RALEIGH LECTURE ON HISTORY

From Confederation to Compromise: The Austrian Experiment, 1849–1867

R. J. W. EVANS
Brasenose College, Oxford -
Fellow of the Academy

Many Raleigh Lectures have been concerned with empires, appropriately enough; but none has yet addressed the Austrian Empire. Only two of them, in fact, were located squarely, as to subject, in central or east-central Europe. Let me take as my starting-point that by Namier exactly fifty years ago, on the ‘Revolution of the Intellectuals’—far the longest of all the Lectures, in its written form at least. I shall come to the other, en passant, at the end.

Namier famously exposed the incompetence, selfishness and shortsightedness of the 1848ers in Germany: all those ‘professorial lambs, bitten by the pan-German dog’. But was not what replaced them even more incompetent, selfish, and shortsighted? The restored regimes, especially the restored head and doyen of the Confederation, Habsburg Austria, have had a bad press, which reached its nadir in 1918. In fact, the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy coincided exactly with the establishment of the Raleigh endowment, and that coincidence was not quite wholly fortuitous. The donor, Sir Charles Wakefield, a great enthusiast for the best achievements of Britain in the world, evidently

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took a more jaundiced view of the Austrian contribution to civilisation: in 1920 he headed a London civic deputation to the young Czechoslovakia's Festival of Freedom and returned with the order of the White Lion.²

Plenty of commentators, contemporary and later, have seen the 1850s as the beginning of the end for the Habsburgs. I cite the editor, in 1852, of the English translation of a work on the circumstances which had led to revolution in the Monarchy four years earlier:

Austria has not made the slightest progress towards consolidation of her factitious greatness. She subsists only by virtue of a permanent state of siege and martial law. . . . Her subject populations . . . are more disaffected than ever. No inward vitality binds together the heterogeneous elements of her Empire; the prestige of her might is gone, the sanctuary of her authority has been profaned, her weakness made manifest, the mechanism of her power laid bare. She maintains her state by terrorism alone.³

The immobile system of the Metternichian Vormärz—so runs this verdict—had been brought down by elemental passions of discontent. Various kinds of liberal and national programme were advanced, and much reform implemented in the year of revolution. The greatest failings of new regimes in the area were their lack of experience, and fratricidal conflicts among opponents of the old order. It was no tribute to the Habsburgs or their vacillating rump government, but the army held firm against assorted Czechs, Italians, and German radicals, till they were able to initiate a general restoration, though they had to call on Russian help to defeat rebellion in Hungary. A new emperor, the malleable young Francis Joseph, was dominated by a clique of aristocratic-military-clerical reactionaries under the cynical and debauched Prince Felix Schwarzenberg. Forced to grant a constitution (dated 4 March 1849), they never intended to observe it; and duly retreated into absolutism again with the Silvester Patents at the end of 1851.

There followed—I am still rendering the most familiar, commonplace account—years with no real policy except repression under Interior Minister Alexander Bach, who succeeded as acting head of

³ William Coxe, History of the House of Austria . . . to Which is Added, Genesis, or Details of the Late Austrian Revolution by an Officer of State (4 vols., 2nd edn., London, 1872), iv, p. cxxvii.
government on the death of Schwarzenberg in 1852. Austria lived on borrowed time, friendless in Europe, especially after alienating Russia by her indecisive stance during the Crimean War, till she blundered in 1859 into a disastrous passage at arms with north-Italian patriots and their French allies, which introduced almost a decade of extreme constitutional instability at home. She was quite unable to curb the ideas and ideals, especially the national claims, which had surfaced in 1848, or to sustain rivalry with Prussia for leadership of the fast-advancing Germany, since the regime remained essentially inert, inefficient, backward, and stagnant.

There are grains of truth in all that; but mainly it is the stuff of legends, tenacious despite a few of the weightiest and profoundest tomes in Habsburg historiography which bear on the issues. 4 In fact there is quite another way of looking at these developments. In important respects, ‘neo-absolutist’ government was not restorative at all, but innovative, on a broad front, with a clear and ambitious programme, which drew on significant bases of support. Let us hear now from the actual author of that work translated in 1852, Count Hartig:

Those who are presently occupied with the task of re-erecting the Austrian state edifice are not to be reproached for the troublesome dust occasioned by the removal of the rubbish, and for the comfortless damp and chilliness pervading the new-built halls, which have not been allowed time to dry. Such are the inevitable consequences of rebuilding.5


5 Coxe, History, iv. p. cxxxv. Hartig was a minister before 1848; his shrewd dissection of Vormärz Austria and its nemesis originally appeared as Genesis der Revolution in Österreich im Jahre 1848 (Leipzig, 1850). Architectural metaphor came naturally enough to Bach himself: ‘Today we have as yet no state . . . so we must create it, in order to be able to rule like others in Europe. . . . We must build anew.’: cited in O. Urban, Česká společnost, 1848–1918 (Prague, 1982), pp. 110 f.
Or, to stay with English connections, let us ponder the opinion of Francis Newman, erratic and free-thinking brother of John Henry, that Austria had undergone a ‘radical revolution’ by 1860 ‘which wants to cut away the present from the past’.

Schwarzenberg headed a team of hard-nosed centralists, many of them younger men, who commanded a much more powerful and extensive state machine than before. A uniform administrative organisation legislated for the whole Monarchy for the first time, epitomised by the new official record of their acts, the *Reichsgesetzblatt* and provincial *Landesregierungsblätter*. Their work embraced, on the one hand, all territories, in a scheme—outlined in the Silvester Patents—of crownlands, circles, districts and communes, which largely disregarded traditional entities, and permitted only the most minor of local variations. Hungary was fully incorporated, and tariff barriers were abolished. On the other hand, it embraced, in principle, every level of society, with full equality before the law and abolition of all peasant subjection. Both these measures had been provided for, of course, in the revolutionary agendas of 1848; but their implementation proved a massive operation, which proceeded according to recognisably modern standards, even if it involved anomalies like reintroducing the birch into Austria from Hungary on grounds of consistency.

This multifarious activity harnessed considerable resources, in agriculture and industry, with the beginnings of modern economic management and a banking system. Communications dramatically improved, and the urban environment was transformed, especially with the Ringstrasse project in the capital, Vienna. Foreign trade more than doubled. Growth rates roughly matched those elsewhere in the German Confederation.

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6 *Reminiscences of Two Exiles and Two Wars* (London, 1888), p. 104 and passim. Newman, a serious observer of the central European scene, was closely associated with Polish and Hungarian emigrés.

7 Text of the Silvester decrees in *Reichsgesetzblatt* 1852, II Stück, Nr. 2 (10 Jan. 1852), and in C. von Czernin, *Österreichs Neugestaltung, 1848–58* (Stuttgart/Augsburg, 1858), pp. 29–34; glossed ibid. pp. 35 ff. Internal customs had already been eliminated in October 1850: *Landeskongress- und Regierungsblatt für das Kronland Ungarn*, 1850, XV Stück, Nr. 160 (9 July 1850).


rational reforms of taxation, both direct and indirect, which raised its revenue by two-thirds (in Hungary by four times). At the same time it stimulated further advance: the Credit-Anstalt bank being floated as a personal initiative of the Emperor, his minister of finance, and a few courtiers. By 1858, such efforts found their blithe, complacent, punctilious, and indefatigable chronicler in Carl Czoernig, former head of the statistical office. From him we learn of the stunning achievements of the regime: 47,221,812 cubic ft of roadstone used in Hungary; 3,000 kms. of railways built (including the genuinely pioneering Semmering-bahn), 2,389 post-offices, in various categories; 359 barges on the Danube plus 100 steamers of the Donau-Dampfschiffahrts-gesellschaft; the precise structure of the state forestry service, with its Landesforstdirektionen, divided into Forst-Inspektions-Bezirke, Forst-Wirtschafts-Bezirke, Forst-Aufsichts-Bezirke, and so forth. Czoernig records a mass of endeavours great and small, from the maintenance of law and order (the police made over one million arrests in 1854, against only 70,000 four years before—what progress!), to measures against cruelty to animals or elaborate safeguards against the explosion of steam-engines. His title is Oesterreichs Neugestaltung. The phrase implies reconstruction, even a kind of renaissance.

This Austria was a new state. Anticipated by the ambitions of Joseph II—but the old Reich and much else had still stood in his way; then by the proclamation of Francis as ‘Emperor of Austria’ in 1804—but that title applied ‘without prejudice to the [existing] rights of our various dominions’: now, for the first and only time during all the centuries of

but that does not affect the present argument, besides which the psychological expectations generated by those events certainly did play a part. H. Böhme, Deutschlands Weg zur Großmacht. Studien zum Verhältnis von Wirtschaft und Staat während der Reichsgründungszeit, 1848–81 (Cologne/Berlin, 1966), takes a different view, though—despite his name—he is not well informed on the Austrian side. Brandt, Neabsolutismus, pp. 281 ff., 378 ff., occupies the middle ground.


