RICHARD MEREDITH JACKSON
1903–1986

Richard Meredith Jackson who was always known to his friends as Meredith, was a complex person. He consistently presented himself to the world as a radical critic of whatever was the establishment view on any subject; yet he was also a traditionalist. The son of a solicitor who was also a justice of the peace, he himself duly became both a solicitor and in due course a justice of the peace.

He was born on 19 August 1903, the second of the four sons of James Jackson and his wife Jenny May, whose maiden name was Parnell, and he was brought up in Northampton where his father practised. His mother died when he was thirteen and his father remarried. It seems to have been due to the influence of his stepmother, who was a Quaker, that at the age of fourteen he was sent to Sidcot, a small Quaker school in Somerset, from which in 1920 he moved for his last year to Leighton Park, the Quaker school near Reading. From there in 1921 he came up to St John’s College, Cambridge, to read law with a view to becoming a solicitor. He liked to appear different from the typical undergraduate. When the fashion was to wear flannel trousers and short hair, Meredith wore velveteen trousers and long hair. (In late middle age when long hair became common, he had a crew cut.)

In 1924 he graduated with a First Class in the Law Tripos and moved to London to serve his three years’ solicitors’ articles with the firm of Oswald Hickson and Collier, whose senior partner, Oswald Squire Hickson (1877–1944) has been described as ‘a liberal lawyer who took the idea of the Rule of Law seriously’.¹ He completed his articles, passed the Solicitors’ Finals, and was duly admitted on 11 January 1928. Then, instead of joining the family firm or practising in London, he returned to Cambridge to devote himself to academic law. It was then—and to some

extent still is—unusual for a solicitor to become an academic lawyer. Although in the legal profession solicitors outnumbered barristers by over ten to one, most of those who aspired to be academic lawyers found it more convenient to obtain a professional qualification by being called to the Bar. No post-graduate period of training corresponding to the three years of solicitors’ articles was required and the Bar Finals could be taken within a few months of the law degree. Furthermore as the ‘senior branch’ of the profession, the Bar exercised a dominant influence on legal education generally. In Meredith’s view, everything was directed towards the training of members of the Bar and the teaching was based on the assumption that all that mattered was what barristers and judges do in court. As a result little attention was paid in the law curriculum to what other lawyers did, and such important matters as drafting were virtually ignored.

Meredith had neither a college nor a faculty appointment and set himself up as a free-lance supervisor of undergraduates, while at the same time beginning serious research. In his teaching he covered the whole spectrum of subjects included in the Law Tripos, from Roman law to English constitutional law, but his personal research was in English legal history. There was then a general feeling, no doubt fostered by H. D. Hazeltine, the Downing Professor, and by P. H. Winfield, Meredith’s own teacher at St John’s, that an academic lawyer should prove his credentials in the history of the common law. Meredith chose the early history of quasi-contract, a particularly difficult topic, and a dissertation on that subject won him the Yorke Prize in 1931.

Since he had no college fellowship, he had to do a great deal of supervising to keep himself, and for this purpose hired a garret room looking on to the main gate of King’s College. It was reached by a steep staircase from the passage now leading to the Arts Theatre, which had not then been built. Of the wide range of subjects that he taught, he at that time found Roman law to be of particular intellectual satisfaction and was an admirer of W. W. Buckland’s lectures. Many undergraduates found these too difficult, but Meredith communicated to his own pupils his fascination with their quality. Most law supervisors saw their role as primarily to prepare their pupils for Tripos examinations and did not encourage them to criticize the law that they were learning. From the start, however, Meredith made his pupils look thoughtfully at the law and read even the judgments of appellate courts in a critical spirit. He taught that judgments should be criticized not only for the quality of their reasoning but also in
the light of the social purpose of the law being applied, a view which is now commonplace but which was rare in the early thirties.

In addition to his supervising, he was asked to give lectures for the Faculty of Law, which had just introduced into the first year a course on the English Legal System. Presumably under the direction of the Faculty, the course was then largely historical, with much from Maitland, Holdsworth, and even Maine's *Ancient Law*. One undergraduate who took the course in 1932–3, and who later himself became a leading professor of law wrote, of the English Legal System: 'For my generation it was quite the most exciting subject of the Tripos and Jackson’s lectures on it ranked with Buckland, McNair and Winfield.' His success in teaching this course was recognized by his appointment as Lecturer in Law in the University in 1934, but he still had no college fellowship.

