CARLILE AYLMER MACARTNEY
1895–1978

CARLILE AYLMER MACARTNEY was born on 24 January 1895. His father was a barrister, and his family of Northern Irish, and more distant Scottish, origin. His mother's name before marriage was Louisa Gardiner.

Macartney won a scholarship at Winchester, and was in College from 1909 to 1914. He won the school prize for Greek verse and the Kenneth Freeman classics prize, as well as the Goddard Exhibition, the school's award for outstanding classical scholarship. In his last year he held the school office of Prefect of Library. He won an open scholarship at Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1914.

He did not go up to Cambridge in October, as war had meanwhile broken out in Europe. He joined the army as a private. Many years later he used to say that the master in charge of the Officer Training Corps at Winchester had disliked him, and refused to recommend him for an immediate commission; and that he had remained eternally grateful to this man, since he would otherwise almost certainly have been killed. Seven out of fifteen scholars of his year were in fact killed, but Macartney survived. He was commissioned in November 1914, served in the Hampshire Regiment for two years, and was then transferred to Royal Field Artillery in January 1917. He was wounded at Potisje near Ypres in July 1917. After two months in hospital in England, a training course and another period in hospital in Ireland, he returned to France in June 1918 and served in an anti-aircraft battery until the end of hostilities.

After the war he returned to take up his scholarship at Trinity, but did not stay to complete his degree.

1 In my research for this memoir, I received valuable help from the following persons, to whom I should like to record my gratitude: Mr G. C. W. Dicker, Keeper of Old Wykehamist Records, Winchester College; Miss Alex Ward, Head of Army Historical Branch, Ministry of Defence; Miss Dorothy Hamerton, then Librarian at Chatham House and in charge of its archives; Dr László Péter, of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies in the University of London; and most of all Miss Elizabeth Barker, the historian of wartime British diplomacy in Central Europe, for her unfailingly generous advice and assistance in tracing papers in the Public Record Office, and for her personal memories of C. A. Macartney's activities. To all of these my grateful acknowledgements.
In 1919–20 he spent some time in Central Europe as a journalist, and it is from then that his study of the languages, politics, and cultures of that region began. In 1921 he was appointed vice-consul in Vienna, a position which he held for four years. In this period his knowledge of the intricacies of Danubian life deepened, and he became personally acquainted with many of the persons and problems thrown up by the convulsions of the perished Habsburg Monarchy. In 1923 he married Nedella, daughter of Colonel Mamarchev of the Bulgarian army.

After leaving Vienna, he worked for the Survey of International Affairs, produced at the new Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House, under the direction of his friend and elder fellow-Wykehamist Arnold Toynbee. Macartney wrote the second volume of the 1925 Survey. In 1926 he joined for two years the editorial staff of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. In 1928 he moved to the League of Nations Union, and worked in its intelligence department for eight years, partly in Geneva and partly in London, becoming their chief specialist on the national minorities of the new multi-lingual states of Central and Eastern Europe, and indeed an expert in this field unsurpassed in any country of Europe or beyond. During these years his first books appeared: The Social Revolution in Austria in 1926; The Magyars in the Ninth Century in 1931; Hungary (a general history in the ‘Modern World’ series) in 1934; and National States and National Minorities in the same year.

Macartney was eager to obtain an academic appointment, and applied for the Sir Ernest Cassel Chair of International Relations at the London School of Economics. His referees were Gilbert Murray, Arnold Toynbee, and Monty Rendall, and he also had supporting testimonials from Sir James Headlam-Morley, J. L. Garvin, and R. W. Seton-Watson; but his application was unsuccessful. In November 1931 Toynbee recommended him for the Stevenson Chair at LSE, but this too was unsuccessful. The scholar appointed to this chair was C. K. (later Sir Charles) Webster. Macartney’s impressive scholarly achievements, however, received recognition with his appointment to a Fellowship at All Souls, in 1936. His association with the college lasted for more than forty years, and was undoubtedly a blessing for him, since it enabled him to study and write in a university setting, without being compelled to do regular teaching or academic administration, for which tasks he was probably not temperamentally suited. He made his home at Boars Hill, within easy reach of All Souls, and could travel to and from London when required. In 1937 he published another major book: Hungary and Her Successors.
During the Second World War he was a leading member of the enlarged Research Department of the Foreign Office, directed by Toynbee, located in Oxford, and consisting largely of persons formerly closely associated with Chatham House, together with the small but extremely efficient secretarial infra-structure of that institution. Macartney's task was to supply expert advice to the Foreign Office in connection with Central Europe in general, and Hungary in particular. Possibly more important was his contribution to the Hungarian Section of the BBC Overseas Service. His regular broadcasts, in Hungarian with a strong English accent, were immensely popular in Hungary, where he became known more widely than ever before as Makartni Elemér (the latter Hungarian Christian name being pronounced approximately as his own Christian name of Aylmer). It was a tribute both to his reputation and to a certain surviving liberalism in wartime Hungary that his series of volumes of *Studies in the earliest Hungarian historical sources*, which had begun to appear in Budapest in 1938, could continue in that city despite the state of war between the two countries, parts 4 and 5 being published in 1942 (but with the false date of 1940 printed on them in order to satisfy censorship!). The series was completed by parts 6 and 7 in Oxford in 1951.

