacio seu retractacio vel revocacio ficta et frivola inventoris heresis sepe dicte. Circa istam partem facienda sunt tria. Primo enim probandum est quod verba predicta ipsum non excusant quin fuerit et adhuc sit hereticus. Secundo ostendendum est quod assertor heresis ante dicte, licet posset converti ad catholicam veritatem, tamen nullo modo poterit excusari quin fuerit hereticus. Tercio dicendum est qualem revocacionem oportet ipsum facere, si velit inter catholicos reputari, que scilicet declararet ipsum non esse hereticum, licet per nullam revocacionem poterit declarare se non fuisse hereticum.
is placed the fictitious and
protestation or retraction or revocation of the inventor of the oft
mentioned heresy. Concerning this part three things must be done.
|[s 156] Ad evidenciam istorum sunt aliqua notanda, quorum primum est quod due sunt differencie credendorum. Quedam enim sunt credenda explicite, et quedam sunt credenda implicite. Patet aperte, quia nullus catholicus debet totam fidem Christianam penitus ignorare; igitur sibi non sufficit solummodo credere fidem Christianam esse veram, sed oportet quod aliquid explicite credat quod ad fidem pertinet Christianam; et ita quilibet catholicus aliquid credere tenetur explicite. Quod Augustinus super Iohanne, prout recitatur de cons. dist. 4o, c. 1o, aperte insinuat, dicens: “Necessarium est visibile sacramentum aque ad ablucionem visibilis corporis, sicut necessaria est doctrina invisibilis fidei ad sanctificacionem invisibilis anime”. Ex hiis aperte colligitur quod quilibet Christianus tenetur aliqua addiscere de fide Christiana que credat explicite.
| To make these things clear certain points must be noted, of which the first is that is there are two kinds of things to be believed. For some things must be believed explicitly, and some must be believed implicitly. This is quite clear, because no Catholic ought to be completely ignorant of the whole of the Christian faith; therefore it is not enough for him to believe only that the Christian faith is true, but he must believe explicitly something that belongs to the Christian faith; and thus every Catholic is bound to believe something explicitly. Augustine plainly suggests this, On John, as quoted De Consecratione, dist. 4, c. 1. He says: "The visible sacrament of water is necessary to washing the visible body, just as the invisible teaching of the faith is necessary to the sanctification of the invisible soul". We gather clearly from these words that each Christian is bound to learn something of the Christian faith that he should believe explicitly.
|[s 157] Item, idem Augustinus, ut habetur de cons. distinccione predicta, c. Ante baptismum: “[Ante baptismum] cathecizandi debet homo prevenire officium, ut fidei principium cathecuminus accipiat rudimentum”. Et capitulo sequenti sic legitur: “Ante vigenti dies baptismi ad purgacionem exorcismi cathecumini currant, in quibus vigenti diebus omnino symbolum, quod est, ‘Credo in deum patrem omnipotentem’, spiritualiter doceantur”. Ex hiis patet quod baptizandi fidem suam, antequam ad alia se transferant, debent addiscere, quod eciam ex tractatu de cons., dist. 4a, c. Symbolum, et c. Cathecismi, et c. Non liceat, et c. Postquam, patenter habetur. Ex quo evidenter infertur quod quisque catholicus aliqua credere tenetur explicite.
|Again, the same Augustine [rather, Rabanus], as we find in De Consecratione, in the above-mentioned distinction, c. Ante baptismum (c. 54): "[Before baptism] a man should anticipate the duty of catechising, so that the catacumen may receive the first rudiments of the faith". And in the following chapter we read as follows: "Twenty days before baptism let the catacumens hasten to the purgation of exorcism; in these twenty days let the whole of the creed, which is, 'I believe in God the father almighty', be taught spiritually". From these [passages] it is clear that before they turn to other matters those who are to be baptized should learn their faith. This is also clearly established by the treatment in De Consecratione, in the same distinction 4, chapters Symbolum, Cathecismi, Non liceat, and Postquam [c. 56, 57, 59, 61]. From this it is plainly inferred that every Catholic is bound to believe some things explicitly.
|[s 158] Quod vero aliqua sunt credenda implicite est manifestum. Nam quilibet catholicus tenetur credere totam scripturam divinam; aliqui tamen multa in ea contenta ignorant, et ita non possunt ea credere explicite; sufficit igitur eis quod credant ea implicite.
|And that some things must be believed implicitly is manifest. For every Catholic is bound to believe the whole of divine scripture; yet some people are ignorant of many things contained in it, and thus they cannot believe those things explicitly; it is therefore enough for them to believe them implicitly.
|[s 159]Porro, quia multi doctrinam Thome recipiunt, pro illis adducenda sunt verba ipsius quibus ostenditur distinccio supra dicta. Ait itaque 2a-2e, q. 2a, a. 5o: “Quantum ergo ad primum, prima credibilia, que sunt articuli fidei, non solum tenetur homo explicite credere, sed eciam tenetur habere fidem. [Recte: Quantum ergo ad prima credibilia, que sunt articuli fidei, tenetur homo explicite credere, sicut et tenetur habere fidem.] Quantum autem ad alia credibilia, non tenetur homo explicite credere sed solum implicite vel in preparacione animi, inquantum paratus est credere quicquid in scriptura divina continetur”. Ex hiis patenter habetur quod aliqua sunt credenda explicite et aliqua implicite.
|Moreover because many accept the doctrine of Thomas, his words must be quoted for them, by which the above-mentioned distinction is shown. He says, therefore, 2-2, q. 2, art. 5 : "With respect to the first, the first objects of belief, which are the articles of faith, a man is bound not only to believe explicitly, but is also bound to have faith.[More accurately: With respect to the first objects of belief... a man is bound to believe explicitly, just as he is bound to have faith.] With respect to other objects of belief, a man is not bound to believe explicitly but only implicitly or in the preparation of the mind, inasmuch as he is ready to believe whatever is contained in divine scripture". From these words it is clearly established that some things must be believed explicitly and others implicitly.
|[s 160] Secundo notandum est que sunt illa que sunt tenenda explicite. Circa quod dicendum est quod aliqua sunt credenda explicite ab omnibus Christianis de communi lege, quia omnes Christiani de communi lege ea credere tenentur explicite. Alia vero credenda non sunt explicite ab omnibus de necessitate sed ab aliquibus tantum.
| Second, it must be noted what those things are that must be held explicitly. About this it must be said that some things must be believed explicitly (in the common course of events) by all Christians, because (in the common course of events) all Christians are bound to believe them explicitly. But other things need not be believed explicitly as a matter of necessity by all but only by some.
|[s 161] Prima credenda explicite sunt illa que sunt apud omnes catholicos tamquam catholica divulgata, cuiusmodi sunt articuli fidei contenti in “Credo in deum patrem omnipotentem”. Illos enim articulos fidei omnes Christiani tenentur credere et addiscere. Preter quos eciam sunt nonnulla alia que omnes credere tenentur explicite, licet explicite in dictis articulis non contineantur — sicut quod anime reproborum in infernum descendunt, ubi graviter puniuntur; quod anime electorum que sunt in purgatorio erunt in celo; quod demones in inferno torquentur; quod sunt aliqui alii sancti et boni in celo; et similia — que ideo debet ecclesia catholica credere explicite quia sunt veritates catholice apud omnes catholicos tamquam catholice divulgate.
|The first things that must be believed explicitly are those that are published among all Catholics as being Catholic, such as the articles of faith contained in [the creed], "I believe in the father Almighty.". For all Christians are bound to believe and learn those articles of faith. Besides those there are also some others that all are bound to believe explicitly, though they are not contained explicitly in the articles of the creed, such as: that the souls of the wicked go down to hell where they are severely punished, that the souls of the elect which are in purgatory will be in heaven, that the Demons are tormented in hell, that there are in heaven some other saints and good persons, and the like, which the Catholic Church ought to believe explicitly for the reason that they are Catholic truths published among all Catholics as being Catholic.
|[s 162] Aliqua vero sunt credenda explicite non ab omnibus, quia non omnes catholici tenentur credere ea explicite, sed illi, scilicet, qui sciunt ipsa in scriptura divina aut in doctrina ecclesie contineri. Quia illi qui tenentur scire scripturam divinam et doctrinam ecclesie multa tenentur credere explicite ad quorum fidem explicitam alii non tenentur. Propter quod prelati, et maxime prelatus prelatorum, id est summus pontifex, multa tenentur credere explicite que alii non tenentur explicite credere. [s 163] Propter illos autem qui doctrine Thome adherent sunt verba eiusdem in hac materia recitanda. Ait itaque, 2a-2e, q. 2a, a. 6o, “Explicacio fidei oportet quod perveniat ad inferiores homines per maiores, et ideo, sicut superiores angeli, qui inferiores illuminant, habent pleniorem noticiam de rebus divinis quam inferiores, ut dicit Dionysius 12o c. Celestis Hierarchie, ita eciam superiores homines, ad quos pertinet alios erudire, tenentur habere pleniorem noticiam de credendis et magis explicite credere”. Ex hiis verbis patet quod de intencione istius doctoris est quod aliqui tenentur aliqua credere explicite ad quorum fidem explicitam alii non tenentur.
|Other things, however, must be believed explicitly not by all, because not all Catholics are bound to believe them explicitly, but those who know that they are contained in divine scripture or in the teaching of the Church. For those who are bound to know the divine scripture and the doctrine of the Church are bound to believe many things explicitly, to explicit faith in which others are not bound. For this reason prelates, and especially the prelate of prelates, that is, the supreme pontiff, are bound to believe many things explicitly that others are not bound to believe explicitly. And for the sake of those who adhere to the teaching of Thomas, his words in this matter must be reported. For he says, 2-2. q. 2, art. 6: "The explanation of the faith must come to inferior men through the greater, and therefore, just as the higher angels, who illuminate the inferior, have fuller knowledge of divine matters than the inferiors, as Dionysius says in Celestial Hierarchy c. 12, so also superior men, to whom it pertains to teach others, are bound to have fuller knowledge of things to be believed, and to believe more explicitly". From these words it is clear that it is this doctor's opinion that some are bound to believe some things explicitly, to explicit faith in which others are not bound.
|[s 164] Sed quereret forte aliquis, que sunt illa credenda explicite ab aliquibus et non ab omnibus? Ad quod potest responderi quod illa sunt in duplici differencia: quedam enim sunt que de necessitate spectant ad officium aliquorum, sicut qui habent officium predicacionis aliqua tenentur credere explicite ad que alii non tenentur; quedam vero sunt ab aliquibus credenda explicite, et non ab omnibus, quia ad aliquorum pervenit noticiam quod in scriptura divina aut doctrina universalis ecclesie explicite continentur, licet hoc ad noticiam omnium nequaquam pervenerit. [s 165] Sicut aliqui sciunt in sacris literis contineri quod Abraham habuit plures uxores, et quod Heliseus prophetavit post Heliam, et quod Christus fugit in Egyptum, et ideo illi tenentur explicite credere supradicta; aliqui autem ignorant hec in sacris literis reperiri, et illi non tenentur ea credere explicite sed implicite solum. Et sic loquendo de credendis explicite, potest contingere quod laicus tenetur aliquid explicite credere ad quod credendum explicite episcopus aliquis, eciam in theologia magister, minime tenetur: si enim laicus sciret in scriptura divina reperiri quod Amasias fuit filius Ioas, ipse teneretur hoc credere explicite; episcopus autem et magister in theologia, si non teneret in memoria quod hoc reperitur in scriptura divina, non teneretur pro tunc hoc credere explicite.
