MORTIMER WHEELER ARCHAEOLOGICAL LECTURE

BRITAIN AND JULIUS CAESAR

By CHRISTOPHER HAWKES

Fellow of the Academy

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I am happy to be speaking in the presence of these lectures' eponymous hero, Sir Mortimer, in the twentieth week of the fifty-first year of our friendship. Here tonight too is Mr. C. E. Stevens, my friend from early schooldays, when he and I delved together in that fat red volume by T. Rice Holmes, Ancient Britain and the Invasions of Julius Caesar (1907). Holmes had excessive trust in Caesar's good faith. But he was ample, and averse to textual surgery—more favoured then by others than today. Robust, he was also acute; and for dates, prior to the Julian Calendar, I follow his system—not Le Verrier's, in spite of M. Michel Rambaud, the French Caesarian of today. (The lecture as printed here includes much that in speaking I omitted for brevity, besides rewordings required to accord with my reading during 1976. Of my helpers here to be acknowledged in notes as I go, 1 death has overtaken Derek Allen and C. E. Stevens; and Sir Mortimer's presence to hear me was the last occasion of our seeing one another.)

I. Prologue: The Ocean, Alps, and Rhine, to 58 B.C.

Caesar marched to supremacy over the Roman world from the West. From Britain came a little—less indeed than he had

The reference key throughout is the Bibliography, pp. 185–92; I have tried to serve archaeologists equally with classicists.

1 This Mortimer Wheeler Lecture was the fifth. My debts to acknowledge, in preparing and revising it, are many: to Sir Mortimer himself, to C. E. Stevens, and to D. F. Allen, all running far back; to my wife Sonia Hawkes; and more lately incurred, to Professors Kenneth Jackson, Leo Rivet, and Charles Thomas, and to Michael Avery, James Dyer, John Kent, Michael Mackensen, Daphne Nash, Stuart Rigold, and Warwick Rodwell. Dr. Nash has given me help from the Heberden Coin Room (Ashmolean Museum, Oxford); for photography I thank Robert Wilkins (Institute of Archaeology, Oxford); and for drawing so skilfully the figures and maps from my originals, Marion Cox.
hoped—of the Western wealth that equipped him. Ancient trust in that wealth was old: Carthaginian, Greek, Phoenician, prehistoric. It started from Spain, when men discovered

wealth in metals there; most of them are southern yet recur as north-western too. And tin (for making copper into bronze) is rare, unlike Spain’s copper, in the south, but grows in
abundance up the Ocean coast to Galicia, drawing traders north, and thence into farther explorations, to Gaul's north-western or Armorican wealth: tin in Brittany, and more then in Britain.\(^1\) So Carthage was drawn; and from the final years of her trading, till the middle second century B.C., there may even be Punic derivation for the pottery with countersunk paired loop handles, adopted in Brittany and thence into south-west Britain (fig. 1 and map 1).\(^2\) Transmission would have been by Corbilo, known (on the Loire) since the voyage of Pytheas, the Greek fourth-century explorer who came from Marseilles.\(^3\) That Greek city-state, foe of Carthage and ally of Rome, had routes

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\(^1\) Hawkes 1977, map 7, distribution of Western tin-ores.

\(^2\) Two-handed jars, so typically Punic, persisted till the third-second centuries, in simple forms such as spread to Hispanic coastlands: Harden 1962, 150–1, using Cintas, *Céramique punique* (1950). In my fig. 1 with map 1, nos. 9–11 are from Carthage, 8 (painted) from the mouth of the Mondego (Portugal: site of Sta. Olaya, excav. A. dos Santos Rocha, Mus. Figueira da Foz). Sailings to the Loire may be guessed till the tin trade languished after Carthage's fall (middle second century along with death of Massinissa, old king of Numidia, rich (Walsh 1965) and I think placed better for a hand on such traffic). Brittany, so getting the idea of two handles, could apply it in the countersunk form (4–7, grey), whence Britain derived its own, as on sites from Cornwall to Dorset (Maiden Castle, 1–3): Wheeler 1939; 1943, 56, 206–9, 383; Wheeler and Richardson 1953, 100–1, fig. 31; Thomas 1966, 77 with n. 21; start here within second century, Frere 1961, 86–90; this Punic suggestion of mine was not in print till now.

\(^3\) Hawkes 1977, 40–2, 44–5.
by land, avoiding Spain through Gaul, towards Britain and especially for British tin (map 2). But the central-Gaulish Arverni could exert control; and only their defeat, later in the second century when Marseilles brought Rome into Gaul, let the south then prosper as a new Roman province with the old Greek city set within it. Provinces in Spain, at first taken from
Carthage, were two: Hither (with Tarraco) and Farther—opened to the Ocean in 139, when the native resister Viriatus fell¹ and left Rome with the whole south-west. The incoming governor was Decimus Junius Brutus.² He advanced to the Douro and beyond: into Galicia (map 3A), whose name Callaecia supplied an additional name for himself, Callaicus. But although he crossed the river Lima and reached the Minho he had to fall back; from the Bracari and coastal Talabriga he was summoned away. No record connects him with the ‘Tin Isles’ (Cassiterides), fabulous mart for the tin of a far north-west. The frontier down on the Tagus stayed; and only forty years on, crossing higher up, did the consular Publius Licinius Crassus advance, by Salamanca and doubtless Zamora (map 3B), on Galicia from the east.³ So the ‘Tin Isles’ coast, of which sailings from the south had at last reported a discovery, had its shallow mines and peaceful men observed by Crassus, who ‘sailed across’ to them.⁴

¹ Texts in FHA iv. 96–135.
³ Texts in FHA iv. 152–3: his base-camp (castra) Liciniana, Ptol. Geogr. ii. 5, 6 (mis-spelt in Itin. Ant. 438, 5), was on the middle Guadiana between Toledo and Mérida; for 96; 95, he was around Salamanca, for there he forbade the Blotonenses (of Bletos) to continue appeasing their gods by human sacrifice (Plutarch, Q.R. 83; it had just been abolished at Rome with himself as consul, 97: Pliny xxx. 12); 94, from there to a Galicia too far north for Brutus, his route would have to be that from the east by Zamora.
⁴ To the men, not islands which in Greek would have the pronoun feminine. Most have read masc. auteus as though fem. antas—including Schulten: FHA vi. 99, 901. The account is Strabo (iii) 176, end of chapter that has begun on 175. Crassus can have crossed one of this coast’s deep rías or firths, both its sides then of course being equally mainland. The islands along it seem not to have tin, except perhaps a little on Ons. Strabo here will have drawn on Posidonius, who was travelling around in Spain not very much later; but he starts the chapter with the isles of old false conjecture, ‘out at sea’, ill-suited to what follows and contradicting the chapter’s concluding words, ‘Iberia and the islands lying off it’: writing far away, he failed to perceive the discrepancy. Strabo here finishes on Spain: book iii. As Britain comes in iv, with Gaul, that alone shows his Crassus not Caesar’s officer (pp. 133–4, 147–9), who thus cannot visit British tinniers in Cornwall (as fancied by too many), or a Scilly archipelago, really mostly formed from a large single island through local submergence later: unknown to Dion 1952, 310, when expounding the contemporary changes on the lowermost Loire; here he should be set beside Hawkes 1977, 1, 23, 26. I owe thanks to Charles Thomas for advising me on Scilly; much of his work on it is in Ashbee 1974.
And he pronounced the sea-voyage free for traders from the south, although it was longer than the crossing to the tin in Britain.

Map 4, with all Spain, shows Gaul and the Channel so crossed. With Marseilles (Massilia in Latin) the traffic now was shared by Roman Narbonne (the colony Narbo), and two descriptions were preserved by Diodorus (c. 60–40). He took one if not both from Posidonius, it seems (whom Strabo, rather after, used for Crassus); this leader in Greek ethnography himself had been in Spain and Gaul early in the century. Keeping the details here to a note,¹ I shall return to this tin-trade later. Its

¹ Diodorus's accounts are v. 22, 2 and (briefer) 38, 5. In the latter, the
augmenting by the Spanish had as yet no more than begun; and in Spain, after Crassus, there again was war. Rome’s new government, from 80, had to wage it with the natives drawn to revolt (map 4) by the dissident Roman leader Sertorius. Galicia’s miners could still prefer to be peaceful: Sertorius’s man Perperna

tin comes ‘out of the Britannic island’, is conveyed to ‘Gaul lying directly opposite’, and ‘through the inland middle of Celtica is carried on horses by the merchants, both to the people of Massalia and the city named Narbo’. Usually the source has been presumed to be Posidonius, who was in Gaul some forty years earlier than D was writing. Corbilo at mouth of the Loire (map 2) is not mentioned: primarily only by Polybius (preceding century); in my opinion (p. 134) it was destroyed, in 104 or 103, by the Teutoni. So the route will indeed have run inland from the coast ‘directly opposite’, the ‘island’ being Britain as a whole—or alternatively Wight (p. 143).

The account in 22 was seen formerly as coming from the early third-century Timaeus (thus Holmes 1907, 499–514), because its tin, from Belerion (tip of Cornwall) is shipped at a tidal island there (St. Michael’s Mount), Iktis, and Timaeus in a passage known only from Pliny (iv. 104) has tin obtained in an island, frequented by Britons, which his text spells ‘Mictis’. Pliny did not think of the Isle of Wight; yet its spelling, in authentic Latin Vectis, means a Celtic name beginning with a W-sound, which Greek spells Ou-. Professor Kenneth Jackson’s assuring me that therefore its name cannot ever have been Iktis, so that ‘Mictis’ ought to be a manuscript error for \*Victis or else Greek \*Ouiktis (or actually for Vectis or Ouektis), is here acknowledged with my gratitude, as equally in Hawkes 1977, 28–30. It demolishes the false equation Iktis = Vectis (as though English ‘ill’ could = ‘well’), and thus the sole ground for supposing that Timaeus can have here been Diodorus’s source.

Timaeus’s own source must have been Pytheas (Hawkes 1977, 7, cf. 9), at whose fourth-century date (and after) tin ingots would be those known to Cornish archaeology, not of astragalus form as in D but essentially plano-convex: Tylecote 1966 (some are Roman; post-Roman ones are different again). To call the unique one from Falmouth Harbour off St. Mawes an astragalus, with Aileen Fox (1964, 116, 240), was shown to be impossible by Hencken (1932, 166); its weight of 156 lb. (71.67 kg. approx.) and its narrow yet wide-barred H shape, nearly 0.864 m. long, recall the Mediterranean ‘ox-hide’ ingots of copper, which are second-millennium. Pytheas’s date would be surprising too (though the early first century is not) for the tin’s reaching Iktis as D describes, on waggons, and for the merchants’ thirty-day pack-horse trail through Gaul ‘to the mouth of the Rhone’, in which his first account is consistent with his second, quoted above. Both were left aside by Mette when he edited the texts that have a bearing on Pytheas (Mette 1952: in England barely noticed), though including of course the Pliny from Timaeus. If Posidonius were not the source for both D’s accounts, despite their measure of agreement, the other would be one of the explorers mentioned by Strabo, (i) 63, as having seen, besides Ireland, Britain and small isles round it. He speaks of them as modern, and again so on Ireland, (ii) 115; none should be prior to 100, so the time of Posidonius should in any case stand.
had to march in arms there, plainly for their metals;\(^1\) so the sea-trade doubtless was serving Metellus, the government commander in the south. He and Pompey, commander in the east, were forcing Sertorius gradually north, to encirclement at Osca by Pompey and then to be murdered there. Four years afterwards, in 68, there arrived in Spain from Rome, as a quaestor in the south, young Gaius Julius Caesar. Seven years more, and he was back (map 5) in Farther Spain, as its governor.

In Rome he had just been praetor, and speaking at the funeral of Julia his aunt, widow of the great and redoubtable Gaius Marius. Marius had served in both Spain; in 114 he had governed the Farther. Caesar, now almost forty, had known him in boyhood; he had learnt, from his glory as a soldier, memorable lessons. Farther Spain still had glory to offer, and wealth. Big debts that he owed in Rome being settled for him there by Marcus Crassus, son of old Publius and also rich from Spain, he squeezed new riches for himself from there—though protecting provincial debtors.\(^2\) His province’s Atlantic side, still unruly, he tackled in arms.\(^3\) Over the Tagus, he could quell the Herminian hillmen if he captured their hillforts. But success this way (as Marius had known) took time: his dash on past the Douro was checked by Herminians revolting in his rear. Back then, and driving them down to the coast, he had trouble at an island: tidal—it is now the peninsula Peniche—and for assailants a death-trap. He took it only by combined operations, with ships from Gades (Cadiz): another lesson. Lastly, embarking with his fleet, he sailed up north, to the coast with the ‘Tin Isles’; surpassing both Brutus and Crassus, he rounded the cape, to the north-facing bay of La Coruña and took by storm its citadel Brigantium, where such a navy, never seen by any before, struck terror. This late-summer visit to a harbour that could serve for adventuring farther, like Pytheas, who had sailed to

\(^1\) Texts in *FHA* iv. 182 ff., 224–5 ff.: Perperna arrived in winter 77/6; he wintered with Sertorius 75/4 in Lusitania, south of Galicia; by the end of 74 they were forced north to the Ebro, and never gained any initiative again. So 74 is the year for Perperna to lunge into Galicia, taking Cales (at mouth of the Douro) and in action north of it on the Lima (named superstitiously ‘river of oblivion’): *FHA* iv, 233, from fragments 43–4 of the *Histories* of Sallust (contemporary of Caesar). His motive, obscure to Schulten, would be gaining more metals, with tin to make bronze, for the sinking Sertorian army.

\(^2\) Texts in *FHA* v. 10–12, 14–15 (Appian, Suetonius, Plutarch, Cicero, etc.).

\(^3\) His whole campaign (ib. 12–13), Dio xxxvii. 52–3.
Armorica and all round Britain, is revealing. North-western Spain itself, he had learnt, would be a conquest lengthy and hard; eastward, it led to the lands in which Sertorius had fallen to Pompey; Pompey was jealous for his own renown in Spain, and Pompey was important, along with Marcus Crassus, in Caesar's politics. Might he then instead reach Armorica and Britain through Gaul? So he turned back south. Next June he was in Rome once more, soon balked of a triumph but set for his consulship, to be gained through his private supporting by Pompey and Crassus. Three years on from that, through Gaul in arms, he was facing Armorica, and the Veneti who there controlled the crossing to Britain. And his best young officers
were Decimus Brutus, of the family of old Callaicus, and a
Publius Crassus who was son of his wealthy supporter, and
grandson of old Publius Crassus of the 'Tin Isles'.

Yet the Gallic side of the West had its inland part. It was open
to Central Europe, where currents from the East met others
from the North. The Cimbri, in the late second century, had
come from the North: against Bohemia first, which repulsed
them, and on toward the Balkans—to return soon after, fight
Romans in the Eastern Alps, and proceed to Gaul. With the
Teutoni now, they arrived in 109. Celts from the Alpine fore-
lands had joined them, Tulingi and others; next year the consul
Silanus, rashly opting to advance, was beaten; so was Cassius
in 107, by the Tigrini (though they then went home); the
bigger force of 104 met total disaster; Spain was assailed, much
of Gaul overrun—and, I fancy, Corbilo destroyed. Only Marius
—reformer of the army—saved Italy and Rome. The invaders' 
destruction in 102 and 101 was never forgotten. So Caesar knew
that Italy and the West must be guarded from dangers on their
inland sides. Inner Europe and the North lay there behind; and
also the East.

The Pontic king Mithradates, known best for his reign in
Asia Minor, his Aegean irruption, Armenian alliance, and defeat
in 66 by Pompey, had dominions north of the Black Sea too
(map 6); and from these in his last three years, to 63, he planned
a thrust through Europe into Italy. With his death, the threat
very soon took a further form. Within the Carpathian Ring,
between the Pontus and Danube, was Dacia; Mithradates will
have planned his thrust in political accord with it. Its king,
young when he was old, was Burebista. Archaeology shows—
besides much commerce—its people expanding to west, and
Celts there having to retreat to the Middle Danube. Burebista
had only to cross, and push on west overrunning Pannonia, to
endanger Italy next by the Alps and Adriatic. The Pannonian
lands between, however, were held by the Celtic Boii. From
their Hercynian home (Bohemia), they had formed now a big

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1 No one aware of the ambiene shown by East-European archaeology,
on its Pontic side from long before Mithradates, can think his design as far-
fetching as have many historians.

