Part 1, Book 6, chapters 36-50

Capitulum 36

Chapter 36

Discipulus: Ex premissis intelligo quod dicentium licere catholicos appellare a papa heretico dicunt quidam quod non est necesse verbum 'appellandi' emittere, licet aliquando expediat, quidam vero dicunt quod hoc est necesse. Primi autem diversas patiuntur difficultates vocales propter varias significationes quas nomini 'appellationis' attribuunt. Omnes autem predicti in hoc conveniunt quod omnem doctrinam pape hereticam et etiam papam hereticum licet fidelibus impugnare. Ideo omisso vocabulo 'appellationis' et 'appellantis' volo in quibusdam interrogationibus quas tibi de materia precedenti proponam uti vocabulo 'impugnationis' et 'impugnantium'. In primis autem interrogo an impugnantes papam hereticum sint a catholicis aliis defendendi etiam contra papam taliter impugnantes punire volentem.

Student: I understand from the preceding material that of those who affirm that catholics are allowed to appeal from a heretic pope, some say that it is not necessary to utter the word "appeal" though it might sometimes be useful, while others claim that the utterance is necessary. And the former are involved in various terminological difficulties because of the distinct senses which they attribute to the word "appeal". All of the aforementioned individuals, however, do agree on one point: that believers have the right to oppose every heretical doctrine of the pope, and even the heretic pope himself. Therefore, putting aside the terms "appeal" and "appellant", I would like to use the terms "opposition" and "opponent" in the context of certain questions I shall be putting to you with respect to the preceding issue. And first of all I ask whether opponents of a heretic pope are to be defended by other catholics even against a pope wanting to punish such opponents.

Magister: Circa hanc interrogationem sunt assertiones contrarie. Una est quod impugnantes papam hereticum qui verbum 'appellandi' nequaquam emittunt non sunt a catholicis defendendi. Alia est contraria scilicet quod sunt a catholicis defendendi.

Master: There are contrary assertions in reply to this question. One is that the opponents of a heretic pope who by no means utter the word "appeal" must not be defended by catholics. There is a contrary view, namely that such opponents must be defended.

Discipulus: Pro istis assertionibus contrariis te libenter audio allegare.

Student: I am gladly all ears as to your arguments in support of these contrary assertions.

Magister: Prima assertio videtur posse probari tali ratione. Maius est defendere impugnantes papam hereticum quam eorum impugnationi deferre, quemadmodum maius est defendere appellantes quam appellationi deferre. Sed catholici non tenentur deferre impugnationi pape heretici nisi impugnantes interposuerint appellationem legitimam. Ergo nec tenentur taliter impugnantes defendere. Secundo sic. Per impugnationem non eximitur impugnans a iurisdictione prelati quem impugnat sed per appellationem legitimam eximitur appellans a iurisdictione prelati a quo appellat. Ergo per solam impugnationem pape heretici non eximitur impugnans a iurisdictione pape, sed per appellationem eximitur. Catholici autem non debent defendere contra papam nisi solos exemptos a iurisdictione pape. Ergo licet teneantur defendere appellantes non tamen tenentur defendere impugnantes qui non appellant.

Master: It appears that the first assertion may be proved by the following reason. It is a greater matter to defend the opponents of a heretic pope than to defer to their opposition, just as it is a greater matter to defend appellants than to defer to their appeal. But catholics are not bound to defer to an opposition against a heretic pope unless these opponents have issued a legitimate appeal. Therefore neither are they bound to defend such opponents. Here is a second reason. His opposition does not exempt an opponent from the jurisdiction of the prelate he is opposing, but a legitimate appeal does exempt an appellant from the jurisdiction of the prelate from whom he is appealing. Therefore a mere opposition to a heretic pope does not exempt the appellant from the pope's jurisdiction, but an appeal does create such an exemption. And catholics must not provide a defense against the pope except and only to those individuals who are exempt from the pope's jurisdiction. Therefore although catholics are obligated to defend appellants, they are not for all that obligated to defend opponents who do not appeal.

Capitulum 37

Chapter 37

Discipulus: Sufficiant iste allegationes pro assertione predicta, ideo pro contraria allegare conare.

Student: These are sufficient arguments in support of the aforementioned assertion. Therefore attempt to argue in favour of the contrary assertion.

Magister: Quod omnes impugnantes papam hereticum cum circumstantiis debitis, licet non appellent, sint a catholicis defendendi videtur multis rationibus posse probari. Est autem prima ratio talis. Qui sancte, rite, et legitime causam omnium fidelium prosequuuntur sunt ab omnibus fidelibus defendendi. Qui enim negotium alicuius gerit utiliter auxilium et favorem ab eo meretur, aliter enim erit ingratus et nequam non reddens bonum pro bono. Sed impugnantes papam hereticum causam omnium fidelium prosequuntur, quia causa fidei est causa omnium catholicorum. Ergo sunt ab omnibus catholicis defendendi.

Master: It appears that one may prove by many reasons that all opponents of a heretic pope, appropriate circumstances taken into account, must be defended by catholics even if they do not issue an appeal. And the first reason is this. Those who pursue the cause of all the faithful religiously, properly, and legally, must be defended by all the faithful. Indeed he who usefully performs another's business deserves his assistance and support, otherwise the latter would be a thankless and worthless person who does not reward a good deed with its like. But opponents of a heretic pope pursue the cause of all believers, because the cause of faith is the cause of all catholics. Therefore these opponents must be defended by all catholics.

Secundo sic. Magis tenentur catholici et fideles defendere prosequentes causam fidei que est causa omnium quam teneatur papa defendere illos qui causas proprias prosequuntur. Sed papa debet defendere illos qui causas proprias prosequuntur, teste Zepherino papa qui, ut habetur 2 q. 6 c. Ad Romanam, ait: "ad Romanam ecclesiam ab omnibus maxime tamen ab oppressis est appellandum et concurrendum quasi ad matrem ut eius uberibus nutriantur, auctoritate defendantur, a suis oppressionibus releventur". Ergo multo magis si impugnantes papam hereticum ad quoscunque concurrerint orthodoxos, sunt ab eis defendendi.

Here is the second reason. Catholics and believers are more obligated to defend those who pursue the cause of faith, which is the cause of everyone, than a pope is obligated to defend those who pursue their personal causes. But a pope is bound to defend those who pursue their personal causes, witness Pope Zephyrinus who states in 2 q. 6 c. Ad Romanam: "all people and most of all those who are oppressed must appeal to the Roman church, and fly to it as to a mother so as to be nourished by her breasts, defended by her authority, and relieved of their oppression". [col. 468] Therefore all the more must the opponents of a heretic pope be defended by whichever orthodox persons they have resorted to for this assistance.

Tertio sic. Magis sunt defendendi a catholicis impugnantes hereticam pravitatem, ne propter impugnationem huiusmodi patiantur, quam sint socii a sociis. Sed socius socium debet defendere, teste Ambrosio qui in libro 'De officiis', ut legitur 23 q. 3 c. Non inferenda, ait: "qui enim non repellit a socio iniuriam, si potest, tam est in vitio quam ille, qui facit". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod socius socium debet contra iniuriantem defendere. Ergo multo magis catholici debent impugnantes hereticam pravitatem defendere ne propter impugnationem huiusmodi iniuriam patiantur.