|But perhaps someone might ask, What are those things that must be believed explicitly by some and not by all? They can be answered that they are of two kinds: there are some which necessarily relate to an office some people have, for example those who have the office of preaching are bound to believe some things explicitly to which others are not bound; and other things are to be believed explicitly by some, and not by all, because it has come to the knowledge of some that they are explicitly contained in divine scripture or in the teaching of the universal Church, though this has not come to everyone's knowledge: for example some know that it is contained in sacred literature that Abraham had several wives [Genesis 25:1], and that Eliseus was a prophet after Elias [3 Kings 19:19], and that Christ fled into Egypt [Matthew 2:14], and therefore those persons are bound to believe those things explicitly; but others are ignorant that these things are to be found in sacred literature, and they are not bound to believe them explicitly but only implicitly. And speaking thus of things to be believed explicitly, it can happen that a lay person is bound to believe something explicitly while some bishop, and also a Master of theology, is not at all bound to believe it explicitly; for if the lay person knew that it is found in divine scripture that Amasias was the son of Joas [4 Kings 14:1], he would be bound to believe this explicitly, but the bishop and the master of theology, if he did not hold it in his memory that this is found in divine scripture, would not at that time be bound to believe it explicitly.
|[s 166] Isto igitur modo accipiendo credendum explicite ab aliquo, omne credibile potest esse credendum explicite ab aliquo. Quia nullum est credibile quin aliquis possit scire in scriptura divina vel doctrina ecclesie explicite vel implicite contineri; qui autem scit illud in scriptura divina sive explicite sive implicite contineri tenetur illud credere explicite; ideo, et cetera. Ex hoc sequitur quod aliquis tenetur uno tempore aliquid credere solum implicite, et alio tempore tenetur illud idem credere explicite. Et hoc quidem Thomas aperte insinuat, dicens: “Quantum ad aliqua credibilia, non tenetur homo explicite credere sed solum implicite vel in preparacione animi, inquantum paratus est credere quicquid in scriptura divina continetur. Sed tunc hoc solum tenetur explicite credere quando hoc ei constiterit in doctrina fidei contineri.” Hec allegacio fit pro illis qui tenent doctrinam Thome.
|In this [second] way, therefore, of taking the phrase "to be believed explicitly by someone", everything believable can be something that must be believed explicitly by someone. Because nothing is believable without its being possible for someone to know that it is contained explicitly or implicitly in divine scripture or in the teaching of the Church; and whoever knows that it is contained explicitly or implicitly in divine scripture is bound to believe it explicitly; therefore, etc. It follows from this that someone is bound at one time to believe something only implicitly and at another time is bound to believe that same thing explicitly. And Thomas indeed suggests this plainly when he says: "With respect to some objects of belief, a man is not bound to believe explicitly but only implicitly or in the preparation of the mind, inasmuch as he is ready to believe whatever is contained in divine scripture; but he is bound to believe this explicitly only when he is certain that it is contained in the teaching of the faith". This quotation is made for the sake of those who hold the teaching of Thomas.
notandum est quod heretici sunt in duplici differencia: quidam enim
sunt scientes heretici, et quidam sunt heretici nescientes. Illi sunt
scientes heretici qui sciunt se Christiane fidei obviare, sicut
apostate a fide, qui fidem Christianam arbitrantur falsam. Illi sunt
heretici nescientes qui putant se tenere fidem Christianam sed reputant
et tenent pertinaciter quandam fidem esse Christianam que in rei
veritate non est. Multi enim fuerunt heretici qui putabant se solos
catholicos et omnes alios eis contrarios a veritate catholica deviare.
Hec distinccio ex verbis beati Augustini que ponuntur 6a, q. 1a, c.
Quero, patenter accipitur. [s 168]
Ait enim: “Quero ergo quis peccet gravius, qui
nesciens heresim incurrit, an qui sciens ab avaricia, id est
recessit? Secundum illam regulam qua peccata sciencium peccatis
ignorancium preponuntur, avarus cum sciencia vincit in scelere. Sed si
forte hoc faciat in heresi sceleris ipsius magnitudo quod facit in
avaricia scientis admissio, hereticus nesciens avaro scienti
coequatur”; ubi dicit glossa super verbo
“Ille est ignorans hereticus qui sequitur opinionem quam
veriorem, ut 24a q. 3a c. Heresis”. Ex hiis patenter habetur
aliqui sunt scientes heretici et aliqui nescientes.
| Third, it must be noted that there are two kinds of heretics. For some are knowing heretics and some unknowing. Those are knowing heretics who know that they oppose the Christian faith, such as apostates from the faith, who judge that the Christian faith is false. Those are unknowing heretics who think that they hold the Christian faith but believe and hold pertinaciously that some faith is Christian which in truth of fact is not; for there have been many heretics who believed that they alone were Catholics and that all others contrary to them were deviating from Catholic truth. This distinction is taken clearly from the words of blessed Augustine, quoted 6, q. 1, c. Quaero. For he says, "I ask, therefore, who sins more seriously, he who falls into a heresy without knowing, or he who, knowing, does not step back from avarice, that is, idolatry? According to the rule by which the sins of those who know are greater than the sins of those in ignorance, the knowingly avaricious man conquers in crime. But if, perhaps, the magnitude of the crime itself does as much in heresy as the knower's admission in avarice, the unknowing heretic is equated with the knowingly avaricious man". Here the gloss says upon the word "unknowing", "He is ignorantly a heretic who follows an opinion that he believes to be more true, as in 24, q. 3, c. Haeresis. From these [words] it is established clearly that some are heretics knowingly and others unknowingly.
|[s 169] Quod eciam aperte probatur, quia Arius, Sabellius et alii plures dampnati fuerunt heretici; sed non fuerunt scientes heretici, quia scripture divine et doctrine apostolice et ecclesie universali putabant se firmiter adherere et in illa doctrina se fundare; igitur non fuerunt scientes heretici, quemadmodum apostate a fide scienter negant Christianam fidem et scripturam sacram, dicentes eam esse falsam et fictam. Fuerunt igitur predicti heretici nescientes, et nonnulli scientes.
|That is also openly proved, because Arius, Sabellius and many others were condemned as heretics; but they were not heretics knowingly, because they thought that they adhered firmly to divine scripture and to apostolic teaching and to the univeral church and that they based themselves upon that teaching; therefore they were not heretics knowingly, in the way apostates from the faith knowingly deny the Christian faith and the holy scripture, saying that it is false and fictitious. There were, therefore, the above unknowing heretics, and some who were knowing.
|[s 170] Quarto notandum est quod errantes contra fidem Christianam oberrant ipso facto, et hoc contingit dupliciter: quia aut errant contra veritatem quam tenentur explicite credere, sicut si quis assereret Christum non fuisse mortuum, putans hoc ad fidem Christianam minime pertinere; quidam autem errant contra veritatem quam non tenentur credere explicite, sicut si aliquis putat Christum non fugisse in Egyptum. Et hoc quidem adhuc contingit dupliciter, quia quidam errant pertinaciter nec parati sunt corrigi, quidam vero errant sed parati sunt corrigi. Ista quatuor predicta possunt per exempla aperta probari, sed videtur quod probacione non egent. [s 171] Primi autem errantes sunt heretici manifesti, et similiter secundi, et tercii, sed non quarti, quod per multas raciones et auctoritates apertas posset ostendi, sed causa brevitatis unica auctoritas adducetur, qua quatuor predicta probantur.
| Fourth, it must be noted that those who err against Christian faith by that fact wander away from it. This happens in two ways, because either  they err against a truth they are bound to believe explicitly, as if someone asserted that Christ did not die, thinking that this does not at all pertain to the Christian faith; and  some err against a truth they are not bound to believe explicitly, as when someone thinks that Christ did not flee into Egypt. And again this happens in two ways, because  some err pertinaciously and are not ready to be corrected, and  some err but are ready to be corrected. These four divisions can be proved by clear examples, but it seems that they need no proof. And the first kind of persons in error are manifest heretics, and likewise the second and third, but not the fourth. This could be shown by many clear arguments and authorities, but for the sake of brevity a single authority will be quoted, by which the above four are proved.
|Est autem auctoritas Augustini, que ponitur 24a q. 3a c. Dixit Apostolus, qui ait: “Qui sentenciam suam, quamvis perversam aut falsam, nulla pertinaci animositate defendunt, presertim quam non audacia sue presumpcionis pepererunt sed a seductis atque in errorem lapsis parentibus acceperunt, querunt autem cauta sollicitudine veritatem, corrigi parati cum invenerint, nequaquam sunt inter hereticos reputandi.” [s 172] Ex hiis verbis patenter infertur quod scientes errantes contra Christianam fidem sunt heretici reputandi. Quia secundum verba premissa errans contra fidem qui non est paratus corrigi est hereticus; sed hereticans scienter contra fidem non est paratus corrigi. Quia errans contra fidem debet corrigi per regulam fidei Christiane; qui ergo regulam fidei putat falsam non est paratus corrigi; igitur est inter hereticos computandus.
|It is a text of Augustine, which is quoted in 24, q. 3, c. Dixit Apostolus. He says: "Those who defend their opinion, though perverse or false, with no pertinacious animosity---especially one that they did not bring forth by the audacity of their own presumption, but accepted from elders seduced and fallen into error---and seek the truth with careful solicitude, ready to be corrected when they find it, are by no means to be counted among the heretics". These words clearly imply that those who knowingly err against the Christian faith are to be regarded as heretics. For according to the above words one who errs against faith and is not ready to be corrected is a heretic; but one who is a heretic knowingly against the faith is not ready to be corrected, because one erring against faith ought to be corrected by the rule of the Christian faith; therefore whoever regards the rule of faith as false is not ready to be corrected; therefore he is to be counted among the heretics.
|[s 173] Secundo, ex verbis predictis concluditur quod errans contra veritatem catholicam quam tenetur explicite credere est hereticus censendus, quia talis non querit cauta sollicitudine veritatem nec paratus est corrigi. Constat enim quod iste qui non credit hoc quod credere debet non solum implicite sed explicite de necessitate salutis non querit cauta sollicitudine veritatem, nec paratus est corrigi; igitur est inter hereticos numerandus, secundum auctoritatem Augustini predictam.
|Second, it is proved by the above words that one who errs against a Catholic truth that he is bound to believe explicitly must be regarded as a heretic, for such a person does not seek the truth with careful solicitude and is not ready to be corrected. For it is certain that anyone who does not believe what he ought to believe not only implicitly but explicitly, by necessity of salvation, does not seek truth with careful solicitude and is not ready to be corrected; therefore he is to be numbered among the heretics, according to Augustine's text above.
|[s 174] Tercio,
ex auctoritate prescripta evidenter ostenditur quod errans pertinaciter
contra veritatem catholicam quam non tenetur explicite credere est
hereticorum numero aggregandus. Nam errans pertinaciter contra
veritatem catholicam quam non tenetur explicite credere, defendens
eciam pertinaci animositate falsam et iniquam sentenciam comprobatur
sentenciam falsam contrariam veritati
quam non tenetur explicite credere propter solam pertinaciam et
propter defensionem inter hereticos numeratur). Sed defendens
pertinaci animositate falsam et iniquam sentenciam secundum Augustinum
inter hereticos computatur. Igitur errans pertinaciter contra veritatem
catholicam quam non explicite tenetur credere hereticus est
|Third, it is evidently shown from the above text that one who errs pertinaciously against a Catholic truth that he is not bound to believe explicitly is to be counted among the number of heretics. For one who errs pertinaciously against a Catholic truth he is not bound to believe explicitly is proved also to be one who defends with pertinacious animosity a false and wicked opinion (for one who pertinaciously defends a false opinion contrary to a truth that he is not bound to believe explicitly is counted among heretics because of his pertinacity alone and not because of his defence). But one who defends with pertinacious animosity a false and wicked opinion is counted among heretics, according to Augustine. Therefore one who errs pertinaciously against a Catholic faith that he is not bound to believe explicitly must be regarded as a heretic.