2 The trade, Glodariu 1976 (in English): conclusions 97–102. The advance
1971a and b and for this century especially c; Benadik 1971; behind all are
Filip 1956, and Daicoviciu C. 1945 (though position since then much
altered). Burebista's reign, at conclusion of Berciu 1967, is equated there
with an archaeological horizon very well marked.
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Middle-Danube realm, conjoined with Taurisci, and ruled by a king Critasirus. Burebista, more probably in 60 than any time later, smashed it in a battle. Till then, they were masters in Central Europe and a danger to Italy themselves. If invading it now, they could thus forestall any Dacian invasion from the east; and to tempt them were former Boian lands now Roman, the

lands round Bologna. If Burebista hit them later, as is still believed by some (after his harrying the Black Sea coast and Macedonia), this would be a Boian threat; if he hit them in 60, the threat was himself. A threat in 59, through the Eastern Alps, was being felt then in any case at Rome.

1 Strabo (vii) 298, 303-4, 313, 315, with (v) 213; (viii) 292, the resulting ‘desert of the Boii’ adjoins a lake, which (though there confused with L. Constance) is clearly Pannonian, and the same (Neusiedler See) as the ‘lacus Pelso’ that is placed by Pliny, iii. 146, beside this ‘desert’, with Norici as (westerly) neighbours.
2 Strabo as n. 1 and (xvi) 762; Suetonius 44. 3; Gelzer 1969, 322 with n. 6; see n. 3.
3 Gelzer as n. 2; and 87 with his n. 1 on the date, citing PWRE (1959) and E. Swoboda’s Carmina (ed. now for citing is 1964). Two views on it stand in contrast (for that of Mócsy see p. 138, n. 5); Hungarians and Germans have mostly preferred the ‘late’—upheld Sept. 1976 by Professor
Caesar was consul; and was given by the People, in the Law of Vatinius the tribune, two provinces for nearly five years: Cisalpine Gaul—North Italy—and Illyricum, adjoining it beside the Adriatic and the Eastern Alps. Adjoining both, within those Alps, was the kingdom of Noricum: equally at risk from beyond, it was friendly to Romans. A pact with Noricum also now was made, with a royal marriage, by the formidable Ariovistus, over on the Rhine.  

1 His tribes, with the name Germani, had territories formerly all on its east; his crossing it to Gaul, to side with a grouping of powerful peoples there, led in 60 (at Magetobriga)  

2 to his beating opponent peoples, whose leaders—the Aedui—had long been friends of Rome. Yet now, in 59 with Caesar as consul, she bestowed her coveted friendship on Ariovistus.  

3 He prized its prestige, Rome wanted him appeased; but his Norican commitment and the Illyrican for Caesar, effecting a triple deterrent, could avert the threat from farther east, whose-ever this was. Of unknown leanings are only the Vindelici, in modern Bavaria. And at this point, Boii—whether recouping or forestalling Burebista’s onset from the east—invaded Noricum in force: it was a mass migration.  

4 But they failed. And he did nothing. So the threat dissolved.  

5 Ariovistus now could be treated

A. Nagy (Debreцен) at the Nice international congress, against my doubting. Czechoslovaks and Romanians, however, and some Germans, favour the ‘early’, dating the battle towards or no later than 60; see also p. 138 n. 5 for Alföldy 1974. For date ‘about 60’, Filip 1962, 74 (with behind him his 1956) claims support from recent research in Hungary itself, besides Romania; ‘60’ is the date in Neustupný 1961, 161; from Romanian discussions (Macrea 1956; Pippidi 1965, 266–87; Vulpe 1968, 27–31) ‘60’ comes as the latest possible in Daicoviciu C. 1969, 21–2. The disjunction explains my attitude here, but the ‘early’ is still what I prefer: see p. 136 n. 5 and n. 3 on the Boii who in 58 joined the Helvetii (p. 138).

1 BG i. 53–4: the king in Noricum, Voccio, sends him his sister, to marry (in bigamy) after his going into Gaul. For his going there not before 61 or 60, see text below with n. 5 and pp. 137 n. 1, 138 n. 1. Voccio’s inscribed coinage will cover that time.

2 BG i. 31, 12; 44, 3. Name-form and date, Holmes 1911, 554–5; location somewhere in eastern Gaul, but unknown.

3 BG i. 40, 2; 43, 4, 8; 44, 5.

4 BG i. 5, 4–

5 Gelzer 1969, 87, threat from Burebista ‘sooner or later’; but see here above, p. 135 with nn. 1–3, and below p. 138 with n. 5 on the Boii: their invasion of Noricum has to be 59, and their fighting force was leading a mass migration. The Helvetii to whom they recoiled are in Caesar set apart from Ariovistus; BG i shows vividly his art of disjunctive concealment (Stevens 1952b; Rambaud 1953, 1956). Ariovistus, now his foe but only the year before his friend, was an embarrassment needing this art to carry him over; it was from non-Caesian sources, never coming through to us.
as the western danger that he always had been. South Gaul, the Transalpine Province, went to Caesar (from 1 January) for 58, with a legion which (then) his Cisalpine three, and any more he might raise, would reinforce. Thus in arms, as in
diplomacy till now, he could uphold his determined protection of the West.

Ariovistus was beyond the mountain chain of the Jura (map 7). Within it, holding the forelands of the Alps in Switzerland, were the Helvetii, with a High Rhine frontier on the north where they faced Germani. I believe that Ariovistus himself had previously forced them back to it, from the older one farther north, on the Main, from which Tacitus mentions their retreat. To Caesar in 58 he boasted of fourteen years in the field, and directly, that the Boii and Burebista were known to Strabo, sixty years on; little as it is, what he tells us has clues we can follow. See next Part II.

Tacitus, Germania, 28, 2; cf. Ptolemy, Geogr. ii. 11, 6.
most of those years should be prior to his entering Gaul.¹ There was warfare on the High Rhine still,² and within it they were cramped; here were their tribes who had fought against Rome with the Teutoni.³ Their famous plan of migration,⁴ not now on to Roman soil but to the west, was moved by their noble Orgetorix in 61 to serve his ambitions, yet after their exposure and his consequent death it was persisted in. By early 58 they had been joined by neighbours and by Boii: those who had invaded Noricum and failed, last year, and were not going home.⁵ Caesar broke them all, and sent most of the survivors

¹ BG i. 36, 7. Thus the position of Ariovistus’s people the Nemetes, at vi. 25, 2 (in the ‘German excursus’), is beside the Helvetii and the Raurici round Basel, where the Black Forest (head of the ‘Hercynian’) flanks the Rhine. Their stretching out over it to upper Alsace was thus part of his movement into Gaul. The Rhine peoples’ list at iv. 10, 3 has Nemetes in the two chief second-class manuscripts (where the better have Nantuates in error: see p. 146 with n. 5) placed next to the Helvetii, therefore on the High Rhine; it turns then north down the Rhine till it reaches the Triboci, who again were one of the peoples of Ariovistus. The river’s flowing ‘through’ them should suggest their being stretched out over it: about Mainz and Worms (so it seems) where next they were followed by his Vangiones, they themselves moving south to the region of Speier. On all these three see p. 140 with n. 3. For iv. 10 see Rambaud 1967, 66–9, against the doubting of the chapter by Klotz and Fuchs, from von Göler and Meusel (who persuaded even Holmes: 1911, 455–6, 481–2, 692–3 nn. 2–3). The idea that A crossed the Rhine at the start of his fourteen years is an error.

² Warfare BG i. 1, 4; 40, 7; frontier location 1, 5 and 2, 3.

³ Notably the Tigurini (p. 134), whose victory over Cassius is recalled BG i. 7, 4; 12, 4–5; 13, 2.

⁴ BG i. 2 ff.

⁵ Why not? and where had been home? ‘Beyond the Rhine’, BG i. 5, 4, is unhelpfully obvious. Filip has them fleeing (1962, 74) out of Pannonia after the smashing by Burebista: for this as in 60 at latest, see notes 1 and 3 to p. 135. Filip reinforces his belief in it from BG i. 29, 1–2: when Caesar has broken the Helvetic migration that they joined after failing in Noricum—having fruitlessly assailed Norelia there, i. 5, 4—the peoples numbered in the Greek-written list that he finds (one-quarter being warriors) are 368,000 in total, 32,000 being Boii. Stevens 1952b, 168, takes 157,000 as the total recorded by Livy (from his excipitor the early fourth-century Orosius, Hist. adv. Paganos vi. 7, 5); this is greatly the likelier truth, so the Boii can be no less than 14,000. But any such very large host with non-combatant majority (females, old men, and boys were listed apart) means a mass migration: p. 136 n. 5. Thus an exit from Pannonia is to that extent more probable, and therefore the ‘early’ date for the Dacian assault on it. So Alfsöldy 1974, 39–42, 45, 50 and 295 (notes): at the Magdalensburg in Carinthia, to be accepted as Norelia, excavation shows damage to the murus gallicus defence-wall, close before the middle of the century, so assignable to Boian assault in 59. Mócsy 1974, 18, propounding a date between 56 and 50, inferred
back. But their intended destination on the Atlantic coast of Gaul, in the land of the Santoni around the Charente, was not so perilously near the Roman Province as he pretends. 1 What he skilfully hides is that out of the Province that way, along the Garonne, where a native ruler quite lately had been named Rome’s friend, 2 ran the trade-route linking Roman Narbonne with the Ocean, at the Gironde estuary’s mouth, of which the Santoni held one side (map 7): no place for a greedy Helvetic intrusion. They had sea-going ships; so also had the Pictones 3 who stretched to the Loire; the Veneti beyond (as I have said) held the sea-way to Britain. So the Helvetic migration’s story has a British connection; and Caesar will have known.

As for Ariovistus, the group that had brought him in arms into Gaul had as its strongest power the Arverni (p. 128 with map 2): they could threaten all routes between south and north, the chief of which passed through the Aedui. These in 61 had appealed to the Senate in Rome. As its reply, Transalpine governors were told to defend them and Rome’s other friends, where there might be advantage to Rome; yet it added no teeth. 4 But Caesar had the teeth, and after the Helvetii he had them for Ariovistus; he bit and on the next day crushed him from Burebista’s not having conquered the Dardani in Serbia till after 57 (he wants both offensives near together: see his map, fig. 5), has no reason, 17, for the Boian assault on Noreia. Nor has Swoboda 1964, 230–2 (cited also by Gelzer: my n. 3 p. 135), unless by supposing a confusion with the Cimbri, at latest in 113. Even the ‘late’ date, surely, would be better than that. If preferring it still, and guessing these Boii as migrating from a home in Bohemia, one could see them as in Noricum to clear the way into Italy; but this is a further guess, and I would rather follow Filip. Clearest, in any case, is Roman awareness of an Eastern-Alps threat in 59; it dissolved, whose-ever it was, but it still is what I think should explain (despite n. 1 below) the award of friendship to Ariovistus, not any slackening of Caesar’s care for the West.

1 BG i. 10, 1–2. For Stevens, 1952b, 168, 172, the plan of migrating here was a fabrication; if so, the false destination was adroitly chosen. This whole account by Stevens of book i, with Helvetii, Aedui, Sequani and Ariovistus, should be read beside mine; in 1974 he told me that he held to it. It makes the matter Gaulish entirely, and omits any elements from Central Europe. It perhaps could be adapted to include them, but I need not attempt this.

2 Mentioned by Caesar in a different context, not till 52. He was Olluvio, father of Teutomatus of the Nitioriges (region of Agen) and implied to have been his predecessor as their king, BG vii. 31, 5.

3 These ships come also in a different context only, iii. 11, 5: p. 147 n. 1 (147–8).

4 BG i. 31, 9 with vi. 12, 5, their envoy disappointed. Terms of the decree and its date, i. 35, 4.
in battle (September 58), somewhere in upper Alsace not far from the Rhine. The king fled over, in a boat, and very few others; those left on the bank were slaughtered by Caesar’s cavalry.1 As this was only the mounted part of his auxiliaries, and the men in his legions—six—were fewer than the enemy’s, other fugitives, left unslaughtered, will have formed a fair proportion of the total.2 So Caesar has barely concealed what is anyhow obvious, that defeated Germani were left on the Rhine’s left bank. Vangiones, Nemetes, and Triboci henceforward remained there.3 The line of the Helvetii and these, then, held it from the Alps to the Middle Rhineland; and it suited a political decision that he made a year after. This was to extend the name ‘Germani’ to denote all east-bank peoples, whether Celts though differing from Gaul’s, as were these, or folk between Celts and the North, or distinct and genuine Northerners, notably the Suebi. Ariovistus indeed had made a marriage alliance with those, before he left home;4 and a hundred septes of them marched to his aid against Caesar. Not many can have sped (though Sedusii might) to the battle, as the main mass heard of

1 BG i. 53, 1–3.
2 Holmes 1911, 653 from BG i. 51, i; 654–5 with 240–1, on the list of migrants, Helvetic and the rest, cited here, p. 138 n. 5.
3 Gelzer 1969, 112, declaring this, has behind him Mommsen, Röm. Geschichte iii (1889) 257–8, transl. History of Rome, v (1894), 48–9; with his citations (n. 4: Pliny, Tacitus, Ptolemy) for their all being there hereafter, archaeology agrees. Basic, for the Mains-Worms region, is Behrens 1923. See n. 1 on p. 138 on Triboci in the list BG iv. 10, 3; if in Caesar this comes from Posidonius and so does Strabo (iv) 193, where they had moved into west-bank lands of the Mediomatrici, their taking that region should be prior to Ariovistus; but their replacing by Vangiones there, and moving to upper Alsace, should anyhow belong to his movement, like the Nemetes’ arrival round Speier (same note). What he twice was told by Caesar was intolerable, i. 35, 3 and 43, 9, was that the masses he brought across the Rhine should be increased still further. That he might not be able to send home any crossed already, is expressly acknowledged by Caesar at 43, 9; these two passages were those that Mommsen relied on (Holmes 1911, 455–6, quite wrongly disapproving). Upper Alsace had belonged (iv. 10, 3 shows it) to the peoples who had brought him into Gaul, the Sequani (map 7: i. 31, 10); his demand for more of their lands was to admit the Harudes—people from the North, to be noticed here directly below. Till his defeat, he could expect to go on like that, as the Aeduan noble says in i. 31, 11; after it, there was only the room that was held by the three Rhine peoples, who themselves would be threatened if any more multitudes came. So Mommsen rightly saw them as entrusted by Caesar with the frontier’s guardianship. Only from the Middle Rhine northward had he trouble any further: they guarded the rest.

4 BG i. 53, 4; cf. p. 136 with n. 1.
it when still far away, and went home;¹ but other true Northerners already were at hand, the Harudes. News of these Northern accessions struck Caesar with dismay.² His swift advance and victory saved the situation. He was right to see henceforward that from over the Rhine, Northerners would make the worst potential danger. But his giving them the name ‘Germani’ cannot make Ariovistus a Northerner, nor any of his three tribes left along the Rhine’s west bank.³ Their king had led them to defeat, and then saved his own skin; Caesar, after the blood-letting, left them to keep ‘Germani’ out—on a long stretch of his frontier guarding the West. How his first Gallic War book simplifies and dissembles the competing threats to it, by deceits that some still fail to apprehend, is a prime illustration of his cunning. On the Channel and again in Britain, we must wait for more of it.⁴

II. Britain over the Channel, 57–56 B.C.

Caesar’s frontier had now to be stretched still farther, to reach the Ocean (map 7). He had secure communications with his Province through the lands of the Aedui; he wintered his army in those of the Sequani, farther outside it still.⁵ Between him

¹ BG i. 37, 3, they have reached the Middle Rhine (opposite the Treveri), whence they retreat soon for home, i. 54, 1. Yet Ariovistus’s order of battle, i. 51, 2, has a unit of Suebi; and of Sedusii (Northerners, named nowhere else in BG). Unit-size not being stated, neither need be large; Triboci, Vangiones, and Nemetes must be main units. Its Harudes call for no doubt (text and note 2). Its ‘Marcomanni’ after these, which cannot be genuine, as this was a group not formed till the time of Augustus, can be a later gloss on Harudes by someone who thought it was their up-to-date name. The historical Marcomanni, an emigrant group coming down from the North, were essentially Suebic but might have included some Harudes.

² BG i. 51, 10 (see p. 140 n. 3); 37, 2–5 (‘vehementer commotus’).

³ This abridges, of necessity curtly, what I first read in Stümpel 1932: still the best presentation of the case that I know, although the boldest. For Caesar’s soon calling peoples ‘Germani’ who were neither German Northerners nor Celts, but anyhow were east of the Rhine, see Hachmann, 1962; though close to my position, going further was hardly his concern there. It is not contradicted by Caesar when at i. 40, 5, in his speech to his officers, he calls Ariovistus’s host ‘that enemy’ whom Marius had met when he beat the Cimbrini and Teutoni (and whose prisoners joined the slave-revolt in Italy, 73): those forces were mixed; so was this one; and he goes on next to call it (40, 7) ‘the same’ as had fought the Helvetii, which really was of SW. Germany’s Germani (p. 137 with n. 1). A pep-talk speech by Caesar can afford such liberties. Space fails me for more about Germani.

⁴ Stevens on this: 1952a and b.