The third reason is this. In order not to suffer as a result of this opposition, the opponents of heretical wickedness must be defended by catholics to a greater extent than partners must defend one another. But a partner must defend a partner, witness Ambrose who state in the book 'On offices' as we read in 23 q. 3 c. Non inferenda: "for he who does not, if he can, prevent a partner from being harmed is just as guilty as the one who commits the misdeed". [col. 898] We gather from these words that a partner must defend a partner against someone doing him wrong. Therefore all the more must catholics defend opponents of heretical wickedness lest they suffer harm due to such opposition.

Quarto sic. Non minus tenentur catholici defendere impugnantes hereticam pravitatem quam ecclesia teneatur defendere sceleratos et impios qui ad eam confugiunt, cum boni magis sint defendendi quam mali. Sed ecclesia tenetur defendere malos fugientes ad ipsam (17 q. 4 c. Frater et coepiscopus noster et c. Sicut) et in multis aliis decretis sanctorum patrum idem habetur. Ergo multo magis catholici tenentur defendere impugnantes hereticam pravitatem.

Here is the fourth reason. Catholics are not less bound to defend opponents of heretical wickedness than the church is obligated to defend criminals and immoralists that flee to it for safety, since the good are more to be defended than the bad. But the church is obligated to defend the criminals who flee to it for security (17 q. 4 c. Frater et coepiscopus noster, [col. 817] and c. Sicut), [col. 816] and we find the same point in many other decrees of the holy fathers. Therefore all the more must catholics defend the opponents of heretical wickedness.

Discipulus: Quod ecclesia defendit malos fugientes ad ipsam est ex privilegio speciali quale non habent impugnantes hereticam pravitatem.

Student: The fact that the church defends criminals who flee to it for security is due to a special privilege, which is not enjoyed by the opponents of heretical wickedness.

Magister: Hec responsio impugnatur, quia ubi est eadem ratio debet esse idem ius. Sed ratio quare ecclesia defendit malos fugientes ad ipsam est ut honor ecclesie conservetur (17 q. 4 c. Reum). Honor autem ecclesie et universaliter omnium catholicorum et etiam Dei magis conservatur per defensionem impugnantium hereticam pravitatem quam per defensionem malorum quantumcunque ad ecclesiam confugerint. Ergo magis defendendi sunt quam tales mali predicti.

Master: This response is rejected, because where the reason is the same the law must be the same. And the reason why the church defends criminals who flee to it for security is so that the honour of the church might be preserved (17 q. 4 c. Reum). [col. 817] But the honour of the church and in general the honour of all catholics, and that of God also, is better preserved by a defense of the opponents of heretical wickedness than by a defense of criminals no matter how many flee to the church for security. Therefore these opponents must be defended more than the aforestated criminals.

Discipulus: Alias rationes adducas.

Student: Present other reasons.

Magister: Quinto videtur posse probari eadem assertio sic. Fides catholica est magis defendenda quam patria. Unusquisque autem debet defendere patriam iuxta illud sapientis: "pugna pro patria". Cui concordat Ambrosius primo 'De officiis' qui, ut legitur 23 q. 3 c. Fortitudo, ait: "fortitudo, que bello tuetur a barbaris patriam, vel domi defendit infirmos, vel a latronibus socios, plena iustitia est". Ergo multo magis fides catholica est ab omnibus catholicis defendenda. Non autem defenditur fides nisi defensentur impugnantes hereticam pravitatem. Igitur omnes catholici pro loco et tempore impugnantes hereticam pravitatem debent defendere.

Master: The same assertion may be proved as follows by a fifth reason. The catholic faith must be defended more than one's country. But every single person must defend his country in accordance with the sentiment of a wise thinker [proclaiming]:"fight for your country". [W.J. Chase, ed., The Distichs of Cato, Madison, Wisc., 1922, p. 12, no. 23 (collectio distichorum vulgaris)] Ambrose agrees with this in book 1 of 'On offices', and states what we read in 23 q. 3 c. Fortitudo: "full of justice is the courage to make war on barbarians for the country's protection, to defend the helpless at home, or partners from bandits". [col. 897] Therefore all the more must the catholic faith be defended by all catholics. But the faith is not defended unless the opponents of heretical wickedness are defended. Therefore all catholics, when time and circumstance are appropriate, must defend the opponents of heretical wickedness.

Sexto sic. Hoc debet catholicus impugnantibus papam hereticum sine quo dilectio Dei et proximi non habetur. Sed absque defensione impugnantium papam hereticum dilectio Dei et proximi non habetur. Quod autem dilectio Dei, patet, quia quod non fit impugnantibus propter Deum papam hereticum non fit Deo, iuxta illud Christi Matth. 25: "quamdiu non fecistis uni de minoribus his, nec michi fecistis", ubi Christus asserit manifeste quod opera misericordie que non fiunt suis fidelibus, intelliguntur non fieri sibi, propter quorum omissionem impii deputabuntur eternis suppliciis. Ergo defensio que non exhibetur impugnantibus papam hereticum intelligitur non exhiberi Deo. Qui autem non exhibet defensionem debitam honori divino Deum non diligit. Ergo qui non defendit impugnantes hereticam pravitatem caret dilectione divina. Nec etiam habetur dilectio proximi si impugnantes hereticam pravitatem minime defenduntur. Quia qui proximo in sua necessitate non subvenit caritatem proximi minime habet. Impugnantes autem papam hereticum maxime indigent defensione. Ergo qui eos negligunt defensare caritatem ad ipsos nullatenus habent.

Here is the sixth reason. A catholic owes to the opponents of a heretic pope that without which the love of God and of one's neighbour cannot be realized. But there can be no love of God and of one's neighbour without a defense of the opponents of a heretic pope. It is evident that there can be no love of God, because what is not done to those who oppose a heretic pope for God's sake is not done to God Himself, according to the words of Christ in Matthew 25: "inasmuch as ye did it not to one of the least of these, ye did it not to me". [Matthew 25:45] Christ obviously asserts here that works of mercy, which are not done to his faithful, are understood as not done to him; and that non-performance of these works will send the impious to eternal torments. Therefore a defense not provided to the opponents of a heretic pope is understood as not provided to God. But one who does not provide the defense owed to the divine honour does not love God. Therefore one who does not defend the opponents of heretical wickedness lacks the love of God. And the love of one's neighbour is also missing if the opponents of heretical wickedness are not defended, because he who does not assist his neighbour in his necessity does not show love towards his neighbour. But the opponents of a heretic pope require to be defended in the highest degree. Therefore those who neglect to defend them have no love towards them at all.