In 1936 he published his first book: *The History of Quasi-Contract in English Law* (it was reprinted in the USA in 1986). It was the tenth in the series, *Cambridge Studies in English Legal History*, under the general editorship of Professor H. D. Hazeltine, ran to some 130 pages and cost 10s. 6d. Part I, which dealt with the story down to the late seventeenth century, consisted in substance of the essay which had won him the Yorke Prize. Part II, written subsequently, dealt with the ensuing developments. The work gained its author the LLD degree in 1938.

P. H. Winfield had already marked out the frontiers of what in the *Province of the Law of Tort* (1931) he described as the 'ill-explored country' occupied by quasi-contractual obligations in English law. It was into this formidable terrain of the Year Books and early cases that Meredith boldly ventured. Indeed in the estimation of P. A. Landon, the chief feature of the book was the 'immense industry which Mr. Jackson has shown in examining the original authorities', and another reviewer remarked that 'the industry and thoroughness of the author cannot be too highly praised'. A particular feature of the research was a substantial increase in our knowledge of the action of account, which involved the demolition of Langdell's general theory. An expert like P. A. Landon could find 'remarkably few slips' in the

\[2\] (1937) 53 L.Q.R. 272.
book, but considered the title ‘somewhat of a misnomer’, because Jackson dealt only with the common law writs, whereas a full history of quasi-contract in English law would have dealt with the rise of the trust concept, with the equitable doctrines of subrogation and tracing, and with the development of the rules of salvage in the Court of Admiralty. But it is clear from the Editor’s Preface that Meredith had restricted his study to the history of quasi-contract at common law, and Landon himself concedes that a full history would have been ‘unwieldy and of little practical value’. Nevertheless there is a good deal to be said for Landon’s suggestion that the book ought preferably to have been entitled, The History of Quasi-Contract in the Common Law Courts.

One is intrigued to find that Meredith stated in his Preface that he hoped before long to write a book on the modern law of quasi-contract. Such a book was unfortunately never written. His interests turned away from private law completely, concentrating instead for the remainder of his working life mainly on criminal law and public law and administration.

At first Meredith took a critical interest in the operation of the criminal law. In an article, ‘Absolute Prohibition in Statutory Offences’, he drew attention to the increase in the number of offences in which a guilty mind was not required and noted that the courts were readier than they had been to construe statutes as imposing absolute liability. ‘So long as proper use is made of minimal punishment in cases of inadvertent offences there seems no reason to object to such stringent provisions.’ However some statutes produced odd results. Thus in R. v Larssonear (1933) the accused was convicted under orders made under the Aliens Restriction Acts in that she, ‘being an alien to whom leave to land in the United Kingdom had been refused, was found in the U.K.’. She had arrived at Holyhead in police custody after being deported from Ireland and was ‘found’ in a police cell. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that since she satisfied all the requirements of the offence the conviction was correct. As Meredith observed: ‘It is a nice distinction: if being in a place is absolutely prohibited by statute, and you are taken to that place by physical compulsion certainly you did not go there (for it is not your act), but if you are “found” there, it is no good saying that you did not arrive there.’

6 (1933) 97 J.P. 206.
In an article, ‘Jury Trial Today’, he challenged the usual view that juries were the main protection of the liberty of the subject, particularly where political issues were involved. Edward Jenks had said that in sedition trials ‘the sturdy independence of juries was a real safeguard against oppression and a strong justification of the jury system’. Meredith commented: ‘I have examined many of the late eighteenth century trials for seditious libel and failed to find any justification for this view. In reading these cases I found it quite impossible to predict what the jury was going to do; for every acquittal there was a conviction to balance it. The only cure for admiration of these juries is to read the State Trials and ponder over the possibility that if the printer put ‘guilty’ when he meant ‘not guilty’ and vice versa you would not have noticed anything odd.’ The explanation, he thought, lay in the qualification and mode of selection of jurors, which led to juries whose composition was confined to the middle and upper classes. He tested this by examining ‘a ward in Cambridge that consists partly of working class houses, old and new, and partly of middle class houses,’ and showed that ‘it is only by some stretch of the imagination that a working class prisoner can be said to be tried by “twelve representatives of his countrymen”’.