Habsburg rule in central Europe, a single uniform citizenship, or *Reichsbürgerrecht*, was instituted, and no intermediate or constraining authorities remained. As the Silvester Patents put it, ‘the lands which under their old, historic or new titles are united with the Austrian imperial state (*Kaiserstaat*), form the inseparable elements of the Austrian imperial hereditary monarchy (Erbmonarchie).’

Dynasticism thus gained confirmation as the first postulate of authority. Whereas his uncle had as recently as 22 October acknowledged himself to be a constitutional monarch, Francis Joseph was on 2 December 1848 crowned ‘by the grace of God, Emperor of Austria’. More important: he was perhaps the last major European ruler really to believe it. Skirting the unfortunate irony that he then had to take a leaf out of the rival Napoleonic book with his copycat coup in the dying hours of 1851—Bonapartist emulation which was not lost on a scornful Bismarck—the handsome, energetic and brash young ruler set out to make a distinctively Austrian contribution to the practice of nineteenth-century monarchy. As one of his ambassadors put it in 1858: ‘Every power has a moral basis from which it cannot depart unpunished. . . . Austria has for principle the respect due to the imprescriptible rights of sovereigns.’ Those rights were buttressed by the two supports which had become increasingly indispensable for the house of Habsburg over the previous century: army and bureaucracy.

It is a moot point whether the army of Radetzky and Windischgrätz saved the Monarchy in 1848–9; if so, then no thanks to its formal command structure. It is more important that Francis Joseph firmly believed so, cleaving to the virtues of a military hierarchy answerable directly and only to himself, and even removed in stages from any

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13 In the patent reopening the Austrian Parliament at Kremsier/Kroměříž: Macartney, *Habsburg Empire*, p. 400.


ministerial responsibility. The gigantic Arsenal, built in 1848–56 to intimidate the Viennese, is its great monument. Equally symptomatic was the Emperor’s practice of transacting civilian business in a general’s uniform, and the promotion of his one-day-old son to headship of a regiment. Over 400,000 men under arms and a new gendarmerie represented a crippling financial burden to which we shall return.16

Centralised administration was likewise a legacy from the mid-eighteenth century, now reinforced with mountains of further regulations, whose summits peep out in the Reichsgesetzblatt decrees. The pages of Czoernig form a splendid testimonial to frenzied activity: a sea of bureaucrats, chopping and changing and surging as they are channelled into this or that laboriously charted and minutely regulated haven of Tüchtigkeit and Ordnung.17 There were devoted servants in Vienna, like Joseph Oettl, long-time ministerial secretary and peasant emancipator, a ‘Bureaucrat in der edlen Bedeutung des Wortes’ (in the words of Wurzbach, soon to appear again), who on the day of his last operation still turned up at his office to make sure the desk was clear;18 in the provinces, like Archduke Albrecht—Francis Joseph’s first cousin once removed—who, sent to hold the fort in the new civil-military administrative region of Ofen, had to call in a Saxon eye specialist because of the strain of reading so much paper;19 and down in the localities—witness the richly entertaining memoirs of an anonymous, untranslatable ‘k.k. Stuhlrichter in Disponibilität’, who had to procure table, chairs (!) and much else at his own expense before he could introduce civilisation as the regime knew it to remoter reaches of the Great Hungarian Plain.20

17 Note, in this connection, the thirty-three pages (pp. 695–728) devoted to developments since the book went to press.
19 C. von Duncker, Feldmarschall Erzherzog Albrecht (Vienna/Prague, 1897), p. 191.
20 Acht Jahre Amtsleben in Ungarn, [ed. G. Oehme] (Leipzig, 1861). The anonymous author, having been sent to serve in a legal capacity, found himself promptly redeployed as a district (Bezirk) administrator, with the traditional designation of Stuhlrichter (szolgabíró). So primitive, he tells us, were his conditions of work that it took a year to establish any kind of Ordnung at all, and five years to get a proper office building. When political conditions then changed, in 1860, he was placed in suspension (‘in Disponibilität’) without even a word of thanks.
By contrast, an earlier prop had to be largely dispensed with: the nobility. The blow to its socio-economic influence was serious enough, even if cushioned by some concessions to landowners in the reform legislation and windfall agrarian profits. But the nobles’ traditional political authority came under siege. Partly they were simply not up to the job in hand. ‘I don’t know a dozen men in our class with enough political vision or enough knowledge’—thus far Schwarzenberg’s cynical mot is well known; but note what follows: ‘to whom one could entrust a substantial share in power without fear that they would rapidly lose it.’ Here is the deeper reason for mistrust, since the nobility stood for the constitutional compromises of the old regime. And see where those had led!

The new masters ignored bitter resentment at this political effacement. Its best-known spokesman was Windischgrätz—who accused the government of promoting communism. But let me cite instead a Moravian, Count Egbert Belcredi, to give the flavour:

Just as the doctrinaires sought to realize their ideals in 1848 through the violence of the excited mob, with the assumption of power as their legal title, so are things today, only the boot is on the other foot. . . . What conservative institutions the revolution from below left intact, the revolution from above has continued to destroy.

Symbolic was the comparative exclusion of Prince Metternich, finally back from exile in 1851; whereas his long-time associate, Kübeck, an authoritarian fonctionnaire of commoner stock, returned to the inner-

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22 This remark is variously cited. I have translated it from Urban, Česká společnost, p. 89. Other versions can be found in A. Schwarzenberg, Prince Felix zu Schwarzenberg, 1848–52 (New York, 1946), p. 40, still the standard life; and in A. Sked, The Survival of the Habsburg Empire (London, 1979), p. 208, who makes rather too much of the regime’s anti-aristocratic credentials.
24 Z deníků moravského politika v éře bachově: Egbert Belcredi, 1830–9, ed. J. Boček (Brno, 1976), pp. 34, 36 (Mar. 1852). Cf. ibid., p. 28: ‘Everything . . . is handed over without protection to the bureaucrats, to organized democracy, or rather anarchy, to the most dangerous proletariat, a uniformed one, to what nowadays is called the regime’ (23 June 1851).
most court circle. Individual aristocrats, of course, remained prominent, like Felix Schwarzenberg himself; but the war of attrition with the rest—among them his literary cousin, ‘Landsknecht’ Friedrich—profoundly shifted the balance of power within the Monarchy. It is plausible to argue (however unpalatable to liberal and national modes of historiography) that this was the largest single reason for the failure of the new order.

The role of military and civilian cadres is important, but unsurprising. They provided a more powerful material base for Austrian ambitions at mid-century than is often realised, even if the effect was spoiled by the falling real salaries of officials—and a plethora of petty enactments on the size of their beards etc.—and by wastage in the uncontrolled army estimates. But the new political entity needed an equivalent emotional, spiritual, and intellectual allegiance. The task of providing it fell to the other historic ally of Habsburg authority, the Catholic Church. We must look back for a moment to grasp the complexities of that assignment. The earlier drive for consolidation of the state had included an ecclesiastical dimension: Josephinist pressure for reform of the Church, under the aegis of enlightened officialdom, towards a more subordinate social and pastoral role. This proved a controversial and


incomplete policy. By 1848 Erastian and progressive impulses had largely run their course. Meanwhile a sort of ‘Oxford Movement’ sprang up to fill the vacuum: Romantic-conservative-ultramontane groupings, inspired especially by the charismatic Clemens Maria Hofbauer, whose order of Redemptorists had over a thousand priests by this time, including a hundred missionaries in the New World, and spawned a spirited and spiritual, at times even *spirituel*, literary revival among clergy and Catholic laity.\(^{29}\)

The Revolution, though it carried with it a fringe of religious enthusiasts, was denounced by most clerical opinion. The Austrian bishops, led by Francis Joseph’s old tutor, Rauscher—and with another Schwarzenberg, Felix’s younger brother, Cardinal Ferdinand, prominent—became the first organised body to rally to the regime in 1849, and soon received their reward.\(^{30}\) The Emperor, no ostentatious or fervent Catholic, was nevertheless a firm believer, wholly persuaded of his divine calling, and of the need for a domestic holy alliance. His lieutenant Bach cemented his own fragile position with an increasingly clerical stance. The Church recovered much traditional autonomy, together with controls over marriage and, above all, education. These were codified in the Concordat, signed on Francis Joseph’s birthday in 1855 (but proclaimed— quaintly — on the Fifth of November), another stupendous piece of minute social regulation, which included such provisions as that couples married as Protestants, then converted to Catholicism, then reverting to Protestantism again, should subject themselves to Roman prescription.\(^{31}\)

For our purposes, however, the new ecclesiastical order’s leading sector was a genuine pedagogical renewal under Leo Thun. A major overhaul of elementary schooling went with the introduction of a proper *Gymnasium* system, closely supervised by the clergy: in the


\(^{31}\) *Reichsgesetzblatt* 1855, XLII Stück, Nr. 195 (5 Nov. 1855); ibid. 1856, XLVI Stück, Nr. 185 (8 Oct. 1856), the supplementary legislation on marriage, over fifty pages of text, with 77 articles followed by 251 clauses (the provision mentioned is at p. 617). The main Concordat is also printed in Czoernig, *Neugesaltung*, pp. 632–41.
late 1850s, 181 Gymnasium directors were priests, only 85 laymen. At the top came universities acquiring a research component, and endowed with a kind of patriotic objective. The spiritus rector of all this, Count Thun, promoted a vision of greatness rooted in the constructive understanding of pan-Monarchical traditions. His young protégé, Alexander Helfert, compiled a programmatic statement ‘on National History and the Current State of its Cultivation in Austria’. A direct result was the foundation of the Institut für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, directed initially by a Tyrolean monk, whom his abbot granted secondment only with reluctance, but soon revealed as one of the earliest and finest institutions of professional training in historiography anywhere in Europe. (It is ironic that future members of the guild would deal so severely with the circumstances which brought the Institut into being!)