After the war Macartney returned to All Souls, and his literary output once more revived. His *Medieval Hungarian Historians* (1953) summarized his conclusions on the seven-part series of 1938–51. In 1957 he published a two-volume work curiously entitled *October Fifteenth*. The title refers to the date of Admiral Horthy's abortive attempt to break away from Hitler in 1944; but the book is a detailed history of internal and foreign policies in Hungary from 1929 to 1944. While working on this book, Macartney held the Montague Burton Chair of International Relations at Edinburgh University, a part-time post whose lecturing duties were not arduous, but permitted him to remain in Oxford and to travel northwards from time to time. A short history, entitled simply *Hungary*, appeared in 1962. In 1968 Macartney published his last major work, *The Habsburg Empire 1790–1918*, a detailed narrative of Austria and Hungary in the nineteenth century and up to the collapse of the Monarchy, with special emphasis on the history of institutions. Having hitherto specialized in the early Middle Ages and the twentieth century, Macartney applied himself in his last years to the Early Modern period. The result was two slighter but valuable works, *Maria Theresa and the House of Austria* (1969) and a collection of
well-chosen documents with explanatory notes, *The Habsburg and Hohenzollern Dynasties in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (1970), this latter appearing in his seventy-sixth year.

Macartney was an individual scholar, in the tradition of European learning in the age, long since expired, when scholars sought both to learn and to diffuse the results of their learning, and when universities had not become extensions of state bureaucracy. He was also a participant in international politics, with opinions passionately held and with a sense of duty to exert political influence. This account of his life will therefore have two themes, which cannot be effectively unscrambled from each other: his major historical works and his involvement in the field of international affairs and foreign policy.

His first book, *The Social Revolution in Austria*, was published in 1926. Not quite 300 pages long, it was divided about half-and-half between a summary of Austria’s recent history and a discussion of the main social classes, institutions, legislation, and unsolved problems. It began with a short penetrating essay on the Habsburg Monarchy, and then described in much greater detail the period of defeat and attempted revolution, and the emergence of a democratic republic. There followed two chapters on the Social Democratic Party, the conflicting groups within its leadership, the institution and operation of works councils in factories, and socialist achievements in housing in Vienna. Then came a chapter each on the peasants and the Church, on the middle classes, and on the relations between Jews and Germans, in the broader economic and cultural spheres as well as in political life. This book showed Macartney to be a shrewd observer as well as a promising historian, commanding the clear straightforward style, with no words wasted and with no needless erudite obscurities, and the ability to put scenes and incidents vividly before the reader’s imagination, which were to mark most of his published works. The book was at the same time a personal statement, with irony and occasional venom. These were, however, rather impartially distributed. Financial speculators, left socialist demagogues, anti-socialist Roman Catholic priests, and Galician Jewish immigrants might each in turn resent some of his judgements.

His next book, *The Magyars in the Ninth Century*, published in 1930, was a study of a little explored corner of early medieval history. Using Byzantine and Latin sources, as well as passages translated for him from Arabic and Persian authors, besides secondary works by German and Hungarian historians, he
endeavoured to distinguish from each other the Magyars and the other peoples of the steppe—Cumans, Kavars, Petchenegs, and many others—of whom very little was known, and to reach conclusions about the origins of the ninth-century invaders of Central Europe who founded the Hungarian state. In 1934 came Hungary, a volume in Ernest Benn’s Modern World series edited by H. A. L. Fisher. It followed approximately the pattern of his Austria book, with about two-fifths devoted to history and the rest to analysis of the Constitution, the Church, the main social classes and the problems of foreign policy. The differences between aristocratic magnates and gentry, and the role played by the latter in political leadership and in administration, were clearly explained. So also were the problems of the peasantry, which comprised landless labourers on vast estates, dwarf holders with too little land, and prosperous farmers found chiefly in the west and south-west. The inadequacy of such land reform legislation as had occurred was also made abundantly clear. The position of Jews in business was another important theme: Hungarian Jews emerged in a more favourable light than had Austrian Jews in the earlier book. A fault of the book was the very small space devoted to education and to the role of the intellectual, as opposed to the business, section of the middle class, whether Jewish or Magyar.

It is convenient to mention at this point Macartney’s later works in the history of Hungary, an important part of European history and one in which he attained high standards of scholarship, but a field of study of less widespread interest than his publications, from the 1930s on, in international politics.

Outstanding was his series of ‘Studies in the earliest Hungarian historical sources’, of which eight successive parts appeared between 1938 and 1952. The first five were published in Budapest, the last in Oxford. In this obscure and specialized field there was and is certainly no one in Britain, and few if any in Hungary capable of a critical judgement of Macartney’s work, which remained an object of admiration mingled with awe. His last book on a Hungarian theme was a short comprehensive history of that country, published in 1962 and bearing the same simple title as his 1934 book, Hungary, with which it should not be confused.

His fourth book, National States and National Minorities, of 1934, was a major work of scholarship, the most original, and possibly in the long term the most valuable, of all his writings. It was a result both of very wide historical reading and of experience of the activities of the League of Nations in Geneva and of its most influential champions in England. He traced the emergence of
the concept of nationality from medieval western Christendom; the intricate pattern of conquests, and coexistence of successive dominant and subject peoples, in Central and Eastern Europe; and the concepts of individual nationality within a multi-national empire, as they were embodied in the millet system of the Ottoman Empire, or discussed by political thinkers in Austria-Hungary. He then examined the nationalist movements that grew in the Danube basin and the Balkan peninsula in the nineteenth century and up to 1914; the adoption by the Allies of the aim of national self-determination in the Great War; and the redrawing of frontiers and creation of new states which followed the war. Almost half the book was devoted to a detailed analysis of the purposes and the operation of the Minority Treaties, placed under the supervision of the League, which nine states were obliged to sign. His conclusions were pessimistic. Where a community which shared a national consciousness was broken by a frontier (and he recognized that this was sometimes unavoidable), a nationally conscious group was torn away from its community and placed in a state where another nationally conscious community was dominant. (This situation was different from one in which a whole nationally conscious community was placed under the rule of another, though writers on nationalism often confused, and still confuse the two.) Macartney’s conclusion was that ‘a national state and national minorities are incompatibles’.