Septimo arguitur sic. Non defendere Christum et non defendere discipulos Christi veritatem catholicam nuntiantes ad idem genus criminis pertinet, sicut spernere Christum et spernere discipulos Christi. Sed spernere Christum et spernere discipulos Christi ad culpam spectat consimilem, ipso Christo testante qui, ut habetur Luc. 10, dixit discipulis suis: "qui vos spernit me spernit". Hoc etiam patet, quia non defendere alium est quidam modus specialis alium contempnendi. Qui enim non defendit, spernit. Non defendere namque, cum quis potest, ex contemptu procedit sicut defendere ex amore procedit. Sed omnes catholici debent Christum defendere quando possunt, testante Augustino, qui turbam asserit graviter deliquisse quia Christum cum duceretur ad mortem non defendit, qui, ut habetur 23 q. 3 c. ultimo, ait: "ostendit propheta nec illos immunes a scelere esse, qui permiserunt principibus Christum interficere, cum pro multitudine timerentur, et possent illos a facto, et se a consensu liberare". Ergo etiam illi qui discipulos Christi veritatem catholicam nuntiantes non defendunt non sunt immunes a scelere reputandi. Tales autem discipuli Christi sunt papam hereticum impugnantes qui veritatem profitentur catholicam. Ergo tales sunt ab omnibus catholicis defendendi.

Here is the seventh argument. Not to defend Christ and not to defend the disciples of Christ who announce catholic truth pertains to the same category of crime as does the spurning of Christ and the spurning of his disciples. But spurning Christ and spurning the disciples of Christ involves an identical sin, Christ himself attesting to this in Luke 10, where he said to his disciples: "he that despiseth you despiseth me". [Luke 10:16] Indeed this is evident, because not to defend another is a certain specific mode of despising that person. For he who does not defend, despises. And not to defend when one can, proceeds from contempt, just as to defend proceeds from love. But all catholics have the duty to defend Christ when they can, as Augustine attests who states that the crowd sinned gravely because it did not defend Christ when the latter was being led to his death. Here are his words as recorded in 23 q. 3, last chapter: "the prophet demonstrates that they also were not exempt from crime who allowed their leaders (who feared for the security of the populace) to kill Christ, and who might have liberated these leaders from responsibility for the misdeed, and themselves from consenting to it". [c. Ostendit col. 898] Therefore they also who do not defend the disciples of Christ announcing catholic truth must not be considered as being exempt from crime. But those who oppose a heretic pope and profess the catholic truth are such disciples of Christ. Therefore they must be defended by all catholics.

Octavo sic. Qui miserie alicuius compatitur subvenit sibi et defendit eum cum potest. Sed sanum membrum et verum corporis Christi mistici compatitur alteri membro in periculo constituto, cum videmus iuxta Apostolum quod "si quid patitur unum membrum" (corporis naturalis) "compatiuntur omnia membra" (1 Cor. 12.) Ergo si aliqui patiuntur propter impugnationem catholice veritatis, omnia membra sana corporis Christi mistici compatiuntur eisdem et per consequens eis subveniunt et ipsos defendunt si possunt.

Here is the eighth reason. He who feels compassion towards another's wretchedness comes to his assistance and defends him when he can. But a healthy and true member of Christ's mystical body feels compassion for another member when the latter is in danger, since we see, according to the Apostle, that "whether one member" of a natural body "suffer, all the members suffer with it" (1 Cor. 12). [1 Corinthians 12:26] Therefore if some suffer because of an attack on catholic truth, all healthy members of Christ's mystical body suffer along with them, and consequently come to their assistance and defend them if they can.

Nono sic. Opera misericordie sunt omnibus impendenda. Ergo et defensio cum sit opus misericordie est omnibus impendenda, et per consequens defensio impugnantibus papam hereticum est prestanda.

Here is the ninth reason. Works of mercy must be afforded to all people. Therefore defense also, since it is a work of mercy, must be afforded to everyone, and consequently defense must be made available to the opponents of a heretic pope.

Capitulum 38

Chapter 38

Discipulus: Per istam rationem probaretur quod impugnantes catholicam veritatem essent a catholicis defendendi quia opera misericordie non solum bonis sed etiam malis oportet catholicos exhibere.

Student: One might prove by this reason that opponents of catholic truth must be defended, because it is appropriate for catholics to extend works of mercy not only to the good but also to the bad.

Cum ergo defensio sit opus misericordie oportet catholicos defensare hereticos veritatem catholicam impugnantes. Item, opera misericordie nequaquam cadunt sub precepto, tunc enim qui non daret eleemosynam aut non redimeret captivos peccaret mortaliter. Si ergo defensio est opus misericordie catholici ad talem defensionem de necessitate salutis minime astringuuntur.

Therefore since defense is a work of mercy, it is proper for catholics to defend heretics who oppose catholic truth. Again, works of mercy are in no way obligatory for in that case he who did not give alms or did not redeem captives would sin mortally. Therefore if defense is a work of compassion, catholics are not bound to such defense by necessity of salvation.

Amplius, sicut punire delinquentes pertinet solummodo ad iudices seculares vel ecclesiasticos, ita defendere bonos ad superiores et potestates publicas noscitur pertinere. Ergo non ad omnes catholicos pertinet defensare impugnantes papam hereticum.

More, just as the punishment of delinquents pertains solely to secular or ecclesiastical judges, so is the defense of law-abiding people known to be the preserve of political superiors and of public authorities. Therefore it is not the business of all catholics to defend opponents of a heretic pope.

Rursus, oppressorum defensio exhibetur cum illate vel inferende iniurie propulsantur. Sed iniurias propulsare ad viros perfectos minime pertinet, tum quia talibus Ipsa Veritas ait Matth. 5: "Ego autem dico vobis non resistere malo". Tum quia armis iniuria propulsatur, viris autem perfectis, sicut clericis, non licet arma movere. Ergo saltem ad viros perfectos minime spectat impugnantes papam hereticum defensare. Ista sunt que rationem factam de operibus misericordie et nonnullas alias, ut michi videtur, impediunt. Ideo quomodo respondetur ad ea gestio scire.

Further, a defense of the oppressed is displayed when injuries committed or yet to be inflicted are warded off. But the repulsing of such wrongs is not the business of perfect individuals. For Truth itself states in Matthew 5: "But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil". [Matthew 5:39] And weapons ward off wrongs, but perfect individuals, such as clerks, are not allowed to wield arms. Therefore it does not pertain to perfect individuals (at least) to defend opponents of a heretic pope. These objections, it seems to me, restrict the validity of the point you have made, as well as that of some other arguments. Therefore I would like to know how one replies to them.

Capitulum 39

Chapter 39

Magister: Dicunt nonnulli quod iste obiectiones tuam insipientiam manifestant, et quod non intelligis assertionem predictam ostendunt. Ad cuius evidentiam tria dicunt esse notanda, quorum primum est quod sicut diversa sunt opera iustitie quorum quedam omnibus subditis et prepositis possunt congrue convenire (sive enim subditus sive prepositus alienum habet, de necessitate iustitie restituere debet nisi ex aliqua causa rationabili excusetur), quedam vero sunt opera iustitie que non conveniunt omnibus sed solum prepositis (sicut iudicare iuste non competit nisi superiori), sic sunt quedam opera misericordie et beneficentie que omnibus competere possunt, sicut orare, intercedere pro aliquo, et nonnulla alia, quedam vero sunt opera misericordie que non omnibus competere debent, cuiusmodi opus est nonnunquam aliquos armis defendere.

