RALEIGH LECTURE ON HISTORY

THE ISTMUS REPAIRED:
THE RESURGENCE OF THE
ENGLISH ARISTOCRACY, 1660-1760

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On 6 February 1649 the House of Commons, in its Rump form, resolved that the House of Lords was ‘useless and dangerous, and ought to be abolished’. A month later and the deed was done.¹ It was a speed of execution that even Mr Wedgwood Benn might envy. The tone is so blunt, direct, and uncompromising that one might imagine we had strayed into the 1790s and were listening to Tom Paine. It would have taken a remarkably shrewd observer in 1649 to have predicted that the eighteenth century, when it came, would be neither democratic nor noticeably egalitarian, but dominated by the Russells and the Cavendishes, the Berties and the Montagus. James Harrington, crediting the House of Lords with the role of equipoise or balance between crown and people, was convinced that the constitution was beyond repair. In the Commonwealth of Oceana, published in 1656, he observed that the House of Peers, ‘which alone had stood in this gap, now sinking down between the King and the Commons, showed that Crassus was dead, and Isthmus broken’.²

In fact, news of the death of Crassus (like that of Mark Twain) was greatly exaggerated and, in the form of the English peerage, he made a remarkable recovery. It is that recovery which I want to discuss. You will, I hope, forgive me if my remarks are necessarily rather general in character. This is in part because it is not a theme that has attracted much attention from historians,

¹ CG vi. 132. The second reading was on 7 March and the third on 19 March; CG vi. 158, 168.
² The Political Works of James Harrington, ed. J. G. A. Pocock, p. 198. Marcus Crassus is said by Lucan (Pharsalia, i. 99–103) to have held the balance between Caesar and Pompey, his death rendering civil war inevitable: ‘Nam sola futuri | Crassus erat belli medius mora. Qualiter, undas | qui secat et geminum gracilis mare separat Isthmos | Nec patitur conferre fretum, si terra recedat, | Ionium Aegaeo frangat mare . . .’
save, perhaps, in its economic aspect. Edward Miller has described the abolition of the House of Lords as 'astonishing', and Professor J. H. Hexter referred to the revival of the prestige of the aristocracy after 1660 as 'one of the most annoying perplexities of the period'. Edward Miller’s remark, with perceptive comments, is in a review of L. Stone, *The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558–1641*, in *Historical Journal* (1966), 133–6; Hexter’s is in *On Historians*, p. 218.

Professor Sir John Plumb has, of course, written with great distinction on the growth of political stability, but that is a theme parallel to mine. Certainly the landed and propertied classes have an especial interest in stability in any period, but the question tonight is why political stability took an essentially aristocratic form. This neglect is in marked contrast with European and particularly French historiography. The revival of the French nobility after the death of Louis XIV, of the Swedish nobility after Charles XII, and the Russian nobility after Peter the Great, has prompted much scholarly investigation. Indeed, the latest revisionist writing in French history has cast doubt on whether there was an aristocratic revival. It is a little ironic that the revival of the French nobility, which may not have taken place at all, should have been so much discussed, while the revival of the English nobility, which almost certainly did take place, should have been, by comparison, ignored.

I say ‘almost certainly’ not merely out of the nervousness that afflicts historians when they stray even a few decades from their well-trodden paths. There are two specific reasons for caution. First, a group of able young historians, some five years ago, strenuously denied the Harrington–Stone thesis that the peerage was in difficulties immediately before the civil war. You will find their articles in the *Journal of Modern History* for 1977. I have not time to do justice to their arguments, and must content myself with remarking that the counter-attack launched upon them by Professor Hexter and Derek Hirst in the following volume seems to

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me very persuasive. Secondly, some of my audience may feel that my starting-point distorts the problem—that by beginning with the abolition of the House of Lords I have posed the question melodramatically. It has been put to me that the circumstances of the 1640s were wholly exceptional. On reflection, I remain unrepentant. I do not think that historians can really talk about exceptional circumstances: they cannot pick and choose which developments in the past to acknowledge—they are stuck with what happened. I speak severely, but it is mitigated by the fact that one of the worst examples I came across was in my own writing. The attitude seems to me to be dangerously teleological—as though what happened should really not have happened, as though it were, somehow, a mistake. I have argued elsewhere that historians are fully entitled to make use of hindsight, but the amount of hindsight employed in this kind of attitude worries even me.

I am, of course, prepared to concede that men did not set out in 1640 to destroy the monarchy and replace it by a commonwealth, that their motives were short-term and tactical rather than strategic. Historical motives often are: that does not, in itself, put them into a special category. Blair Worden, in his admirable book on the Rump Parliament, suggested that the Lords were abolished largely because attendance had dwindled to the point when the House no longer retained credibility. That is certainly true. In 1649 their lordships were reduced to the same handful of six or seven peers—Pembroke, Grey, Denbigh, Nottingham, Mulgrave,


2 My own comment on the fading of radical reform after 1660 was that the lower orders had acquired during the war an influence which they could not, in any normal period, sustain. The phrase in italics adds nothing to the explanation and could, with advantage, be deleted (Parliamentary reform, 1640–1832, p. 23).

3 The Historian at Work, pp. 9–11.

4 The Rump Parliament, 1648–1653, p. 172: ‘There was little to be said for propping up a House of Lords deserted by the overwhelming majority of its members.’
Salisbury. When the survivors demanded a call of the House—
‘peremptorily’—for 28 December 1648 it produced no more than
eight peers out of a possible 150 or so. But it is not the whole truth.
Dr Worden observed that the republicanism of 1649 was ‘mere
improvisation’. I think that needs to be qualified, at least as far as
the abolition of the Lords is concerned. First, the tiny attendance
in the Lords in 1649 was itself the product of previous political
decisions—it was not some freak of fortune. Secondly, the Lords
were in open conflict with the majority in the Commons: when, on
2 January 1649, twelve lords were persuaded to attend, they
voted, nem. con., not to support the trial of the King. Thirdly, we
must bear in mind the very vigorous propaganda directed against
the authority of the Lords during the previous three years by
Lilburne and Overton. That campaign had made considerable
progress in the ranks of the army—to which the hand-to-mouth
version of events hardly does justice. Disaster did not over-
whelm the Lords out of a clear sky, and the Commons’ resolution,
I remind you, declared that the Lords were both useless and
dangerous.