|[s 175] Quarto, ex auctoritate supra dicta infertur quod errans non pertinaciter contra veritatem catholicam quam non tenetur credere explicite non est inter hereticos computandus. Quia talem dicit Augustinus inter hereticos minime computandum: talis enim paratus est corrigi per regulam fidei Christiane, et ideo non errat scienter contra fidem; querit eciam cauta sollicitudine veritatem, et ideo non contra aliquod quod teneatur credere explicite errat; quia eciam paratus est corrigi, non errat pertinaciter, sed ex sola simplicitate vel ignorancia errat, et ideo non est inter hereticos computandus.
|Fourth, it is inferred from the above text that one who errs, but not pertinaciously, against a Catholic truth he is not bound to believe explicitly is not to be counted among the heretics. For Augustine says that such a person is by no means to be counted among heretics, since such a person is ready to be corrected by the rule of Christian faith and therefore does not err knowingly against faith; also he seeks the truth with careful solicitude and therefore does not err against something he is bound to believe explicitly; also, because he is ready to be corrected, he does not err pertinaciously, but errs from simplicity alone, or ignorance; and therefore he is not to be counted among the heretics. [[This paragraph seems faulty]]
|[s 176]Quinto, notandum est quod non solum per verba, predicaciones, dogmatizaciones, determinaciones, diffiniciones, asserciones verbales errantes contra fidem de pertinacia convincuntur, verum eciam per facta et opera sepe pertinaces probantur. Ille enim qui presumpcione violenta potest convinci negare aliquam veritatem catholicam quam prius agnovit esse catholicam est pertinax reputandus. Item, iste qui correctus legitime se non emendat; [s 177] item, ille qui molestat vel persequitur catholicam veritatem contrariam defendentes et pravitatem hereticam impugnantes, item ille qui recusat se subicere correccioni et emendacioni illius vel illorum cuius vel quorum interest, item ille qui de veritate penituit informari, item ille qui ad suum tenendum errorem alios premiis, penis vel preceptis aut iuramentis commovet et cogit, item qui cogit alium veritatem catholicam abiurare — est pertinax reputandus. Hiis enim modis aliisque quampluribus est errans de pertinacia convincendus et inter hereticos computandus.
| Fifth, it must be noted that not only are those who err against the faith convicted of pertinacity by their words, their preaching, their teaching, their determinations, definitions and verbal assertions, but often they are proved to be pertinacious also by deeds and works. For he who can by a violent presumption be convicted of denying some Catholic truth that previously he acknowledged to be Catholic must be regarded as pertinacious. Also, he who having been lawfully corrected does not amend himself, also he who molests or persecutes those who defend the contrary Catholic truth and attack heretical wickedness, also he who refuses to subject himself to the correction and emendation of him or of those whom it concerns, also he who regrets being informed of the truth, also he who moves and compels others by rewards, penalties, precepts or oaths to hold his error, also he compels another to forswear the Catholic truth --- must be regarded as pertinacious. For in these ways and in many others is a person in error to be convicted of pertinacity and counted among the heretics.
|[s 178]Sexto, notandum est quod differencia est inter protestacionem et revocacionem. Protestacionem enim, quantum ad propositum spectat, potest facere tam ille qui errat quam ille qui non errat contra fidem. Errans enim contra fidem protestatur quod non intendit aliquid dicere contra fidem, et talis protestacio, si est vera, declarat protestantem non errare vel non dicere aliquid scienter contra fidem, et in hoc ostendit quod non est scienter hereticus; sed non suffragatur sibi quin possit esse nesciens hereticus. Non errans eciam contra fidem protestatur, per hoc ostendens quod, si erraret, non erraret nisi ex simplicitate vel ignorancia, non ex pertinacia. [s 179] Revocacio autem non pertinet nisi ad errantem tantummodo; qui enim non errat, non debet aliquid revocare. Sed qui errat contra fidem, cum cognoverit se errasse, tunc debet facere tam revocacionem quam protestacionem, quia debet fateri se errasse et debet promittere quod de cetero contra fidem nequaquam errabit.
| Sixth, it must be noted that there is a difference between protestation and revocation. For a protestation (as it relates to the present matter) can be made both by one who errs and by one who does not err against the faith. For one who errs against the faith protests that he does not intend to say anything against the faith, and such a protestation, if it is true, makes clear that the person making it does not knowingly err or say anything against the faith; and in this he shows that he is not knowingly a heretic, but it does not benefit him to the extent that he cannot be a heretic unknowingly. One who does not err against faith also makes a protestation, showing by this that if he were to err, he would err only from simplicity or ignorance, not from pertinacity. However, a revocation pertains only to one who errs; for one who does not err should not revoke anything, but when one who errs against the faith learns that he has erred, he should then make both a revocation and a protestation, because he ought to confess that he has erred and he ought to promise that from now on he will by no means err against the faith.
|[s 180]Septimo, notandum est quod revocacio quam facit errans contra fidem non debet esse condicionalis, sed debet esse pura et absque omni condicione. Sicut enim penitencia de peccato commisso non debet esse condicionalis sed sine condicione, ita non debet quis errans revocare errorem suum sub condicione sed absolute. Videtur quod aliqui errantes contra fidem, et eciam aliqui non errantes, ex consuetudine revocant aliqua sub condicione, dicentes, “Si aliquid dixi vel dixero contra fidem, revoco totum”. Talis revocacio magis dicenda est protestacio quam revocacio; talis enim non fatetur se errasse, sed fatetur quod non dixit vel dicet scienter aliquid contra fidem et quod, si sciverit se dixisse aliquid contra fidem, paratus est revocare. Magna autem differencia est inter revocacionem et protestacionem si sciret aliquid dicere contra fidem revocare Talis enim non revocat, sed protestatur se paratum revocare si se cognoverit contra fidem errasse vel errare.
| Seventh, it must be noted that a revocation made by a person in error against the faith should not be conditional but ought to be pure and unconditional. For just as repentance for a sin committed should not be conditional but unconditional, so one who errs should not revoke his error under a condition but absolutely. It seems that some who err against faith, and also some who do not err, are accustomed to revoke certain things subject to a condition, saying, "If I have said or do say anything against the faith, I revoke the whole". Such a revocation should be called a protestation rather than a revocation; for such a person does not say that he has erred, but says that he did not or will not say anything against the truth knowingly, and that if he learns that he said anything against the faith, he is ready to revoke. However, there is a great difference between revocation and protestation, if he knows that he has said something against the faith to revoke For such a person does not revoke, but protests that he is ready to revoke, if he learns that he has erred or does err against the faith.
|[Arguments for theses: 1. His words do not exuse him]
|[s 181]Hiis visis probanda sunt tria que in principio huius capituli premissa fuerunt, quorum primum est quod inventor heresis sepe dicte (scilicet quod anime sanctorum in celo non videbunt clare deum ante diem iudicii) non potest per verba que hic dixit aliqualiter excusari quin fuerit et adhuc sit hereticus. Quod probatur sic: Per verba communia catholicis et hereticis obduratis ac perfidis non potest tenens heresim contrariam veritati catholice quam tenetur credere explicite excusari quin fuerit et adhuc sit hereticus. [s 182] Quia heretici verba talia communia catholicis et hereticis proferentes morem simie imitantur, que, cum sit expers penitus racionis, in quibusdam gestibus et actibus sequi animal racionale conatur, licet non sit (1a q. 1a, Si quis inquit). Heretici cum sint a fide catholica alieni, in quibusdam verbis catholicos imitantur, sed frustra, quia per verba talia minime excusantur. Sed verba predicta que iste profert sunt communia catholicis et hereticis obduratis et perfidis. Dicunt enim catholici, dicunt et omnes nescientes heretici, quantumcumque obdurati et perfidi, quod non est intencionis eorum aliquid dicere contra fidem et, si aliquid dixerint, revocant totum. [s 183] Talem enim protestacionem et revocacionem, que magis dicenda est protestacio quam revocacio, omnes Sabelliani, omnes Arriani, omnes Donatiste, omnes Greci et ceteri heretici universi (qui alios sibi contrarios reputabant hereticos et se catholicos) saltem protestati fuissent: qui tamen per talem protestacionem nullatenus excusati fuissent. Igitur cum iste teneat heresim contrariam veritati quam tenetur credere explicite, per verba huiusmodi minime excusatur quin fuerit et adhuc sit hereticus.
|Now that these things have been seen, the three points proposed at the beginning of this chapter must be proved. The first is that the inventor of the often mentioned heresy (namely that the souls of the saints in heaven will not see God clearly before the day of judgment) cannot in any way be excused by the words he has said here so that he has not been and is not now a heretic. This is proved as follows. One holding a heresy contrary to a Catholic truth he is bound to believe explicitly cannot be excused so that he has not been and is not now a heretic by words that are common to Catholics and to obdurate and faithless heretics. For heretics uttering such words common to Catholics and heretics imitate the way of an ape, which, while utterly without reason, in certain gestures and actions tries to follow a rational animal, though it is not one (1, q. 1, Si quis inquit[c. 70]). Thus those who are heretics, although they are alienated from the faith, imitate Catholics in certain words, but in vain, because they are not at all excused by such words. But the foregoing words which this man utters are common to Catholics and obdurate and faithless heretics. For Catholics say, and also all unknowing heretics, however obdurate and faithless, say, that it is not their intention to say anything against the faith, and if they have said anything, they revoke the whole. For such a protestation and revocation, which must rather be called a protestation than a revocation, all Sabellians, all Arians, all Donatists, all Greeks, and all the rest of the heretics, who regarded others opposed to them as heretics and regarded themselves as Catholics, would at least have made protestation; yet they would not at all have been excused by such a protestation. Therefore, since this man holds a heresy contrary to a truth he is bound to believe explicitly, he is not at all excused by such words so that he has not been and is not now a heretic.
|[s 184] Et si dicatur quod per illam racionem nullus errans contra fidem per talem protestacionem excusaretur quin esset hereticus (cum talis protestacio sit communis catholicis et multis hereticis, quia omnibus hereticis qui sunt nescientes heretici), secundum quod tenens aut predicans heresim contrariam veritati catholice: probabiliter potest dici quod nullus errans pertinaciter apud deum per talem protestacionem poterit excusari, licet apud ecclesiam, que decipi potest, possit errans contra veritatem catholicam quam non tenetur credere explicite excusari si per alium modum de pertinacia convinci non possit — et tunc quidem non excusatur solummodo per protestacionem huiusmodi, sed simul per talem protestacionem et defectum probacionis per alium modum de pertinacia convincendi. [s 185] Sed qui tenet, docet, aut predicat heresim contrariam veritati catholice quam tenetur credere explicite, et hoc ipse scit, constat quod de heretica pravitate convincitur, et ideo talis per protestacionem huiusmodi nullo modo poterit excusari.
|And if it is said that by that argument no such protestation would excuse anyone erring against the faith so that he was not a heretic (since such a protestation is common to Catholics and to many heretics, because to all heretics who are heretics unknowingly), as holding or preaching a heresy contrary to Catholic faith, it can probably be said that no one who errs pertinaciously can be excused by such a protestation before God, though before the Church, which can be deceived, a person erring against a Catholic truth he is not bound to believe explicitly can be excused, if he cannot be convicted of pertinacity in another way---and then indeed he is not excused by such protestation alone, but at once by the protestation and the lack of any other kind of proof to convict him of pertinacity. But someone who holds, teaches, or preaches a heresy contrary to a Catholic truth that he is bound to believe explicitly, and knows that he does this, is certainly convicted of heretical wickedness, and therefore such a person can in no way be excused by such a protestation.