As Macartney saw it, there were three possible solutions to the problem. One was to change the frontiers so that they should greatly reduce the numbers left on the ‘wrong sides’. This remedy, which became generally known as Revisionism, had severe limitations, and was not applicable at all to certain regions. The second was an exchange of populations. This was in fact adopted in several cases, the most important being between Greece and Turkey, where tremendous hardships were caused, but the two governments, recently at war with each other, made concerted efforts to mitigate them. Both these solutions were discussed at length in Macartney’s book, but he himself preferred a third, which was to replace nationality as the basis of legitimacy of government by some higher principle. Essentially, he believed that the problems of national minorities could only be solved by the abolition of national states. He quoted with approval Lord Acton’s condemnation of modern nationalism: ‘A state which is incompetent to satisfy different races condemns itself; a state which labours to neutralise, to absorb or to expel them, destroys its own vitality; a state which does not include them is destitute of
the chief basis of self-government.' Looking at the world of 1934, he could not see examples which offered much immediate help or hope to victims of national discrimination in Central Europe. The two cases which came nearest to this were the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. In the first case, while lacking enthusiasm for the Bolshevik form of government, he nevertheless took seriously the claim of the Soviet authorities to have introduced genuinely equal treatment of all nationalities. In the second case, as a result of a long history, it had become true of Britain that 'the state can fairly be said to be equally the state of all nationalities inhabiting it'. But as Macartney would not have wished to see a re-enactment of the Bolshevik Revolution in the Danube valley, and it was useless to advise the Danubians to repeat six hundred years of British history, there was little comfort to be derived from either example.

In the next years Macartney concentrated on the Hungarian minorities, and in 1937 published *Hungary and Her Successors*. This book, like its predecessor exceeding 500 pages, examined in detail the status of the Hungarian minorities in lands which had been ceded by the peace treaties to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. In stating his conclusions he had in mind the situation at the time of the collapse of the old Hungary and the situation as it was in the mid-1930s. At the time of writing it was clear to him that Hungarians both in the residual Hungarian state and in the minority areas of neighbouring states bitterly resented the situation created by the peace treaties, and that this resentment was by no means confined, as opponents of Hungary especially in Czechoslovakia liked to argue, to the landowning upper class. It was equally clear to him that the non-Hungarian nations which had formerly lived under Hungary had no desire to be reunited with Hungary: in his view this had been true of Romanians and Serbs already in 1918 but only partially of Slovaks, but in 1937 was equally true of all three. He therefore rejected the 'maximum' revision advocated by nationalists in Budapest—that is, the restoration of the old frontiers. He did, however, favour a 'minimum' revision, which he specified in detail. He believed that it would be not only an act of justice to the Hungarians but a measure beneficial to the peace of Europe if Hungary were to recover from Czechoslovakia the Grosser Schütt island between the two branches of the Danube east of Bratislava, and some portion of the plain north of the Danube; and from Romania the plains lying west of the Bihar mountains. The second of these changes would restore 400,000 Hungarians to Hungary
while placing only 40,000 Romanians under Hungarian rule. Apart from this he believed that Ruthenia, formerly the north-eastern corner of Hungary and now the eastern province of Czechoslovakia, should be restored to Hungary. The Ruthenes were not Czechs or Hungarians, and would be a minority in either state. Their national identity was by no means clear (Ukrainian, or Russian, or a distinct Ruthene people), but in Macartney’s view their economic situation would improve if they were included in Hungary. Macartney was thus advocating adoption, within limits, of the first of the three solutions which he had set forth in his earlier book. He remained, however, convinced that the third solution was still the best. He reiterated his opinion that in Central Europe the ‘national state’ (Hungarian from 1867 to 1918, the three Successor States since 1918) had proved a failure. He still held out as an ideal the state which stands above nationalism, and offers equal respect to all cultural communities existing within it. He believed that ultimately the best candidate for such a state would have been a reconstituted Hungary. His reasons were that the Hungarian state before 1918 formed, within its natural frontiers, an admirable geographical and economic unit, and that there was an earlier Hungarian tradition, long antedating the age of nationalism, which fitted Lord Acton’s criteria. It was summed up in the advice given to his son by St. Stephen, the pagan chief who became the first crowned Christian king of Hungary and was later canonized by Rome: Regnum unius linguae uniusque moris imbecille et fragile est.

A year after the appearance of the book, the Munich surrender brought about the mutilation of Czechoslovakia, in consequence of which Hungary regained from Slovakia substantially more territory than Macartney had proposed, but did not acquire Ruthenia. The latter was given far-reaching autonomy within the rump republic, and was designed by Hitler to be a centre for Ukrainian nationalist activities directed against the Soviet Union and Poland. While the new Czechoslovak–Hungarian frontier was still being negotiated, Macartney published, on 26 October 1938, in The Times a 2,500-word article, in which he set forth in precise and unemotional language the Hungarian case. Essentially the article was a concentrated summary of the facts and arguments of his book; but it was remarkable for almost totally ignoring the international situation which had made revision of frontiers possible. Its opening paragraph contained the following words:

This is one of the rare occasions on which it may prove possible to get a settlement founded on acknowledged principles of justice; to prove that revision need not necessarily strike a blow at peace, but may lay the
foundations for a more enduring order. For in so far as a settlement affording honourable satisfaction to both parties can now be reached, a new era of cooperation in the Danube valley may open.