Master: Some say that these objections demonstrate your lack of wisdom, and indicate that you do not understand the assertion being discussed. They say that three points must be noted in order to clarify matters. Here is the first of these points. In the same way that there are differing works of justice, some of which may appropriately concern both subjects and rulers (for whether you are a subject or a ruler you must return by necessity of justice property which is not yours unless you are excused from this by some reasonable cause), while other works of justice do not concern everyone but only rulers (for instance to judge with justice only pertains to a superior), so are there some works of compassion and kindness which may concern everyone (for instance to pray, or to intercede on someone's behalf, and a few other such) while there are certain works of compassion, on the other hand, which must not concern everyone, such as the task which sometimes arises of defending certain individuals by force of arms.

Secundo dicunt esse notandum quod licet precepta affirmativa obligent semper, non tamen pro semper, et ideo semper remanet quilibet obligatus ad opera misericordie que sibi competunt proximis exhibenda. Non tamen tenetur quilibet talia opera misericordie omni tempore exercere sed loco et tempore opportunis, aliis circumstantiis debitis observatis.

It must secondly be noted, they say, that although affirmative commands are always obligatory, they are nevertheless not binding under every circumstance which might arise. And thus everyone remains obligated to perform personally appropriate works of mercy to his neighbours. Nevertheless everyone is not bound to exercise such works of compassion at all times, but only when the time and the place are opportune, and when other relevant circumstances are taken into account.

Tertio dicunt esse notandum quod multis modis potest quis alios defensare. Uno modo armis violentie resistendo, alio modo verbis pro aliquo allegando vel impugnare volentes verbis exhortatoriis, preceptoriis, vel prohibitoriis seu aliis quibuscunque a violentia reprimendo, alio modo occultando vel non prodendo, aut in domum vel locum tutum recipiendo, aliisque modis quam pluribus quos longum esset enarrare contingit alios defensare.

They say that it must thirdly be noted that a person may defend others in many ways. One way is by resisting with force of arms; another is by verbally arguing on someone's behalf or by dissuading would-be attackers from violence by words of encouragement, command, prohibition or by other words of whatever nature; another is by hiding someone or by not betraying him to the authorities, or by giving him shelter in one's home or in some safe place. And there exist many other ways to defend others, which it would take a long time to recount.

Discipulus: Narra quomodo ad obiectiones meas per ista notabilia respondetur.

Student: Describe how one responds to my objections with the help of the points just listed.

Magister: Ad primam dicunt quod quamvis interdum oporteat etiam malis opera misericordie exhibere, non tamen omnia opera misericordie sunt omnibus malis et impiis exhibenda. Intercedere enim apud iudicem pro puniendis reis est opus misericordie et tamen pro sceleratis incorrigibilibus liberandis nullus intercedere debet (23 q. 4 c. Est iniusta), et ideo licet hereticis impugnantibus catholicam veritatem sint quedam opera misericordie impendenda, defensio tamen que in favorem heretice pravitatis vel in preiudicium fidei christiane posset aliqualiter redundare est omnino subtrahenda, que tamen catholicis papam hereticum impugnantibus in favorem fidei orthodoxe a fidelibus est prebenda.

Master: They say to the first objection that although occasionally it might be proper to exhibit works of compassion even to bad people, nevertheless all works of mercy must not be performed on behalf of all bad and irreligious persons. For instance, it is a work of mercy to intercede before a judge on behalf of guilty individuals who must be punished, and yet no one has the duty of interceding for the liberation of incorrigible scoundrels (23 q. 4 c. Est iniusta). [Col. 915] Therefore while certain works of mercy must be afforded to heretics who oppose the catholic faith, nevertheless a defense which might in some fashion result in benefiting heretical wickedness or prejudicing the Christian faith must be completely denied to them, and believers must provide the appropriate defense only to catholics who oppose a heretic pope in support of orthodox belief.

Ad secundam potest dici quod omnia opera misericordie pro aliquo tempore cadunt sub precepto, quemadmodum amor proximi ex quo omnia opera misericordie procedere debent cadit sub precepto. Et ideo defensio impugnantium papam hereticum, circumstantiis debitis observatis, cadit sub precepto, licet tale preceptum non intelligatur pro omni tempore obligare.

A possible response to your second objection is that all works of compassion are obligatory for a certain time, just as the love of one's neighbor (from which all works of compassion must proceed) is obligatory. And therefore the defense of opponents of a heretic pope is obligatory when the relevant circumstances are there, even though the precept in question is not understood to be obligatory at all times.

Discipulus: Pro quo tempore secundum istos obligat hoc preceptum.

Student: According to these theorists when does this precept become obligatory.

Magister: Respondetur quod sicut dare eleemosynam tenetur de necessitate ille qui potest cum ex parte indigentis apparet evidens et urgens necessitas, nec scit alium quem probabiliter credit velle et posse necessitatem habentis indigentiam subvenire, sic tunc tenetur quilibet qui potest modo defensionis sibi congruo et possibili impugnantes papam hereticum defensare, quando tali defensione necessario indigent nec apparet alius qui eis velit et possit tuitionem impendere. Sicut etiam quando immineret periculum fidei essent prelati a subditis arguendi et fides catholica esset fideliter confitenda, sic quando ex omissione defensionis impugnantium papam hereticum periculum fidei immineret vel subtraheretur honor Dei, essent impugnantes papam ab omnibus qui possunt, si non apparet alius qui eos protegeret, defendendi, et quicumque eis in aliquo casu (videlicet predictorum) defensionem debitam denegaret in peccatum mortale et fautoriam heretice pravitatis laberetur nec posset aliquis nisi per solam impotentiam excusari.

Master: The answer is that just as a person who can afford it is necessarily bound to give alms when an obvious and urgent requirement exists on the part of the needy, and the person does not know anyone else whom he probably believes to be willing and able to relieve the need of the individual in crisis, in the same way anyone who can is obligated to defend, in the manner possible and relevant to his situation, opponents of a heretic pope, when these opponents necessarily require such a defense and no one else emerges who is willing and able to provide protection. Indeed, just as when a danger to the faith were imminent prelates would have to be verbally confronted by subjects and catholic belief faithfully stated, in the same way when a danger to the faith or a diminution of God's honour were imminent due to the defense of a heretic pope's opponents being neglected, these opponents of the pope would have to be defended by all those who could help [at that moment], if no one else would appear to protect them. And whoever would in some appropriate situation deny these opponents the defense owed to them would lapse into mortal sin and become an aider and abettor of heretical wickedness, nor might anyone be excused here save by lack of power.

Discipulus: De ista materia in septimo huius diligenter inquiram. Ideo refer quomodo ad aliam instantiam respondetur.

Student: I shall inquire carefully about this issue in the 7th Book of this work. Therefore report how one responds to another objection.