Dicunt igitur quod ista duo sunt probanda. Primum est quod iste, qui
et predicat heresim contrariam veritati quam tenetur credere explicite
statim, absque maiori inquisicione vel examinacione, est hereticus
iudicandus. Secundum quod licet talis possit converti ad catholicam
veritatem, tamen nullo modo, nec per protestacionem predictam nec alio
modo quocumque, poterit excusari quin fuerit hereticus.
|They [John's critics] say, therefore, that these two points must be proved: first, that this man, who holds and preaches a heresy contrary to a truth he is bound to believe explicitly, must be judged a heretic immediately without further inquiry or examination; second, that though such a person can be converted to Catholic truth, nevertheless he can in no way---by the aforesaid protestation or in any other way whatever---be excused so that he has not been a heretic.
|[s 187] Primum aperte probatur sic. Illa veritas catholica que est apud omnes catholicos tamquam catholica divulgata est ab omnibus credenda explicite; hoc ex notabili secundo supra scripto colligitur evidenter. Sed hec, "Anime sanctorum in celo clare vident deum", postquam iste ad papatum fuit assumptus et ante, fuit apud omnes catholicos tamquam catholica divulgata, quia diu postquam iste papatui presidebat nullus catholicus eam in dubium revocavit. Igitur tenebatur et tenetur eam credere explicite, sicut illam, “Christus fuit passus”. Ex quo sequitur quod iste tenet et predicat heresim contrariam veritati quam tenetur credere explicite. Ideo statim, sine maiori inquisicione vel examinacione, hereticus est iudicandus. Hoc enim ex quarto notabili suprascripto colligitur evidenter; ibi enim probatum est quod omnis talis errans est hereticus manifestus, et ideo quando constat quod talis errat, est hereticus reputandus.
|The first is plainly proved as follows. A Catholic truth that has been published among all Catholics as Catholic must be believed explicitly by all. We gather this evidently from the second notable point written above. But this truth, "The souls of the saints in heaven clearly see God", has been published among all Catholics as being Catholic since this man became Pope and before, since long after he became Pope no Catholic called it into doubt. Therefore he was bound and is bound to believe it explicitly, just like the [truth] that Christ suffered. From this it follows that he holds and preaches a heresy contrary to a truth he is obliged to believe explicitly. Therefore immediately, without further inquiry or examination, he must be judged a heretic. For we gather this evidently from the fourth notable point above; for it was there proved that every such erring person is a manifest heretic, and therefore when it is certain that such person errs, he must be regarded as a heretic.
|[s 188] Hoc eciam aliter consimiliter probatur. Qui teneret et doceret Christum non fuisse passum et mortuum, ideo esset statim hereticus reputandus quia apud omnes catholicos tamquam catholicum divulgatur quod Christus fuit passus et mortuus. Igitur quicumque negat veritatem catholicam que apud omnes tamquam catholica divulgatur est hereticus reputandus. Nec est de tali querendum an paratus sit corrigi vel non sit paratus corrigi, an protestetur vel non protestetur, sed statim est hereticus reputandus. Aliter enim inter errantes contra illa que tenentur credere explicite et inter errantes contra illa que non tenentur credere explicite differencia assignari nequiret.
|It is also proved likewise in another way. He who held and taught that Christ did not suffer and die would be immediately regarded as a heretic, for the reason that it is published among all Catholics as Catholic that Christ suffered and died; therefore whoever denies a truth that is published as being Catholic among everyone must be regarded as a heretic. And concerning such a person it must not be asked whether he is ready to be corrected or not ready to be corrected, whether he protests or does not protest, but he must be regarded immediately as a heretic. For otherwise no difference could be assigned between those who err against what they are bound to believe explicitly and those who err against what they are not bound to believe explicitly.
Item, errans contra fidem, si debet de pravitate heretica excusari,
oportet quod per ignoranciam excusetur. Errans igitur contra fidem qui
laborat ignorancia que non excusat nisi probetur, antequam probetur non
debet per ignoranciam excusari. Sed qui errat contra veritatem que apud
omnes catholicos est tamquam catholica divulgata vel ignorat
esse apud omnes tamquam catholicam divulgatam vel
laborat ignorancia que ipsum apud ecclesiam non excusat nisi
ignoranciam talem probaverit, quia secundum sanctos canones, illa que
publice fiunt nemini licet ignorare, et si talem ignoranciam
allegaverit, ipsam probabit (9a, q. 1a, Ordinaciones, in textu et in
glossa). [s 190]
Igitur qui negat catholicam veritatem communiter apud catholicos
divulgatam, si protestando qualitercumque se voluerit per ignoranciam
de pravitate heretica excusare, oportet quod ignoranciam huiusmodi
probet. Unde si iste posset probare legitime quod numquam audivit
aliquem catholicum predicare, tenere, docere vel asserere animas
sanctorum in celo videre deum, posset de pravitate heretica excusari,
sed aliter non — sicut eciam si quis negans Christum fuisse
passum per protestacionem huiusmodi (scilicet quod non intenderet
aliquid dicere contra fidem, et si diceret, totum revocaret) de
pravitate heretica excusaretur, nisi per alium modum de pertinacia
|Again, one who errs against faith, if he should be excused of heretical wickedness, ought to be excused by ignorance. Therefore anyone erring against the faith who labours under an ignorance that does not excuse unless it is proved should not be excused by ignorance before it is proved. But he who errs against a truth published among all Catholics as Catholic either does not know that this truth has been published among all as Catholic or labours under an ignorance that does not excuse him before the Church unless he proves that ignorance, for according to the holy canons no one is permitted not to know things done publicly, and if he alleges such ignorance, he will prove it (9, q. 1, Ordinationes, in the text and in the gloss [s.v. nisi probare, col. 866]). Therefore he who denies a Catholic truth commonly published among Catholics, if by protesting he wishes in any way to excuse himself of heretical wickedness by ignorance, ought to prove that ignorance. Thus, if this man could prove lawfully that he never heard any Catholic preach, hold, teach, or assert that the souls of the saints in heaven see God, he could be excused of heretical wickedness, but otherwise not --- just as by such a protestation (namely that he did not intend to say anything against the faith, and if he did he revoked the whole) someone denying that Christ suffered would also [if he could prove that he had never heard any Catholic preach that Christ had suffered] be excused of heretical wickedness, unless in some other way he were convicted of pertinacity.
|[s 191] Sic ergo pro prolixitate vitanda probatum est unica racione quod per sacros canones asserentes quod nulli licet ignorare ea que publice fiunt, geruntur, et tenentur posset multipliciter confirmari quod inventor heresis sepe fate, per illam protestacionem quam facit, nullo modo potest excusari quin fuerit et adhuc sit hereticus.
|Thus, therefore, it has been proved by one argument, to avoid prolixity, that through sacred canons asserting that no one is permitted not to know things that are done, carried on and held publicly it could be confirmed in many ways that the inventor of the often mentioned heresy can not, by the protestation he makes, in any way be excused so that he was not and is not still a heretic.
|[2. Even if he is converted, he was a heretic]
|[s 192] Secundum autem probandum est quod, licet possit converti ad catholicam veritatem, tamen nullo modo — nec per protestacionem predictam nec alio modo quocumque — poterit excusari quin fuerit hereticus. Quod breviter sic probatur. Qui in rei veritate est hereticus, licet possit converti, tamen nullo modo poterit excusari quin fuerit malus. Sed iste fuit hereticus, igitur, licet possit converti ad catholicam fidem, tamen non excusari poterit quin fuerit hereticus.
|And second it must be proved that although he can be converted to the Catholic truth, nevertheless in no way -- either by the above protestation or in any other way whatever -- can he be excused so that he was not a heretic. This is proved briefly as follows. One who in truth of fact is a heretic, though he could be converted, nevertheless in no way can be excused so that he was not wicked; but this man was a heretic; therefore, though he can be converted to the Catholic faith, nevertheless he cannot be excused so that he has not been heretic.
|[s 193] Maior est manifesta. Minor probatur primo per predicta, quia predicavit et docuit heresim contrariam veritati catholice quam tenetur credere explicite, igitur fuit hereticus.
|The major is manifest. The minor is proved, first, by the above, because he preached and taught a heresy contrary to a Catholic truth that he is bound to believe explicitly; therefore he was a heretic.
|[s 194] Secundo probatur sic. Sicut patet ex quinto notabili, errans contra catholicam veritatem non solum convincitur per verba que asserit sed eciam per facta et opera; et ideo ad convincendum istum de pertinacia et heretica pravitate non solum attendenda sunt verba ipsius, sed simul cum verbis consideranda sunt opera eius per que aliquis de pertinacia convincitur manifeste.
|It is proved secondly as follows. As is clear from the fifth notable point, one who errs against Catholic truth is convicted not only through the words he asserts, but also by his deeds and works; and therefore to convict this man of pertinacity and heretical wickedness one must notice not only his words, but together with the words one must consider the works through which a person is manifestly convicted of pertinacity.
|[s 195] Preterea sic. Errans contra fidem qui predicantes, docentes, vel defendentes aut tenentes catholicam veritatem, et impugnantes hereticam pravitatem, persequitur et molestat est hereticus iudicandus, sicut tactum est in quinto notabili suprascripto. Sed iste predicantes et tenentes catholicam veritatem, scilicet quod anime sanctorum in celo vident deum, et impugnantes contrariam hereticam pravitatem, persequitur et molestat. Igitur hereticus est censendus.
|Again as follows. One who errs against the faith and persecutes and molests those who preach, teach, defend or hold Catholic truth and those who attack heretical wickedness, must be judged a heretic, as has been touched on in the fifth notable point above. But this man persecutes and molests those who preach and hold a Catholic truth, namely that the souls of the saints in heaven see God, and those who attack the contrary heretical wickedness; therefore he must be considered a heretic.
|[s 196]Maior istius racionis est manifesta, que tamen multis modis ostenditur, primo sic. Reprobi circa fidem sunt heretici reputandi. Qui autem predicantes veritatem catholicam et pravitatem hereticam impugnantes persequitur et molestat est reprobus circa fidem: quia dampnabiliter veritati resistit; qui autem dampnabiliter veritati resistunt sunt reprobi circa fidem, teste Apostolo, qui 2a ad Timotheum 3o, ait, “Quemadmodum autem Iannes et Mambres restiterunt Moysi, ita et hii resistunt veritati, homines corrupti mente, reprobi circa fidem”; et per consequens sunt heretici iudicandi.
|The major of this argument is manifest; however, it is shown in many ways, first as follows. Those who are "wicked concerning the faith" must be regarded as heretics; but one who persecutes and molests preachers of Catholic truth and attackers of heretical wickedness is wicked concerning the faith. Because he damnably resists the truth; but those who damnably resist the truth are wicked concerning the faith, as the Apostle testifies, who says, 2 Timothy 3[:8]: "And just as Iannes and Mambres resisted Moses, so also these resist the truth, men corrupt in mind, wicked concerning the faith"; and consequently they are to be judged heretics.
|[s 197] Secundo sic. Errans contra fidem qui persequitur et molestat veritatem catholicam confitentes et pravitatem hereticam impugnantes non querit cauta sollicitudine veritatem, nec paratus est corrigi. Talis autem est hereticus manifestus, secundum Augustinum, ut habetur 24a, q. 3a, Dixit Apostolus. Igitur tales persequentes veritatem catholicam confitentes sunt heretici manifesti.
|Second as follows. One erring against the faith who persecutes and molests those who confess Catholic truth and attack heretical wickedness does not seek the truth with careful solicitude and is not ready to be corrected; such a person, however, is a manifest heretic, according to Augustine, reported 24, q. 3, Dixit Apostolus. Therefore such persons persecuting those who confess Catholic truth are manifest heretics.
|[s 198] Item sic. Gravius peccat et delinquit qui veritatem catholicam predicantes impugnat quam qui tales non recipiunt. Sed qui non recipiunt predicatores catholice veritatis peccant mortaliter, testante ipsa veritate, Matthei 10o, que ait: “Quicumque non receperit vos vel audierit sermones vestros, exeuntes foras de domo vel civitate excutite pulverem de pedibus vestris. Amen dico vobis, tollerabilius erit terre Sodomorum et Gomorrheorum in die iudicii quam illi civitati”. Igitur gravius, vel non minus, peccant qui ideo alios persequuntur vel molestant quia catholicam tenent vel predicant veritatem et pravitatem impugnant hereticam. Sed peccatum tale et tam grave non est sine pertinacia. Igitur tales sunt pertinaces, et per consequens heretici sunt censendi.