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Most of the discussion that has taken place on this subject has been
concerned with the economic recovery of the peerage after 1660.
I do not wish to add much to that now, partly because I have
recently had an opportunity to comment elsewhere. It is not easy
to establish the economic dimensions of the problem we are trying
to discuss. The heroic attempt by Professor Lawrence Stone—
running to more than 800 pages—to delineate a financial crisis of
the aristocracy before the civil war, did not command total
acceptance. In particular, D. C. Coleman, J. H. Hexter, and
Gerald Aylmer argued, in my view with some justice, that if there
had been a crisis—to be revealed by the counting of manors—it
had been at the end of Elizabeth’s reign, and by the time of the civil
war was largely resolved. Joan Thirsk and Sir John Habakkuk
have shown that the war itself was less damaging to the fortunes of
the greater royalists than had been supposed, even if some of the

1 LJx. 636-7, 639.  2 LJx. 642.
3 In the Wiles Lectures, delivered at The Queen’s University, Belfast, in
May 1982 and to be published by Cambridge University Press.
4 D. C. Coleman, ‘The “Gentry” controversy and the aristocracy in crisis,
English aristocracy’, On Historians, chapter iv, pp. 149–226; G. Aylmer, Past and
Present (1965), 113–25.
lesser families were dragged down. The growth of the great landed estates in the later seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries has been, and continues to be, the subject of vigorous debate. But while there is general agreement that the greater estates, including those of the peerage, prospered in that period it is hardly unfair to say that the extent remains doubtful, the timing obscure, and the causes uncertain. The scale of the economic advance, while sufficient to support a change of regime, scarcely seems enough to necessitate it.

Dr Christopher Clay, one of those who has most persistently challenged the importance of the strict settlement or entail as a factor promoting the growth of the great estates, has recently pointed out that the sale of estates by landowners was most likely when there was a change of family ownership, with no direct male heir. If there were several daughters, the estates might be split: even if there was one heiress, the receiving family might not be sensitive about selling off what were, to them, outlying estates.


3 'Property settlements, financial provision for the family, and sale of land by the greater landowners', Journal of British Studies, xxi. 1 (Fall 1981), 18–38.
Lawrence Stone tells us that the extinction rate of peerage families in the seventeenth century remained high, remarking that ‘this inexorable attrition destroyed any prospect of maintaining the peerage as a self-perpetuating closed caste’. It may therefore be of some consequence to note that there was a considerable fall in the extinction rate of the peerage in the course of the eighteenth century.

For purposes of comparison, it is essential that extinction rates should be calculated on the same basis and with the same assumptions. My own tables assess the survival of peerages from the date of creation for one hundred years. This, of course, draws an arbitrary distinction between peerages which survived only 99 years and those which tottered on for 101 years. Nevertheless, it enables comparisons to be made over different periods.

The rate of extinction of the peerage creations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries runs, according to my calculations, at substantially over 50 per cent. Those created by James I, for example, run at 54 per cent and those created during the reign of Charles II (after the Restoration) run at nearly 59 per cent. In the course of the following century, however, the extinction rate fell. For peerages created between 1720 and 1739, and between 1760 and 1779, it was as low as 33 per cent, and though there was some increase in extinction rates for peerages created between 1800 and 1819, the very high levels of earlier centuries were not reached.

Part of the reason for the longer life expectation for peerages is clear—the placid and peaceable nature of Hanoverian politics compared with the unhealthy excitement of earlier epochs. The dreary round of attainders and executions which marked the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, together with considerable risk of dying in battle, gave way to the tiny hazard of death in a duel. For those who like the obvious quantified, more than 30 per cent of the fifteenth-century peerage met violent deaths, 9.2 per cent in the sixteenth century, 6.6 per cent in the seventeenth century (despite the death of thirteen peers in the civil war), and a mere 0.7 per cent in the eighteenth century. The reign of George III was at least safer to be a peer in.

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3 Killed in battle during the civil wars were Lords Brooke, Carnarvon, Denbigh, Kingston, Lindsey, Northampton, Sunderland, and Widdrington;
The second reason for the improving survival rate for eighteenth-century peers is, I hope, rather less apparent—the increased use of the device of the special remainder. The normal patent provided for descent by tail male—to the male heirs of the grantee. But those with particular favour might be permitted extended terms. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, special remainders were granted sparingly—to existing noblemen on promotion, or to particular favourites such as George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, in 1617, or Henry Bennet, raised to an earldom in 1672 four months before his daughter, to whom the special remainder applied, married the young Duke of Grafton, son of Charles II by Lady Castlemaine. After 1714, the Whig nobility availed themselves very freely of the device, and during the reign of George I nearly half the peerages granted included special remainders to brothers, uncles, cousins, daughters, or younger sons. The laws of genetics could not be suspended, even for the Whigs, but they could be mitigated. The result was some strange remainders. Since it was inconvenient to remove Sir Robert Walpole from the House of Commons, a barony was granted in 1725 to his eldest son, with a special remainder in favour of his brothers, father, and the heirs of his grandfather in turn. In theory, therefore, father might have succeeded son in the peerage. The Irish peer, Lord Coningsby, had divorced his first wife and disinherited her son; his English patent in 1716 therefore stipulated descent to the heirs male of any subsequent wife. The Duke of Newcastle, as befitted the doyen of the Whigs, sprouted special remainders, since his own marriage was childless. His first titles in 1714 and 1715 contained remainders to his younger brother, who predeceased him; in 1756 his dukedom of Newcastle upon Tyne was superseded by another as Duke of Newcastle under Lyme, with descent to a nephew; and in 1762, for good measure, he obtained a barony to go by a separate route to a cousin.