⁵ BG i. 54, 2.
and the Ocean were the peoples called Belgae. His advance among them, spring 57, brought him first to the Remi, whose ambassadors, senior nobles, brought him their friendship. In the past, they explained, Germani had crossed the Rhine to settle hereabouts; mostly descended from these, they were now reckoned Belgae. They enumerated all the peoples so called, extending on the west to the Channel; it becomes clear later that the country this way was distinctively and separably Belgic, so that Caesar on three occasions calls it ‘Belgium’. Where the name of Belgae now prevailed farther east, the Germanic settlers of old had been merged in its unity. For distinction from Ariovistus’s, ‘A-Germani’, and the Northerners, Deutschgermanen or ‘D-Germani’, we may call those settlers ‘B-Germani’, as merged by now in the Belgae. The ambassadors also named others ‘who are called Germani uno nomine’ (besides their particular tribe-names), north of the Ardennes. These joined the Belgae now against Caesar politically; being on the Belgic side of the Rhine, so Germani Cisrhenani, we may call them ‘C-Germani’ to set them apart from ‘B’ and from ‘A’; all were differentiated Celts (unlike the ‘D’).

Caesar, through getting his Remic friends attacked by the patriot Belgae, took excuse for subduing these tribes, and the C-Germani, each in turn. Their league against him, formed in the winter before for their common defence, under Galba he king of the powerful Suessiones (round Soissons, map 7), can initially explain the gold uniface coins (blank obverse), plentiful in Britain, as dispatched there in hopes of a purchase of British support. The sovereignty of Galba’s precursor Diviciacus had

1 BG ii. 4, 1 ff.
2 BG v. 12, 2; 24, 3 (despite some manuscripts’ ‘Belgis’); 25, 4; less clear location only by Hirtius in viii. 46, 4, 7; 49, 1; 54, 4 (with 5). See Hawkes 1968, 6–9 with maps, correcting Hawkes (and Dunning) 1931, 240–3, after Hachmann 1962, 46–8 with n. 69. So thought Holmes already 1911, 395–7.
3 BG ii. 4, 10.
4 BG ii. 3, 4.
5 BG vi. 2, 3. They will have included the peoples who later emerge as Tungri, whence Tacitus on the name: Germania, 2, 5. Archaeology, latest: De Laet 1974, ch. 11, esp. 515–18, 519–30.
6 BG ii. 1, 1 ff. (in 1 citing i. 1, 1–2); ii. 5, 4–11, 6, Caesar contrares the attack on the Remi and reverses it; deals then with tribes in turn, ii. 12 ff.
7 Allen (1961, 115–16 and 1962) ascribed these, his Gallo-Belgic E group of coins, to an invasion, in approximately 60, spread from Essex inland, from Kent into Surrey, and westwards in coastal Sussex, where they would diest Armoricain coins and also his prior Gallo-Belgic D group, letting this and a retreat from Surrey explain the ensuing new coinage in Dorset; summary, Hawkes 1968, 11–12 with fig. 3 map E (some also on eastern

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reached to Britain—though today less probably reflected in coins than I thought some years ago. But Caesar defeated Galba, storming his fortress of Noviodunum—an action coast). Yet Allen’s phrase ‘major surge of invaders or refugees’ (1961, para. 59) hardly suits his admission that the coins (para. 58) ‘had remarkably little lasting effect here’. Scheers 1972, 6 says only ‘émigrations’, and does so in concluding her article’s new demonstration (1–5) that these E coins—uniface, as also the Sussex Xo (Allen para. 53) came here from the Ambiani (region of Amiens): later than C, which were also theirs (n. 1 below), as were A in the century before (p. 144 n. 5; the succession, her 1966b), and dated, by quality, weight, and certain hoards, to the attempted Belgic stand against Caesar. They are the Ambianic portion of a simultaneous chain of issues, by Belgic tribes and Treveri, belonging accordingly to winter 58–57: cf. BG ii. 1–4 and my p. 142. Britain, next summer, was the refuge of vanquished chiefs (14, 2: Bellovaci, the Ambiani surrendering next, 15, 2); but as Caesar noted quiet British aid to the Gauls that year (as in 56: on just these years as implied in iv. 20, 1, see Rambaud 1967, 100–1, beside Collingwood 1936, 32, n. 1), these coins in Britain mean missions to obtain that aid, and only secondly emigrating refugees. Combined, the two will explain their distribution much better than would forcible invasion, which I took too readily from Allen: he admitted refugees but with invaders first. Hence Mackensen 1974, 26 (with 45 n. 120 on Dorset), referring further to Scheers 1973; next has come her 1975; and all have prompted my repentance in the text, encouraged by Dr. John Kent’s having presented, to the Society of Antiquaries November 1976, his own reassessment of the coinages in general, embodying this point with numerous others. See further: next note; p. 144 n. 5; p. 164 n. 2; p. 165 n. 1; p. 177 n. 2; p. 184 n. 1.

1 Hawkes 1968, 12–13, on Allen’s coin-group Gallo-Belgic C, and his series of insular groups, to British K from British A which most closely resembles it (11, fig. 3, map C), must now be held excessively rash, and for two good reasons. Gallo-Belgic C cannot be made Suevian, any more than Atrebatic as was once supposed. It is a coinage of the Ambiani (Scheers 1969b; 1970, 143; 1973 i, 6 ff. and ii. 308 ff., with iv, figs. 100–5), and not commencing till the years just after 70, which must anyhow be thought too late for Diviciacus. His hegemony stretching to Britain (BG ii. 4, 7) need not—as Suevionic coins themselves are later than 70—have involved any community of coinages at all: Scheers 1970b (on their coins altogether), 153; and on the looseness of such ‘hegemonies’ (high-kingships) Nash 1975. Secondly (Mackensen 1974, 45 n. 110, using Scheers 1970b, 155; 1973, ii. 388–9, 441–2), the main southern-insular versions, British A1–A2, B1–B2, form a series which not only stretches off into the west (where B2 awaits location beside B1), but becomes so much later as it goes that it extends into the 50s. None the less, Gallo-Belgic C must still be the primary prototype of all, and its proving to be Ambianic cannot impair this sign of its prestige; its distribution here (Mackensen 11, Abb. 1) is densest in Kent around the Medway, and the prestige could accordingly stem from a seizure of power there, soon after 70, by forces with impulsion from the Ambiani of Amiens. See p. 165, with n. 1 (these coins) and p. 164 n. 2 (those of potin here; dates overlapping).
illumined by Mortimer Wheeler's explaining the nature of its earthworks—and advanced against the Bellovaci (region of Beauvais). These, well inside the distinctively Belgic 'Belgium' (again map 7), had long had a friendship with Rome's old allies the Aedui; their opposing Caesar now had brought him to provoke them with an Aeduan force. Yet on his own approach they surrendered, leaving the Aedui expecting gain from them, but the irreconcilables in angry retreat to Britain. Thus Britain's south-eastern quarter, linked with these Belgic peoples opposite, was left in Caesar's mind as potentially troublesome.  

1 In Wheeler and Richardson 1957, 12, accepting it as l'Oppidum de Pommiers (Aisne), an example of their 'Fécamp' type of wide-ditched massive defence, 8–12 with fig. 2; description of Pommiers and refs. by Mrs. M. A. Cotton, 129–30 in course of gazetteer 126–32; Fécamp (le Camp du Canada) excavations 1939, 62–75; le Châtellier, Duclair, 75–83 (both now dép. Seine-Maritime).

2 BG ii. 14, 2.
3 BG ii. 5, 2–3; 10, 5; 14, 1.
4 BG ii. 14, 2–3, 4–5; surrender on Caesar's approach, ii. 13.
5 BG iv. 20, 1. On the evidently earlier invaders of Britain's 'maritime part' out of 'Belgium', see pp. 168–70, with nn. Mentioned not in Caesar's narrative but only in his 'British excursus', v. 12–14, and there without dates, they need them from archaeology, supported perhaps, in part, by appropriate coin-groups. Forms of weapon, other metalwork and ornament, adopted or adapted in Britain out of Gaul, start afresh in La Tène II times, second century B.C.: Hawkes 1968, 13–14. In distribution, indeed, these are far from being 'maritime' strictly, and are scattered both west and north from the south-east corner; yet 'maritime' in the excursus need not signify the same as in the narrative, being contrasted with interiores mostly non-agricultural and skin-clad (14, 2), claiming to be native (12, 1), and only credible if mainly in the Highland Zone. Thus 'maritime part' will perhaps just be loosely the Lowland, extending farther than the narrative's 'maritime states' (11, 8).

As the signs of La Tène II influence do so extend, they may perhaps be a clue for tracing the invaders. And if some, not all, used coins (as ought to be expected in the second century), such coins (beginning within it) are to hand: in the first place, Gallo-Belgic A. Scheers has now shown that these are of the Ambiani (inside 'Belgium'): her 1968; more fully 1969a, confirming her date (like Allen's) for their start at about 150, and explaining their arrival by invasion (in successive instalments). For Gallo-Belgic B, brought from elsewhere on the coast into a Lower Thames enclave, see her 1970a: dating these from rather nearer towards 100 (again like Allen), she explains them by what she here calls 'émigration'. With Rodwell 1976 independently concurring, and Allen 1961–2 on both groups now expanded yet essentially confirmed, my linking them with some of our La Tène II features is upheld. Brought from Gaul and in A's case circulating long, they mean ascendancy, and never any mass displacements. The La Tène II features are likewise drawn into older British metalwork traditions, and are evinced indeed partly in the furnished inhumations introducing this custom from abroad, but
His next year’s aim, however, was not that end of the Channel, but the other. Here was the Armorican Gaul to which I already have drawn attention; it was the western and a northern part of the country of the peoples ‘beside the sea’ (Areorumae):¹ Brittany round to the Loire, and the Cotentin where dwelt the Unelli (map 7). The Veneti, controlling traffic with Britain as I said, were now its chief power; like the Osismii of Finistère, they had a land with metals—and of Britain’s, plainly, they drew upon the trade in tin.² Of this I have spoken already in regard to the record supplied by Diodorus: p. 130, to which my note (prolonged p. 131) gives the background now for the subject. If the two Diodorus accounts mean two chief routes for the crossing of the Channel, the longer which names Belerion, in Cornwall, should be over to the harbours of the Veneti; the shorter, which names ‘the Brettnic island’ only, but the Gaulish end as ‘lying directly opposite’, should be over to north Armorica straight from a British south-coastal entrepôit, such as would serve for trade with the British south-east, not only for the traffic with Gaul, and doubtless at different times could be locally varied. We can believe that Pytheas was told of such a mart on Vectis, the Isle of Wight (same note). One at Lulworth Cove, to be guarded by the Bindon Hill dyke, protective though unfinished, might have been tried from the Cotentin, by those who had the coves along its north-west tip, together, all guarded by the Hague-Dick, of Late Bronze date.³ And on our coast often still in river-depositions, our traditional rite. Just as those features stretch in space beyond the coins, so in time they need not strictly be held confined to the coins’ own dates. But in the Ambiani who along with them did bring coins, our Gallo-Belgic A, we now have forerunners of those who brought C (p. 143 with n. 1). So a quite long background lay behind Caesar’s disquiets over Belgic Britons. And its mention in his British excursus was to suit him further, as we soon shall see.

¹ Thus Armorica (Western) above, pp. 127, 133. Areorumae civitates: BG v. 53, 6; vii. 75, 4 (enumerated by name); viii. 31, 4, ‘in the farthest confines of Gaul adjoining the Ocean’. In iii. 34 their appellation is translated, as maritimae.

² Above, p. 127 with nn. 1–2 and maps 1–2; from Corbilo, mentioned no longer now and I think destroyed by the Teutoni (p. 134), the trade will have passed to Venetic control already by the time of P. Crassus the elder (pp. 129–30 with map 4).

³ Bindon Hill linear earthwork, Wheeler 1953; pottery not later than an early moment in the Iron Age. For La Hague-Dick (crossing the neck at the tip that runs to Cape de la Hague), the dating was got by radiocarbon from Swedish excavations in its rampart; I hope to write on it further on another occasion.
between those two, strong evidence attests one at Hengistbury Head, in precisely the time of the trade that we know from Diodorus. Just west of Vectis (map 7), shielding Christchurch Harbour, and protected by great double dykes across its landward neck, it has yielded from harbour-side sites many pieces of Italian amphoras for wine; Dr. Peacock has dated them, from near to 100 till the years around 50 B.C.¹

His Gaulish distribution for such, from the Province in the south, furthermore shows trade routes: one leads northward through the Aedui up among the Belgae, one from round Narbo to near the Gironde and the Atlantic; there are wreck-finds off the Morbihan coast, and fragments from the excavations, Wheeler’s and Leslie Murray Threipland’s, in Brittany forts.² This is just the route, meeting sea beside the Santoni (p. 139), that Caesar had determined to keep well away from the Helvetii. And while Narbo appears in Diodorus as one of the terminals for British tin, the other was of course Massilia, the trade’s old mistress. The Gallic War twice shows care for Narbo;³ Massilia it never even names. Small wonder then that in autumn 57, while preparing 56 for Armorica, Caesar tried to by-pass Massilia⁴ with a shorter route to Italy than any by the Western Alps: over the Great St. Bernard pass (map 7). Beyond the Nantuates (on the south of Lake Geneva and the lowermost Alpine Rhône)⁵ the pass was blocked by Veragri, allied with Seduni from higher on the river; they fought his task force hard, but the Seduni at least were repulsed, and the Veragri left with

¹ Hengistbury excavations (1911–12), Bushe-Fox 1915, with all the pottery-associations; amphoras, Peacock 1971, 171–4, fig. 37 Hengistbury specimens, fig. 36 distribution-map with Gaul; chronology (Dressel types 1A and start of 1B) 162–6; bibliography 185 ff.; British sites from Cornwall to I. of Wight, 180–2, now most notably augmented by finds from Winchester.
² Morbihan wreck-finds, Peacock 185, citing André; in forts, Wheeler and Richardson 1957, 33–6, figs. 5–6, nos. 43, 77, 79, from le Camp d’Arthus, Huelgoat (Finistère), and 80–1, fig. 21, nos. 24–5, 30, from le Châtellier, Duclair (now Seine-Maritime).
³ BG iii. 20, 2; vii. 7, 2.
⁴ As pointed out by Rambaud 1965, 3, 9.
⁵ Nantuates here, Holmes 1911, 453–5, quite rightly (though initial N restored by editors). At iv. 10, three good manuscripts put them on the Rhine, where a less good pair have correctly Nemetès: p. 138 n. 1. That short chapter 10, thought spurious by Germans, has some other geographical errors, but Rambaud 1967, 66–8, follows Constans in judging it suited to its context, though taken by Caesar from a note that his doxiers had got from some Greek geographer. An addition (10, 1) about the Maas has been interpolated later. Nantuates instead of Nemetès, however, will rather be the
the pass are not heard of again. His other preparations were
effected in the west itself.

Armorica' wealth, in the metals long exploited—gold, copper,
iron, lead, and the tin of the trade with the south—had behind
it in Britain so much for augmenting the trade's available
resources, that Venetic and Massilian profits were alike best
served from the British supply. Caesar had recoiled from the
Spanish; and now, in the fresh deal he aimed at with Pompey
and Crassus, Spain would go as one of the prizes for requiting
Pompey's support for himself, in getting his existing proconsular
command prolonged. Protection of the West seemed assured
along the Rhine's whole length; thus a deep impression had
been made by his Belgic campaign. He wintered some of his
legions close to the scenes of it, which must mean south and
south-west of them down the Seine, and some between it and
the middle and lower Loire; both the locations were to serve
for Armorica next. As a western prelude to this, he had sent
one legion on a march among its peoples, through Normandy,
past the Unelli and touching the Veneti and Osismii, under
young Publius Crassus (p. 134), to assure him of their total sub-
mission. Gaul as a whole, he declared, was therewith pacified;
itself unvisited centre would be soon surrounded. Next spring,
while sending an officer Sabinus to grasp the Armorican north,
Caesar would take the Venetic navy, and add to it further ships:
a fleet for Decimus Brutus (p. 134). The year would give him
all the coast of the Ocean from Seine to Gironde: not simply for
note's mistake, amended later in some but not in all good copies, after
Caesar himself had carelessly overlooked it. His way with his notes, very
seldom so careless, will be illustrated soon from Britain.