This extraordinary complacency infuriated those who felt that the destruction of the old democratic Czechoslovakia was in itself a tragedy, and still more that Hitler’s diplomatic success had created a solid base of German domination in Central Europe from which it would be able to threaten the rest of the continent and the world. Among these was Macartney’s older colleague R. W. Seton-Watson, who in previous years had greatly admired Macartney’s work, and encouraged and tried to help his career. A painful exchange of letters took place between them, after which their relations, though outwardly correct, remained irreparably strained.

Five months later came the complete dismemberment of rump Czechoslovakia, and this time Hungary, without the approval of Hitler, forcibly annexed Ruthenia. This won Macartney’s approval, for the reasons stated in his earlier writings, and also because it put an end to the Ukrainian schemes. As Hungary had acted against German wishes in this case, though in accordance with them after Munich, it showed, he believed, that her rulers placed Hungarian interests first, and had not become vassals of Hitler.

At the outbreak of war in September 1939 Macartney joined the Research Department of the Foreign Office located in Oxford. In November 1939 the British Minister in Hungary, Mr (later Sir) Owen O’Malley requested that Macartney should come to Hungary. The Foreign Office, and Arnold Toynbee as his immediate chief, agreed to this, and he spent February and March 1940 there. He met a great number of Hungarians, including his old friend Count Paul Teleki, a distinguished academic geographer as well as an elder statesman, who had become Prime Minister for the second time in February 1939. Macartney’s findings were summarized in a long memorandum forwarded by O’Malley to the Foreign Office on 29 March 1940. Teleki and the Regent, Admiral Horthy, were essentially pro-Western. Teleki had preserved a considerable measure of political liberty, making Hungary an oasis in the Danubian fascist desert. This was recognized by Hungarian Jews and socialists, who knew that they could only lose by any further changes. However, the ability of Hitler to promise more gains of territory, at the expense of Romania and Yugoslavia, which Britain could not do, made it difficult for any Hungarian government to resist German pressures.
The Vienna Award of 30 July 1940, dictated by Ribbentrop and Ciano to the governments of Hungary and Romania, divided Transylvania between the two, leaving hundreds of thousands of each nation on the ‘wrong’ side of the line, but representing very large gains for Hungary. It was discussed in a memorandum by Macartney for the Foreign Office of 9 September 1940. His recommendation for policy was that Britain should remain uncommitted to either the Romanian or the Hungarian side. ‘Keep the carrot dangling . . . Do nothing irrevocable.’ He outlined various possible future settlements: an independent Principality of Transylvania; a restoration of the Trianon frontier; cession to Hungary only of the western plainland region; either of two earlier official Hungarian proposals which differed from the Vienna Award; a treaty compelling the Romanian government to grant the Hungarians autonomy within a united Transylvania; a transfer of populations; or the retention of the existing partition. The first, though attractive, he considered unrealizable; the second unjust; population exchange so brutal and so expensive as to be unacceptable; promises of autonomy worthless; and the various Hungarian proposals of the past open to serious objections. Paradoxically, he ended up moderately in favour of what the Axis dictators had imposed: the present line ‘. . . not entirely to be sneered at as an attempt to secure a not very inequitatable ethnographic line . . . may well be regarded as impermanent, but so must any solution’.

In April 1941 German pressure, and the strongly pro-German command of the Hungarian army, brought Hungary into the war against Britain’s ally Yugoslavia, and this was rewarded by annexation of territory from that country. Unable either to consent to this policy or to prevent it, Count Teleki shot himself. On 27 June Hungary went to war with the Soviet Union. The rulers of the now much enlarged Hungary showed little sign of following the advice of St. Stephen or of Lord Acton. They displayed a national intolerance towards their new non-Hungarian subjects not less than that of the Succession States between the wars. In January 1942 reprisals against Yugoslav partisan activities culminated in a massacre in Novi Sad (Újvidek), the main city of the annexed region of Yugoslavia, on the Danube, in which it was estimated that some 2,250 Serbs and 700 Jews lost their lives.

Nevertheless pro-British and democratic forces not only existed, but were tolerated by the government to a much greater extent than anywhere in Europe outside neutral Sweden and Switzerland. Liberal and socialist ideas could be expressed in print, and
part of the press supported the concept of an Independence Front—which in the circumstances could only mean united action by opponents of the Third Reich. Miklos Kállay, who became Prime Minister in March 1942, was himself bitterly anti-German, protected the democratic elements, and sought for an opportunity to withdraw from the war against Russia. His emissaries established contact with the British authorities during the summer of 1943. The surrender of Italy aroused hopes that the Allies would be able to move into Yugoslavia from Italy, in which case he would have brought Hungary over to their side. However, the inability of the Allies to occupy more than southern Italy, and the fate meted out by a vengeful Mussolini and his German patrons to those Italians, including his own son-in-law, who had abandoned him, destroyed such hopes. In March 1944 German forces occupied Hungary, and forced Horthy to accept a puppet government, recruited from reliably Germanophile politicians of the upper and middle classes, which provided further support to the war effort against Russia and obligingly sent hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews to their deaths in the German extermination camps. In October 1944 Regent Horthy made a last attempt to break loose from Germany, ill planned and quickly crushed. Hungary was placed under the joint rule of German forces and of a semi-criminal rabble of Hungarian fascists, and became the main battleground between the southern forces of the German and Russian armies. At the end of the fighting Budapest was in ruins, the economy collapsed, and the people at the mercy of Russian soldiers encouraged by their commanders to wreak vengeance for the sufferings of Russia on any one who fell into their hands.