Coupled with an austere attitude towards new creations for executed were Lords Cambridge, Capel, Derby, Holland, and Strafford. Violent deaths did not, of course, necessarily mean the extinction of a peerage. Four successive Lords Clifford died in battle between 1391 and 1461 without the peerage itself becoming extinct. It is also true that many attainders were subsequently reversed or remedied by a new creation. An attainder on the Cliffords was reversed by Henry VII in 1485, and Thomas Cromwell's son was granted a barony in 1540 five months after his father's execution. Nevertheless, the tendency was to hasten extinctions.

2 Viscount Bolingbroke obtained a similar special remainder in Anne's reign.
much of the century, the slow rate of extinction made the English
peerage more of a Venetian oligarchy (to use Disraeli's term) than
it ever had been. But, even if the worst happened, and a title
became extinct, it by no means followed that the estates would be
lost to the nobility. Often they passed, without the title, to
brothers, nephews, or cousins. Lord Wilmington's property in
1743 went to his cousin the Earl of Northampton; the wealth of the
last of the Godolphins went, in 1785, via a sister, to the Osbornes,
Dukes of Leeds. When the estates passed to a daughter or
daughters, the peerage had an exceptional chance of acquiring
them. We can trace the estates of twenty-two peerages which
became extinct in the eighteenth century, leaving the inheritance
to a daughter or daughters. For the purposes of simplification,
I shall ignore younger daughters. Of the twenty-two heiresses,
seventeen married peers or the heirs of peers. They spurned mere
barons or viscounts, capturing nine earls and eight dukes. Of the
remaining five, one married the younger son of an earl and was
made a peeress in her own right; two others married the grandsons
of peers, who were themselves raised to the peerage. The fate of the
other two is particularly revealing. The only heiress to marry
a commoner was the eldest daughter of the last Baron Langdale
(though her two younger sisters married barons). The Langdales
were a Catholic family with estates at Holme in Yorkshire, out
of favour, and comparatively poor. Only one of the twenty-two
remained unmarried. Lady Charlotte Rich was daughter of the
last Earl of Warwick; the estates had become alienated from the
title, the family was said to be too poor to educate its own children,
and the last Earl existed on royal bounty. Hanoverian peers were
not notoriously sentimental and nobody made an offer for Lady
Charlotte. Whether she was more unlucky than others who did
find a husband must remain a matter of conjecture. When the
last Earl of Carbury (Baron Vaughan) died in 1713, extremely
wealthy, there was an unseemly rush after the heiress, Lady Anne.
Lords Lumley and Hertford were reported to be in hot pursuit,
but she was snapped up within six months of her father's death by
the future Duke of Bolton. The property safely digested, he
declared an unconquerable aversion to her person, abandoned
her, and set up house with the actress Lavinia Fenton.¹

¹ The Complete Letters of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, ed. R. Halsband, i.
236–7; H. Walpole to W. Cole, 21 June 1782, The Yale Edition of Horace Walpole's
Correspondence, ii. 328–9.
I must not allow picturesque detail to divert me from my main purpose. I wish now to suggest, in broad outline, some of the political developments which may have helped to enhance the standing and influence of the nobility.

Lord Chancellor Clarendon, at the Restoration, was among those inclined, publicly at least, to dismiss the vicissitudes of the peerage during the Great Rebellion as little local difficulties. ‘Your Lordships’, he told the peers in December 1660, ‘will easily recover that estimation and reverence that is due to your high condition . . . no nobility in Europe is so entirely beloved by the people: there may be more awe, and fear, and terror of them, but no such love towards them as in England.’ Gratifying though it must have been to the peers to receive these assurances, they should not be regarded as uncontaminated evidence. A more disinterested observer was the French traveller, Samuel de Sorbière, who observed that in England ‘la haute noblesse est insupportablement fière et orgueilleuse’—unbearably haughty and arrogant. We cannot accept, with Clarendon, that once the soundness of the English people and their deep affection for the peerage had reasserted itself, all would be well.¹

Though the crucial decisions were made by Monk and the army, the Lords played some part in the Restoration.² On 25 April 1660, at the opening of Parliament, ten peers gathered, thanked Monk for his services, and begged him to restore ‘the ancient, fundamental government of this nation’. Monk made a suitably

¹ L, J xi. 238.
² Relation d’un voyage en Angleterre (1664; reprinted Cologne, 1666), 124. It is only fair to add that Sorbière’s account of English life was strenuously contested, particularly in T. Sprat, Observations on M. de Sorbière’s voyage into England. Written to Dr. Wren (1665). But in a volume of 298 pages, in which Sorbière was dismissed as a ‘vain traveller, an empty politician, an insolent pedant and an idle pretender to learning’, Sprat did not challenge the comment on the peerage. In any case, as an aspiring bishop, Sprat had motives of his own, and was at particular pains to refute Sorbière’s political views: ‘he insinuates that the true sovereign power amongst us resides in the People. Which is a doctrine that was scarce ever heard of in England till the year forty eight and vanished in sixty. He affirms, that there is a mixture of all sorts of government in the composition of our state, notwithstanding that we have so many acts of Parliament that devolve the whole power on the crown’ (p. 180).
³ Their titles had been preserved, somewhat incongruously, during the republican period. The Earl of Pembroke had served in the House of Commons as knight of the shire for Berkshire, and the Earl of Salisbury and Lord Howard of Escrick had been returned for King’s Lynn and Carlisle respectively. Seven peers had been nominated by Oliver Cromwell to his ‘other house’ in January 1658, but only Lords Eure and Fauconberg had taken their seats.
gnomic reply, advising their lordships to 'look forward, and not backward, in transacting of affairs'. Charles II, from Breda, was more expansive, declaring to the peers his joy that 'you are again acknowledged to have that authority . . . which hath always belonged to you, by your birth and the fundamental laws of the land'. The return of the bishops took longer and was a matter of some contention. The act depriving them of their seats had passed in February 1642 and received the royal assent: it was therefore still in force and a new act restoring them was required in July 1661.