1 BG iii. 1–7, 1.
2 Armorician metal resources, Briard 1965, 15–25 (three maps). South-West
British, Fox A. 1964, 21–4 (map of copper and tin lodes). And her 116, 131,
240; tetradrachm of silver, issued 93–2 by the quaestor Aesillas (Macedonia)
found near another, of Alexander the Great (after 326, so could be time of
Pytheas), both near native fort in S. Devon, Antiq. Journal, xxx (1950), 152–4
(Holme Chase, metalliferous area); also 116 (and Allen 1961, 121, 281),
from Paul, near Penzance and close to coast of Belerion area, hoard of
forty-three Cisalpine silver drachms imitating Massilian, minted (approx.)
late second century B.C. The natives, unlike the Armoricans, refrained from
issuing coinage themselves; these finds should mean cross-Channel sailings
to Devon and Cornwall from long before Caesar.
3 BG ii. 35, with Rambaud 1965, 125–8; historical setting, 1–5 with map 1.
4 BG ii. 34 with Rambaud 123–5 and 1–5.
5 BG ii. 35, 1 with Rambaud 8–10 and map 2, for the campaigns of 56
(143 ff.).
surrounding interior Gaul but as base for getting quickly to Britain. Meanwhile, back in Italy and witnessing Illyricum as quiet,\(^1\) he could proceed with the politics of gaining his prolonged command. Wooing first Crassus, then Pompey, he brought them to Lucca to confer with him in private. A share-out of power was agreed upon, for years to come. He would ensure for the two, by sending in troops out of Gaul to sway the election, fresh consuls in 55 which would let them fix his tenure of his provinces, and tenures elsewhere for themselves: not even discussable till 1 March 50 so allowing no successors till he passed, from 49, into his own fresh consulship, promised for 48.\(^2\) For clinching his assurances at Lucca to his partners, everything now depended on Gaul, and on Britain in hand at latest in 55.\(^3\) But already when there—early spring 56 (their calendar’s middle April was today’s late March)—he knew, through his Crassus in Gaul, that the tribes of Armorica were out in revolt. For months they had been seeing just what his ambitions would lose them. They revolted against his design upon their ships for Britain—though his book never says so. Non-Caesarian accounts, here most succinctly summarized by

\(^1\) *BG* ii. 35, 2; iii. 1, 1 and 7, 1; here no more about either, as Caesar has concealed the entire chronology, from now until the following May, for reasons of his own. See Stevens 1953a, 9–11; Rambaud 1965, 143–51; the naval preparations, iii. 9, 1–2, must have been ordained so ‘swiftly’ in autumn 57 already, for they could not be swiftly finished for Brutus to take command next spring. They gave him (11, 5) not only warships built on the Loire (9, 1) but Gallic ships commandeered from ‘pacified regions’: two farther south but the remainder not specified, and guessed by Stevens (11–12) as on the Channel facing Britain—commandeered, originally, then, for the right-wing army in a double invasion, with the left in the ships of the Veneti and southerly neighbours. I agree that 56 would be the year for it if Caesar had his mainland bases secure enough, but (with Rambaud) have taken this proviso as allowing 55 to be a likelier alternative.


\(^3\) For there even were sceptics who declared that no Britain existed: Plutarch 23, 2, well cited by Stevens (1953, 21 n. 1, with also Dio xxxix. 50, 3), scenting Livy behind, and behind the fourth-century Eutropius, *Brennarium* vi. 17, Britons ignorant even of the name of Romans till Caesar arrived. Writers prior to Caesar on Britain were Greek; they will not have filled Roman readers all with trust in what Pytheas had claimed, but Greek Polybius had scorned, large isles in the Ocean (cf. Hawkes 1977, 40). Caesar, whose reading of Greeks (*BG* vi. 24, 2) included Eratosthenes, a chief upholder of Pytheas, of course knew better; but to validate Britain he had got to invade it himself.
Strabo, must be seen to have declined his own story and recorded the truth. As outstanding interpreter here, our debt is to Stevens. While the natives' forts inland could be reduced, by Sabinus in the north and in the west by Caesar, their coast's cliff-castles made a problem that could only be resolved by operations on the water. His warships now built, and Gallic ships from farther south—the Pictones and Santoni I noticed before (p. 139)—made him a fleet, under Decimus Brutus, for a naval battle (maps 5 and 7). The enemy fleet, in that battle, was totally destroyed. But this was the Armorican fleet he had relied on for transporting his army to Britain.

All his long-nursed project was therefore in ruins. Fierce vengeance on prisoners could not help—and of course there were survivors. Young Crassus he had sent to Aquitania, past the Garonne; he did extremely well, and his were the troops that went to Rome to get his father and Pompey made consul. When the father went on to his chosen tenure of Syria, the son went too—both going to their deaths, in 53. Pompey took the

1 iv. 4, 1 = (iv) 194.
2 Stevens 1947, 4; 1952a, 8–16. He was praised rather faintly by Wheeler (Wheeler and Richardson 1957, 17–18, where for Crassus see my p. 129 n. 4 and for 'Diodorus Siculus' read Strabo), and rather under-used by Rambaud (1965, 13, 144–74; 1966, 421–2), probably less because too clever than too ambitious: in projecting for Caesar a full-length conquest of Britain, and of Ireland as well, to be approved as essential for a Gaul meanwhile being steadied for provincial status (by the 'ten legati' of Stevens 13–14, n. 7: citations from Cicero). But is ambitionness ever out of place when the subject is Caesar? And where else, if he had pacified Gaul in 57, would he go?

3 Armorican hillforts, Wheeler and Richardson 1957, 1–4, 19; gazetteer 102 ff.; reduction 56 n.c. declared from excavations 1938: le Camp d'Arthus, Huelgoat (Finistère), 23–30; le Camp du Chatellic at Le Petit Celland (Manche), 38–54, presumably by Sabinus; in Finistère see also 54–61, Kercaradec at Penhars. Cliff-castles, 4–8; Morbihan, trial excavations 1939, (Murray) Threipland 1944, 128–49, on Ile de Groix and Belle-Isle and at Vieux-Passage, Plouhinec. These I name for Wheeler's and his colleagues' sake; French activity has long had its own renewal: see the NAA (Notices d'Archéologie Armoricaine) in every year's Annales de Bretagne, and most recently P.-R. Giot in Duval (ed.) 1973, 595–607.

4 BG iii. 12–16. On 16 with Caesar's claim to have blotted out the Veneti, by slaughter and enslavement, see Rambaud 1965, 172–3, citing Merlat in NAA 1954, 167–9; the claim is hyperbolic, but his crediting fugitives to Britain can no longer have archaeological support in the form adduced by Wheeler (Frere 1961, 86–90: phase dated from '56' must have begun no later than second century).

5 BG iii. 11, 3; 20–7.

6 Dio xxxix. 31, 2; Gelzer 1969, 127 with notes.

7 In battle with the Parthians at Carrhae (Haran), 53.
Spains; though he governed them by legates, from Rome, his controlling Spanish wealth must have sharpened the pangs in the breast of Caesar. He had staked so much upon Gaul and Britain that he now was in extremely sore straits. He never could appear to be failing. He must make a fresh plan, holding Gaul, to get to Britain besides: as soon as he could manage it when once the new year had assured him, by the law that his partners would carry, his prolonged command. He would have to go back to Belgic Gaul, and to Britain’s more troublesome corner. The south-west, although the Armoricans had called on it for aid, was inaccessible now. He would have to invade the south-east. And opposite this were two Belgic peoples, Morini and Menapii, never subdued in 57. Autumn was coming, but he marched right across to them and straight into action, braving the weather. He did everything he could in the time. All yet would be well.

III. Britain invaded by Caesar, 55 and 54 B.C.

55 B.C.

Britain, for all to be well, must give him safe access, swift advance, and somehow a prospect of profitable wealth. Access risks in the Straits should be minimal; advance could be speeded through action by cavalry; as for the wealth (other than in slaves), though its chief known source was the tin that now seemed so remote, yet clearly Britain must have widespread markets and routes of its own, like Gaul’s, some stretching far enough east for him to lay his hands on. What Armorica had been taking could only have been part of the output; and although he had ruined its western traffic, the northern may still have been in business, as coins of the Coriosolites and some

1 The Law of Pompeius and Licinius (Crassus); passed between January and April 55, say many, as Gelzer 1969, 128; also Rambaud 1967, 1–10, at 2–4 countering Stevens 1953, who yet might be right in his retarding its date till Caesar had been into Britain. And the troops that had swayed the elections at the start of January (p. 149) were with Publius Crassus, so only need march from Aquitania: 1965, 8, map 2. Rambaud’s belief ibid. 9, n. 1, in a Crassus cruise to Britain just before (my p. 129 n. 4) seems implicitly retracted in his 1967, 4–5.

2 BG iii. 9, 9; response not vouched for, but implied in iv. 20, 1, Rambaud 1967, 100–1. For the Cornish cliff-castles just like the Armorican, and cordoned pottery Armorican in style or derivation of around this time, showing more than just trade relations, see Fox A. 1964, 122 with pls. 67–8; 127–8 with pl. 74; Thomas 1966, 75–92.

3 BG iii. 28.
of the Hengistbury amphoras allow. Victories in south-east Britain should assure him much; and trouble through its fugitives from Gaul should be amenable to remedy. What was not so safe was his base, too near (map 7) to the Lower Rhine frontier. The Middle Rhine’s Treveri indeed seemed quiet. But the ‘C-Germani’ on their north-west side were being reached by an intrusion over the Lower: Usipetes and Tencteri had crossed, being driven from their homes by aggressions of the Suebi. Britain then had to be postponed. Caesar’s first fight with the intruders led to their massacre; to his bridging the Rhine, at news of which the Suebi retired; then to dealings with others; he could only return to north Gaul when already it was August. He writes as if only then did he settle, though so late, on even venturing to Britain: a look at the coasts and country would be helpful; also Gauls had been receiving British help. No one seeks to go there, he says, but merchants; and personal inquiry, from a round-up he made of them, showed they knew nothing of the country unless just opposite, nor of harbours to shelter a fleet on the coasts they did know. He therefore sent an officer he trusted, Volusenus, in a fast-rowing warship, to explore. The ship was back, after more than four days, about a week before the start. By that time Caesar, with his Tenth and Seventh legions, had arrived at the place where the crossing would be shortest; this was the beach of Wissant, rather east of Cape Gris Nez. Assembling Belgic ships there, and last year’s fleet that had defeated the Armoricans, he was ready—when a number of British states sent envoys, promising submission. He sent these amicably home, and with an influential envoy of his own:

1 Amphoras: Peacock 1971, 162–4, Dressel type 1, forms A and B (fig. 35, 1 and 2); 165–6, 1A until middle first century B.C., 1B from slightly before that; 173 (with 174, fig. 37), Hengistbury mostly 1A, but the few 1B could run past 56. (Perhaps hardly past 52: see below, p. 178.) Coriosolites coins in Britain, Allen 1961, list (to date) 272–3, mainly south-coastal Devon-Sussex so with Hengistbury central; Allen 1962, map 7, adding Jersey. Michael Avery, with cross-Channel routes as Avery 1973, 536–42, 551, map fig. 11, allows me to refer to his unpublished Oxford thesis of 1971, in which this slight prolongation of the traffic implied by the coins was first proposed.
2 BG IV 1–19; Holmes 1917, 95–100, 689–724; Rambaud 1967, 10, 39–99. The August date, with all dating for Caesar’s invasion of Britain in 55, is independent of the Roman calendar, and taken from his note of full moon, on a night soon after he had landed, which modern astronomy has fixed—at 3:33 a.m. on 31 August: Holmes 1907, 600–3; 706–7. See further n. 1 on p. 153. Standard accounts since Holmes of both expeditions, 55 and 54: Collingwood 1936, 32–53; Frere (1967) 1974, 42–54; Bayly 1962 should be set beside both, with Colvin 1959, 1963: my p. 154 n. 1.
Commius, a Belgic noble of the Atrebates (region of Arras), whom after their subjection in 57 he had made their king. Through dispatching him thus to Kent, he hoped for a bridgehead of friendly power: any move against this would give him grounds for hitting back (as at the Belgic onset on the Remi), in the terms of the Senate’s decree (p. 139) for the defence of Rome’s friends in Gaul. His preparations, as all these doings make plain, had been started well before his camping at Wissant. Commius would get picked up by Caesar already when returning from the Rhine, and passing his capital, the Oppidum d’Étun near Arras; Volusenus’s start, not specified by Caesar, was on 10 August, and probably from Boulogne.1 Lastly, the eighteen cargo-ships for the cavalry, at Ambleteuse (fig. 2), an *ulterior portus* (‘lower down’ the coast), became wind-bound there, so the cavalry was sent to them, while Caesar, unwilling to wait, was able to set sail. The first wind they presently got soon changed to a second which drove them up the Straits, till blown by a third into Sangatte (*superior portus*). Trying again, a new first wind let them nearly reach Caesar, but a second blew a gale. It swept them past; some made Ambleteuse, but others were borne towards Sussex, and thence were lucky in regaining the Continent anywhere. Fig. 2 shows both of the attempts, from Rambaud who explains the rotation, due to shifting depressions, of winds that could be stormier then than now.2 First by this, then, Caesar’s plans were spoilt. He would now (apart from a troop of thirty taken across by Commius) have to do without cavalry altogether.

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1 Between the Canche (too marshy) and Ambleteuse on which see text with n. 2. Rambaud 1967, 109, suggests the Somme, altogether farther south, but only perhaps through his taking him to Beachy Head, 106; for my own account of his voyage, see text and map 9. On Caesar’s preparations in sum, as presented *BG* iv. 20–2, I follow Rambaud gladly in general, 1967, 10–12, 15–16, 100–12, and in particular firmly on Wissant as the main fleet’s starting-point (11 and 104), against Holmes who (with Jullian) chose Boulogne: 1907, 306, 552–95, and has been followed by all who have not seen that this ‘shortest crossing’ (iv. 21, 3) is contrasted by Caesar with the ‘most convenient’, from Boulogne which he adopted next year: namely Portus Itius, v. 2, 3 (with my n. 1 on p. 157). To Dover from Boulogne is 49 km., from Wissant 35. And on the ports that the cavalry transports used see next note.

2 Rambaud 1967, 11–12, 108–11 with map 2, 126–8; tides and meteorology 1966, 423; *BG* iv. 22, 4; 23, 1; 26, 5; 28, 1–3. Holmes (n. 1), insufficiently briefed on the meteorology, got ‘inferior’ and ‘superior portus’ interchanged: on the Latin, see Rambaud (but his 1966, 422 besides, on the view of R. Dion).
He and the infantry, expecting no such thing and putting out from Wissant by night, next morning (27 August)¹ had arrived off Dover. The painter of pl. XXI, c. 1690, would be anchored at the self-same spot,² where he waited for his legions and regarded the Dover scene, as Volusenus had already. Of what he did then expect, he says nothing: it was surely a boat, coming forward to meet him, with friendly Britons from Commius to welcome him ashore.³ None came. Up there on the cliff, where the painting has Dover Castle, looking much as today, was the big British hillfort that has left its chalk rampart—though eroded

¹ BG iv. 23, 1: the third watch of the night, when he started to put out, began at midnight, the small hours of the day that Holmes thought probably 26 August but perhaps 27th (1907, 603), which I follow Rambaud in preferring (1965, 126, 128, 16); the full moon of night 30–1 (n. 2, p. 151) followed his 4th day in the island, iv. 28, 1 with 29, 1.
² Wheeler 1930, 41 for this painting, his pl. IX (in the Mowll collection, Dover); the claim for the spot for Caesar here is my own: BG iv. 23, 2–5; 6, he takes the fleet to Deal (as text here ensuing).
³ The natural harbour usable by Britons began to be Romanized some 150 years later: Rigold 1970, with plan fig. 1 opp. p. 89; on his evidence, Rivet 1974, 63, suggests it as the ‘New Haven’ of Ptolemy ii. 3, 3.

in front—as the Castle's outer work. Re-discovered by Colvin,\(^1\) this major fortress is the key to the expedition's understanding. Caesar would be given its harbour and all its district, if Commius prevailed there; if not—as was seeming now likely—Volusenus will have shown him how to take it: from behind (map 8). Towards Deal, he will have found that the cliffs fall away; beyond, from off-shore, he saw all the south-eastern Kentish downs rising up—their high reverse side he will have seen while

\(^1\) Colvin 1959, noting the overlapping-earthwork entrance; 1963, 630 with plan 1, fig. 53; pottery (his n. 1) Bayly 1962, xlviii. Mr. Colvin has cordially encouraged my adducing him here.
west of Dover—and sloping north-eastward to low ground close to the sea. The shore then receded into a bay, where the fleet, if a British one appeared, could be bottled up; once landed on the beach at its corner, however, the legions could ascend that slope, and pin the defenders of the hillfort against their cliffs. So Caesar, who had waited since morning while the fleet closed up, got the tide about 3 p.m., with a south-west wind—the same that deflected his cavalry’s ships, had he known it, at sea (fig. 2)—and sailed round to Deal. By 6 he was off the beach (near Walmer Castle), and could land. The eagle-bearer’s plunge, the fight, the surrender, yielding Commius back stultified, are familiar to us all; then the gale that bore away the cavalry and rose, that night (30–31 August), with the new-moon tide, to the smashing of the fleet—warships on the beach and transports at anchor—and its sequels, the reaping of the corn-fields for food and the chariots’ attack down the slope from the woods, the fight against a larger force, surrender renewed, and final withdrawal (26 September) make Caesar a well-told tale. Yet it has hidden his original objective: a foothold for starting on Britain from Dover.