Magister: Ad illam instantiam dicitur quod aliquod genus defensionis solummodo pertinet ad iurisdictionem habentes, quemadmodum ad eos pertinet tantummodo regulariter plectere delinquentes. Sed preter talem defensionem, sicut dictum est in tertio notabili suprascripto, sunt multi alii modi defendendi papam hereticum impugnantes, qui aliis a iudicibus competere possunt. Sepe enim aliqui a violentiis aliorum solum precibus defenduntur, unde et de tali modo defensionis habetur dis. 87 c. Eos ubi sic legitur: "eos, qui ad ecclesiam confugiunt, tradi non oportet, sed loci sancti reverentia et intercessione defendi". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod nonnunquam eo ipso quod aliqui non traduntur vel pro eis interceditur, defenduntur. Multis etiam aliis modis potest quis defendi, qui non solum ad iurisdictionem habentes sed etiam ad quoscunque alios pertinere noscuntur. Possunt ergo catholici minimi nullam iurisdictionem habentes et etiam maiores multis modis defendere papam hereticum impugnantes, quia interdum eos non tradendo, occultando, ab eorum persecutione molestantes verbis multiphariis revocando, et aliis modis quos longum esset enarrare.

Master: The response to the next objection is that some category of defense only pertains to those who wield jurisdiction, as for instance the regular punishment of delinquents only pertains to them. However, besides this kind of defense, as was stated above in the third notable point, there are many other ways of defending the opponents of a heretic pope which might be relevant to individuals other than judges. Some indeed are frequently defended from the violence of others by prayers alone, whence such a method of defense is mentioned in dis. 87 c. Eos, [col. 305] where we read the following: "it is not proper to surrender those who flee to a church for security, but rather to defend them by the religious awe and intercession of this holy place". One gathers from these words that sometimes certain persons are defended by the very fact that they are not surrendered or that intercession is made on their behalf. Indeed someone may be defended in many different ways, which are known to pertain not only to those who possess jurisdiction but also to ordinary individuals. Therefore the least among catholics, those who have no jurisdiction, and also the powerful, may defend the opponents of a heretic pope in many ways: sometimes by not betraying them, or by hiding them, or by using all needed words to convince those who persecute these opponents to desist, and by other means it would take a long time to describe.

Et per idem respondetur ad obiectionem quartam, quia preter defensionem que fit armis sunt multi alii modi defendendi impugnantes predictos. Cum vero accipis quod iniuriam propulsare ad viros perfectos minime pertinet, negatur de multis modis iniuriam propulsandi. Et cum allegas auctoritatem Christi, respondetur secundum Augustinum super Iohannem ut legitur 23 q. 1 c. Paratus, quod dictum Christi preceptum magis est ad preparationem cordis quam ad opus. Cum autem dicis quod armis iniuria propulsatur, verum dicis. Sed preter istum modum propulsandi iniuriam sunt alii multi viris perfectis et clericis congruentes.

One responds similarly to the fourth objection, because there are many other ways of defending the aforesaid opponents than to use the defense that relies on arms. And where you suggest that it does not pertain to perfect individuals to ward off intended injury, this is negated as to many ways in which such repulsion may proceed. And when you advance the authority of Christ, the response is to follow Augustine's commentary on John, which we read in 23 q. 1 c. Paratus, [col. 891] that the stated command of Christ is directed more towards inner motivation than towards action in the real world. And when you say that arms ward off harm, you speak the truth. But besides this mode of warding off harm, there are many others, which are compatible with the status of perfect individuals and clerks.

Capitulum 40

Chapter 40

Discipulus: Considero ex predictis quod isti largissime nomine 'defensionis' utuntur, cum dicunt quod impugnantes papam hereticum sunt a catholicis defendendi, et ideo magis quam prius assertionem predictam intelligo, et tamen adhuc vellem scire an amplius quam prius sepedicta assertio explicetur.

Student: I reckon from the aforesaid that these theorists use the term "defense" in the widest sense when they say that catholics must defend the opponents of a heretic pope, and therefore I have a greater understanding of the assertion we are discussing than I did before. Nevertheless I would like to know whether this oft mentioned assertion might be explained more extensively than it earlier was.

Magister: Videtur quod ultimate sic valeat explicari. Quilibet catholicus et fidelis impugnantes zelo fidei orthodoxe papam hereticum, cum evidenter indigent et necessario, vel periculum immineret fidei christiane, tenetur de necessitate salutis modo sibi possibili et congruenti defendere, si alius non apparet in promptu quem probabiliter credat velle et posse taliter impugnantes papam hereticum defensare.

Master: It seems that ultimately the assertion may be explained as follows. Every catholic and believer is obligated by necessity of salvation to defend (in a manner possible and appropriate to his situation) those who oppose a heretic pope for the love of orthodox belief, when they are obviously and necessarily in need, or when there is imminent danger to the Christian faith, if someone else does not readily appear whom the initially obligated person probably believes to be willing and able to defend these opponents of the heretic pope.

Discipulus: Quid si quis credat tales ex rancore vel odio aut alias ex mala radice papam hereticum mala intentione impugnare, nunquid tenetur eos predicto modo defendere.

Student: What if someone thinks that these opponents are badly motivated in their attack on the heretic pope, and are proceeding out of rancor or hatred or out of some other evil root, is he then still bound to defend them in the manner discussed.

Magister: Nullus debet presumere tales papam hereticum mala intentione impugnare nisi hoc sibi constet legitime et non ex levi iudicio. Si tamen constaret sibi quod ex mala intentione papam hereticum impugnarent, eos deberet defendere ne propter impugnationem pravitatis heretice paterentur, maxime si ex omissione defensionis ipsorum periculum fidei immineret, quia in hoc magis veritas defenderetur catholica quam pravitatem hereticam impugnantes. Ad veritatem autem catholicam defendendam universi catholici sunt astricti.

Master: No one must presume these persons to be badly motivated in their attack on a heretic pope unless this becomes legitimately apparent to him and is not the result of unsophisticated opinion. If it should nevertheless become apparent to him that these persons were badly motivated in their attack on the heretic pope, he would still have the duty to defend them, so that they would not suffer because of their opposition to heretical wickedness, above all if there was an imminent danger to the faith by this neglect of their defense; because in this context it is the catholic faith which would be defended, more so than the persons of those who are attacking heretical wickedness. And all catholics are bound to defend the catholic faith.

Discipulus: De quo periculo fidei imminente intelligitur dicta assertio cum dicit quod taliter impugnantes papam hereticum sunt tuendi quando periculum fidei immineret.

Student: What imminent danger to the faith is understood by the assertion we are discussing when it states that such opponents of a heretic pope must be protected when there is an imminent danger to the faith.

Magister: Respondetur quod intelligitur de periculo fidei in una regione vel regno imo etiam uni soli homini imminente, quia si quis probabiliter estimaret quod unum regnum vel regio aut civitas vel etiam unus homo averteretur a fide vel faveret heretice pravitati nisi taliter impugnantibus papam hereticum defensionem impenderet, ipse non tuendo, si posset, mortaliter peccaret.

Master: The answer is that this is understood of an imminent danger to the faith in one region, or one kingdom, indeed even in the soul of a single person, because if someone were probably to surmise that one kingdom or one region or one city or even a single human being would be turned away from the faith or would give support to heretical wickedness unless defense was provided to the opponents of a heretic pope, that someone would commit a mortal sin by failing to give them protection if he could.