Reverence for the Catholic and großösterreichisch figure of Maria Theresa, who enacted her first great administrative reform exactly one hundred years before the neo-absolutist ones, was characteristic of this phase, as in the writings of the Jewish convert Karl Ferdinand Hock and the rising Alfred von Arneth. Meanwhile, the Austrian Academy of Sciences, founded on the eve of revolution, was fostered as the hub of scholarly activity in the Monarchy at large; its President, Baumgartner—though a physicist—actually became minister of commerce. A petty official, Constant von Wurzbach, compiled the first dictionary of Austrian national literature, meaning all writers in the Habsburg lands;


then commenced his stupendous *Biographical Lexicon* of the whole
Monarchy and its cultures.\(^{35}\)

A larger purpose revealed itself here, in the eyes of its propagators:
‘Austria’s Mission as a Catholic World-Power’, first enunciated in
the title of a pamphlet by an egregious turncoat called Chownitz, but a
sentiment which could rally enthusiasts both at home—especially in the
Tyrol—and beyond the borders.\(^{36}\) Catholic immigration had begun in
the *Vormärz*, with the ultramontane publicists Karl Ernst Jarcke and
George Phillips, who were then joined by—*inter alia*—Bernhard
Meyer, formerly secretary to the Swiss Sonderbund, and a man given
to shallow organicist thinking about the state.\(^{37}\) Friedrich Hurter, like-
wise from Switzerland, became Habsburg court historiographer. Kon-
stantin Höffer moved to Prague to hammer the Hussites; and two
brothers of famous leaders of the German opposition settled in
Vienna: Max von Gagern, director of the government press bureau,
and Gustav Heine, editor of the semi-official *Fremdenblatt*, who was
later raised to the peerage (what would Heinrich have said?).\(^{38}\) Among
those further afield who saw scope in this programme was Sir John
(later Lord) Acton, who had taken German lessons in Munich from
Meyer, and commented favourably on the Monarchy as a focus for
international Catholic loyalty.\(^{39}\)

35 R. Meister, *Geschichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, 1847–1947* (Vienna,
(Vienna, 1856); id., *Biographisches Lexicon*. Cf. the entry by A. Bettelheim in *Neue

36 J. Chownitz, *Österreichs Mission als katholische Weltmacht* (Schaffhausen, 1850); cf.
Mayer, *Österreich als ‘katholische Großmacht’*, is suggestive, though—being mostly about
the Tyrol—a good deal narrower than its title suggests.

37 For Mayer’s views, see his *Rückblick* (below, n. 75), and his *Erlebnisse* (Vienna
Budapest, 1875). The phenomenon as a whole needs further investigation. Cf. Till, *Hof-
bauer; Mayer, Österreich als ‘katholische Großmacht’, passim;* and H.-C. Kraus, ‘Carl Ernst
Jarcke und der katholische Konservatismus im Vormärz’, *Historische Zeitschrift*, cx (1990),
409–45.

38 For assessments of Hurter, Höffer, and others, see H. von Srbik, *Geist und Geschichte vom
deutschen Humanismus bis zur Gegenwart* (2 vols., Munich/Salzburg, 1951), ii. 33 ff., 75 ff.
For the contemporary Austrian press: *Deutsch-österreichische Literaturgeschichte*, pp.
353 ff. Other immigrant Catholic professors at this time included Wilhelm Heinrich Grauert
(from Westphalia), Joseph Aschbach (from Nassau), J. B. Weiss (from the Breisgau), Karl
Ernst von Moy (from Bavaria), and Johann Friedrich Schulte (from Bonn). Not all were of
like mind—the last two being, respectively, a leading Ultramontane and a future Old
Catholic. We should also remember that Romantic Catholicism was no Austrian or even
*großdeutsch* monopoly, as the example of Radowitz in Prussia shows.

39 Ágnes Deák, ‘Eötvös József és Lord Acton: találkozás a liberalizmus és a nacionalizmus-
Here we stand at the heart of the ‘Austrian’ endeavour. But the official Catholic programme was vitiates in three ways. First, there was the incongruity of trading away powers to a reactionary papacy and abandoning some lively local theological traditions. In 1857, after a genteel but fierce witch-hunt inside the establishment, the writings of the greatest Austrian religious thinker of the day, Anton Günther, were even placed on the Index. Second, and partly in consequence, the authorities faced running confessional battles, from the affair of a troublesome Evangelical pastor in Bohemia called (absit omen!) Kossuth, to the toils of their new Protestant Patent, with the labyrinthine and divisive provisions of the Concordat being brought to bear on all sorts of test cases. Third, and most significantly, the German ingredient, welcome and natural up to a point, also contributed to a larger internal contradiction.

Liberalism might have been presumptively seen off in the Austrian 1850s as a claim for political representation and constitutional forms— even the paranoid Metternich seemed convinced of that—but this proved to be at the cost of assimilating much of its progressive, rational, and basically anticlerical ideology within the state apparatus. Hence, of course, the latter’s economic, administrative and legal clout. Consider how many men of 1848 served the neo-absolutist regime. Bach (once the darling of the bourgeoisie, even students) may largely have crossed the floor, but other prominent Viennese reformers stuck to their guns: the Krauss brothers (one of them minister of justice); the agrarian experts Kleyle and Cajetan Meyer; Joseph Pipitz, who became director of the National Bank; the lawyer Anton Hye, editor of the Reichsgesetzblatt; Hock, the progressive Catholic who engineered a

40 Bunnell, Before Infallibility, is an attractive guide to this abstruse subject. A similar, but more tragic case involved the Czech dissident priest, Augustin Smetana, whose funeral in Prague in 1851 created a great stir: see A. Springer, Aus meinem Leben (Berlin, 1892), pp. 183 ff.; A. Meissner, Ich traf auch Heine in Paris, ed. R. Weber (Berlin, 1973), pp. 292–301; and especially P. Křivský, Augustin Smetana (Prague, 1989).


series of liberal trade treaties and edicts which fill page after page of that journal.\textsuperscript{43}

Others had also been active at the Frankfurt Parliament. Anton von Schmerling, \textit{de facto} premier of its executive, and Karl Ludwig Bruck resigned their Austrian portfolios when the new establishment took hold—but they soon reappeared as president of the court of cassation and minister of finance. Czoernig, whose intimate association with the regime is already familiar to us, had served at Frankfurt; likewise Burger, Perthaler, the Kalchberg brothers. . . . And again there were immigrants, who tended in this case to be Protestants. Most notably there was Bruck himself who, born at Elberfeld in the Prussian Rhineland, fetched up at Trieste as a young Byronic voyager to Greece, and became one of the founders of the Österreichischer Lloyd.\textsuperscript{44} His secretary, Gustav Höfken, from Westphalia, had a career as soldier, journalist, and economist behind him when hired by Bruck at Frankfurt.\textsuperscript{45} They were joined by such as Heinrich Ahrens, from Saxony, another Frankfurt deputy, radical philosopher and professor at Graz; Ludwig Lewis, from Hamburg, refounder of Austrian Freemasonry as soon as circumstances allowed; the mordant north-German journalist Rogge, source for so many good stories, especially at the expense of the Catholic Church; the famous social and political theorist Lorenz Stein, apostle of public administration (\textit{Verwaltung}), and professor at Vienna from 1855.\textsuperscript{46} Not

\textsuperscript{43} Details about these men in Wurzbach, \textit{Biographisches Lexikon, s.v.}.; cf. G. Franz, \textit{Liberalismus. Die deutschliberale Bewegung in der Habsburgischen Monarchie} (Munich, 1955), pp. 61 ff. Although Hock also moved in clerical circles, his resentment at obscurantism was deeply felt, as remarks to Archbishop Schwarzenberg in 1849 reveal: ‘Da sind Leute wie Zenner, Rauscher und ihresgleichen, die im Sich-Verstocken, Hin- und Herbeugen, Schleichen, Kriechen, alten Beichtspiegel und verknöcherten Kirchenrechten das Heil suchen; da stehen Jarcke, Hutter, etc., welche mit der ganzen neueren Zeit nichts anzufangen wissen und keine Hilfe sehen, als einen starken Ruck zurück ins Mittelalter’ (cited Mayer, \textit{Österreich als ‘katholische Großmacht’}, p. 142 n.).

