William of Ockham, Dialogus,
part 3, tract 1, book 3

Text and translation by
John Scott and John Kilcullen.

Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, The British Academy

 

Conventions used in collation files

CAP. I.

Discipulus: Quamvis regulariter minime expediret totam universitatem fidelium uni capiti fideli sub Christo subesse, tamen videtur quod nullus catholicus debeat dubitare quin — pro necessitate temporis, vel propter excellenciam beati Petri, vel ex alia causa speciali nobis fortassis ignota, aut de potencia absoluta — Christus potuit constituere beatum Petrum caput, principem et prelatum aliorum apostolorum et universorum fidelium. Ideo specialiter nunc scrutemur an de facto Christus tantam beato Petro contulit dignitatem.

Chapter 1

Student: Even if it would not regularly be advantageous for the whole totality of the faithful to be under one believing head under Christ, it seems nevertheless that no catholic ought to doubt that Christ was able to appoint blessed Peter head, ruler and prelate of the other apostles and all the faithful -- because of the necessity of the time, or on account of blessed Peter's excellence, or from some other special cause perhaps unknown to us, or out of his absolute power. Therefore let us now examine in particular whether Christ did in fact confer so great a dignity on blessed Peter.

Verum quia istius inquisiti, et aliorum quamplurium discuciendorum inferius, nec una pars nec alia aliter quam per scripturas vel auctoritates potest ostendi, circa scripturas autem recipiendas sunt diverse opiniones et adverse, quibusdam dicentibus quod solummodo scripture canonice et generalium conciliorum debent de necessitate salutis admitti, aliis aliter sencientibus. Ideo, licet qualis fides scripturis aliis quam canonicis debeat adhiberi in prima parte huius dialogi, ubi quesivimus que assercio catholica que heretica est censenda, disseruimus aliquantulum exquisite, hic tamen, propter dicta quorumdam que tunc non habuimus, non tedeat nos aliqualiter tangere de eodem. Circa hoc ergo diversas opiniones cum motivis earum non te pigeat recitare.

But since neither one side nor another of this inquiry and the many others that are to be discussed below can be shown except through writings or authoritative texts, and there are different and opposing opinions about the writings that ought to be accepted -- with some people saying that only the canonical scriptures and the writings of general councils ought to be admitted as necessary for salvation, and others thinking otherwise -- therefore, although in the first part of this Dialogue (where we sought to learn what assertion should be considered catholic and what heretical) we examined fairly carefully what kind of trust should be placed in other writings than those that are canonical, yet, on account of the remarks of some people that were not available to us at the time, it would not weary me to touch in some way on the same issue here. So would you mind setting out the different opinions about this and the reasons for them.

WHICH WRITINGS ARE AUTHORITATIVE FOR CHRISTIANS?

OPINION 1: The Bible and general councils and nothing else

Magister: Una est opinio tenens quod
nullam scripturam irrevocabiliter veram credere vel fateri tenemur de necessitate salutis eterne nisi eas que canonice appellantur, vel eas que ad has ex necessitate sequuntur, aut scripturarum sanctarum sensum dubium habencium eas interpretaciones seu determinaciones, que per generale fidelium seu catholicorum concilium essent facte, in hiis presertim in quibus error dampnacionem eternam induceret, quales sunt articuli fidei Christiane.

Master: One is the opinion which holds that we are bound from necessity for eternal salvation to believe or confess as irrevocably true no writing except those that are called canonical or those that follow from them by necessity, or those interpretations or judgements of holy scriptures of uncertain meaning that have been made by a general council of faithful persons or catholics, particularly in connection with those [issues] where error would lead to eternal damnation, such as are the articles of the christian faith. [Cf. Marsilius, Defensor Pacis, II.xix.1.]

Quod enim interpretacionibus concilii generalis sit talis prestanda credulitas patet, quia pie tenendum est quod tales interpretaciones sunt nobis ab eodem Spiritu revelate. Quod ex scriptura ostenditur. Nam veritas ipsa Matthei ultimo dicit,
“Et ecce ego vobiscum sum omnibus diebus, usque ad consummacionem seculi”. Unde Rabanus ait: “Ex hoc intelligitur quod usque in finem seculi non sunt defuturi in mundo qui divina mansione et inhabitacione sunt digni”, quibus scilicet ad fidei conservacionem Spiritum sanctum pie tenendum est semper adesse. Unde Ieronimus: “Qui ergo usque ad consummacionem seculi cum discipulis se esse promittit, et illos ostendit semper esse victuros, et se numquam a credentibus recessurum”. Idem aperte convincitur Actuum 15o, dicente apostolorum et fidelium congregacione post ambiguitatis illius determinacionem, “Visum est enim Spiritui sancto et nobis”. Asseruerunt enim et asserit scriptura ipsorum determinacionem, in dubietate illa circa fidem, factam esse a Spiritu sancto. Cum igitur fidelium congregacio seu concilium generale per successionem vere representet congregacionem apostolorum et seniorum ac reliquorum  fidelium, in determinandis scripture dubie sensibus, in quibus maxime periculum eterne dampnacionis induceret error, verisimile, quinimo certum est, deliberacioni universalis concilii Spiritus sancti dirigentis et revelantis adesse virtutem. 

For it is clear that such belief should be given to the interpretations of a general council, since it ought to be held as a matter of piety that such interpretations have been revealed to us by the same Spirit. This is shown by Scripture. For the truth himself says in the last chapter of Matthew (28:20), "Behold I will be with you always, until the end of time." Hence Rabanus says: "From this it is understood that until the end of time the world will not be without those who are worthy of divine immanence and indwelling", those, that is, to whom, we must piously hold, the Holy Spirit is always present for the preservation of the faith. Hence Jerome says: "He [Christ] promises therefore that he will be with his disciples until the end of time, and shows that they will always conquer, and that he will never abandon those who believe in him". The same point is clearly demonstrated in Acts 15:28 where, after deciding the point of doubt, the gathering of the apostles and the faithful says, "For it has seemed to the Holy Spirit and to us". For they asserted, and Scripture asserts, that their judgement in that uncertainty about the faith was made by the Holy Spirit. Since, therefore, a gathering of the faithful or a general council truly represents by succession the gathering of the apostles, the elders and the rest of the faithful, it is likely, indeed it is certain, that in the definition of the senses of doubtful Scripture, particularly where a mistake might lead to the danger of eternal damnation, the power of the holy spirit is present to the deliberation of a universal council, guiding and revealing. 

Hoc autem deduccione infallibili (ut asserunt) ex scriptura vim sumente patere potest. Quoniam frustra dedisset Christus legem salutis eterne, si eius verum intellectum, et quem credere fidelibus est necessarium ad salutem, non aperiret eisdem hunc querentibus et pro ipso invocantibus simul, sed circa ipsum pluralitatem fidelium errare sineret; quinimo talis lex non solum ad salutem foret inutilis, sed in hominum eternam perniciem tradita videretur. Et ideo pie tenendum est, determinaciones conciliorum generalium in sensibus scripture dubiis a Spiritu sancto sue veritatis originem sumere. This can, however, be clear from an infallible deduction (as they assert) that takes its force from Scripture, since Christ would have given the law of eternal salvation in vain if he did not reveal its true meaning, one that it is necessary for the faithful to believe for their salvation, to those seeking this meaning and together calling on him for it, but instead permitted the greater number of the faithful to make a mistake about it. Indeed such a law would not only be useless for salvation but would seem to be handed down for the eternal destruction of men. It should be held as a matter of piety, therefore, that the judgements of general councils about uncertain meanings of Scripture have the origin of their truth from the Holy Spirit. [Cf. Marsilius, II.xix.2, 3]

CAP. II.

Discipulus: Opinionem aliam recitare non differas.

Chapter 2.

Student: Do not defer setting out another opinion.

OPINION 2: also papal decrees, the canons of the apostles, doctors approved by the church

Magister: Alia est assercio quod non solum scripturis canonicis et determinacionibus seu interpretacionibus conciliorum generalium est de necessitate salutis firma prestanda credulitas, sed eciam decretis et decretalibus epistolis summorum pontificum, nec non et apostolorum canonibus qui in biblia non habentur, et dictis doctorum ab ecclesia approbatorum est fides absque dubitacione aliqua adhibenda.

Master: Another assertion is that for necessity of salvation firm trust should be shown not only in the canonical Scriptures and the judgements or interpretations of general councils, but unhesitating trust should also be put in the decrees and decretal letters of the highest pontiffs and also in the canons of the apostles which are not found in the bible and in the sayings of the doctors approved by the church. [[Doctors approved by the church are those canonised as doctors; doctors (otherwise called "masters") in universities are not approved in that sense, though they have a right to teach.]]

Quod enim apostolorum canonibus supradictis sit fides certissima adhibenda videtur asserere Zephernius papa, qui, ut habetur dist. 16a, c. Sexaginta, ait, “Sexaginta sentencias apostoli prescripserunt cum aliis quamplurimis episcopis, et servandas eas esse censuerunt”. Item Leo papa, ut habetur in eadem dist., c. Clementis, ait, “Clementis librum, id est Petri apostoli itinerarium, et canones apostolorum numerant patres inter apocrypha, exceptis quinquaginta capitulis que decreverunt orthodoxe fidei adiungenda”. Item, sexta synodus, ut legitur eadem dist., c. Placuit, ait, “Placuit huic sancte synodo ut amodo confirmata et rata sint canonum apostolorum 85 capitula”. Hoc idem testatur Isidorus, qui, ut ibidem habetur, ait, “Propter eorum auctoritatem ceteris conciliis preponimus canones qui dicuntur apostolorum, licet a quibusdam apocryphi dicantur, quoniam plures eos recipiunt, et sancti patres eorum sentencias synodali auctoritate roboraverunt et inter canonicas posuerunt constituciones”. Ex hiis colligitur quod saltem quibusdam canonibus apostolorum est credulitas adhibenda indubia.

For Pope Zepherinus seems to assert that the most certain trust should be put in the above mentioned canons of the apostles. He says, as found in dist. 16, c. Sexaginta [c.2, col.42], "The apostles and very many other bishops commanded sixty decisions and decreed that they should be observed." Also, as we read in the same dist. c. Clementis [c.3, col.42], Pope Leo says, "The fathers count the book of Clement, that is the account of the journey of the apostle Peter, and the canons of the apostles among the apocrypha, except for 50 chapters which they determined should be added to orthodox faith." Also the sixth synod says, as we read in the same dist. c. Placuit [c.4, col.42], "It is the opinion of this holy synod that the 85 chapters of the canons of the apostles be henceforth established and confirmed." Isidore testifies similarly, saying, as found in the same place [col.42], "Because of their authority we put the canons which are said to be of the apostles before the rest of the councils, even if they are called apocryphal by some people, since many people accept them and the holy fathers confirmed their decisions with synodal authority and placed them among the canonical constitutions." We gather from these [texts] that undoubting belief should be given to at least certain canons of the apostles.

Quod vero decretis et decretalibus summorum pontificum credulitatem ac reverenciam catholici debeant exhibere testantur et Nicolaus papa et Agatho papa, quorum asserciones habentur dist. 19a, c. Si Romanorum et c. Sic omnes. Ad quod eciam probandum alie auctoritates sanctorum patrum possent adduci quamplurime, que abbreviacionis causa non allegantur ad presens.

 Both Pope Nicholas and Pope Agatho attest that catholics should indeed show belief in and reverence for the decrees and the decretals of the highest pontiffs. Their assertions are found in dist. 19, c. Si Romanorum [c.1, col.58] and c. Sic omnes [c.2, col.60]. Very many other texts of the holy fathers could also be brought forward to prove this, but for the sake of brevity they are not cited now.

Quod vero eciam dictis doctorum ab ecclesia approbatorum oporteat credere dist. 15a affirmare videtur, ubi diversorum sanctorum patrum recipienda enumerantur opuscula.

That it is indeed also fitting to believe the sayings of doctors approved by the church seems to be affirmed by dist. 15 [col.34], where the works of various holy fathers are listed as to be accepted.

Hoc eciam racione probatur, quia asserciones summorum pontificum non solum in diffinicione causarum et negociorum sunt recipiende sed eciam in exposicione scripturarum sanctarum, quibus in exposicione scripture preferuntur sancti patres tractatores divinarum scripturarum (dist. 20a, § 1o); ergo exposiciones huiusmodi tractatorum recipiende sunt. Quod vero dicta summorum pontificum eciam in exposicione seu interpretacione scripture sint recipienda Hormisda papa videtur asserere, qui, ut habetur dist. 50a, c. Si ille, ait, “Nemo michi alia quelibet contra auctoritatem sedis apostolice vel 318 episcoporum vel reliquorum canonum constituta obiciat, quia quicquid contra illorum diffinicionem, in quibus Spiritum sanctum credimus locutum, dictum fuerit recipere non solum temerarium sed eciam periculosum esse non dubito”. Huic consentire videtur Nicolaus papa, qui, ut legitur 25a, q. 2a, c. Si quis, ait: “Si quis dogmata, mandata, interdicta, sancciones vel decreta pro catholica fide vel ecclesiastica disciplina, pro correccione imminencium vel futurorum malorum a sedis apostolice presule salubriter promulgata contempserit, anathema sit”. Hoc idem per alios canones quamplurimos affirmari videtur.

This is also proved by reason, because the assertions of the highest pontiffs should be accepted not only in the resolution of cases and affairs but also in the exposition of the sacred scriptures, [though] in the exposition of scripture the holy fathers as commentators on the divine scriptures are preferred to them (dist. 10, para. 1) [Constitutiones col.19]. Expositions of such commentators, therefore, should be accepted. Pope Hormisdas seems to assert that the sayings of the highest pontiffs about the exposition or interpretation of scripture should indeed be accepted. As found in dist. 50, c. Si ille [c.58, col.199], he says, "Let no one present to me anything at all against the authority of the apostolic see or against the decisions of the 318 bishops or of the remaining canons, because I do not doubt that to accept anything that is said against a resolution of those in whom we believe the Holy Spirit has spoken is not only rash but even dangerous." Pope Nicholas seems to agree with this when he says, in 25, q. 2, Si quis [c.18, col.1016], "If anyone holds in contempt pronouncements, orders, prohibitions, sanctions or decrees that have been advantageously promulgated by the bishop of the apostolic see for the sake of catholic faith or ecclesiastical discipline, or for the correction of imminent or future evils, let him be anathema." This same [point] seems to be affirmed by very many other canons.

CAP. III.

Discipulus: Estne alia opinio aliquid superaddens predicte?

Chapter 3

Student: Is there another opinion that adds something to the aforesaid one?

OPINION 3: also other doctors when they agree

Magister: Est quorumdam opinio quod non solum Christiani tenentur predictis firmiter adherere: sed eciam doctoribus qui non sunt ab ecclesia approbati et qui se invicem reprobant, eciam circa illa que contingunt catholicam fidem, quantum ad ea in quibus omnes vel plures et precipue magis famosi concordant, alii credere constringuntur.

Master: There is the opinion of some that Christians are bound to adhere firmly not only to those doctors just mentioned, but also others are bound to believe doctors who have not been approved by the church and who disagree among themselves, even about matters which concern the catholic faith, with respect to those matters about which all or most of them, especially the more famous, agree.

Discipulus: Scio plures qui hoc sentire videntur, sed non sum memor quod audierim vel viderim quemquam eorum hoc auctoritate vel racione probare. Ideo tu ad hoc allegaciones aliquas nitere invenire.

Student: I know many people who seem to think this, but I am unable to remember hearing or seeing any of them prove it by authority or reason. So would you try to find some arguments for it?

Magister: Quod hoc pluribus modis probari possit apparet. Nam illis opportet adhibere fidem quibus non credere est iniquum. Sed non credere doctoribus est iniquum, teste Leone papa, qui, ut habetur 24a, q. 3a, c. Quid autem, ait, “Quid autem iniquius est quam impia sapere et sapiencibus doctoribusque non credere?” Ergo doctoribus est credendum, presertim quantum ad illa in quibus omnes vel plures et magis famosi consenciunt.

Master: It seems that this can be proved in many ways. For we must place trust in those whom it is wrong not to believe. But it is wrong not to believe doctors, as Pope Leo attests when he says, in 24, q. 3, Quid autem [c.30, col.998], "What is more wrong than to think impious thoughts and not believe the wiser and those who are doctors?" Doctors ought to be believed, therefore, especially with respect to those matters about which all or most of them, and the more famous, agree.

Amplius, in intelligendis scripturis divinis illis est credendum a quibus scripture sunt discende, teste beato Clemente, qui, ut legitur dist. 37a, c. Relatum, ait, “Oportet ab eo scienciam discere scripturarum qui eam a maioribus secundum veritatem sibi traditam servat”. Ergo maioribus est credendum. Doctores autem sunt maiores. Ergo oportet doctoribus credere.

Further, as blessed Clement attests, in connection with understanding the divine scriptures those people should be believed from whom the scriptures should be learnt. He says, as we read in dist. 37, c. Relatum [c.14, col.139], "We must learn knowledge of the scriptures from him who preserves it in line with the truth handed down to him by the seniors." Therefore seniors should be believed. Doctors, however, are seniors. Therefore we must believe doctors.

Item, presumendum est pro multitudine, et maxime sapientum (dist. 19a, In canonicis, et dist. 61a, Nullus invitus). Sed illis credendum est pro quibus presumitur. Ergo credendum est multitudini doctorum, cum inter sapientes debeant computari.

Also, we should presume in favour of the multitude, and especially the multitude of the wise (dist. 19, In canonicis [c.6, col.61] and dist. 61, Nullus invitus) [c.13, col.231]. But those should be believed in whose favour we make presumption. The multitude of doctors should be believed, therefore, since they should be numbered among the wise.

Rursus, ille prudencie sue innititur qui ea que sibi credenda seu tenenda videntur doctorum assercionibus presumit preponere, ut colligitur ex verbis Ieronimi que ponuntur Extra, De constitucionibus, Ne innitaris. Nemo autem sue prudencie debet inniti, Salomone hortante, Proverbiorum 3o, qui ait, “Ne innitaris prudencie tue”. Ergo assercionibus in quibus concordant doctores nullus debet sentenciam suam preponere, et per consequens omnes alii doctoribus in huiusmodi credere constringuntur.

Again, that person relies on his own prudence who presumes to prefer those things which it seems to him should be believed or held to the assertions of the doctors, as we gather from the words of Jerome found in Extra, De constitutionibus, Ne innitaris [c.5, col.8]. No one, however, should rely on his own prudence, as Solomon urges, when he says in Proverbs 3:5, "Do not rely on your own prudence." No one, therefore, should prefer his own opinion to assertions about which doctors agree, and consequently all others are bound to believe doctors in matters of this kind.

Preterea, fide dignorum testimonio est credendum. Doctores autem qui fide digni sunt censendi testes sunt assercionum suarum, quemadmodum apostoli appellantur testes Christi, quia evangelicam ausi fuerunt asserere veritatem. Ergo quando doctores concordant, et presertim famosi, alii credere tenentur eisdem.

Moreover, the testimony of those who are worthy of credit should be believed. Those doctors, however, who are worthy of credit should be considered witnesses of their own assertions, just as the apostles are called witnesses of Christ, because they dared to assert gospel truth. When doctors agree, therefore, and especially those who are famous, others are bound to believe them.

Adhuc, unicuique experto et perito in aliqua sciencia, arte vel facultate est credendum. Doctores autem theologie sunt experti et periti in theologica facultate. Ergo credendum est eisdem.

Besides, anyone who is experienced or skilled in some science, art or faculty should be believed. Doctors of theology, however, are experienced and skilled in the faculty of theology. Therefore, they should be believed.

CAP. IV.

Discipulus: Si est aliqua opinio que omnibus obviet supradictis, ipsam audire desidero, ut michi detur occasio intelligendi profundius veritatem.

Chapter 4

Student: If there is some opinion which opposes all the above, I want to hear it, so that I will be given an opportunity of understanding the truth more profoundly.

OPINION 4: the Bible, Bible writers, and the apostles must always be believed; others sometimes but not always

Magister: Est quedam opinio que, viam eligens mediam, predictis omnibus in aliquo adversatur, tenens quod scripture divine contente in biblia, et eiusdem sacre scripture scriptoribus, et universali ecclesie, atque apostolis, absque ulla dubitacione in omnibus est credendum. Nullis aliis, quantacumque doctrina vel sanctitate prepolleant, est in omnibus absque omni excepcione fides necessario adhibenda, ita quod nec concilio generali, nisi esset congregata universalis ecclesia, nec decretis aut decretalibus vel assercionibus summorum pontificum, nec doctorum dictis, sive fuerint ab ecclesia approbati sive non fuerint approbati, est necessario credulitas in omni dicto et casu absque omni excepcione prestanda, licet in multis negari non debeant et quoad multa Christiani ipsis credere teneantur.

Master: There is an opinion which chooses a middle way and opposes all the above [opinions] in some way. It holds that the divine scriptures contained in the bible, the writers of that holy scripture, the universal church and the apostles should be believed in everything without any hesitation. Trust in everything without any exception should not necessarily be given to any others, however distinguished they are in learning or sanctity. So it is that belief without any exception in every saying and case should not necessarily be offered to a general council, unless the whole church has been gathered together, or to the decrees, decretals or assertions of the highest pontiffs or to the sayings of doctors, whether they have been approved by the church or have not been approved, though in many matters they should not be denied and christians are bound to believe them in respect of many matters.

Can we be bound to believe anyone who may sometimes err?

Discipulus: Istam opinionem alias non audivi nec legi. Ideo, ut cognoscam an aliquid apparencie vel veritatis contineat, ipsam intendo aliqualiter tecum discutere. Videtur primo quod sibi ipsi repugnet. Nam sicut qui in uno criminosus ostenditur in nullo negocio admittendus est tamquam testis veritatis sed suspectus est habendus, ita qui in uno errat vel errare potest in nullo sibi necessario est credendum sed merito potest haberi suspectus, quod sicut errat in uno ita errat in alio. Quod de intencione Augustini videtur esse aperte, secundum quem si in scripturis divinis aliquod mendacium, eciam minimum, reperiretur, eis fides esset minime adhibenda. Unde dicit in prima epistola ad Ieronimum, et habetur dist. 9a, c. Si ad scripturas: “Si ad scripturas sanctas admissa fuerint vel officiosa mendacia, quid eis remanebit auctoritatis?”, quasi diceret, “Nichil”. Si ergo concilio generali, summis pontificibus et quibuscumque doctoribus non est necesse in omnibus credere, sequitur quod in nullo est eis fides necessario adhibenda: cuius oppositum opinio predicta tenere videtur. Videtur ergo quod sibimet repugnet. Tu vero narra quomodo ad hoc opinio eadem respondere conatur.

Student: I have not heard or read that opinion anywhere else. So that I may learn, therefore, whether it contains any plausibility or truth, I intend to have some discussion of it with you. First of all, it seems that it is self-contradictory. For, just as someone who is shown to be guilty in one affair should not be admitted as a witness of truth in any lawsuit but should be regarded as suspect, so someone who errs or can err in one thing should not be believed necessarily in anything but can deservedly be regarded as suspect, because just as he errs in one thing so he errs in another. This seems clearly to be Augustine's opinion. According to him if any falsehood, even the slightest, were to be found in the divine scriptures, trust should not be put in them. Whence, in his first letter to Jerome, as found in dist. 9, Si ad scripturas [c.7, col.17], he says: "If even falsehoods in accordance with duty are admitted in the holy scriptures, what authority will remain to them?", as if to say, none. If it is not necessary, therefore, to believe a general council, the highest pontiffs and any doctors at all on every matter, it follows that trust should not necessarily be put in them in any matter. The aforesaid opinion seems to hold the opposite of this. Therefore, it seems to be self-contradictory. Set out now how that opinion tries to reply to this [argument].

Magister: Respondet quod secus est de criminoso et de errante vel potente errare absque omni crimine et peccato. Criminoso enim in nullo credendum est; unde nec ad testimonium debet admitti. Ex quo enim dampnabiliter a regula racionis recessit non est firmiter presumendum quod racionem et veritatem velit in quocumque tenere, nisi forte in aliquo quod ad concupiscenciam vel commodum eius absque omni contrario sue voluntati pertineat. Sed de errante aut potente errare absque omni crimine et peccato (nisi forte veniali) non est presumendum quod velit scienter aliquid asserere contrarium veritati. Unde et errantes in quibusdam, et opiniones falsas — non scienter nec culpabiliter, absque assercione, adhesione vel defensione temeraria vel pertinaci aut dampnabili — tenentes, ad perhibendum testimonium veritati, in iudicio et extra, debent admitti, et in multis debet adhiberi fides eisdem. Et ideo, quamvis secundum istam opinionem non sit necessarium in omni dicto et casu absque omni excepcione credere concilio generali, Romanis pontificibus et doctoribus quibuscumque, tamen in multis est credendum eisdem, quemadmodum eorum testimonia sunt eciam in iudicio admittenda. Sed si generale concilium quodcumque vel Romanus pontifex aut quicumque doctor scienter vel culpabiliter aliquod falsum assereret vel defenderet vel quomodolibet adhereret, nulli assercioni eius (nisi aliter de eius veritate constaret) esset fides vel credulitas firmiter adhibenda.

Master: The reply is that there is a difference between a guilty man and one who errs or can err without any offence or sin. For the guilty man should not be believed in anything and so should not be admitted as a witness. For, from the fact that he has abandoned the rule of reason in a way worthy of condemnation, it should not firmly be presumed that he wants to hold to reason and truth in anything, except perhaps in a matter that pertains to his own desire or convenience and is in no way contrary to his own will. But it should not be presumed of anyone who errs or can err without any offence or sin, except perhaps a venial one, that he wishes knowingly to assert something contrary to the truth. Whence, both those who err in certain matters and those who hold false opinions -- but not knowingly or culpably and without any rash, pertinacious or blamable assertion, adherence or defence -- ought to be permitted to present testimony to the truth, in court and outside it, and in many matters trust ought to be shown in them. And although, therefore, it is not necessary according to that opinion to believe a general council, the Roman pontiffs and all doctors in every saying and case without any exception, they ought nevertheless be believed in many cases, just as their testimonies should also be allowed in court. But if any general council, a Roman pontiff or any doctor were knowingly or culpably to assert or defend or in any way at all cling to something false, trust or belief should not firmly be put in any assertion of its or his unless its truth were established in some other way.

Discipulus: Contra ista auctoritas Augustini militare videtur. Ideo dic quomodo isti respondent ad istam.

Student: Augustine's text seems to militate against those [views]. Tell me how they reply to it, therefore.

Magister: Respondetur quod Augustinus loquitur de scripturis quarum omnibus partibus est eadem racio prestandi fidem, et de omnibus talibus verum est quod si una sola pars inveniretur falsa, nulli parti talis scripture esset credendum propter hoc quod ibi sic scribitur. Talis autem est scriptura divina, quia cuilibet assercioni contente in ipsa ideo fides prestanda est quia instinctu Spiritus sancti ibidem est scripta et asserta. Sed quando est aliqua scriptura totalis et non eadem racio prebendi credulitatem cuilibet parti eius, quamvis una pars admittatur, alia potest non admitti, quemadmodum libri philosophorum et poetarum et aliorum gentilium ac eciam secularium pro parte admittuntur et pro parte repelluntur (dist. 37a, § Sed econtra et c. Turbat et c. Si quid veri). A quo capitulo Si quid veri dicit glossa accipi “argumentum quod testes et instrumenta possunt pro parte rata haberi, pro parte non”; sic eciam “donacio pro parte est valida, pro parte non” argumentum, 17a, q. 4a, Questi; et “utor pro me quo non utor contra me”, ut notat glossa dist. 9a, c. 1a. Sic dicitur quod generali concilio et aliis in uno casu est credendum et in alio non, quia non est eadem racio credendi sibi in omnibus.

Master: It is replied that Augustine is speaking of writings in all parts of which there is the same reason for showing trust. And it is true of all such writings that if one single part were found to be false no part of that writing should be believed for the reason that it is so written there. The divine scripture is such a writing, however, because the same trust should be shown in every assertion contained in it since it is written and asserted there by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. But when there is some complete piece of writing and there is not the same reason for believing each part of it, it is possible not to admit one part even if another part is admitted, just as the books of the philosophers and poets and other gentiles and also of seculars are partly admitted and partly rejected (dist. 37, para. Sed econtra [Gratian, dictum post c.7, col.137], c. Turbat [c.8, col.137] and c. Si quid veri [c.13, col.139]). The gloss says that from Si quid veri "an argument" can be taken "that witnesses and documents can be considered partly established and partly not". So also "a grant is partly valid and partly not" (an argument from 17, q. 4. Questi [c.41, col.826]). And "I use on my own behalf that which I do not use against myself" (gloss on dist. 9, c. 1) [Rather, dist. 10, c. 1; gloss, v. Contra haereticos, col. 31]. So it is said that a general council and others [popes, doctors, etc.] should be believed in one case and not in another, because there is not the same reason for believing them in every case.

CAP. V.

Discipulus: Quod recitasti de differencia inter criminosum et errantem seu errare potentem absque peccato, quantum ad hoc quod non criminoso sed alii est sepe credendum, apparenciam videtur michi habere, ex quo plura cogitandi est michi data occasio. Nunc autem dic quare tenet predicta opinio quod non est credendum in omnibus absque omni excepcione generali concilio et aliis qui non fuerunt scriptores scripture divine neque soli ecclesiam universalem constituunt.

Chapter 5.

Student: What you have said about the difference between a guilty man and one who errs or is able to err without sin, namely that not the guilty man but the other one should often be believed, seems to me to have a show of truth, and it gives me an opportunity to think about more things. Explain now, however, why the above opinion holds that a general council and others who neither were writers of divine scripture nor by themselves constitute the universal church should not be believed in everything without any exception

A General Council may err, according to opinion 4

Magister: Hoc dicit propter hoc quod concilium generale et omnes alii supradicti possunt errare, eciam culpabiliter, contra veritatem orthodoxam et aliam.

Master: It says this because a general council and all the others mentioned above can err, even culpably, against orthodox truth and other truth.

Discipulus: Si concilium generale potest errare, multo forcius et Romanus pontifex, et quelibet alia congregacio parcialis, ac quilibet doctor et scriptor qui non fuit scriptor sacre scripture, errare valebit, et si non in omnibus absque omni excepcione est concilio generali credendum, multo magis aliis in omnibus absque omni excepcione minime est credendum. Quare sufficiat nobis ad presens hoc de concilio generali tractare secundum opinionem prescriptam.  Sane de hiis, et aliis que spectant ad ipsam, prima parte nostri dialogi, libro 5o, c. 25o et 26o et 27o et 28o, aliquantulum diffuse tractavimus. Ideo circa hec noli hic diu morari, sed aliqua motiva breviter tange absque deduccione prolixa.

Student: If a general council can err, it is much more the case that both the Roman pontiff and any other partial gathering at all and any doctor and writer at all who was not a writer of sacred scripture will be able to err, and if a general council should not be believed in everything without any exception, it is much more the case that others should not be believed in everything without any exception. Let us content ourselves for the moment, therefore, with considering this matter, according to the aforesaid opinion, in connection with a general council. Certainly, we have treated at some length these and other matters which pertain to it [this opinion] in the first part of our Dialogue in book 5, chapters 26, 27, 28 and 29 [rather, 25-28], so do not linger for long over these matters here, but touch briefly on some arguments without drawing them out at length.