|Again as follows. One who attacks those who are preaching Catholic truth sins and is at fault more seriously than those who do not receive such preachers; but those who do not receive preachers of catholic truth sin mortally, as truth himself testifies. In Matthew chapter 10[:14-15], he says: "Whoever does not receive you or hear your words, going outside their house or city, shake the dust from your feet. Amen, I say to you, it will be more bearable for the lands of Sodom and Gomorrha on the day of judgment than for that city". Therefore those who persecute or molest others for the reason that they hold or preach Catholic truth and attack heretical wickedness sin more seriously, or not less. But such a grave sin does not exist without pertinacity. Therefore such persons are pertinacious, and consequently must be regarded as heretics.
|[s 199] Sic igitur probata est maior, quod errans contra fidem qui predicantes et asserentes catholicam veritatem aut impugnantes hereticam pravitatem persequitur et molestat est hereticus iudicandus. Minor autem, quod iste predicantes et tenentes animas sanctorum in celo videre deum et impugnantes contrariam hereticam pravitatem persequitur et molestat, per opera eius aperte probatur: primo, quia ideo, ut fertur, quemdam predicatorem in theologia magistrum carceri mancipavit; [s 200] secundo, quia, ut dicitur, volentes predicare veritatem catholicam privavit sermonibus consuetis; tercio, quia, ut narratur, quosdam amicos suos suadentes sibi veritatem predictam male portavit; quarto, quia, sicut fertur, scripta defendencium veritatem predictam conatur pervertere et eripere eos in verbis, ut sic cogat eos a veritate consona cessare. Ista et multa alia que dicitur fecisse in defensores veritatis catholice consistunt in facto, et ideo non per racionem vel auctoritatem sed per testes et alia documenta legitima sunt probanda.
|Thus therefore the major has been proved, that one erring against the faith who persecutes and molests preachers and asserters of Catholic truth or those who attack heretical wickedness must be judged to be a heretic. And the minor -- that this man does persecute and molest those who preach and hold that the souls of the saints in heaven see God and those who attack the contrary heretical wickedness -- is proved plainly by his works. First, because for that reason, it is reported, he subjected a certain preacher, a Master of Theology, to imprisonment. Second because, as it is said, he deprived of their accustomed sermons those wishing to preach Catholic truth. Third because, as is reported, he reacted badly to certain friends of his persuading him to the aforesaid truth. Fourth because, as is reported, he tries to twist the writings of those who defend the aforesaid truth and catch them out in their words, so that in that way he compels them to abandon the harmonious truth. These things and many others that he is said to have done to the defenders of Catholic truth are matters of fact, and therefore they should be proved not by argument or by authority but by witnesses and other lawful evidence.
|[s 201] Secundo, per opera eius ostenditur quod est hereticus manifestus. Nam errans contra fidem qui in favorem sui erroris reprobos et malignos promovet et exaltat hereticus est censendus, quia talis non est paratus corrigi, et per consequens est hereticus reputandus. Sed inventor heresis sepe dicte in favorem erroris sui hereticos, reprobos et malignos, ut refertur, promovet et exaltat; igitur hereticus est censendus. Maior est manifesta. Minor in facto consistit, et ideo per legitima documenta est probanda.
|Second it is shown by his works that he is a manifest heretic, for one who errs against the faith and, in favour of his error, promotes and elevates wicked and malignant people must be considered a heretic, for such a person is not ready to be corrected and consequently must be regarded as a heretic. But the inventor of the often mentioned heresy, it is reported, in favour of his error, promotes and elevates heretics, wicked and malignant people; therefore he must be considered a heretic. The major is manifest. The minor is a matter of fact, and therefore must be proved by legitimate evidence.
|[s 202] Ex dictis aperte colligitur quod secundo promittebatur probandum in principio istius capituli: quod, scilicet, licet assertor heresis antedicte possit converti ad catholicam veritatem, tamen nullo modo poterit excusari quin fuerit hereticus.
|From what has been said we gather clearly what secondly was promised to be proved at the beginning of this chapter, namely that, although the assertor of the aforementioned heresy can be converted to Catholic truth, yet in no way can be excused so that he has not been a heretic.
|[3. What sort of revocation he must make]
|[s 203]Tercio principaliter est dicendum qualem revocacionem ipsum oportet facere si velit inter catholicos reputari, que scilicet declaret ipsum non esse hereticum (licet per nullam revocacionem poterit declarare se non fuisse hereticum). Ad cuius evidenciam est sciendum quod errantes primo modo, secundo et tercio, de quibus dictum est in quarto notabili, ad hoc quod debeant catholici reputari, necesse est quod simpliciter et absolute sine omni condicione (sicut dictum est in quinto notabili) revocent suum errorem et fateantur se errasse. [s 204] Errantes autem quarto modo, de quo dictum est in quinto notabili quarto prescripto, si cognoverint se errasse, per puram revocacionem absque omni condicione ad hoc quod pro catholicis habeantur satisfacere restringuntur. Si autem aliquis erraverit quarto modo, non tenetur aliquid revocare proprie loquendo, sicut ante dictum est in sexto notabili, sed sufficit sibi facere protestacionem, nisi per alia verba eius aut opera possit de pertinaci animositate convinci.
|Third (in the main series) we must say what sort of revocation he ought to make if he wishes to be regarded as a Catholic, namely such as would declare that he is not a heretic (though by no revocation can he show that he has not been heretic). To make this clear it must be known that those who err in the first, second and third ways mentioned in the fourth of the notable points above, must, in order to be regarded as Catholics, simply and absolutely without any condition (as was said in the fifth of the notable points [rather, in the seventh]) revoke their error and confess that they have erred. However, those who err in the fourth way spoken of in the fifth notable point previously written fourth above, if they learn that they have erred, are constrained to make satisfaction by a pure revocation without any condition, in order to be regarded as Catholics. However, if someone has erred in the fourth way, he is not obliged to revoke anything (in the proper sense of "revoke"), as was said before in the sixth notable point, but it is enough for him to make a protestation, unless he can be convicted of pertinacious animosity by his other words or works.
|[s 205]Ex istis duo liquide constant. Primum est quod omnes heretici, sive sint scientes heretici sive nescientes heretici (de quorum differencia dictum est in tercio notabili suprascripto), et omnes eciam catholici qui sciunt se ex ignorancia vel simplicitate contra fidem errasse, ad hoc quod pro catholicis habeantur, tenentur errorem suum pure et absolute et simpliciter sine omni condicione, notificacione et palliacione revocare et se errasse fateri. [s 206] Secundum est quod catholicus errans ex sola simplicitate non tenetur aliquem errorem revocare, sed si nichil habetur contra ipsum nisi quod talem errorem tenuit absque omni pertinacia opinando antequam sibi constiterit quod erravit, sufficit quod protestetur se ex intencione nichil dixisse contra fidem et quod paratus est revocare, si cognoverit se errasse.
|From these things two points are clear and certain. The first is that all heretics, whether they are heretics knowingly or unknowingly (their difference has been spoken of in the third notable point above) and also all Catholics who know that they have erred against faith from ignorance or simplicity, to be regarded as Catholics, are bound to revoke their error purely and absolutely and simply without any condition, comment or excuse, and to confess that they have erred. The second is that a Catholic who errs from simplicity alone is not bound to revoke any error, but if there is nothing against him except that he held such an error without any pertinacious opining before it was certain to him that he erred, it is enough that he should protest that he said nothing against the faith deliberately, and that he is ready to revoke if he learns that he has erred.
|[s 207] Primum istorum auctoritate, exemplis, et racione probatur. Auctoritate quidem primo Leonis pape, ut habetur 1a, q. 7a, c. Saluberrimum, evidenter ostenditur. Ait enim: “Saluberrimum et spiritualis medicine utilitate plenissimum est ut (sive presbyteri, sive diaconi, sive subdiaconi, aut cuiuscumque ordinis clerici) qui se videri correctos volunt atque ad fidem catholicam, quam pridem amiserant, rursum reverti ambiunt, prius errores suos et ipsos auctores erroris a se dampnatos sine ambiguitate fateantur, et sensibus pravis eciam peremptis, nulla desperandi supersit occasio, nec ullum membrum talium possit societate violari, cum per omnia illis professio propria ceperit obviare”. Ex quibus verbis evidenter colligitur quod omnes errantes contra fidem, qui volunt videri correcti, suos errores revocare tenentur.
|The first of these is proved by authority, examples and argument. It is shown evidently first, indeed, by the authority of Pope Leo, as we find it in 1, q. 7, c. Saluberrimum. For he says this: "It is most healthy, and most full of the utility of spiritual medicine, that those (whether priests or deacons or sub-deacons or clerics of any order) who wish to be seen to have been corrected and strive to come back again to the Catholic faith, which they had long since lost, should first of all confess their errors and say that the authors of the error have been condemned by themselves, without any ambiguity, so that, with all wicked ideas eliminated, no occasion will remain for despairing of them, nor can any member be violated by fellowship with them, since in all respects their own profession will begin to prevent them". From these words we gather evidently that all in error against the faith who wish to be seen to have been corrected are obliged to revoke their errors.
|[s 208] Ad hoc est facile respondere quod errantes primo modo, secundo, tercio et quarto, si se errasse cognoverint, tenentur velle videri correcti, et ideo pure et sine omni condicione suos errores revocare tenentur. Errantes autem quarto modo, si se errasse nequaquam cognoverint, non tenentur de hoc velle videri correcti pro tunc; sed nec tenentur tunc scire se errasse.
|[Ly: But perhaps you will say that it seems possible to infer from this text that those who err in any way at all are bound to revoke their error if they wish to be seen to have been corrected, the opposite of which is assumed in the second point that follows from what was said.] It is easy to answer this. Those who err in the first, second, third, and fourth ways, if they learn that they have erred, are bound to wish to be seen to have been corrected, and therefore they are bound to revoke their errors purely and unconditionally. However, those who err in the fourth way, if they do not learn that they have erred, are not at that time bound to wish to be seen to have been corrected in this matter, and neither are they bound at that time to know that they have erred.
|[s 209] Ad predictam conclusionem est concilium Martini Pape, in quo, ut legitur 1a, q. 7a, c. [Si quis episcopus, dictum est:] “Si quis episcopus vel alicuius episcopi presbyter aut diaconus in alicuius heresis opinionem offenderit, et ob hanc causam fuerit excommunicatus, nullus episcopus in communione eum recipiat, nisi prius in communi concilio, porrecto fidei sue libello, satisfaciat omnibus, et ita liberam teneat suam purgacionem. Hoc idem et de fidelibus laicis sit decretum, si in aliquam heresis opinionem fuerint nominati”. Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod omnes errantes contra fidem qui errores suos revocare tenentur pure suam debent confiteri fidem, et per consequens pure et absque condicione suos errores revocare.
|In favour of the above conclusion there is a council of Pope Martin, in which, as we read 1, q. 7, c. Si quis episcopus, [it was said: "If any bishop] or any bishop's priest or deacon or acolyte has offended in [his] opinion of some heresy, and for that reason has been excommunicated, let no bishop receive him into communion, unless first, having offered a written statement of his faith, he satisfies everyone , in common council, and in this way holds his purgation free. The same has been decided also concerning faithful lay persons, if they have been named in some opinion of heresy". By these words we are given to understand that all in error against faith who are obliged to revoke their errors, should confess their faith purely, and consequently should revoke their errors purely and without condition.
|Hoc eciam ex decreto Pape Lucii, quod ponitur Extra, De hereticis, Ad abolendam, potest intelligi vel colligi evidenter.
|This can also be understood, or gathered evidently, from a decree of Pope Lucius, found in Extra, De haereticis, Ad abolendam.