During these two years Macartney continued to produce learned comments on the Hungarian situation, with diminishing effect. He must have been generally informed at the time of Kállay’s peace efforts, but took no part in the negotiations and contacts, which were handled through the channels of the Special Operations Executive under the direction of the Foreign Office, in consultation with the United States and Soviet governments. As the victory of the Allies approached, Macartney hoped that Britain would use its influence to secure a settlement in Central Europe that would be just to all peoples concerned. In particular, since both Romania and Hungary had been allies of Hitler, he hoped that the Transylvanian problem would be considered without prejudice either way. It is arguable that his influence may have contributed to the use, in the terms of armistice given by the
Allies to Romania in September 1944, of the qualified formula that Romania would be given 'Transylvania, or the greater part of it, subject to confirmation at the peace settlement'. In practice, it was the Soviet government alone which decided the frontier, and Stalin preferred simply to restore to Romania what she had had before, while keeping for himself the eastern half of Moldavia, or Bessarabia. At the peace conference with the lesser enemy states, held in Paris in the summer of 1946, neither the British nor the American government raised any objection.

Macartney's six years as a government specialist on Central European affairs may thus be said to have achieved nothing, even if he did provide much well-digested information. More important were his broadcasts, which were widely listened to, highly popular, and maintained or increased the sympathy for Britain felt by many Hungarians. They were, however, an object of fierce attack by the Czechoslovak exiles. A feature of this quarrel was the hostility between Macartney and the exiled Count Michael Károlyi, the ill-fated radical Prime Minister of 1918–19, who was excluded from the BBC broadcasts, essentially on the ground that his memory and his name were anathema to the effective political class in Hungary. Károlyi's claim to be heard was espoused by the Czechs, and this further strengthened Macartney's objection to him. The inability of these two men to do each other justice, Károlyi a somewhat quixotic aristocrat with a noble record of struggle on behalf of social reform and political liberty, Macartney a devoted friend of Hungary with deep understanding of its social and political issues, must be a source of some surprise and great regret to an observer of modern Hungary.

Macartney's broadcasts, however, also raised a serious question on which there was genuine disagreement among British officials concerned with Hungary. One view was that by maintaining indirect communication with the rulers and the wider political class of Hungary, by showing understanding for these men's difficulties while firmly insisting that the alliance with Germany would prove, and was already proving, disastrous for Hungary and should be abandoned, the broadcasts were encouraging those who were trying to minimize Hungary's military effort in Russia, and who were trying not without success to preserve liberal decencies in Hungarian political life. Thus, it could be claimed, the broadcasts were promoting Allied interests. The opposite view was that, admirably intentioned though they were, the broadcasts were encouraging Horthy, Kállay, and their friends to believe that they could go on fighting the Soviet Union without incurring
any real displeasure from the Western powers. It was not denied that Macartney emphasized the solidity of the Western–Soviet alliance and urged the Hungarians to break with Hitler. But the mildness of his tone, their personal knowledge of his affection for Hungary and of the sort of Hungarians who were his friends, and the fact that the British government used him as its spokesman, caused them to ignore his warnings and to believe that they could get away with a policy of fighting against one ally and seeking the protection of the others. The broadcasts were thus, it was argued, more harmful than beneficial to Allied interests.

In August 1943 Macartney’s broadcasts were stopped. It seems likely that this was due rather to the prevalence of the second over the first of these two British views than to successful intrigues by Czechs. Macartney, however, was deeply hurt by the decision, which he remembered with bitterness in later years.

After the war Macartney returned to the calm of All Souls and Boars Hill, and took up again his literary labours. The last thirty years of his life produced two major works and several others of lesser but substantial value.

The first was *October Fifteenth*, published in two volumes in 1957 by Edinburgh University Press, at a time when Macartney held his part-time chair there. The title is taken, as already noted above, from the date in 1944 when Regent Horthy made his unsuccessful attempt to break away from Germany, and was instead arrested and deported by his former allies, being rescued from comfortable incarceration in a German castle by the liberating American army. It is an extremely detailed exposé of Hungarian history between 1929 and 1945. It is based on his own experience, spread over more than thirty years, on conversations with leading persons (including visits to both Horthy and Kállay in their immediate post-war captivity), on massive study of the Hungarian press, on such official documents as had been published or were available up to the time of writing, and on more interesting documents given to him by various Hungarians who had been able to acquire them, as well as on private diaries and on published memoir literature. The rather large portion devoted to foreign policy partly duplicates what has been done by others, and may be faulted in detail as greater quantities of official documents are studied by historians. But the narrative of internal politics, and the presentation of the personalities and motives of all the prominent, and many less prominent, figures is of incomparable value. Individuals come to life in these pages as they are portrayed by an author who combines insight into character with
remarkable literary skill. No other writer, Hungarian or foreign, has done this job, or is or ever will be in a position to do it. It is safe to say that this book will be a source of knowledge for all who may ever wish to study this particular place and period in history. It is also arguable that any one who gives himself time to peruse attentively these 1,000 pages (an enjoyable but protracted experience) will emerge with a better understanding of the tragic predicament of small nations and of persons charged with small bits of power and responsibility in mid-twentieth-century Europe, and indeed of the human political condition tout court.