Magister: Motiva ibi tractata fundantur principaliter in hoc, quod una sola est ecclesia, scilicet militans universalis et tota, cuius concilium generale est solummodo pars, que non potest errare contra fidem; et in hoc, quod illa congregacio que valet ex voluntate humana dissolvi et cessat, cuiusmodi est concilium generale, potest contra fidem errare; et in hoc, quod omnes ille persone que existentes in diversis locis possunt contra fidem errare, eciam si ad eundem locum convenirint poterunt contra fidem errare; et in hoc, quod nulla vocacio humana certarum personarum, et paucarum, nec commissio humana facta pluribus personis, presertim paucis, potest eas confirmare in fide; et in hoc, quod congregati in concilio generali non sunt dicendi non posse errare, neque propter sapienciam eorundem, neque propter sanctitatem, neque propter auctoritatem vel potestatem, neque propter promissionem factam a Christo, que salvari potest si fides in aliis extra concilium generale remaneat.

Master: The arguments considered there are based principally on the fact that it is the one church only, that is the church militant, universal and whole, of which a general council is only a part, which can not err against the faith; and on the fact that a gathering which can be dissolved by human will and which ceases (and a general council is of this kind) can err against the faith; and on the fact that all those persons who while living in different places can err against the faith will be able to err against the faith even if they meet in the same place; and on the fact that no human summoning of certain people, especially a few, and no human mandate given to several people, especially to a few, can confirm them in faith; and on the fact that those gathered in a general council should not be said to be unable to err, either on account of their wisdom or sanctity or authority or power, or on account of the promise made by Christ (which can be satisfied if faith remains in others outside the general council).

Quibus additur allegacio talis. Omnis congregacio illorum qui pauci sunt respectu aliorum catholicorum, eciam prelatorum, potest contra fidem errare, quia non est tenendum necessario quod quidam pauci sint in fide confirmati, quantumcumque insimul congregentur. Quamvis enim sepe legatur quod presumendum est pro multitudine, ut notat glossa, dist. 19a, In canonicis, non tamen ita legitur quod presumendum sit pro paucitate. Cum ergo non sit taliter pro multitudine presumendum quin liceat credere multitudinem posse errare, dicente Domino, Exodi 23o, “Non sequeris turbam ad faciendum malum”, multo minus presumendum est pro paucitate. Et per consequens non est necesse credere quoscumque paucos quorum nullus est confirmatus in fide non posse errare. Sed pauci Christiani, eciam respectu episcoporum, possent sufficere ad celebrandum concilium generale, sicut sepe respectu multitudinis prelatorum pauci ad generale concilium convenerunt. Nam, ut legitur in decretis, dist. 16a, c. Sexta synodus, in generali concilio Anquiritano fuerunt solummodo 18 patres, qui valde pauci fuerunt respectu tocius multitudinis patrum. In concilio eciam Gangrensi fuerunt 18 patres, in Antiocheno fuerunt patres 30, in Arelatensi fuerunt 19, in quodam alio Arelatensi fuerunt 11 patres. In alio Arelatensi fuerunt 18, in concilio Aurasicensi fuerunt 16, in Empanensi fuerunt 16, in Aureliensi fuerunt 31, in Aruernensi fuerunt 15, in Maticensi fuerunt 21, in Lugdunensi fuerunt 17, in alio Lugdunensi 20. Ergo concilium generale potest errare contra fidem.

The following argument is added to these. Every gathering of those who are few in respect of other catholics, even of the prelates, can err against the faith, because it should not necessarily be held that a particular few have been confirmed in faith, however much they are gathered at the same time. For although we often read that a presumption should be made in favour of multitude, as the gloss on dist. 19, In canonicis [col.83] notes, yet we do not read in the same way that a presumption should be made in favour of fewness. Now since a presumption should not be made in favour of multitude in such a way that it is not permitted to believe that the multitude can err (for the Lord says in Exodus 23:2 "Do not follow the crowd in doing evil"), much less should [such] a presumption be made in favour of fewness. Consequently it is not necessary to believe of any few at all, none of whom has been confirmed in the faith, that they can not err. But a few christians, even with respect to the [number of] bishops, could suffice to celebrate a general council, just as often a few in respect of the multitude of prelates have gathered together at a general council. For as we read in the decretals, dist. 16, Prima adnotatio [c.11, col.47], there were only 18 [28 Friedberg] fathers at the general council at Ancyra, and these were very few of the total multitude of fathers. There were also 16 fathers at the council of Gangra, 29 fathers at the council of Antioch, 19 at Arles, and 11 fathers at another council there. There were 16 at another council at Arles, 16 at the council of Orange, 26 at Albon, 31 at Orleans, 15 at Auvergne, 21 at Mâcon, 18 at Lyons and 20 at another council there. A general council, therefore, can err against the faith.

Amplius, illa congregacio potest errare contra fidem que ad hoc quod autentica sit censenda indiget ab homine confirmari qui valet contra fidem errare, quia non magis confirmatur in fide indigens confirmacione quam confirmans. Sed concilium generale, ut sit autenticum et ut eius assercio vel diffinicio sit reputanda autentica et ut auctoritatem obtineat, indiget confirmari a papa, qui potest contra fidem errare, teste Gelasio papa, qui, ut habetur 25a, q. 1a, c. 1o, ait, loquens de sede prima (per quam papam intelligit), quod “unamquamque synodum sua auctoritate confirmavit et continuata moderacione custodit”. Cui concordare videtur Pascasius papa, qui, ut habetur Extra, De eleccione, c. Significasti, ait, “Cum omnia concilia per ecclesie Romane auctoritatem et facta sint et robur acceperint”. Hiis consentit Iulius papa, qui, ut habetur dist. 17a, c. Regula, ait, “Nec ullum ratum est aut erit umquam concilium quod eius”, scilicet Romane ecclesie, “non fuerit fulcitum auctoritate”. Hinc Gracianus, 25a, q. 1a, § Quamquam, loquens de sacris canonibus eciam generalium conciliorum, ait, “Sacri quidem canones ita aliquid constituunt ut sue interpretacionis auctoritatem sancte Romane ecclesie reservent”. Ex hiis aliisque quampluribus colligitur quod concilium generale papa confirmat et ei auctoritatem prestat. Papa autem potest errare contra fidem. Ergo eciam concilium generale potest errare contra fidem, et ita non est necessarium in omnibus absque omni excepcione credere concilio generali, presertim cum secundum quosdam aliquando erraverit, ut eis apparet et in prima parte istius dialogi, libro 5o, existit probatum.

Further, that gathering can err against the faith which needs to be confirmed by a man who can err against the faith before it is to be considered authentic, because the one needing confirmation is not more confirmed in the faith than the one confirming. But for a general council to be authentic, for an assertion or definition of its to be regarded as authentic and for it to obtain authority, it needs to be confirmed by the pope, who can err against the faith, as pope Gelasius attests. In 25, q. 1, c. 1 [col.1007], speaking about the first see, by which he means the pope, he says that "it has confirmed every single synod by its authority and guards them with constant guidance." Pope Paschasius seems to agree with this when he says, as found in Extra, De electione c. Significasti [c.4, col.49], "... since all councils have been brought about by and have received their strength from the authority of the Roman church." Pope Julius agrees with these. As found in dist. 17, c. Regula [c.2, col.51], he says, "No council is or ever will be valid that has not been supported by its," that is the Roman church's, "authority." Hence Gratian, speaking of the sacred canons even of general councils, says in 25, q. 1, para. His ita respondetur [col.1011], "The sacred canons, in truth, so determine any matter that they reserve the authority of its interpretation to the holy Roman church". We gather from these and very many other [texts] that the pope confirms a general council and furnishes it with authority. The pope, however, can err against the faith. A general council, therefore, can also err against the faith. Thus it is not necessary to believe a general council in everything without any exception, especially since some people say that it has sometimes erred, as it seems to them and as was proved in book five of the first part of this Dialogue.

CAP. VI

Discipulus: Sicut superius recitasti, c. 4o, quamvis secundum istam opinionem non sit simpliciter necessarium credere in omnibus absque omni excepcione concilio generali, tamen secundum eandem in multis negari non debet, et quoad multa Christiani tenentur eidem credulitatem prestare. Ideo ista duo ultima nunc secundum opinionem sepe dictam declara.

Chapter 6.

Student: Although, as you recorded in chapter 4 above, it is not simply necessary according to that opinion to believe a general council in everything without any exception, nevertheless, according to that same opinion, in many matters it ought not be denied and, with respect to many matters Christians are bound to accord it belief. Would you now make clear, therefore, how that oft-stated opinion understands those two particular points

A council's statement on a matter of fact within their direct knowledge should be presumed true, according to opinion 4

Magister: Ad evidenciam istorum dicitur esse sciendum quod eorum que asseruntur per concilium generale quedam consistunt in facto, quia videlicet concilium generale narrat et asserit illa que facti sunt, quemadmodum historia scripture divine narrat rem gestam. Quedam autem non consistunt in facto sed in ipsa natura rei de qua loquitur, sicut cum narrat et asserit ea que spectant ad naturam dei et creaturarum, sive simplicium sive compositarum, vel eciam illarum que unitatem solummodo aggregacionis vel ordinis habere noscuntur.

Master: It says that to make these clear it should be known that some of the matters that are asserted by a general council consist in fact, because, that is, a general council tells of and asserts matters of fact, just as the story of divine scripture tells what was done. Some of the matters, however, do not consist in fact but in the very nature of the thing of which it speaks, as when it tells of and asserts things which pertain to the nature of God and of his creatures, whether simple or composite, or also of those things which are known to have unity only of aggregation or order.

Per istam distinccionem conatur ista opinio declarare prescripta, dicens quod si concilium generale erraret, sive circa illa que consistunt in facto sive circa alia, ille cui hoc constaret ei credere non deberet, et eidem liceret in hoc contradicere et negare concilium generale. Ille autem cui hoc non constaret, quantum ad illa que facti sunt, deberet credere assercioni et testimonio concilii generalis, presumendo quod concilium generale quantum ad illa que facti sunt nichil assereret nisi que essent sibi certa, quemadmodum eciam iudex tenetur credere testibus quos non potest repellere sed reputat, et reputare debet, idoneos et veraces, licet in rei veritate deponant falsum. Nec iudex ignoranter credendo falsis testibus peccat; immo peccaret si non crederet, ex quo nichil habet contra ipsos unde suspicari possit quod falsum dicant. Sic fideles ignoranter credentes concilio generali erranti non peccant in huiusmodi; immo si nollent adhibere fidem peccarent, ex quo nichil habent contra concilium generale. 

By this distinction that opinion tries to make the above-mentioned points clear, saying that if a general council were to err, either about matters that consist in fact or about other matters, he to whom this was evident ought not believe it and would be permitted in this matter to contradict and deny the general council. He to whom this was not evident, however, ought, with respect to matters of fact, to believe the assertion and testimony of the general council, on the presumption that, with respect to matters of fact, the general council would assert nothing about which it was not certain, just as a judge too is bound to believe witnesses whom he can not reject but regards, and ought to regard, as suitable and truthful, even if in point of fact they make a false deposition. A judge who in ignorance believes false witnesses does not sin; on the contrary, he would sin if he did not believe, because he has nothing against them on the basis of which he can suspect that they speaking falsehood. Thus the faithful who in ignorance believe a general council which is in error do not sin in matters of this kind [i.e., of fact]; on the contrary, they would sin if they were to refuse to show trust, because they have nothing against that general council.

Si autem concilium generale erraret circa alia quam circa ea que facti sunt, puta circa illa que de deo vel creaturis in sacris literis asseruntur, nulli Christiano cui hoc non constaret liceret assercionem concilii generalis negare nec de ea publice disputare, nisi aliqui periti et opinionis laudabilis impugnarent eandem, et hoc propter scandalum evitandum et ut concilio generali a quolibet qui nescit ipsum errare circa huiusmodi honor et reverencia debita deferantur; debentque singuli, eciam qui assercionem contrariam antea tenuissent (non tamen fuissent certi), explicite pro assercione concilii generalis presumere et quasi condicionaliter adherere (si scilicet non est contraria catholice veritati), ita ut publice non teneant opinionem contrariam <eciam opinando in mente>; tamen possunt opinari contrarium et sollicite scrutando scripturas querere veritatem. 

If a general council were to err, however, about matters other than matters of fact, for example about what is asserted about God or creatures in sacred literature, no Christian to whom this [i.e., that the council was in error] was not evident would be permitted to deny that assertion of the general council or to dispute about it publicly, unless some men who were learned and of praiseworthy views were opposing it -- this is so that scandal should be avoided and honour and due reverence be offered to a general council by everyone who does not know that it is in error about this matter; and each person, even those who had previously maintained an opposing assertion (but had not been certain), should make an explicit presumption in favour of the assertion of the general council and adhere to it, as it were conditionally -- that is, if it is not opposed to catholic truth -- so that they do not publicly hold an opposing opinion, even as a conjecture in their mind [delete: "even as a conjecture in their mind"]; they can, nevertheless, hold the opposite as an opinion and seek the truth by carefully examining the scriptures.

Si autem concilium generale non errat circa huiusmodi que non consistunt in facto, nulli licet, maxime publica assercione, ipsum negare nec contrarium opinari aut quomodolibet, eciam dubitando, publice defensare, eciam si prius opinatus fuisset contrarium, cum de contrario, et ex quo est falsum, nemo possit esse certus, licet quis deceptus possit putare se esse certum. 

If a general council, however, does not err about matters which do not consist in fact, no one is permitted to deny it, especially by a public assertion, or to hold as opinion or defend the opposite in any way at all, even by doubting publicly, even if he had previously held the opposite as an opinion, since about that opposite, just because it is false, no one can be certain, although someone who is deceived can think that he is certain.

Si autem non errat circa ea que in facto consistunt, ei omnes Christiani sine dubitacione credere debent, quia, cum non erret, non possunt Christiani probabiliter suspicari quod aliquo decipiatur errore in asserendo vel narrando veritatem rei geste.

If, however, it does not err about those matters which consist in fact, all christians should believe it without hesitation because, since it is not in error, christians can not suspect with probability that it is deceived by some error in asserting or telling of the truth of something that was done. [Note in the above passage the "objective" notions of certainty and probability.]

CAP. VII

Discipulus: Ista opinio multa tenet que magna discussione indigere videntur. De quibus forsan postea conferam tecum, sed, omissis ad presens aliis, solummodo dicas quare dicit aut innuit quod aliter se possunt et debent habere Christiani in adherendo concilio generali cum aliquid asserit circa ea que facti sunt et cum aliquid asserit circa alia (illa scilicet que sciencie sunt et non facti).

Chapter 7

Student: That opinion maintains many things which seem to need great discussion. Perhaps I will discuss these with you later, but leaving aside other matters for the moment, would you tell me only why it says or implies that Christians can and should behave differently in adhering to a general council when it makes some assertion about matters of fact than when it makes assertions about other matters, that is matters of [theoretical] knowledge not of fact

Magister: Ut hoc melius intelligas, scire debes quod ea que facti sunt in multiplici differencia sunt. Quedam enim explicite in scripturis divinis habentur, sicut quod apostoli circuibant cum Christo, quod Paulus fuit Rome, et huiusmodi que in libris historialibus biblie affirmantur. Quedam vero non reperiuntur in biblia, sed ab aliis quam a scriptoribus biblie eorum accipitur certitudo, qui ea explicite in suis inseruerunt historiis. Quedam autem in huiusmodi libris solum habentur implicite, ita quod absque subtili deduccione ex illis minime elici possunt. Quedam autem in libris huiusmodi non habentur, sed ipsis narrantibus per se ipsos sunt nota. Et de istis principaliter intelligit opinio suprascripta. Rursus, non solum eorum que facti sunt sed eciam aliorum, quedam continentur in scripturis divinis explicite et quedam implicite, ita quod nisi a doctis cum magno labore et studio ex illis que in scripturis habentur explicite inferri non possunt. Et de istis eciam locuta est memorata opinio. 

Master: To understand this better you should know that matters of fact are of great diversity. For some of them are found explicitly in the divine scriptures, such as that the apostles travelled around with Christ, that Paul was at Rome, and things of this kind that are asserted in the historical books of the bible. Some of them, however, are not found in the bible but they receive their warranty from writers other than writers of the bible who have inserted them explicitly in their histories. Some of them, however, are found only implicitly in books of this kind so that they can not be drawn out from them without subtle deduction. Some of them, however, are not found in books of this kind but are known directly to those narrating them. It is these that the aforesaid opinion mainly means. Again, some matters of fact as well as other matters are contained explicitly in the divine scriptures, and some implicitly so that they can not be inferred from what is found explicitly in the scriptures except with great labour and study by learned men. The aforesaid opinion has also spoken about these.

 

Ex hiis dicitur quod quia pauciores homines et rarius decipiuntur, vel decipi possunt, in factis et gestis que per se ipsos cognoscunt quam in hiis que solummodo ex aliis subtili et multis incognita raciocinacione eliciunt. Ideo magis creditur hominibus in hiis que asserunt se vidisse, vel audivisse aut aliquo sensu alio percepisse, quam in hiis que ex dictis aliorum, vel eciam ex sibi notis, arguendo concludunt. Unde et sepe doctori theologie de aliquo facto testimonium perhibenti multi absque dubio credunt, qui tamen opinionibus suis, quantumcumque firmissime immo pertinaciter adhereat eis, non credunt, immo ipsum errare et falsa dicere et asserere firmissime putant, quia tenent quod scienter non diceret falsum et arbitrantur quod de illo quod facti est est certus, quem deceptum circa alia arbitrantur. 

From these points it is said that because fewer men are deceived -- and that more rarely -- or can be deceived about facts and deeds they know directly than about things they only draw out from other [persons or facts] by a subtle process of thought unknown to many, men are, therefore, more believed about things they say they have seen or heard, or perceived by some other sense, than about things they infer from the words of others or even by arguing from things known to them. Thus often many people believe without doubting a doctor of theology offering testimony about some fact, and yet do not believe his opinions [about matters of theoretical knowledge and law], however much he were to adhere to them most firmly, even pertinaciously -- indeed, they most firmly think that he is wrong and is saying and asserting falsehoods. This is because they hold that he would not knowingly speak a falsehood, and they think that he is certain about the matter of fact but think he is deceived about the other matters.

 

Sic dicunt de concilio generali, quod cum asserit aliquid quod facti est, quod dicit per se ipsum cognoscere, vel invenisse explicite in scripturis divinis, vel in libris illorum quibus, quantum ad illa que asserunt se cognoscere per se ipsos, est credendum ab omnibus qui de contrario non sunt vel non possunt esse certi, semper est adhibenda fides concilio generali, nisi possit probari contrarium. 

In the same way they say of a general council that trust should always be given to it when it asserts some matter of fact [1] that it says it knows directly or has found explicitly [2] in the divine scriptures or [3] in books by those whom -- with respect to those things which they [the authors] claim they know directly -- everyone who is not or can not be sure of the contrary should believe unless the opposite can be proved.

Quoad alia autem que taliter minime cognoscuntur sed solummodo arguendo ex aliis quorum accipitur noticia a peritis scientibus argumenta sophistica a veris discernere, non est necessarium tantam credulitatem prestare concilio generali, eo quod notum est et certum plures literatos et qui periti putantur, quantumcumque sint in concilio generali, nescire in multis sophismata a veris argumentis discernere. Quia tamen plurimi, fallaciarum naturam ignorantes, eciam qui memoriam literarum supra alios habere noscuntur, non solum in theologia et philosophia sed eciam in scienciis legalibus paralogisant, credentes demonstracionem et infallibile facere argumentum quando, quamvis ignoranter, sophistice omnino procedunt, quando igitur in generali concilio congregati, presertim si pauci sint (sicut aliquando fuerunt solummodo undecim, quemadmodum probatum est prius) et in sciencia discernendi sophisticas raciones a veris sunt minime eruditi (vel non sunt notabiliter excellentes), non est tanta fides adhibenda eisdem quando raciocinando ex aliis (quamvis indubiis) aliquam assercionem determinant quanta adhibenda esset eis si aliquid quod facti est assertive proferrent, firmiter affirmando hoc vel per se ipsos evidenter cognoscere vel per illos quibus omnino in huiusmodi est credendum.

With respect to other matters, however, that are not known in this way but only by arguing from other [propositions] knowledge of which is acquired from learned men who know how to distinguish sophistical arguments from true ones, it is not necessary to show so much belief in a general council., since it is well known and certain that many who are learned and thought to be experts, in many cases (however much they are in a general council) do not know how to distinguish sophistical arguments from true ones. Because, however, many (even those who are known to have a memory of literature above others), ignorant of the nature of fallacies, reason falsely, not only in theology and philosophy but also in the legal sciences, believing that they are producing a demonstration and an infallible argument when they are proceeding (though in ignorance) completely sophistically --- when , therefore, gathered together in a general council, especially if there are few of them (as there were sometimes only eleven, as was proved above) and they are not skilled in the science of distinguishing sophistical arguments from true ones, or are not notably distinguished, such great trust should not be given to them when they decide on some assertion by a process of reasoning from other [assertions] (even if undoubted) as should be given to them if they put forward assertively some matter of fact that they firmly declare they manifestly know directly or from others who should be completely believed in matters of this kind.

Answers (according to opinion 4) to the arguments of opinion 1 to prove the infallibility of a general council.

Translation of chapters 8-11 will be found in William of Ockham, A Letter to the Friars Minor and Other Writings, ed. A.S. McGrade and John Kilcullen (Cambrige University Press, 1995) p. 207 ff.

CAP. VIII

Discipulus: Reor me advertere intellectum opinionis  predicte que quoad multa fundatur in hoc, quod concilium generale potest contra fidem errare, cuius contrarium tenet et probare conatur prima opinio superius 1o c. recitata. Ad cuius allegaciones narra qualiter ista opinio ultima nititur respondere.

Magister: Ad primam, cum innuit quod pie tenendum est interpretaciones concilii generalis esse nobis revelatas ab eodem Spiritu a quo revelate sunt divine scripture, respondetur quod non est necesse, nec semper oportet omnes Christianos hoc credere, quia concilium generale sepe innititur, vel inniti potest, sapiencie humane, que deviare potest a vero. Et ideo non oportet de necessitate salutis credere quod quicquid concilium generale diffinit circa fidem tenendum, <quod illud> diffiniat tamquam sibi revelatum a deo et quod tunc spirituali revelacioni innititur.

Quod pluribus modis videtur posse probari. Nam ubi aliquid speratur revelandum a deo, non studio et meditacioni humane, sed solummodo oracioni vel aliis bonis operibus oportet insistere, vel saltem minus oportet insistere studio quam aliis operibus bonis. Hinc est quod cum Daniel speraret sompnium Nabugodonozor et interpretacionem eius sibi revelandam a deo, socios suos hortabatur ut non per studium, quamvis essent docti, sed per oracionem et supplicacionem a deo tantum quererent sacramentum. Quod postea per oracionem se asseruit Daniel consecutum, cum dicat, c. 2o, “Tibi, deus patrum nostrorum, confiteor, teque laudo, quia sapienciam et fortitudinem dedisti michi, et nunc ostendisti michi que rogavimus te, quia sermonem regis aperuisti nobis”. Hinc eciam Christus, quia promisit apostolis se revelaturum eisdem que oporteret eos loqui cum ducendi essent ante reges et presides, ipsis inhibuit ne studio tunc vacarent, dicens eis, ut habetur Matthei 10o, “Cum autem tradent vos, nolite cogitare quomodo aut quid loquamini. Dabitur enim vobis in illa hora quid loquamini. Non enim vos estis qui loquimini, sed spiritus patris mei qui loquitur in vobis.” Quando igitur per revelacionem aliquid solummodo est sperandum, non est studio et meditacioni humane sed oracioni vacandum. Sed cum in concilio generali est questio fidei terminanda, meditacioni scripturarum insistitur. Ergo non per revelacionem est necessario questio fidei in concilio generali terminanda, sed per sapienciam, que habetur et haberi potest per studium et meditacionem humanam, poterit eadem questio terminari; licet deus de gracia speciali ipsam valeat revelare, non est tamen tenendum certitudinaliter quod per revelacionem habeatur, nisi deus hoc miraculose et aperte revelet.

Amplius, quando certitudinaliter tenendum est aliquid per revelacionem habendum, pro eodem adipiscendo non ad sapienciores sed ad meliores (sive sint literati sive illiterati, sive clerici sive laici, sive sint viri sive femine) vel ad prophetas est racionabiliter recurrendum, quia non sapiencioribus sed melioribus deus communiter sua secreta revelat. Quod veritas ipsa testari videtur, cum dicit, Matthei 11o, “Confiteor tibi, pater, Domine celi et terre, quia abscondisti hec a sapientibus et prudentibus et revelasti ea parvulis”. Hinc sanctus ille rex Iosias, ut habetur 4o Regum 22o, cum vellet per revelacionem scire voluntatem dei de verbis voluminis reperti in templo, misit ad Holdam prophetam, uxorem Sellum, eciam ipsos sacerdotes et peritos legis divine, et ab ipsis sacerdotibus et peritis legis veritatem minime requisivit, licet Malachie 2o dicatur, “Labia sacerdotis custodiunt scienciam, et legem requirunt ex ore eius”. Quia ex ore sacerdotis, qui scienciam et legem dei explicite scire tenetur, requirenda est lex dei, quantum ad illa que per exercitacionem et meditacionem in lege haberi possunt; quantum ad illa autem que per revelacionem sunt habenda, ad habentes spiritum prophecie, si qui sint, et ad sancciores, quorum oraciones sunt deo magis accepte, est principaliter recurrendum, nec quantum ad huiusmodi est necessario magis lex requirenda ex ore sacerdotis et summi pontificis quam ex ore vidue vel laici literas nescientis. Sed pro questione fidei terminanda in concilio generali, ad sapienciores magis literatos, sive sint meliores sive non, eciam secundum communem opinionem hominum, recurritur. Ergo non est tenendum necessario quod semper per revelacionem divinam questio fidei terminetur.

Ex hiis colligitur quod non est necesse tenere semper questionem fidei per revelacionem in generali concilio terminari, sed tenendum est, nisi contrarium reveletur miraculose a deo, quod deus permittit ut congregati in concilio generali in diffiniendo questionem fidei et in aliis secundum proprium sensum procedant, assistente sibi divina influencia generali. Et ideo conceditur quod non est impossibile concilium generale errare.

Quod adhuc iuxta predicta tali modo probatur. Existentes in concilio generali tractantes et deliberantes ac diffinientes questionem fidei aut innituntur precise revelacioni divine aut innituntur sapiencie et virtuti humane. Primum non potest dici, quia tunc, iuxta predicta, pro questione fidei terminanda non oporteret consulere in sacra scriptura peritos nec volumina divina mente revolvere, nec opus esset cogitare quomodo esset questio fidei terminanda, sed totum esset committendum deo, solummodo per oracionem invocando ipsum, qui solus potest revelare quamlibet catholicam veritatem: quod tamen non fit quando questio fidei est in generali concilio terminanda, quia sapientes in concilio generali de ipsa deliberant et veritatem ex literis sacris nituntur elicere, ut iuxta scripturas divinas de ipsa diffiniant. Quod concilia generalia fecisse hactenus dinoscuntur, quia per scripturas sacras diffinierunt subortas ex scripturis fidei questiones. Ergo existentes in concilio generali volentes questionem fidei terminare non committunt totum deo, ab ipso per solam oracionem diffiniciones questionis fidei postulantes, sed innituntur sapiencie et virtuti humane, quia pericie quam habent de scripturis et per meditacionem sollicitam habere possunt. Sed in omnibus que innituntur sapiencie et virtuti humane error poterit reperiri. Ergo existentes in concilio generali circa questionem fidei terminandam possunt errare.

Nec est necesse tenere quod congregati in concilio generali semper et in omnibus tractatibus suis, eciam quando tractatur de questione fidei terminanda, aliter dirigantur a Spiritu sancto quam papa quando tractat negocia cum cardinalibus in consistorio suo, vel quam patriarche seu primates aut archiepiscopi vel metropolitani quando celebrant concilia provincialia, aut aliter quam episcopi et alii prelati quando de ecclesiasticis disponunt negociis, licet aliquando accidit, et adhuc poterit accidere, quod ad concilium generale venientes specialiter a Spiritu sancto dirigantur, et quod eis miraculose veritates alique revelentur, et quod deus eos miraculose ab omni errore preservet ac diffinicionem eorum circa fidem et alia ordinata per ipsos manifestis confirmet miraculis. Sed absque operacione miraculi non est necesse tenere quod aliter aliquid reveletur a Spiritu sancto vocatis ad concilium generale quam conciliis provincialibus et aliis congregacionibus Christianorum, de quibus constat quod non sic diriguntur a Spiritu sancto quin possint errare tam in moribus quam in fide. Ergo non est necesse asserere contrarium de omni concilio generali.

Item, illa congregacio potest errare contra fidem que potest in negociis male procedere et malo exitu terminari. Sed hec de concilio generali possunt contingere. Nam, ut habetur  1a, q. 1a, c. Principatus, “Difficile sit ut bono peragantur exitu que malo sunt incohata principio”; ex quo patet quod omnis congregacio que malo potest incohari principio poterit non bono exitu terminari. Concilium autem generale potest incohari malo principio. Concilium enim generale congregandum est per papam, ut habetur dist. 17a, per totum; papa autem, cum possit peccare et dampnari ac contra fidem errare, mala intencione et corrupta — immo intencione aliquid diffiniendi contra catholicam veritatem — potest congregare generale concilium. Igitur concilium generale malo principio et corrupta intencione congregatum malo exitu peragi potest, et per consequens poterit contra fidem errare.

CAP. IX

Discipulus: Indica quomodo antedicta opinio ad alias allegaciones supra c. 1o huius tercii adductas respondere conatur.

Magister: Ad illam que in promissione Christi Matthei ultimo est fundata, respondetur quod Christus futurus est cum ecclesia universali usque ad consummacionem seculi, et ideo, ut dicit Rabanus (sicut allegatum est), “Usque in finem seculi non sunt defuturi in mundo qui divina mansione et inhabitacione sunt digni”. Ex quibus verbis Rabani colligitur quod dicta promissio Christi non debet intelligi de concilio generali, tum quia dicit “non sunt defuturi in mundo”, et non dicit non sunt defuturi in concilio generali; tum quia raro concilium generale est in mundo, universalis autem ecclesia semper usque ad consummacionem seculi erit in mundo. Ergo secundum Rabanum illa promissio Christi non de concilio generali sed de universali ecclesia debet intelligi, ut pie et absque dubio sit tenendum semper Spiritum sanctum adesse universali ecclesie. Sic eciam Ieronimus de universali ecclesia intelligit cum dicit Christum “numquam a credentibus recessurum”, quia semper erunt usque ad consummacionem seculi aliqui Christo credentes, sive concilium generale sit sive non sit.