Capitulum 41

Chapter 41

Discipulus: Assertionem predictam, ut estimo, clare intelligo, quamvis non sit michi demonstratum quod contineat veritatem, pro qua adhuc allegare coneris ut sciam fundamenta quibus frater M. et sui sequaces probare nituntur quod sunt a catholicis contra summum pontificem defendendi.

Student: I think that I clearly understand the assertion we are examining, although its truthfulness has not been demonstrated to me. Continue the task of offering arguments in support of it, so that I may know the theoretical foundations whereby brother M. and his followers attempt to prove that they must be defended by catholics against the supreme pontiff.

Magister: Assertio memorata decimo tali ratione videtur posse probari. Illud sine quo periclitatur tam fides catholica quam humana societas magis est a catholicis impendendum pro fide catholica conservanda quam pro societate servanda, eo quod quilibet catholicus magis zelare tenetur pro fide quam pro societate humana. Absque mutua tamen defensione periclitatur tam catholica fides quam humana societas. Pro humana autem societate servanda Christiani sibi debent auxilium mutuum impendere, quia quemadmodum Veritate testante, ut habetur Matth. 12: "omne regnum divisum contra se desolatur, et omnis civitas vel domus divisa contra se non stabit", sic omnis societas per mutuam defensionem minime colligata non stabit, quod Veritas Ipsa ubi prius insinuare videtur aperte cum dicit: "qui non est mecum contra me est et qui non congregat mecum spargit". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod qui non est cum aliquo, ipsum modo sibi congruenti et possibili defendendo, contra ipsum esse dinoscitur. Ex quo sequitur quod talis societas minime stabit. Et ita pro societate humana servanda debet unus alii defensionem impendere. Ergo multo magis pro servanda fide catholica debet unus alteri defensionem et tuitionem cum potest impendere. Ex quo infertur quod impugnantibus papam hereticum est defensio exhibenda.

Master: Here is what appears to be a tenth possible proof in support of the examined assertion. That, the absence of which endangers both the catholic faith and human society, should be provided by catholics more for the preservation of the catholic faith than for the preservation of society, since every catholic is obligated to show a greater zeal for the faith than for human society. But in the absence of mutual defense both the catholic faith and human society are endangered. And Christians are obligated to afford each other mutual assistance for the preservation of human society, because as Truth attests in Matthew 12: "every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand". [Matthew 12:25] Thus, every society which is not united by mutual defense will not stand, and this Truth Itself seems to openly convey in the cited context when It states: "he that is not with me is against me; and he that gathereth not with me scattereth abroad". [Matthew 12:30] One gathers from these words that he who is not with someone, providing him with defense in a way both appropriate and possible, is known to be against that someone. From which it follows that such a society will not stand. And thus one person is obligated to provide defense to another so that human society might be preserved. Therefore all the more must someone provide defense and protection to another, if he can, so that the catholic faith might be preserved. From which one concludes that defense must be provided to the opponents of a heretic pope.

Undecima ratio talis est. Qui debet alteri auxilium et consilium in aliqua causa impendere debet eidem defensionem congruam exhibere. Catholicus autem debet impugnantibus papam hereticum auxilium et consilium impendere, aliter enim zelator fidei catholice nequaquam existeret. Ergo debet eis etiam defensionem impendere.

Here is the eleventh reason. He who must provide assistance and counsel to another in some cause must provide the same with an appropriate defense. But a catholic must provide assistance and counsel to the opponents of a heretic pope, for otherwise he would not show himself to be an ardent devotee of the catholic faith. Therefore he must likewise provide a defense for them.

Duodecima ratio talis est. Quilibet tenetur defendere, si potest, patientem quamcumque iniuriam. Ergo multo magis quilibet tenetur defendere, si potest, patientem iniuriam quia defendendo fidem catholicam papam hereticum nititur impugnare. Consequentia est manifesta et evidens, quia si patiens iniuriam est defendendus, maxime defendendus est si propter iustitiam et catholicam fidem iniuriam noscitur sustinere. Antecedens autem auctoritatibus sanctorum patrum videtur aperte probari. Ait enim Symachus papa ut habetur dis. 83: "mortem enim languentibus probatur infligere, qui hanc, cum possit, non excludit", et per consequens iniuriam probatur inferre qui hanc cum possit non excludit. Nullus autem debet iniuriam inferre. Ergo quilibet tenetur iniuriam patientem, cum possit, defendere. Item, Ambrosius libro 'De officiis', et ponitur dis. 86 c. Pasce, ait: "quisquis enim pascendo hominem servare poteris, si non pavisti, occidisti". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod ille dicitur occidere alium qui sustentationem, cum potest, non exhibet corporalem. Ergo similiter ille intelligitur iniuriam irrogare qui, cum potest, iniuriam non excludit. Et ita quilibet, si potest, debet defendere iniuriam patientem. Item, Innocentius tertius, ut habetur Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Quante, asserit manifeste quod "facientes et consentientes pari pena plectendos canonica condempnat auctoritas, eos etiam delinquentibus favere interpretans, qui, cum possunt, manifesto facinori desinunt obviare". Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod qui proximum ab inferenda iniuria non defendit, cum potest, est pari pena cum iniuriante plectendus. Ita quilibet, cum potest, patienti iniuriam debet defensionem impendere.

Here is the twelfth reason. Everyone is bound to defend, if possible, someone who suffers harm no matter what its nature. Therefore all the more is everyone bound to defend, if possible, someone who suffers harm because of attempted opposition to a heretic pope in defense of the catholic faith. The consequence is clear and evident, for if someone suffering harm must be defended, he is to be defended above all if he is known to be sustaining harm for the cause of justice and the catholic faith. The antecedent proposition for its part appears to be expressly proved by authorities of the holy fathers. For Pope Symachus states in dis. 83: "he is proven to have inflicted death on the seriously ill who does not prevent it when able to do so", [col. 293] and consequently he is proved to have caused the harm who does not prevent it when he can. But no one must cause a harm. Therefore everyone is obligated, if possible, to defend someone suffering harm. Again, Ambrose states in the book 'On offices' (and this is recorded in dis. 86 c. Pasce): "for whoever, for if you, might have saved a man by feeding him, you killed him if you did not provide nourishment." [col. 302] One gathers from these words that someone who does not provide bodily sustenance to another when he can is said to be killing him. Therefore in similar fashion someone is understood to be inflicting harm if he does not prevent it when he can. And thus everyone, if he can, must defend someone who suffers harm. Again, Innocent III asserts evidently in Extra, De sententia excommunicationis, c. Quante that "canonical authority condemns those who do the deed and those who consent to the deed as meriting the same punishment, and also favours counting among delinquents those who fail to act against an obvious crime when they can". [col. 909] One gathers from these words that he who can but does not defend his neighbour from impending harm is to receive a punishment equal to that of the harm's perpetrator. Thus, where possible, everyone must provide defense to someone who suffers harm.