While the Restoration settlement was inconclusive in general, there was some slight shift towards the Lords. The House regained its authority as the supreme court of appeal on the abolition of Star Chamber. The theory of a balanced constitution, with the Lords acting as pivot, had received much publicity following Charles I's Answer to the Nineteen Propositions, and the dictatorial rule, first of the Rump, then of the Army, strengthened the case for some moderating mechanism. Indeed, it would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that the protracted constitutional disputes of the Commonwealth period turned mainly on the question of the composition and functions of a second chamber.

The monarchy emerged stripped of its prerogative courts, including the Court of Wards. These limitations did not prevent Charles II and James II waging over the next twenty-eight years a vigorous campaign to restore royal power. In their struggles with Parliament, the remaining prerogative powers of dispensation and suspension, together with the prorogation and dissolution of Parliament, were of fundamental importance. The House of Commons emerged with enhanced prestige and greatly increased experience of government. Its regular summoning was guaranteed by the Triennial Act of 1641, which remained on the statute book, and contained specific sanctions against any repetition of the eleven years without Parliament. But these guarantees were lost by its repeal in 1664. It was replaced by a purely pious act, relying upon the monarch to summon Parliament within three years, but making no provision against his failure to do so. The delight of Charles II on that occasion was marked by an imprudent speech in which he declared that England was once more a monarchy in the eyes of Europe, foreshadowing his disregard even of the watered-down act in the 1680s. By the end of his reign, vigorous use of the power of dissolution, the remodelling of the parliamentary corporations,

1 LJ xi. 3-4; 7.
the improvement in royal finances, and the steady growth of the standing army were striking what appeared to be decisive blows at the efficacy of parliamentary control, and laying the foundations for a very formidable monarchy.¹

Clearly, the central issue of the Civil Wars, the relationship of crown and Parliament, remained unresolved. No doubt the peerage could have accommodated itself to an emphatic royal victory, but the resulting power-structure, with a great enhancement of the influence of central government, would have been very different from that which emerged after 1688.

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Professor Hexter once remarked that historians are uneasy about the English Revolution.² If that is so, they are positively embarrassed by the Glorious Revolution. It is strange that events which are, after all, hardly in dispute, should be so difficult to get into focus. Professor J. R. Jones, one of the most recent and successful commentators on the Glorious Revolution, tells us that 'most modern historians deny to the events of 1688/9 the title of a real revolution'.³ One American historian, Lucile Pinkham, has even described it as 'the respectable revolution', as though that automatically neutered it, or rendered it contemptible.⁴

There are several reasons for this dismissiveness towards 1688. Some commentators have had their teeth set on edge by exuberant claims made on behalf of the Glorious Revolution by Whig historians such as Macaulay and Trevelyon: 1688, wrote the latter, was a turning-point in the history of our country and of the world—'Britain obtained, not only political and religious liberty, but national power.'⁵ This is so excessive that there is an understandable tendency to respond by denying the Revolution any consequences at all. Other historians are suspicious at the absence of bloodshed—at least if one ignores Ireland and Scotland and remains unsympathetic to James's nose-bleed at Salisbury. How could such a tepid affair have had important consequences?

Recent historians have offered more subtle reservations. In

¹ My argument is necessarily sketched out at this point. For an excellent recent article, arguing a similar case, see A. McInnes, 'When was the English Revolution?', History (October 1982), 377–92.
² On Historians, p. 218.
⁵ The English Revolution, 1688–9, p. 19.
tracing the growth of the governing order, Professor Pocock suggested, 'one might even question the importance of 1688 itself, considered as an isolated episode'. I am not quite sure who has been considering it as an isolated episode, nor whether that would be a very sensible thing to do. What I take Professor Pocock to mean is that the consequences seem sometimes to have been by-products of the Revolution and that there was a kind of delayed action before the full implications of the Revolution became apparent. I think this is too often the case in history for it to be a distinguishing characteristic of the Glorious Revolution. It is true—indeed it is something of a commonplace—that many of the constitutional limitations on the crown—the annual Parliaments, the Triennial Act of 1694, the Act of Settlement—came later; and it is sometimes argued that they were more the product of the war than of the Revolution. I think that interpretation is a little austere, when one recalls that William's primary purpose in risking the invasion was to engage British support in the European struggle. Professor Pocock puts forward a similar argument in relation to the Financial Revolution, which he sees as the most important consequence. 'It appears a momentous event indeed,' he writes of the Glorious Revolution, 'but not in itself a major alteration in the structure of British politics. The structural change comes a few years later, in what we are now accustomed to calling the Financial Revolution; and though it was a consequence of the events of 1688, it was neither foreseen nor intended by the actors in that memorable year.' But the Financial Revolution itself, I am sure Professor Pocock would agree, depended upon public confidence, and that public confidence could be given only to a parliamentary regime. Professor Clayton Roberts has demonstrated very convincingly that the majority in the Commons recognized at once the advantage against the monarchy which the Revolution had given them, determined immediately to keep the monarchs short of money as a guarantee of frequent parliaments, and that this was a deliberate, avowed, and intended policy.

It does not, of course, follow that, if the Glorious Revolution enhanced the standing of Parliament, it would necessarily increase the power of the peerage. It is true that the House of Lords, as well as the Commons, gained in both prestige and experience after 1688 by enjoying annual and longer Parliaments. Yet in the

1 Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776, ed. J. G. A. Pocock, pp. 269–70.
2 Ibid., p. 13.
persistent warfare with the House of Commons in the next thirty years or more, the House of Lords was scarcely able to sustain its own position, largely because it could not break the financial monopoly of the Commons. The comparative eclipse of the House of Lords as an institution may have helped to divert the attention of historians from other changes which were augmenting the political influence of the nobility.