Ad illam allegacionem que in Actuum 15o est fundata respondetur dupliciter. Uno modo quod determinacio facta per apostolos et seniores de qua fit mencio Actuum 15o facta fuit per revelacionem Spiritus sancti miraculosam, qualis adhuc fieri possit in concilio generali; sed non est necesse quod fiat, nec semper fuit facta, nec forte semper fiet, quandocumque celebrabitur concilium generale, nec est inconveniens dicere aliquas revelaciones fuisse factas apostolis et tamen tales non fieri in omni concilio generali. Aliter dicitur quod apostoli et seniores, absque revelacione Spiritus sancti tunc facta eis, ex verbis Christi que ab ore eius audierant et ex factis eius que viderant collegerunt determinacionem illam. Viderant enim ipsum non servasse legalia multa et ceremonialia, qui et docuerat eos non esse necessarium servare eadem. Quare absque revelacione speciali poterant scire quod credentes conversi ex gentibus ad huiusmodi servanda minime tenebantur. Unde et apostolus Paulus ante congregacionem illam hoc constanter asseruit, quod non fecisset nisi certus de hoc antea extitisset. Et quamvis sibi omnes alii contradixissent, ipse tamen a sua sentencia minime recessisset, ipso attestante, cum ait, ad Galatas 1o, “Licet nos aut angelus de celo”, et cetera. Nec tamen pertinax extitisset licet hominibus aliis restitisset, quia circa verum scienter assertum non potest pertinacia inveniri. Cum ergo dixerunt apostoli et seniores, “Visum est enim Spiritui sancto et nobis”, et cetera, sub tali intellectu dixerunt sub quali dixit Apostolus 1a ad Corinthios 12o, “Nemo potest dicere ‘Dominus Iesus’ nisi in Spiritu sancto”, quia omnia bona sunt a Spiritu sancto, quamvis deus in omni tali sermone non faciat novum miraculum.

Et eodem modo respondetur ad auctoritates plurimas asserentes sentencialiter quod sancti patres in conciliis generalibus congregati illa que diffinierunt, statuerunt et egerunt a Spiritu sancto inspirati fecerunt, et per consequens interpretaciones quas fecerunt circa dubia fidei diffinienda eis revelate fuerunt. Quia non ideo dicuntur a Spiritu sancto fuisse inspirati quia ipsis tunc Spiritus sanctus, ultra influenciam Spiritus sancti que ad omne opus placens deo requiritur, aliquid modo speciali et non solito inspiravit, sed quia Spiritus sanctus ipsos movit ad rectam diffinicionem fidei faciendam sicut omnes movet ad quecumque opera meritoria exercenda. Propter quod, iuxta sanctorum patrum sentenciam, concilia generalia que rite, iuste, sancte, canonice et catholice celebrata fuerunt sunt ab omnibus catholicis devotissime suscipienda, amplectenda et veneranda. Si tamen non fuissent catholice celebrata, quamvis omnes episcopi orbis terre presentes adfuissent, non essent a fidelibus recipienda sed penitus respuenda. Et si queratur quis habet iudicare an fuerint catholice celebrata, respondetur quod, quia non diffinierunt aliquid nisi quod potest elici ex scripturis divinis, ideo periti in scripturis, et habentes aliarum sufficientem intelligenciam scripturarum, habent iudicare per modum firme assercionis quod diffinita ab eis sunt catholice diffinita. Summi autem pontifices, si non fuerint presentes sed tantummodo auctoritate eorum, presentibus legatis ipsorum, celebrata fuerint, autentice iudicare habent quod catholice extiterint celebrata; si autem summus pontifex presens fuerit, sufficit quod autenticet ipsa.

Discipulus: Numquid secundum istam opinionem licet alicui cui non constat concilium generale rite et catholice celebratum fuisse negare illud quod est per idem concilium diffinitum, vel saltem dubitare?

Magister: Respondetur per distinccionem, quia tua interrogacio est generalis, non specificans an concilium generale catholice diffiniat vel erronee. Quia aut concilium generale catholice diffinit aliquid esse credendum, aut erronee. Si catholice, nulli licet publice negare, vel eciam publice dubitare, taliter diffinitum; nulli eciam licet pertinaciter occulte, vel eciam mentaliter, de tali eciam diffinito dubitare. Sed non tenetur quis, eciam cui constat generale concilium catholice diffinisse, explicite et absolute, absque omni contradiccione, explicita vel implicita sive subintellecta, credere taliter diffinitum, sed sufficit quod credat implicite. Si vero aliquid diffinitur erronee per generale concilium sive per congregacionem que a multitudine fidelium generale concilium estimatur, ille qui nescit generale concilium sive talem congregacionem errare presumere debet pro tali concilio vel congregacione, non tamen presumpcione tam violenta quin probacio sit in contrarium admittenda, sicut presumendum est pro sentencia iudicis, quamvis in rei veritate iniusta fuerit et iniqua, donec probetur vel constet contrarium. Et ideo, postquam per sacras scripturas constitit tale concilium generale errasse, sive approbetur sive reprobetur a papa, tali generali concilio nullatenus est credendum, sed est, ab omnibus scientibus, eciam publice pro loco et tempore, reprobandum.

Discipulus: Dic quomodo respondetur ad allegacionem sequentem.

Magister: Ad illam , que constitit in hoc, quod congregacio fidelium seu concilium generale per successionem vere representat congregacionem apostolorum et seniorum ac reliquorum fidelium, respondetur quod sola ecclesia universalis illam congregacionem perfectissime representat, et illa sola sibi succedit proprie et primo, et ideo illa sola errare non potest. Concilium autem generale nequaquam perfectissime representat eam, nec ipsum illi primo succedit, neque successio illa quam Christus promisit cesset ex quo sepe cessat concilium generale. Imperfecte tamen et aliquo modo concedi potest quod concilium generale illam congregacionem apostolorum et aliorum representat et quodammodo sibi succedit, quemadmodum papa cum collegio cardinalium aliquo modo representant congregacionem eandem et aliquo modo succedunt, qui tamen, tam in pertinentibus ad fidem quam in moribus, possunt errare: et ita per representacionem et successionem huiusmodi probari non potest quod concilium generale errare nequit.

CAP. X

Discipulus: Narra quomodo respondetur ad ultimam allegacionem adductam ad probandum quod concilium non potest errare, que consistit in hoc, quod frustra dedisset Christus legem salutis eterne si eius verum intellectum querentibus minime revelaret.

Magister: Respondetur per duplicem distinccionem. Quarum prima est quod eorum que in conciliis generalibus determinantur et determinari possunt, et similiter que possunt esse dubia circa fidem, quedam sunt que ex scripturis divinis deduccione infallibili possunt inferri — ita quod, quamvis nec illud quod infertur nec illud (vel illa) ex quo (vel ex quibus) infertur possit (vel possint) naturali racione esse notum (vel nota), tamen illacio potest naturaliter esse nota, cum eciam illacio falsi ex falso et falsis possit naturaliter et infallibiliter esse nota. Quedam sunt que ex scripturis divinis infallibili deduccione inferri non possunt — quemadmodum per beatum Ieronimum beatam virginem esse corporaliter in celo ex scripturis certitudinaliter haberi non potest, sicut eciam nec quod  illi de quibus dicitur Matthei 27o, “Multa corpora sanctorum surrexerunt” cum eo, et cetera, corporaliter ascenderint in celum, nec quod corporaliter non ascenderint, infallibiliter deduci non potest ex scripturis divinis.

Secunda est quod dubium circa fidem sive circa divina et ea que spectant ad salutem potest esse duplex, quia aliquod est cuius noticia explicita est necessaria ad salutem et aliquod cuius noticia explicita non est necessaria ad salutem.

Per hoc respondetur ad allegacionem predictam. Quia aut in concilio generali proponitur aliquod dubium terminandum quod ex scripturis divinis deduccione infallibili et naturaliter nota, saltem sapientibus et peritis, potest inferri, aut proponitur aliquid terminandum quod taliter ex scripturis divinis inferri non potest, sed per solam revelacionem divinam potest haberi. Rursus, aut necessaria est fidelibus noticia illius quod proponitur in generali concilio determinandum, aut non est necessaria fidelibus. Si illud quod proponitur diffiniendum in concilio generali potest infallibili deduccione ex scripturis divinis inferri et noticia eius est necessaria fidelibus, non exclusa oracione et aliis operibus bonis, debent sapientes in concilio generali congregati diligentissime scrutari scripturas sacras, exemplo illorum de quibus dicitur Actuum 17o, “Susceperunt verbum cum aviditate, quotidie scrutantes scripturas si hec ita se habeant”. Quia concilium generale et quilibet catholicus, ne temptare Dominum videatur, cum aliquid sibi incumbit agendum, debet facere quicquid racionabiliter et provide potest, exemplo Abrahe, qui, secundum Augustinum in questionibus Genesis, et habetur  22a, q. 2a, c. Queritur, cum ingrederetur Egyptum, timens propter pulchritudinem uxoris Egypcios, “quod potuit fecit, quod non potuit deo commisit, in quem speravit”.

CAP. XI

Discipulus: Per predicta narra quomodo respondetur ad allegacionem  contrarium opinancium.

Magister: Respondetur quod cum accipiunt “frustra dedisset Christus legem salutis eterne si eius verum intellectum, et quem credere fidelibus est necessarium ad salutem, non aperiret eisdem hunc querentibus et pro ipso invocantibus simul, sed circa ipsum fidelium pluralitatem errare sineret”, si per “pluralitatem” fidelium (hoc est Christianorum recte credencium) intelligant totam ecclesiam seu congregacionem fidelium, loquendo de vero intellectu cuiuscumque contenti in lege divina qui est necessarius ad salutem (secundum quod verba eorum pretendunt) et de apercione talis intellectus per scripturas vel revelacionem congregatis in concilio generali sive aliis qui essent extra concilium generale (nam et quando celebratur concilium generale, et quando non celebratur, multa necessaria ad salutem aperiuntur, vel aperiri possunt, tam per scripturas quam per revelacionem miraculosam, illis qui non sunt in concilio generali, per quos ad existentes in concilio generali poterunt pervenire, si digni extiterint vel fuerit necessarium Christiano populo ad salutem), <et> ita ex hoc probari non potest quod necesse sit credere “determinaciones conciliorum generalium in sensibus scripture dubiis a Spiritu sancto sue veritatis originem sumere”  [cf. above] illo modo quo scripture divine eius sunt scriptoribus inspirate: Tum quia intellectus legis necessarius ad salutem potest aliis aperiri, vel per scripturas vel per miraculosam operacionem. Quod non debet mirabile vel incredibile reputari, cum plures sepe sapienciores et meliores non conveniant ad concilium generale quam sint ibi congregati, possitque generale concilium intencione corrupta vocari, et, eciam quamvis intencione recta fuerit congregatum, poterit tamen non rite postea celebrari, cum ibi congregati non sint nec in fide nec in gracia et bonis moribus confirmati, sed forte aliquando vel omnes vel plures fuerint aut esse poterint peccatis gravibus involuti. Et ideo lex Christi non est inutilis nec in hominum tradita perniciem [cf. above], quia, sive verus intellectus ipsius reveletur vel aliter manifestetur existentibus in concilio generali sive non venientibus ad idem concilium generale, utilis poterit esse ad salutem eternam ipsam pie querentibus atque recte. Multa enim quoad intellectum legis divine revelavit deus et in modis aliis manifestavit peritis viris et sanctis — et imperitis — qui ad generale concilium minime convenerunt, et non solum quia non celebrabatur generale concilium, sed in tempore concilii generalis, et adhuc potens est deus facere idem. Tum quia intellectus legis ad multa potest aperiri per consideracionem scripturarum, absque hoc quod Spiritus sanctus modo speciali aperiat quibuscumque intellectum ipsarum. Tum quia in concilio generali multa dubia circa fidem declarari possunt que non sunt necessaria ad salutem. Tum quia ostensum est  prius quod concilium generale, seu quod concilium generale a maiori parte Christianorum putatur, potest errare contra fidem.

Si vero taliter opinantes per “pluralitatem” fidelium intelligant maiorem partem fidelium sive Christianorum, et per intellectum legis intelligant absque omni excepcione intellectum cuiuscumque contenti in lege divina, et intelligant loqui de querentibus intellectum ipsum pro omni tempore, [quociesque] quesierint huiusmodi intellectum et pro ipso invocaverint, multipliciter errant. Primo, quia non frustra esset lex salutis eterne data a Christo quamvis maior pars fidelium, immo omnes preter paucissimos vel preter unum, errarent, non dampnabiliter sed execrabiliter, circa ipsam, eciam circa intellectum qui est necessarius ad salutem. Nec esset frustra data lex licet omnes Christiani preter paucos vel unum dampnabiliter errarent circa ipsam, quia tota fides Christiana absque hoc, quod frustra esset data lex salutis eterne, in uno solo posset salvari, quemadmodum in triduo tota fides in sola matre redemptoris nostri permansit. Secundo, quia multa sunt contenta in scripturis divinis quorum verus intellectus primus et literalis non est omni tempore necessarius ad salutem, quamvis ab existentibus in concilio generali queratur solucio, tam per meditacionem vehementem in scripturis quam per oracionem, ita ut ipsum omnino diffinire proponant. Non est necessarium credere quod deus aperiat ipsis per scripturas vel per revelacionem miraculosam huiusmodi verum intellectum, quia, quamvis deus non deficiat ecclesie sue, scilicet congregacioni fidelium, in necessariis, tamen non semper prebet se ad illa que non sunt necessaria ad salutem, sine quibus potest esse salus, quamvis ipsa nitantur precibus continuis impetrare.

CAP. XII

Discipulus: Contra predicta obiciam aliqua, ut cum audiero responsiones ad ipsa clarius intelligam an prescripta aliquid contineant veritatis.

Chapter 12

Student: I will make some objections to the foregoing so that when I have heard replies to them I will understand more clearly whether what has been written above contains any truth.

Objections against opinion 4

 (1) against the claim that general councils may err

Hoc itaque videtur, quod nullo modo sit credendum quod concilium generale possit aliquid diffinire contra catholicam veritatem. Nam, sicut sepe accipiunt illi qui opinantur predicta, deus numquam deficiet in necessariis congregacioni fidelium que est ecclesia dei. Sed concilium generale non diffinire aliquid contra fidem est necessarium ecclesie sue:

 And so it seems that we ought in no way believe that a general council can define anything against catholic truth. For, as those who hold the above opinion often assume, God will never fail the gathering of the faithful, that is the church of God, in what is necessary. But it is necessary for his church that a general council not define anything against the faith.

Tum quia totam ecclesiam dei non exponi periculo heresis et erroris est necessarium ecclesie dei; si autem concilium generale aliquid diffiniret contra fidem, tota ecclesia dei exponeretur periculo heresis et erroris, quia nemo tunc inveniretur qui posset aut sciret defendere fidem contra concilium generale.

This is so on the one hand because it is necessary to the church of God that the whole church of God not be exposed to the danger of heresy and error. If a general council were to define something against the faith, however, the whole church of God would be exposed to the danger of heresy and error, because there would not then be found anyone who could or would know how to defend the faith against the general council.

Tum quia non induci in temptacionem est necessarium ecclesie dei. In oracione enim quam Christus fideles docuit universos hoc petitur; Christus autem non docuit in oracione Dominica petere nisi necessaria; ergo non induci in temptacionem est necessarium ecclesie dei. Tota autem ecclesia dei induceretur in temptacionem gravissimam si concilium generale aliquid diffiniret contra fidem. Ergo ipsum non diffinire aliquid contra fidem est necessarium ecclesie dei, ex quo infertur quod credendum est concilium generale non posse errare contra fidem.

This is so also because it is necessary that the church of God not be led into temptation. For this is sought in the prayer which Christ taught all the faithful; Christ, however, in the Lord's Prayer did not teach us to seek anything not necessary; not to be led into temptation, therefore, is necessary for the church of God. The whole church of God would be led into the most severe temptation, however, if a general council were to define something against the faith. It is necessary for the church of God, therefore, that it [the council] not define anything against the faith. From this we infer that we should believe that a general council can not err against the faith.

Tum quia illud concilium quod suscipiendum est sicut sanctum evangelium non potest errare contra fidem. Concilium autem generale recipiendum est sicut sanctum evangelium, teste Gregorio, qui, ut habetur dist. 15a, Sicut, ait, “Sicut sancti evangelii quatuor libros, sic quatuor concilia recipere et venerari me fateor”. Ergo concilium generale errare contra fidem non potest.

This is also so because that council which should be received like the holy gospel can not err against the faith. A general council should be received like holy gospel, however, as Gregory attests when he says, as we read in dist. 15, Sicut [c.2, col.35], "I confess that I accept and venerate the four councils like the four books of the holy gospel." Therefore, a general council can not err against the faith.

Tum quia universalis ecclesia errare non potest. Diffinicio autem et iudicium generalis concilii tamquam diffinicio universalis ecclesie debet haberi, quia universali consensu constituta videtur, ut Gregorius (ubi prius) videtur asserere, dicens, “Cunctas vero quas prefata veneranda concilia personas respuunt, respuo, et quas venerantur, complector, quia dum universali sunt consensu constituta, se et non illa destruet, quisquis presumit absolvere quos religant aut ligare quos absolvunt”. Huic Gelasius papa concordare videtur, qui, ut habetur 25a, q. 1a, c. Confidimus, ait, “Confidimus quia nullus iam veraciter Christianus ignoret uniuscuiusque synodi constitutum quod universalis ecclesie probavit assensus nullam magis exequi sedem pre ceteris oportere quam primam”. Ex quibus colligitur quod id quod facit concilium generale ab universali fit ecclesia. Et per consequens concilium generale errare non potest.

This is so also because the universal church can not err. A definition and judgement of a general council, however, ought to be regarded as a definition of the universal church because it seems that they [councils] are established by universal consent, as Gregory seems to assert in the same place as before [col. 35] when he says, "Indeed all those persons whom the aforesaid venerable councils reject, I reject, and those they venerate, I embrace, because, so long as they are established by universal consent, anyone who presumes to release those whom they bind or to bind those whom they release will destroy himself and not them." Pope Gelasius seems to agree with this. He says, as found in 25, q. 1, c. Confidimus, "We trust that every Christian now truly knows that the first See, above all, must carry out the decision of any synod that the assent of the universal church has approved." From these we gather that what a general council does is done by the universal church. And consequently a general council can not err.

(2) against the claim that in the Bible there may be things that at some times need not be understood

Secundo contra predicta specialiter quoad hoc quod  dicit  non omnium contentorum in lege divina verum intellectum esse omni tempore necessarium ad salutem obici potest. Nam si alicuius contenti in lege divina verus intellectus et primus non esset omni tempore necessarius ad salutem, frustra illud fuisset positum in lege divina, cum lex divina non nisi propter salutem electorum sit data, sed posset dici de eo, “Ut quid membranas occupat?” (dist. 19a, Si Romanorum), ubi dicit glossa, ex hoc accipitur “argumentum quod nullum verbum positum in aliqua scriptura debet vacare nec superflue poni”. Verus ergo intellectus et primus omnium contentorum in lege divina est necessarius ad salutem.

Secondly, an objection can be made against the foregoing especially in so far as it says that a true understanding of everything contained in the divine law is not at all times necessary for salvation. For if a true and primary [[i.e. in the literal or historical sense]] understanding of anything contained in the divine law were not at every time necessary for salvation, that [thing] would have been put in the divine law uselessly, since the divine law was only given for the salvation of the chosen, but it could be said of it: "Why does it take up parchment?" (dist. 19, Si Romanorum [col.80]) -- where the gloss says that from this is taken "an argument that no word put in any writing should be void nor be put in unnecessarily". A true and primary understanding of everything contained in the divine law, therefore, is necessary for salvation.

Amplius, verus intellectus eorum que in nova lege traduntur fuit necessarius ad salutem illis qui fuerunt summi in veteri testamento. Nam necesse fuit maiores in veteri testamento trinitatis et incarnacionis mysterium explicite, et non solum implicite, credere. Ergo cuiuslibet expresse scripti in lege divina, tam nova quam veteri, verus intellectus est necessarius ad salutem, ut saltem aliqui primum explicite credant et non ignorent.

Further, a true understanding of those things that are handed down in the new law was necessary for salvation for those who were leaders in the old testament. For it was necessary that the greater persons of the old testament believe explicitly, not just implicitly, the mystery of the trinity and the incarnation. A true understanding, therefore, of anything at all expressly written in the divine law, whether the new or the old, is necessary for salvation, in such a way that at least some believe explicitly the primary sense and are not ignorant of it. 

Hec sunt inter alia que possunt obici contra predicta, ad que aliquas responsiones audire desidero. These are some of the objections that can be made against the abovementioned points, to which I want to hear some answers.

CAP. XIII

Chapter 13

Answers on behalf of opinion 4

(1): it is not necessary for councils to be infallible

Discipulus: Ad  primum respondetur per distinccionem de necessario, quia aliquid esse necessarium ecclesie Christi dupliciter potest intelligi: vel quia est utile, vel quia sine illo non est nec umquam erit salus.

Master: The reply to the first of them is by a distinction of the word "necessary", because that something is necessary for the church of Christ can be understood in two ways: either that it is useful, or that without it there is not nor ever will be salvation.

Primo modo accipiendo necessarium, concilium generale non diffinire aliquid contra catholicam veritatem est necessarium ecclesie dei, sicut papam non errare nec diffinire aliquid contra fidem est necessarium, id est utile, ecclesie dei. Sed quantum ad omnia talia necessaria Christus non semper adest ecclesie, quinimo contraria permittit, vel potest permittere, evenire; unde et plures summi pontifices erraverunt pertinaciter contra fidem.

Taking "necessary" in the first way, it is necessary for the church of God that a general council not define anything against catholic truth, just as it is necessary, that is useful, for the church of God that the pope not err nor define anything against the faith. But Christ is not always with his church with respect to everything that is necessary in this way, but rather permits or can permit the opposite to come about: whence, several highest pontiffs have erred pertinaciously against the faith.

Secundo modo accipiendo necessarium, concilium generale non errare contra fidem non est necesse ecclesie, quia, quamvis concilium generale erraret, in multitudine fidelium posset tamen per veram et catholicam fidem salvari; quinimo haberet scripturas sacras per quas errorem concilii generalis posset convincere manifeste, si diffiniret aliquid contra ipsas. Si autem diffiniret aliquid esse tenendum tamquam de necessitate fidei quod tamen non esset necesse credere, per easdem scripturas possent alii Christiani aperte ostendere quod taliter diffinitum ad fidem minime pertineret.

Taking "necessary" in the second way, it is not necessary for the church that a general council not err against the faith, because, even if it were to err, it would still be possible to be saved among the multitude of the faithful [the church] through true and catholic faith. Indeed it [the multitude] would have the sacred scriptures through which it could clearly convict the general council of error, if it were to define anything against them. If, moreover, it were to define that something should be held as a necessity of faith which in fact it was not necessary to believe, other christians could clearly show by those same scriptures that the thing so defined did not pertain to the faith.

Cum autem accipitur quod, si concilium generale diffiniret aliquid contra fidem, tota ecclesia dei exponeretur periculo heresis et erroris, respondetur per distinccionem de periculo. Est enim quoddam periculum tantummodo imminens seu circumstans, et est periculum involvens seu prosternens.

When it is taken [as a premise], however, that if a general council were to define something against the faith, the whole church of God would be exposed to the danger of heresy and error, reply is made by a distinction of the word "danger". For there is a certain danger which is only threatening or surrounding, and there is a danger which is enveloping or subverting.

Periculo imminenti seu circumstanti totam ecclesiam dei exponi negari non debet sed concedi. Hoc enim fatetur ecclesia ipsa cum in quadam collecta dicit, “Deus qui nos in tantis periculis constitutos” et cetera, a quibus liberari deposcit cum alibi dicit, “A cunctis nos mentis et corporis defende periculis”. Talibus periculis expositus fuit apostolus Paulus, sicut ipse fatetur,  2a ad Corinthios 2o, et a quolibet se liberatum fuisse dicit c. 1o, cum ait, “De tantis periculis nos eripuit”. In tali periculo eciam aliquando fuit tota ecclesia dei que erat sub veteri testamento, Deuteronomii 20o: “Dominus deus vester in medio vestri est, et pro vobis contra adversarios dimicabit, ut eruat vos de periculis”. Tali eciam periculo se exponere ex causa racionabili est laudabile iudicandum. Unde eciam in laudem preliancium contra infideles dixit Debbora, ut habetur Iudicum 5o, “Sponte obtulistis de Israel animas vestras ad periculum”. 

It should not be denied but granted that the whole church of God is exposed to threatening or surrounding danger, for the church itself confesses this when it says in one of its collects, "God who has established us in such great dangers" etc. [PL 78, col. 48], and it asks to be freed from these when it says elsewhere, "Defend us from all dangers of mind and body" [PL 217, col. 917]. The apostle Paul was exposed to such dangers, as he himself confesses in 2 Cor. 2, and he says in 2 Cor. 1:10 that he was freed from every [danger], saying, "He snatched me away from such great dangers." The whole church of God has also sometimes been in such danger as it was in the time of the old testament: "The Lord your God is with you, to fight for you against your enemies so as to rescue you from dangers" (Deut. 20:4). Indeed, it should be judged praiseworthy to expose oneself to such danger for a rational reason. For this reason Deborah spoke in praise of those fighting against the unbelievers, as we read in Judges 5:2, "You people of Israel freely offered your souls to danger."

Periculum involvens seu prosternens est duplex, scilicet corporale et spirituale, sed neutri umquam exponetur tota ecclesia dei, licet corporaliter multi ex fidelibus involvantur non numquam. Spirituale autem finaliter nullus electus incurret, et de tali periculo videtur intelligere sapiens cum Ecclesiastici 3o ait, “Qui amat periculum in illo peribit”.

Enveloping or subverting danger is of two kinds, corporal and spiritual, but the whole church of God will never be exposed to either, even if many of the faithful are sometimes enveloped corporally. None of the chosen, however, will finally incur the spiritual [kind], and the wise man seems to mean such danger when he says in Ecclesiasticus 3:27 "He who loves danger will perish in it."

Si itaque concilium generale diffiniret aliquid contra fidem, poterit tota ecclesia dei exponi periculo heresis et erroris primo modo accipiendo periculum, quemadmodum aliquando, quia non potuit generale concilium convocari, Christianitas quoad multos fuit periculo heresis involuta et quoad alios impugnata, teste Isidoro, qui, ut legitur dist. 15a, c. 1o, ait, “In precedentibus namque annis persecucione fervente docendarum plebium minime dabatur facultas. Inde Christianitas in diversas hereses scissa est”. Posset tamen contingere quod quamvis concilium generale diffiniret aliquid contra fidem ecclesia dei non exponeretur periculo, quia posset contingere quod congregati in concilio generali essent pauci et viles, tam in re quam in hominum reputacione, respectu illorum qui ad illud concilium minime convenissent; et tunc illorum error leviter extirparetur per multitudinem meliorum et sapienciorum et famosiorum illis, quibus eciam multitudo simplicium adhereret, magis quam scilicet decem vel duodecim aut quindecim per quos posset generale concilium celebrari — quemadmodum aliquando, scilicet in concilio Arelatensi, tantummodo undecim patres fuerunt (dist. 16a, Sexta), quamvis tunc multiplicati fuerunt Christiani et plures occupaverunt provincias quam diebus nostris. Periculo autem involventi seu prosternenti nequaquam exponeretur tota ecclesia dei, quamvis concilium generale diffiniret aliquid contra fidem, quia remanerent aliqui, vel multi vel pauci, qui tali diffinicioni erronee minime consentirent, sed pro loco et tempore contradicerent manifeste.
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And so if a general council were to define something against the faith, the whole church of God could be exposed to the danger of heresy and error, taking "danger" in the first sense ["threatening", not "enveloping"] -- just as sometimes, because a general council could not be called together, Christianity, in respect of many christians, has been enveloped in the danger of heresy and, in respect of others, has been attacked [that is, the danger was "enveloping" in respect of some but not in respect of the whole Church; such danger can happen because a council meets and defines wrongly, or because no council meets when one is needed], as Isidore attests when he says in dist. 15, c. 1 [Canones, col.34] "For in the preceding years, while persecution was raging, the faculty of teaching the people was not given and so Christianity was split into various heresies." It could happen, however, that even if a general council were to define something against the faith, the church of God would not be exposed to danger, because it could happen that those gathered together in the general council were few and worthless, both in truth and in human reckoning, in comparison to those who had not come together to that council; then their error would be easily eradicated by the great number who were better, wiser and more renowned than them, to whom the multitude of the simple would adhere, rather than to the ten, twelve or fifteen by whom a general council could be celebrated -- as an example, there were once only eleven fathers at the Council of Arles (dist. 16, Prima adnotatio [c.11, col.47]), even though at that time the number of christians had increased and they were occupying more provinces than in our day.) The whole church of God, however, would not be exposed to enveloping or subverting danger even if a general council were to define something against the faith, because there would remain some, many or a few, who would not consent to such an erroneous definition but would according to place and time clearly contradict it.[That is: the Church as a whole will never fall into "enveloping" danger because there will always be some christians -- at least a few, and perhaps even most of the wiser and more renowned -- who will resist the error.]

Discipulus: Saltem multitudo Christianorum, maxime laicorum et simplicium, prosternenti exponeretur periculo, potissime si papa esset presens in tali concilio vel errori huiusmodi consentiret, et papa cum consencientibus sibi potencior esset aliis; quod tamen pro inconvenienti debet haberi.

Student: At the least, the multitude of christians, especially the lay and the simple, would be exposed to subverting danger, especially if the pope were present in such a council or were to consent to an error of this kind, and the pope and those agreeing with him were more powerful than the others. This should be regarded as unsuitable.

Magister: Respondetur quod in tali casu magis timendum esset de periculo clericorum, in sacris literis peritorum et aliorum, quam de multitudine laicorum, id est simplicium, presertim quando multitudo clericorum, per avariciam, ambicionem, simoniam et alias vias pravas, ad ordines, dignitates et beneficia ecclesiastica pervenisset, et aliis esset criminibus irretita. Quia plura et maiora temporalia amitteret quam simplices laici si pape temporaliter prevalenti perseveranter resisteret, et ab obtinendis dignitatibus et beneficiis ecclesiasticis clericos repelleret papa, non laicos. Propter quod procliviores essent clerici ad assenciendum errori pape et concilii generalis, quia, ut testatur Iohannes papa, prout legitur 16a, q. 2a, c. 1o, “Humani moris est illum vereri cuius iudicio et voluntate nunc erigitur, nunc deprimitur”. Clerici eciam, propter maiorem literarum sacrarum noticiam quam habent, vel habere tenentur, et quia questio fidei, licet spectet ad laicos (dist. 96a, c. Ubinam), principalius tamen pertinet ad clericos, magis peccarent et gravius quam laici; et ideo magis verendum esset ne deus eos permitteret ruere in errorem. Multitudo insuper Christianorum, dum tamen aliqui vel saltem unus fidelis remaneat, potest involventi periculo heresis et erroris, aliis exigentibus peccatis, ipsorum exponi; quibus in hereticam pravitatem labentibus, valeret ille qui de lapidibus potest suscitare filios Abrahe, vel de aliquibus ipsorum aut de aliis, quando voluerit numerum Christianorum augere.