|[s 210] Verum quia auctoritates predicte, et alie de ista materia, ad intellectum perversum possunt trahi, sunt duo notanda, quorum primum est, quod in auctoritatibus predictis quedam ponuntur que sunt de iure humano positivo; aliquid autem continent quod est de iure divino, quod omnes summi Pontifices et omnia concilia generalia mutare non possunt. Asserunt enim auctoritates prefate quod errantes contra fidem errorem suum revocare pure tenentur, quod verum est secundum legem divinam, quantum ad simplicitatem revocacionis, presertim si aliqui scandalizati fuerint de errore. [s 211] Debent enim errorem dimittere et, propter scandalum sedandum, fateri se errasse et veritatem catholicam fateri, iuxta illud Matthei 10o, “Omnis ergo qui confitetur me coram hominibus, confitebor et ego eum coram Patre meo qui in celis est”, et ad Romanos 4o, “Corde creditur ad iusticiam, ore autem confessio fit ad salutem”. Quod autem secundum concilium Martini pape errantes debeant libellum fidei sue in concilio communi porrigere, et secundum Lucium papam heretici debent suam heresim abiurare, est ex iure humano et ex iure positivo, quod ex causa iusta instituitur et posset ex racionabili causa mutari.
|But because the above texts and others concerning this matter can be drawn to a perverse understanding, two points must be noted. [i] The first is that in the above texts some things are laid down which are from human positive law; however, they contain something from divine law, which no supreme pontiff or general council is able to change. For the above texts assert that those who err against faith are obliged to revoke their error purely, which is true according to divine law, in respect of the simplicity of revocation, especially if some persons have been scandalised by the error. For they ought to lay aside the error, and to allay scandal they must confess that they have erred and confess the Catholic faith, in accordance with the text of Matthew 10[:32], "Therefore all who confess me before men, I will confess also before my father who is in heaven", and Romans 4 [10:10], "For, with the heart, we believe unto justice: but, with the mouth, confession is made unto salvation". However, that, according to the council of Pope Martin, those in error should offer a written confession of faith in common council, and that, according to Pope Lucius, heretics should forswear their heresy, are from human and positive law, which is enacted for good reason and could for good reason be changed.
|[s 212] Secundo sciendum est quod heretici sic tenentur suum errorem revocare quod et debent simpliciter et pure fateri se graviter deliquisse, et ideo secundum canonicas sancciones sunt graviter puniendi; sed errantes contra fidem ex sola simplicitate vel ignorancia absque omni pertinacia, licet pure et sine omni condicione debeant revocare suum errorem, non tamen tenentur fateri se errando peccasse, saltem mortaliter. Nec post revocacionem huiusmodi est eis penitencia imponenda, nisi forte sponte vel ad cautelam vel ex humilitate voluerint penitenciam sustinere. Nec propter talem errorem sunt infamia aliqua notandi.
|[ii] Second it must be known that heretics are bound to revoke their error in such a way that they ought also simply and purely confess that they have been gravely at fault, and therefore according to canon law they are to be punished severely; but those who err against faith only out of simplicity or ignorance without any pertinacity, although they ought to revoke their error purely and without any condition, are nevertheless not obliged to confess that they have sinned (at least mortally) by erring. And after such revocation no penance should be imposed on them, unless perhaps voluntarily or as a precaution or out of humility they wish to undergo penance, and on account of such error they should not be marked by any ill fame.
|[s 213] Sic igitur auctoritatibus patet quod omnes heretici, sive scientes sive nescientes, si voluerint correcti videri, et eciam omnes catholici errantes postquam cognoverint se errasse, pure et sine omni condicione et palliacione suum debent revocare errorem, fatendo se errasse et protestando quod de cetero scienter contra catholicam veritatem nequaquam intendunt errare.
|So therefore it is clear from the texts that all heretics, whether knowing or unknowing, who wish to be seen to have been corrected, and also all Catholics who err after they learn that they have erred, should revoke their error purely and without any condition or excuse, confessing that they have erred, and protesting that for the future they do not intend to err knowingly against Catholic truth.
|[s 214] Hec eadem assercio aperte probatur exemplis. Primum autem exemplum habetur in decretis, 1a q. 7a, c. Maximum, ubi de quodam heretico dicit Leo papa: “Maximum quoque ex laico, reprehensibiliter licet ordinatum, tamen si donatista iam non est, et a spiritu scismatice pravitatis alienus est, ab episcopali (quam quoquomodo adeptus est) non repellimus dignitate, ita ut ipse libello ad nos directo catholicum se esse manifestet”. Ex quibus verbis habetur quod iste quondam donatista pure et sine omni condicione debuit manifestare se esse catholicum, quod facere nequaquam potuit nisi pure et sine omni condicione heresim abnegando.
|The same assertion is plainly proved by examples. The first example is found in the decretals, 1, q. 7, c. Maximum, where Pope Leo says of some heretic, "As for Maximum, also, ordained from the laity, though reprehensibly, if nevertheless he is not now a Donatist and is a stranger to any spirit of schismatical wickedness, let us not drive him from the episcopal dignity he has somehow obtained, provided he shows himself to be a Catholic by a document addressed to us". It is established by these words that this former Donatist was obliged to to show that he was a Catholic purely and without any condition, which he could by no means do except by denying the heresy purely and without any condition.
|[s 215] Secundum exemplum ponitur, c. Donatum, de quodam alio, de quo idem Leo papa sic ait: “Donatum autem Seiacensem ex Novaciano (ut comperimus) cum sua plebe conversum, ita Dominico gregi volumus presidere, ut libellum sue fidei meminerit ad nos dirigendum, quo et Novati dogmatis dampnet errorem, et plenissime confiteatur catholicam veritatem”. Ex hiis colligitur quod iste Donatus debuit plenissime catholicam veritatem confiteri; igitur et debuit pure et sine omni condicione pravitatem hereticam abnegare.
|The second example is found in the chapter Donatum [1, q. 7, c. 20], concerning some other person of whom the same Pope Leo says: "Donatus the Salian converted (as we learn) from Novatian with his people, we wish to rule over the Lord's flock in such a way that he should remember he must direct to us a document of his faith, by which he should both condemn the error of Novatian's teaching and most fully confess the Catholic truth". From these words we gather that this Donatus was obliged to confess the Catholic faith most fully; therefore he was also obliged to deny heretical wickedness purely and unconditionally.
|[s 216] Tercium exemplum ponitur de cons., dist. 2a, c. Ego Berengarius, ubi clare habetur quod Berengarius pure et sine omni condicione et palliacione sane revocavit errorem, immo anathematizavit, dicens: “Ego Berengarius, indignus ecclesie sancti Mauricii Andegavensis diaconus, cognoscens unam catholicam et apostolicam fidem, anathematizo omnem heresim, precipue eam de qua hactenus infamatus sum, que asserere conatur panem et vinum”, et cetera. Ex hiis verbis patenter habetur quod iste pure et sine omni condicione ac palliacione suum revocavit errorem.
|The third example is found in De consecratione, dist. 2, c. Ego Berengarius, where it is clearly established that Berengarius indeed revoked his error purely and without any condition and excuse, indeed anathematized it, saying: "I, Berengarius, unworthy deacon of the church of St Maurice of Angers, acknowledging the one Catholic and apostolic faith, anathematise every heresy, especially that concerning which I have formerly been in ill repute, which tries to assert that the bread and wine", etc. It is clearly established by these words that he revoked his error purely and without any condition and excuse.
|[s 217] Quartum exemplum est de beato Augustino, qui quandoque perpendit errorem, absolute pure et sine omni condicione revocavit eundem. Unde in epistola ad Vincencium, et ponitur 23a, q. 6a, c. Vides, sic dicit: “Mea primitus sentencia erat, neminem ad veritatem Christi cogendum, verbo esse agendum, disputacione pugnandum, racione vincendum, ne fictos catholicos haberem, quos apertos hereticos noveram. Sed hec opinio mea non contradicencium verbis tantum, sed demonstrancium superabatur exemplis”. Ex quibus verbis patenter habetur quod beatus Augustinus pure et sine condicione fatebatur opinionem suam superatam a veritate fuisse, et ita opinionem suam pure et sine omni condicione revocavit. Non enim in revocacione necesse est uti verbo revocandi, sed sufficit verbis equipollentibus uti.
|The fourth example concerns blessed Augustine, who when he considered [something to be] an error, revoked that error absolutely, purely and without any condition. Whence, in his letter to Vincentius [Letter 93], found in 23. q. 6, c. Vides, he says the following: "My original opinion was that no one should be compelled to Christ's truth, that one must act by word, fighting by disputation, conquering by argument, lest we have pretended Catholics whom we knew to be plain heretics. But this opinion of mine was overcome not only by the words of those who contradicted it, but by examples they pointed out." These words plainly establish that blessed Augustine confessed purely and without condition that his opinion had been overcome by the truth, and thus he revoked his opinion purely and without any condition; for in a revocation it is not necessary to use the word "revoke", but it is enough to use equivalent words.
|[s 218] Si enim dicit quis, “Reprehendo hanc opinionem meam vel sentenciam”, vel “Dico esse falsam”, aut “contra veritatem”, immo si dicit, “Fateor assercionem contrariam esse veram”, vel verba equipollencia profert, in rei veritate pure et sine omni condicione errorem suum pretendit revocare. Et isto modo Augustinus errores revocavit quamplures, ipsomet testante, qui in principio libri Retractacionum ait: “Iam diu illud facere cogitabam atque disponebam quod nunc adiuvante Domino adgredior, quia differendum esse non arbitror, ut opuscula mea — sive in libris, sive in epistolis, sive in tractatibus — cum quadam iudiciaria severitate recenseam, et quod me offendit velut censorio stilo denotem. [s 219] Neque enim quisquam, nisi imprudens, ideo quia mea errata reprehendo me reprehendere audebit. Sed si dicit non ea debuisse a me dici que postea michi eciam displicerent, verum dicit, et mecum facit; eorum quippe reprehensor est quorum et ego sum”. Et postea ait: “Quicumque ista lecturi sunt, non me imitentur errantem, sed in melius proficientem”. Ex hiis aliisque quampluribus verbis beati Augustini concluditur aperte quod beatus Augustinus errores suos pure et sine omni condicione voluit revocare. [s 220] Unde et in libro Retractacionum, de se et de suis opinionibus loquens, sepe utitur talibus verbis: “temere dictum est”, “minus considerate dictum est”, “hoc improbo et non approbo”, “nec illud michi placet”. Ex quibus modis loquendi colligitur evidenter quod Augustinus plures errores pure et sine omni condicione ac palliacione revocavit (licet plura dicta sua non revocaverit in libro Retractacionum, sed retractavit exponendo quem de ipsis habuit intellectum).
|For if anyone says, "I reject this opinion or teaching of mine," or "I say that it is false" or "contrary to the truth"; indeed, if he says, "I confess that that the contrary assertion is true", or utters equivalent words, in truth of fact he purports to revoke his error purely and without any condition. And in this way Augustine revoked very many errors, as he himself testifies. At the beginning of his book of Retractations [CSEL vol. 36, pp. 7, 10] he says: "For some time I have been thinking and preparing to do something which, with God's help, I am now beginning, because I do not think it should be deferred: I am reviewing with a kind of judicial severity my works---books, letters, tracts---and marking with a censor's pen (so to speak) the things that dissatisfy me. For only an unwise person will dare to censure me for censuring my own errors. But if he says that I should not have said the things that afterwards displeased even me, he speaks the truth and agrees with me; in fact he criticises the things I also criticise... Let those who read those things not imitate me in my error but in my progress to something better." These and many other words of blessed Augustine plainly prove that blessed Augustine wished to revoke his errors purely and without any condition. Thus in the book of Retractations, speaking of himself and his own opinions, he often uses such words as, "it has been said rashly", "it has been said inconsiderately", "I disapprove this and do not approve", and "it does not please me". We gather evidently from these ways of speaking that Augustine revoked many errors purely and without any condition and excuse (though in his book of Retractations many of his sayings he did not revoke, but he reworked them by explaining how he meant them).