In the first place, the Glorious Revolution gave a welcome boost to the reputation of the peerage. It had taken a much more prominent part than during the 1640s and it had acted decisively. Whereas during the civil wars the nobility had been divided and ineffective, the folly of James II had united it as never before, and in a cause which the vast majority of the people supported with passion. Indeed, for a few days in December 1688, the peers gave a lead to the nation. The balancing theory of the constitution became, momentarily, a living reality. In 1679 the Lords had opposed a domineering House of Commons and rejected Exclusion; nine years later they had opposed a domineering monarch, and saved the country from popery and despotism. Ideologically, the peerage lived off that moment of glory for the next one hundred and fifty years.

It was of substantial benefit to the peerage that it was now credited with a vital constitutional function to replace the old military and feudal one, which was clearly becoming obsolescent. In the words of Chatham, silken barons replaced the iron barons of old.1 At the same time, the nobility may have profited from the growing feeling of disenchantment with royal absolutism which can be detected throughout eighteenth-century Europe. Philosophers argued that dynastic warfare and capricious government were inseparable from absolutism. It was an argument which could be applied to England. While it can be plausibly maintained that genuine national interest was pursued in the policies of Louis XIV, Peter the Great, and Charles XII, the policies of James II had been repudiated by the whole nation, and those of Charles II would have been, had they been fully known.

In addition to what might be called a growing ideological repugnance towards absolutism, disputed successions served to weaken several European dynasties in this period, and nobilities were able to wring important concessions from monarchs by playing off one claimant against another. In Russia, the shaky claims of the Tsarinas Elizabeth and Catherine, both of whom

1 Debate of 9 January 1770, Parliamentary History, xvi. 662.
clambered to the throne over the rightful Tsar, diminished their authority. In Sweden, the dispute between the Hesse and Holstein parties in 1718 enabled the aristocracy to obtain an extremely favourable constitution, in which the powers of the monarchy were severely curtailed. Though in France the succession was not in dispute, the anxiety of the Duc d'Orléans as Regent to set aside the will of Louis XIV led him to make substantial concessions to the parlement, the spearhead of the aristocratic opposition to the crown. The Jacobite schism was one of the longest-running dynastic disputes, and the existence for sixty years or more of an alternative royal family, with a better formal claim to the throne, could hardly fail to weaken the position of the Hanoverians. The King, Lord Hervey wrote of George II, was often reminded 'both in Parliament and in print, that his crown had been the gift of the people; that it was given on conditions; and that it behoved him to observe those conditions, as it would be both as easy and as lawful, in case he broke any of them, for the people to resume that gift, as it had been for them to bestow it'.

Perhaps the most important way in which public confidence in the revolutionary settlement showed itself was willingness to lend to the government. Parliamentary security for the funds contrasted sharply with the hazards of dealing with absolutist or quasi-absolutist regimes. It might be argued that the long-term implications of this development were inimical to aristocratic rule and that the class of financiers, bankers, and rentiers which finally emerged surpassed the nobility in wealth and offered, in time, an alternative power-base. But in the short term the development of the 'monied interest' was by no means as damaging to the landed interest as some Tories feared, and may have been positively beneficial. First, it helped to stabilize the revolutionary regime by giving thousands of influential people a vital interest in its continuation. Secondly, by increasing vastly the amount of money available for investment, it helped to bring down the rate of interest, which was of considerable concern to the peerage, who were great borrowers. Thirdly, the vast increase in available public wealth resolved the dilemma which had dominated—indeed, distorted—Harrington's analysis. Harrington had understood that the military role of the nobility was a thing of the past but could not see how an alternative mercenary army could be supported. It was a fair question, and countries such as Sweden, Russia, Denmark, Hesse, and Saxony were driven to desperate

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lengths to support large armies. But British public credit proved capable, not merely of supporting an army perfectly adequate to maintain law and order at home, but a navy able to sweep our adversaries from the high seas, and subsidies to our continental allies to keep them in the field. It was a different story from 1667, when the Dutch lay in the Medway and Charles II had no money to pay his sailors.

But the feature of the revolutionary settlement that afforded most opportunity to aristocratic participation was that government was shared: I prefer that word to 'mixed', which has different connotations. Within broad policies, which had to be acceptable to Parliament, the monarch retained substantial power, particularly in appointments. The two Houses of Parliament, the court, and the cabinet council became the nodal points of political power. This gave the peerage a considerable advantage. They alone had a right of private audience with the monarch, which, as the events of December 1783 were to show, could be of considerable value. By tradition they occupied the great offices of state, as well as many court appointments, which gave constant access to the royal family. In Parliament, they added to the influence they wielded in the House of Lords a growing influence in the House of Commons, as they launched attacks in the counties and smaller boroughs on the electoral power of the country gentlemen. Once Parliament had become a permanent part of the routine government of the country, the peerage was well placed to translate its local influence into political power—the granting of generous leases, hunting rights, wholesale entertainment, purchasing power, and, above all, patronage: in 1742 the peerage presented, for example, to some 1,400 livings. Of course there was great resistance. In many of the larger boroughs, the peers made little headway against local mercantile oligarchs; in some of the counties the freeholders banded together to resist aristocratic intrusion; even in the smaller boroughs, certain

1 The Swedish answer was the system of 'indelningsverket' or military villages, and the remedy of Alexander I of Russia was his ill-fated scheme of military colonies. An alternative policy of easing the burden by hiring out troops ran the risk of dragging the country into unnecessary conflicts. The standing army built up in England after the Restoration provided careers for large numbers of sons of the nobility, and their presence, particularly in the upper ranks, was some guarantee that the army could not be used for a royalist coup d'état, as happened often elsewhere.

families—the Aislabies at Ripon, the Drakes at Amersham, the Franklands at Thirsk, or the Foresters at Much Wenlock—were quite capable of holding their own. But the greater social standing, longer purses, and proximity to the fount of favour gave peers a distinct advantage.