\textsuperscript{44} R. Charmatz, Karl Ludwig von Bruck: der Vorkämpfer Mitteleuropas (Leipzig, 1916), still an acceptable biography, despite its liberal and nationalist Tendenz.


\textsuperscript{46} Most of these figures have entries in Wurzbach, \textit{Biographisches Lexikon}, and in more recent and orthodox bibliographical compendia (\textit{Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, Neue deutsche Biographie, Österreichisches biographisches Lexikon}). Rogge’s memorably witty and racy \textit{Österreich von Világos bis zur Gegenwart}, scouge of Jesuitical intrigue, Roman skulduggery, and much else which the regime held dear, needs to be handled with care, though it is essentially accurate. It is ironic that Stein, on whom see now G. Pope, ‘The Political Ideas of Lorenz Stein and their Influence on Rudolf Gneist and Gustav Schmoller’, D.Phil. thesis (Oxford, 1985), thought Austrian \textit{Verwaltung} too complex for elucidation within his system.
least I must mention Heinrich Laube, who forsook his career as rebel and parliamentarian to manage the Burgtheater; and the most celebrated German dramatist of the age, Friedrich Hebbel: a powerful literary duo indeed, even if in personal terms they failed to see eye-to-eye.

Such arrivals bore witness to the attractiveness of the new Austrian state and its possibilities. Yet they also confirmed a stridency about German identity within it. A delicate balance had long existed between two poles of Austrian-German allegiance: ideological co-habitation was often not too hard, particularly while the first element connoted a more political, the second a more cultural affinity.47 But 1848 presented a dilemma. As Hebbel bluntly but perceptively put it, right at the beginning of the revolutionary year: ‘The dear Austrians! Now they are pondering how they can unite themselves with Germany, without uniting themselves with Germany.’48 More seriously, waves of enthusiasm for the national cause were henceforth channelled into a new cultural assertiveness, feeding on heady exposure to fresh initiatives in thought and letters after decades of comparative isolation.49 Only now did Austrian universities acquire chairs in the various branches of German jurisprudence, and even in German literature. German philosophy, especially in the form of Herbartism, swept through the lecture-halls, and a team of philologists arrived from Heidelberg, Breslau, Bonn, Würzburg and elsewhere.50

The German tongue was introduced for practically all public purposes right across the area, and readily identified with the positive features of the new programme. As the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung condescendingly put it in 1850: ‘Material advantage will prove a much stronger force binding the populations of the various crownlands

49 The extent of Austrian intellectual separation from (the rest of) Germany before 1848 is a point of contention. H. Seidler, Österreichischer Vormärz und Goethezeit. Geschichte einer literarischen Auseinandersetzung (Vienna, 1982), seeks to minimise it, but develops no larger historical argument against the countervailing evidence.
together than the right, devoutly desired by spokesmen of the nationalities, to turn Austria into a second Babylon. It is no accident that the Reichsgesetzblatt, begun with a bold provision for publication in all the languages of Great Austria, appeared from 1852 in German alone; or that bureaucrats were so important as littérateurs in that language. ‘[Austria’s reforms] will’, so Stein asserted, ‘place the domestic Germanic element on an unshakeable base.’

Höfken and others sought settlers, particularly for the ‘barren wastes’ of Hungary. Few farmers came, but plenty of skilled workers, to join the teachers attracted by Thun and confirm the impression of a process of colonisation. Moreover, a divergent appeal could be made to the same historical canon, especially to Joseph II, increasingly viewed as a German hero (since the 1848 revolution broke out on his birthday), and represented as the originator of modernising, centralising policies, in fact as the first ‘Josephinist’, a term coined at this time. Certainly there was a reminder of Joseph in the breathless pace and bewildering detail of neo-absolutist legislation. The compilers of a land survey of Hungary in the 1850s, finished within two years in truly Herculean fashion, recalled with pride that Joseph’s own cadastre had had to be left incomplete after four. And an inspiration for his namesake on the throne: whereas Francis Joseph, like his predecessor, may have been more Germanised against than Germanising, the dynasty never appeared so Teutonic in its ethos as during the 1850s and early 1860s.

55 Historians do not quite agree on the calculations associated with the choice of (a) regal name(s) for the new Emperor: cf. Redlich, Emperor Francis Joseph, p. 29: Bled, Franz Joseph, pp. 3, 48. But before 1848 he had been generally known as ‘Franz’. Judgments about his and his family’s ethnic sensibilities must be very impressionistic: cf. below, n. 104. Linguistically speaking, however, the court was, by Habsburg standards, comparatively
THE AUSTRIAN EXPERIMENT, 1849–1867

The irony of all this at a time when Josephinist regulation of the
Church was in process of dismantlement—to the glee of clerical
satirists like Brunner—does not need stressing. Or that the Institut
für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung should take on a young Pro-
testant teacher from Anhalt, Theodor Sickel, who subsequently hijacked
it into a centre for study of the German, not the Austrian, Reich. Even
Thun, himself under pressure for the comparatively pluralist proclivities
of his department, entertained no doubt about the irreducibly ‘German
character of the state’; while the irreproachably multicultural Wurz-
bach, afforded no kind of official encouragement, had to rise at 5 a.m.
each day to pursue his researches privately. It is instructive to cast a
sidelong glance across the border to Bavaria, where a contemporaneous
campaign to create patriotic feelings through Church and administra-
tion, museums and ceremonies, and the sense of a common past
achieved little more, it seems, than the continued wearing of
Lederhosen.

Such internal contradictions, beside external pressures, to which I shall
shortly return, would soon show how the real motto for the first and
main phase of the Austrian experiment might have been ‘sauter, pour
mieux reculer’, the more so because of its sins of omission and
commission in respect of other kinds of national sentiment. The
‘nationality question’ was alleged not to exist: declared to be first
merely a matter of Gleichberechtigung (i.e. equal rights), then (in the
Silvester Patents) just equality before the law. Vernacular languages
gained certain (grudging) guarantees, at least in the education system,

monoglot, tending to discard old cosmopolitan means of communication (albeit Francis
Joseph’s mother still kept her diary in French), whereas the role of Hungarian or Czech
was still entirely subordinate and largely formulaic. Marriage, of course, tied the dynasty to
Germany even more closely at that time than at others. Cf. B. Hamann, ‘Die Habsburger und
56 J. M. H. Ritzen, Der junge Sebastian Brunner in seinem Verhältnis zu Jean Paul, Anton
Günther und Fürst Metternich (Proefschrift, Nijmegen, 1927), a defective work, but useful in
this connection.
57 Urban, Česká společnost, pp. 92 f. An instance of Thun’s dilemma is recorded by W.
Heindl, ‘Universitätsreform und politisches Programm’, Österreichische Osthefte, xx (1978),
79–98.
58 M. Hanisch, Für Fürst und Vaterland. Legitimitätstiftung in Bayern zwischen Revolution
1848 und deutscher Einheit (Munich, 1991).
as part of an essentially ethnographical vision of Austria’s ‘family of peoples’. The notorious ‘hussar’ uniforms—a charge on their wearers of up to half an annual salary, and arousing either obsequiousness or disdain—were actually envisaged as a concession to Hungarian sensibilities. More was seen as unnecessary and undesirable—the exception to prove the rule being the Italian provinces, where German culture was kept at bay, yet disloyalty remained chronic.

This handling of the nationality issue must be seen as resting on a double miscalculation: a policy flawed in itself, which additionally compromised a regime exposed to so many other challenges. But we need to seek to understand the mandate for such ideological blindness towards the consequences of invading non-German cultural space—space which the Vormärz state had left largely inviolate. Native and newcomer, Carl Czoernig and Bernhard Meyer, vied with each other in patronising remarks about the puny velleities of the semi-barbarous local peoples, especially in Hungary. Literary giants uttered withering comments in public and private: Grillparzer, on how Kant’s first Critique would have sold only three copies in Magyar, and how ‘Czech nationality has only a single flaw, that it isn’t one’; Anastasius Grün, shifting from patronage to contempt for Slovene letters;


60 Berzeveczy, Absolutismus, i. 321–3; Acht Jahre (above, n. 20), p. 15, describes the uniform with kalpak and sabre, atilla and mante, boots and spurs, and tights, which its wearer was unable to don or doff unaided.

Hebbel, Stifter, or Bauernfeld. Yet disdain for other ethnic claims only gradually proved disastrous.