His goddess Fortuna served Caesar more amply when he made his report to the Senate. The thanksgiving voted was the longest in Roman history, twenty days. Thus reassured that his doings were officially approved, to the pleasure of the public, he was soon ordaining a better and a much bigger fleet. For what he next year was to do with it, however, his designs owed most to Volusenus (map 8). The bay beyond the 55 landing-place was wide, not choked as now by alluvium and banked with shingle. Volusenus saw it first fed by the Northbourne, ending the slope north-east from the downs, and bordered next by a beach—which he duly noted. Past that, it ran back into an open channel, the Wantsum; the mainland there faced an island, Thanet, which ended in a steep north cape. Doubling this, he met the channel’s other end, where the coast led him west, as far as Sheppey; it was the estuary coast of the Thames.

1 BG iv. 24–36; Rambaud 1965, 116–44, and 18–23 on composition (24) from basic notes on file and his own campaign-report.
2 BG iv. 38, 5; Stevens 1947, 5–6 (with Plutarch on Cato’s lone vote against it) is vivid on the public acclaim for even such a short expedition into Ocean.
3 BG v. 1, 1–41; 2, 1–3; 5, 1–2: all bearing on his special concern for the shipbuilding.
4 See pp. 161–2 with n. 3 on my wife’s documentation; with the late Mrs. Mary James, she was indispensable equally in our field-work.
And he must have expected it. For Caesar had found that the merchants had known what was opposite to Gaul, and the coasts of Kent (though nowhere with a harbour for a fleet); his negative manner of saying so (p. 151) has concealed their awareness of

![Diagram](image)

**Fig. 3.** 54 B.C.: crossing of the Straits, turn of the tide, and landing.

the estuary, yet some must have known it, past Sheppey at least to the Medway. That large-mouthed river is the centre of one of our scatters of Gallo-Belgic coins (p. 143, n. 1), and we shall further see evidence soon that the Medway was reached in fact by merchants, evidently round from the bay between the Wantsum and Deal. The beach in this bay, just mentioned, was chosen by Caesar for his landing next year. He will have been told of it first by Volusenus, but reveals from him nothing that would bear on 54—though the fast ship he had given him (lateen-rigged and oared) in more than four days at sea would do at least 1,200 km., quite enough to justify the course that I show on map 8.¹ And the coasts lying north from Deal, round

¹ Beach, *BG* v. 8, 3; 9, 2. Volusenus's ship, iv. 21, 1 and 9; Rambaud 1965, 103 and 106, but in error where guessing that he passed to Kent from the Somme by Beachy Head: that Sussex coast, the westward *inferior pars*
to the Thames estuary and up it, were to be crucial in 54 to Caesar’s designs.

54 B.C.: Kent, and the prospect of Essex

The start again was late: an affair in Illyricum, trouble with the Treveri, the dissident Aeduan Dumnonix, and prolonged contrary wind, made it July, about the 6th (by the calendar then, 31st),1 when Caesar sailed with his fleet, at dusk, from Boulogne. No more Dover. His course was north (fig. 3); the tide bore him on till at dawn on the 7th, seeing coast away behind, he waited for the ebb and set his soldiers to row, hard across it. Their effort got the fleet to the beach about mid-day.2 Not closely located in his book, it is agreed to have been north of the beach of 55,3 and modern research can let the bay, between that and what then was the Wantsum channel, have nowhere a beach like Caesar’s, ‘soft and open’ for his anchoring his fleet—of more than 800 ships—save one, long buried by the choking-up of the bay, and close to Worth. At Worth, in 1925, excavation of a small Roman temple (map 9) found under it pottery, running from early in the Iron Age; and from late in it—broadly of Caesar’s time—three little bronze shields, which are votive.4 Here then prior to the temple was a beach-side

of 28, 2, had nothing to do with Dover and Deal. Excluding it secures to V his time for the estuary coast of the Thames.

1 BG v. 1–8, 2. On the date, and contemporary calendar-date, Holmes 1907, 706–30, refuting (with others) Le Verrier as followed by Stoffel (for Napoleon III) and still by Rambaud. Boulogne as Portus Itius, Holmes 552–95; Rambaud 1967, 59–60, with my p. 152 n. 1. But see his 1966, 422–3, for French views other than his own.

2 BG v. 8, 1–5; tellingly evoked by Collingwood, a mariner himself (1936, 33), but seemingly with South Foreland for North.

3 Holmes 1907, 595–674, though with a physical topography largely obsolete today (518–52), established the 55 beach as at Deal, near Walmer Castle, and stretching (we can add) to a point about the railway-station, where it turned for the corner of the bay. On the 54 beach, which he established at least as north of it, he was hampered through non-recognition of the bay’s existence, but rightly put the camp on a gentle rise of ground near Worth, though of the temple there (see text) he could not know; the off-shore water, which at Deal is part of the Downs, opposite Worth is called the Small Downs, and there he put the anchored fleet. But why, after the gale of 55, Caesar exposed it there, neither he nor anyone I know has seen hitherto.

4 Temple, Lewis 1966, 3, 40, 51 (later Roman), 170 plan fig. 31 from Klein 1928, excavations; pottery (and brooch) Antiq. Journal, xx, 115–21 (Hawkes), votive shields, Reginald Smith ibid. viii, 79–81, fig. 11, whence
sanctuary; not surprising, for this whole bay was where ships from Gaul nearly all put in, as Caesar records only later—the harbour ad Cantium. Protecting it, the South Foreland (now stunted by the sea) was the Cantium promontory. The Isle of Thanet’s cape, the North Foreland, Caesar will have seen, receding when the tide had borne him past it (fig. 3); yet never does he mention the island, nor its Wontsum channel. We know

Cunliffe 1974, 296–7, fig. 15: 5 (all three shapes); Harding 1974, 103–5, fig. 25 (two only, C–D), comparing others of the period from elsewhere (A–B).
its name Tanatos from later geographers only. Yet how can either have escaped Volusenus's report? Why Caesar has hidden the geography, we soon shall see.

From Worth, where his camp (map 9, camp 1) will have been somewhere close to the sanctuary, the plain stretches west to the Little Stour, with a ford at Littlebourne, then gently rises to the ridge looking down upon the Great Stour ford at Canterbury. The way from Worth, quite straight, must have been the trackway to Cantium harbour. The Roman road from Canterbury later had the same alignment on Worth, till its swerve toward the Romans' Richborough port (my map's small island in the Wantsum). Caesar now, ashore unopposed, and at Worth taking prisoners (people doubtless in the sanctuary), learnt from them where the native forces, scared at his fleet, had gone. At midnight, up the trackway, leaving behind his anchored fleet (as its guard, ten cohorts only, with some horse), he marched. Twelve miles forward at dawn, he saw them in retreat across the Great Stour ford; when cavalry drove them up higher ground past it, they climbed through woods to a fort, and this can only have been Bigberry, up above Harbledown. Sadly ill treated today, it was planned some forty-five years ago by Ronald Jessup, who illumined then Boyd Dawkins's earlier find of a wrought-iron firedog, recently discussed by Piggott, and of continental type that can befit this period. The occupants had blocked all its entrances with logs—Caesar guessed, for a prior tribal war; most of its habitation appears (from its excavated pottery) as earlier, and he calls it 'excellently fortified both by

1. Rivet 1974, 66, after Bradley (1881 as cit. 1885) and Müller 1883 as noted 57 and 80; 66 also, Cantium promontory not North Foreland but South.

2. Piggott 1971, 249, 253–4 (type B, this firedog), 259, 265; illustration, Fox C. 1958 pl. 26C, text 75, 132; old excavations (1864 and all before 1887) found pottery and much more ironwork: Boyd Dawkins 1902; Jessup 1939, 144–5, 257; 1933, full description with his own fine plan (and the firedog, 110); excavations 1933–4, Jessup and Cook 1936 (whence Cunliffe 1974, 66, simpler plan fig. 5: 4); dating of their pottery reconsidered 1976 by Dr. T. C. Champion, whom I gratefully thank for his judgement given me in writing, from examining all in the light of modern comparisons: hardly any should be reckoned so late as the time of Caesar. 'Bigbury' was Dawkins's spelling, 'Bigberry' more usual now, as Jessup, and already Belloc 1904 (1948, 273–6); both described and reflected on the site before most of its modern disfigurement, by house and garden enclosures in addition to older tree-planting and gravel-digging. For an earlier-occupied fort thus later less used but resorted to in war, compare (p. 174) Ravensburgh as oppidum Cassivellauni.
nature and by works', omitting his usual hillfort word, which is _oppidum_. Anyhow his Seventh Legion stormed it; and Caesar put his camp, most probably, near it to the west (map 9, camp 2).\(^1\)

Why had he made this dash? Keeping back ten cohorts only from his force of five legions? Some twenty thousand infantry, plus cavalry,\(^2\) in motion, means deployment on his flanks, protecting his centre's advance and fanning out; Bigberry thus would be the apex of a broad enough front to guarantee him security. The centre legions and horse he led in person to success, but it assured him much more. With his left flank watching the downs and their woods, and his right the mouths of the Stours, both wide open to the Wantsum, watched at its opposite end by his ships, he had its channel, and Thanet's island beyond, cut off. Yet all this he hides, with all that undoubtedly he knew about the coasts and the Thames. In the regions beyond its mouth dwelt nearly their strongest tribe, the Trinovantes. Their Essex coast faced Kent. But in recent warfare, along with the rest, they had been fought by an inland neighbour who proved to be stronger, Cassivellaunus. Their king had been killed, and his son Mandubracius had barely escaped with his life. This prince, to seek Caesar's protection, had come to him in Gaul. We are not told when; and the record of the warfare and his flight is split apart, between separated points in Caesar's narrative. Both are farther on, disjoined from the present position in Kent; but a third shows Mandubracius in Caesar's train.\(^3\) Caesar, as his deal with the Remi showed, and his attempt at one in Kent through Commius, required a friendly power that he could claim to be defending, under the Senate's decree (p. 139), against the rest. Commius, thrown into chains at Dover and returned looking foolish, had failed him; Mandubracius would not—and now had told him much more

\(^1\) _BG_ v. 9: the whole narrative, from the landing. Bigberry is not wide-ditched nor massively banked, like Fécamp (p. 144 n. 1), so the soldiers could lock their shields, fill the ditch with an _agger_, and climb more easily. Briefer, Rivet in _Jesou_ and _Hill_ (eds.) 1971, 191, 194.

\(^2\) Any legion might be fielding fewer than its full 6,000 men, yet Caesar's five now (_BG_ v. 8, 2), less the ten cohorts left at base (g. 1), can imply a good 20,000 infantry advancing; his cavalry totalled 2,000 (v. 8, 2 with 5, 3). The 5,000 legionary average thus suggested is admittedly a guess, but within the limits of _Holmes_ 1711, 559–63. _Rambaud_ 1965, 7 can make it appear too low. See further his 1958 on all the war's individual legions.

\(^3\) In his train, _BG_ v. 20, 3; with him in Gaul, v. 20, 1; warfare with Cassivellaunus, 20, 1 with 11, 9.
View of Dover from the sea, about 1690, from a contemporary painting in oils (51 x 30 inches) in the Mowll Collection, Dover, reproduced by Wheeler 1930. The painter must have been anchored in just the same position as Caesar, on the morning of 27 August 55 B.C.
Portrait of Julius Caesar, 44 B.C., on silver denarius of the moneyer Marcus Mettius: Crawford 430/17.

Ashmolean Museum, Oxford
than any merchant, Volusenus, or Kentish hostage. His tribesmen would welcome his return, if Caesar brought him and avenged his father. The fleet was ready. It had Thanet to take, but Peniche (p. 132) had been an ample lesson. Squadrons then would sail, round the Foreland and through the Wantsum, leaving guard enough at his base-camp, over to Essex. Caesar would be saved any forcing of the Thames higher up, against Cassivellaunus. Like his Gallic province's old proconsul Domitius, whose grandson was his enemy in Rome, he could impress the natives mounted on an elephant: it seems he had an elephant actually brought with him. Fortuna was turning. But in the night of those dreams beside Bigberry she turned to double-cross him. Before the morning's triple pursuit of its fugitives was all out of sight from his camp, gallopers came from the fleet: it had been ruined by a gale. He had left it at anchor to be ready for the Wantsum, for Thanet, and next for the Trinovantes. Its ruin was the ruin of his plans. He must again make new ones.

54 B.C.: from Kent to the Thames

Accounts of Caesar in Kent have allowed too little for its changes of coastline; my own estimations may themselves be too conservative. Though exactness is by nature unattainable, the essentials are as valid as research can make them. My guide has been Sonia Hawkes, my Kent-born wife; her knowledge, from periods earlier to later, has helped me on the map and in

1 BG iv. 38, 4: at the end of 55, two Kentish tribes had sent hostages as promised; the rest had not.

2 Stevens 1959, dismissed too sweepingly by Scullard: 1974, 194 with n. 136. Our informant is Polyaeus (about A.D. 160–180), who has the elephant clearing Caesar's passage of a river, panicking the British warriors and chariot-teams of 'Kasolaunos'. Romans all knew that horses could be terrified by elephants, but Stevens gave Caesar a political motive for bringing one: Domitius, proud of his elephant-riding grandsire in southern Gaul, should be made to stomach an elephant-riding Caesar. In BG, writing when conscious that in Britain he had formed no province like Domitius's in Gaul, Caesar would retract and say nothing of his elephant; yet its clearing the river will at least have been told to the Senate, including Domitius, in his report for 54—which Livy can afterwards have used, Polyaeus then Livy. Stevens was possibly rash (as also Dayet 1960) in adducing the event to account for Caesar's issuing the well-known coin, his 'elephant' silver denarius (Crawford 443/1), which for Scullard is irrelevant (and equally for Crawford: his ii. 735). But detach this, and Stevens's case from Polyaeus remains; see therefore p. 164, n. 1, p. 170, n. 3.

3 Hawkes S. 1968, with all relevant coastal documentation (for the
the field, both coastwise and on through inland country—which had now to be traversed by Caesar. Ten days, in continuous day and night shifts, got the ships and wrecks ashore, their repairing put in hand, and the camp defences extended around them as a single great naval camp. Recording this, Caesar omits what steps he must have taken to ensure himself local security, minimizing risks both from Thanet and from Dover, where most of the downs must now have escaped his grip. Back at last beside Bigberry again (map 9, camp 2), he found resistance ready in force and with a new commander. The Cassivellaunus he had meant to assail from Essex was a fighter so famed from his wars, that his former foes, now Caesar's, had joined in awarding him supreme command.¹ His tactics for Kent were to muster with chariots and horsemen in the up-hill woods, and fall upon the Romans in the open low ground, whether marching, camping, or foraging. The topography puts the battle at Caesar's third camp near Boughton, below the tail of Blean Forest, and the biggest battle close to Whitehill; a factor in it must have been the Judd's Hill fort, in Syndale Park beside Ospringe. It was won under Gaius Trebonius, and cleared the way for advancing further (map 10). In front of three legions, the cavalry routed the assaulting Britons at last; when their chariots were rushed into flight by the charge, their forces dispersed.² But destroyed they were not; Wantsum's N. end, add C. L. So, Arch. Cantiana, lxxvi (1971), 93–7), has full discussion and conclusions for NE. Kent, and map (her fig. 24), starting-point for mine: 9 with 8, 11 with 10, and the SE. portion of 12. Her map is for the Roman period, and may even for that be too conservative on coastlines; for Caesar's, a century before that started, my own may in places err more that way. They are nowhere at all too radical.

¹ BG v. 11, 9, Trinovantes unmentioned, but Britanni toti had done so; bello imperioque (praefecerant) may appear as if hendiadys: (had put him in) 'command of the war'. Yet imperium is Caesar's usual word for a Celtic or Belgic high-kingship, whether as war-lord (here; vii. 4, 6, Vercingetorix; ii. 4, 7, Galba) or long-term (ibid., his father Diviciacus, p. 143 with n. 1); and for Caesar, this war-imperium will condition the terms of peace (p. 177).

² BG v. 15–17: Caesar on the British chariot-fighting here (from notes used also in iv. 33: p. 167 with n. 1) describes its effect on both infantry and cavalry, 16, 1–2, and its final overcoming by cavalry charge, 17, 3–4. Battle here close to Whitehill, and previous at camp (3) near Boughton, are my estimations from the moves in Caesar with maps, Geological (Drift) and Ordnance Survey. Judd's Hill, former hillfort round Syndale Park: Arch. Cantiana, i (1868), 167; xiii (1880), 2, C. Roach Smith; 13, Flinders Petrie; VCH Kent, i, 460; Jessup 1930, 159. All, among the earthworks in G. Payne's survey of 1888 (Archaeologia, li) and in VCH i, have other Kent forts, some
Map 10. Caesar's advance to the Thames, and through Cantillan's lands to the Lea ford; stippled, land above 200 and (closer) 400 ft.
among their downs and woods to the south, they would wait until the Romans were away inland. Cassivellaunus then would throw them at the naval camp.