The general drift of the struggle may be indicated by juxtaposing two sets of figures: the marked decline by the mid eighteenth century in the number of contested elections and the marked increase in the number of peers' sons returned to the House of Commons. Of the first trend, which is by now a familiar story, let me quote two examples. The county of Gloucester was contested at the general elections of 1690, 1698, Feb. 1701, Dec. 1701, 1702, 1705, 1708, 1710, 1713, 1715, and 1734—i.e. at eleven of the fifteen general elections after the Glorious Revolution. Subsequent to 1734 it was contested at only one other general election (and that a derisory candidature) up to the Great Reform Act of 1832. The commanding interests were the Dukes of Beaufort on the hill and the Earls of Berkeley in the valley. They reached a formal understanding to share the seats in 1783 and brushed aside an appeal by a voter in 1784 against aristocratic interference. Addressed hopefully to the Independent freeholders of the county, this demanded to know 'what can be the reason that the Freeholders of the county of Gloucester are treated with so little ceremony... Are we to be considered as so many feudal vassals transferable to such representatives as the much-to-be-lamented Aristocracy of the county may think proper to appoint?' Presumably the answer was Yes, since, at the end of the century, the knights of the shire were George Granfield Berkeley, son of the fourth Earl of Berkeley and Lord Henry Charles Somerset, commonly known as the Marquis of Worcester, heir to the fifth Duke of Beaufort. My other example is the borough of Weobley, in Herefordshire, where the right of election was in ancient vote houses—i.e., it was a burgage borough. It was contested at eleven of the eighteen general elections between 1688 and 1754, as well as at by-elections in 1691, 1708, 1730, and 1732. By 1754 the Thynnes, Viscounts Weymouth and subsequently Marquisses of Bath, had purchased enough houses to command a majority and the borough was never again contested before being placed in Schedule A in 1832. The two members for Weobley in 1761 were Henry Frederick Thynne, son of the second Viscount Weymouth, and Lord William Henry Cavendish Bentinck, Marquis of Titchfield, heir to the second Duke of Portland and brother-in-law to the third Viscount

1 Gloucester Journal, 5 April 1784.
Weymouth. I need hardly say that it was not totally disinterested zeal for the public service which animated members of Parliament. Henry Frederick Thynne, to look no further afield, rejected with some scorn a Groomship of the Bedchamber worth some £500 p. a. (he was twenty-six at the time), was found a Clerkship of the Green Cloth (at £1,000 p.a.) instead, before being appointed in 1770, Joint Postmaster-General at £3,000 p.a. That brought to an end his career in the House of Commons, where, as far as we know, he never troubled the Speaker with his views.

The number of sons of English peers in the House of Commons returned at the general election of 1690 was 32. By 1715 it was 34,1
49 in 1722, 59 in 1727, 63 in 1741, 78 in 1747, 77 in 1754, and, by the last general election of the century in 1796, it had risen to 82.
This is, of course, far from representing the peerage element in the Commons. You will not, I hope, think me prim for omitting here illegitimate sons, of whom there were always a few. In 1754, in addition to the 77 sons of English peers, there were 17 Irish peers, 6 sons of Irish peers, and 13 sons of Scottish peers, totalling 113.
There were another 45 grandsons of peers, 33 members married to the daughters of peers, 22 nephews of peers, 8 brothers of peers, 7 brothers-in-law of peers, and one foreign nobleman.2
There were two illegitimate sons of peers and one illegitimate grandson, if one can have illegitimate grandsons. This brings the total up to over 230 in a House of 558 members. It was a sizeable contingent. I will spare you the cousins, save to point out that—particularly with the Pelhams—they formed a considerable political connection in their own right. You will also not think me too cynical if I presume that members such as J. S. Charlton and Andrew Wilkinson, Newcastle’s election agents returned for one of his boroughs, or Robert Barbor, Lord Exeter’s agent and returned for his borough of Stamford, were not indifferent to the views of their aristocratic patrons.

You will not misunderstand the drift of my argument. I am not trying to reconstruct a picture of eighteenth-century politics on Walcott lines, with the family as the basic unit. I am not really concerned with politics at that level at all. But the close aristocratic network made for a unity, a cohesion of underlying assumptions, and an identity of interest, which imparted great strength to the regime.

1 By the Act of Union of 1707 the House was increased by forty-five members, but it was very rare for the son of an English peer to sit for a Scottish constituency.
2 Jean Louis de Ligonier, then a general. He was given an Irish viscountcy in 1757, an English barony in 1763, and an earldom in 1766.
I mentioned earlier the unity of purpose exhibited by the nobility in 1688 and contrasted it with their ineffectiveness at the time of the civil wars. One of the fissures then had been the deep religious divide which ran, not only through the peerage, but the whole nation. Lawrence Stone has suggested that, of the 121 peers in 1641, probably one-fifth were Roman Catholic and another fifth Puritan in sympathy. Allowing for indifference, less than half of the peerage was deeply committed to the Anglican church. By the eighteenth century, the position was changing fast. The Catholic element in the peerage was shrinking steadily and, in contrast to its position under Charles II and James II, had no political influence. In 1703 there were still nineteen Catholic peers. By 1758 it was down to twelve; the Radcliffes and Widdringtons had been attainted for Jacobitism, Rivers, Gerard, and Carrington had become extinct, and Cardigan, Waldegrave, and Fauconberg had converted to Anglicanism. By 1790 it was down to a mere six, the old faith suffering its most severe blow in 1780 when Lord Surrey, heir to the Dukedom of Norfolk, converted. Audley, Montagu, and Teynham had gone over, and the peerages of Langdale and Stafford had become extinct. As a percentage of the peerage as a whole, the Catholic element had shrunk from 12 per cent at the beginning of the eighteenth century to less than 3 per cent at the end.

At the same time, the influence of old dissent collapsed, very few peers retaining presbyterian or Puritan sympathies. Since, unlike the flight from Catholicism, this did not call for public renunciation, it cannot be quantified precisely. Sir Edward Harley had been a zealous presbyterian and had fought for Parliament; his son, Robert, became the leader of the Tories, the Church party, and his son, Edward, built a remarkably baroque chapel at the family seat at Wimpole. The first Lord King had possessed Puritan sympathies, at least as a young man, and the last Lord Willoughby de Parham was reputed a presbyterian, but neither the Kings nor the Willoughbies were of great consequence. Nor did the new creed of Methodism desire or obtain much aristocratic patronage: the Duchess of Buckingham spoke for her order when, in a letter of stinging reproof to Lady Huntingdon, she wondered that her ladyship could relish doctrines so much ‘at variance with high rank and good breeding’.