The technique of testing received opinions against the facts was extended to the whole system of courts in Meredith’s most famous work, *The Machinery of Justice in England*. It appeared in 1940 but its full impact was delayed until the end of the war when it had an enormous influence on the first generation of post-war undergraduates. The preface stated that its object was ‘to explain the system of law courts and allied matters relating to the administration of justice’. Previously this was hardly considered to be a ‘subject’, but, as he explained, ‘thought about law has changed a good deal in the last twenty years. The attempt to treat law as a pure science isolated from the society it serves is succumbing to a more sociological approach.’ The work had grown out of his teaching of the English Legal System but the emphasis on history, which characterized his course a few years before, was abandoned. He now scoffed at the fact that ‘academic tradition has there succeeded in imposing a mass of historical study to satisfy the idea that it is cultural to know what happened in the middle ages and not to know what happens in the twentieth century’.

The work explained the course of both civil actions and

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criminal prosecutions and in connection with the latter included sections on juvenile courts, the probation service, and a particularly thoughtful account of the technique of sentencing. His criticism of the working of magistrates' courts was searching, particularly in relation to the ascendancy of the police. As he observed, few laymen come to realize that 'police veracity is no lower and no higher than that of the average respectable citizen'.

Under the heading 'Personnel of the Law' he discussed fusion of the two branches of the profession and offered a balanced account of the appointment and status of judges, noting drily that 'English conditions tend to produce a certain measure of uniformity in the outlook of the judges'. He concluded this section with a statement made by the Lord Chief Justice at the Lord Mayor's Banquet in 1936: 'His Majesty's Judges are satisfied with the almost universal admiration in which they are held,' and commented: 'Complacency is a dangerous thing. So also is indiscriminate disparagement.' After dealing with costs and legal aid for the poor, he gave an illuminating account of the special administrative tribunals, which had recently been set up and to which he was to devote so much attention later. Finally he dealt with law reform and presented a strong case for establishing a Ministry of Justice. He then put forward his own plan for reorganizing the system of courts, in which the distinction between the High Court and county courts would be abolished and both replaced by district courts. Much of the book's success was due to its forthright style, e.g., 'Parliament has so arranged matters that the rich and officially poor may go to the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division ... and thereafter remarry, whilst the rest of the community may go to the magistrates' court ... and thereafter live in continence or adultery' (pp. 23–4). 'In libel cases the amount of damages is becoming a grim joke. It may be far cheaper to maim a man for life by knocking him down with a motor car than to call him an ass, unless of course the Court of Appeal holds that there was no evidence upon which the jury could have found that "ass" meant a stupid fellow, for possibly the only judicial knowledge of an ass is that it is equus asinus' (pp. 230–1).

The importance of The Machinery of Justice was immediately recognized. One reviewer commented on how unusual it was 'to get a book which combines accurate description of legal institutions with informed criticism and appraisal'. Another reviewer,
after declaring the strength of the work to be ‘the sound and balanced judgment with which the author weighs virtues and failings’ in the legal system, discerned some indications of bias: ‘in favour of something like socialism . . . in favour of the academic against the practising lawyer and in favour of the solicitors’ profession against the Bar.’ Since Meredith had clearly relished trailing his coat in these respects, as for example when he remarked in relation to law reform, ‘The Bar has little interest in anything but fees and etiquette,’ he would probably have admitted all these preferences.

*The Machinery of Justice* went through seven editions in Meredith’s lifetime and an eighth was in preparation at the time of his death. Sir Denis Dobson, formerly Permanent Secretary to the Lord Chancellor’s Department, writing in *The Times* after Meredith’s death,\(^9\) pointed out that, when the book first appeared, ‘the need for radical change in our system of legal administration was barely perceived and . . . Jackson was one of the first to stress the need for the law and its administration to be more readily responsive to changes in society. . . . The many changes over the whole field of legal administration during the past 40 years owe much to Jackson.’ Some observers have noted that subsequent editions of the *Machinery of Justice*, although still critical, were much mellower in tone than the first. This was probably the result of Meredith’s experiences during the Second World War.