The Slavs had, ironically, just brought tribute in explicitly Austrian coin to the dynasty: the ‘Austro-Slav’ programme of loyalty to the great-power interests of the state in return for political concessions, which had been adumbrated in a famous slogan of František Palacky’s, and developed by the Czech leadership. The sentiment was unrequited, indeed condemned, with the exile of its most tenacious spokesman, Karel Havlíček, who insisted—vis-à-vis Thun—on a ‘total implementation of equal rights’, refusing to be cast in the role of (as he put it) a ‘wretched and despised Irishman’. Meanwhile Palacky, a Protestant into the bargain, crept into the shadows to lick his wounds.

Sepulchral quiet reigned in 1850s Bohemia on the national front, and many Czechs were drawn into the state apparatus. It was fashionable and profitable to be ‘Johann Mieschtián’ rather than ‘Jan Měšťan’. A local journalist could even write in 1856, about Czech-German relations there:

The mutual impact which these different peoples exert on one another, the resulting competition and choice of employment according to talent and inclination, which have led to a general division of labour, are surely responsible for many fortunate consequences here. Far from Bohemia suffering in its development from differences between its nationalities, it owes them the eminent position which it occupies among the crownlands of the Monarchy.

A starry-eyed view, for sure. Yet there was some mandate for it in the despondency of Czech representatives. ‘Particular Slavdom makes no

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66 Stůzl, České Bach, p. 309 n.
sense nowadays,’ wrote one, ‘the solidarity of world conditions has become so marked, that particularist tendencies must become mere utopias.’ The historian Gindely thought in the mid-1850s that the ‘böhmische Nationalsache’ was lost beyond recovery.\(^67\)

Hungary was different. There could be no doubt about the existence of a national cause there, or about official rejection of all its works. The Hungarians were rebels, who had offended against the dynastic-military foundation of Habsburg sovereignty—Francis Joseph had actually taken the field against them personally—and whose rights were consequently forfeit (verwirkt). Then a Hungarian tailor’s apprentice tried to assassinate the Emperor on the streets of his capital (the man couldn’t even speak German to his captors, fulminated Hebbel, clear evidence that you can’t trust metrics\(^68\)). Fresh from completing the Arsenal, Vienna’s masons were redeployed on a comparably massive votive church to commemorate the Emperor’s deliverance. Bach’s tendency to refer to the ‘former kingdom of Hungary’, and Albrecht’s post at the head of a General-Gouvernement (sinister appellation to the twentieth-century ear), provide better clues than Meyer’s protestations that some statehood survived.\(^69\)

Hence a fateful alienation of the considerable potential support there, led by the so-called ‘old conservative’ nobles. Their measured, conciliatory disapproval was registered in print by Somssich as early as 1850; and Hungary’s leading political theorist, Eötvös, most thoughtful of all contemporary defenders of Habsburg sovereignty, remained strongly Austrocentric in his writings throughout the decade.\(^70\) So did


\(^68\) Hebbel, Werke, v. 115–17: ‘‘Sollte das nicht ein Wink sein, nirgends das Fundament des Throns zu suchen, als in Deutschland, und also Deutschland und deutsches Element zu kräftigen?’’

\(^69\) Berzeviczy, Absolutismus, i. 271, 274, 276. Meyer, Rückblick, pp. 9 ff. passim.

the perceptive and sardonic journalist Kecskeméthy, who in 1856 confided to his diary: ‘I’m more of a Magyar than a Czech or a German, but above all I’m a citizen of the Austrian Empire, and only as such am I a Magyar.’ Yet the Old Conservatives were denounced by Francis Joseph as ‘the most reprehensible and base party in the state’, precisely because they were seen as an organised grouping capable of opposition, and because the inconsistency, which they pointed out, of imputing general guilt to the inhabitants of a realm, while claiming popular support for governmental measures there, touched too raw a nerve.

The conservatives still tried in vain for a breakthrough in 1857, when the Emperor made a ceremonial visit to his Potemkin kingdom. In a nice episode, the ruler was greeted at the new pierhead in the lakeside spa of Balatonfüred by the assembled—corralled—faithful; but since its construction was incomplete, the local dignitaries actually had to stand knee-deep in the water. By then it was still too early for the Austrian experiment to attain its ends in Hungary: Bach said he needed twenty-five years there, ‘then we have won the game for ever’. But it was probably already too late to prevent an explosion of resentment if the regime’s overall strategy failed. The cosy platitudes of Meyer’s Rückblick were met by the devastating satire of Széchenyi’s Blick, from one who had done his utmost to sustain Austrian government before the revolution. Széchenyi’s outburst coincided with uproar about the introduction—after years in gestation—of new state

72 ‘Die verwerflichste und schlechteste Partei im Staahe’: Francis Joseph to his chief of police in 1852, in J. I. Mayr (ed.), Das Tagebuch des Polizeiministers Kempen (Vienna, 1931), p. 247. Cf. Berzeviczy, Absolutismus, i. 195 ff., 257 ff., ii. 117–19, 157 ff., and passim; Schmidt-Brentano, Armee, pp. 358 ff. This contradiction within the doctrine of Verwirkung was soon to be exposed most trenchantly by Széchenyi, Blick (below, n. 75), pp. 23 ff. and passim.
73 Rogge, Oesterreich, i. 480 ff.; Berzeviczy, Absolutismus, ii. 112 ff.
74 ‘Dann haben wir für immer gewonnenes Spiel’: quoted from Rogge, Oesterreich, i. 359.
75 [B. Meyer], Rückblick auf die jüngste Entwicklungs-Periode Ungarns (1857, repr. Vienna, 1903); [I. Széchenyi], Ein Blick auf den anonymen “Rückblick” welcher für einen vertrauten Kreis in verhältnismäßig wenigen Exemplaren im Monate October 1857 in Wien erschien (London, 1859). As Széchenyi’s title implies, the Rückblick, a short and feeble piece of government propaganda, attained prominence only through his massive, and likewise anonymous, demolition of it. Beneath its memorable invective (cf. below, p. 158), the Blick makes a compelling case for the conservative critique of the regime which I have just outlined. Cf. R. J. W. Evans, ‘Széchenyi and Austria’ in History and Biography. Essays in Honour of Derek Beales, ed. T. C. W. Blanning and D. Cannadine (Cambridge, forthcoming).
regulation of the Protestant churches, which enforced upon them the kind of Josephinist controls just conceded to the papacy in respect of Catholics. The unrest assailed a government suddenly losing direction and impetus.

The beginning of 1859, when Széchenyi’s tirades began to circulate in Austria, already featured in the regime’s plans as a turning-point. The National Loan, floated as a wedding gift to the Emperor in 1854, and hugely successful, albeit largely on Morton’s Fork principles, was set to be fully subscribed by then. On the strength of this, convertibility of the gulden, the condition for a new currency treaty with other German states which would help compensate for continuing exclusion from the Zollverein, was resolved upon for 1 January. But economic trends gave rise to increased anxiety, as the Monarchy suffered disproportionately from the Europe-wide recession, and its budgetary deficit could be funded only, and then inadequately, by a programme of railway privatisation. The still sanguine Bruck was about to earn his epithet as Austria’s Necker. The very same day, anniversary of the introduction of naked absolutism in 1852, the imminence of war with France over Italy became clear—it will be recalled that Louis Napoleon reacted very differently to the attempt on his life by an Austrian gaolbreaker called Orsini. Within a further six months, the military machine had broken down at Magenta and Solferino, bankrupting the government and shattering its prestige. Seven fat years of the Austrian state idea were to be swallowed by seven lean years.

Of course, Austria’s problem had always been an international one, with the occupational hazard for her rulers that policies appropriate domestically might not suit the larger central European context. The

76 Brandt, Neoabsolutismus, pp. 692 ff. Metternich, who subscribed 100,000 fl., was allegedly lectured by the chief of police on his duty to give more: Stözl, Ära Bach, p. 74 n.
79 Hübner, the recipient of Napoleon’s famous New Year snub, is especially interesting on the in-fighting within the regime during 1859, as neo-absolutism began to implode: Monarchia Austriaca dopo Villafranca.
Metternichian system operated as a kind of dual dualism: partnership with Prussia in the German Confederation (Bund); and a loose deal with Hungary at home. In the aftermath of revolution, the latter was swept away;\textsuperscript{80} and the former, too, seemed modified to Austrian advantage: more großdeutsch than kleindeutsch, in the parlance of the time, and with encouragement to the ‘great Austrian’ ideal of an at least vaguely unified Reich from Baltic to Adriatic. There has been desultory debate about this. Did Schwarzenberg really seek an empire of seventy million people, and the subordination of Prussia? Or did he display rather a neo-Metternichian respect for the status quo, confirmed by his lacklustre successor Buol?\textsuperscript{81} He failed to achieve the first, but got—in great-Austrian eyes—rather more than the second, enough to give offence at Frankfurt to the rancorous Bismarck through the complacent behaviour of Francis Joseph’s envoys to the Bund, Friedrich Thun, Leo’s brother, and the extravagant Prokesch von Osten. Stein spoke of Austria’s progress towards ‘undoubted predominance in Germany’.\textsuperscript{82}

If so, it was credit which could not be banked, as the Crimea soon showed. The war was not really the cause of Austria’s future misfortunes, as often supposed; rather the symptom of an existing ideological

\textsuperscript{80} Cf., as evidence of this terminology, the interesting comment by Hartig to Metternich in August 1851: ‘Die einzige wahre Errungenschaft seit Ihrer Entfernung von Wien, die Vernichtung des früheren Dualismus in der Regierung des Kaiserreiches, war, wie ich es bezeugen muß, immer das Ziel Ihrer Wünsche’: Metternich-Hartig: ein Briefwechsel, pp. 103 ff. Whether Metternich had actually sought that goal is a moot point; if so, then on the whole he seems to have preferred some sort of estates constitutionalism as the common denominator, rather than absolutism. For a less generous interpretation, see E. Andics, Metternich und die Frage Ungarns (Budapest, 1973).