Capitulum 42

Chapter 42

Discipulus: Auctoritates predicte de solis iudicibus vel prelatis habentibus super alios potestatem debent intelligi, non autem de illis qui potestatem vel iurisdictionem super iniuriantes nullam habent. Quod pluribus modis videtur posse probari. Primo autem hoc auctoritate beati Augustini que ponitur 23 q. 4 c. Forte ostenditur. Ait enim: "forte in populo Dei stat iuxta te avarus, raptor, inhians rebus alienis, quem nosti talem, et fidelis est, vel potius fidelis vocatur. Non eum potes de ecclesia pellere, non habes aliquem aditum castigando et corripiendo ipsum corrigere, accessurus est tecum ad altare. Noli timere", et infra: "sane si iudex es, si iudicandi potestatem accepisti, ecclesiastica regula, si apud te accusatur, si veris documentis testibusque convincitur, coherce, corripe, excommunica, degrada". Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod non ad socios sed ad prelatos spectat corrigere delinquentes, et per consequens non ad socios sed ad prelatos spectat defendere passos iniurias quia cuius est defendere patientem iniuriam eius est reprimere et per consequens plectere iniuriam inferentem.

Student: The cited authorities must be understood as applying only to judges or to prelates who have authority over others, but they do not apply to those who have no authority over the perpetrators of harm. It seems that this can be proved in many ways. And the authority of blessed Augustine, which is recorded in 23 q. 4 c. Forte, shows this first of all. He says this: "perhaps among the people of God there stands next to you a greedy miser, a robber, who lusts after what belongs to others, and you know his character, and he happens to be a believer, or rather he is so called. You cannot throw him out of church, you have no possibility of changing him through rebuke or correction, and he will be marching with you to the altar. Fear not". [col. 902] And further on: "of course if you are a judge, if you have received the authority to adjudicate, if he is accused before you, if he is convicted by legitimate examples and witnesses, use the rule of the church to coerce him, to correct him, to excommunicate him, to lower his status". [col. 902] One gathers from these words that the correction of delinquents pertains not to partners but to prelates, and consequently that it pertains not to partners but to prelates to defend those who have suffered harm, since the same instance which must defend him who suffers harm has the duty to prevent the harm and thus to punish the perpetrator thereof.

Secundo probatur idem sic. Si socius tenetur defendere socium, videns aliquem verberare clericum et non defendens ipsum sententiam excommunicationis incurreret iuxta auctoritatem Innocentii tertii superius allegatam. Sed hoc est inconveniens, sicut glossa ibidem tali ratione probat: "nullus est excommunicatus ex facto alterius nisi participando vel in locutione, vel in oratione, aut in crimine, supra eodem, capitulo Nuper, vel nisi mandatum vel auctoritatem prestiterit, supra eodem, capitulo Mulieres". Sed hic nullo tali modo participat, ergo non est excommunicatus, et per consequens socius non tenetur defendere socium.

Here is a second proof of the same point. If a partner is bound to defend a partner, then a person who sees someone battering a clerk and does not defend the latter would incur a sentence of excommunication according to the authority of Innocent III, which was cited above. [1 Dial. 6.41] But this is inconvenient, as the contextual gloss proves [col. 1919] by the following reasoning: "no one is excommunicated by the deed of another unless he participates by comment, by verbal incitement, or in the criminal act itself, see above, same question, c. Nuper; [col. 900] or unless he has issued the order or granted the authority for the commission of the deed, see above, same question, c. Mulieres". [col. 891] But in the issue at hand no one is participating in this way, therefore no one is excommunicated, and consequently a partner is not obligated to defend a partner.

Tertio probatur idem ratione quam innuit glossa ubi supra et eandem tangit glossa 23 q. 3 c. Non inferenda, que sic potest formari. Nullus tenetur ad illud pro quo potest ex pacto recipere pecuniam, quia illud ad quod quis de necessitate absque omni pacto tenetur debet gratis impendere. Sed pro defensione socii socius licite recipit pecuniam, nec receptam pecuniam tenetur restituere. Ergo socius non tenetur socium de necessitate absque pacto defendere.

A third proof of the same point stems from the reason implied by the gloss just cited (the identical argument is touched upon by the gloss [col. 1294] to 23 q. 3 c. Non inferenda) and may be constructed as follows. No one is obligated to do something for which he may be remunerated by contract, because that to which someone is necessarily obligated independently of any contract he must perform without payment. But a partner lawfully receives money for the defense of a partner, nor is he bound to return the money received. Therefore a partner is not necessarily bound to defend a partner independently of a contract.

Quarto ostenditur idem sic. Non magis tenetur socius socium defendere quam teneatur medicus periclitantem infirmum gratis curare. Sed medicus non tenetur gratis infirmum curare, quia de suo non tenetur quis facere beneficium (10 q. 2 Precarie). Ergo nec socius tenetur socium gratis defendere.

Here is a fourth demonstration of the same point. A partner does not have a greater obligation to defend a partner than a doctor would be obligated to cure without payment someone who was dangerously ill. But a doctor is not obligated to cure the ill for nothing, because no one is obligated to grant favours from what belongs to them (10 q. 2 Precarie). [col. 621] Therefore neither is a partner obligated to defend a partner for nothing.

Quinto sic. Defensio socii est quedam militia vel aliquid simile militie. Sed nemo tenetur suis stipendiis militare, testante Apostolo qui 1 Cor. 9 ait: "quis militat suis stipendiis unquam" quasi diceret "nullus". Ergo nemo tenetur alium gratis defendere. Sexto sic. Defendere socium est benefacere. Sed nemo tenetur alii benefacere gratis quia per leges nemo cogitur benefacere sed malefacere prohibetur, ut testatur Augustinus contra Petilianum et ponitur 23 q.5 Ad fidem. Ergo nemo tenetur socium gratis defendere. Hec sunt quibus probari videtur quod socius non tenetur socium gratis defendere, ex quo sequitur quod non tenentur omnes catholici impugnantes papam hereticum defensare.

Here is the fifth proof. The defense of a partner is a type of military service or something that resembles this. But no one is bound to perform military service at his own expense, witness the Apostle who states in 1 Corinthians 9: "who goeth a warfare any time at his own charges?",[1 Corinthians 9:7] as if he were saying "no one". Therefore nobody is obligated to defend another without payment. Here is the sixth proof. To defend a partner is to confer a benefit. But no one is bound to confer a benefit upon someone for no remuneration, since the laws force no one to confer benefits, but only prevents wrongdoing, witness Augustine against Petilianus (and this is recorded in 23 q. 5 Ad fidem).[col. 939] Therefore no one is obligated to defend a partner for nothing. These are the reasons, which appear to prove that a partner is not obligated to defend a partner gratis, from which it follows that all catholics are not obligated to defend the opponents of a heretic pope.

Porro quia, ut estimo, frater M. et adherentes sibi illos qui ipsos contra summum pontificem non defendunt reprehensibiles arbitrantur, putantes quod non solum pro causa fidei patientes sed etiam alii pro levioribus causis sustinentes persecutiones et iniurias non tantum a prelatis sed etiam a sociis et aliis sunt pro viribus defendendi, peto quod assertionem predictam, quod socius videlicet tenetur defendere socium, allegationibus quantum potes fortioribus munire coneris, et quomodo ad rationes in contrarium quas adduxi frater M. et sui respondeant studeas propalare. Per huiusmodi enim et impugnationes quibus predicti frater M. et sui dominum summum pontificem et sibi adherentes impugnare conantur magis profunde intelligam, et quomodo debent reprobari et refelli evidentius animadvertam.