When war broke out he was thirty-six, and an established scholar. An early marriage to Lydia Jibourtovitch had ended in divorce and in 1936 he had married Lenli, daughter of Alexander Tie Ten Quee, who had left China to settle in Jamaica, and was herself a Cambridge graduate. They remained devoted to each other until Meredith’s death fifty years later, and Lenli provided the stability in his personal life that he needed. They had two children, a son and a daughter. The son Sean followed his father to St John’s College, read law and rowed in the college first boat. His death in an accident at the age of 31 was a devastating blow to Meredith and Lenli.

For the greater part of his life Meredith engaged in vigorous recreations. In his youth he played rugby, he swam and he climbed; but the abiding passion of his life was undoubtedly the sea, and as a sailor he was to win considerable renown. As early as 1927 he crewed for a more experienced colleague in an attempt


to cross the Atlantic in a small craft which possessed neither engine nor radio nor life-raft. They nearly succeeded, but were dismasted in a storm while off Cape Farewell. By heroic efforts they managed to keep afloat for six days and were then rescued by a passing merchant ship. Nothing daunted, Meredith later acquired a boat of his own and subsequently gained a reputation among undergraduates who crewed for him as a fearless sailor who particularly enjoyed navigating in storms.

In 1940 he was included in a scheme for calling up academics for Government service, but his papers were mislaid for some months and he served in the Home Guard while waiting for his assignment to the Home Office, where he worked in the Criminal Division from 1941 to 1945. In 1942 he became a justice of the peace for Cambridgeshire. A year later he was made Secretary of the Departmental Committee on Justices' Clerks, whose report was published in March 1944 (Cmd. 6507). One who worked for Meredith in the Home Office at this time wrote after his death that he always seemed 'in all senses larger than life. He was abrasive, moody, compassionate and stimulating. Under him such thorny subjects as "The deduction of income tax from maintenance orders" became exciting voyages of discovery.'... He also cared deeply about the magistrates' courts. How infuriated he became when people referred to them as police courts! He constantly reviled them for incompetence and prejudice, but he always believed in them and we learned to, too. He cared about justice.'

Meredith's experience with the Committee on Justices' Clerks made him a natural choice as secretary of the more important Royal Commission on Justices of the Peace in 1946. This was an arduous assignment particularly as he had left the Home Office and returned to Cambridge, where St John's College made him a Fellow in 1946. Yet despite the demands of teaching the large post-war classes of undergraduates, he dealt expeditiously with the work of the Royal Commission, which presented its Report in 1948 (Cmd. 7463). Its recommendations were substantially implemented in the Justices of the Peace Act 1949.

He had resumed his lectures on the English Legal System for a few years (they now included much about the work of JPs), but increasingly he was becoming interested in the wider aspects of government and in the relationship between central and local government. He realized that, as a result of the recently enacted

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Town and Country Planning Act, the local authorities were assuming ever greater powers in relation to the ordinary citizen. He himself was elected to Cambridgeshire County Council as a Labour Party member in 1946 and in his first year was a member of its Education, Valuation, Water Supply and Sewage, and Local Pensions Committees. The following year he became Chairman of the County Planning Committee. This led inexorably to his nomination in 1948 to membership of the Departmental Committee on Qualifications of Planners, which presented its Report in 1950 (Cmd. 8059). He also served on the Local Government and General Purposes and the Road Safety Committees of the County Council. In 1950 the University promoted him to be Reader in Public Law and Administration.

Since these developments had not been reflected in the Cambridge curriculum, he took an active part in setting up a public law section in the postgraduate LLB course, so that the new law and practice could be subjected to proper academic scrutiny. His local government experience led to invitations to advise the Control Commission in the British Zone of occupied Germany. Between 1949 and 1951 he paid a number of visits there and was invited by the government of Lower Saxony to advise on their draft legislation in 1953. In 1954 there was yet another government inquiry in the form of membership of the Royal Commission on Mental Health Services. That Commission presented its Report in 1957 (Cmd. 169), but by then Meredith was already involved with the Departmental Committee on Children and Young Persons, which sat from 1956 to 1960.

During this period he gave several talks on the BBC Third Programme on such topics as magistrates, sentencing, Committees of Inquiry, and compulsory purchase of land, all based on his personal experiences. Despite his immersion in the affairs of local government, he sat regularly as an (unpaid) justice of the peace and some talks reflected the viewpoint of the magisterial bench, e.g., ‘A magistrate looks at motorists’, ‘A magistrate looks at parking’.