|[s 221] Sed forte quereret aliquis, an Augustinus fuerit hereticus, ex quo plures errores contra fidem docuerat. Ad quod dicendum est quod Augustinus post conversionem suam propter nullum errorem fuit hereticus reputandus. Quia nullum errorem contrarium veritati catholice que apud omnes catholicos tamquam catholica existit divulgata, nec aliquem errorem contra veritatem catholicam quam credere tenebatur explicite, tenuit, eciam opinando; sed ex sola ignorancia aut simplicitate erravit, quesivitque cauta sollicitudine veritatem, quam postquam invenit, statim correxit se, ac loco et tempore opportunis pure et sine omni condicione revocavit errorem et confitebatur plenissime catholicam veritatem.
|But perhaps someone might ask whether Augustine was a heretic, since he had taught many errors against faith. To this it must be said that after his conversion Augustine was not to be regarded as a heretic for any error, because he did not hold, or even entertain as an opinion, any error contrary to a Catholic truth published among all Catholics as Catholic, or any error against a Catholic truth he was obliged to believe explicitly, but he erred only from ignorance or simplicity, and he sought the truth with careful solicitude, and after he found it, he immediately corrected himself, and, at an appropriate place and time, revoked his error purely and without any condition and confessed the Catholic faith most fully.
|[s 222] Sic igitur manifeste est ostensum quod tam omnes heretici quam catholici ex ignorancia contra fidem errantes, postquam cognoverint se errasse, pure et sine omni condicione errores suos revocare tenentur.
|So in this way it has been shown manifestly that both all heretics and Catholics who err against faith from ignorance, after they have learnt that they have erred, are obliged to revoke their errors purely and without any condition.
|[s 223] Et hec eadem assercio racione probatur. Nam quilibet catholicus, loco et tempore opportunis, aliis circumstanciis necessariis debitis observatis, pure et sine omni condicione confiteri tenetur catholicam veritatem. Confessio autem catholice veritatis est reprobacio contrarie heretice pravitatis antea opinate vel asserte et pura et sine omni condicione revocacio heretice pravitatis. Sic igitur quilibet, loco et tempore opportunis, aliisque circumstanciis debitis et necessariis observatis, pure et sine condicione, postquam cognoverit se errasse, errorem revocare tenetur.
|And this same assertion is proved by argument. [i] For every Catholic, at an appropriate place and time, and with other necessary due circumstances observed, is bound to confess the Catholic truth purely and without any condition. However, the confession of Catholic truth is the rejection of the contrary heretical wickedness previously held or asserted, and a pure and unconditional revocation of heretical wickedness. So therefore each person is obliged, at an appropriate time and place and with other due and necessary circumstances observed, to revoke an error, after he learns that he has erred, purely and without condition.
|[s 224] Amplius, secundum Augustinum in epistola ad Vincencium, et ponitur 23a, q. 7a, c. ult., nemo potest gaudere se esse correctum nisi doleat se fuisse perversum, et secundum Gelasium, ut habetur 24a, q. 2a, c. Legatur, nulli nisi se corrigenti est venia concedenda. Igitur, consimiliter, nemo potest gaudere se ad catholicam veritatem esse reversum nisi doleat se a veritate catholica deviasse, et per consequens qui contra fidem erravit, si vere et non ficte revertitur, omnem dimittit hereticam pravitatem et errorem contrarium. Nec potest autem errorem perfecte, meritorie et virtuose dimittere nisi satisfaciat illis quos prius scandalizaverat (vel quibus dederat occasionem errandi), quod nequaquam facere potest nisi pure et sine omni condicione revocando errorem. Igitur talem revocacionem eum facere oportet, si Deo et catholicis satisfacere cupit.
|[ii] Further, according to Augustine in his letter to Vincentius, reported in 23, q. 7, last chapter, no one can rejoice that he has been corrected unless he grieves that he has been wrong. And according to Gelasius, as we read 24, q. 2, c. Legatur, forgiveness must not be granted to anyone unless he corrects himself. Therefore, similarly, no one can rejoice that he has come back to Catholic truth unless he grieves that he had deviated from Catholic truth, and consequently he who has erred against the faith---if he comes back truly and not fictitiously---lays aside all heretical wickedness and contrary error. But he cannot lay aside error perfectly, meritoriously and virtuously unless he satisfies those whom he had previously scandalised, or to whom he had given occasion to err, which he cannot do except by revoking the error purely and without any condition. Therefore he must make such a revocation, if he wishes to satisfy God and Catholics.
|[s 225] Iste autem raciones non procedunt de hereticis errantibus non manifestis sed occultis, quia illis sufficit ad veritatem redire catholicam (et qui dampnabiliter erraverunt, confiteri debent secundum formam ecclesie sacerdoti): licet raciones predicte procedant de hereticis et errantibus manifestis et publicis, qui alios scandalizaverunt, vel saltem aliis occasionem errandi dederunt, et [probent] quod isti debeant pure et sine omni condicione revocare errores.
|These arguments do not hold of heretics erring not manifestly but in a hidden way, because it is enough for them to return to Catholic truth (and those [of them] who have erred damnably should confess according to the form of the Church to a priest), though the above arguments do hold concerning those who manifestly and publicly fall into heresy and error, who have scandalised others, or at least given them occasion to err, and [show] that they should revoke their errors purely and without any condition.
|[s 226] Tercio sic. Sicut peccata sunt purganda, sic revocandi sunt errores. Sed secundum Calixtum papam, ut habetur Extra, De penitenciis et remissionibus, c. 1o, “Manifesta peccata non sunt occulta correccione purganda”, nec sunt sub condicione expurganda. Igitur errores manifesti et divulgati non sunt secrete nec sub condicione, sed pure et simpliciter revocandi. Sic ergo patet quod omnes heretici et omnes errantes, postquam cognoverint se errare, pure et sine omni condicione suos errores revocare tenentur, vel occulte saltem coram deo si sint occulti, [vel] publice si errores suos publicaverint (quia illis quos scandalizaverunt, vel quibus saltem occasionem errandi dederunt, satisfacere obligantur).
|[iii] Third, as follows. [a] Errors must be revoked in the same way as sins must be purged. But according to Pope Calixtus, quoted Extra, De Poenitentiis et remissionibus, c. 1: "Manifest sins are not to be purged by hidden correction", and they are not to be purged conditionally. Therefore manifest and published errors must not be revoked secretly or conditionally, but purely and simply. Thus, therefore, it is clear that all heretics and all who are in error, after they learn that they have erred, are bound to revoke their errors purely and without any condition, either in a hidden way at least before God, if their errors are hidden, or publicly if they have published their errors (for they are bound to satisfy those whom they have scandalised, or those to whom they have given at least occasion to err).
|[s 227] Secundo probandum est quod errans contra catholicam veritatem quam non tenetur explicite credere ex sola simplicitate vel ignorancia absque omni pertinacia, antequam cognoverit se errasse, non tenetur errorem aliquem revocare, sed sufficit protestari quod paratus est revocare, si se errasse cognoverit. Quod probatur sic. Nullus tenetur mentiri; igitur talis non tenetur recognoscere se errasse, ex quo credit se numquam errasse; ergo quamdiu sibi non constat quod erraverit, errorem revocare non debet.
|[b] Second, it must be proved that one who errs out of simplicity or ignorance alone, without any pertinacity, against a Catholic truth that he is not bound to believe explicitly is not bound to revoke any error before he learns that he has erred, but it is enough to protest that he is ready to revoke if he learns that he has erred. This is proved as follows. No one is bound to lie. Therefore such a person is not bound to admit that he has erred, since he believes that he has never erred; therefore while he is not certain that he is in error, he should not revoke the error.
|[s 228] Sed diceret aliquis quod per hanc racionem nullus hereticus nescienter teneretur suam heresim revocare: quia mentiri non debet; ergo non debet recognoscere se errasse, ex quo credit se numquam errasse. Ad hoc dici potest quod per racionem predictam bene probatur quod hereticus nescienter, stante consciencia qua putat se veritatem tenere, non debet revocare errorem; sed illam conscienciam tenetur dimittere, et non tenetur heresim tenere. Sed qui errat contra veritatem quam non tenetur explicite credere non tenetur de necessitate salutis conscienciam talem dimittere, nec peccat mortaliter conscienciam talem habendo, antequam cognoverit se errasse. Et ideo non est simile de heretico et de tali errante.
|But someone might say that by this argument no unknowing heretic would be bound to revoke his heresy: because he ought not lie; therefore he ought not recognise that he has erred, since he believes that he has never erred. To this it can be said that by the above argument it is indeed proved that an unknowing heretic, while the conscience stands by which he believes that he holds the truth, ought not revoke the error. But he is bound to lay aside that conscience and is not bound to hold the heresy. But one who errs against a truth that he is not bound to believe explicitly is not bound by necessity of salvation to lay aside that conscience, nor does he sin mortally in having such a conscience before he learns that he is in error. And therefore the heretic and such a person in error are not similar cases.
Ex predictis concluditur manifeste qualem revocacionem debet facere
inventor heresis saepedicte, si velit inter catholicos reputari, que
scilicet declaret ipsum non esse hereticum pro heresi memorata (licet
per nullam declaracionem poterit declarare se non fuisse hereticum).
Quia ipse pure et sine omni condicione ac palliacione dictam heresim
revocare tenetur hiis verbis vel equipollentibus: “Abnego
quam predicavi et docui, qua asseritur quod anime sanctorum in celo non
clare vident deum; consencio autem fidei orthodoxe, ac corde et ore
confiteor quod anime sanctorum purgate in celo sunt deum facialiter
clare videntes”. [s 230]
autem talem revocacionem facere teneatur ex premissis ostenditur. Nam
ostensum est quod omnes errantes contra veritatem catholicam quam
credere tenentur explicite suum errorem pure et sine omni condicione
revocare tenentur. Sed iste errat contra veritatem catholicam quam
credere tenetur explicite. Igitur dictam heresim pure et sine omni
condicione revocare tenetur.
|The foregoing implies manifestly what sort of revocation the inventor of the oft mentioned heresy should make, if he wishes to be reputed a Catholic: namely one that declares that he is not a heretic on account of the mentioned heresy (though by no declaration could he declare that he has not been a heretic). For he is bound to revoke the said heresy purely and without any condition or excuse, in these or equivalent words: "I disown the heresy I have preached and taught, by which it is asserted that the souls of the saints in heaven do not clearly see God; I consent to the orthodox faith, and with heart and mouth confess that the purged souls of the saints are in heaven seeing God clearly face-to-face". That he is bound to make such a revocation is shown from what has gone before. For it has been shown that all those who err against a Catholic truth they are bound to believe explicitly are bound to revoke their error purely and unconditionally. But this man errs against a Catholic truth he is bound to believe explicitly. Therefore he is bound to revoke the said heresy purely and unconditionally.
|[s 231] Et ideo cum dicit, “Numquam tamen nostre intencionis fuit dicere aliquid contra fidem”, per hec verba minime excusatur, sicut nec Greci, Iacobite, Georgiani, Arriani, Sabelliani, Donatiste et alii heretici quamplurimi minime excusantur licet non fuerit intencionis eorum aliquid dicere contra fidem. Licet enim excusetur per hoc quod non fuerit scienter vel sciens hereticus, non tamen poterit excusari quin fuerit, saltem nesciens vel nescienter, hereticus.
|And therefore when he says, "However, it was never our intention to say anything against the faith", he is not at all excused by these words, just as Greeks, Jacobites, Georgians, Arians, Sabellians, Donatists and very many other heretics are not at all excused though it was not their intention to say anything against the faith. For though this excuse means that he was not a knowing heretic, nevertheless he cannot be excused so that he was not at least an unknowing heretic.
|[s 232] Duobus autem modis debet convinci. Primo, quia non credit veritatem quam tenetur credere explicite. Secundo, quia — esto quod non negaret veritatem quam tenetur credere explicite, et ideo, hoc posito, quamvis per solas predicaciones suas convinci non posset, tamen — convincitur per opera sua, per que ostendit pertinaciam manifestam, et quod non querit cauta sollicitudine veritatem, et quod non est paratus corrigi.