The other major work was a history of Austria-Hungary from the death of Joseph II to the abdication of Charles, entitled The Habsburg Empire 1790–1918, published in 1968 and running to nearly 900 pages. The emphasis is on constitutional developments, and these are viewed mainly from the centre, which means Vienna rather than Budapest, let alone the lesser centres such as Prague or Lemberg. Even Hungary, of which he knew so much, recedes into the background, and his interest returns to Austria, where his concern with Central Europe had begun nearly fifty years earlier. Habsburg rulers and their bureaucrats are the leading figures, and Macartney shows in his handling of them the empathy and the clarity of expression that mark so much of his work. His grasp extends to the intricacies of the financial bureaucracy, which do not make easy reading, and he reveals thorough knowledge of peasant problems and of their interconnection with national conflicts. In the Preface he expresses mild disdain for the ‘tribal histories’ produced in profusion in recent years by members of the lesser ‘nationalities’: one sees what he means, but this is to do less than justice to a good deal of valuable scholarship that has seen the light in neighbouring states, despite difficult intellectual conditions. Macartney’s distaste for nationalism as legitimacy was unabated, but he was no longer concerned to find a new legitimacy: this book was devoted only to the past.

The statement of the late Professor Pribram, quoted in this Preface, that a historian of the Monarchy needed fourteen languages, was exaggerated: half that number from within its borders, plus French and very marginally Russian, would suffice, and of these Macartney had sufficient command. The difficulty of the subject is only partly linguistic. It is rather that the essence of this empire’s history is that it produced a culture, with its own unity, to which all the arts, literature, physical and human landscapes, and a way of life contributed, but which was more than any of these. Literature can more easily be treated in words
than the other aspects. There was such a thing as 'Austrian' literature, if we may use that adjective to cover the whole Kulturraum (no English equivalent). However, this 'Austrian' literature is marvellously elusive. Most of the best of it was expressed in one language — German — yet much that was essential remained embedded in other languages from which it could not be fully extracted. At the same time the fact that German was the language of a wider great literature in no way permeated by an 'Austrian' spirit made any clear demarcation impossible. Macartney in his Preface stated that he felt compelled to leave out 'all Kulturgeschichte proper, as distinct from literary etc. activities which had their importance for the development of national movements'. This is a perfectly reasonable decision, but it does mean that the innermost essence of the subject is missing. But could any mortal grasp that essence? No one yet, certainly in English, and probably in any other language, has better described the anatomy of the many-limbed and many-headed creature than Macartney, and it seems unlikely that any one will do a better job for some time yet.

Macartney was elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 1965. He was also made a Corresponding Member of the Austrian, and was awarded the Grand Decoration of Honour, with gold, of Austria in 1974. He revisited Hungary several times after the war, the first being in 1945 and the last at a historical colloquium in Budapest in 1971. He was elected a Corresponding Member of the Hungarian Academy in 1947, but two years later, at the height of the Stalinist terror under Mátéys Rákosi, his membership was terminated. Though Hungarian historians working under the communist regime held him in high regard, and he had good personal relations with them, they were not able to obtain a reversal of this insulting and unjust action, doubtless imposed on the Academy by the party leadership; and this was a source of lasting bitterness to him. He also made one lecture tour in the United States, and was elected a Freeman of the City of Cleveland (Ohio), the centre of the largest population of Americans of Hungarian descent.

Mention must be made in conclusion of his activities on behalf of Hungarian exiles in Britain. He was one of a small group of British academics who visited Austria immediately after the Hungarian Revolution of October 1956 to see what could be done for students from Hungarian universities who had escaped from the Soviet invasion. He took a personal interest in those who came to Britain and were enabled to continue their studies in this
country. He was also a founder, and for many years President, of the Anglo-Hungarian Fellowship, which held regular meetings in the hospitality of the Polish Hearth in South Kensington, at which lectures were given and problems discussed which interested cultured Hungarians uprooted from their homeland.

In Macartney's lifetime two world wars started in Central Europe; not only did crises in that region trigger off two human catastrophes, but among the deeper causes of both disasters were forces at work in those lands, which were little understood in the north and west of Europe at the beginning of this century, though they became more familiar as they spread to Russia, the Muslim lands, and the whole world beyond Europe and North America.

The tragedy of twentieth-century Central Europe had its social, national, constitutional, and international aspects. All four strikingly foreshadow developments in Asia and Africa in the mid-century.

The social scene was marked by the antagonism, sometimes latent and sometimes brutally evident, between pre-industrial upper classes, with privileges and mentalities that had disappeared in most of northern and western Europe, and a peasantry with too little land and primitive methods of agriculture, growing poorer as its numbers increased and its needs were neglected by rulers overwhelmingly interested in cities and industry. That part of the peasantry which became uprooted from the village and swelled the population of the new urban agglomerations, added to the confusion and the unrest.

In multi-lingual and multi-confessional Central Europe social discontents became inseparable from national. From subcultures based on minority languages emerged educated élites no longer willing to be treated as members of second-class communities, ruled by persons who considered themselves to belong to the only, official, nation in the state. Mere cultural diversity was slowly transformed into national consciousness; leaders appeared who claimed that their peoples too were nations, and as such demanded their own sovereign states; and more and more members of these peoples followed their lead.

Increasingly, the old political legitimacy was undermined, and the attempts to replace it had small success. The political challengers of the old order spoke of democracy, but whether that was a suitable word to describe what they got, is rather doubtful. Democratic constitutions were duly enacted, but old methods of government remained. Majority rule was exploited by demagogues, or obstructed by officials, or both processes occurred
together. Universal suffrage, distorted in this way, could not so much liberate the peoples as offer the masses to the demagogues as a bludgeon with which to beat their rivals; and after years of confusion new tyrants emerged.