Meredith took his magisterial duties seriously. He served on the Council of the Magistrates’ Association continuously from 1948 until 1972, when he retired from the Bench and was made Vice-President of the Association. He was Chairman of its Legal Committee from 1952 until 1961 and again from 1968 until 1972. He drafted the Association’s written evidence to the Royal Commission on the Police in 1960 and gave oral evidence to the Commission in January 1961.
In the post-war period some of Meredith's colleagues commented that he was no longer the rebel that he had been before the war but rather the elder statesman, doubtful of the wisdom of changing the Law Tripos and generally suspicious of its reform. However others, who remembered the precise nature of his complaints in the 1930s, observed that what he had warned against then was a parochialism which resulted in excessive concentration on a narrow range of 'practical' subjects of English private law with the consequent restriction of the more historical, international and jurisprudential aspects of law, and it was precisely that trend he was now opposing. He abhorred above all a narrowly technical view of legal education and felt that Cambridge particularly, with its large Law Faculty, should take a broad view of law as an academic subject.

It is not surprising, after the success of *The Machinery of Justice* and with the benefit of his personal experience as a county councillor, that Meredith should have decided to write about local government as well. *The Machinery of Local Government* first appeared in 1958, a second edition following in 1965. This was not (nor was it intended to be) a legal textbook, but rather a general description of the English system, but excluding the special position of London. It was written, as he tells us in the Preface, 'from a mixture of direct experience, observation and discussion'. The book met a definite need of the time. Following the urging by Mr Creech Jones, as Secretary of State in 1947, of the immediate introduction of democratic local government in all African colonies, a constant flow of colonial administrators had started to come to England to study our system. What these visitors required, and what traditional expositions of the law of local government failed to provide, was a description of what actually happens inside the committee room, how the chairman prepares himself for the meeting, and what part is played by political parties. This is exactly what this book provided. Moreover it was not purely descriptive: one of the most interesting chapters discusses the arguments for and against the running of councils on party political lines, Meredith's own view being that party politics have contributed very little to local government.

What assessment did he make of our system of local government as a whole? Rather surprisingly, perhaps, it met with his general approval, and while he certainly conceded that it did have some unresolved problems, there is an air almost of complacency about this book. Thus in his Preface he states that 'the English system fills the bill remarkably well', and in his
concluding chapter he is confident that local government is ‘one
of the more stable institutions’. Little did he foresee, at that stage
at least, the upheavals which were to take place later in his
lifetime.

B. Keith-Lucas, writing soon after the first edition appeared,\textsuperscript{12}
complained that the book said little about parish councils and
small district councils (this was perhaps not surprising seeing that
Meredith’s own experience was at the county council level). He
also took the author to task for appearing to underestimate the
importance and status of the Clerks (now of course known as
Chief Executives) and ‘failing to give them the credit they
deserve as advisers and administrators of great ability’, and this
perhaps is a fair criticism. Subject to these two points however,
this reviewer hailed the book as ‘an admirable presentation of the
machinery of local government and a most welcome change from
the usual legalistic account’.

The work on local government in England led to further
invitations to look at its working elsewhere. Already in 1954 he
had gone to inquire into local government in Nigeria, and in
1963 he was appointed sole Commissioner to inquire into the
operation of local government in Barbados. The distinction of his
work was recognized in overseas universities too. In 1962–3 he
took sabbatical leave from Cambridge to accept an appointment
as Visiting Professor at McGill University in Montreal. How
should he get there? He had already sailed to Spitzbergen more
than once and in 1961 the Royal Cruising Club awarded him its
Challenge Cup for the best cruise of the year for a voyage there.
He was beginning to suffer from arthritis of the hip but that did
not deter him from sailing his boat, the Isbjorn, to Canada and up
the St Lawrence, and bringing her back the following year,
gaining him the Challenge Cup for a second time. Later he was
to sail across the Atlantic and back yet again before the necessity
of a hip operation in 1966 finally obliged him to change to a
smaller boat and confine himself to shorter cruises.