\textsuperscript{82} ‘[A reformed Austria] wird einerseits das herrschende germanische Element in seinen eigenen Staaten auf unerschütterliche Basis stellen,’—thus far the quotation from the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung translated above, p. 150—‘und andererseits in Deutschland die unbezweifelte Präponderanz haben’: Pope, loc. cit. Such remarks earned him Treitschke’s riposte: ‘Stein was such a sophist, he deserved to become an Austrian’: ibid., p. 300. For Bismarck’s ‘borussische Entrüstung über die geringschätzige und verletzende Art der Behandlung, die wir von der Politik Buol-Prokesch erführen’, see his Gedanken und Erinnerungen (1898: new edn., Stuttgart/Berlin, 1913), i. 124.
quandary. She did not want to fall in with either West or East—that was the arrogance of the Austrian experiment.\footnote{A point well made by H.-H. Brandt in his contribution to Die Kaiser der Neuzzeit, 1519–1918, ed. A. Schindling and W. Ziegler (Munich, 1990), pp. 341–81, at 355 ff.} Anyway she could not: strategic considerations aside, association with Russia would involve fatal loss of dignity, flexibility and socio-economic impetus, defeating the whole purpose of neo-absolutist regeneration; but the West was the home of alien values, from the conspiracies of Hungarian emigrés to the ‘so-called English-French constitutional principle’.

In order to sustain that neutral posture, Austria needed German support, which was not forthcoming. Nor did it materialise, as the government had confidently anticipated, in 1859, when the Bund recognised no casus foederis in northern Italy. The bitter tone of Francis Joseph’s ensuing Laxenburg manifesto hints at the extent of the miscalculation.\footnote{Quoted in Redlich, Staats- und Reichsproblem, i, pt. 2, pp. 127 ff. Actually the model for the Austrian constitution of 1848 had been Belgium, i.e. the ex-Austrian Netherlands. Schroeder, Crimean War, pp. 27 ff., 138 ff., 157 ff., and passim, gives a good analysis of Austrian reasons for deserting Russia. The novelist, Adalbert Stifter, for one, felt that Austria was in lonely occupation of the moral high ground at this time: ‘Seit meiner Vereinsamung und seit ich gegen Europas Mächte, welche mit Ausnahme Österreichs das Recht und die oberste Sitte aus Selbstsucht und Feigheit oder wenigstens Schwäche fallen ließen, eine so tiefe Verachtung fühle, sind mir meine Arbeiten Rettung und Trost geworden . . .’: Sämtliche Werke (24 vols., Prag/Reichenberg, 1904–39), xix. 188.} In this sudden crisis of confidence, Foreign Minister Buol wrote a revealing memorandum which indicted the whole system: powerful stuff, we might say, even from one who had not been as closely involved with it as he had—until we take up the magnificently withering satire of Széchenyi on Schwarzenberg, that ‘rotten-souled voluptuary’, ‘vampire thirsting for human blood’, whose ‘unexampled heartlessness has been matched only by his most deplorable ignorance in the affairs of state’, and Bach the ‘miserable dwarf’ and ‘genuine charlatan’.

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\footnote{‘Der warmen und dankbar anzuerkennenden Theilnahme ohnegleichen, welche Unsere gerechte Sache in dem größten Theile von Deutschland bei den Regierungen, wie bei den Völkern gefunden hat, haben sich Unsere ältesten und natürlichen Bundesgenossen hart-näckig der Erkenntnis verschlossen, welche hohe Bedeutung die große Frage des Tages in sich trug’: Hamann, ‘Habsburger und die deutsche Frage’, pp. 218–19. German responses were anyway hindered by (the speed of) Austria’s pre-emptive aggression, by the fact that Lombardy was not part of the Confederation, and by disputes about supreme command over the Bund’s troops.} Buol’s Denkschrift is in Redlich, Staats- und Reichsproblem, i, pt. 2, pp. 234–40. Széchenyi, Blick, pp. 435–70.
Austria was pushed into a ‘new era’: but one of limited restructuring, not dismantlement. For all the fresh leadership—Bach and Buol were unceremoniously dismissed, in favour of the Pole Gołuchowski and Metternich’s protégé Rechberg—and a little later Thun followed them out of office—the regime remained a squarely dynastic instrument, and as yet undertook only one significant strategic change to broaden its base: readmission of the constitutional principle. Even this took place initially by the back door, and with protestations of continuity. Francis Joseph had, after all, proclaimed a Verfassung exactly a decade before and toyed with implementing some of it; then had introduced a pliant Imperial Council (Reichsrat) as the only chink in the authoritarian carapace. Bach’s long-promised law on communal semi-autonomy reached the statute-book just four days before war broke out: typically it ran to 346 paragraphs; equally typically, it was never put into effect. Now, however, that was because it did not go far enough.

We can identify three phases of constitutional shift, which served three overlapping purposes (but before engaging with them I should make clear that I mean to skirt the increasingly bewildering intricacies and peripateias of this political landscape, in order to keep the fate of the 1850s edifice firmly in view). Firstly the advisory functions of the Reichsrat were expanded, still in corporative (landständisch) terms, and it was allowed to grow milk teeth of consent—‘zustimmende Befugnisse’, then ‘verfassungsmäßige Mitwirkung’, in the coded language of the time. Domestic and foreign creditors needed to be satisfied in the short run (as well as certain anti-Jewish enactments modified) and

87 The term ‘neue Ära’ is normally applied to Prussia from the assumption of power by William I (initially as regent) in 1858. Its applicability to Austria is perceived by Sheehan, German History, pp. 869 ff. Here is not the place to indicate the mass either of contemporary or of subsequent literature about the new, largely uncensored, political processes in the Habsburg lands. There is a characteristically authoritative treatment of the ‘Eight Years of Experiment’, 1859–67, in Macartney, Habsburg Empire, pp. 495–568.
88 This recommendation, Metternich’s last service to the Habsburgs before his death a few months later, was made when the Emperor paid him a visit for the first time in years, another sign of the times: Hübner, Monarchia Austriaca dopo Villafranca, pp. 91 ff.
89 Redlich, Staats- und Reichsproblem, i, pt. 1, pp. 382 ff., who documents the central role of Kübeck (cf. above, pp. 142–3) in the genesis of the Reichsrat, as guarantor of its deference. None of the representative or elective provisions of the Constitution of 4 March 1849 were actually implemented (though the Chambers of Commerce set up in some towns did possess certain minimal consultative features): see ibid. 338 ff., and the clear exposition in Macartney, Habsburg Empire, pp. 422 ff.
90 Rogge, Oesterreich, i. 498–500.
solvency restored; moreover, Bruck had resorted to overselling the loan, and that and related scandals brought him to suicide.

This Reichsrat now, secondly, in October 1860, pushed the government into summoning fuller representative bodies. Itself further afforded as a supreme diet, it should be matched by provincial assemblies elected on a carefully restricted curial franchise, in order to conciliate the aristocracy, above all in Hungary, whose vested interests were at last given some priority. But what might conceivably have satisfied regional aspirations there a decade before now yielded only uncontrollable pressure for more. The Old Conservatives won a momentary triumph, but found themselves hoist with their own petard, as the inept decision for immediate revival of the county congregations, followed—but only six months later—by a diet, opened up Pandora’s box. A spectre was unleashed still deeply troubling to the imperial soul: ‘that dualism between Hungary and the extra-Hungarian parts of the Monarchy, which is certainly above all things to be avoided’. Within six months a third, diagonal, move onward ostensibly only clarified and augmented the Octobrist arrangements, but in fact brought an important shift of emphasis: to full parliamentary life under the so-called Patent (as arcane a description as was ‘Diploma’ for its predecessor).

Now it was intended to woo the großdeutsch

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91 Beer, Finanzen, pp. 297 ff.; Brandt, Neoabsolutismus, pp. 813 ff., esp. 874–86. For the need to conciliate Jewish interests, given that the government’s chief creditors included Rothschilds et al., see ibid. 830 f., 872–4. The mixed experiences of Austrian Jews in the 1850s—the reparations demanded from Hungarian communities and discriminatory regulations, especially in relation to landholding, need to be set alongside their evident material advance—cannot be entered into here. Cf., most recently, L. Gonda, A zsidőség Magyarországon, 1526–1945 (Budapest, 1992), pp. 90 ff.