Master: The reply is that in such a case there should be greater fear of danger to clerics learned in the sacred scriptures and to others [i.e. other clerics] than to the multitude of the laity, that is the simple, especially when the multitude of clerics had attained their orders, offices and ecclesiastical benefices by avarice, flattery, simony and other improper ways and had been entangled in other crimes, because they would lose more and greater temporalities than simple laymen if they were to persevere in resisting a temporally more powerful pope and the pope were to hold back clerics but not laymen from obtaining ecclesiastical offices and benefices. For this reason clerics would be more disposed to give assent to an error of the pope and general council, because, as Pope John attests in 16, q. 2, c. 1, [Visis litteris, col.785] "It is human nature to fear him by whose judgement and will one is either raised up or pressed down." Because too of the greater knowledge of sacred literature which clerics have, or are bound to have, and because the question of faith, even though it does pertain to laymen (dist. 96, Ubinam), pertains more chiefly to clerics, they sin more and more seriously than laymen; and there should be a greater fear, therefore, lest God permit them to rush into error. Moreover, as long as some or at least one of them remains faithful, the multitude of christians, driven by their other sins, can be exposed to the enveloping danger of heresy and error. While these are slipping into heretical wickedness, he who can raise up the children of Abraham from stones [Matthew 3:9] can, whenever he wishes, increase the number of christians, either from some of them [those slipping into heresy] or from others.

Discipulus: Indica breviter qualiter respondetur ad allegaciones sequentes, quibus probatur concilium generale non posse errare contra fidem.

Student: Indicate briefly how reply is made to the arguments which follow and by which it is proved that a general council can not err against the faith.

Magister: Ad istam qua accipitur quod ecclesia dei induceretur in temptacionem gravissimam si concilium generale aliquid contra fidem diffiniret, respondetur quod totam ecclesiam dei induci in temptacionem dupliciter intelligi potest: vel ut temptacioni succumbat — et ne hoc accidat petitur in oracione Dominica, et numquam eveniet, nec eveniret quamvis generale concilium contra fidem erraret — vel ut temptacione impugnetur qua graviter infestetur. Hoc poterit evenire, teste beato Iacobo, qui c. 1o sue canonice ait, “Omne gaudium existimate fratres mei, cum in temptaciones varias incideritis”.

Master: To the arguments in which it is taken [as a premise] that the church of God would be led into the most severe temptation if a general council were to define something against the faith, the reply is that the idea of the whole church of God being led into temptation can be understood in two ways, either that it succumbs to temptation -- and we ask in the Lord's Prayer that this not happen, and it never will, nor would it come about even if a general council were to err against the faith -- or that it is assailed by temptation by which it is seriously afflicted. This could come about, as blessed James attests when he says in his letter 1:2, "Consider it nothing but joy, my brothers, when you come upon various temptations."

Ad allegacionem sequentem, tenentem quod generale concilium recipiendum est sicut sanctum evangelium secundum Gregorium, respondetur quod hoc intelligendum est de generali concilio rite, iuste et catholice celebrato, secundum quod dicitur omnes apostolice sedis sancciones debere accipi sicut si voce Petri essent firmate, secundum Gracianum, dist. 19a. Hoc autem intelligi debet de illis sanccionibus vel decretalibus epistolis in quibus nec precedencium patrum decretis nec evangelicis preceptis aliquid contrarium invenitur, ita tamen quod hoc vocabulum “sicut” omnimodam similitudinem nequaquam importet, sicut nec Matthei 5o, cum dicit Christus, “Estote perfecti, sicut et pater vester celestis perfectus est”, nec illud c. 22o, “Diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum”, nec illud Iohannis 20o, “Sicut misit me Pater, et ego mitto vos”. Quamvis enim generale concilium aliquid rite ac catholice diffiniat et determinet, et ideo sit sicut sanctum evangelium suscipiendum, sanctum tamen evangelium cum maiori reverencia et devocione suscipiendum est quam concilium generale quodcumque.

To the following argument which holds that a general council should be accepted, according to Gregory, like holy gospel, the reply is that this should be understood of a general council celebrated rightly, justly and in catholic fashion, in the way it is said that all sanctions of the apostolic see should be accepted "just as if" they were declared by the voice of Peter, according to Gratian (dist. 19 [Sic omnes, col. 60). This should be understood of those sanctions or decretal letters in which nothing is found which is opposed either to the decrees of earlier fathers or to gospel precepts, yet in such a way that the phrase "just as" [or "like" or "as] does not imply an identical likeness -- as it does not in Matthew 5:48, when Christ says, "Be perfect, as your heavenly father is perfect", and in Matthew 22:39, "Love your neighbour as you do yourself", and in John 20:20, "As my father sent me, so I send you". For even if a general council defines and determines something properly and in catholic fashion, so that, therefore, it should be received "just as" holy gospel, yet the holy gospel should be received with more reverence and devotion than any general council whatever.

Ad aliam autem allegacionem, accipientem quod diffinicio generalis concilii tamquam diffinicio universalis ecclesie debet haberi, respondetur quod generale concilium non debet regulariter occulte seu secrete aut paucis scientibus celebrari, sed vulgandum est per universalem ecclesiam — hoc est, per omnes regiones in provincia [seu provinciis] in qua (seu in quibus) catholici commorantur — generale concilium congregari debere, quatenus omnes catholici tacite vel expresse consenciant et quasi auctoritatem tribuant, ut ad concilium profecturi eorum nomine circa ordinanda et diffinienda in generali concilio canonice et catholice atque rite procedant, ut merito quicquid licite et catholice statuerint vel diffinierint universali statuatur et diffiniatur assensu. At vero si quid indigne aut illicite et non canonice vel non catholice statuerint vel diffinierint, universalis ecclesie nullatenus statutum vel diffinitum probetur assensu. Talis enim assensus ad nichil illicitum potest extendi, quia talis assensus universalis ecclesie est secundum intencionem assenciencium interpretandus, quemadmodum iuramentum secundum intencionem iurantis interpretari debet, ut notat glossa, Extra, De iureiurando, super capitulum Quintavallis. Quando igitur concilium generale rite convocatur et in omnibus catholice et sancte procedit, quicquid fecerit ab universali ecclesia fieri est putandum, et ideo de tali concilio generali loquuntur Gregorius et Gelasius. Si autem aliquid fecerit illicite et non catholice, minime universalis ecclesie probatur assensu, quia universalis ecclesia, quamvis consenserit quod convocaretur concilium generale, non tamen putanda est, nec expresse nec tacite, in aliquod illicitum consentire.

To another argument which takes it as a premise that a definition by a general council should be considered as like a definition by the universal church, the reply is that a general council should not as a rule be celebrated privately, secretly or with few knowing about it, but it should be made known throughout the universal church, that is throughout every region in the province or provinces in which catholics live, that a general council ought to be gathered together, so that all catholics tacitly or expressly agree and bestow, as it were, authority on it, for the purpose that those coming to the council in their name should proceed, in the matters they have to ordain and define in the general council, canonically, properly and in catholic fashion, with the result that what they decree or define in a licit and catholic fashion is deservedly decreed and defined with universal assent. But if, on the other hand, they decree or define something unworthily or illicitly and not in a canonical or catholic way, let that decree or definition not be approved by the assent of the universal church. For assent of this kind can not be extended to anything illicit, because this kind of assent of the universal church should be interpreted according to the intention of those assenting, just as an oath should be interpreted according to the intention of the one swearing it, as the gloss on Extra, De iureiurando, c. Quintavallis notes (s. v. Iuramentum, col. 816; cf. gloss on Extra, De iureiurando, Veniens, s. v. Praescivisset, col. 808). When a general council is properly convoked, therefore, and proceeds in everything in a catholic and holy way, whatever it does should be considered as done by the universal church. It is about a general council of this kind, therefore, that Gregory and Gelasius are speaking. If it does anything illicitly and not in a catholic way, however, it is not approved by the assent of the universal church, because even if the universal church has agreed that the general council be convoked, yet it should not be thought that it consents, either expressly or tacitly, to anything illicit.

Aliter respondetur quod postquam acta generalis concilii per universos populos catholicos fuerunt promulgata, si nullus contradicens aut impugnans apparet, sunt putanda ab universali ecclesia approbata, et de talibus conciliis generalibus loquuntur Gregorius et Gelasius. Si autem acta generalis concilii non fuerint apud omnes populos catholicos diligenter exposita, non est dicendum quod tale concilium sit explicite ab universali ecclesia approbatum, licet, si sancte et catholice fuerit celebratum, possit dici implicite ab universali ecclesia approbatum.

Another reply is that if, after the acts of a general council have been made known among all catholic people, no one is seen to contradict or attack them, they should be considered as approved by the universal church, and it is about general councils of this kind that Gregory and Gelasius are speaking. If, however, the acts of a general council have not been carefully expounded among all catholic people, it should not be said that such a council has been explicitly approved by the universal church, although it can be said that it has been implicitly approved by the universal church if it has been celebrated in a holy and catholic way.

Discipulus: Istud est calumpniabile, ut videtur, nam non minus ligat quicquid statuitur vel diffinitur per concilium generale quam statutum apostolice sedis, sed illud universalem ligat ecclesiam (Extra, De constitucionibus, Quoniam), nec oportet ad hoc ut liget quod omnium auribus inculcetur (Extra, De postulacione, Ad hec). Ergo et quicquid statuitur vel diffinitur a concilio generali universalem ligat ecclesiam, et per consequens pro approbato ab universali ecclesia est habendum.

Student: That seems to be disputable, for whatever is decreed or defined by a general council is no less binding than a decree of the apostolic see, but that binds the universal church (Extra, De constitutionibus, c. Quoniam [c13, col.16]), and it is not necessary for it be binding that it be pressed into the ears of everyone (Extra, De postulatione, c. Ad haec [c.1, col.41]). Whatever is decreed or defined by a general council, therefore, also binds the universal church and must, as a consequence, be considered approved by the universal church.

Magister: Respondetur quod statutum apostolice sedis eciam post duos menses non ligat nisi illos ad quos ipsius noticia poterat pervenire, quia ignorantes, presertim ignorancia invincibili, minime ligat, (Extra, De constitucionibus, Cognoscentes). Sic eciam quod statuitur vel diffinitur in concilio generali non ligat universalem ecclesiam nisi per universalem ecclesiam fuerit legitime divulgatum, et ideo non est censendum explicite approbatum ab universali ecclesia antequam taliter publicetur. Non oportet autem taliter diffinitum singulorum auribus inculcare, sed sufficit taliter publicare quod nullus se possit, si in contrarium venerit, per ignoranciam excusare.

Master: The reply is that even after two months a decree of the apostolic see binds only those to whose notice it was able to come, because it does not bind those who do not know it, especially those whose ignorance can not be overcome (Extra, De constitutionibus, c. Cognoscentes [c.2, col.7]). In this way too, what is decreed or defined in a general council does not bind the universal church unless it has been duly made known throughout the universal church, and it should not be considered explicitly approved by the universal church, therefore, before it has been made public in this way. It is not necessary, however, for something defined in this way to press upon the ears of each person, but it is enough if it has been made public in such a way that no one can excuse himself by ignorance if he has come to the opposite [conclusion].

CAP. XIV

Discipulus: Nunc superest tractare ista que obiecta sunt contra dicta superius, c. 12o, quibus videtur ostensum quod omnium contentorum in scripturis divinis verus intellectus et primus est omni tempore necessarius ad salutem. Narra igitur quomodo opinantes illi respondent ad ipsa.

Chapter 14

Student: It now remains to consider the objections in chapter 12 against the things said earlier [by opinion 4], by which [objections] it seems to be shown that a true and primary understanding of everything contained in the divine scriptures is at all times necessary for salvation. Tell me, therefore, how those holding this opinion [i.e. opinion 4] reply to those [objections].

Answer (2): it need not always be possible to understand every passage in the Bible

Magister: Ad primum illorum, cum dicitur quod frustra esset positum in scriptura illud cuius verus intellectus non est omni tempore necessarius ad salutem, respondetur quod falsum assumitur, quia ad hoc, quod aliquid non frustra ponatur in scriptura divina, sufficit quod aliquando, licet non omni tempore, eius verus intellectus et primus sit necessarius ad salutem, quemadmodum Veritas ipsa multa dixit et protulit, nequaquam frustra, quorum tamen verus intellectus non erat tunc necessarius ad salutem. Mater enim sua sanctissima numquam aliquo necessario ad salutem extitit destituta, et tamen quando Christus dixit sibi et patri putativo, Luce 2o, “Quid est quod me querebatis? Nesciebatis quia in hiis que patris mei sunt oportet me esse?”, ipsa verum intellectum et primum illorum verborum Christi non concepit, cum immediate subiungatur ibidem, “Et ipsi non intellexerunt verbum quod locutus est ad illos”. Que tamen, sicut ([ubi] prius) habetur, mater eius conservabat in corde suo, verum intellectum ipsorum postea habitura. Christus eciam dixit apostolis, ut legitur Luce 18o: “Ecce ascendimus Ierosolimam et consummabuntur omnia que scripta sunt per prophetas de filio hominis. Tradetur enim gentibus, et illudetur, et flagellabitur, et conspuetur, et postquam flagellaverint, occident eum, et tercia die resurget”. Quorum tamen verborum verum intellectum tunc minime habuerunt, quia immediate subiungitur, “Et ipsi nichil horum intellexerunt. Erat enim verbum istud absconditum ab eis et non intelligebant que dicebantur”. Eisdem eciam dixit Christus, ut habetur Iohannis 16o, “Modicum et iam non videbitis me, et iterum modicum et videbitis me, quia vado ad Patrem”. Quorum tamen verborum verum intellectum non habuerunt, quia de ipsis scribitur ibidem, “Dixerunt ergo ex discipulis eius ad invicem, ‘Quid est hoc quod dicit nobis: Modicum et non videbitis me’”, et post, “‘Nescimus quid loquitur’”. Ex quibus aliisque quampluribus colligitur manifeste quod plura dixit Christus apostolis quorum tamen verum intellectum minime tunc habuerunt. Ex quo concluditur quod verus intellectus illorum tunc non erat apostolis necessarius ad salutem. Cum igitur tunc essent in statu salutis, nichil defuit eis quod tunc erat eis necessarium ad salutem. Et tamen constat quod tunc Christus non dixit talia frustra. Ergo, a simili, poterunt in scripturis divinis aliqua contineri quamvis eorum verus intellectus et primus non sit omni tempore necessarius ad salutem.

Master: To the first of them, when it says that anything of which a true understanding is not at all times necessary for salvation would have been put in scripture uselessly, the reply is that it makes a false assumption, because for something not to be put in divine scripture uselessly it is enough that a true and primary understanding of it is sometimes, even if not at all times, necessary for salvation, just as Truth himself said and revealed many things which were not useless but of which a true understanding was not at that time necessary for salvation. For his most holy mother never lacked anything necessary for salvation, and yet when Christ said to her and his putative father in Luke 2:49, "Why were you searching for me? Did you not know that I must be about my father's business?", she did not come to a true and primary understanding of those words of Christ, since the text immediately adds, "And they did not understand the words that he spoke to them." (Luke 2:50) As is found (same place), however, his mother kept these things in her heart, to come to a true understanding of them later. Christ also said to the apostles, as we read in Luke 18:31-3, "See, we are going up to Jerusalem, and everything that is written about the Son of Man by the prophets will be accomplished. For he will be handed over to the gentiles and he will be mocked and flogged and spat upon. After they have flogged him they will kill him, and on the third day he will rise again." Yet they did not then have a true understanding of those words, since the text immediately adds (Luke 18:34), "And they understood nothing about these things, for that saying was hidden from them and they did not understand what was said." As we read in John 16:16, Christ also said to them, "A little while, and you will no longer see me, and again a little while, you will see me ... because I am going to the Father." They did not have a true understanding of these words, however, because in the same place it is written of them, "Some of his disciples therefore said to one another, 'What is this that he says to us: A little while, and you will not see me...We do not know what he is talking about.'" We clearly gather from these and very many other texts that Christ said many things to the apostles of which, nevertheless, they did not have a true understanding at the time. We conclude from this that a true understanding of those things was not at the time necessary to the apostles for salvation. Since at the time they were in a state of salvation they lacked nothing that was then necessary to them for salvation. And yet it is certain that at the time Christ did not say such things to them uselessly. By similar [reasoning], therefore, some things could be contained in the divine scriptures although a true and primary understanding of them is not at all times necessary for salvation.

Discipulus: Forte diceretur ad ista quod non est inconveniens aliqua in scripturis divinis haberi quorum verus intellectus non est omni tempore omnibus catholicis necessarius ad salutem, quemadmodum illa que dixit matri et apostolis non erant eis necessaria ad salutem. Verus tamen intellectus omnium que in scripturis divinis habentur semper est aliquibus, etsi non omnibus, necessarius ad salutem.

Student: Perhaps it would be said to those [arguments] that it is not unsuitable for some things to be found in the divine scriptures the true understanding of which is not at all times for all catholics necessary for salvation, just as the things he said to his mother and the apostles [quoted just above] were not necessary to them for salvation. Nevertheless, a true understanding of everything found in divine scripture is always for some, though not all, necessary for salvation.

Magister: Ut videtur aliis hoc non valet, quia qua racione plurium que dixit Christus matri sue et apostolis tunc nulli fideli eorum erat intellectus necessarius ad salutem, racione consimili non est inconveniens aliqua reperiri in scripturis divinis quorum verus intellectus nulli pro aliquo tempore est necessarius ad salutem; et tamen illa non sunt frustra posita in scripturis, nec frustra membranas occupant, quia verus intellectus ipsorum pro aliquo tempore erit aliquibus necessarius ad salutem, quo tempore idem intellectus aliquibus aperietur, vel per investigacionem humanam ex scripturis, vel per miraculosam revelacionem, si verus intellectus ipsorum humana invencione vel erudicione haberi non potest. Propter idem eciam nullum verbum in scriptura divina vacat nec aliquid est superflue positum, quia quamvis multa sint in ea quorum verus intellectus non est semper necessarius ad salutem, aliquibus tamen aliquando necessarius erit.

Master: This does not seem valid to other people, because whatever the reason why the understanding of many things Christ said to his mother and the apostles was not at the time necessary to any of those believers for salvation, for like reason it is not unsuitable for some things to be found in the scriptures of which a true understanding is at some time not for anyone necessary for salvation; and yet those things have not been put in the scriptures uselessly and do not "take up parchment" uselessly [cf. above], because at some time a true understanding of them will be for some people necessary for salvation, and at that time such understanding will be opened to some people, either by human exploration of the scriptures, or by miraculous revelation if a true understanding of them can not be had by human discovery or learning. For the same reason too there is not a word in divine scripture that is "void" or anything that has been "put in unnecessarily" [cf. above], because although there are many things in it of which a true understanding is not always necessary for salvation, yet at some time it will be necessary for some people.

Cum autem  postea  accipitur quod verus intellectus eorum que in lege nova traduntur fuit necessarius ad salutem illis qui fuerunt sub veteri testamento, respondetur quod aliquorum, puta incarnacionis et trinitatis, et non omnium, erat verus intellectus literalis explicitus necessarius ad salutem, quia multa continentur in lege nova quorum verus intellectus literalis nulli in veteri testamento extitit revelatus. Quod Veritas ipsa videtur asserere, cum dicit, ut habetur Matthei 13o, “Multi prophete et iusti cupierunt videre que videtis, et non viderunt, et audire que auditis, et non audierunt”, et sentencia eadem habetur Luce 10o.

However, when it is later taken as a premise that a true understanding of those things that are handed down in the new law was necessary for salvation for those who lived in Old Testament times, it is replied that a true, literal and explicit understanding of some things, like the incarnation and the trinity, was necessary for salvation, but not of all things, because there are many things contained in the new law of which a true, literal understanding was not revealed to anyone in the Old Testament. Truth himself seems to assert this when he says, as we read in Matthew 13:17, "Many prophets and just men wanted to see what you are seeing, and they did not see, and to hear what you are hearing, and they did not hear", and a similar saying is found in Luke 10:24.

CAP. XV

Chapter 15

Can interpretation ever need a new revelation?

Discipulus: Unum in premissis invenitur quod improbabile omnino videtur, quod scilicet aliqua in sacris literis continentur quorum verus intellectus et primus solummodo per revelacionem divinam haberi potest. Quia quamvis posset alicui videri quod aliqua in scripturis divinis non essent superflue posita quorum verus intellectus per studium et meditacionem in scripturis haberi possit, omnino tamen improbabile videtur quod ea in scripturis non essent superflue posita quorum verus intellectus per studium et meditacionem in scripturis haberi non possit, sed per solam revelacionem divinam, quia ita posset deus revelare verum intellectum ipsorum si non essent scripta sicut postquam sunt scripta. Cum igitur ex scripturis nulla capiatur utilitas nisi intelligantur, sequitur quod illa quorum intellectus per solam revelacionem valet haberi prius inutiliter omnino scribuntur.

Student: One thing which seems to be completely improbable is found in the preceding words, namely that some things are contained in sacred literature of which the primary and true understanding can be had only by divine revelation. For though someone might think that something had not been put in the divine scriptures unnecessarily if a true understanding of it could be had by study and meditation on the scriptures, it seems, however, altogether improbable that those things are not put in the scriptures unnecessarily whose true undertanding cannot be had by study and meditation in the scriptures, but only by divine revelation. Because God could reveal a true understanding of such things if they had not been written just as [he can] after they have been written. Since, therefore, no benefit is taken from the scriptures unless they are understood, it follows that those things which can be understood by revelation alone are quite unprofitably written down first.

Rursus, non solum talia inutiliter sed eciam periculose essent scripta, quia ista scriptura que non potest intelligi, ad cuius tamen intellectum capiendum possunt niti legentes et circa quam si non intelligatur periculose contingit errare, videtur esse periculosa legentibus. Sed ad capiendum intellectum quorumcumque que in scripturis divinis habentur possunt niti legentes, circa que, si erraverint, periculose errabunt, quia, ut ait Ieronimus, et habetur 24a, q. 3a, c. Heresis, “Quicumque aliter scripturam intelligit quam sensus Spiritus sancti flagitat, a quo scripta est, licet ab ecclesia non recesserit, tamen hereticus appellari potest”. Ergo periculose talia essent scripta. Volentes enim ad verum intellectum ipsorum pervenire, et non valentes, laberentur faciliter in errorem.

Again, such things would have been written not just unprofitably but even dangerously, because that writing which can not be understood yet which those reading can try to gain an understanding of and about which it is possible to err dangerously if it is not understood, seems to be dangerous to its readers. But readers can try to gain an understanding of everything which is contained in the divine scriptures and if they are in error about these matters they will err dangerously, because, as Jerome says in 24, q. 3, Haeresis [c.27, col.997], "Whoever understands scripture in a sense other than the sense which the Holy Spirit, by whom it was written, demands, can be called a heretic even if he has not withdrawn from the church." Such things, therefore, would have been written dangerously. For those who wanted to arrive at a true understanding of them but were not able to do so, would slip easily into error. 

Hec inter alia sunt quibus predicta assercio posse improbari videtur. Tu narra quomodo respondetur ad ipsa. Primo tamen nitere pro opinione illa allegare. These among others are [the arguments] by which it seems the aforesaid assertion can be rejected. Tell me how reply is made to them, but first try to argue for that opinion.

CAP. XVI

Magister: Quod plura contineantur in scripturis divinis quorum verus intellectus et primus virtute humani ingenii ex scripturis sacris colligi nequeat, sed per revelacionem divinam solummodo possit haberi, videtur posse probari. Nam verus intellectus et primus proferentis oracionem ambiguam habentem multos sensus haberi non potest nisi proferens oracionem eandem quem intellectum habeat aperte declaret. Si quis dixerit, “Iohannes cantat missam”, cum plures appellentur hoc nomine, audiens non sciet de quo loquens intelligit nisi ipse sibi revelet.. Unde et propter hoc videtur ut nititur declarare quedam opinio quam tractavimus prima parte istius dialogi, libro 7o, quod quando lex aliqua vel constitucio habet plures sensus, a conditore est interpretacio requirenda. Nemo enim alius potest scire intellectum quem habuit legis conditor in condendo. Plures autem oraciones ambigue in scripturis divinis habentur, nam secundum doctrinam sanctorum patrum non solum voces que in oracionibus ponuntur sunt signa, sed eciam res significate per voces sunt signa aliarum rerum. Unde et Veritas ipsa, ut refert Gregorius in omelia super parabolam seminantis, insinuavit aperte quod “semen” verbum, “ager” mundum, “volucres” demonia, “spine” divicias signant. Una autem res et eadem plures alias res, eciam contrarias, in scripturis sacris signat. “Leo” enim aliquando signat Verbum, ut ibi, “Vicit leo de tribu Iuda”, aliquando diabolum, ut ibi, “tamquam leo rugiens”, et cetera, aliquando virum fortem, aliquando crudelem. Ergo oracionum ambiguarum, quarum non parva invenitur in sacris literis multitudo, cum res signant, verus et primus intellectus haberi non potest nisi ipse revelet, scilicet deus, qui oraciones huiusmodi revelavit.

Chapter 16

Master: It seems provable that many things are contained in the divine scriptures of which a true and primary understanding can not be gathered by the power of human wit from the sacred scriptures, but can be obtained only by divine revelation. For a true and primary understanding of someone uttering an ambiguous phrase which has many senses can be obtained only if the one uttering the phrase makes quite clear what understanding he has. If someone says, "John sings mass", when there are many men called by this name, someone hearing him will not know whom the one speaking means unless he, [the speaker], reveals it to him. It is for this reason, it seems, that an opinion we dealt with in Book 7 of the first part of this Dialogue [cf. chapter 4] tries to make clear that when some law or constitution has several senses, its author's interpretation should be sought, for no one else can know the thought the author of a law had in framing it. Many ambiguous phrases are found in the divine scriptures, however, for according to the teaching of the holy fathers not only are the words put in phrases signs, but the things signified by the words are signs of other things too. For this reason, as Gregory reports in his homily on the parable of the sower [PL 76, col. 1131], Truth himself clearly implied that "the seed" designates the word, "the field", the world, "the birds", demons and "the thorns", wealth. One and the same thing, however, signifies several other things, even contrary things, in the sacred scriptures. "Lion" sometimes designates the Word, as in "the lion of the tribe of Judah was victorious" (Apoc. 5:5), sometimes, the devil, as in "like a roaring lion" (1 Peter 5:8), sometimes, a strong man, sometimes, a cruel man. A true and primary understanding, therefore, of ambiguous phrases which signify things, of which not a small number is found in sacred literature, can not be had unless he, that is God, who has revealed such phrases, reveals it.

Hec allegacio et conclusio principalis declaratur et confirmatur per aliam in exemplis fundatam apertis. Nam plura revelata fuerunt prophetis ac viris contemplativis in sapiencia sublimissimis divinorum, vel aliis per quos ad prophetas et viros illuminatos a deo pervenerunt, ad quorum intellectum verum et primum ipsi prophete, antequam fuit revelatus eisdem, non poterant pervenire. Ergo, racione consimili et multo maiori, intellectus verus et primus illorum que solummodo enigmatice et sub similitudinibus et figuracionibus rerum in scripturis divinis revelata sunt a deo haberi non potest nisi deus revelet eundem. Consequencia aperta videtur. Antecedens multis probatur exemplis.

This argument and the main conclusion are made clear and confirmed by another [argument] based on plain examples. For many things were revealed to prophets, to contemplative men most distinguished in wisdom about divine matters, or to others, through whom they came by God's agency to the prophets and enlightened men, of which the prophets themselves could not arrive at a true and primary understanding before it was revealed to them. By a similar and much stronger argument, therefore, a true and primary understanding of those things which have been revealed by God in the divine scriptures only enigmatically and in similes and figures of things can not be had unless God reveals it. The inference seems clear. The premise is proved by many examples.

Iohannes enim evangelista, singulariter illuminatus a deo, plura sibi in Apocalypsi revelata minime intellexit antequam intellectus eorum sibi revelaretur a deo, unde et exposicione multorum indiguit. Postquam enim vidit, ut legitur Apocalypsis 17o, “mulierem sedentem super bestiam… ebriam de sanguine sanctorum”, dixit ei angelus, “Quare miraris? Ego dicam tibi sacramentum mulieris et bestie”. Minime tamen intellexit antequam angelus ei dixit, et ita ad verum intellectum et primum illius revelacionis ante aliam non pervenit. Sic eciam mysterium septem stellarum et septem candelabrorum, de quo legitur c. 1o, antequam Christus revelavit sibi, ipse Iohannes minime intellexit. Unde et Christus dixit eidem post visionem predictam, “Scribe ergo que vidisti, et que sunt, et que oportet fieri post hec. Mysterium septem stellarum quas vidisti in dextera mea et septem candelabra aurea, septem stelle, angeli sunt septem ecclesiarum, et candelabra septem, septem ecclesie sunt”. Idem eciam Iohannes cum, ut habetur 7o c., interrogaretur ab uno de senioribus, “Hii qui amicti sunt stolis albis, qui sunt? et unde venerunt?”, respondit, “Domine mi, tu scis”, quasi diceret, “Quamvis ego viderim eos, tamen nescio qui sunt et unde venerunt, sed tu scis”. Et ita ad verum et primum intellectum visionis illius Iohannes antequam sibi ille senior revelavit non pervenit.

For John the evangelist, who was singularly enlightened by God, did not understand many things revealed to him in the Apocalypse until that understanding was revealed to him by God, and thus he needed many things to be explained. For, as we read in Apocalypse 17:3,6,7, after he saw "a woman sitting on a beast ... drunk with the blood of the saints", an angel said to him, "Why do you marvel? I will tell you the mystery of the woman and the beast." Until the angel spoke to him, however, he had not understood, and so he did not arrive at a true and primary understanding of that revelation [of the woman] before another revelation [i.e. the angel's explanation]. So too John did not understand the mystery of the seven stars and the seven lampstands, of which we read in Apoc. 1:12-16, until Christ revealed it to him. For this reason Christ said to him after that vision (Apoc. 1:19-20), "Now write what you have seen, what is and what must happen after this. As for the mystery of the seven stars which you saw in my right hand and the seven golden lampstands: the seven stars are the angels of the seven churches, and the seven lampstands are the seven churches." When the same John, as we read in Apoc. 7:13,14, was asked by one of the elders, "Who are these who are robed in white and where do they come from?" he replied, "My lord, it is you who know", as though to say, although I saw them yet I do not know who they are or where they have come from, but you do know. And so John did not arrive at a true and primary understanding of that vision until that elder revealed it to him.