The advance was thus between the downs and the estuary coast, on which Caesar is silent, as also on his having the Medway to cross: upstream from where it was tidal, so doubtless at Halling and Holborough and Snodland, where are fords that have the downs behind them. These silences also muffle the Medway’s affording an entry from the sea. Yet here are centred not only those gold Gallo-Belgic coins that I have mentioned (p. 143), but also, and this way reaching inland Kent, class I of our cast coins of potin, which imitate Gaulish imitations of the bronze of Marseilles. They were cast in rows; and one type, from some twenty until eight or ten years before Caesar, had had its moulds impressed with strips of Egyptian papyrus— in this, Marseilles must have dealt. As middlemen, the Aedui would pass it into ‘Belgium’ (map 7), down the Seine or to their friends equally now neglected. Map 11 has those here relevant; for Oldbury and Loose (Quarry Hill) see p. 168 end of n. 4 from p. 167.

1 On these fords exhaustively, Thornhill 1974. From prehistoric to medieval times, through marine transgression at the estuary, the point of high tide was pushed gradually up-river. But in Caesar’s time the fords (between Cuxton and Aylesford) will all have been usable, though the water-volume, slowed by the level at the mouth, would be greater. Hilaire Belloc, when the tide’s prehistory here was unknown, was the first (I think) to view them in regard to trackway-borne communications; his topography was seldom at fault: Belloc 1904 (1948, 234–55 with his neat small map). For the Medway as the ‘great river’ (unnamed) in Polyænus, forced for Caesar by his elephant (p. 161, n. 2) against ‘Kasalouinos’, see p. 170, n. 3 on his passage of the Thames soon after.

2 Allen 1971, 128–30, developing with E. G. Turner’s help the discovery by J. P. Wild: Antiquity, xl (1966, June), 139–42. This type G’s date (his Class I, G A–B–C), Allen 133, 136, 143; illustr. pls. I–III, V (52–5): with the liberty of using approximate years to represent the indications of his wording, one can run it from a start a little after 75 to a conclusion before 60, so for ten or a dozen years. The earlier types, without papyrus, are rarer; when the later, again without it, have reached type L, there are eight known hoards; two on Thanet, four on the lower Thames, and one in inland Kent, with one (Snettisham in Norfolk) farther off. As the home of the whole Class I is north Kentish (Thanet–Surrey) with the Medway in the middle, Allen ascribed these hoards, round its edges, to escapers from the onset of Caesar. See his 136–7 with map fig. 33, 142–3 and lists 144–6, 147–8. As for dating prior to the onset, the need for ‘small change’ which the potin supplied, felt first in Kent through its trade with Gaul where potin was current already, will have started them here before the arrival of the gold Gallo-Belgic C. For this (p. 143, n. 1.) starts later now than Allen believed. Thus the only gold locally existing would still be the old Gallo-
the Bellovaci, neighbours of the Ambiani on the Somme; it could be shipped from either—with bulkier commodities—to Britain. That at its south-east corner, ad Cantium, nearly all ships from Gaul put in (p. 158), is told us in the 'British excursus' in Caesar's text, before Trebonius's battle. Any bound for the Medway—or the Thames itself—would do so on their way into the estuary. Having veiled the existence of this to hide his failure at crossing it to Essex, he has the Thames named only in his narrative, up where he now had to cross it as a river. But the coins, and perhaps already Gaulish-like pots as at Aylesford, higher on the Medway,² show acquaintance from the water with the whole of north Kent; moreover Thanet might itself have held another island market, like the Isle of Wight's touched upon already (p. 145), drawing barterable metals—including tin—from the west. Not tidal like Belerion's St. Michael's Mount, it has for this no ancient authority, but the modern writings on all the three have a review from Mr. I. S. Maxwell;³ in spite of his still thinking Pytheas the source of the Diodorus accounts (pp. 130–1), it should serve to remind us of our loss through silences of Caesar's.

The 'British excursus', all or part, has been by some judged spurious. Yet one can see how Caesar used his dossiers now for narrative, now for gathering matter up into excursuses like this; it should nowhere be later than his finishing the whole, in the winter 52–51. Its matter where not from his campaign-reports, or staff notes, will be excerpts from earlier writers: Posidonius doubtless among them but others besides. What does, however,

Belgic A, none new being wanted (same note) for Diviciacus. There would anyhow be potin in his time (Scheers 1970b, 'towards 80–75'); and the type made with papyrus, showing trade from the south through Gaul, will be current at Gallo-Belgic C's new date of arrival, from the Ambiani. Among the aims of the take-over (p. 143 n. 1 once more) would be profits from the trade. And this is Gaul's trade with Kent in Caesar's excursus (text above).

¹ Ambiani being responsible (p.143) for our Gallo-Belgic C, and in 57 surrendering to Caesar next to the Bellovaci (BG lii. 15, 2), their neighbours on the south, who were influential (15, 1) and friends of the Aedui (14, 2), one can clearly see the route of the trading connection with the south and Marseilles (map 7). The alternative harbour on the Seine was in a region that had shared in our Gallo-Belgic B, though this had gone out before Caesar's time (Scheers 1970a). The scene of course is much more clear through eliminating E as a coinage of invasion: p. 142 with n. 7 (142–3).
² Birchall 1965, 243–9, 256–8, 288–91, 296–8, 301–4, 320–34, figs. 6–11; Rodwell 1976, 215–34, fig. 15, 13; fig. 14 map; add Stead 1976, my p. 192.
³ Maxwell 1972; many points of interest.
seem to have happened to it later is misplacement of a codex leaf, so that the three excursus chapters, now our 12, 13, 14, had a previous order 14, 12, 13. And either for meeting unconformity so caused, or through mistranscription already, an occasional sentence may be out of its intended place. (So 14, 1 could follow 12, 1–2, leaving only the rest of 14 after end of 12.)¹ Of the excursus’s contents—dimensions of Britain (these better than the extant older ones),² climate and trees, people and dwellings, habits and currency—one notices the tin, ‘in inland regions’, while the iron (small in amount) comes in the ‘maritime’. Only in Cornwall is that so; is the note from the dossier of 56?³ But if Kent’s using iron from the Weald is meant,⁴ the tin could seem ‘inland’ to a note-writer hearing of

¹ Rambaud 1974, with text and commentary 81–7, has introduction 29–33 on treatment of dossiers in annalistie structure, 34–8 on this treatment’s disordering through leaf misplaced, as here and perhaps at v. 18–19 (my p. 167 n. 4 (167–8)), and occasional dislocation of a sentence; cf. Holmes 1914 ad loc. on similar principle, against recourse to excessive rejections of text; hence Collingwood 1936, 34 ff., 476, excursus ‘substantially genuine’.

² BG v. 13, Britain as triangle (obtuse-angled at Cantium), Ireland on W. and Man between, ultimately from Pytheas through recension of data by Eratosthenes: Rivet 1974, 59–60, using Tierney in Journ. Hellenic Studies, lxxix (1959), 132–48. Pytheas estimated Britain’s circumference from his days of coastwise sailing; Strabo (ii) 104, from Polybius, gave his total as ‘more than 40,000 stades’ (or 6,280 km.). Pliny iv. 102 has it as 4,825 Roman miles which = 39,000 stades, and quotes him for this together with Isidore of Charax who is extant for 39,000: Geogr. Graec. minores, ed. Müller, ii. 509, 32. Diodorus v. 21, 4 still has 42,500: longest side 20,000, east side 15,000, short side (next to Continent) 7,500. All three are exaggerations, natural in view of their ultimate source; the total = nearly 6,700 km., against an actual nearly 2,600, and short side = 1,180 km. against an actual about 540. Caesar’s sources, however, allowed him circumference of some 2,960 km. namely 2,000 Roman miles, and this is only some 400 km. more than actuality. Yet his short side is still some 200 km. too long, at 740 km. = his 500 Roman miles. He says nothing of an earlier source for this, and it might have been (I fancy) transferred, from some recent measurement of Gaul’s N. coast, taking Finistère as opposite Land’s End, which the tin trade would have prompted (p. 130 n. 1 (131), p. 147 with n. 2): by navigator’s points between there and the capes at the Straits, it could make the length of the Channel 4,000 stades, = 740 km. and Caesar’s 500 miles. His figures show anyhow his turning to data far more realistic than the older Greek figures, which were ultimately Pytheas’s sailing-days artificially turned into stades: Hawkes 1977, 11.

³ BG v. 12, 5; this was Stevens’s explanation, repeated to me vigorously 3 October 1974.

⁴ Jessup 1930, 141–2, affirming this, saw it probably explaining the iron ore smelted in the furnace discovered at Swarling: Bushe-Fox 1925, 49–53, Appendix by its excavator C. L. (later Sir Leonard) Woolley. Bushe-Fox’s
an inland route for it eastward (map 7), unaware of it as landed at the mouth of the Severn from Cornwall. Either way, care was here neglected; and Caesar could himself neglect it on occasion, as in Gaul (p. 146 with n. 5) on the Nantuates. In the excursus there is anyhow some matter from what must have been his autumn report for 55; but conversely, his 55 account of British chariots has them dashing amongst his cavalry—not at hand till 54.\(^1\) The excursus then, altogether, is a patchwork quilt.

Its dividing Britain up, into ‘interior’, with wild aborigines, and ‘maritime part’, invaded and settled ‘out of Belgium’, gives an ethnography, handy for Caesar’s decrying an interior he never had reached, that is foreign—and in matter thus prior—to his first-hand narrative. Schematic in the manner of a Greek ethnographer, the bipartition is false to fact. The ‘maritime shore and those regions that are opposite Gaul’, known to the merchants whom he questioned in 55, are in the excursus just the 500-mile line of the coast. Its corner and the harbour for ships from Gaul are in Kent, ‘which is maritime entirely’; but the excursus never limits to Kent the invader civitates, with their names still as in ‘Belgium’, nor mentions the names. Essex being maritime really, was one the Trinovantes? Though I once thought not, archaeology now has made it indisputably probable;\(^2\) and for Caesar’s concealing their maritime location, we have seen, he had reasons of his own. He gives ‘maritime civitates’ a frontier at only one point of his narrative. They are divided by the Thames, ‘about 80 miles from the sea’, from the borders of his leading enemy Cassivellaunus.\(^3\) The excursus follows immediately, then comes Trebonius’s battle; then at once Caesar marches to the Thames—no Medway, no details, no hillforts (though there were plenty: map 9).\(^4\) One can only

well-known cremation-cemetery close by, studied afresh by Birchall 1965, 242-3, 245-9, 256-8, 288, 295-301, 324-8, figs. 1-5, is claimed as beginning no later than Caesar by Rodwell 1976, 215-29, 232-4; the furnace was anyhow in broadly contemporary use.

\(^1\) Rambaud 1967, 21, 137-8 on BG iv. 33; 1974, 6, 87-9 on v. 15-17.

\(^2\) Rodwell 1976, 214 (but on coins see my p. 142 n. 7), 216-19 with map fig. 11, 225 ff. with map fig. 11, 238-40 with map fig. 18 (after Peacock 1971).

\(^3\) BG v. 11, 8-9; cf. 18, 1.

\(^4\) On the placing of the excursus here between v. 11 and 15, and resumption at 18, 1 (cognito consilio eorum) from 11, 8 where Cassivellaunus has command communi consilio, see Rambaud 1974, 81, 87, 92, and 34-7 with my n. 1 to p. 166. The placing here is not to mask any slowness of advance
give a general line for his march to the river-bank: probably at Wandsworth.¹

54 B.C.: in the country of Cassivellaunus

Cassivellaunus, on the other bank, fought with his country at his back. He and his dominant people there have long seemed Belgic invaders themselves; their name in later record, Catuvellauni, seemed suggestive of the Catalaunii, dwelling on the Marne in Gaul round Châlons. But those, by Caesar unnamed, no doubt because a client tribe, probably of the Remi, were well outside his 'Belgium' whence the excursus brings the invaders. My pointing this out (from Hachmann)² led to a new view of Cassivellaunus, not as recent Belgic arrival but as native Briton. Archaeology and studies of coins, moving on past subsequent essays that I wrote,³ have enabled their comparison with Caesar by Caesar, but to draw away notice from the fact that Cassivellaunus had now the initiative, Caesar having lost it when the gale wrecked his fleet and his design of assailing him from Essex. Rambaud 36–7 entertains (from Meusel) a further misplacing of a leaf, whereby chapters 18 and 19 have interchanged places; the existing 19 begins with Cassivellaunus dejected through Caesar's successful crossing of the Thames, but if placed before 18 the cause would be his beating in Trebonius's battle (17). As the text now stands, his dejection's noting at 19, 1 as ut supra demonstravit, can only have referred to his feelings at losing that battle which are not, in fact, brought into the account of his defeat at end of 17; if the change is made, that defeat will then become the whole prime cause of his dejection, and the note ut supra demonstravit has to be interpolated later, not by Caesar. In any case the course of events has been obscured by what was evidently Caesar's purpose, of high-lighting only the Trebonius battle and the forcing of the Thames: nothing else. Yet he may have found the Medway contested (p. 164 n. 1; p. 170 n. 3, suggesting why suppressed), and have had to deal with such hillforts as map 11 shows (p. 162 n. 2); for Oldbury, Ward Perkins 1944, with added defence of Fécamp type (p. 144 n. 1), the dating now is high enough for this: Hawkes 1968, 10 from Mrs. Cotton; Rodwell 1976, 191–3, noting also the Quarry Wood fort at Loose, SE. from Aylesford on my map: Kelly 1971, not necessarily post-Caesar.

¹ Holmes 1907, 692–9, 742, really got nowhere. Stevens 1947, 6, n. 21, gave Wandsworth because the crossing is at the only ford (BG v. 18, 1), therefore the Britons' own, and the clue to it thus distribution of British (La Tène) finds in the river; 'the vicinity of Wandsworth' was declared to him as the place by the man with the greatest knowledge of all such finds, G. F. Lawrence: Archaeo. Journal, lxxvi (for 1929), 69–98; Wandsworth, 90–1. See too G. M. Willcox in Trans. London & Middlesex Arch. Soc. 26 (1975)...


to present that view in corroborated forms:1 upholding the Catuvellauni as British, as against the invaders who were ‘maritime’, it has even made their territory belong to the excursus’s ‘interior part’ of Britain. But Caesar’s Thames about 80 miles from the sea (that is, from his landing-place, Worth)2 divides them from ‘maritime states’ without assigning them to any ‘interior’; and if the recent wars were of Cassivellaunus as a Briton against those states, the Trinovantes he beat will be a ‘maritime state’, though beyond the Thames—at its estuary: the estuary that Caesar was having to hide. So between his excursus and narrative he juggled with ‘maritime’. Cassivellaunus is never that, and though never ‘interior’ either, there is nothing in Caesar against the archaeology and coins that 100; ibid. 84–5, Frere put it just before, to fit Allen’s dates for coins and let it have chariots from Gaul (abandoned there shortly after 90), not borrowed in Britain from the north, as Piggott had once suggested. But none had as yet reckoned Cassivellaunus and his chariots in the south both native.

1 Michael Avery, original article of 1969, unpublished, has summary in Harding (ed.) 1976, 142 n. 103; Harding 1974, 223–6 with map fig. 61, developed same or essentially similar views; for the train of thought that led to both, see opposite, with nn. 2–3.