92 Imperial Diploma of 20 October 1860, in Reichsgesetzblatt 1860, LIV Stück, Nr. 226; also in Redlich, Staats- und Reichsproblem, i, pt. 2, pp. 228 f.; commentary ibid., pt. 1, pp. 572 ff. Hübner grumbled that, even as late as the ministerial debates of mid-1859, Hungary still ‘n’existait pas pour ces Messieurs’: Monarchia Austriaca dopo Viennafranca, p. 109.


94 The imperial decree of 26 February 1861, in Reichsgesetzblatt 1861, IX Stück, Nr. 20, also in Redlich, Staats- und Reichsproblem, i, pt. 2, pp. 229–34, is not actually described as a ‘Patent’, or indeed given any title at all. Perhaps the officials involved were too busy preparing the 240 pages of appendices to it, issued on the same day. Commentary ibid., i, pt. 1, pp. 768 ff.; F. Fellner, ‘Das “Februarpatent” von 1861’, Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, lxii (1955), 549–64, who stresses aspects of continuity in this legislation, and the close involvement with it of Francis Joseph; and the brilliant critique by Eisenmann, Compromis, pp. 260–304, who sees the Patent as a fraud to save the reality of Bachian absolutism.
constituency at home and abroad. Who better than the man of the moment, Schmerling, (unwisely) sprung into power by the Old Conservatives, and taken up by Francis Joseph with some reluctance, but an Admirable Crichon for the Austro-German generation of 1848, and for informed foreign commentators like Acton. Meanwhile the rampant Hungarian political nation totally rejected the powers of the new central parliament.

Two years are a very long time in politics. The Austrian dynasty and his government were learning to manoeuvre in a much more open arena. Yet—what matters to this argument—1850s priorities stayed uppermost in this quasi-Liberal Empire. Hungary's insubordination was visited with what may be described as 'neo-neo-absolutism': a further dose of Austrian bureaucracy, law, and the rest. A curious condition of reversed dualism now obtained, opposite to that of the Vormärz, with constitutional processes established west of the river Leitha, but revoked to the east. The Reichsrat (Imperial Council—a paternalist designation deliberately retained for the new legislative body) was still largely subject to the will of ruler and central administration, with which Schmerling identified himself. Oppositional forces—liberal critics of the army and Church, and Slav and other federalist claimants—were still puny. Schmerling, sanguine about cementing the remainder of the Austrian ideal, appealed to großdeutsch solidarity in the rest of the Confederation. Pan-German enthusiasm, evidenced by the nationwide Schillerfest of 1859, was now intensified by a widespread sense of backlash, what Hebbel called 'racial conspiracy', on the part of other nationalities.

Here we are suddenly on very familiar ground. I do not presume to enter into any reinterpretation of the 'Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland', that Struggle for Supremacy to which Friedjung and

95 Disappointment with the incompleteness of ministerial responsibility and parliamentary sovereignty under the Patent, and with Schmerling's connivance at it, can be traced through the account in Rogge, Oesterreich, ii. 92 ff.

96 For the celebrations on the centenary of Friedrich Schiller's birth, cf. Srbik, Deutsche Einheit, iii. 23–5; Lengauer, 'Kulturelle und nationale Identität', pp. 207 ff.

97 'Man muß vielleicht in Österreich leben, um zu erfahren, in welchem Grade der deutsche Name jetzt gehäuft wird, und wie notwendig es ist . . . gegen die uns von allen Seiten drohende Rassenverschwörung gerüstet zu sein': quoted in Deutsch-österreichische Literaturgeschichte, p. 8.
others devoted justly celebrated analyses, and Srbik six volumes of documents. Austria certainly did not mean to rock the Confederate boat, and the situation might have been sustainable for the foreseeable future, given Prussian goodwill towards some version of the status quo (which was no zero-sum game anyway). But she did need to consolidate support in Germany, given her continuing over-commitment on other fronts. For Francis Joseph that meant clinging to princely brotherhood, despite his disappointment in 1859—a mentality still deeply conditioned by the circumstances of his own political legitimation. He grasped at the Frankfurt Fürstentag in 1863—a meeting of the club of crowned heads alone—as ‘a final means of saving German rulers from ruin in the face of the revolution’.

From the Austrian regime came more confusing signals, likewise a legacy of 1850s attitudes. Schmerling exemplified a liberal reformist element, not inconsiderable in itself (as, for example, his new communal legislation showed), but condemned to be a quantité négligeable, trumped by Prussia and the Nationalverein, and lamed by fears among the Austrian commercial bourgeoisie about free trade. The main appeal of Austria—apart from to großdeutsch democrats who followed in the footsteps of Marx and Engels and did nothing for the official marketability of the cause—remained squarely Catholic and conservative. Foreign minister Rechberg himself, and his counsellors Bielegeleben, Gagern, and Meisenbug, were immigrant clericals to a man, in terms of their origins; as, in his way, was the shadowy ultramontane franco- phone éminence grise, Esterházy. They planned for new institutional arrangements among the German states, with a federal Bundesrat and

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99 Quoted in Bled, Franz Joseph, p. 132. For the Fürstentag, see Srbik, Deutsche Einheit, iv. 1–77; and now N. Wehner, Die deutschen Mittelstaaten auf dem Frankfurter Fürstentag, 1863 (Frankfurt, 1993), who does not quite prove his claim that it yielded a ‘decision that Austria would not remain in the Bund’.


indirectly-elected Bundesversammlung, rather akin to the closely controlled package just enacted for Austria herself; but their constituency was simply not large enough if things came to a crunch.\footnote{102}

There can be no doubt that the German question formed the central international priority of the Austrian Emperor through these years. Italian possessions were ultimately dispensable, as the diplomacy of 1866 would show, if face could somehow be saved.\footnote{103} Balkan ambitions, though the Crimea had placed them firmly on the agenda, were no substitute, till he had to make a virtue out of necessity. Francis Joseph’s protestations of being a ‘German prince’, though not to be conceived in any squarely national sense, signified rather more, I think, in the overall \textit{großdeutsch} context, than the residual, neutral interpretation recently accorded them.\footnote{104} Given the vicious circle of Habsburg sovereignty—how much easier for a king of Prussia, who could embrace the two worlds without schizophrenia!—he needed a broader and secure platform in Austria too.

Schmerling failed to deliver it. ‘We can wait’, he claimed, in a notoriously conceited slogan;\footnote{105} but that proved fruitless, especially since his government could not contemplate a genuine appeal to the


\footnotetext[103]{Partly for that reason I have neglected the Italian dimension in the domestic policy of the Austrian Experiment, though it merits attention. For the last phase of its diplomatic implications, see Taylor, \textit{Struggle for Mastery}, pp. 159 ff.}


\footnotetext[105]{Macartney, \textit{Habsburg Empire}, p. 530 and passim.
people over the heads of the elites, in order to fill empty seats in the Reichsrat. The Emperor reverted to Schmerling’s aristocratic rivals, dismissing him with no more respect than his predecessors, and installing Count Richard Belcredi (brother of that *frondeur* of the fifties whom we encountered earlier). Francis Joseph was even ready to build a bridge to the Slavs, so long as they were prepared to accept Catholic-conservative tutelage and function as honorary Austrians.

At the same time he parleyed seriously with Hungarians for the first time, in the context of a curious transformation of the attitudes of the latter towards the German-Austrian space. Cultural dictatorship had only hardened their national feeling: *Schillerfeste* were matched by *Kazinczy-ünnepék*, in honour of another national poet born in 1759. But the weaker version of autocracy after 1861 weighed less heavily on their intellectual life. They could vent their spleen more freely; and the objects of their resentment were perceived as ‘Austrian’ institutions. Germany, after all, now appeared a bastion of progress again. Thus Hungarian leaders, while remaining opposed to all entanglements of an essentially Confederated kind—Deák in 1861 famously insisted that ‘their wars are not our wars’—did not mind some Habsburg consolidation in Germany. They had begun to grasp, before Vienna did, that since the great-Austrian arch could not be held in place indefinitely, this would tend to reduce direct pressure upon themselves. At the same time they remembered, what Vienna had forgotten, that Habsburg power, even in attenuated form, could only be securely grounded on voluntary recognition of its utility by non-Austrian political elites within the Monarchy. The next step would thus lie with Andrássy, the European diplomat, rather than with Deák, the country squire.

The stage was set for denouement. Francis Joseph, having again forsaken liberal ground at home, was led away from the Confederation, for the last time, into the labyrinth of the Schleswig-Holstein

affair, still trusting in monarchical solidarity against revolution, ‘the surest defensive weapon of the existing legal order against the great political and social dangers of our time’.\(^{109}\) still the programme of 1849. Bismarck, of course, double-crossed him, that Bismarck whom, as a strong man in Prussia, he so much admired. The resultant war destroyed German dualism, along with Groβdeutschland, as a practical political goal for a long time to come.