 Ioseph eciam, de quo habetur Genesis 41o, verum et primum intellectum sompnii quod sibi Pharao enarravit per revelacionem accepit. Unde et Pharao dixit eidem, “Ostendit tibi deus omnia que locutus es”. Sic eciam interpretacionem veram sompniorum pincerne et pistoris Pharaonis per revelacionem accepit. Nequaquam enim virtute humani ingenii poterat scire quod tres propagines et tria canistra in sompniis illis plus signabant tres dies quam tres ebdomadas vel tres menses vel tres annos. Per revelacionem ergo solummodo, postquam fuerunt sibi predicta sompnia recitata, interpretacionem veram agnovit. Unde et ipse, ut habetur 40o c., dixit, “Numquid non dei est interpretacio?”, quasi dicat, “Ille qui vos fecit sompniare, et quid vera significarent sompnia vobis minime indicavit, michi interpretacionem poterit revelare”.

It was by revelation too that Joseph, about whom we read in Genesis 41, received a true and primary understanding of the dream which pharaoh narrated to him. That is why pharaoh said to him (Gen.41:39), "God has shown you everything that you have spoken." In the same way he also received by revelation a true interpretation of the dreams of pharaoh's cupbearer and baker (Gen.40:9-19). For it was not by power of human wit that he could know that the three branches and the three baskets in those dreams designated three days rather than three weeks or three months or three years. After those dreams had been related to him, therefore, he knew their true interpretation only by revelation. That is why he said, as we read in 40:8, "Is not the interpretation God's?", as if to say, he who made you dream and did not indicate to you how your dreams would signify true events could reveal the interpretation to me.

Item, Daniel plurium visionum quas viderat verum et primum intellectum antequam doceretur non accepit. Capitulo enim 7o, post visionem quatuor ventorum et quatuor bestiarum, subiungitur: “Horruit spiritus meus; ego Daniel territus sum in hiis, et visiones capitis mei conturbaverunt me. Accessi ad unum de assistentibus, et veritatem querebam ab eo de omnibus hiis. Qui dixit michi interpretacionem sermonum et docuit me”. Capitulo eciam 8o, post aliam visionem, subiungitur: “Cum ego Daniel quererem intelligenciam, ecce stetit in conspectu meo quasi species viri. Et audivi vocem viri inter Ulai; et clamavit, et ait: Gabriel, fac intelligere istam visionem”.

Again, Daniel did not receive a true and primary understanding of many visions he had seen until he was taught. For after his vision of the four winds and the four beasts, is added, in Dan. 7:15-6, "As for me, Daniel, my spirit was troubled and I was terrified by these things, and the visions of my head confounded me. I approached one of the attendants to ask him the truth concerning all this. He told me the interpretation of matters and taught me." He also adds in Dan. 8:15-6 after another vision, "When I, Daniel, ... tried to understand it, then someone appeared standing before me, having the appearance of a man, and I heard a human voice by the Ulai, calling, 'Gabriel, help him to understand this vision.'"

Ex hiis aliisque quampluribus evidenter colligitur, ut videtur, quod prophetis et illuminatissimis viris, omnique sapiencia divina et humana peritis, plura revelata fuerunt que tamen, antequam docerentur a revelante, non intellexerunt. Unde et sepe prophetis plures visiones ostense fuerunt quarum postea interpretacio extitit revelata, sicut Ieremie 1o et 13o et Ezechielis 17o et Isaie 5o et aliis locis quampluribus, sicut eciam Christus parabolas quas loquebatur turbis apostolos docebat, ut legitur  Marci 4o. Si ergo prophete et viri illuminatissimi plurium que viderunt non poterant nisi per novam revelacionem verum ac primum accipere intellectum, multo magis alii enigmaticarum visionum non possent ad verum et primum intellectum pertingere nisi reveletur alicui qui aliis manifestet eundem. Cum igitur in scripturis divinis quamplures visiones et parabole enigmatice et obscure — immo obscuriores quam sint quedam per revelaciones exposite — que adhuc nequaquam sunt exposite habeantur, sequitur quod plura in scripturis divinis habentur ad quorum verum et primum intellectum nemo valet absque revelacione pertingere.

From these and very many other [examples] we clearly gather, it seems, that many things were revealed to prophets, to most enlightened men, and to those learned in all divine and human wisdom, which they did not understand until they were taught by revelation. And thus many visions were often shown to prophets the interpretation of which was revealed later, as in Jeremiah 1 and 13, Ezechiel 17, Isaiah 5 and very many other places. In the same was Christ too taught the apostles about the parables which he spoke to the crowds, as we read in Mark 4. If prophets and most enlightened men, therefore, could receive a true and primary understanding of many things that they saw only through a new revelation, so much more would others be unable to attain a true and primary understanding of enigmatic visions unless it is revealed to someone who shows it clearly to others. Since, therefore, there are found in the divine scriptures very many enigmatic and obscure visions and parables which have not yet been explained -- more obscure indeed than some that have been explained by revelations -- it follows that there are many things found in the divine scriptures of which no one can obtain a true and primary understanding without revelation.

Amplius, sensus verus et primus oracionis habentis plures sensus catholicos, quam ad quemlibet illorum potest quilibet trahere sicut vult, haberi non potest nisi indicaverit ille qui protulit eam, quia, ex quo trahi potest ad diversos sensus maxime vocis, non potest sciri quem illorum intenderet proferens nisi ipse exprimat, presertim si non potest elici aliquis sensus nec ex verbis antecedentibus nec consequentibus proferentis. Multa autem verba plurium visionum et parabolarum et enigmaticarum locucionum in sacris literis conscriptarum habere possunt diversos sensus catholicos, ad quorum quemlibet potest quilibet prout voluerit trahere ea. Unde et diversi sancti talia verba quamplura diversimode exponunt. Alii eciam absque omni periculo eadem verba aliter quam sancti ad diversos sensus traxerunt, et adhuc alii ad alios trahent. Quod eciam patet ex hoc quod secundum beatum Clementem, ut habetur 37a dist., c. Relatum, “Multa verba sunt in divinis scripturis que possunt trahi ad eum sensum quem sibi unusquisque eligerit”; ergo multo magis possunt trahi ad diversos sensus catholicos. Ex quo concluditur quod de ipsis verus et primus intellectus dei revelantis absque nova revelacione haberi non potest.

Further, if a phrase has several catholic senses, to any of which anyone can draw the phrase just as he wishes, its true and primary sense can not be had unless the speaker makes it known. For from the fact that it can be drawn to different senses, especially verbal [I don't know what "especially verbal" means], it is not possible to know which of them the speaker intended unless he himself expresses it, especially if it is not possible to draw out some sense either from the preceding or from the following words of the speaker. Many words in many visions, parables and enigmatic phrases written in sacred literature, however, can have different catholic senses, to any of which anyone can draw them just as he wishes And thus different saints expound many such words in different ways, and some other people have without any danger drawn the same words to different senses than the saints did and still others will [in future] draw them to other [senses]. This is also clear from the fact that, according to the blessed Clement, as found in dist. 37, c. Relatum [c.14, col.139], "There are many words in the divine scriptures that can be drawn to the sense that anyone chooses for himself." It is much more the case, therefore, [non sequitur!] that they can be drawn to different catholic senses. We conclude from this that God's true and primary meaning when he revealed them can not be had without a new revelation

Amplius, multa sunt in scripturis divinis que mistice solummodo debent intelligi, sicut docet Gregorius in Moralibus in diversis locis; immo, secundum eundem, plura, si intelligerentur literaliter, generarent errorem. Sensus autem misticus qui potest accipi ex verbis divinis virtute ingenii humani absque revelacione speciali non est ita approbandus a catholicis ut coequetur illis que habentur in biblia, vel recipiatur ad aliquid in fide catholica confirmandum, nisi alibi in scripturis divinis habeatur expresse. Quod Augustinus, eciam Ieronimus et Gregorius, sentire videntur. Nam secundum Augustinum, ut habetur dist. 9a, in diversis capitulis, scriptura divina est literis et exposicionibus omnium episcoporum et aliorum preponenda, ita ut solis scriptoribus biblie deferendus sit hic timor et honor ut non credentur errare in aliquo. Qualis honor et timor nulli deferendus est post ipsos. Secundum Ieronimum eciam in prologo in libris Proverbiorum et Gregorium in Moralibus, liber Iudith, Tobie et Maccabeorum ac Ecclesiastici atque liber Sapiencie non sunt recipiendi ad confirmandum aliquid in fide. Dicit enim Ieronimus, sicut Gregorius, “Sicut Iudith et Tobie et Maccabeorum libros legit quidem ecclesia, sed inter canonicas scripturas non recepit, sic et hec duo volumina”, scilicet Ecclesiastici et Sapiencie, “legit ad edificacionem plebis, non ad auctoritatem ecclesiasticorum dogmatum confirmandam”. Sed exposiciones episcoporum et aliorum qui fuerunt post scriptores canonicarum scripturarum non sunt maioris auctoritatis quam libri predicti; ergo sensus quicumque quem colligunt ex scripturis divinis, nisi alibi habeatur ex scripturis divinis, non est cum illa reverencia suscipiendus ut debeat allegari ad confirmandum aliquid in catholica fide. Sensus autem verus et primus cuiuscumque revelati a deo in scripturis valet ad auctoritatem ecclesiasticorum dogmatum confirmandam. Ergo multorum in scripturis divinis sensus verus et primus absque revelacione divina haberi non potest.

Further, there are many things in the divine scriptures which should only be understood mystically, as Gregory teaches in various places in his Moralia [PL 75, col. 513; cf. col. 772]; indeed according to him there are many things which would generate error if they were understood literally. A mystical sense which can be taken from divine words by power of human wit without a special revelation, however, should not be so approved by catholics that it is placed on the same level as those things which are found in the bible, or taken to confirm something in the catholic faith, unless it is expressly found somewhere else in the divine scriptures, as Augustine, Jerome and Gregory also seem to think. For according to Augustine, as found in various chapters [[esp. chs. 5 and 8]] of dist. 9, divine scripture is to be preferred to the letters and expositions of all bishops and other men, so that such fear and esteem that they are not believed to err in any matter should be offered only to the writers of the bible. This kind of fear and esteem should be offered to no one after them. According to Jerome in his Prologue to the book of Proverbs and Gregory in the Moralia [Nothing found in Gregory], the books of Judith, Tobias, Maccabees, Ecclesiasticus and Wisdom should not be taken to confirm anything in the faith. Like Gregory, Jerome [[PL.28, col.1308]] says, "Just as the church does indeed read the books of Judith, Tobias and Maccabees but has not accepted them among the canonical scriptures, likewise it also reads these two volumes", that is of Ecclesiasticus and Wisdom, "to edify the people but not to confirm the authority of the teachings of the church." But the expositions of bishops and others who lived after the writers of the canonical scriptures are not of greater authority than the aforesaid books. Therefore any sense which they infer from the divine scriptures, unless it is found elsewhere in the divine scriptures, should not be received with such reverence that it should be adduced to confirm something in the catholic faith. The true and primary sense of anything revealed by God in the scriptures, however, is valid for the confirmation of the authority of the teachings of the church. The true and primary sense of many things in the divine scriptures, therefore, can not be had without divine revelation.

Adhuc, non magis virtute ingenii humani potest haberi sensus verus et primus aliquorum misticorum divinorum quam parabolarum humanarum. Sed multarum parabolarum et locucionum misticarum seu enigmaticarum humanarum primus sensus proferentis virtute ingenii humani sepe haberi non potest nisi proferens manifestet. Quomodo enim uxor Sampsonis, quamvis subtilissima extitisset, pervenisset ad sensum primum sui problematis, nisi forte a casu, quando dixit, “De comedente exivit cibus, et de forti egressa est dulcedo”, nisi ipse revelasset eidem? Ita enim potest per “comedentem” et eciam per “fortem” significari ursus vel elephas aut draco vel cete maris aut alia bestia forcior leone, vel minus fortis, sicut leo. Per “cibum” eciam et per “dulcedinem” non solum mel sed eciam alie res dulces comestibiles significari possunt. Alia eciam res per “comedentem” et alia per “fortem”, et rursus alia res per “cibum” et alia per “dulcedinem” convenienter significari potest. Cum igitur, ut testatur Apostolus, 1a ad Corinthios 2o, nemo sciat hominum “que sunt hominis nisi spiritus hominis qui in ipso est”, nullo modo uxor Sampsonis virtute humani ingenii, quantumcumque fuisset instructa, scivisset quod Sampson intelligebat per “comedentem” et “fortem” leonem, et per “cibum” atque “dulcedinem” mel, nisi ipse sibi dixisset. Ergo multo forcius verus et primus intellectus visionum et revelacionum divinarum haberi non potest virtute humani ingenii, quia, sicut dicit Apostolus, 1a ad Corinthios 2o, “Que dei sunt nemo cognovit nisi spiritus dei”.

Further, a true and primary sense of any divine mysteries can not any more be had by power of human wit than can be had of human parables. But the utterer's true sense of many human parables and mystical or enigmatic sayings can not often be had by power of human wit unless the one uttering them shows it clearly. For how would Samson's wife, even if she had been very subtle, have arrived (except perhaps by chance) at the primary sense of his riddle when he said, "Out of the eater came food, and out of the strong came something sweet", if he had not revealed it to her. For by "eater" and also by "the strong", a bear or an elephant or a serpent or a whale or some other beast stronger than a lion (or less strong) can be designated, as much as a lion. Also by "food" and by "something sweet", not only honey but other sweet eatables can be signified. Also, "eater" and "the strong" can suitably signify two different things, and again "food" and "something sweet" can signify different things. Since, therefore, as the Apostle testifies in 1 Cor.2:11, no one knows "what is in a man except the spirit of the man that is within him", however well taught Samson's wife had been, she would in no way have known by power of human wit that by "eater" and "the strong" Samson meant a lion and that by "food" and "something sweet" he meant honey, if he had not told her. A fortiori, a true and primary understanding of divine visions and revelations, therefore, can not be had by power of human wit, because, as the Apostle says in 1 Cor.2:11, "No one comprehends what is God's except the spirit of God."

Preterea, primus intellectus minus obscuri non potest haberi virtute ingenii humani, ergo multo forcius primus intellectus illorum que sunt magis obscura virtute humani ingenii haberi non potest. Consequencia videtur probacione minime indigere. Antecedens videtur posse probari auctoritate beati Gregorii, secundum quem, ut videtur, primus intellectus quem habuit Christus in parabola seminantis, que est minus obscura et minus enigmatica quam multe visiones et revelaciones que non sunt exposite per revelacionem in scripturis, virtute ingenii humani haberi non potuit. Dicit enim super parabolam illam, “Quis michi umquam crederet si ‘spinas’ divicias interpretari voluissem?”, quasi diceret, “Nullus”. Et tamen absque illa interpretacione primus intellectus parabole haberi non potuit, quia Christus exponendo predictam parabolam sic interpretatus est. Ergo primus intellectus aliarum parabolarum, visionum et revelacionum que per deum revelantem non sunt exposite virtute humani ingenii haberi non potest.

 

Further, the primary understanding of something less obscure can not be had by power of human wit; a fortiori, therefore, the primary understanding of those things that are more obscure can not be had by power of human wit. The validity of the inference does not seem to need proof. The premise seems provable from a text of blessed Gregory, according to whom, it seems, the primary understanding which Christ had of the parable of the sower, which is less obscure and enigmatic than many visions and revelations which have not been made clear by revelation in the Scriptures, could not be had by power of human wit. For he says about that parable, "Who would ever believe me if I had wanted 'thorns' to be interpreted as wealth?", as if to say, no one. And yet the primary understanding of that parable could not be had without that interpretation because Christ interpreted it in that way when expounding it. The primary understanding, therefore, of other parables, visions and revelations which have not been made clear by God's revealing them can not be had by power of human wit.

CAP. XVII

Discipulus: Deduxisti raciocinaciones fundatas in scripturis ad probandum conclusionem predictam. Nunc ipsam per auctoritates nitere confirmare.

Chapter 17

Student: You have elaborated reasonings based on the scriptures to prove the above conclusion. Now try to confirm it through texts.

Magister: Nonnullis apparet quod auctoritatibus tam scripturarum canonicarum quam aliarum potest ostendi, de quibus adducam paucas. Hoc enim videtur Daniel dixisse, c. 12o, ubi sic legitur: “Tu autem, Daniel, claude sermones et signa librum usque ad tempus statutum”. Ex quibus verbis potest colligi, ut videtur, quod quidam sermones revelati Danieli ita sunt clausi ut nemo possit absque revelacione ad primum eorum intellectum pertingere.

Master: It is clear to some people that this can be shown by texts from the canonical scriptures as well as from other writings. I will bring forward a few. For Daniel seems to have said as much in his twelfth chapter, where we read, "But you, Daniel, keep the words secret and the book sealed until the appointed time" (Dan. 12:4). It seems that we can gather from these words that some words revealed to Daniel have been kept so secret that no one can obtain the primary understanding of them without revelation.

Item, ut legitur Actuum 8o, dixit Philippus eunucho legenti Isaiam prophetam, “‘Putasne intelligis que legis?’ Qui ait, ‘Quomodo possum, si non aliquis ostenderit michi?’”, quasi diceret, “Nullo modo”. Ex quibus verbis habetur quod ex verbis illis scripture que legit eunuchus non potest aliquis primum intellectum ipsorum colligere nisi ab alio doceatur. Ergo racione consimili aliorum que eque vel magis obscura sunt non potest primus intellectus haberi nisi revelatus appareat.

Again, as we read in Acts 8:30-1, Phillip said to the eunuch who was reading the prophet Isaiah, "'Do you think that you understand what you are reading?' He replied, 'How can I unless someone guides me?'" as though to say "in no way". We conclude from these words that no one, unless he is taught by someone else, can acquire the primary understanding of those words of scripture which the eunuch was reading. By similar reasoning, therefore, the primary understanding of other things which are as obscure or more obscure can not be had unless it is clear by revelation.

Item, psalmista ait, “Da michi intellectum”, et cetera, quasi diceret: “Ad primum intellectum multorum legis tue scrutando pervenire non potero nisi tu reveles, ideo da michi intellectum primum illorum”. Plura enim sunt in lege antiqua statuta quorum nulla racio potest per hominem assignari quare precepit illa deus filiis Israel, sicut illa “Non arabis in bove et asino. Non indueris vestimento quod ex lana linoque contextum est”, et similia. Et per consequens primus intellectus talium contentorum in lege absque revelacione haberi non potest. Hinc Ieronimus in prologo biblie ait, c. 7o, “Quis enim digne exprimit  tria et quatuor scelera Damasci, Gaze et Tiri et Idumee”? et cetera. Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod prophecia Amos prophete digne explicari non potest nisi per revelacionem divinam. Hoc eciam beatus Gregorius, super Ezechielem, omelia 15a, videtur asserere, dicens, “scriptura sacra tota quidem propter nos scripta est, sed non tota intelligitur a nobis. Multa quippe in illa ita aperte scripta sunt ut pascant parvulos, quedam vero obscurioribus sentenciis ut exerceant fortes, quatenus cum labore intellecta plus grata sint. Nonnulla autem ita in ea clausa sunt ut, dum ea non intelligimus, agnoscentes infirma nostre cecitatis, ad humilitatem magis quam ad intelligenciam proficiamus”. Ex quibus verbis habetur aperte quod aliqua sunt in scripturis sacris que intelligere non valemus; loquitur enim beatus Gregorius in persona omnium viatorum, et forcium qui obscuriores noverunt elucidare sentencias. Constat quod per revelacionem quecumque scripta sunt possunt intelligi et eorum potest primus intellectus haberi. Idem eciam Gregorius, pro se et pro omnibus aliis catholicis, 3o libro Moralium c. 17o, loquens de amicis Iob, ait, “Utrum continuis septem diebus et septem noctibus cum afflicto Iob sederint, an certe diebus septem et noctibus totidem instancia ei crebre visitacionis adhererent, ignoramus. Sepe enim rem quamlibet tot diebus agere dicimur, quamvis non eisdem diebus ad eam continue vacemus. Sepe vero scriptura sacra sic totum pro parte sicut pro toto partem ponere consuevit”. Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod, cum scriptor libri Iob determinate intenderit loqui de septem diebus et septem noctibus continuis vel non continuis, quia de hiis vel de illis scriptura illa fuerit vera et non de utrisque, sequitur quod nos ad primum intellectum verborum illorum determinate non possumus pervenire.

Also, the psalmist says (119:34), "Give me understanding" etc, as though to say, "Unless you reveal it, I will not be able to arrive at the primary understanding of many things in your law by examination. Give me, therefore, the primary understanding of those things." For there are many things decreed in the old law for which no reason can be given by a man why God commanded them to the children of Israel, such as (Deut.22:10-1), "You shall not plough with an ox and a donkey. You shall not wear clothes made of wool and linen woven together", and similar things. And consequently the primary understanding of such things contained in the law can not be had without revelation. Hence, in chapter seven of his Prologue to the bible, Jerome says, "For who expresses appropriately the three or four transgressions of Damascus, Gaza, Tyre and Edom?" etc. We gather from these words that the prophecy of the prophet Amos can only be explained appropriately by divine revelation. Blessed Gregory in his fifteenth homily on Ezechiel seems to assert this too when he says, "The whole of sacred scripture was indeed written for our sake, but not all of it is understood by us. To be sure many things in it have been written so clearly that they feed children, some in more obscure statements to exercise the vigorous, since things understood with effort are more pleasing. Some things in it, however, are so concealed that while we do not understand them, knowing the infirmities of our blindness, we make progress more in humility than in intelligence." We clearly conclude from these words that there are some things in the sacred scriptures which we can not understand. For blessed Gregory is speaking in the person of all pilgrims and of the vigorous who know how to cast light on more obscure sentences. It is certain that by revelation whatever has been written can be understood and the primary understanding of it can be had. Speaking about the friends of Job in chapter 17 of book 3 of his Moralia [[PL 75, col. 610]], the same Gregory says on his own behalf and on behalf of all other catholics, "Whether they sat continuously for seven days and seven nights with the afflicted Job, or indeed for seven days and same number of nights were devoted to him in the perseverance of their constant visiting, we do not know. For often we are said to do something for so many days even if we are not continually occupied in it for that many days. Indeed sacred scripture has often been accustomed in this way to put the whole for the part and the part for the whole." We gather from these words that since the writer of Job intended to speak specifically of seven days and nights that were either continuous or not continuous, because that scripture is true of one or the other but not of both, it follows that we can not arrive definitely at the primary understanding of those words.

CAP. XVIII

Discipulus: Nolo plures allegaciones audire pro assercione prescripta, sed cupio scire quomodo respondetur ad allegaciones in contrarium superius c. 15o inductas. Ideo narra aliquas responsiones ad ipsas.

Chapter 18

Student: I do not want to hear further arguments for the afore-mentioned assertion, but I do want to know how one can reply to the arguments to the contrary brought forward in chapter 15 above. Would you, therefore, relate some replies to them.

Magister: Ad primam, que consistit in hoc, quod talia essent superflue posita in scripturis divinis si primus intellectus ipsorum (antequam essent impleta) absque revelacione divina haberi non posset, respondetur quod non superflue posita sunt, quia scripta sunt ad exercitacionem, quia in talibus verbis multiplices latent sensus preter primum sensum revelantis, quos dum illi qui in exponendis scripturis divinis allegorice [et] tropologice delectant ex huiusmodi enigmatice revelatis eliciunt, utiliter occupantur, quemadmodum beatus Gregorius in Moralibus sibi profecit et aliis verba beati Iob diversimode exponendo, et tamen ad illum intellectum quem habuit Iob in pluribus verbis absque revelacione (nisi forte a casu) non potuit pervenire. Verba enim plura Iob modis innumeris a beato Gregorio et aliis poterant exponi, quibus tamen modis beatus Gregorius ipsa nequaquam exposuit. Et ita verba Iob plures sensus possunt habere preter illum quem habuit Iob. Quis ergo scit si beatus Gregorius sensum quem actualiter in mente Iob habuit in proferendo verba illa expressit? Non videtur quod ipsemet beatus Gregorius hoc scivit, et ideo forte aliquando beatus Gregorius ad illum sensum quem actualiter Iob intendebat verba Iob exposuit et tamen ipse hoc nescivit. Sic eciam verba Iohannis in Apocalypsi et aliorum prophetarum multos sensus possunt habere, teste beato Ieronimo, qui in prologo biblie ait: “In verbis singulis”, scilicet Apocalypsis, “multiplices latent intelligencie”. Sed quem intellectum habuit beatus Iohannes in eis vel Christus revelans, hoc nullus exponens Apocalypsin certitudinaliter scit, nisi cui deus revelavit.

Master: To the first, which consists in this, that such things would have been put in the divine scriptures unnecessarily if, before they were fulfilled, the primary understanding of them could not be had without divine revelation, the reply is that they have not been put in unnecessarily because they have been written for exercise, in that numerous senses besides the primary sense of the person revealing it lie hidden in such words. While those who delight in expounding the divine scriptures allegorically and tropologically draw these [senses] out of things revealed thus enigmatically, they are being usefully occupied, just as blessed Gregory profited himself and others by expounding the words of Job in different ways in his Moralia; and yet, unless perhaps by chance, without revelation he could not have arrived at the understanding Job had of many words. For many words of Job were able to be expounded by blessed Gregory and others in countless ways, yet blessed Gregory did not expound them in those ways. And so Job's words can have more senses than the sense that Job himself had. Who knows, therefore, whether blessed Gregory expressed the sense which Job actually had in mind in uttering those words? It does not seem that blessed Gregory himself knew this. And perhaps, therefore, blessed Gregory did sometimes expound the words of Job according to that sense which Job himself actually intended, yet without knowing this himself. So too the words of John in Apocalypse and of other prophets can have many senses, as blessed Jerome attests when he says in his Prologue to the Bible, "In each of the words", that is, in Apocalypse, "numerous understandings lie hidden" [PL 28, col. 177]. But, unless God has revealed it to him, no one expounding Apocalypse knows with certainty what understanding blessed John had or Christ had in making this revelation.

Discipulus: Contra istud obici potest, quia verba scripture divine eodem Spiritu, scilicet Spiritu sancto, exposita sunt quo sunt scripta. Ergo eundem sensum quem habuit revelans habuerunt et exponentes. Quare exponentes verba divine scripture ad primum intellectum ipsorum pervenerunt.

Student: Against that it can be objected that the words of divine scripture have been expounded by the same spirit, that is the Holy Spirit, by which they were written [cf. above]. Those expounding it, therefore, have had the same sense which the one revealing it had. For this reason those expounding the words of divine scripture have arrived at the primary understanding of them.

Amplius, omnes sensus catholici eorundem verborum sunt eque primi, quia non est racio quod unus sit primus magis quam alius. Sed omnes sensus secundum quos beatus Gregorius exposuit verba queque Iob sunt catholici. Ergo quilibet eorum est eque primus, et ita beatus Gregorius pervenit ad primum intellectum omnium verborum Iob. Et consimili racione alii sancti exponentes Apocalypsin et alias prophecias atque queque obscura scripture divine ad primum intellectum pervenerunt.

Further, all catholic senses of the same words are equally primary, because there is no reason that one is more primary than another. But all the senses according to which blessed Gregory expounded every word of Job are catholic. Anyone of them at all, therefore, is equally primary. And so Blessed Gregory arrived at a primary understanding of all the words of Job. And, by similar reasoning, other saints expounding Apocalypse and other prophecies and whatever is obscure in divine scripture arrived at a primary understanding [of them].

Magister: Ad primum istorum respondetur quod, quia omne verbum est a Spiritu sancto et “omnis sapiencia a domino deo est”, ut legitur Ecclesiastici 1o, ideo scripture divine, quando non erronee exponuntur, aliquo modo eodem Spiritu exponuntur quo sunt tradite; tamen quando fuerunt tradite, a solo deo fuerunt, et nequaquam virtute ingenii humani invente fuerunt. Exposiciones autem non erronee sanctorum, saltem sepe, virtute ingenii humani, assistente divina influencia generali, ex scripturis et racione infallibili fuerunt invente. Ideo non omnino eodem modo verba scripture divine eodem Spiritu sancto sunt scripta et a viris sanctis exposita. Propter quod exposiciones sanctorum non sunt tante auctoritatis quante sunt illa que scripta sunt in scripturis canonicis. 

Master: The reply to the first of these is that because every word is from the Holy Spirit and "all wisdom is from the Lord God", as we read in Ecclesiasticus 1:1, then, when the divine scriptures are not erroneously expounded, they are expounded in some way by the same Spirit as that by which they were handed down. Yet when they were handed down they were from God alone, and were not invented by force of human wit. But expositions of the saints which are not erroneous have been, often at least, invented by force of human wit, from the scriptures and by infallible argument, with the general assistance of the divine influence. Therefore the words of divine scripture were written by the Holy Spirit and expounded by holy men by the same Holy Spirit, but not in altogether the same way. For this reason the expositions of the saints are not of such great authority as things written in the canonical scriptures.

Si tamen exposiciones huiusmodi eciam per certitudinem primum exprimerent intellectum verborum scripture divine, eiusdem essent auctoritatis, non quia ab expositoribus sunt expresse, sed quia in canone biblie reperiuntur.

If, however, such expositions also were to express with certainty the primary understanding of the words of divine scripture, they would be of the same authority -- not because they have been expressed by those expositors but because they are found in the canon of the bible.

Sic eciam, si plures, puta 10 vel 20, magistri, lectores vel predicatores verbi dei, aut alii, hiis temporibus sacras literas exponentes, eandem auctoritatem enigmaticam et obscuram in Apocalypsi vel prophecia alia scriptam secundum diversum  [[secundum diversum: cf. in diversum, Oxford Latin Dictionary, "diversus", 4b; cf. Seneca, De ira, III.21.3, Livy XXXVI.x.7]] exponerent intellectum non erroneum sed verum et sanum, posset aliquo modo concedi quod quilibet istorum eodem Spiritu eandem auctoritatem exponeret, quia omnis sensus verus et sanus est a Spiritu sancto, a quo inspirati locuti sunt scriptores literarum sanctarum; [non tamen] eodem modo esset quelibet exposicionum huiusmodi a Spiritu sancto quo ab ipso scripture divine sunt tradite.


So also if many, say 10 or 20, masters, lectors or preachers of the word of God, or others expounding sacred literature in these times, were to expound the same enigmatic and obscure text written in Apocalypse or another prophecy according to a [variety of] different understanding[s], not erroneous but true and sound, it could be granted in some way that each of them would be expounding that text by the same Spirit [as that by which it was written], because every true and sound sense is from the Holy Spirit, who inspired the writers of sacred literature; however, each of these expositions would not be from the Holy Spirit in the same way as the divine scriptures were handed down by Him.

Si eciam quilibet sensuum predictorum inveniretur sentencialiter in biblia, quamvis unus eorum in uno loco et alius in alio, quilibet eorum esset tante auctoritatis quante sunt alia que scripta sunt in biblia, non quia ab aliquo istorum exprimitur, sed quia sentencialiter in biblia reperitur; et tamen non omnis, immo forte nullus, talium sensuum esset primus intellectus et verus illius textus quem tales exponentes exponerent. 

Also if any of those senses were found in its substance in the bible, even if one of them was in one place and another in another, each of them would be as authoritative as other things written in the Bible, not because it is expressed by any of them [i.e., expositors] but because it is found in its substance in the bible. Not every such sense, however, indeed perhaps none of them, would be the primary and true understanding of that text which such expositors were expounding.