|And he should be convicted in two ways. First, because he does not believe a truth that he is bound to believe explicitly. Second, because --- supposing that he did not deny a truth he is bound to believe explicitly, and therefore, on this assumption, though through his preachings alone he could not be convicted, nevertheless --- he is convicted by his actions, through which he shows manifest pertinacity and because he does not seek the truth with careful solicitude and is not ready to be corrected.
|[s 233] Cum autem dicit quod “si aliquid dixerimus”, et cetera, “totum ex nunc revocamus”, quamvis hic utatur verbo revocandi, tamen ista non est revocacio proprie loquendo, sed est magis protestacio.
|And when he says that "if we have said anything", etc, "we revoke the whole of it from now", though here he uses the word "revoke", nevertheless this is not a revocation properly speaking but rather a protestation.
|[s 234]Et ideo hic probanda sunt duo, primo, quod hic non ponitur revocacio proprie dicta, secundo, quod ista protestacio sibi non prodest. Quod vero hic non sit revocacio, patet: quia condicionalis nichil ponit, hec autem est condicionalis, igitur non est revocacio alicuius erroris. Secundo, quia revocacio est erroris confessio; qui autem dicit aliquid condicionaliter nichil confitetur; igitur, et cetera. [s 235] Tercio, quia catholicus qui numquam erravit nullum debet revocare errorem; predicta autem verba potest et debet dicere omnis catholicus; igitur hec nulla est revocacio. Quarto, quia talia verba eciam diceret omnis nesciens sive nescienter hereticus, qui errori suo pertinaciter adheret, putans eum esse catholicam veritatem, et tamen talis per talia verba nullum revocare intendit errorem; igitur talia verba revocacionem non continent.
|And therefore two points must be proved here. First, that here he does not put forward a revocation in the proper sense; second, that this protestation does not benefit him. [i] That there is no revocation here is clear, because a conditional statement asserts nothing, but this is conditional, therefore it is not the revocation of any error. Second, because a revocation is a confession of error; but someone who says something conditionally confesses nothing; therefore etc. Third, because a Catholic who has never erred should revoke no error; the above words, however, can and should be said by every Catholic; therefore this is no revocation. Fourth, because every unknowing heretic, who adheres to his error pertinaciously, thinking that it is Catholic truth, would say such words also; and nevertheless such a person by such words intends to revoke no error; therefore such words do not contain a revocation.
|[s 236] Secundo probatur quod dicta protestacio sibi minime prodest. Primo, quia protestacio tunc non prodest cum quis facit in contrarium, Extra, De censibus, c. Olim, et De constitucionibus, Cum. Sed iste facit multa contra protestacionem predictam, quia per multa facta et opera ostendit se ad revocandum nullatenus esse paratum, sicut ostensum est prius; igitur talis protestacio tali minime prodest.
|[ii] Second, it is proved that the said protestation does not benefit him at all. [a] First, because a protestation is of no benefit when someone does the opposite, Extra, De sensibus, c. Olim, and De constitutionibus, Cum; but this man does many things opposed to the above protestation, for by many deeds and works he shows that he is by no means ready to make a revocation, as has been shown above; therefore such a protestation in no way benefits such a person.
|[s 237]Secundo, quia talis protestacio condicionalis minime prodest protestanti quem ignorancia vel simplicitas non excusat, quia in difficilibus et occultis fidei taliter protestantur catholici, ut insinuent se errare (si errant) non ex pertinacia aliqua, sed ex ignorancia vel simplicitate sola. Et ideo talis protestacio in difficilibus valet solummodo quando protestans potest per simplicitatem vel ignoranciam excusari. Sed quod iste istis modis excusari non valeat constat aperte: primo non simplicitate, quia ex multa deliberacione, meditacione et studio dicit, et cum hoc predicat heresim sepe dictam. [s 238]Nec valet per ignoranciam excusari, quia ignorancia illorum que quis scire tenetur nequaquam excusat; ipse autem tenetur scire quod hec est veritas catholica, scilicet quod anime sanctorum in celo clare vident deum. Quia hoc tenetur ipse credere explicite, cum sit veritas apud omnes catholicos divulgata, igitur per ignoranciam excusari non potest.
|[b] Second, because such a conditional protestation benefits not at all one who makes the protestation whom ignorance or simplicity does not excuse, because in difficulties and obscurities of faith Catholics protest in this way to suggest that if they are in error it is not through any pertinacity, but from ignorance and simplicity alone. And therefore such protestation in difficult matters avails only when the person protesting can be excused by simplicity or ignorance. But that this man cannot be excused in these ways is plain and certain. [bi] First, not by simplicity, because he speaks from much deliberation, meditation and study, and with this he preaches the often mentioned heresy. [bii] Nor can he be excused by ignorance, because ignorance of things one is bound to know does not excuse; but this man is bound to know that it is Catholic truth that the souls of the saints in heaven clearly see God, because he is bound to believe this explicitly, since it is a truth published among all Catholics; therefore he cannot be excused by ignorance.
|[s 239] Tercio probatur sic. Per protestacionem communem catholicis et hereticis non potest errans contra catholicam veritatem quam tenetur credere explicite excusari. Hoc ex precedentibus satis apparet. Sed talis protestacio est communis catholicis et hereticis nescienter: omnes enim tam isti quam illi protestantur, vel protestari possunt, se esse paratos quod, si aliquid dixerint contra fidem, totum revocant. Et iste in hoc casu errat contra veritatem catholicam quam tenetur credere explicite. Igitur per talem protestacionem communem minime excusatur, nec talis protestacio sibi prodest.
|[c] Third, it is proved as follows. By means of a protestation common to Catholics and heretics a person erring against a Catholic truth that he is bound to believe explicitly cannot be excused; this sufficiently appears from what has gone before. But such a protestation is common to Catholics and unknowing heretics, for all, both the former and the latter, protest or can protest that they are ready to revoke the whole if they have said anything against the faith; and this man in this case errs against a Catholic truth that he is bound to believe explicitly; therefore by such a common protestation he is by no means excused, and such a protestation does not benefit him.
|[s 240] Quarto sic. Si talis protestacio sibi prodesset, eadem racione prodesset neganti quamcumque veritatem catholicam. Sed hoc est manifeste falsum: quia tunc liceret cuicumque predicare publice quod Christus non est passus nec mortuus nec natus de virgine, et quod non est alia vita perpetua post hanc vitam, et quod bona opera non prosunt post mortem, et quod deus non est diligendus, et quod non est obediendum deo; et alia consimilia predicare liceret absque metu heretice pravitatis, si predicans protestaretur, dicens, “Ista dico et teneo; tamen non est intencionis mee aliquid dicere contra fidem, et si aliquid dixi, totum ex nunc revoco”. Sed hoc est inconveniens manifestum. Igitur nec illis nec isti talis protestacio prodest.
|[d] Fourth, as follows. If such a protestation were to benefit him, by the same argument it would benefit anyone denying any Catholic truth whatever. But this is manifestly false, for then it would be permissible for anyone to preach in public that Christ did not suffer or die and was not born of the Virgin, and that there is not another everlasting life after this life, and that good works are of no benefit after death, and that God should not be loved, and that one should not obey God; and it would be permissible to preach other similar things without fear of heretical wickedness, if the preacher were to make protest saying, "I say and hold these things, but it is not my intention to say anything against the faith, and if I have said anything, I revoke the whole from now". But this is obviously absurd. Such a protestation can therefore benefit neither them nor him.
|[s 241] Capitulum 12
|[s 242] Sequitur:
|Et si quis magnus aut parvus aliquid habet pro conclusione affirmativa, secure det michi et libenter recipiemus.
|If anyone, great or small, has anything in favour of the affirmative conclusion, let him safely give it to me and I will receive it willingly.
|[s 243] Hic narratur quomodo inventor erroris predicti verbis dolosis et ambiguis se non pertinaciter zelare pro assercione predicta pretendit. Sed dolus eius, cum dicit, “Si quis magnus aut parvus aliquid habet pro conclusione affirmativa, secure det michi”, et ex eius operibus perpenditur evidenter. Nam ex persecucione quam infert zelatoribus catholice veritatis constat aperte quod qui daret sibi aliquid pro veritate, suo errori contraria, se periculo et confusioni exponeret, eo quod zelatores et defensores catholice veritatis eius graciam perdunt et indignacionem incurrunt, licet interdum forte erga aliquos callide suam indignacionem occultet. Hoc in facto consistit, et ideo non per racionem vel auctoritatem sed per facta eius et opera debet ostendi.
|Here it is narrated how the inventor of the aforesaid error pretends in deceptive and ambiguous words that he is not pertinaciously zealous in favour of the above assertion. But his deception when he says, "If anyone, great or small, has anything in favour of the affirmative conclusion, let him safely give it to me", is evidently weighed by his actions. For from the persecution he inflicts on those who are zealous for Catholic truth it is plain and certain that anyone who was to give him anything in favour of the truth opposed to his error would expose himself to danger and confusion, because those who are zealous for and defend Catholic truth lose his favour and incur his indignation (though sometimes perhaps he cleverly hides his indignation towards some people). This is a matter of fact, therefore it should not be shown by argument or authority but by his actions and deeds.
|[s 244] Cum vero dicit, “Libenter recipiemus”, suam dolositatem et maliciam per verba ambigua molitur abscondere. Nam potest quis allegaciones contra suam opinionem libenter recipere, vel ad reprobandum, vel ad respondendum, vel ad investigandum qui sue opinioni dissenciunt, vel ad discuciendum, vel ad probandum. Primis tribus modis videtur probabile quod ipse libenter reciperet allegaciones pro parte affirmativa, ut scilicet eas reprobet, ut eis respondeat, ut qui suo errori dissenciunt investiget et eos, si viderit tempus, destruat et confundat. Sed ad discuciendum et probandum, facta eius ostendunt quod non libenter recipiet allegaciones contra suum errorem. .
|However, when he says, "I will receive it willingly", he tries to hide his deceptiveness and malice by ambiguous words. For someone can willingly receive arguments against his opinion, either for disproving [them], or for answering [them], or for investigating those who disagree with his opinion, or for analysing, or for testing [them]. It seems probable that he would willingly receive arguments in favour of the affirmative side in the first three ways, namely to disprove them, to reply to them, to investigate those who disagree with his error and, if he sees an opportunity, to destroy and confound them. But his deeds show that he will not willingly receive arguments against his error in order to analyse and test them.
|[s 245] Capitulum 13
|[s 246] Sequitur:
|Et super hoc statim petivit fieri publicum instrumentum: et solutum est consistorium.
|And concerning this he straightway sought that a public instrument be made, and the consistory was dissolved.
|[s 247] Hic ultimo narratur quod de revocacione sua, vel protestacione, petivit fieri publicum instrumentum. Sed per precedencia patet quod, iuxta processum precedentem, tale instrumentum sibi non poterit suffragari, eo quod predicta protestacio sibi minime prodest.
|Here it is narrated finally that he sought that a public instrument should be made of his revocation or protestation. But from what has gone before it is clear that, in accordance with the above argumentation, such an instrument cannot support him, because the above protestation can not benefit him at all.
|[s 248] Omnia suprascripta que de meo protuli, sicut et dicta mea et opuscula universa, correccioni et emendacioni illius vel illorum cuius vel quorum interest submitto, paratus, si cognovero quod aliquid dixerim contrarium veritati, omnimode revocare. Si vero asserciones istius vel opera aliter recitaverim quam veritas habeat, reportatoribus imputetur.
|All the things written above that I have offered of my own, as also all my statements and writings, I submit to the correction and emendation of him or those concerned, ready, if I learn that I have said anything contrary to the truth, to revoke it in every way. If however I have reported his assertions or actions otherwise than is true, let it be imputed to the reporters.
Return to Table of Contents