Großösterreich was also done for, and with it any lingering hegemony of feudals and clericals. A bargain with the Hungarians, favoured by the moderate wing of liberals in Austria, who escaped at last from their obsession with centralism and civilisation, was brokered by the Protestant immigrant, Beust.\(^{110}\) The old internal dualism came back with a vengeance, including two separate citizenships (no more Reichsbürgerrecht), legal systems, legislatures, and so on. Austria—now in many ways the less coherent party to it, as Hungary had been before 1848—did not even survive as a name, formally speaking.\(^{111}\) ‘Compromise’, the time-honoured English term for the legislative transaction of 1867, while not a strictly accurate rendering of ‘Ausgleich’ or ‘kiegyezés’, nevertheless conveys a psychological truth. The Austrian experiment was over.

But the search for the Monarchy’s greatness was not. Only its context now shifted with the rehabilitation of Hungary. ‘In the Orient lies our future,’ Francis Joseph had written to his mother at the time of the Crimean War, words echoed in public by Stein: ‘Now it is [the

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\(^{110}\) E. Somogyi, A birodalmi centralizációtól a dualizmusig: az osztrák-német liberálisok útja a kiegyezéshez (Budapest, 1976); there is also a slightly modified German edn., Vom Zentralismus zum Dualismus . . . (Budapest, 1983). Resentment at Beust’s intervention was nevertheless widespread in Austria, and not only on the political right: cf. Brießwechsel zwischen Anastasius Grün und Ludwig August Frankl, ed. B. von Frankl-Hochwart (Berlin, 1897), p. 314; Beer, Finanzen, pp. 346 ff.; H. Friedjung, Der Ausgleich mit Ungarn (3rd edn., Leipzig, 1878).

\(^{111}\) The ‘Austro-Hungarian Monarchy’ after 1867 consisted of, on the one side, Hungary, and, on the other, ‘the kingdoms and lands [still, after the reconstitution of a separate all-Hungarian parliament] represented in the Reichsrat’. For the fate of the ‘Austrian idea’ in this period, cf. G. Stourzh, ‘Die dualistische Reichsstruktur, Österreichbegriff und Österreichbewußtsein, 1867–1918’, in Innere Staatsbildung und gesellschaftliche Modernisierung in Österreich und Deutschland, 1867/71 bis 1914, ed. H. Rumpler (Vienna/Munich, 1991), pp. 53–68. Note also that dualism as ‘dual centralism’ was not definitively installed in Austria until 1871, with the failure of the Bohemian constitutional negotiations, and remained incomplete there. As an interpreter of the circumstances and consequences of the Compromise, Eisenmann, Compromis, pp. 403–680, has never been surpassed.
Austrian] mission to be the bearer of civilisation to lands newly won for Europe. Yet only from the end of the 1860s did the Emperor and his government act consistently to realise this maxim. Within a decade they were embroiled with Bosnia, that medieval dependency of the Crown of St Stephen about which Seton-Watson lectured on this occasion in 1931. It proved the maelstrom into which a compromised Habsburg realm would at length be sucked for good and all.

The Austrian experiment was not defeated by general social backwardness, or by economic breakdown; or even, perhaps, by much dissent about methods: its opponents, too, often saw administration, not representation, as the key to success. It failed rather through over-extension, through neglect of potential allies, and through bad timing, particularly in respect of constitutional or national ‘concessions’. Underlying that was its internal disharmony, including progressive demoralisation of the functionaries who bore the main burden of this ‘dictatorship of the secretariat’, and the restraints on public activity even by those relatively sympathetic to the regime. Deeper still lay the dilemmas of official identity, and the crippled immobility of a system actuated only from above, by an emperor who rapidly became the first prisoner of the state. He would, said his adjutant and confidant Grünne, admiringly, have made an excellent minister of police: the comment speaks volumes for both of them, and for their management of affairs.

The young Francis Joseph arguably wielded more complete authority over a more complex range of territories than any other crowned head in modern European history. There is no gainsaying that much of the legacy of that absolutism has been construed in negative terms. Patern-

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113 R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Role of Bosnia in International Politics, 1875–1914* (Raleigh Lecture, British Academy, 1931); the paper was actually read in January 1932.

114 Thus, for example, Egbert Belcredi writes in May 1850: ‘That the welfare and freedom of a people lie far more in Verwaltung than in Verfassung is a truth still far too little perceived’: *Z deníků moravského politika*, p. 18. Note the important, though rather anachronistic, general argument of Stölzl, *Ara Bach*, that it was the absence of a social policy, not nationalism as such, which undermined the Austrian position in Bohemia in the 1850s. Somewhat similar points are made by M. Gross, *Počeci moderne Hrvatske. Neoapsolutizam u civilnoj Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji, 1850–1860* (Zagreb, 1985), now available in German as *Die Anfänge des modernen Kroatiens* (Vienna, 1993), the largest study of the impact of neo-absolutist dynamism on an undeveloped peripheral region of the Monarchy.

115 This well-known remark is cited by most chroniclers of the period, e.g. by Srbik, *Deutsche Einheit*, ii. 147.
alism and etatism; the alienation of society from a powerful administrative machine which ground ever more finely; an unaccountable but incompetent military force: all of this constitutes a black legend, above all in Hungary, and obscures genuine indebtedness. What if reformist measures had been implemented in a 'neo-Austria' earlier, before the expectations aroused by 1848, before the added burdens of war debt and rampant army expenditure, before international isolation and mid-century German nationalism? In the event, the 1850s and their aftermath stand exactly halfway between the 1780s and 1914–18, the intermediate lurch towards an overtly German orientation in east-central Europe, which yielded countervailing tensions elsewhere. Was, then, the century of German domination over the Continent being ushered in anyhow, as Namier believed, whether the Habsburg realms functioned as official, or just as unofficial, conduit?\footnote{The Habsburg Monarchy was 'the greatest Germanizing agency without a vestige of a German national idea . . . the greatest single obstacle to Germany's national consolidation, the incarnation and bulwark of principles opposed to it, and yet the greatest asset of an expansionist German imperialism. It had to be removed as an obstacle from within Germany before her unification could be achieved; and then it staked out the line for the initial stages of a German national bid for dominion': L. B. Namier, draft text of Waynflete Lectures, 1946–7, Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS Eng. Hist. d 341–2, here at 341, fos. 2–3. These formed a sequel to Namier's Raleigh Lecture, but unfortunately only a few pages of continuous text survive, along with masses of notes (also ibid., MS Eng. Hist. f 22–3) for a prosopography of the members of Frankfurt and Vienna/Kremsier Parliaments in 1848–9; cf. J. Namier, Lewis Namier, pp. 266 ff.}\footnote{It is attributed to a satirical pamphlet of Alphonse Karr, Les guêpes, in January 1849.} Plus ça change, it may be recalled, is a phrase coined in the turmoil of the mid-nineteenth century.\footnote{Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, 1836–95, born in Lemberg, was brought up there and, after the revolution, in Prague and Graz, where he became the first lecturer in History at the University under Thun’s new dispensations. Cf. Wurzbach, Biographisches Lexikon, s.v., who calls him a 'schauerliche Mißgeburt des Geistes der Zeit', but gives him full treatment; and now B. Michel, Sacher-Masoch (Paris, 1989).} Yet the Austrian experiment was a serious initiative, capable of creative modification and development, if only its creators could have achieved a harmonious perception of their own aims and a realistic assessment of their limitations. We may draw the lesson that 'Austria', in the conventional loose sense, was better off if she did not strive after any more precisely 'Austrian' raison d'Être, the effort to achieve which involved a kind of psychological self-destruction. It is no accident, perhaps, that the son of Prague's chief of police, Sacher-Masoch, was at the time gathering material for his novels of self-abasement, the original documents of 'masochism'.\footnote{The Habsburg Monarchy was 'the greatest Germanizing agency without a vestige of a German national idea . . . the greatest single obstacle to Germany's national consolidation, the incarnation and bulwark of principles opposed to it, and yet the greatest asset of an expansionist German imperialism. It had to be removed as an obstacle from within Germany before her unification could be achieved; and then it staked out the line for the initial stages of a German national bid for dominion': L. B. Namier, draft text of Waynflete Lectures, 1946–7, Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS Eng. Hist. d 341–2, here at 341, fos. 2–3. These formed a sequel to Namier's Raleigh Lecture, but unfortunately only a few pages of continuous text survive, along with masses of notes (also ibid., MS Eng. Hist. f 22–3) for a prosopography of the members of Frankfurt and Vienna/Kremsier Parliaments in 1848–9; cf. J. Namier, Lewis Namier, pp. 266 ff.}\footnote{It is attributed to a satirical pamphlet of Alphonse Karr, Les guêpes, in January 1849.}