Si autem nullus istorum reperiretur sentencialiter, nec implicite nec explicite, in canone biblie, tamen quilibet illorum esset verus et sanus; certum esset quod nullus esset primus sensus auctoritatis exposite a quolibet istorum, vel hoc non constaret, et tamen quilibet illorum esset aliquo modo a Spiritu sancto, cum omnis doctrina sana et que secundum pietatem est sit aliquo modo a Spiritu sancto.
.

If, however, none of them [those true and sound senses] was found in its substance, neither implicitly nor explicitly, in the canon of the Bible, each of them, nevertheless, would be [ex hypothesi] true and sound. Certainly none would be the primary sense of the text expounded by any of them, or it would not be certain that it was, and yet each would in some way be from the Holy Spirit, since every sound doctrine in accord with piety is in some way from the Holy Spirit.

Ad secundum dicitur quod primus intellectus verborum scripture divine quantum ad illa que a solo deo revelata fuerunt est ille propter quem fuerunt principaliter revelata: sicut illorum verborum que angelus dixit Danieli vel beato Iohanni vel aliis prophetis, et que eciam in propheciis inspirata fuerunt, et que Christus dixit discipulis suis, primus sensus est ille propter quem inspirata vel prolata fuerunt. Unde primus sensus parabolarum Christi est ille quem Christus postea discipulis suis expressit, quia propter illum principaliter protulit eas; et tamen multos alios sensus possunt habere.

To the second, it is said that the primary understanding of the words of divine scripture, with respect to those matters that have been revealed by God alone, is that [understanding] for the sake of which they were principally revealed, just as the primary sense of those words which the angel said to Daniel or to blessed John or to other prophets, and also those which were inspired in the prophecies, and which Christ said to the disciples, is that [sense] on account of which they were inspired or uttered. Thus the primary sense of the parables of Christ is that which Christ afterwards expressed to his disciples, because he uttered them chiefly on that account; and yet they can have many other senses.

Quantum autem ad illa verba scripture divine que homines, sive boni sive mali, dixerunt, primus intellectus est ille quem in mente habuit ille qui protulit, sicut primus intellectus probleumatis Sampsonis fuit ille quem actualiter cogitavit. Quod tamen probleuma sub eisdem verbis potuisset, et adhuc posset, alius proponere et alium intellectum habere, qui intellectus esset primus intellectus eiusdem proferentis. Et ita alius esset intellectus probleumatis Sampsonis in quantum prolatum fuit ab ipso, et alius esset intellectus eorundem verborum si alius eadem verba sub alio intellectu proferret: quemadmodum istorum verborum non variatorum, “Rex precepit fures suspendi”, alius communiter est intellectus primus eorum qui proferunt ea in Francia, et illorum qui proferunt ea vel scribunt in Anglia, et illorum qui proferunt ipsa in Castella, quia Franci communiter intelligunt ipsa de rege Francie, Anglici de rege Anglie, et alii de rege Castelle, et audientes ipsa in diversis regnis diversum ex eis capiunt intellectum. Si autem eadem verba proferuntur in civitate vel patria que, secundum veritatem vel secundum opinionem hominum, nulli regi est subiecta, audiens ipsa ex ipsis verbis precise ad primum intellectum proferentis pervenire non posset, quia non posset scire an intelligeret de rege Castelle vel alio, propter hoc quod ista verba proferens potest intelligere de uno rege vel de alio secundum quod sue fuerit placitum voluntati, cuius voluntas ab alio sciri non potest nisi deus vel ipsemet sibi voluerit revelare. Et si duo vel plures proferant verba predicta et de diversis regibus ipsa intelligant, alius erit intellectus primus istorum verborum inquantum proferuntur ab uno et inquantum proferuntur ab alio.


With respect to those words of divine scripture, however, which men, either good or bad, have uttered, the primary understanding is that which he who uttered it had in mind, just as the primary understanding of Samson's puzzle was that which he actually had in mind. Someone else, however, could have, and still could, set forth this puzzle in the same words and have another understanding [of it]. This understanding would be the primary understanding of the one uttering it, and so there would be another understanding of Samson's puzzle, in as much as it was uttered by that person, and there would be another understanding of the same words if someone else were to utter the same words under another understanding, just as there is of the unchanging words, "The king has commanded that thieves be hanged". Commonly there is one primary understanding of those who utter them in France, another of those who utter or write them in England, another of those who utter them in Castille, because the French commonly mean them of the king of France, the English of the king of England, and the others of the king of Castille, and those who hear them in different kingdoms take a different understanding from them. If the same words are uttered, however, in a city or country which, in truth or in the opinion of men, was not subject to any king, the one hearing them could not from the words themselves alone arrive at the primary understanding of the one uttering them, because he could not know whether he was referring to the king of Castille or some other, because the speaker of those words can refer to one king or another according as it pleases his will. This will can not be known by anyone else unless God or he himself wishes to reveal it to that other person. And if two or more people utter those words and mean them of different kings, the primary meanings of those words as they are uttered by one and by the other will be different.

CAP. XIX

Discipulus: Adhuc dupliciter obiciam contra predicta. Non enim videtur bene dictum quod beatus Gregorius non pervenerit ad primum intellectum verborum beati Iob, quia de multis verbis Iob que non debent ad literam sed mistice dumtaxat intelligi — sicut de illis, “Pereat dies in qua natus sum”, et de multis aliis — asserit manifeste quod Iob ipsa intellexit sicut ipse exponit, quod non fecisset nisi scivisset illum fuisse primum intellectum Iob, quia secundum predicta ille est primus intellectus verborum alicuius quem proferens actu habet in mente.

Chapter 19

Student: I will object in two ways again to the foregoing. For it does not seem well said that blessed Gregory did not arrive at the primary understanding of the words of blessed Job, because he clearly asserts of many of the words of Job which should not be understood literally but only mystically (such as, "Let the day perish on which I was born" (Job 3:3), and many others) that Job understood them just as he [Gregory] expounds them. He would not have done this if he had not known that that was Job's primary understanding because, according to the above, the primary understanding of anyone's words is that which the speaker actually has in mind.

Rursus, secundum predicta multa essent verba in scriptura divina que — quamvis legi possint et debeant ad edificacionem plebis et convertendo ipsa in sensus morales et alios qui ab eis ab ingeniosis hominibus accipi valent, quemadmodum fabule poetarum et aliorum fingencium bruta fuisse locuta et multa tractasse, atque alie, utiliter applicari possunt ad mores informandos — tamen ad auctoritatem ecclesiasticorum dogmatum confirmandam, et ad roboranda illa que in contencionem veniunt et ad firmandam fidem in re dubia essent nullatenus alleganda, cum primus intellectus ipsorum haberi non possit, et alii intellectus eorum authentici minime sint putandi nisi per alias scripturas vel asserciones que refelli non debeant valeant demonstrari. Cuius tamen contrarium sanctos patres fecisse cognovimus. Augustinus enim ad Bonifacium, et habetur 23a, q. 6a, c. Scismatici, per “vias et sepes”, de quibus loquitur Christus Luce 14o, intelligit hereses et scismata, volens per eadem verba probare quod heretici et scismatici intrare ecclesiam sunt cogendi. Et tamen per vias et sepes ita possunt intelligi alia crimina sicut hereses et scismata; unde et alii criminosi sunt per severitatem ecclesiasticam coercendi. Nec habetur quod Christus ibi per vias et sepes intellexerit hereses et scismata. Innocencius eciam tercius, ut habetur Extra, De maioritate et obediencia, Solite, et alii plures, per illa verba dicta Ieremie, 1o, “Ecce constitui te hodie super gentes et super regna”, probant quod imperium sacerdocio est subiectum, et tamen quod illa verba Ieremie, 1o, de papa respectu imperii debeant intelligi nequaquam revelatum est a deo.

Again, from the above there would be many words in divine scripture which -- although they can and should be read so as to build up the people, for example by turning them to the moral and other senses which can be taken from them by ingenious men, just as the stories of poets and others who represent brute beasts as having spoken and discussed many things, and other stories, can usefully be applied to the shaping of morals, nevertheless -- should not be brought forward to strengthen the authority of ecclesiastical teachings, to bolster those matters that come into contention and to strengthen the faith in any doubtful matter, since their primary understanding can not be had and other understandings of them should not be thought authentic unless they can be demonstrated from other writings or assertions which should not be rejected. Yet we have learnt that the holy fathers did the opposite of this. For Augustine writing to Boniface, as we read in 23, q. 6, c. Scismatici [c.1, col.947], understands the highways and hedgerows of which Christ speaks in Luke 14:23 to mean heresies and schisms, wanting to prove by these words that heretics and schismatics should be forced to enter the church. And yet by highways and hedgerows other crimes can be understood as well as heresies and schisms; thus also other guilty men should be restrained by ecclesiastical strictness. Nor is it established that Christ by highways and hedgerows there meant heresies and schisms. Also, Innocent III, as we read in Extra, De maioritate et obedientia, c. Solitae [c.6, col.196], and many other [writers] prove through the words of Jeremiah 1:10, "See, today I appoint you over nations and over kingdoms", that the empire is subject to the priesthood, and yet it has not been revealed by God that those words of Jeremiah 1:10 ought to be understood of the pope with respect to the emperor.

Magister: Ad primum istorum respondent quidam dicentes quod quemadmodum literatus quidam in libro quem de prestigiis fortune composuit sepe tali exposicione et modo loquendi usus est, “contigit”, id est contingere potuit, “quandoque eveniet”, id est si quando evenire contigerit, sic eciam beatus Gregorius, cum sepe sentencialiter dixit “Iob dixit”, “intellexit” vel “dicere voluit”, nichil aliud dicere intendebat nisi quod Iob sic intelligere potuit, sed quod actualiter Iob sic intellexerit non intendebat asserere. Et ad hoc designandum sepe tali modo utitur beatus Gregorius, “Aliter possint verba Iob intelligi”, per hoc insinuans quod sepe non intendebat asserere cum dixit “Sic intellexit Iob” quod tunc Iob in mente talem habuit intellectum, sed quod talem habere poterat intellectum. Sic eciam multi predicantes et exponentes sacras scripturas de diversis sanctis viris et feminis vel alia determinata materia tali modo loquendi utuntur, “De hoc sancto prophetavit vel locutus est Isaias” vel Ieremias vel alius propheta aut alius scriptor alicuius partis scripture canonice, et tamen, si recte sapiunt, non intendunt quia tunc propheta vel alius in mente de tali sancto vel materia loqui volebat, sed quod intelligere poterat aut quod de tali materia talia verba possunt intelligi. Et ad hoc designandum intelligentes frequenter talibus verbis utuntur, “Talia verba scripture divine de hoc vel de hoc possunt exponi”.

Master: To the first of these some people reply by saying that just as a certain scholar in the book which he composed On the Deceptions of Fortune often used the following discourse and way of speaking: "it happened", that is, it could have happened, "at some time it will result", that is, if ever it happens to result, so also, when (as he often did) blessed Gregory said in substance, "Job said, meant or wanted to say", he was intending to say merely that Job could have meant this; he was not intending to assert that Job actually did mean this. And to indicate this, blessed Gregory often uses this way [of speaking]: "In another way the words of Job could be be understood...", by this insinuating that when he (Gregory) said, "Job meant the following", he was often not intending to assert that at that time Job had such a meaning in mind but that he could have had such a meaning. In the same way too, many who preach and expound the sacred scriptures as they refer to different holy men and women or some other definite matter use the following way of speaking, "Isaiah" (or Jeremiah or another prophet or another writer of some part of canonical scripture) "said or prophesied about this holy man", yet if they are thinking rightly, they do not mean that the prophet or other person was at that time wanting to speak in his mind about the saint or matter, but that he could have meant it or that such words can be understood about such a matter. And those meaning to indicate this frequently use the following words, "These words of divine scripture can be expounded" about this or that.

Discipulus: Possuntne adduci aliqua exempla ex scripturis pro tali modo loquendi?

Student: Can some examples of such a way of speaking be adduced from the scriptures?

Magister: Videtur quibusdam quod sic. Unde Exodi 8o dicitur de magis Pharaonis, “Feceruntque similiter malefici incantacionibus suis, ut educerent sciniphes”, id est facere conati fuerunt. In Iob eciam dicitur, “Quis restitit” deo, id est resistere voluit, “et pacem habuit?” Si enim “restitit” ponitur pro “resistere voluit” et “fecerunt” ponitur pro “facere conati” fuerunt, videtur quod “intellexit” possit poni pro “intelligere potuit”.

Master: It seems to some people that the answer is "yes". So, speaking about Pharaoh's magicians, Exodus 8:18 says, "The magicians likewise by their incantations worked to bring forth gnats", that is, they tried to work it. Job 9:4 too says, "Who has resisted God", that is has wanted to resist, "and had peace?" For if "has resisted" is put for "has wanted to resist" and "worked" for "tried to work" it seems that "meant" can be put for "could have meant".

Discipulus: Dic quomodo respondetur ad secundam obieccionem quam adduxi.

Student: Tell me how reply is made to the second objection that I brought forward.

Magister: Nonnulli concedunt quod verba scripture de quorum primo intellectu per certitudinem non constat adduci ad probandum per illa sola que in contencionem veniunt <aliorum> non debent. Ad manuducendum tamen, et ad persuadendum vel aliquo modo declarandum aliquid de quo est contencio, sub aliquo sensu sano non erroneo adduci possunt, quemadmodum ad persuadendum aliquo modo articulos fidei et eciam ea que per solam revelacionem possunt cognosci raciones et argumenta a sanctis et aliis adducuntur, que tamen ad probandum huiusmodi sufficienter allegari non debent. Et ideo, quemadmodum sancti similitudines et naturales raciones assumunt ad declarandum quomodo tres persone sunt unus deus, et quomodo corpus Christi vere est in sacramento altaris, et similia, sic eciam sanctus Augustinus per verba Salvatoris de viis et sepibus voluit declarare quod heretici et scismatici intrare ecclesiam sunt cogendi. Si tamen de hoc esset apparens contencio, per illam solam auctoritatem Christi sufficienter probari non posset. Sic eciam per verba divina dicta Ieremie, ut allegatum est supra, declarari potest quod imperium est aliquo modo indignius sacerdocio et summo pontificatu, quod tamen per verba illa ostendi non posset nisi aliunde constaret, quemadmodum per quasque similitudines et raciones naturales a sancto Augustino et aliis quibusque adductas sufficienter declarari non posset quod tres persone sunt unus deus, eciam apud Christianos, nisi per alium modum certitudinem ipsius acciperent. Propter quod, ut quidam putant, per illa verba Ieremie non potest ostendi quod imperium est a papa vel quod imperator aut alius rex quicumque est vasallus pape, nec aliquid aliud, nisi quod per alias vias potest sufficienter ostendi. 

Master: Some people grant that words of scripture whose primary meaning is not established with certainty should not be brought forward to prove through them alone matters which come into contention. They can be brought forward, nevertheless, under some sound, not erroneous sense, to lead someone by the hand or to persuade them or to make clear in some way something about which there is dispute, just as reasons and arguments from the saints and from others are brought forward to persuade (someone) in some way of the articles of faith and even of those things that can be known by revelation alone, and yet these should not be brought forward as sufficient proof of matters of this kind. And therefore, just as holy men adopt similes and natural reasons to make it clear how three persons are one God and how the body of Christ truly is in the sacrament of the altar and the like, so too holy Augustine wanted to make clear through the words of the saviour about the highways and hedgerows that heretics and schismatics should be forced to enter the church. Yet if there were a clear dispute about this, it could not be proved adequately solely by that text of Christ. Thus also it can be shown through the divine words said to Jeremiah, as quoted above, that the empire is in some way less worthy than the priesthood and the highest pontificate, yet that could not be shown by those words unless it were established from another source, just as it could not adequately be made clear even to christians by any similes and natural reasons adduced from Saint Augustine and any others at all that three persons are one God, unless they were to accept its certainty through some other means. For this reason some people think that it can not be shown by those words of Jeremiah that the empire is from the pope or that the emperor or any other king at all is a vassal of the pope or anything else at all except what can be shown adequately in other ways. 

Sic generaliter aliqui arbitrantur quod per nullum sensum misticum cuiuscumque auctoritatis scripture divine potest aliquid sufficienter ostendi nisi constet quod idem sensus misticus est primus intellectus scribentis aut revelantis vel docentis, vel nisi alibi in scriptura sacra tamquam sensus primus sentencialiter habeatur, aut per viam aliam manifestam irrefragabiliter possit ostendi. Ex quo videtur posse concludi quod de stulta temeritate excusari non possint qui per solos sensus misticos scripture divine, quos nec ex aliis locis scripture possunt argumento evidenti inferre, nec per racionem irrefragabilem possunt concludere, nec per certam et specialem ac miraculosam revelacionem certificati sunt de ipsis, aliqua futura contingencia audent predicere, vel quando futura evenient que absque determinacione temporis in sacris literis sunt predicta asserere non formidant, vel queque alia non metuunt affirmare que per aliam viam indubiam et apertam manifestare non possunt. Cuilibet enim tali videtur Iohannes Apocalypsis ultimo comminari cum dicit, “Si quis apposuerit ad hec, apponet deus super illum plagas”. Cui Salomon videtur alludere cum ait, Proverbiorum 30o, “Ne addas quidquam verbis illius, et arguaris inveniarisque mendax”. Tales enim, temerarii et pravitati heretice propinqui, credentes se ad omnium contentorum in scripturis sacris primum posse pertingere intellectum, minime imitantur humilitatem beati Augustini, qui, quamvis fuerit in scripturis supra alios eruditus, fatetur se non omnia intelligere que in scripturis diligentissime legit. 
Thus some people think as a general rule that nothing can be shown adequately through any mystical sense of any text at all of divine scripture unless it is established that that very mystical sense is the primary meaning of the one writing, revealing or teaching it, or unless it is found in substance elsewhere in sacred scripture as the primary sense, or it can be shown inviolably in some other clear way. It seems possible to conclude from this that they can not be absolved of foolish rashness who, from mystical senses of divine scripture alone, which they can not infer by evident argument from other places in scripture and can not demonstrate by inviolable argument and have not been assured of them by certain, particular and miraculous revelation, dare to predict any future contingents, or are not afraid to affirm when future events will come about which have been predicted in sacred literature without a specification of time, or do not fear to assert any other things which they can not show clearly by another undoubted and obvious way. For John seems to threaten any such person when he says in the last chapter of Apocalypse (22:18), "If anyone adds to these, God will add plagues to that person." Solomon also seems to allude to such a person when he says in Proverbs 30:6, "Do not add anything to his words, or else he will rebuke you and you will be found a liar." For such rash men, near to heretical wickedness, believing themselves able to arrive at the primary meaning of everything contained in the sacred scriptures, do not imitate the humility of the blessed Augustine who, although he was learned in the scriptures above other men, admits that he does not understand everything which he reads most carefully in the scriptures. 
Unde pertractans, 20o De civitate dei, verba beati Pauli Apostoli 2a ad Thessalonicenses 2o, ubi dicitur, “Et nunc quid detineat scitis, ut reveletur in suo tempore” et cetera, ait: “Quid autem ait, ‘Et nunc quid detineat scitis’, id est quid sit in mora, que causa sit dilacionis eius, ‘ut reveletur in suo tempore’, scitis: quoniam hoc scire illos dixit, aperte hoc dicere noluit. Et ideo nos, qui nescimus quod illi sciebant, pervenire cum labore ad id quod sensit Apostolus, cupimus, non valemus; presertim quia et illa que addidit hunc sensum faciunt obscuriorem. Nam quid est, ‘Iam enim mysterium iniquitatis operatur. Tantum qui modo tenet teneat, donec de medio fiat; et tunc revelabitur iniquus’? Ego prorsus quid dixerit me fateor ignorare”. Quod in epistola ad Ieronimum, et habetur dist. 9a, c. Ego solis, insinuare videtur dicens, “Si aliquid in eis”, scilicet scripturis canonicis, “offendero quod videatur contrarium veritati, nichil aliud <existimo> quam mendosum esse codicem, vel non esse assecutum interpretem quod dictum est, vel me minime intellexisse, non ambigam”. For this reason, when in chapter 20 of The City of God [[Loeb vol.6, 358-60]] he treats the words of the blessed apostle Paul in 2 Thess. 2:6, "And you know what is now restraining him, so that he may be revealed when his time comes" etc, he says: "You know what he says, 'And you know what is now restraining him' -- that is, what delay or cause of delay there is, 'so that he may be revealed when his time comes': since he said that they knew this, he would not say it openly. And therefore we, who do not know what they knew, are eager but unable to arrive, even with an effort, at what the Apostle meant, especially because what he added makes this meaning more obscure. For what is (2 Thess. 2:7-8), 'For the mystery of lawlessness is already at work; only let him who now holds him, hold until he is taken out of the way and then the lawless one will be revealed'? I confess myself completely ignorant of what he has said." He seems to imply this in his letter to Jerome, as we read in dist. 9, c. Ego solis [c.5, col.17], where he says, "If I meet with anything in them", that is the canonical scriptures, "that seems contrary to the truth, I do not doubt that the codex is faulty or that the translator has not followed what was said or that I have not understood it."

Discipulus: Verba predicta de apponentibus et addentibus aliqua contraria verbis scripture divine debent intelligi, non de apponentibus et addentibus que ex aliis locis scripture nequeant extrahi evidenter. Aliter enim sancti patres quamplura verba scripture mistice exponendo graviter deliquissent. Immo videtur quod per verba Salvatoris possit ostendi quod verba huius[modi] scripture aliter quam per revelacionem miraculosam possint intelligi, cum ait discipulis suis, Matthei 24o, “Cum videritis abominacionem desolacionis, que dicta est a Daniele propheta, stantem in loco sancto: qui legit, intelligat”. Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod Christus insinuavit aperte intellectum primum prophetie Danielis de qua ibi fit mencio aliter quam per revelacionem miraculosam posse haberi.

Student: The remarks above should be understood of those adding things opposed to the words of divine scripture, not of those adding things which can not be clearly extracted from other places of Scripture. For otherwise the holy fathers would have transgressed seriously in expounding mystically very many words of scripture. Indeed it seems that it can be shown by the words of the saviour that the words of this Scripture can be understood otherwise than by [i.e. without needing] miraculous revelation. For he says to his disciples in Matt. 24:15, "When you see the abomination of desolation standing in the holy place, as was spoken of by the prophet Daniel: let the reader understand." We gather from these words that Christ clearly implied that the primary understanding of the prophecy of Daniel mentioned there can be had otherwise than by miraculous revelation.

Magister: Ad hoc respondetur quod quadrupliciter potest aliquid addi scripturis divinis. Quia potest addi aliquod falsum; potest eciam eis apponi verum, non tamen tamquam primus intellectus scripture; potest eciam eis addi verum tamquam primus intellectus ipsarum possibilis haberi ex sola meditacione scripturarum, supposita influencia divina; potest eciam eis addi verum tamquam primus intellectus haberi possibilis per revelacionem vel per alicuius facti novi exhibicionem apertam.

Master: The reply to this is that something can be added to the divine scriptures in four ways. Something false can be added. Also something true, yet not as the primary meaning of the scripture, can be added to them. Also something true can be added to them as their primary meaning able to be obtained solely from meditation on the scriptures, assuming divine influence. Something true can also be added to them as the primary meaning able to be obtained by revelation or the clear showing of some new fact.

Qui primo modo aliquid apponit vel addit scripturis divinis quandoque pertinax hereticus est censendus, quandoque vero errans solummodo, est putandus, secundum diversitatem falsi quod additur et eciam secundum varietatem adhesionis addentis.

Anyone who adds something to the divine scriptures in the first way should sometimes be considered a pertinacious heretic but sometimes should only be thought of as in error, according to difference in the falsity added and also according to the difference in adherence of the one adding it.

Si vero apponatur eis aliquod verum quod non est primus intellectus scripture, non tamquam primus intellectus sed solummodo tamquam verum, nequaquam scripture contrarium sed tamquam edificans ad salutem vel aliquo modo ad declaracionem catholice veritatis, laudabiliter addi potest, et sic sancti veritates plurimas sacris literis addiderunt.

Now if something true which is not the primary meaning of the scripture is added to them, not as the primary meaning but only as something true which is not opposed to scripture but which builds salvation or in some way makes catholic truth clear, it can be added in a praiseworthy way; and in this way the saints have added many truths to sacred literature.

Tercio modo potest addi aliquid scripturis tamquam primus intellectus possibilis haberi ex meditacione scripturarum. Et si vere sic potest haberi, laudabiliter addi potest, quia sic addere non est aliud quam dicere explicite et aperte quod scriptura dicit implicite et latenter. Si autem talis intellectus vere ex scripturis haberi non potest et tamen apponitur tamquam primus intellectus, falso apponitur et aliquando apponens tantummodo errans, aliquando hereticus est censendus. Asserere enim pertinaciter aliquod verum esse primum intellectum scripture divine qui non est, sapit heresim manifestam, quia, quamvis verum quod apponitur non sit falsum nec contrarium catholice veritati, tamen assercio qua dicitur esse primus intellectus scripture est erronea atque falsa.

Something can be added to the scriptures in the third way, as the primary meaning able to be obtained from meditation on the scriptures. And if it can truly be obtained in this way, it can be added to them in a praiseworthy way, because to add something in this way is only to say explicitly and openly what the scripture says implicitly and in a hidden way. If such an understanding can not truly be obtained from the scriptures, however, and yet is added as the primary meaning, it is added falsely; and the one adding it should be considered sometimes as only in error and sometimes as a heretic. For to affirm pertinaciously something true as the primary meaning of divine scripture when it is not, is to suggest manifest heresy; because although the true thing that is added is not false or opposed to catholic truth, yet the affirmation that it is the primary meaning of the scripture is erroneous and false.

Quarto modo potest aliquid addi scripturis tamquam primus intellectus dummodo habeatur per revelacionem vel per exhibicionem apertam novi facti, ut sancti apostoli per revelacionem novam plurium parabolarum Christi a Christo exponente ipsas acceperunt primum intellectum. Sic eciam discipuli videndo statuam Cesaris poni in templo poterant accipere primum intellectum prophecie Danielis. Sic eciam discipuli, ut habetur Iohannis 2o, videntes Christum resurrexisse a mortuis, ceperunt intellectum illorum verborum Christi, “Solvite templum hoc, et in tribus diebus excitabo illud”. Post hec enim verba ibidem subiungitur, “Ille autem dicebat de templo corporis sui. Cum ergo resurrexisset a mortuis, recordati sunt discipuli eius quia hoc dicebat, et crediderunt scripture et sermoni quem dixit Iesus”.

Something can be added to the scriptures in a fourth way as the primary meaning as long as it is obtained by revelation or by the clear showing of a new fact, just as by a new revelation the holy apostles received the primary meaning of many parables of Christ though Christ expounding them. In this way too, when the disciples saw the statue of Caesar being put in the temple they were able to arrive at the primary understanding of Daniel's prophecy (Matt. 24:15). In the same way, when the disciples saw that Christ had risen from the dead they grasped the meaning of those words of his which we read in John 2:19, "Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up." For after these words is added (John 2:21-2), "But he was speaking of the temple of his body. After he was raised from the dead, therefore, his disciples remembered that he said this and they believed the scripture and the word that Jesus spoke."

CAP. XX

Discipulus: Ut expediamus nos de ista materia, narra quomodo respondetur ad secundam obieccionem quam c. 15o induxi.

Chapter 20

Student: So that we may free ourselves from this matter tell me what reply is made to the second objection I introduced in chapter 15.

Magister: Respondetur ad ipsam quod, sicut scriptura sacra, et in locis planis et aliis obscurioribus (quorum tamen primus virtute ingenii humani potest accipi intellectus), pie legentibus fructuosa existit, licet aliis occasio sit errandi (unde et communiter omnes heretici hereses suas in scripturis divinis fundare conati sunt), sic eciam illa quorum primus intellectus absque revelacione haberi non potest salubria sunt et utilia legentibus ea non ad capiendum primum intellectum ipsorum sed ad humilitatem et alios sensus misticos capiendos, licet periculosa et mortifera sunt superbis atque stultis, qui alciora se querunt et temere investigant que minime apprehendere valent.

Master: The reply to it is that just as, both in those places that are clear and in others that are more obscure, yet of which the primary meaning can be arrived at by force of human wit, sacred scripture is profitable for those who read it piously, though it is an occasion of erring for others (which is why all heretics have generally tried to base their heresies on the divine scriptures), so also those matters of which the primary meaning can not be had without revelation are beneficial and useful for those reading them--- not with the purpose of grasping their primary meaning but for humility and the purpose of grasping their other mystic senses, though they are dangerous and deadly to the proud and foolish who inquire into matters that are above them [Cf. Ecclesiasticus 3:22] and rashly investigate what they can not understand.

CAP. XXI

Discipulus: Quia opinio supra 1o c. huius tercii recitata, quamvis concedat quod scripturis canonicis et determinacionibus generalium conciliorum sit certa credulitas adhibenda, tamen hoc generaliter negat de scripturis aliis quibuscumque, ideo videamus an illa sit consona veritati. Primo autem pone opinionem cum motivis eiusdem.

Chapter 21

Student: Although the opinion recited above in chapter one of this third [book] grants that sure belief should be offered to the canonical scriptures and the decisions of general councils, yet it denies this generally of any other writings at all. Let us see, therefore, whether that is in accord with the truth. Now first set down that opinion with the arguments for it.

OPINION 1 again: Why other writings besides the Bible and councils are not authoritative.

Magister: Opinio predicta ponitur et probatur in hec verba:
Quod autem scripturis aliis, que scilicet humano spiritu revelate sunt et tradite, nemo certam credulitatem aut veritatis confessionem prebere teneatur, apparet. Quoniam nulli scripture falsum signare potenti tenetur quis firmiter credere aut ipsam tamquam veram simpliciter confiteri. Hoc autem paciuntur scripture innitentes humane invencioni singularis persone aut collegii parcialis. Possunt enim a veritate deficere, ut experiencia palam, et habetur in Psalmo 115o, “Ego autem dixi in excessu meo: omnis homo mendax”. Scripture vero canonice non sic, quia non sunt ab humana invencione, sed immediata dei tradite inspiracione, qui non potest falli nec fallere vult. 

Master: It is put and proved in the following words. Now that no one is bound to offer sure belief or a confession of truth to other writings, that is those which have been revealed and handed down by the human spirit, is clear, since no one is bound to believe firmly or acknowledge as simply true any writing that is capable of expressing falsehood. This can be true, however, of writings that rely on human invention by a single person or partial group. For they can be wanting in truth, as is clear from experience. We also read  in Psalm 116:11, "I said in my excess: 'Everyone is a liar'". The canonical scriptures, however, are not like this, because they are not passed on by human invention but by the immediate inspiration of God, who can not be deceived and does not want to deceive.