1 The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558–1641, p. 742.
2 Surviving were Arundel of Wardour, Clifford of Chudleigh, Dormer, Petre, Shrewsbury, and Stourton.
3 The Life and Times of Selina, Countess of Huntingdon, by a member of the houses of Shirley and Hastings, i. 27.
This leads me to consider, at least briefly, the role of party, since there is little point in demonstrating that religion was no longer a divisive factor if it had merely been replaced by party zeal. There has, of course, been a vast concentration of scholarship on party, much of it of exemplary quality, and my only criticism, if I may be allowed one, is that party has perhaps been more expounded than assessed.

I have neither the desire nor the competence to challenge the assumption that party was an essential ingredient in the political life of the early eighteenth century. But I would like to offer three reservations. The first is that it is scarcely open to dispute that party zeal was greatly mitigated in later decades. In part this was a result of the decline in religious fervour to which we have just referred. Grudging toleration, however inadequate in theory, was in practice an effective policy for neutralizing religious issues. The sending of Walpole to the Tower in 1712 and the impeachment of Oxford in 1717 seem the last flickers of the frenetic political life of the previous century, in which Clarendon and Shaftesbury had died in exile, Danby had spent five years in the Tower, and Lords Stafford and Russell had been beheaded. The speed of the transformation is remarkable, and the very idea of the Duke of Newcastle being sent to the Tower strikes us as ludicrous.

Secondly, there are indications today of a willingness among historians to reconsider the effect of party animosity, even in Anne’s reign. It has sometimes seemed to me that several historians were knocked a little off balance by their determination to extirpate the heresies of Professor Robert Walcott, who stalks their work like Petrushka’s ghost. But Professor Geoffrey Holmes, in our discussions in *The Whig Ascendancy*, agreed that he was ‘prepared to tone down his previously unqualified emphasis on how divided English society had been’, and drew attention to the factors making for stability.¹

Thirdly, though it is a commonplace to deplore party antagonism, it has therapeutic qualities. Party animosities act as a safety-valve for aggressive instincts and party warfare, however tedious, is preferable to real warfare. In the eighteenth century, it served at times to disguise the extent to which Whigs and Tories shared common assumptions. Not until late in the century did Cobbett, Paine, and Bentham develop a radical critique, best expressed in Hazlitt’s celebrated description of Whigs and Tories as two stage-coaches, which ‘raise a great dust, spatter one another with mud,

but both travel the same road and arrive at the same destination¹. By helping to make aristocratic oligarchy more difficult to discern, party rivalry afforded it some protection. I do not mean to deny that party conflict remained vigorous, and, at times, rancorous, but it was, after all, Charles, second Earl Grey, a party zealot all his life, who declared, in a moment of crisis in 1827, that he would stand or fall with his order.⁸

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My decision to end this survey in 1760 is not mere rhetorical orundity, still less a belief that history moves conveniently in reigns or centuries. By 1760, the resurgence was nearing its peak.³ Party conflict was at a very low ebb. At the general election of 1761, there were fewer contests than at any point between the Glorious Revolution and the Great Reform Act. Of the forty counties, four went to a poll, compared with twenty-three in 1710 and twenty-six in 1705.⁴ The peerage and the baronetage were at their most exclusive.⁵ The administration was presided over by the Duke of Newcastle, with the assistance of two other dukes, four earls, two barons, and one commoner.⁶ Contrast it with our

¹ Preface to Political Essays, Collected Works of William Hazlitt, ed. P. P. Howe, vii. 20–1: ‘The distinction between a great Whig and Tory lord is laughable. For Whigs to Tories “nearly are allied, and thin partitions do their bounds divide”.
² Debate of 12 June 1827, Parliamentary History, 2nd series, xvii. 1261.
³ A. D. Harvey, Britain in the early Nineteenth Century, has much of interest to say about aristocratic influence and puts the peak later. It is a question which scarcely permits a precise answer. Though the electoral influence of the peerage continued to grow after 1760, it was, in my view, offset by increasing criticism of the aristocracy.
⁵ The total of baronetcies dropped from c.800 in 1700 (of whom 621 were English, 52 Irish, and 187 Scottish) to about 624 by 1760 (497, 52, 165, respectively). There was a slight rise to about 700 by the end of the century. The seventeenth-century baronetage was much larger: between 1660 and 1669 there were 412 creations (330, 28, 54) compared with only 51 in the decade 1690–9 (30, 2, 19). The total of peers (excluding Irish and Scottish) on 1 January 1718 was 189, on 1 January 1758 was 185, and, by the end of the century, had risen to 266.
⁶ This was the inner cabinet. The Dukes of Bedford and Devonshire were Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland and Lord Chamberlain; Earl Granville was Lord President of the Council, Temple Lord Privy Seal, Holderness Secretary for
starting point on 14 December 1648, when three peers attended the House of Lords and it was said of them that they ‘sit and tell tales by the fireside in hope of more lords to drive away the time’.1

The year 1759, the last full year of George II’s reign, was also that in which, in Horace Walpole’s phrase, the church bells never stopped ringing to mark British victories. At Oxford, Professor William Blackstone was in the middle of his course of lectures on English law. The excellency of the British constitution, he told his audience, was due to the perfect balance between its parts, and the responsibility for maintaining that balance rested with the peerage.2 Capability Brown, having finished beautifying Chatsworth, was about to turn his attention to the lakes at Blenheim, before moving on to complete the Gothick folly at Wimpole for the second Lord Hardwicke.