2 BG v. 11, 8: mare as in 9, 1; 80 Roman (118 km.) = 73 English miles, three more than the crow-flight Worth to Wandsworth Bridge. The clause cuius fines . . . LXXX is in all the manuscripts and perfectly clear: Cassivellaunus’s bounds are divided from ‘maritime states’ by the Thames where its distance from the sea (at Worth) is about 80 miles. Caesar reached it (18, 1–4) having learnt, from deserters and prisoners, that it only could be forded (with difficulty too) at one place, where the farther bank, with sharp stakes lining it, and more under water, was held by the enemy; he saw them there when he came to the place, having led his army to the ‘Thames in fines Cassivellaunii, in being purposive (‘for entering’ them: so Rambaud, pour entrer dans le territoire). The 80-mile point, the ford and the frontier upon it, are all one place: the description here in 18 fully fits the clause in 11, 8, cuius fines a maritimis circitibus flumen dividit quod appellatur Tamesis, a mari circiter milia passuum LXXX. Against over-critical editors, whether rejecting the whole clause (Knoke), suspecting words lost before cuius (Fuchs), or rejecting them from cuius to Tamesis (Meusel), the text has been upheld by Du Pontet, whose model was old Nipperdey (see his preface) not Meusel, Holmes (against Meusel), Klotz, Constans, Seel, and Rambaud. Stevens (vivas vae 3 October 1974) assured me that he too was for Holmes against Meusel: Caesar, whether or not correcting a figure got already (if from Britons or Gauls, perhaps ‘50 leagues’, = 75 miles), will have had the approx. 80 measured as his marching total to the Thames, entered it then in the notes for his report, and thence used it when composing BG. He put it here, not in 18, so that Cassivellaunus should be seen as remote, and recently (11, 9) at war with neighbours who in 20 will include the Trinovantes; we can see why he hid these till then, and left them still seeming equally remote, but he made Cassivellaunus seem here to be remote because his choosing by
present him as native.\footnote{1} His people can well have begun to adopt some ‘maritime’ elements of culture, but at that time still much less than they afterwards adopted, when Caesar had gone.\footnote{2}

From the forcing of the Thames that he had hoped to avoid, against fierce resistance and the famous sharp stakes (some possibly from older wars?),\footnote{3} Caesar had to pass through Cassi-
the Britons as war-lord (9 again) enhances thereby the aggrandisement implied for himself. Altogether the text of 11, 8 must stand.

1 ‘Native’ thus does not mean ‘interior’ as in the excursus; what it means is ‘not maritime’ as either in that or in the narrative. Rodwell 1976, 208–11 (acknowledging Frere), comes nearer to this than those whom I cite here in p. 168, nn. 2–3 and 169 n. 1.

2 Interpreting of coins, as my notes on them show (pp. 142–4, 164–5, 177, 178, 184), is at the time of writing still in a movement of transit: Allen’s of 1961–2 was not so much too ‘invasive’—apart from Gallo-Belgic E (and probably D)—as too exposed in his datings of gold, after A and B, to correction from the Continent. So too Rodwell 1976, who on A and B thus is at his best, with important maps. And Allen 1976, posthumous, is altogether basic. Interpreting of pottery and other material culture, as evidence has grown through the fifty years from Bushe-Fox, seems also in transit: to a reconciliation of ‘invasionist’ and ‘pacifist’ viewpoints, on the basis of one between chronologies lower and higher, and of more excavation. (My 1972 and 73 were meant as pointers along the way.)

3 \textit{BG} v. 18: on the tactics for crossing, described with extreme compression, still see Holmes 1907, 698–9; stakes in bank perhaps previous, Harding 1974, 225. Too often ignored, however, as there, is the story I have mentioned already (p. 161 n. 2, p. 164 n. 1 with map 10) of a ‘great river’ held against Caesar by ‘Kasolaunos’, and crossed in safety when his Britons and their chariot-horses all fled in terror from the elephant, armoured and with turret on its back full of archers and slingers, which Caesar sent ahead into the water: Polyaeæus, \textit{Strategia} viii. 23, 5. See Stevens 1959; Scullard 1974, 194, with 279 n. 196; both have assumed that the river was the Thames, so that it seems to Scullard ‘hazardous to accept Polyaenus against Caesar’. For the Thames, Caesar’s account of course must stand: sending in cavalry first, next legions, he prevailed through the speediness and shock of their attack. So if the elephant was there, though suppressed in \textit{BG}, it could only have been leading the cavalry—which, with the legions, Polyaenus suppressed to make his tale more remarkable without them. Yet the Britons’ sharp stakes were not only in the bank: as Caesar had been told, they were also under water; did the Britons know this elephant already? Would he risk it against their stakes? So the river, unnamed in Polyaenus, though ‘great’, should be not the Thames but the Medway. If held by the Britons in advance of the Thames, as ‘great’ enough to baffle the Romans—it was plainly the river so judged in \textit{a.d.} 43, Dio lx. 20, 2–4—Polyaeæus will be telling us why Cassivellanus lost it. Suppressed in \textit{BG} by Caesar along with all mention of the elephant (Stevens), and along with the whole of his advance to the Thames (which its clearing him the Medway will have sped), the story (transmission as Stevens) will be all the better credible. And
velaunus’s country now, to reach the Trinovantes’ landward corner, where friends and food would be ready. Only so could their natural frontier, the Lea, be reached and crossed (map 10) at fords higher up than its length of great marshes, impenetrable down to the Thames. Cassiellaunus evacuated homes and fields into forests overlooking the advance, where his chariots could muster and burst on any cavalry that scattered for ravaging and plunder; thus infantry forays alone could be allowed, never far from the columns on the march, and this just suits the physiography in Hertfordshire, with forest on the drift-clad upland, while the valleys’ thin cover over chalk makes them arable and viable. Thus Caesar marched up the Brent, and on till he descended on the Lea about Broxbourne. But he must have been still on the march, with the Lea far ahead and the Thames across his rear, when Cassiellaunus played the stroke for which he now had his best opportunity. He sent orders for the kings in Kent, who were four, to collect the whole of their forces, for capturing Caesar’s naval camp by surprise. While he waited for the outcome of that, the Trinovantes learnt that Caesar was nearing the Lea—of course their frontier: nowhere else hereabouts can its line have been (map 10)—so dispatched to him envoys who promised their submission, and asked to be given Mandubracius back. And this is where Caesar in his book first states that Mandubracius existed at all. His escape, from his father’s fate, to Caesar in Gaul can be at last here told, as distantly as possible from the gale that had wrecked the fleet, left at anchor for reaching his country across the estuary (pp. 158–61). Caesar on reaching it instead by land, though never saying just where it was, explains Mandubracius now when assured of the friendship of his people, and their readiness with hostages and corn for the hungry army, on his giving them the prince as king and fending Cassiellaunus off. This defending of friends of Rome from a foe, as in Gaul the Claudius, with elephants brought in the supports for his invaders, together with himself (Dio lx. 21, 2), will have thought both of panicking horses and of emulating Caesar. Scullard, 198–9, has neither.

1 BG v. 19.

2 So (over chalk) on all sides of London, as mapped for Royal Commission on Historical Monuments, London iii, Roman (1928), 12, plans C and D (text by Wheeler); area of Verulamium (St. Albans), Wheeler and Wheeler 1936, 13, map fig. 2: valley woodland clearable, upland forest; 24, map pl. X, from this to Welwyn area, by Wheathampstead (other sites excluded): lands wooded thickly, lightly, open (chalk) and alluvial.

3 BG v. 20.
Aedui and Remi, legitimized his war, as will now be understood.

It moreover so impressed five other British tribes, that they all sent missions of surrender: Cenimagi, Segontiaci, Aocalitae, Bibroci, Cassi. Among them are those (unnamed) from whom Caesar hears (note his vivid present tenses) that 'not far from that place' (where they have met) 'is the oppidum, Cassivellaunus's, protected by woods and swamps, to which a sizeable number of men and of cattle has' (just now) 'gathered together'. No permanent capital oppidum this, or Trinovantes would have told him of it first; he at once explains 'Britons call an oppidum' (a place) 'to which, when with rampart and ditch they have fortified difficult woods, for avoiding enemies' incursion, they gather by custom.' Setting out for this place, with legions, he finds it 'excellently fortified by nature and by works'. (He has used that phrase already (p. 159) of Bigberry—though not called oppidum.) Never mind: his rapidly assailing it, on two sides, soon had the enemy in flight from a third. Captures in the flight, and slayings, were many; inside was found very much cattle. Modern search for a capital oppidum, viewed in terms of 'urbanization', onwards from the days recorded by Holmes, has had a number of sites to choose from (map 11). On the brow above Roman Verulamium, facing St. Albans, the fortification that starts in Prae Wood was by Wheeler proved to have a date too late; he preferred the more massively fortified site above Wheatheampstead, with its 'Devil's Dyke' western side and semblance of opposite ditch at 'The Slad'. His pottery within, from a transverse gully, he dated from around this time, lasting till Prae Wood's date around 10 b.c.; he had also then a brooch. But when was its beginning? Ann Birchall said as early as Caesar if Wheeler be believed; Rodwell prefers not later but depends on duration of the critical pot-forms. Certainty can only be attained from renewed excavation. The glory that Wheeler won here was a pioneer's. Of my map's strongest other sites (bivallate earthwork), Gatesbury at Braughing is unduly far east; The Aubreys at Redbourn, unexplored, has the weakest site; Bulstrode has no effective finds, while Cholesbury, like Wheatheampstead most in pottery and vallation (smaller, but a

¹ BG v. 21, 1–3. ² Holmes 1907, 699–702. ³ Wheeler and Wheeler 1936, 6–16, 22–4, 40–9, Prae Wood; 16–22, Wheatheampstead, with the Beech Bottom Dyke that I omit because not directly related to Caesar (derivative plans, Cunliffe 1974, 66, 83); Birchall 1965, 287–8, cautious; Rodwell 1976, 221–7, 230–1, 234.
circuits), stands up among the Chiltern woods but can have had no swamp.\(^1\)

Ravensburgh, high on a bastion of the Chiltern chalk scarp, giving steep descents on all three sides excepting the easterly, remains. It is adequately far from Trinovantes (25 miles) yet near enough for Caesar. As the scarp should not be very far from Cassivellaunus's northern border, any fort on it might be known among northern neighbours. At Ravensburgh, Mr.

\(^1\) Gatesbury (smallest), Rodwell 1976, 328–9, 364–5, citing C. R. Partridge; Aubreys, Bulstrode, briefly in *VCH, Herts*, iv, *Bucks*, ii; Bulstrode (8.5 ha. enclosed) suggested *oppidum Cassivellauni* by Revd. B. Burgess, 1883; *Records of Bucks*, v. 326–7; Cholesbury, survey, excavation and finds (pottery, Hawkes), Kimball 1934; Chiltern area, Dyer 1961 (with *Antiquity*, xxxvii, 46–9); Saunders 1972; Matthews (i-xiii Hawkes) 1976.
James Dyer's excavations\(^1\) show an early primary rampart, a lengthy interval, then a reconstruction, and a fourth period next, to which the interior stripping published assigns large post-holes set in rows (44 holes in 0.1 hectare). Cattle-pen posts can have stood in them; besides, there was purposeful slighting of the rampart—on the east, where a ditch-fill rapidly followed, with a 'Belgic pedestal' pot-base. This base can be after Caesar (later additions to the works are undated), but the slighting could be his, upon a capture with cattle in the pens. Having forest to south and swamp to south-east, neither open to doubt, excellent natural and earthwork strength, and a size that is eastern England’s biggest—almost 6.5 hectares internally—Ravensburgh stands (fig. 4) quite likely to be shown, with

\(^1\) Dyer 1976; excavations 1964, 1970, 1972. With cordial approval from the owner of the site, Mr. James Ashley Cooper, James Dyer has briefed me on all, with copy of plan for my fig. 4; marsh just SE. at Burwell spring, his 158–9, fig. 1. Caesar’s description of oppidum and capture, BG v. 21, 4–6.
further excavation, as the opposium Cassivellauni taken by Caesar. Legions would easily march by the ridge north-west from the Lea to arrive here; and Wheathampstead will need, for competing, a proof that its ‘Slad’ is true ditch—Mr. Dyer believes it natural. Of Cassivellaunus, Caesar says not that he was present in the fort thus stormed, but that now he got the news that the surprise attack that he had ordered on the naval camp, to cut Caesar off from Gaul at a stroke, had failed. After suffering so much, lands ravaged, worst of all the defection of tribes he had relied on, he let it be known that he was ready for his own surrender.¹

Caesar had been in Britain for some four weeks.² Within them, pulling disappointment into gain, he had certainly accomplished wonders. But he had had to drop the notion of his wintering his army there; in Gaul, he says, it might be needed for sudden troubles. So he would now, and this he does not say, quickly ride to the naval camp, praise the defenders, inspect the ships, start planning the return, and dictate correspondence. His letters to Rome included the one for Cicero, whose recording it, as written from the coast on ‘1st September’, modern 5 August, has alone disclosed the fact and timing of the visit.³ There was also personal tragedy at hand for Caesar. His daughter Julia, in her early twenties but married five years to Pompey, and loved by them both, had just now died in childbirth. That his bond with Pompey would be loosened, he might foresee.⁴ Yet all the more, he must make the best of Britain; a return kept clear of the autumn equinox would leave him, at the most, six weeks. Enough for what he needed to do, if only he ensured success at the start of it. That was, to draw terms of surrender out of Britain which would let him guarantee himself a profit, from its wealth—that wealth which he had hoped for through Armorica, and now must get at here, both to justify his venture and to yield the profit for his use. Treating Cassivellaunus as still a commander-in-chief, although

¹ BG v. 22, 1–3.
² As declared at the start, I follow the chronology of Le Verrier but of Holmes (1907, 707–35), whose case appears to me (with 669–71) to be as firm as ever.
³ In a letter to his younger brother Quintus Cicero, in Britain with the army but not with Caesar then at the coast: Cicero, letters ad Quintum fratrem iii. 1, 25.
a beaten one, he must get him to open the surrender talks by sending a mission to himself, and persuade him to this through means that were sure to succeed. The most urgent, therefore, of his business will be sending for Commius, perhaps forewarned already at his capital by Arras, and pressing him on Cassivellaunus to facilitate the mission. And Caesar records, not explaining his presence at all, that ‘through Commius the Atrebate’ the mission in fact was sent, and that hostages, lest the war should be prolonged, were demanded and duly supplied. He then says he fixed ‘what Britain, each several year (in annos singulos), was to pay to the Roman People as vectigal’. His orders to Cassivellaunus (he continues) were to do no harm to Mandubracius, nor his people the Trinovantes—he now being king. All this happened inland, for Caesar states that after getting the hostages, he marched his army back to the sea and found the ships reconditioned. He was there by 29 August (his calendar’s sixth day prior to October), when as Cicero records he wrote him a letter once again. Caesar’s time on the parleys will therefore have been not less than a fortnight; and the hostages had only all arrived (so it seems) when the army was ready for the march. What profit had the terms guaranteed him? The question leads on to my concluding theme.

IV. From Britain through Gaul to Civil War, 54–49 B.C.

‘Britain is finished off’, was what his last mail told to Cicero; no booty, but hostages got, and pecunia ordained. The number of Caesar’s prisoners, however, was great; he says so when telling how his army was brought, in two successive convoys, safely to Gaul in spite of the approaching equinox—our 26 September. He limits his account to ‘ships for military transport’, but private merchantmen, numerous in July when the fleet had set out, must have been carrying prisoners for sale as slaves, and material booty besides; Strabo in fact records both slaves and booty.

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1 All this is v. 22, 3–5 and 23, 1: most masterly compression.
2 Cicero, letters ad Atticum, iv. 18, 5: he has had one from his brother (p. 175 n. 3) besides Caesar, both being back at ‘the nearest coasts of Britain’ by that day; (litoribus) proximis, emending the manuscripts’ proximo, is generally accepted.
3 BG v. 23: Holmes 1907, 706 with nn. 3–4; Rambaud 1974, 101; with this the Le Verrier chronology naturally accords.
4 Strabo (iv) 200. Private ships in fleet at outset, BG v. 8, 6; its ships altogether had been more than 800. Not booty, but from Kent coast oysters, would be Caesar’s pearls: Suetonius 25, 2; Pliny iv. 16.
More profitable even than immediate loot, moreover, would be that pecunia, that annual tribute to the Roman People: a tax, defined as vectigal. Best interpreter here has again been Stevens. Every tribe’s recorded surrender, and Cassivellaunus’s own as leader, had been a deditio: term in public law for unconditional surrender, whereby the surrendered are liable to vectigal. The terms for Cassivellaunus warning him off the Trinovantes are only a special addition for him to the terms for ‘Britain’ as a whole; they imply a corollary for Mandubracius, as Trinovantian king, that he, having come to Caesar seeking protection (in fidem), may expect the surrender to bring him the status of a ‘client king’ by treaty. Britannia was envisaged meanwhile as a ‘provisional province’, for entering the Empire; the tax lay on all of it. What was this Britannia? Cassivellaunus’s supreme command, given him by all the resisting tribes, is treated now as an imperium over every tribe, so wide that Caesar can use Britannia inclusively. The ‘interior part’ in the excursus (p. 167) is of course here out of the reckoning, but the tribes will include non-maritime besides the ‘maritime’.