In 1966 Meredith was elected both to the Downing Professor-
ship of the Laws of England and to a Fellowship of the British
Academy. The following year he published two books on crimi-
nal justice. The first, Justice of the Peace, was formally a new
edition of a work by Leo Page which first appeared in 1931, with
a second edition in 1947, but it was extensively rewritten by
Meredith with the assistance of P. J. Halnan, Clerk to the

\textsuperscript{12} (1959) 75 L.Q.R. 115.
Cambridge County Justices (now His Hon. Judge Halnan). In the other work, *Enforcing the Law*, of which a revised edition was published as a Penguin Book in 1972, his aim was to show that 'the processes of the criminal law are far less effective than is generally supposed. The showy part is the conviction and sentence, dramatised by judges in the belief that if punishment is severe and publicity widespread there will be less crime. Behind the showy parts lie the problems of police—the prevention of crime, and its detection and successful prosecution' (pp. 234–5). The work reflected the interest its author had taken in the development of the Cambridge Institute of Criminology under Sir Leon Radzinowicz and was dedicated to him. The criticisms of the criminal process were strong but were always supported by constructive suggestions for improvement. Meredith did not believe in general deterrence: 'Naive colonial administrators have on occasion listened to economists who have told them that if rewards were increased productivity would rise, and it didn't. Economic man is now seen to be a creature of myth, but deterrent-controlled man is supposed to be a reality' (p. 214).

What was needed was to make crime more difficult to commit and to increase facilities for detection. Shoplifting, for example, could be discouraged and its detection promoted by design and layout. This is now generally accepted, but it was not so in 1967. Some academics had criticized the retention of offences of strict liability, on which Meredith had written thirty years before. He now put the case for them with a characteristic vigour: 'we do want well-run pubs, foodstuffs that are properly constituted, described, measured and hygienically handled, and roads on which we are reasonably safe from blithering idiots, whether their idiocy comes from their arrogance or from their incompetence' (p. 25). Criminal process from detection to sentence was a necessity. Meredith wanted it to be as effective as possible and no aspect of it, however hallowed by tradition, was immune from his axe.

In 1970 Meredith retired from his Chair but he continued for a while to supervise for his college. Two years later he retired from active work as a magistrate and transferred to the supplemental list, but he remained active as a scholar and worked on new editions of *The Machinery of Justice* until his death on 8 May 1986.

Meredith will be remembered not only as a scholar and public servant, but as an intrepid sailor. Those undergraduates (including a future High Court judge) and other young people who were fortunate enough to be invited to be members of his crews
learned much from him, and not only about the sea. The flavour of life on board one of Meredith’s vessels is neatly captured by a passage from his report to the Royal Cruising Club on one of his Atlantic crossings. Evidently he suffered the usual difficulties of a skipper in getting the young to rise at what he regarded as a reasonable hour, and he noticed that if allowed bread and jam at tea-time they ate so much that they did not want supper until late—and then were sleepier than ever next morning. ‘The technique’, wrote Meredith in his report, ‘is to have sweet biscuits, nicely calculated to stave off mutiny yet leave their hunger to develop so that they will want a meal at a reasonable hour. On such fine points do passages depend . . .’

What many of his friends found astonishing was the absence of any formal honours from the State, surely the fitting reward for a lifetime of such distinguished public service. One suspects that the reason may lie in the radicalism of his youth; yet in later years his writings were certainly not those of a rebel, and in many ways he became a pillar of the establishment. There remained, however, a certain gruffness in his manner, which disconcerted some, and in addition, when involved in conversation in a group, he was often prone (generally with good reason in view of his mastery of the subject matter) to pontificate. Inevitably this led some of his colleagues both in the college and in the Law Faculty to be a little chary of his company. Yet this façade was deceptive, and his close friends knew full well the qualities of warmth and compassion which lay beneath the surface.

As has been stated, Meredith was no stranger to adversity. But the tragic loss of his son, together with his own physical problems later in life, when he suffered from both diabetes and arthritis, and finally, shortly before the end, the amputation of a leg, never quenched his indomitable spirit: suffering was invariably borne by him with a stoic fortitude. In a report to the Royal Cruising Club after an Atlantic crossing he wrote: ‘I would have liked a lot more icebergs, but the first rule of cruising is to bear cheerfully with what the Lord sends.’ He would have agreed, no doubt, that this rule is not confined to cruising.

PETER G. STEIN
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We gratefully acknowledge the help given us in writing this obituary by Mrs Lenli Jackson and Professor Sir Robert Jennings QC.

14 Ibid.