Each new state was nominally sovereign, but each was constrained not only by unsettled frontier disputes with small neighbours but also by the rivalries of neighbouring Great Powers. The relationship between small and large states was not simple. The big bullied the small when they had the chance, but the small used the big for their own ends too.

Macartney was well aware of all four sets of problems. His first book gave precedence to the social factor. The policies and leadership of the Austrian social democrats gave him grounds for cautious optimism—which the tragic events of the mid-1930s proved wrong. He also well understood the yawning social gulf in Hungary between great landowners and landless workers or dwarf holders. He was never—as his critics at times portrayed him—in indifferent to the need for a land reform; but he did not see why the fact that Romania and Czechoslovakia had carried out land reforms should in itself justify their retention of lands inhabited by Hungarians.

As the years passed, he gave greater attention to the problems of nationalism, which in fact assumed first place in the politics of the 1930s. He continued to regard nationalism as a bad basis of legitimacy for a state. He would always have preferred to see forms of government based on some higher principle, under which citizens would have had freedom to develop their own national cultures. But no such state appeared in Central Europe after the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy, and the Habsburg Monarchy had not been such a state.

He preferred democracy, at least in the sense in which that word was habitually used in the West in his lifetime, to dictatorial forms of government, but he was sceptical of its prospects in Central Europe. Hungary’s government in the 1920s was a kind of Whiggish constitutionalism, with a parliament comparable to the British before 1832, and with a large measure of civil liberties, at least for city dwellers. Yugoslavia’s attempts at democracy broke down by 1929. The agony of Romanian democracy was more protracted, but it was never a very healthy organism. Czechoslovakia came much nearer to a Western democratic model, and Macartney gave it credit for this, yet remained sceptical of a state in which the dominant nation formed less than half the population. As for Hungary, in the 1930s the old oligarchic landowning
élite lost a great deal of its power, and some democratization certainly occurred, in the sense of drawing much wider social forces into political life, but this did not make for more of the Western type of democracy. Macartney’s scepticism was increased, but it is a fair criticism of him that he modified it in the case of Hungary by giving it the benefit of more doubts than he was willing to concede elsewhere.

Preoccupied as he became with the need to repair injustices done to national minorities by the Versailles peace settlement, Macartney saw the growing rift between the Western and Central Great Powers in Europe as a struggle between Have-Not’s and Haves. He saw that Hungarian revisionism inevitably received more support from Mussolini and Hitler than from French or British leaders; but the fact that Hungary drifted towards a status of satellite of the Axis did not diminish his sympathy for the Hungarian cause, either before or after a state of war existed between Britain and Germany. He would not admit that, since the Third Reich represented a threat to all civilized values, any person or government which followed its lead was thereby betraying humanity.

Many years later he made to the present writer, in the most friendly manner, the comment that R. W. Seton-Watson’s mistake had been to think that if the national discontents which beset the Habsburg Monarchy could be removed by national self-determination Central Europe would have a happy future; and that Seton-Watson’s son had made an essentially analogous mistake in thinking that if the social oppressions and discontents of the same region in the 1930s could be removed by socialism, there could be a happy future. He was right in both cases, but he could not himself produce a better cure. The Hungary whose wrongs he tried to right proved as fiercely nationalist in its aims and its practice as the Successor States had been to their Hungarian subjects. The peace settlement of 1918–20, inspired by Wilsonian principles of self-determination, was followed not by a community of free peoples but by a Kleinstaaterei of mutually hostile neighbours. The revolution of 1917–21 in Russia, made in the name of socialism, created not a brotherhood of workers’ republics, but a totalitarian empire that crushed all national cultures, including the Russian, even if it used Russians to that end; and its extension to the Danubian lands artificially froze some national antagonisms and exacerbated others. Restoration of the old super-national or pre-national legitimacies of monarchy or of the universal church might be greatly preferable, but their chances seemed negligible.
The twentieth century appeared stuck with the facts of nationalism, in Europe and further afield. The disintegration of the overseas colonial empires reinforced this conclusion. Indeed their fate placed the fate of Austria-Hungary and its Succession States in a different perspective: how far Macartney was aware of this is not clear from his writings. As for the remaining land-based colonial empire, from the Elbe to Kamchatka, no doubt in time it would be one with Nineveh and Tyre, but the time-scale was not predictable.

No way was visible in Macartney’s lifetime of preventing the national consciousness which arises from economic and cultural development from turning into political nationalism. Economic prosperity and social transformations could, and sometimes did, make nationalism milder, but they did not seem able to cure the illness, or to prevent recurrent outbreaks. The Kleinstaaterei of the Danube basin between the world wars was repeated, with strikingly similar ugly features, by the Kleinstaaterei in other continents which followed the Second World War. Yet if a proliferation of small sovereignties was dangerous, attempts to suppress them, and attempts within multi-national states to suppress national cultures or to deny national consciousness, proved no less dangerous. The lessons of Austria-Hungary and of the Successor States were clear, but they were not being learnt.

There was one important problem of these decades in Central Europe, of which Macartney was well aware, which deserves a few more words—the Jewish problem.