It could not last. In Blackstone’s 1763 audience sat a precocious fifteen-year-old student from The Queen’s College, Jeremy Bentham. He did not think highly of the professor’s discourse—‘everything-as-it-should-be-Blackstone’ was his later jibe—and in the developing creed of utility there was little room for the aristocratic principle.3 The great victories of Plassey and Quebec and Quiberon Bay were overshadowed in the 1770s and 1780s by Bunker’s Hill, Saratoga, and Yorktown. The greatest of all the the South, and Hardwicke supernumerary; Baron Anson was First Lord of the Admiralty; and Mansfield was Lord Chief Justice. William Pitt was Secretary for the North. There was considerable fluctuation between the inner, outer, and war cabinets. It is significant that Pitt, nephew of an Irish peer and married to the sister of an earl, brought into Parliament to represent the seven absentee voters of Old Sarum, should be known as the Great Commoner.

1 Quoted in C. H. Firth, The House of Lords during the Civil War, p. 206; LJ x. 630. Firth also quotes a royalist disparagement of ‘parliamentary’ peers in 1652 from Richard Flecknoe, Aigmatical Characters, p. 76: ‘He is a certain silly fellow, who now he has no voice in Parliament, scarcely knows what to say... So they jostle him now in the streets who was wont before, like mandarins, to make whole streets to give him way, and no body takes notice of him, unless some one in scorn points at him (perhaps) and says, “There goes a Lord!”’

2 ‘A body of nobility is also more particularly necessary in our mixed and compounded constitution, in order to support the rights of both the crown and the people, by forming a barrier to withstand the encroachments of both... The nobility therefore are the pillars, which are reared from among the people, more immediately to support the throne, and, if that falls, they must be buried under its ruins. Accordingly, when in the last century, the Commons had determined to extirpate monarchy, they also voted the House of Lords to be useless and dangerous’ (Commentaries on the Laws of England: ‘Of the Parliament’).

3 Blackstone’s lectures formed the starting-point for Bentham’s Fragment on Government, published anonymously in 1776. The jibe comes from Bentham’s Handbook of Political Fallacies, iii: ‘Vague generalities’.
achievements of Hanoverian England was perhaps more destructive of the old order than any of the defeats—the beginning of that transformation into an industrial and technological society in which the aristocracy seemed less and less pertinent.

In the 1770s and 1780s, there is some evidence of increasing resentment at aristocratic intrusion in elections, dramatized in 1792 by T. H. B. Oldfield’s *History of the Boroughs*, the first serious attempt to assess aristocratic influence. Even more disturbing was the proliferation in the 1790s of attacks upon the aristocratic principle as such: peers, who preferred to think of themselves as protectors of the poor and oppressed, were now denounced as parasites upon the industrious classes—a prodigious band of spongers, was Cobbett’s unkind description. Under the pressure of continual warfare and rapid economic change, tempers began to fray. The year 1809 was particularly wretched. It began with the humiliating withdrawal of Sir John Moore’s army from Spain and continued with Chatham’s disastrous expedition to Walcheren. The Foreign Secretary, Canning, fought a duel with the Secretary-at-War, Castlereagh. The Prime Minister, the Duke of Portland, had a stroke, and Perceval’s ministry, which succeeded, was considered too weak to last. Worst of all, the revelation that Mrs Clarke, mistress to the Duke of York, Commander-in-Chief of the army, had been selling commissions exposed the whole aristocracy to charges of peculation and jobbery. Lord Auckland and the Marquis of Buckingham vied with each other in melodrama. Buckingham thought that the Mrs Clarke business would do ‘horrid and incalculable mischief’, and was reminded of the Diamond Necklace affair, which had done so much to discredit the French aristocracy in the years immediately before the revolution of 1789. ‘The vessel of the state is in a perilous way,’ wrote Lord Auckland, ‘the waves troubled, the wind rising, and the captain locked up in his cabin.’

1 Counties in which aristocratic pretensions roused public criticism include Wiltshire (1772), Sussex (1774), Warwickshire (1774), Northumberland (1774), Berkshire (1776), Somerset (1784), and Gloucester (1784). Until the volumes for the *History of Parliament* for the period after 1790 are available, it is not easy to know how significant these protests were. But in 1780 the author of *A letter to Mr. Debrett, being an answer to lucubrations during a short recess* asserted (with some exaggeration) that half the county members were ‘the near relatives or connections of peers, without property or pretence except such relationship or connection to be chosen by a county; almost another fourth are elected by two or three peers’.

2 Buckingham to Grenville, 12 February 1809, Auckland to Grenville, 4 April 1809, *HMC Fortescue*, ix. 277–8, 289–90.
Edinburgh Review, concluded that the situation was desperate.\(^1\)

Political life was polarized between ‘two furious and irreconcilable parties . . . by whose collision . . . our constitution and independence must be speedily destroyed’. His remedy was the old one. Between these ‘violent and pernicious factions’ stand a small but most respectable band . . . the old constitutional Whigs of England . . . Every hour the rising tides are eating away the narrow isthmus upon which the adherents of the constitution are stationed; and every hour it becomes more necessary to oppose some barrier to their encroachment.

But the end was not nigh. Once more the aristocracy recovered its nerve, regrouped, and fought an effective rearguard action—perhaps a second resurgence for some other lecturer to trace.\(^2\) Aristocratic influence survived, though in shrunken form, deep into the twentieth century. The isthmus was more solid than Jeffrey had feared. But, at long last, the waves did break through, and—if you will allow me to end on a most improper note of prophecy—this time, despite the efforts of Lord Weymouth and the Wessex loyalists, a third resurgence looks distinctly improbable.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Vol. xv, January 1810; ‘Short remarks on the state of parties at the close of the year 1809’ (pp. 504–21).

\(^2\) An impressive work, in which the adaptability of the nineteenth-century peerage to changing conditions is a major theme, is D. Cannadine, Lords and Landlords: the aristocracy and the towns, 1774–1907.

\(^3\) I should like to acknowledge the very helpful comments made on an early draft of this lecture by my colleague Dr D. D. Aldridge.