They are Cassivellaunus’s own (in subsequent record the Catuvellauni), four under kings in Kent, the Trinovantes, and the five that had surrendered next; one of these at least lay north of his own, as having given information of his oppidum, and another can have been the Iceni beyond the Trinovantes on an inland side, if the name, in Caesar Cenimagni, as many have thought, means ‘the greater Iceni’ (the surrender not extending to any ‘lesser’). All five should be anyhow north of the Thames; but south of it is Surrey, part of which Caesar had traversed marching west out of Kent, so had somehow subdued (map 10). The tribes are then eleven or twelve. And in Surrey there begins, stretching west into inland Hampshire, the preponderant distribution of the ‘British A’ coins, derived from Gallo-Belgic, and now being seen as late enough for this same time. From some in West Sussex and a neighbour group (‘British D’), with another such (‘British C’) in the Isle of Wight, there begins the ‘British B’ distribution, over western Hampshire and Dorset, clearly now later than Allen believed, so again to be put at this time. None of the states with such coins

\footnote{Stevens 1947, 7–8, advancing from Holmes 1907, 355–6, and augmenting his authorities. Cf. Rambaud 1974, 16, 99–100: two traditions, one commending or magnifying Caesar’s achievement, one disparaging. Further, with Stevens 1951, see p. 179, n. 2.}

\footnote{Mackensen 1974 (after 1973), slightly (but firmly) lowering the dates奔跑.
as these were ‘maritime’ in Caesar’s own sense; nor, as we have been deciding, was Cassivellaunus. As for those extending out west, they need not have joined in his parleys with Caesar, but they were linked in geography to those of the Britannia that did—and the links will have been often economic.

Caesar, through the trade that will have always been supplying it with shares in the metals of the west (pp. 150, 166-7), the north-west probably, and any Midland iron, could include without closer inquiry shares for himself in assessing it to tax, and thus, with the rest of the assessment, profit from quarters that he never was to visit. Reckoning the value in pecunia, he thus could get tin out of Britain after all, along with whatever other wealth the vectigal was laid upon. We have seen that there may also still have been cross-Channel trade in it, from southern Britain over to northerly Armorica (pp. 150-1 with n. 1); from there by land, the route would reach Cenabum on the Loire (at Orléans: map 7), where now were many merchants up from the south. So Caesar could anyhow partly retrieve his disappointment of the year 56.

Just as well. That October, in north-east Gaul, revolt burst out. He had planned next year for Germany again, reasserting the Rhine as his frontier;¹ he managed to, bridging it again, but the year 53 was grim for Caesar, and for his second-in-command, the tough Labienus. Still within winter, Cenabum was assailed, and the merchants and his corn-supply officer all of them massacred. Events moved swiftly into the great revolt of 52—and in that, despite the rewards he had had from Caesar, Commius joined.² Then again, after finishing in winter his Gallic War, in seven books, Caesar had resistance still to stamp out in 51. Commius rose, with his peoples and the Bellovaci, and was furiously active; moreover he knew too much, about those dealings in Britain especially. But when Caesar sent Volusenus to kill him at a parley, he escaped with a wound. When back from dealing with south-west Gaul’s last stand, and with Aquitania, Caesar wintered with the northernmost four of

implicit in the Jersey Le Câtillon hoard, on which Allen relied: his 1961 and 62; distributions, 1962 map 1, whence Hawkes 1968, 11, map C; E’s (from Allen, map 2) no longer explained by invasion, n. 1 on p. 143, from Scheers as there cited (with Mackensen).

¹ Rambaud 1974, 16-22, 102 ff. on v. 24-58, explaining the winter dispositions as prepared for this, and amending, with legions nine not eight, my account 1968, 7-9 with map fig. 1. Campaigns of 53: vi. 1-12, 29-44.
² BG vii; Commius, 75, 76, 79.
his legions at Arras, by Étrun the old capital of Commius—who himself had still been in arms and busily harassing Roman supply-trains. Worsted (though he nearly killed Volusenus) at last in a cavalry fight, he offered hostages: for his life, if nevermore within sight of any Roman, he would go and do whatever he was told.¹

All this has led to disbelief, among some, that the tax due from Britain was paid at all. We have no statement that it was, even in the eighth of the Gallic War books, which Hiortius afterwards wrote to complete the set. Yet does this hide a tribute unpaid, by a Britain thus cheating Caesar? Or hide its being paid, because it swelled the supplies for his preparing, never avowed, of civil war? That it was paid, most English opinion has agreed with Stevens.² Yet his belief that it continued for long seems not so binding; and all-important for Caesar were the first few years. If civil war came, against the party of his enemies in Rome, the right-wing senators, drawing in Pompey as they might, he could win enough against them in the West for invading Spain, and could hope to subdue it. Whatever happened next, there would be wealth for him from there. But in the meantime, Gaul was being bled; in gold alone, what Caesar took away sent the market price plummeting;³ to estimate the loss to the country in wealth of all kinds is beyond possibility. Yet the widespread ruin he had brought it needed a sequel now in appeasement: from directly after the fighting of 51 and for all of 50, bland generosity was plainly essential for peace.⁴ So a steady British tribute would make him an offset. And the great camp by Arras where he passed that winter had Boulogne very near, and a straight road down through the Remi to the Alps, for Italy, if business required it. To the Britons, his previous years’ punishments inflicted in Gaul were a terrible warning:

¹ BG viii; Commius, 6–7, 10, 21–3, 47–8. The final deal was previous to Caesar’s reaching Arras, and was made with Marcus Antonius, now his quaeestor. But when Commius fled none the less, we are told it was from Caesar, who will thus have come just in time—unless the flight was next summer. See text below with p. 183 n. 3.
³ Suetonius 54.
⁴Declared viii. 49, a very forthright statement—though of course with nothing of his need of unopposed recruitment of auxiliary troops, horses, and materials of war for the expected struggle.
they had to expect that he was presently going to return. So for four years or five, I believe that the tribute was paid. But what happened next?

I have tried to show it on a map (map 12). The escape of Commius to Britain, on this, seems dwarfed by the events on the Continent; but from there, very soon, I shall turn to look back on it, and deal with its date and implications. Caesar’s base was still at Arras when he called, in the middle summer of 50, the whole of his army to a place ‘on the bounds of the Treveri’ for high ceremonial: its solemn lustration from stain by the horrors of the war—to be clean for the next one. (The required big stretch of open land would be between the Ardennes and the Woëvre and Argonne, out on the borders of Lorraine round Bouzonville and Basse-Yutz.) After that, striking camp at Arras and moving south to his other great camp, by the Aeduan capital Bibracte on the Mont-Beuvray, he placed Labienus in Cisalpine Gaul—whence he soon would be defecting to Rome. How Caesar, joining his Thirteenth Legion at Ravenna on the Adriatic coast, faced there the dictates of the right-wing party, with Pompey drawn in—that celebrated story yet has lost the locations of the two further legions he was counting on. While three legions more were now with Fabius about Narbo, confronting the Pyrenees and Pompey’s Spain, Caesar will assuredly have moved the Twelfth and Eighth into south-east Gaul: whatever the season, they had to cross the Alps to him without any danger from snow. His December, when the Rome situation reached climax, began in our calendar’s mid-October. But could he be sure so soon that the normal western pass—the Mont-Genèvre—would be open when he summoned them? Safe then would only be the snow-free pass behind Genoa, reached along the coast-road. And Massilia, though included in his policy of appeasement, might still resent his

1 Lustration of ‘army’ (so en masse): viii. 52, 1. Rolling country everywhere, between those forests, no doubt long cleared through native occupation under lordships such as that which in early fourth century, from a lordly tomb undoubtedly (others are renowned both to east and to west), is evinced in the British Museum by the sumptuous four bronze vessels of Basse-Yutz.

2 BCi, 1. 37, 1: not disclosed till he is set for the Pyrenees. Legions set to follow these (37, 2) were ‘more distant’; but where? My map’s route for the Thirteenth into Cisalpine quarters already (whence called to Ravenna, BCi, 7, 8 with 6, 5) is by the Genèvre, reaching the upper Durance from the Drôme and Col de Cabre, rather than by Grenoble: cf. Holmes 1911, 615–16 (Caesar 58 B.C.) with the tribal geography.
AP 12. Caesar's transition from the Gallic to the Civil War, 51–49 B.C. Topography as text and notes pp. 182–5. *Hiberna* are legionary winter-quarters (normally ordained at the end of summer).
robbing it of trade; at first, one legion could watch it, so I fancy
the Twelfth camped somewhere near Aix, for advance, if not
by the Genèvere, then along past Fréjus. By Fréjus, not yet
Roman nor ever with its harbour taken up by Massilia, the
road towards Genoa passed (at that time, climbing the Estérel);
when Caesar got power he founded its town Forum Julii, and
made it a veterans’ colony soon—for the Eighth. So the Eighth
is here now; the Twelfth will be joining it, and both are called
to Italy by Caesar, in time for setting out within Rome’s mid-
December, last week of the modern October. In Rome’s early
February, the modern mid-December, he gets the Twelfth to
him in eastern Italy; the Eighth had to shepherd twenty-two
raw cohorts, just raised, and be joined by some horse from the
king of Noricum, so reached him with these some ten days
later, at Corfinium.¹

For his opening the Civil War, from Ravenna by the Rubicon
and on, securing Apennine passes, Pompey soon now heading
for retreat, this was how Caesar reset the scene: by hidden
intermediate steps from the Beuvray and his northern base-
camp at Arras, which was kept secluded just as long as he
required it, for the Belgae and the tax from Britain. Now at
Corfinium, with various notables and troops in force, stood
Domitius—grandson of Domitius of the elephant (p. 161), and
Caesar’s most deadly enemy. Yet the troops, ringed round, came

¹ Thus the coast-road’s blocking by Ligurian revolt for Pompey, in
February (during our December) at Ventimiglia, put down with small
forces by Caelsus (as he wrote to Cicero: letters ad Familiares viii. 15, 2),
was after the legions had passed, to prevent its re-use; so Caesar’s hiding
those events will accord with his hiding its ever being used, and with his
feigning that he summoned these legions with others in January (our late
November): from Rimini, BCiv i. 8, 1, after leaving Ravenna. To get them
moving in time, he must have summoned them well before he left it: before
mid-December (our late October). The deceit has been notorious, but most
have thought he called them straight from Beuvray and Arras, not from
secondary camps; the diagrammatic lineation of my map can show how he
switched the dispositions.

Fréjus, Forum Julii Octovanaorum Colonia, as among colonies founded by
Caesar, through Tiberius Nero in 46; Rambaud 1966, 432 (older view:
Caesar founds Forum, in Cicero already 43, Colonia for Eighth being later,
c. 30 when entitled Pacensis Classicae); latest account will be P. A. Février,
Forum Julii (Fréjus) ed. 2; ed. 1 was 1963; his summary now, with new
evacuations, is in Goudineau (ed.) 1976, 41–62; I thank him for further
demonstration on the spot, September 1976, notably of road over Estérel.
On Alpine passes’ onsets of snow (ref. esp. Mt.-Genève) I thank for advice
professors Marc Sauter and colleagues (Geneva) and Nino Lamboglia, Inst.
Ligurian Studies (Bordighera), who has shown me the Colle di Tenda as
over. And the notables were spared, including Domitius. He went, from Cosa on the western coast with a squadron of ships, to Massilia, and there brought about a resolve of the city, in Caesar's despite, to withstand him. And this is where I think of the escape—late autumn 51 (or up to middle summer 50)—of Commius, over to Britain out of northern Gaul. The trouble to expect in his case, of course, was in Gaul if he had not made the escape. But his making it affected Britain very much, so I turn to it.

The story of his flight is told not in the Gallic War, but in the Stratagems of Julius Frontinus, who, a century and a quarter later, was governor of Roman Britain, and might have collected the tale from there. It has him pursued by Caesar, who thus will still have been based on Arras, but has him bluffing the pursuit by setting full sail while his ships were aground at low tide. Was Caesar so simply deceived? or was the pursuit a shrewd bluff of his own, intended to fail so that Commius was thus got rid of? But whereas at Corfinium Caesar's clemency was public, to gain him political advantage (which it did), this would have been secret indeed: how few could have guessed it? It looks as if Britain, whatever might be done there by Commius, was now dispensable. If its tribute-tax continued, all impossible and moved me to adopt the coast-road. See in general Gabert and Guichonnet 1965, 38, 74–7, 82–3 map fig. 7, 95–6, 99.

1 BCiv i. 8–23, Caesar's narrative from Ravenna to Corfinium, masterly in vividness yet also in omissions and slants (cf. Pollio in Suetonius 56, 4); on others' views of his veracity (Mommsen, Meyer, Holmes, Adcock, Syme) Rambaud 1966, 133–4 with n. 88, compares O. E. Schmidt, von Fritz and himself; on the march and summoning of legions, 106–7, and Fabre 1972, xxvii, both starting from Stoffel (Guerre civ., 1887); but only from secondary camps can the summoning be just when the crisis demanded it—just after Caesar's 7–10 December (third week of our October), when he had the latest news from Rome (brought first by Hirtius, then by Curio). Domitius spared at Corfinium, and even financed, i. 23, 2–4; proceeds by sea to Massilia, 34, 2.

2 BCiv i. 34–6, Caesar somewhat juggling the sequence of events.

3 Julius Frontinus, governor 74–77/8: Stratagemata, ii. 13, 11. For escape-date as autumn 51, see p. 179 (from BG viii. 48) with n. 1. Otherwise it has to be in 50 at a time when Caesar was at hand for a pursuit. Commius could have planned the escape (flotilla of ships) when the army was away for the fustation, but on starting found Caesar was back from it sooner than he reckoned. Yet after it (viii. 52, 1–2), though Caesar was in movement, we are not told where he went. An escape in middle summer at latest, before he left for Italy (54, 4–5), is the only alternative to one in late autumn 51, which I rather prefer.
the better for Caesar; if not, he had at least had the profit while he needed it most. What Commius did there, we can judge from coins. From the type of Allen’s Gallo-Belic F (now seen as Suessionic) is derived his ‘British Q’, displaying a horse with triple tail. It is distributed in coastal Sussex and inland on the middle and upper Thames and all around; furthermore, after twenty or twenty-five years the type gets an inscription—Commius’s name. His dynasty’s later story is not here relevant; but what must be, is the quantity of Q coins appearing in the great gold hoard of Whaddon Chase (map 11), which has otherwise a quite new class, ‘British L’. This has divisions, related obscurely; but the whole brings change, in distribution, to the former pattern seen north of the middle Thames. In the centre there, Cassivellaunus had not struck coins; now, his country is brought into the L coin area, which stretches outside it. These Whaddon Chase coins have been by some believed his; but Allen’s and the lower modern datings tell against it;¹ what the change means, surely, is Cassivellaunus’s death. So perhaps what Commius did was to foment, or join, a revulsion against him, by tribes that surrender to Caesar had forced to pay the tax. It would henceforth cease. It should cease in the very early 40s, when Caesar had the Civil War fully on his hands.

Pompey had withdrawn to Brundium, eluded Caesar, and sailed to the Balkans. Caesar, speeding now from Rome to Massilia, set Trebonius and Decimus Brutus to besiege it. On into Spain, adding three to Fabius’s legions, he defeated the legates of Pompey at Ilerda. So in Farther Spain soon, he could assure himself the wealth he had withdrawn from in 61, beside the Ocean. Through many worse frustrations, often hidden by his deceits, his successes had put the West, which he had guarded

¹ These lower datings however leave Gallo-Belic F itself, and so the start of British Q, not so late as believed by Allen but actually earlier. This follows from F’s recognition by Scheers as Suessionic, as prior to her last classes (4, 5, and Cricuru), and as passing elements to Q that are all from her previous classes (1–3). So Q will have started here a little before 60, not from the flight of Commius: Scheers 1970b, 154–6. Commius will then have been received among people who already had Q, and were using it before the termination of the sequence British A1–A2–B1–B2: Mackensen 1974 and my p.143 n. 1. None the less he can have quickly been in action; and the coin-map contrast north of the Thames, marked by the Whaddon Chase hoard’s combination of Q and British L, remains sharp. Rodwell 1976, with L Trinovantian, makes it sharper; though his E needs correcting (my n. 7 pp. 142–3), his L could start just after 54 (Mandubracius), and spread wider on Cassivellaunus’s death, which I think should account for the contrast. See text to his maps fig. 3, 4, 10, 19, 20.
by the Rhine, all into his hands—with the trade that he had robbed from Massilia. He arrived in time for its surrender, achieved through the efforts of Trebonius and Brutus. In spite of setbacks (in Illyricum with C. Antonius, in Africa, and briefly through a mutiny) this freed him for the next year’s ultimate reckoning with Pompey. Caesar when supreme (pl. XXII) had a price to pay. In only the fifth year after, on the Ides of March, Trebonius and Brutus joined in extracting it in blood. Yet he was history’s force: driving to power from the West, where his spoils, essential to his triumph, will have included—in the critical years—that tax from the Britain he had had to let drop.

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Strabo, *Geographia*; comp. over anyhow 30 or perhaps approx. 50 years, to about A.D. 21.


Tacitus

The Roman historian Cornelius Tacitus; his *Germania* is of A.D. 98.


UISPP  Union Internationale des Sciences Pré- et Protohistoriques.


Zirra 1971b  —— in Dacia (Bucarest), xv, 171–238.

Zirra 1971c  —— in Archeologické Rozhledy (Prague) xxiii, 529–47.