Hanc autem sentenciam et differenciam humanarum et divinarum scripturarum aperte confirmat Augustinus, 13a epistolarum ad Ieronimum, cum dixit, “Ego enim fateor caritati tue, solum omnium scripturarum libris que iam canonice appellantur didici hunc honorem timoremque deferre, ut nullum earum auctorem scribendo aliquid errasse firmissime credam. Ac si aliquid in eis offeratur literis quod videatur contrarium veritati, nichil aliud quam vel mendosum esse codicem vel interpretem non assecutum esse quod dictum est vel me minime intellexisse non ambigam. Alios autem ita lego ut, quantacumque sanctitate doctrinaque prepolleant, non ideo verum putem quia ipsi ita senserunt, sed quia michi vel per illos auctores canonicos vel probabili racione quod a vero non aberret persuadere potuerunt”. Hoc idem replicat et admonet in prologo 3ii De Trinitate, cum dixit, “Noli”, lector scilicet, “meis literis quasi scripturis canonicis inservire; sed in illis et quod non credis, cum inveneris, incunctanter crede. In istis autem quod certum non habeas, nisi certum intellexeris, noli firmiter tenere”. Idem quoque dixit in epistola ad Fortunacianum et aliis plerisque libris. Id quoque videtur sensisse Ieronimus in Exposicione Catholice Fidei cum dixit, “Novum et vetus testamentum recipimus in eo librorum numero quem sancte catholice ecclesie tradidit auctoritas”.

This opinion and the difference between human and divine writings is clearly confirmed by Augustine in the thirteenth of his letters to Jerome [[PL.33, col.277]] where he said, "I confess to your charity that I have learnt to offer only to the books of all those writings that are now called canonical this honour and fear, so that I most firmly believe that no author of these has erred in writing anything. And if I meet with anything in these writings that seems opposed to the truth, I do not doubt that it is only that the codex is faulty, or the translator has not followed what was said, or I have not understood it. I read others authors in such a way, however, that no matter how distinguished they are in learning and holiness I do not thereby think something true because they have thought it so, but because they have been able to persuade me, either by those authors who are canonical or by probable reasoning, that it does not wander from the truth." Augustine repeats this advice in the prologue of his book De Trinitate [[PL 42, col. 869]] where he said, "Do not", reader, "be submissive to my writings as to canonical scriptures. But in the latter believe unhesitatingly even what you do not believe when you came across it. In the former do not firmly hold to what you did not consider certain unless you understand it as certain." He also said the same thing in his letter to Fortunatianus and in many other books. Jerome seems to have thought the same in his exposition of the catholic faith when he said, "We accept the new and old testament in that number of books which the authority of the holy catholic church has handed down."

Augustinus ergo scripturas proprias a canonicis separavit; nec ipse, qui tante fuit sanctitatis, auctoritatis et sciencie, suas tradiciones canonicas appellare presumpsit. Hoc enim impium est et sacrilegii modus quidam, quoniam in humana tradicione dicta vel scripta error et falsum contingere potest, quod in canone secundum veritatem dicto aut eiusmodi, quam per generale concilium canonice scripture interpretacionem factam diximus, nullatenus evenire contingit.

Augustine, therefore, distinguished his own writings from those that are canonical and did not presume, despite his great holiness, authority, and knowledge, to call his own teachings canonical. For to do so would be impious and, in a certain way, sacrilege since with things said or written on the basis of human teaching error and falsity can occur. It is not possible for this to happen in the canon, truly so called, or in such an interpretation of canonical scripture as we have said to have been made by a general council.

Propter quod eciam ex concilio Carthaginensi 3o prohibitum reperitur racionabiliter valde, ne sub nomine harum, canonicarum scilicet, alie quevis scripture legantur. Unde legitur ibidem, et in Isidori codice continetur series hec: “Item placuit ut preter scripturas canonicas nichil in ecclesia legatur sub nomine divinarum scripturarum. Sunt autem canonice scripture: Genesis” et cetere que de volumine biblie numerantur ibidem.

For this reason we also find it very reasonably prohibited by the third Council of Carthage that any other writings be read under the name of these canonical writings. So we read in the same place, and the following passage is also contained in the codex of Isidore, "It is decreed that nothing besides the canonical scriptures be read in church under the name of divine scriptures. The canonical scriptures, however, are Genesis" and the others which are listed there from the volume of the Bible. [For all the above, see Marsilius, Defensor pacis, II.xix.4-7]

CAP. XXII

Discipulus: Primo contra istam assercionem nitere allegare.

Chapter 22

Student: First of all try to argue against that assertion.

Objections against the rejection of all other writings

Magister: Nonnullis apparet quod ex ipsa possint plures absurditates inferri, quarum prima est quod ex quo scriptores scripture canonice de hoc seculo migraverunt, nullorum mortalium scripturis credulitas est prebenda, et ita nulli mortales essent ad ferendum testimonium admittendi in quocumque casu. Quante autem et quot absurditates ex ista sequuntur nullus sane mentis ignorat. Quod autem ista absurditas ex assercione prescripta sequatur manifestum apparet, nam quorum scripturis quibuscumque non est prestanda certa credulitas, ipsorum in verbis minime est credendum, quia qui potest falsum asserere in scripto, in solo verbo falsum asserere potest.

Master: It appears to some people that many absurdities can be inferred from it. The first of these is that because the writers of canonical scripture have departed this world, belief should not be shown in the writings of any who are alive, and so no one who is alive should be allowed to bear witness in any case at all. No one of sound mind does not know how many great absurdities follow from this. It seems clear, however, that this absurdity follows from the above assertion. For if we should not give sure belief to any of their writings, we should not believe their words, because anyone who can make a false assertion in writing can make a false assertion in word alone.

Secunda absurditas: quod nulli historie, nulli legende cuiuscumque sancti, nullis gestis de summis pontificibus, aliis clericis, imperatoribus, regibus et aliis hominibus, fidelibus vel infidelibus, que non in scripturis canonicis sed in aliis scripturis habentur est credendum. Ex quo ulterius concludetur quod dubitare licet an (preter episcopos, imperatores et reges in quibuscumque partibus orbis terrarum de quibus in scriptura divina et conciliis generalibus fit mencio, et preter illos quos scimus nunc et vidimus presidere) umquam fuerint alii quemcumque fidelem vel infidelem populum gubernantes; vel saltem dubitare de quolibet in speciali non erit illicitum, cum de aliquibus ipsorum validiori testimonio quam per scripturam non canonicam constare non possit. Sequitur eciam quod nulli esset illicitum credere quod, postquam scripta est scriptura canonica, deus nullum fecit miraculum quod ipse non vidit vel non cognoverit per se ipsum, quia forciori testimonio quam per scripturas sanctorum patrum, que tamen non sunt canonice, sibi liquere non potest. Ex quo concluditur ulterius quod dubitare licet an quicumque canonizati per Romanam ecclesiam sint legitime propter vitam et miracula cathalogo sanctorum adscripti, quia potissime de hoc liquet per legendas ipsorum.

A second absurdity is that we should not believe any history, any legend of any saint at all, any deeds of the highest pontiffs, other clerics, emperors, kings and other men whether of the faith or not which are found not in the canonical scriptures but in other writings. From this it will be concluded further that it is permissible to doubt whether, except for the bishops, emperors and kings in all parts of the world mentioned in the divine scriptures or by general councils and those whom we know now or have seen to be in command, there have ever been others ruling any people whether of the faith or not, or at least it will not be impermissible to have such doubt of any such one in particular, since nothing can be known about any of them by any stronger testimony than writing which is not canonical. It follows also that anyone is permitted to believe that since the canonical scripture was written, God has not done any miracle that he has not seen himself or known directly, because it can not be clear to him by any stronger testimony than by the writings of the holy fathers, which are, however, not canonical. From this it is concluded further that it is permissible to doubt whether any one at all canonised by the Roman church has been enrolled in the catalogue of saints legitimately on account of his life and miracles, because this is a matter which is clear chiefly through their "legends".

Alia absurditas sequitur, quod videlicet libris antiquis, instrumentis productis ex archivis publicis, et scripturis que facte sunt calumpniis et aliis quibuscumque que non reperiuntur in biblia, fides esset nullatenus adhibenda, cuius contrarium in sacris canonibus et legibus imperialibus reperitur expresse. Ex hac enim absurditate infertur aperte quod per huiusmodi libros, instrumenta et scripturas numquam esset ferenda sentencia, quia per illas scripturas quibus non est adhibenda fides sentencia ferri non debet, sicut nec est ferenda sentencia per testes quibus credere non oportet.

Another absurdity which follows is that no trust should be extended to ancient books, to documents produced from public archives, to writings made for the purpose of accusations and to any others at all which are not found in the Bible. The opposite of this is found expressly in sacred canons and imperial laws. For from this absurdity we clearly infer that judgement should never be made on the basis of books, documents and writings of this kind, because judgement ought not be made on the basis of writings to which trust should not be extended, just as judgement should not be made on the basis of witnesses whom it is not appropriate to believe.

CAP. XXIII

Discipulus: Iste allegaciones contra prescriptam assercionem ad presens sufficiant. Nunc dic quomodo respondetur ad motiva eius.

Chapter 23

Student: Let those arguments against that assertion be enough for the moment. Tell me now how reply is made to the reasons in support of it.

Answers to the arguments in favour of Opinion 1: How to use writings that may contain errors.

Magister:  Ad primum, cum dicitur quod nulli scripture falsum significare potenti tenetur quis firmiter credere aut ipsam tamquam veram simpliciter confiteri, respondetur quod si ista proposicio intelligeretur de scriptura <vel de scriptore> posset concedi aliquo modo, quia scripture false, presertim postquam constiterit quod ipsa est falsa, adhibere fidem non debet hoc sciens. Sed multe sunt scripture non canonice que hoc minime paciuntur, nec quod hoc paciantur per experienciam constare potest. Multe enim sunt scripture non solum sanctorum patrum sed infidelium philosophorum et aliorum, immo et hereticorum, in quibus nullum falsum poterit reperiri. Quamvis enim heretici in quibusdam scripturis erraverint, quidam tamen eorum in quibusdam aliis nullatenus erraverunt. Unde et Origines, licet (ut fertur) turpissime erraverit, sicut recitat beatus Augustinus, 11o De civitate dei, tamen in multis scripturis eius nullus error apparet. Et ideo multis scripturis infidelium licet adhibere fidem.

Master: To the first when it is said that no one is bound firmly to believe or acknowledge as simply true any writing capable of expressing a falsehood, the reply is that [this proposition can be understood of the writing or of the writer:] if it were understood of a writing, the proposition could be granted in some way, because no one who knows that some writing is wrong should extend trust to it, especially after it has been established that it is wrong. But this is not true of many writings which are not canonical,  nor can this be established by experience. For there are many writings not only of the holy fathers but of philosophers outside the faith and of others, even of heretics, in which no falsehood can be found. For although heretics have erred in some of their writings, some of them, nevertheless, have not erred in certain others. Thus, although it is said that Origen erred most wickedly, as blessed Augustine records in book 11 of The City of God [[ch. 23; Loeb, pp. 515-21]], yet in many of his writings no error appears. It is permitted, therefore, to extend trust to many writings of those outside the faith.

Sed si intelligatur de scriptore — ut videlicet quamvis alicui scripture alicuius non scriptoris scripture canonice adhibenda sit fides, non quia a tali scriptore est scripta, sed quia per scripturas canonicas aut per racionem naturalem potest ostendi quia nullam contineat falsitatem, tamen ipsi scriptori potenti falsum asserere seu significare non tenetur quis firmiter credere, et ideo scripturam eius non est necesse tamquam veram simpliciter confiteri nisi possit aperte probari quod est consona scripturis canonicis vel racioni evidenti naturali — maiorem apparenciam habere videtur. Et tamen sic intellecta a veritate aliena videtur.

But if it is understood of a writer -- that is, that even if trust should be extended to some writing by someone who is not a writer of canonical scripture, not because it has been written by this writer but because it can be shown by the canonical scriptures or by natural reason that it contains no falsity, yet no one is bound firmly to believe that writer who is capable of asserting or expressing a falsehood, and therefore it is not necessary to acknowledge his writing as simply true unless it can be clearly proved that it agrees with the canonical scriptures or evident natural reason -- it seems to have greater plausibility. And yet understood in this way it seems inconsistent with the truth.

Kinds of presumptions, kinds of assertions

Ad cuius declaracionem dicitur esse sciendum quod, sicut secundum iura canonica et alia, alia est presumpcio in cuius contrarium est aliqua probacio admittenda, et alia in cuius contrarium nulla probacio est admittenda, ita potest aliquis alii homini vel assercioni credere et ipsam confiteri tamquam veram dupliciter, quia vel credulitate tam certa ut nullam velit in contrarium probacionem admittere vel audire, aut credulitate firma non tamen tam certa quin reputet quod sit probacio in contrarium audienda, si quis fide dignus offerat se contrarium probaturum.

It is said that to make this clear it should be known that just as, according to canonical and other laws, there is a [kind of] presumption in opposition to which some proof should be allowed and another [kind of] presumption in opposition to which no proof should be allowed, so someone can believe and admit as true some person or assertion in two ways, either with such certain belief that he will not admit or hear any proof to the contrary, or with firm belief yet not so certain that he does not reckon that proof to the contrary should be listened to if someone worthy of belief offers to prove the contrary.

Primo modo nulli scriptori cuiuscumque scripture non canonice in omnibus dictis aut scriptis eius est credendum. Alicui tamen assercioni eius taliter credere licet et oportet in quatuor casibus: puta, si assercio eius patenter et aperte per scripturas canonicas, per assercionem universalis ecclesie, per racionem naturalem evidentem (presertim consonam catholice fidei vel bonis moribus), aut per apertum miraculum possit ostendi.

No writer of any writing at all that is not canonical should be believed in the first way in everything he says or writes. It is permissible, however, to believe some assertion of his in this way, and it is appropriate in four cases; for example, if his assertion can be clearly and plainly shown by canonical scriptures, by the assertion of the universal church, by evident natural reason, especially in agreement with catholic faith or good morals, or by a clear miracle.

Secundo modo pluribus aliis quam scriptoribus scripture canonice in multis aliis quam in predictis quatuor casibus est credendum, quia summis pontificibus, conciliis generalibus, et aliis sanctis episcopis et doctoribus atque fide dignis viris et ab ecclesia probatis, quantum ad ea que facti sunt — que videlicet per se ipsos vel per alios fide dignos quibus credere tenebantur potuerunt cognoscere. Et peccat qui eis non credit, quia reverenciam quam deus tantis viris adhibuit denegare presumit; qui enim eis et huiusmodi non crederet dubitaret an scienter in huiusmodi mentirentur, et ita sine causa ipsos non crederet esse veraces. In huiusmodi ergo credendum est eis. Propter quod non solum per testes sed eciam per libros antiquos et instrumenta que de falsitate convinci non possunt et per scripturas antiquorum licite iudex fert sentenciam, et peccaret si non ferret.

We should believe in the second way many other writers than those of canonical scripture and in many other cases than in the above four -- for example, supreme pontiffs, general councils and other holy bishops and doctors and men worthy of belief and approved by the church -- with respect to matters of fact, that is, those matters which they could have known by themselves or through other men worthy of belief whom they would be bound to believe. He who does not believe these sins, because he presumes to deny the reverence that God has offered to such great men. For he who would not believe them and men of this kind would doubt whether they might lie knowingly in matters of this kind, and so without any reason he would not believe that they are truthful. In matters of this kind, therefore, they should be believed. For this reason a judge can legitimately make a judgement -- and would sin if he were not to do so -- not only on the basis of witnesses but also on the basis of ancient books, of documents which can not be convicted of falsity, and of the writings of the ancients.

 Quantum autem ad illa que pure sunt sciencie et non facti, scripturis sanctorum patrum et auctorum ac consiliorum est reverencia exhibenda, quia doctrina eorum minime est spernenda sed sollicite attendenda et cum diligencia audienda, presertim cum de aliquo pertinente ad fidem vel mores queritur veritas de quo in scripturis suis tradiderunt quod senserunt; et qui doctrinam eorum (cum posset) negligeret legere, si erraret de temeritate plectibili esset merito arguendus, quia, contra preceptum Salomonis, prudencie seu pericie proprie convinceretur inniti. Doctrina insuper eorundem, si in aliqua sui parte videatur contraria veritati, pie et sane exponenda est, si potest, et ad verum intellectum trahenda. Et quamvis ad sanum intellectum trahi non possit, non sunt statim de heretica pravitate notandi, licet errantes debeant reputari.

With respect to matters purely of [theoretical] knowledge and not of fact, however, reverence should be shown to the writings of holy fathers and authors and of councils, because their teaching should not be rejected but should be carefully attended to and listened to with attentiveness, especially when the truth is being sought about some matter pertaining to faith or morals about which they have handed down in their writings what they thought, and anyone who was to neglect to read their teaching when he could read it would deservedly be accused of punishable rashness if he were to err, because he would be convicted of relying, against the instruction of Solomon [Proverbs 3:5], on his own discretion or knowledge. Moreover if any part of their teaching seems opposed to the truth it should be expounded piously and soundly if it can be, and should be led towards a true meaning. And even if it can not be led to a sound meaning they should not be censured immediately for heretical wickedness, although they ought to be regarded as erring.

Nonnullis apparet tamen quod, quantum ad decretales et constituciones ac diffiniciones sollempnes summorum pontificum et aliorum episcoporum ac generalium provincialium et episcopalium conciliorum, et eciam capitulorum et collegiorum quorumcumque, intendencium alios ad suam assercionem firmiter defensandam cogere et artare, et quantum ad alias scripturas eorundem et aliorum, est discrecio facienda. Quia si in primis scripturis invenitur aliquid catholice veritati contrarium, statim auctores eorum sunt heretici reputandi, quia de pertinacia ex hoc ipso quod cogunt alios suo errori pertinaciter adherere possunt manifeste convinci. Si in aliis error aliquis reperitur cuius contrarium tenens vel scribens eundem errorem non tenetur explicite credere, non est statim auctor huiusmodi scripture erronee hereticus iudicandus, sed est de pravitate heretica excusandus, nisi per alios modos, de quibus multa diximus in prima parte istius dialogi, libro 4o, de pertinacia convinci valeat apertissimis documentis.

It seems to some people, however, that a distinction should be made with respect to (1) the decrees, constitutions and solemn definitions of the highest pontiffs, of other bishops, of general, provincial and episcopal councils and even of chapters and any colleges at all which intend to compel and constrain others to defend firmly their own assertion and (2) with respect to other writings of these same people and of others. Because if something opposed to catholic truth is found in (1) the former writings, the authors of it should immediately be regarded as heretics, since they can clearly be convicted of pertinacity from the fact that they compel others pertinaciously to cling to their error. If in (2) the other writings some error is found the opposite of which the one holding or writing that error is not explicitly bound to believe, the author of such an erroneous writing should not immediately be judged heretical, but should be excused of heretical wickedness unless by the plainest evidence he can be convicted of pertinacity in other ways, many of which we have spoken about in book 4 of the first part of this Dialogue.

Porro licet viri huiusmodi venerabiles in aliquo aperte convincantur errare, et ideo liceat eis qui de hoc sunt certi ipsos quantum ad hoc negare et improbare, in aliis tamen quibuscumque de quibus non est certum ipsos errare presumendum est pro dictis eorum, ita ut absque temeritate culpari non possint, neque in genere neque in specie, et quanto plures virorum huiusmodi in aliqua sentencia concordaverint tanto magis presumendum est pro eadem, non tamen sic quin in contrarium valeat audiri probacio. 

Moreover, even if venerable men like this are clearly convicted of erring in something, so that those who are certain of this are permitted to reject them in respect of this matter and to condemn them, yet in any other matters concerning which it is not certain that they err, presumption should be made in favour of what they say, so that they can not be blamed without rashness either in general or in particular, and the more many such men have agreed on some opinion the more should there be a presumption in favour of it, yet not so that a proof to the contrary can not be listened to.

Et quamvis in hiis que pure sunt sciencie seu pericie presumendum sit pro huiusmodi scripturis ipsorum, tamen forcius presumendum est pro scripturis eorundem quantum ad illa que facti sunt, quia forcius presumendum est ipsos nolle mentiri quam per raciocinaciones non esse deceptos. Et ideo in hiis que facti sunt, presertim de hiis que per se ipsos se insinuant cognoscere, tenetur quilibet credere ipsis, nisi per fide digniores de contrario certus existat.

And although there should be a presumption in favour of writings by such men on matters purely of [theoretical] knowledge or skill, yet there should be even a stronger presumption in favour of their writings on matters of fact, because there should be a stronger presumption that they do not want to lie than that they are not deceived by reasoning. In matters of fact, therefore, especially those which they imply that they know directly, everyone is bound to believe them, unless, through those more worthy of belief, he is certain of the contrary.

Discipulus: Contra predicta obici potest, quia non est necesse credere alicui testimonio per quod infallibilis certitudo haberi non potest. Sed per humanum testimonium non potest haberi infallibilis certitudo, eciam cum de aliquo testimonium perhibet multitudo, teste Moyse, immo deo per Moysen, Exodi 23o, qui ait, “Non sequeris turbam ad faciendum malum, nec in iudicio plurimorum acquiesces sentencie, ut a vero devies”. Ergo non est necesse credere humano testimonio cuicumque, et per consequens non est necesse credere quibuscumque scripturis illorum quorum testimonium est humanum tantummodo reputandum, cuiusmodi sunt scriptores omnes preter illos qui scripturas scripsere divinas.

Student: An objection can be raised against the foregoing, because it is not necessary to believe any testimony by which infallible certainty can not be had. But infallible certainty can not be had by human testimony, even when a multitude presents its testimony about some matter, as Moses - or rather, God through Moses - attests when he says in Exodus 23:2, "You shall not follow a majority in wrongdoing; when you bear witness in a lawsuit, you shall not side with the majority so as to deviate from truth." It is not necessary, therefore, to believe any human testimony at all, and, as a consequence, it is not necessary to believe any of the writings of those whose testimony is to be regarded as only human. All writers except those who wrote the divine scriptures are of this kind.

Magister: Ad hoc respondetur quod sepe necesse est credere testimonio quamvis per ipsum infallibilis certitudo haberi non possit, saltem credulitate illa contra quam, non obstante quod dubitacione careat, debeat aut possit admitti probacio. Alioquin in nullo negocio quibuscumque testibus qui non sunt confirmati in gracia universali ecclesie esset credendum. Quare propter testimonium huiusmodi numquam esset a iudice contra aliquem ferenda sentencia. Sepe igitur testimonio fide dignorum omni excepcione maiorum, qui reprobari aut convinci de falsitate non possunt, est credendum, quamvis per ipsum certitudo infallibilis haberi non possit. In huiusmodi enim sufficit certitudo possibilis et sufficiens quamvis non sit infallibilis. 

Master: The reply to this is that often it is necessary to believe testimony even if infallible certainty can not be had by it, with that belief at least against which proof can or should be admitted even though the belief is not doubted. Otherwise the universal church should in no matter believe any witnesses who have not been confirmed in grace; a judge should therefore never pass sentence against anyone on the basis of such testimony. Often, therefore, one must believe the testimony of men worthy of belief, rising above every objection, who can not be condemned for or convicted of falsity, even if infallible certainty can not be had through their testimony. For in matters of this kind possible [probable?] and sufficient certainty, even if it is not infallible, is enough.

Cum autem accipitur quod per testimonium humanum certitudo infallibilis haberi non potest, respondetur quod quamvis per humanum testimonium precise, excluso omni testimonio speciali divino, infallibilis certitudo haberi non possit, tamen concurrente divino testimonio per humanum testimonium certitudo infallibilis potest haberi, et nonnumquam per divinum testimonium possumus esse certi quod humanum testimonium debet infallibile reputari. Si enim humanum testimonium per divinum miraculum approbetur, de infallibilitate eius debemus esse certi. De quo eciam infallibiliter possumus esse certi si ab universali ecclesia, presertim in hiis que sunt necessaria ad salutem, fuerit approbatum, propter promissionem Christi, ex qua colligitur quod Christus numquam deficiet ecclesie in hiis que sunt necessaria ad salutem.

And when it is taken [as a premise], that infallible certainty can not be had by human testimony, the reply is that even though infallible certainty can not be had from human testimony by itself, all special divine testimony being excluded, yet infallible certainty can be had from human testimony when divine testimony concurs with it, and sometimes we can be certain by divine testimony that human testimony ought to be regarded as infallible. For if human testimony is confirmed by a divine miracle we should be certain of its infallibility. We can be infallibly certain of this too if it has been confirmed by the universal church, especially in connection with those matters that are necessary to salvation, because of Christ's promise [Matthew 28:20], from which we gather that Christ will never fail the church in those matters that are necessary for salvation.

CAP. XXIV

Discipulus: Sufficiant ista ad presens de allegacione prescripta. Ideo dic qualiter ad auctoritates sequentes opinio memorata respondet.

Chapter 24

Student: Let that be enough for the moment about that argument. Tell me now, therefore, how that opinion responds to the texts that follow.

Magister: Quantum ad auctoritates Augustini et Ieronimi, primo respondet quoad hominem, dicens quod contrarium opinantes ipsos nequaquam allegare deberent, cum teneant quod non est necesse credere aliis scripturis quam canonicis que in biblia continentur. Quare vel frustra predictas auctoritates allegant, vel opinionem propriam facto negant, cum allegando Augustinum et Ieronimum pro opinione sua firmanda facto ostendant quod auctoritatibus Augustini et Ieronimi, qui non fuerunt scriptores alicuius partis biblie, est credendum.

Master: As to the texts from Augustine and Jerome it first replies ad hominem, saying that those who hold the opposite opinion should not bring them forward, since they [who hold the opposite opinion] maintain that it is not necessary to believe writings other than the canonical ones contained in the bible. Either they bring those texts forward in vain, therefore, or in doing so they deny their own opinion, since in bringing forward Augustine and Jerome to strengthen their own opinion they disclose by their act that we ought to believe texts of Augustine and Jerome, who were not writers of any part of the bible.

Ad rem autem respondet dicens primo ad auctoritatem Augustini ad Ieronimum quod intencio Augustini ibidem est quod universaliter, absque omni excepcione, solis scriptoribus biblie ille timor deferatur et honor ut, eo ipso quod ibi aliquid invenitur, credatur, absque omni probacione in contrarium audienda, esse verum. Alii autem multi ita legendi sunt ut quamvis in multis, precipue in hiis que facti sunt, debeant esse creditum, tamen non in omnibus que facti sunt vel sciencie seu pericie eo ipso debeat aliquid reputari verum tam certitudinaliter quod nulla probacio in contrarium possit admitti quia ipsi ita senserunt, cum errare potuerunt, licet non semper erraverunt et aliqui eorum in nulla scriptura aliquod falsum protulerunt assertive. Et ideo asserciones eorum in hiis que sunt sciencie seu pericie nec sunt taliter necessario recipiende a legentibus nisi <easdem> — vel per scripturas sacras vel per irrefragabilem racionem vel approbacionem universalis ecclesie vel per operacionem miraculi — possint ostendere quod sint consone veritati. In hiis autem que facti sunt que asserunt vel per se ipsos vel fide dignorum relacione legitima cognovisse, ipsis tamquam fide dignis est credendum, nisi per alios credibiliores possit contrarium probari (quia in huiusmodi non est inconveniens quod plus credatur uni quam alteri, quemadmodum secundum quosdam in historiis et translacionibus plus credendum est Ieronimo quam Augustino).

Ad rem [in contrast with ad hominem] it says first, with respect to the text of Augustine to Jerome, that Augustine's intention there is that this fear and honour should be offered universally and without any exception only to writers of the Bible, so that from the fact that something is found there it should be believed to be true and no proof to the contrary should be listened to. Many others should be read, however, in such a way that, although in many things, especially matters of fact, they should be believed, nevertheless it is not the case that in all matters of fact or [theoretical] knowledge or skill something should, from the very fact that they have thought thus, be regarded as true so certainly that no contrary proof can be admitted, since they were able to err, though they did not always err and some of them did not in any writing put forward assertively anything false. And their assertions in matters of [theoretical] knowledge and skill, therefore, should not necessarily be accepted by readers in this way unless they can show -- by the sacred scriptures, by unshakeable reason, by the confirmation of the universal church, or by the operation of a miracle -- that these assertions are in agreement with the truth. In matters of fact, however, which they assert that they have learnt either directly or from a legitimate report from those worthy of trust, they should be believed as worthy of trust, unless the contrary could be proved by others who are more believable (because it is not inappropriate in matters of this kind that one person be believed more than another, just as some people say that in matters of history and translation Jerome should be believed more than Augustine).

 Verumptamen dicitur, sicut tactum est supra, quod pro assercionibus omnibus doctorum approbatorum ab ecclesia presumendum est quousque de contrario constet, quemadmodum presumitur pro assercione iudicis et eciam multitudinis antequam constiterit contrarium. Notatur autem quod Augustinus in auctoritate illa, loquens de scriptoribus aliis a scriptoribus canonis biblie, inter hos scriptores et illos non distinguit. Et ideo sive fuerint summi pontifices sive alii, sive scripserint aliquid in concilio generali sive extra, consimile de eis iudicium est habendum, ut in hiis que sciencie sunt vel iuris non ideo aliquid putetur certitudinaliter modo predicto esse verum quia ipsi ita scripserunt, nisi id aliquo predictorum modorum — scilicet per scripturas canonicas vel raciones irrefragabiles aut operacionem miraculi aut per approbacionem universalis ecclesie — persuadere valuerint.

It is said, however, as was alluded to above, that there should be a presumption in favour of all the assertions of doctors approved by the church until the contrary is established, just as there is a presumption in favour of the assertion of a judge, and even of a multitude, before the opposite has been established. It is noted, however, that in that text, speaking of writers other than the writers of the canon of the bible, Augustine does not distinguish between different categories of writers. And, therefore, whether they were highest pontiffs or others, whether they wrote something in a general council or outside it, the same judgement should be made about them, so that in matters of [theoretical] knowledge or law something should not therefore be thought certainly true in the aforesaid way because they have written it, unless they have been able to make it persuasive in some of the aforesaid ways -- that is, by the canonical scriptures, by unshakeable arguments, by the operation of a miracle or by the confirmation of the universal church.

Consimiliter ad aliam auctoritatem Augustini dicitur quod scripture sue non sunt tante auctoritatis quante sunt divine. Cum hoc tamen stat quod in quibusdam sit ei credendum et quod non est negandus nisi ab illo qui certus est ipsum a veritate recedere.

To the other text of Augustine it is said in a similar way that his writings are not of such great authority as are divine writings. Nevertheless it is consistent with this that he should be believed in certain matters and that he should not be rejected except by someone certain that he is departing from the truth.

Et eodem modo dicitur ad auctoritatem Ieronimi quod solum novum et vetus testamentum recipi debent inter scripturas canonicas, et tamen pluribus scripturis aliis quoad multa est credendum et in multis negari non debent.

And in the same way it is said in response to the text from Jerome that only the new and old testaments should be accepted as canonical writings, and yet many other writings should be believed on many matters and ought not be rejected in many cases.

Et eodem modo respondetur ad concilium Carthaginense, quod ipsum solummodo prohibet, preter scripturas canonicas que sunt Genesis et cetere que de biblia numerantur, alias legi “sub nomine divinarum scripturarum”, cum quo stat quod legende sunt et quod alicuius auctoritatis sunt, ita ut quoad multa negari non debeant et in multis sit credendum eisdem.