Jews and Magyars in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were interwoven in a web of love–hate relationships which cannot easily be unravelled. When in the first decades of the nineteenth century Jews began to pour into Hungary from the formerly Polish territories which had been annexed by Russia and Austria, they encountered the same grass-roots hostility which had characterized all pre-modern Christian societies. However, the dominant land-owning classes soon found that Jews could be useful to them in the task which they set themselves of transforming Hungary into a strong modern national state. Jews revealed talents for industrial entrepreneurship, and for the modern intellectual professions, which Magyar gentry-folk lacked, and did not particularly wish to acquire. As these skills were clearly useful to a modern state, the Hungarian political élite encouraged Jews to develop them, and made their task easier for them. This was especially true after 1867, when Hungarian governments acquired, under the Habsburg Crown, almost complete internal
sovereignty. For their part Jews eagerly embraced the Magyar language, became Magyar patriots—even to the extent of espousing and promoting the official policy of pressing Slovaks, Romanians, and others to turn themselves into Magyars—and increasingly inter-married with Magyars and sought assimilation. The flourishing new urban economy and literary–scientific culture of Hungary at the turn of the century was thus largely the product of an unusually fruitful synthesis, within the growing educated élite, of Magyar and Jew. Meanwhile at the lower levels of the Hungarian social pyramid latent hostility to Jews remained.

In politics Hungarian Jews tended to be liberals or socialists. This did not worry the Magyar rulers. Most of them subscribed to some sort of liberalism, and they were not much worried by socialism among industrial workers. The two forces in which they did see potential danger were nationalism among the non-Magyars and agrarian revolt among dwarf-holder peasants and agricultural labourers. Hungarian Jews had virtually no contact with, or sympathy for, either of these forces.

Things changed dramatically in 1919. Socialism, especially its left wing, communism, briefly triumphed when defeat in war overthrew the old regime in Hungary, and many of the socialist and communist leaders were Jews. Overthrow of the communist regime brought a wave of anti-semitism in Hungary. Although the re-establishment of an orderly oligarchic form of government, with elements of liberalism, under Count Stephen Bethlen in the 1920s, brought improvements, the old honeymoon period between Magyars and Jews was past. In the 1930s new motives for anti-semitism arose with the world economic depression: aspirants for jobs in business and the professions, and persons thrown out of such jobs, saw the Jews, who were numerous in those fields, as rivals or exploiters. As the hold of the old oligarchy relaxed, and middle-class or even plebeian elements were drawn into political life, pressure for restrictions on Jews grew. It reached its climax when the Sztojay government of March 1944—a government, it must be noted, not of wild fascist fanatics but of highly respectable middle-class politicians—sent hundreds of thousands of Jews to Hitler's extermination camps. The destruction of most Hungarian Jews (those of Budapest were spared deportation), was not the work of the old reactionary oligarchy, but was a result of the relative democratization of the 1930s.

These processes Macartney closely observed and understood. He knew that the social and cultural forces involved were too
complex for simple denunciation. He avoided the usual pejorative adjectives of both left and right, but he sometimes spoke and wrote bitingly about Hungarian Jews, as well as about Hungarian Christians, and his expressions in matters in which he felt emotionally involved were not always judicious; but though perhaps it is true that on the whole he disliked Jews, it is not fair to call him, as he sometimes was called, an anti-Semite, and absurd to call him a fascist. This was recognized by the Israeli organizers of a conference held in Haifa in April 1972, on the tragically sensitive subject of relations between Jews and their host peoples in Eastern Europe in modern times, who invited Macartney to read a paper on Hungary. Both in his formal presentation and in informal discussions his sincerity and straightforwardness impressed conference participants.

Macartney had a rather retiring nature, was at times truculent, and could bear grudges for a long time. His career did not follow the normal academic cursus honorum, but intellectual excellence was something which he admired in others and which he himself attained. Neither the bland pieties of the academic world, to which the words ‘liberal values’ were conventionally, though often misleadingly, attached, nor the bureaucratic mechanisms of the institutions which are still called universities because no more suitable name has yet been found for them, held much attraction for him. Yet he was in a broad sense a teacher, and exercised influence not only through his books, and the many lectures which he gave both to academic and to wider audiences, but also through the help and advice which he generously provided for individuals who sought it.

His basic opinions, in so far as one can judge in so reticent a person, were far from the public ethos of the 1970s. An important part of his code was loyalty to friends, and this he unhesitatingly extended to those, in Hungary or elsewhere, who fell victim to political catastrophe, including those who might be said to have brought their fate upon themselves. One example is an old friend from Macartney’s Vienna days in the 1920s, General Hindy, who in January–February 1945 was the joint commander, with the Germans, of the garrison of Budapest when besieged by the Soviet Army. By holding out to the bitter end Hindy could be said to have caused the destruction of most of the capital and the loss of many thousands not only of Russian military but of Hungarian civilian lives. Taken prisoner by the Russians, he was tried as a war criminal and executed. Macartney dedicated his book October Fifteenth ‘to the honoured memory of Iván Hindy, General,
† August 26th 1946’. The rights and wrongs of that particular case must be left to future historians, or to a higher authority still, but Macartney’s gesture shows the man. *Victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni.*

Popularity of person or opinions, intellectual fashions, and the polished image did not stand high on his scale of priorities, but he valued honest praise and resented its absence. These aspects of his character no doubt have various origins, all unknown to the present writer; but it is perhaps not fanciful to attribute them in part to that peculiar combination of humility and arrogance, of respect for the truth and for those who seek it with contempt for all kinds of self-advertisement, which formed the Wykehamical ethos of his day. He will often, as a schoolboy, have heard the words: ‘grant that we, whose lot is cast in so goodly a heritage, may strive together the more abundantly to share with others what we so richly enjoy; and as we have entered into the labours of other men, so to labour that other men may enter into ours’. Whatever may have been his inward vision, his outward performance—fallible judgements and perverse actions included—does not greatly diverge from that prayer. He laboured mightily, and left behind him works which others will use, and using, remember him.

G. H. N. SETON-WATSON