A similar reply is made to the council of Carthage, that it only forbids other writings, besides the canonical scriptures which are Genesis and the others that are reckoned as in the bible, being read "under the name of divine scriptures", with which it is consistent that they (the others) should be read and that they should be of some authority, so that in many matters they should not be rejected and in many they should be believed.

CAP. XXV

Discipulus: Nunc secundum prescriptam opinionem supra c. 4o recitatam narra quomodo respondetur ad illa que supra 2o c. ostenduntur, quod decretis et decretalibus summorum pontificum et canonibus apostolorum, qui in biblia non habentur, et dictis doctorum ab ecclesia approbatorum est fides absque dubitacione aliqua adhibenda.

Chapter 25

Student: Tell me now how reply is made, according to that opinion set down in chapter four above, to the things shown in Chapter two above, that trust without any doubt should be offered to the decrees and decretals of the highest pontiffs, to the canons of the apostles not found in the bible, and to the sayings of doctors approved by the church.

Reply by opinion (4) to the reasons given by opinion (2) for believing the writings of apostles, popes and approved doctors

Magister: Opinio illa concedit quod canonibus apostolorum, quamvis non inserantur in biblia, est adhibenda certa credulitas, quia quamvis non sint inserti in scripturis canonicis, scriptores tamen scripturarum canonicarum fuerunt auctores earum, et ideo recipi debent cum reverencia et credulitate firma, ita ut non liceat credere quod aliquid contentum in eis sit falsum aut perversum.

Master: That opinion grants that sure belief should be offered to the canons of the apostles even if they are not inserted in the bible because the writers of the canonical scriptures were the authors of them even if they have not been inserted in the canonical scriptures. And they should be received, therefore, with such reverence and firm belief that it is not permissible to believe that anything contained in them is false or perverse.

Discipulus: Licet teneamur credere quod nullus scriptorum biblie in scribendo quamcumque partem biblie errare potuerit, sicut nec potuit errare predicando vel verbis asserendo aliquid quod tunc fuit scriptum vel post fuit scribendum in quacumque parte biblie, tamen non artamur credere quod nullus eorum potuerit errare in scripturis aliis a biblia, sicut nec cogimur credere nullum eorum potuisse errare alia asserendo que non erant scripta nec scribenda in biblia. Cum ergo nequaquam credere astringamur quod semper quilibet eorum in verbis et factis tenuerit veritatem (nam et beatus Petrus princeps aliorum apostolorum aliquando ad veritatem minime ambulavit), non tenemur ergo credere quod in aliis scripturis a canone biblie numquam dimiserit veritatem.

Student: Although we are bound to believe that none of the writers of the bible could have erred in writing any part of the bible, just as they could not have erred in preaching or asserting verbally anything which was then written or was afterwards to be written in any part of the bible, yet we are not constrained to believe that none of them could have erred in writings other than the bible, just as we are not forced to believe that none of them could have erred in asserting other things which were not written nor to be written in the bible. Since we are not forced to believe, therefore, that each of them always held to the truth in his words and his deeds, for even blessed Peter, the head of the other apostles sometimes did not walk in the truth, we are as a result not bound to believe that in other writings apart from the canon of the bible they never put aside the truth.

Magister: Ad hoc respondetur dupliciter, uno modo quod quamvis quilibet apostolorum per se a veritate deviare potuerit, sicut et Petrus, tamen collegium apostolorum errare non potuit. Unde et quando Petrus erravit, nequaquam erravit collegium apostolorum, sed unus eorum, scilicet Paulus, ipsum correxit. Unde videtur quod illa promissio Christi Matthei ultimo, “Vobiscum sum usque ad consummacionem seculi”, non tantum debeat intelligi de universali ecclesia sed eciam de collegio apostolorum pro tempore eorundem, quia ipsis immediate fuit dicta promissio et in ipsis fuit facta universali ecclesie. Cum igitur canones apostolorum dicuntur fuisse tocius collegii apostolorum, videtur quod non sit dubitandum quin quicquid continetur in eis nullo modo sit falsum aut perversum. 

Master: There are two ways of replying to this. One way is that although any one of the apostles by himself could have deviated from the truth, as even Peter did, yet the college of the apostles could not have erred. So even when Peter erred, the college of apostles did not err, but one of them, namely Paul, corrected him. It seems from this that the promise of Christ in the last chapter of Matthew [28:20], "I am with you to the end of the age", should be understood not only of the universal church but also of the college of the apostles during their time, because the promise was made directly to them and in them was made to the universal church. Since, therefore, the canons of the apostles are said to have been from the whole college of the apostles, it seems that it should not be doubted that anything contained in them is in no way false or perverse.

Aliter dicitur quod canones apostolorum per universalem ecclesiam, que tunc parvi numeri fuit, approbati fuerunt. Ecclesia autem universalis errare non potest, et ideo nichil erroneum aut iniquum continetur in eis.

In another way it is said that the canons of the apostles were approved by the universal church, which at that time was small in number. The universal church, however, can not err. And, therefore, nothing erroneous or wicked is contained in them.

Discipulus: Quomodo respondetur ad allegaciones quibus ostenditur quod decretis et decretalibus summorum pontificum adhibenda est fides?

Student: How is answer made to the arguments by which it is shown that trust ought to be offered to the decrees and decretals of the highest pontiffs?

Magister: Ad illas datur responsio Graciani dist. 19a, Hoc autem, quod videlicet illis adhibenda est fides in quibus nec precedencium patrum decretis nec evangelicis preceptis aliquid contrarium invenitur. Si autem aliquid illicite et non canonice scripserint, repudiandum est ab illo qui hoc cognoscit. De illis que sunt consona veritati intelligunt Nicolaus papa et Agatho papa et alii sancti patres qui de hoc loquuntur.

Master: Gratian's reply (dist. 19, [para.] Hoc autem [c.7, col.62]) is given to them, namely that trust should be offered to those [decrees] "in which nothing is found which is contrary to the decrees of the fathers who have gone before us or to gospel precepts." If they have written anything impermissibly and not canonically, however, it should be repudiated by whoever knows this. Popes Nicholas and Agatho or other holy fathers who talk about this mean those matters which conform to the truth.

Discipulus: Quid faciendum esset de decretalibus summorum pontificum que continerent aliquid erroneum aut perversum si catholici hoc nescirent?

Student: What would have to be done about decretals of the highest pontiffs which contain something erroneous if catholics did not know this?

Magister: Pro hac materia potes recurrere ad librum septimum prime partis istius dialogi, ubi de hoc multa discussimus.

Master: For this matter you can go back to the seventh book of the first part of this Dialogue where we have discussed many aspects of this.

Discipulus: Hoc non obstante, dic breviter quid de hoc sentit opinio supra c. 4o recitata.

Student: Notwithstanding that, say briefly what the opinion cited in chapter 2 [rather, 4] above thinks about this.

Magister: Illa opinio tenet quod si aliqua decretalis summi pontificis in rei veritate est contraria fidei aut bonis moribus, illi qui hoc ignorant presumere debent pro ipsa, non tamen sic quin possint, et in casu teneantur, probacionem in contrarium admittere. Si vero aliqui, precipue literati et sciencie excellentis vel eciam mediocris, se offerant probaturos decretalem summi pontificis esse contrariam fidei vel bonis moribus aut non esse recipiendam inter scripturas authenticas, alii eorum probaciones audire tenentur, presertim si periculum fidei aut morum aut eciam personarum immineat, quia in hoc casu quilibet Christianus salutem fidei, bonorum morum et personarum catholicarum erronee decretali summi pontificis et honori temporali ipsius preferre tenetur, et quicumque commode potest audire raciones monstrantes decretalem pape esse erroneam seu hereticalem, et noluerit, si ipsam defenderit vel eciam pro ipsa presumpserit, credens et fautor pravitatis heretice est censendus, quia ignorancia talem non excusat, eo quod talis ignorancia est affectata vel crassa et supina, que non excusat.

Master: That opinion holds that if any decretal of a highest pontiff is in truth of fact contrary to faith or good morals, those who do not know this ought to make a presumption in favour of it, yet not in such a way that they can not, and in a particular case are not bound to, admit proof to the contrary. Indeed, if some people, especially those learned and excelling or even middling in knowledge, offer to prove that a decretal of a highest pontiff is contrary to the faith or to good morals or should not be accepted among authoritative writings, others are bound to listen to their proofs, especially if it threatens danger to the faith, to morals or even to persons, because in this case any christian is bound to put the salvation of faith, good morals and catholic persons before an erroneous decretal of a highest pontiff and his temporal honour, and whoever can conveniently listen to arguments showing that a decretal of a pope is erroneous or heretical and refuses to do so should be considered a believer and supporter of heretical wickedness if he defends it or even makes a presumption in its favour, because ignorance does not excuse such a person in that such ignorance is pretended or crass and supine, which does not excuse.

Discipulus: Videtur quod probaciones contra decretales summorum pontificum sunt minime audiende, quia racione consimili audiende essent probaciones contra sacram scripturam, et ita doctor vel literatus alius qui commode posset et non legeret libros hereticorum et philosophorum contra scripturam sacram peccaret, quod tamquam inconveniens est habendum.

Student: It seems that proofs against decretals of the highest pontiffs should not be listened to, because [otherwise] it would for a similar reason be appropriate to listen to proofs against sacred scripture, and in this way, a doctor or other learned man who was conveniently able to read and did not read the books of heretics and philosophers against sacred scripture would sin, which must be regarded as unsuitable.

Magister: Ad hoc respondetur quod non est simile de sacra scriptura et de decretali summi pontificis, quia firmiter est tenendum quod scriptura sacra errare non potest; ideo, nisi aliqua causa moveat specialis, non oportet legere vel audire aliquam probacionem contra ipsam, qualescumque et quotque affirment se posse probare aliquid contra eam. Sed de papa firmiter catholici — literati precipue et intelligentes ac racione vigentes — credere obligantur quod potest errare, et per consequens quod contra quamcumque scripturam ipsius, presertim in hiis que sciencie seu pericie sunt, de qua in speciali non constat quod est consona scripture sacre vel racioni evidenti vel assercioni universalis ecclesie vel per divinum miraculum confirmata, debet audiri probacio. Et ideo nolentes audire probaciones contra decretales pape cum possunt, si errant, per ignoranciam nullatenus excusantur, sed de quolibet illorum verificaretur illud Apostoli, ignorans ignorabitur.

Master: The reply to this is that sacred scripture and a decretal of the highest pontiff are not similar, because it should be firmly held that sacred scripture can not err. Unless some particular reason moves us, therefore, it is not appropriate to read or listen to any proof against it, however many people of whatever kind assert that they are able to prove something against it. But catholics, especially those who are learned and skilful and vigorous in reason, are obliged to believe firmly of the pope that he can err and, as a consequence, that proof against any writing of his should be listened to, especially in matters of [theoretical] knowledge or skill, if it is not certain specifically that it is in accord with sacred scripture or clear reason or an assertion of the universal church or has been confirmed by a divine miracle. And those refusing to listen to proofs against papal decretals when they can do so, therefore, are not excused through ignorance if they err, but to any of them the Apostle's text would apply, that he who does not know will not be known (1 Cor. 14:38].

Discipulus: Qualiter respondetur ad allegaciones quibus ostenditur quod dictis doctorum ab ecclesia approbatorum est credendum?

Student: How is answer made to the arguments by which it is shown that the sayings of doctors approved by the church should be believed?

Magister: Respondetur ad eas quod dictis doctorum ab ecclesia approbatorum taliter est credendum et presumendum pro ipsis si non constet aperte quod obviant veritati. Et ideo opuscula eorum recipienda sunt cum reverencia, non tamen sic quin liceat credere quod aliquid poterat reperiri in eis contrarium veritati, quia de facto unus contrariatur alteri et per consequens aliquis eorum erravit, quia contraria non possunt simul esse vera. Iste tamen honor deferendus est eis ut nullus credatur fuisse pertinax in assercione false sentencie, et ideo nullus eorum de pravitate heretica est notandus, sed presumendum est de quolibet quod tanta sollicitudine quanta potuit quesiverit veritatem, quamvis non semper invenerit.
 .

Master: The reply to them is that we should believe in this way and make a presumption in favour of the sayings of doctors approved by the church if it is not clearly established that they conflict with the truth. And so their small works should be accepted with reverence, yet not so that it is not permitted to believe that something could be found in them contrary to the truth, because in fact one of them is opposed to the other and consequently one of them has erred, since contraries can not be true at the same time. Such honour should be offered to them, however, that none of them should be believed to have been pertinacious in the assertion of a false opinion, and none of them, therefore, should be censured for heretical wickedness, but there should be a presumption about each of them that he has sought the truth with as much care as he could even if he has not always found it.

Ad illud quod accipitur quod assercionibus summorum pontificum, et in exposicione scripturarum sanctarum, est credendum, quibus tamen preferuntur exposiciones doctorum, respondetur quod assercionibus huiusmodi summorum pontificum credendum est modo preexposito. Et ideo eodem modo credendum est dictis doctorum ab ecclesia approbatorum.

To the point taken [as a premise] that assertions of the highest pontiffs, even in the exposition of sacred scriptures, should be believed, with the expositions of doctors preferred nonetheless, the reply is that assertions of this kind by the highest pontiffs should be believed in the way expounded before. And in the same way, therefore, should the sayings of doctors approved by the church be believed.

Ad illud autem Hormisde pape respondetur quod intelligit de illis que a sede apostolica sunt catholice constituta seu diffinita, pro quibus presumendum est nisi probacio evidens in contrarium asseratur.

To that [argument] of Pope Hormisdas, however, the reply is that he means those matters which have been established or defined by the apostolic see in conformity with catholic doctrine, in favour of which there should be a presumption unless clear proof to the contrary is asserted.

Et eodem modo dicitur ad canonem Nicolai pape.

The same response is made to the canon of Pope Nicholas.

CAP. XXVI

Discipulus: Restat secundum opinionem sepe dictam ut narres quomodo respondetur ad allegaciones inductas c. 3o, quibus ostenditur quod eciam doctoribus ab ecclesia minime approbatis, quoad ea in quibus omnes vel plures eorum et precipue magis famosi concordant, alii fidem adhibere tenentur.

Chapter 26

Student: There remains that you should explain how, according to that often mentioned opinion [i.e. of chapter 4], reply is made to the arguments brought forward in chapter three, by which it is shown that others are bound to show trust also to doctors not approved by the church, in respect of those matters in which all or most of them, and especially the most famous, agree.

OPINIONS 3 and 4: non-approved doctors

Magister: Ad primam illarum allegacionum, cum accipitur quod, teste Leone papa, non credere doctoribus est iniquum, respondetur quod intencio Leonis ibidem est quod non credere doctoribus ab ecclesia approbatis quoad ea que sunt consona pietati est iniquum, impia sapiendo. Et ideo premittit ibidem, “Quid est iniquius quam impia sapere”, et cetera. Sed non credere doctoribus qui se mutuo reprobant, eis qui non sunt ab ecclesia approbati, non est iniquum.

Master: To the first of those arguments, when it is taken [as premise] that it is wicked, as Pope Leo attests [24, q. 3, c.30, Quid autem col.998], not to believe the doctors, the reply is that Leo's meaning in that place is that not to believe doctors approved by the church in respect of things in conformity with piety is wicked, thinking impious thoughts. And that is why he puts first in that place, "What is more wrong than to think impious thoughts", etc. But not to believe those doctors who mutually condemn each other and are not approved by the church is not wicked.

Discipulus: Secundum hoc non aliter credendum est doctoribus approbatis ab ecclesia quam non approbatis, quia sicut iniquum est, impia sapiendo, non credere doctoribus ab ecclesia approbatis, ita iniquum est, impia sapiendo, non credere aliis doctoribus qui sunt ab ecclesia minime approbati. Et ita non aliter credendum est istis quam illis.

Student: It follows from this that doctors approved by the church should be believed no differently than those not approved, because, just as it is "wicked, thinking impious thoughts," not to believe doctors approved by the church, so it is "wicked, thinking impious thoughts," not to believe other doctors who have not been approved by the church. And so the one group should be believed in the same way as the other.

Magister: Respondetur quod impia sapere contingit dupliciter, scilicet impie seu pertinaciter, vel non impie et non pertinaciter, quemadmodum eciam in hiis que fidei sunt contingit errare pertinaciter et non pertinaciter, et ita contingit errare impie et non impie. Numquam autem vel raro discreditur doctoribus ab ecclesia approbatis, quando dicta eorum possunt haberi, impia sapiendo, nisi impie, quia raro, et eorum quidam in nullis penitus, erraverunt. Sed sepe contingit impia sapiendo, non impie tamen, non credere doctoribus ab ecclesia minime approbatis: cum eciam, sapiendo impia, contingat in multis non credere eis, cum in multis errent, quod ex contrarietate inter ipsos perpenditur evidenter, propter quam contrarietatem tam crebram et fantasticorum assercionem pro assercionibus eorum est minime presumendum. Et ideo aliter credendum est doctoribus ab ecclesia approbatis quam aliis. Propter sanctitatem enim et veritatem ac utilitatem doctrine doctorum ab ecclesia approbatorum reverencia tanto merito debetur eisdem ut nemo qui non est certus eos (vel eorum aliquem) defecisse debeat quodcumque dictum eorum (vel alicuius ipsorum) negare, contrarium sapiendo, aut aliquam assercionem alicuius eorum ad falsum aut perversum trahere intellectum antequam mentem et motiva eorum (vel alicuius eorum), si potest, viderit diligenter. Sed tantam reverenciam non tenemur doctoribus ab ecclesia minime approbatis necessario exhibere, presertim cum studere in libris eorum, propter diversas opiniones inutiles et fantasticas ac vix opinabiles assertive vel opinative insertas in eis, impedimentum maximum prestet sciencie necessarie et utili ecclesie dei.

Master: The reply is that it is possible to "think impious thoughts" in two ways, that is impiously or pertinaciously, or not impiously and not pertinaciously, just as also in matters of faith it is possible to err pertinaciously and not pertinaciously; and so it is possible to err impiously and not impiously. Never or rarely, however, are doctors approved by the church disbelieved "thinking impious thoughts" except impiously [i.e. pertinaciously], when what they have said can be had [e.g. their books obtained], because they [the doctors] have erred rarely and some of them in nothing at all. But it is often possible for someone "thinking impious [i.e. erroneous] thoughts", but not impiously, not to believe doctors not approved by the church --- since also it is possible, "thinking impious thoughts", not to believe them in many matters, since they err in many matters, which is clearly understood from the opposition among them, because of which very frequent opposition and their assertion of imaginary things there should not be a presumption in favour of their assertions [so disbelieving them, even when they are actually right, is not evidence of pertinacity]. And therefore doctors approved by the church should be believed differently from others.  For reverence is so deservedly owed to doctors approved by the church, on account of their sanctity and the truth and utility of their teaching, that no one who is not sure that they have fallen short (or that one of them has) should deny any saying of theirs (or of his) by thinking its opposite, or lead any assertion by any one of them to a false or perverse meaning, before he has carefully examined, if he can, their (or his) meaning and reasons. But we are not bound necessarily to show such great reverence to doctors not approved by the church, especially since studying their books presents the greatest impediment to the knowledge which is necessary and useful to the church of God because of the various useless, unreal and hardly tenable opinions inserted assertively or as an opinion in them.

Discipulus: Dic qualiter respondetur ad allegacionem sequentem.

Student: Tell me how reply is made to the argument following.

Magister: Respondetur quod scripture divine principaliter discende sunt a doctoribus ab ecclesia approbatis et ab illis qui sunt veritatis et non propriarum opinionum amatores, qui in docendo in divinis literis et aliis scripturis authenticis ac racionibus irrefragabilibus, solam veritatem — non inanem gloriam aut favorem cuiuscumque — querentes, se fundare nituntur, parati opiniones proprias revocare, si eas per se vel per alios doctores vel discipulos (excellentes vel parum intelligentes) cognoverunt veritati quomodolibet adversari: non autem ab illis qui opiniones vel asserciones proprias vel sui ordinis, collegii, nacionis, amicorum vel adherencium aut favencium vel cuiusque persone qualitercumque coniuncte, relictis aut spretis opinionibus seu assercionibus aliorum verioribus vel probabilioribus, tenent aut defendunt, vel teneri cupiunt aut defendi.

Master: The reply is that the divine scriptures should be learnt  principally from doctors approved by the church and by those who are lovers of the truth and not of their own opinions, who in their teaching seek only the truth and not empty glory or anyone's favour, and try to base themselves on divine literature, other authentic writings and unshakeable arguments, being prepared to retract their own opinions if they learn, of themselves or from other doctors or from students (those who excel or those who understand little), that these [opinions] are in any way opposed to the truth. [Teaching should], however, not be by those who, putting aside or spurning the truer or more probable opinions or assertions of others, hold or defend, or want to be held or defended, their own opinions or assertions or those of their own order, college, nation or of their friends or those who favour or support them, or of any person at all who is linked to them in some way.

Discipulus: Quid si aliquis superior vel prelatus voluerit cogere sibi subiectos approbare et tenere opiniones seu doctrinam alicuius doctoris ab ecclesia minime approbati?

Student: What if any superior or prelate wants to compel those subject to him to approve and hold the opinions or teaching of any doctor not approved by the church?

Magister: Dicitur quod talis prelatus peccaret mortaliter et omnes consencientes sibi et faventes.

Master: It is said that such a prelate and all who agree with him and support him would sin mortally.

Discipulus: Numquid secundum opinionem istam artantes sibi subiectos ad defendendum opiniones doctoris vel doctorum huiusmodi sunt inter hereticos computandi, si inter opiniones illas aliqua in rei veritate scripture divine repugnat, quamvis non patenter sed latenter?

Student: According to that opinion, should those who constrain those subject to them to defend the opinions of a doctor or of doctors of this kind be counted among the heretics if there is among those opinions one which in truth of fact conflicts with divine scripture, but only implicitly and not openly?

Magister: Respondetur quod tales sunt heretici reputandi, licet doctor tales opiniones inveniens possit a pravitate heretica excusari — quia deceptus absque pertinacia opinionem suam, que est in rei veritate heretica, quamvis hoc nesciat, poterit divulgare. Sed penis et statutis aut minis vel terroribus aut persecucionibus quibuscumque artantes seu cogentes sibi subiectos ad tenendum opinionem huiusmodi, et tali artacioni seu coaccioni consencientes, de pertinacia excusari non valent. De taliter enim artantibus seu consencientibus intelligi debet illud Urbani pape, quod habetur 24a, q. 3a, c. Qui aliorum, cum ait, “Qui aliorum errorem defendit multo amplius est dampnabilior illis qui errant, quia non solum ille errat sed eciam aliis offendicula erroris preparat et confirmat”, quantum in eo est cogendo alios per huiusmodi artacionem seu obligacionem errori pertinaciter adherere; “unde quia magister erroris est”, per compulsionem huiusmodi, “non tantum hereticus sed eciam heresiarcha dicendus est”.

Master: The reply is that such people should be regarded as heretics, although a doctor who acquires such opinions can be absolved of heretical wickedness, because having been deceived without pertinacity he will be able to publish his opinion, which in truth of fact is heretical though he does not know it. But those who constrain or compel by punishments and statutes or threats, terror, or any sort of persecution those subject to them to hold an opinion of this kind and those who agree to such punishment or compulsion can not be absolved of pertinacity. For it is about those constraining in that way or those agreeing to it that the words of Pope Urban found in 24, q. 3, c. Qui aliorum [c.32, col.999] should be understood when he says: "He who defends the error of others is much more to be condemned than those who err, because not only does he err himself but he also prepares and confirms obstacles of error for others", as much as he can compelling others by such constraint or obligation of this kind to adhere pertinaciously to an error. "Because he is a teacher of error, therefore," by this sort of compulsion, "he should be said to be not just a heretic but a heresiarch."

Discipulus: Alias allegaciones prosequere.

Student: Go on with the other arguments.

Magister: Ad aliam, que accipit quod pro multitudine et maxime sapientum presumendum est, respondetur quod non est semper pro multitudine sapientum taliter presumendum ut in illis que sciencie sunt aliquis multitudini insipientium qui non sunt ab ecclesia approbati credere teneatur antequam invenerit (per scripturas sacras aut racionem evidentem vel operacionem miraculi aut per assercionem universalis ecclesie) quod eorum assercio sit consona veritati, licet pro eis taliter presumere liceat ut eorum assercio minime reprobetur aut negetur nisi constiterit quod obviat veritati.

Master: To another [argument], which takes it that there should be a presumption in favour of the multitude, and especially of the wise, the reply is that there should not always be a presumption in favour of the multitude of the wise in such a way that in matters of [theoretical] knowledge someone is bound to believe a multitude of the unwise who have not been approved by the church before he has found out (through the sacred scriptures or clear reason or the operation of a miracle or the assertion of the universal church) that their assertion is in accord with the truth, though it is permitted to make a presumption in their favour in such a way that their assertion should not be condemned or denied unless it has been established that it conflicts with the truth.

Ad aliam, cum accipitur quod ille prudencie sue innititur qui ea que sibi credenda vel tenenda videntur doctorum assercionibus presumit preponere, secundum quod innuit Ieronimus, Extra, De constitucionibus, c. Ne innitaris, respondetur quod Ieronimus ibidem loquitur de decretis patrum qui fuerunt scriptores scripture divine et de pluribus ab ecclesia approbatis, non autem de aliis qui se invicem reprehendunt et reprobant, quia ad illos non oportet regulariter recurrere —

To another [argument], when it is taken [as a premise], according to what Jerome implies in Extra, De constitutionibus, c. Ne innitaris [c.5, col.8], that he relies on his own prudence [[which Proverbs says we should not do]] who presumes to put those things which it seems to him should be believed or held before the assertions of doctors, the reply is that in that place Jerome is talking about the decrees of the fathers who were writers of divine scripture and about the many who have been approved by the church. [He is] not [talking] about others who find fault with and condemn each other, however, because it is not appropriate regularly to have recourse to them --

licet in casu aliquis teneatur quid senserint indagare: si enim dicant se opiniones suas a scripturis accepisse divinis, non sunt opiniones huiusmodi reprobande seu spernande vel negande ab eo qui non est certus eas esse contrarias veritati, antequam motiva earum viderit diligenter; si enim opiniones eorum fuerint catholice et in sacris fundate scripturis, qui eas negaverit, presertim assertores earum persequendo vel persequentibus in hoc favendo, nolens motiva eorum catholica, quamvis commode possit, legere vel audire attente, non potest de pravitate heretica excusari, quia talis errans non querit cauta sollicitudine veritatem quando tenetur; quare est inter hereticos computandus, prout insinuat Augustinus, ut habetur 24a, q. 3a, c. Dixit Apostolus.

although on occasion someone may be bound to investigate what they think. For if they say that they have received their opinions from the divine scriptures, such opinions should not be condemned, rejected, or denied by someone not certain that they are contrary to the truth, before he has looked carefully into their reasons; for if their opinions are catholic and based on the sacred scriptures, he who denies them, especially by persecuting those who assert them or by supporting their persecutors, and refuses to read or listen attentively to their Catholic arguments, even though he can conveniently do so, can not be absolved of heretical wickedness, because such an errant is not seeking the truth with careful solicitude when he is bound to do so, and therefore he should be counted among the heretics, as Augustine implies in 24, q. 3, c. Dixit apostolus [c.29, col.998].

Et ita in casu non solum illi “in insipienciam” dampnabilem “cadunt” — secundum Leonem papam, ut habetur 24a, q. 3a, c. Quid autem iniquius — “qui, cum ad cognoscendam veritatem aliquo impediuntur obscuro, non ad propheticas voces, non ad apostolicas literas, nec ad evangelicas auctoritates, sed ad semetipsos recurrunt”, sed eciam illi qui ad dicta aliorum, qui eciam non sunt ab ecclesia approbati vel eciam sunt ab ecclesiasticis et clericis reprobati erronee et iniuste, non recurrunt, et in casu qui sic ad alios non recurrunt, eorum motiva legere negligentes, sue prudencie, vel forsitan aliorum prudencie, erronee innituntur.

And so, on occasion, not only do those "fall into" reprehensible "stupidity", -- according to Pope Leo, as we read in 24, q. 3, c. Quid autem iniquius [c.30, col.998] -- "who, when they are prevented by some obscurity from learning the truth, have recourse not to the voices of the prophets, not to apostolic writings, not to gospel texts, but to themselves", but also those who do not have recourse to what has been said also by others who have not been approved by the church, or have even been rebuked erroneously and unjustly by ecclesiastics and clerics; and on occasion those who do not thus have recourse to others, neglecting to read their reasons, are relying erroneously on their own prudence, or perhaps on the prudence of others.

 Non autem illi qui scripturas sacras et doctrinam sanctorum patrum et aliorum opiniones scrutantur sollicite, cum eas possunt habere, sue prudencie reprehensibiliter innituntur, licet invenciones proprias validis munitas racionibus quorumcumque et quotcumque doctorum aliorum opinionibus qui non sunt ab universali ecclesia approbati preponant.

It is not the case, however, that those who punctiliously investigate the sacred scriptures, the teaching of the holy fathers, and the opinions of others, when they can obtain possession of them, are relying reprehensibly on their own prudence, even if they prefer their own inventions, fortified by strong arguments, to the opinions of any other doctors at all, no matter how many there are, who have not been approved by the universal church.

Ad aliam allegacionem, cum accipitur quod fide dignorum testimonio est credendum, respondetur quod fide dignorum testimonio in hiis que facti sunt omnes credere debent, nisi sint aliqui qui sciant eos a veritate declinare. Sed in hiis que sciencie sunt aut iuris aut pericie non est necesse omnes credere testimonio fide dignorum, eciam qui nesciunt eos errare, nec quoad omnia in quibus non errant: et hoc quia notum est quod vacantes scienciis, eciam doctiores, qui nullum falsum scienter assererent, errant in hiis que sciencie sunt et arcium, cum eciam peritissimi erraverint et multa in huiusmodi ignoraverint.

To the other argument, when it is taken [as a premise] that the testimony of those worthy of trust should be believed, the reply is that in matters of fact everyone should believe the testimony of those worthy of trust, except any who know that they are deviating from the truth. But in matters of [theoretical] knowledge, law or skill it is not necessary for everyone to believe the testimony of those worthy of trust, even if they do not know that they are in error, nor in respect of everything about which they do not err. This is because it is known that those who devote themselves to [theoretical] knowledge, even the more learned,  who would not knowingly assert anything false, err in matters of [theoretical] knowledge and the arts, since even the most expert err and do not know many things in matters of this kind.

Ad ultimam dicitur per predicta quod non omni experto in aliqua arte est credendum in omnibus, eo quod multorum non habet experienciam neque periciam que tamen spectant ad artem, et ideo potest in multis errare et sophisticis racionibus decipi.

To the last [argument] it is said according to what has been said before that not everyone expert in a field should be believed in everything, because they do not have experience or skill in many matters which do nonetheless pertain to that field. They can, therefore, err in many things and be deceived by sophistical arguments.

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