Furthermore, since I reckon that brother M. and his supporters consider those who do not defend them against the supreme pontiff to be blameworthy, and think that not only individuals who suffer for the cause of faith but also others who experience persecutions and injuries for the sake of less serious causes must be strongly defended, not just by prelates but also by partners and others, I ask that you attempt to bolster the aforesaid assertion, namely that a partner is obligated to defend a partner, with the strongest possible arguments, and that you undertake to show how brother M. and his friends respond to the objections which I outlined. Indeed such an approach will allow me to understand more profoundly the aggressive theories with which the aforementioned brother M. and his friends are trying to oppose the Lord supreme pontiff and his adherents, and I shall grasp more evidently how these theories must be rebuked and rejected.

Capitulum 43

Chapter 43

Magister: Nequaquam deciperis estimando quod frater M. et adherentes sibi valde reprehensibiles nonnullos reputant christianos et a peccato mortali nullatenus excusandos pro eo quod eis defensionem contra dominum I. non impendunt, dicentes quod quilibet, cum potest, modo congruenti et sibi possibili tenetur socium iniuriam patientem defendere et a periculo liberare. Ex quo moliuntur inferre quod cum ipsi propter iustitiam et fidem catholicam persecutiones gravissimas patiantur, sunt a catholicis defendendi et a periculis liberandi.

Master: You will in no wise be deceived if you reckon that brother M. and his associates consider some Christians to be highly blameworthy, and not to be excused from mortal sin by their failure to defend them against the Lord J. Brother M. and his associates contend that anyone, if he can, is obligated (by using a method both appropriate and personally possible) to defend a partner who suffers harm and to liberate him from danger. From this they attempt to deduce that since they are suffering the most serious of persecutions for the sake of justice and the catholic faith, they must be defended by catholics and liberated from dangers.

Quod autem socius socium patientem iniuriam, cum potest, modo sibi congruenti et possibili, teneatur etiam gratis defendere, auctoritatibus, rationibus, et exemplis videtur posse probari. Hoc enim Ambrosius, ut allegatum est superius, vocaliter et sententialiter videtur asserere dicens: "qui enim non repellit a socio iniuriam, si potest, tam est in vitio quam ille, qui facit". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod qui non defendit socium culpam incurrit, quia repellere iniuriam est defendere reputandum.

It indeed appears possible to demonstrate by authorities, reasons, and examples that a partner, if he can and in a way both appropriate and possible to him, is obligated to defend without payment a partner who is suffering harm. For as was argued earlier, [1 Dial. 6.37] this is what Ambrose appears to assert both by words and in substance when he states; "for he who does not, if he can, prevent a partner from being harmed, is just as guilty as the one who commits the misdeed". [col. 898] One gathers from these words that he who does not defend a partner commits a sin, because to prevent harm from being done should be considered identical to providing a defense.

Discipulus: Ad hoc respondet glossa ibidem dicens: "si potest, id est si est in potestate positus". Ex quibus verbis glosse datur intelligi quod Ambrosius loquitur de prelatis.

Student: The contextual gloss states [col. 1294] in reply to this: "if he can, that is to say, if he wields an authoritative office". One gathers from these words of the gloss that Ambrose is referring to prelates.

Magister: Glossa illam expositionem non asserit, sed tantummodo recitat, quam in fine illius notule reprobare videtur dicens: "sed istis, scilicet asserentibus expositionem predictam, obviat infra, eodem capitulo ultimo". Ex quo capitulo colligitur evidenter quod turba Iudeorum que non defendit Christum contra principes ipsum occidere volentes nequaquam fuit immunis a scelere. Ex quo sequitur quod non solum prelati sed etiam plebei tenebantur defendere Christum contra prelatos eorum, et ita socius tenetur etiam defendere socium. Quod etiam illa expositio corrumpat textum patet aperte, cum loquitur expresse de illo qui a socio iniuriam non repellit.

Master: The gloss does not assert this explanation but merely recites it, and appears to reject it at the end of the commentary when it says: "but they", namely those who assert the aforementioned explanation, "are contradicted below, in the last chapter [c. Non inferenda col. 898] of the same question". One obviously gathers from the last chapter just referred to that the Jewish crowd, which did not defend Christ against the leaders who wanted to kill him, was not exempted from the crime. From which it follows that not only the prelates but also the ordinary people were obligated to defend Christ against their leaders, and thus a partner is likewise obligated to defend a partner. It is also quite clear that this explanation misinterprets the text, which speaks expressly of someone who fails to protect a partner from harm.

Discipulus: Ad idem plures auctoritates adducas.

Student: Present further authorities to the same effect.

Magister: Hoc idem Ambrosius, ut superius est adductum, asserit manifeste, quia dicit quod tueri "a latronibus socios, plena iustitia est". Opus autem iustitie tenetur quilibet exercere. Ergo de necessitate iustitie sunt socii defendendi.

Master: It has been indicated earlier [1 Dial. 6.37] that Ambrose asserts the same point because he states [col. 897] that "full of justice" is the protection "of one's partners from bandits". And everyone is obligated to perform a work of justice. Therefore justice necessarily demonstrates that partners are to be defended.

Item, idem ut habetur dis. 86 c. Non satis loquens illi qui opera misericordie proximo tenetur impendere (qualis est non solum prelatus sed etiam subditus) ait: "si tempore periculi, quo rapitur ad mortem, plus apud te pecunia tua valeat quam vita morituri, non est leve peccatum". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod debet quis socium a morte redimere, et per consequens eadem ratione tenetur eum si potest defendere.

Again, the same Ambrose (this is recorded in dis. 86 c. Non satis) speaking of someone who is obligated to provide works of mercy to his neighbour (not only a characteristic of rulers but also of subjects), states: "at a time of danger, when someone is violently dragged off to death, it is no light transgression if money weighs more with you than the life of the one about to die". [col. 301] These words lead to the conclusion that a partner must be rescued from death and thus, for the same reason, must be defended if this is possible.

Item, ista videtur esse sententia Salomonis qui in Proverbiis (secundum beatum Hieronymum in Prologo) parvulum docens, et per consequens non ad prelatum sed ad alium sermonem dirigens, ait: "erue eos qui ducuntur ad mortem, et qui trahuntur ad interitum liberare ne cesses". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod non solum prelati sed etiam alii persecutiones et iniurias patientes defensare tenentur.

Again, according to blessed Jerome in his prologue, [Hieronymus, Prologus in Bibliam, in Biblia Latina cum Glossa Ordinaria (facsimile reprint of the A. Risch /1480/1 Strassburg editio princeps), Brepols-Turnhout, 1992, vol. II, p. 653b] this appears to be the judgement of Solomon in the Proverbs who, teaching a youngster, and therefore directing his speech not to a ruler but to someone other than a ruler, states: "forbear to deliver them that are drawn unto death, and those that are ready to be slain". [Proverbs 24:11] One gathers from these words that not only prelates but also others are obligated to defend those who suffer injuries and persecutions.

Discipulus: Sufficiant ad presens auctoritates iste pro assertione predicta. Ideo rationes adducas.

Student: For the moment the authorities advanced in support of the assertion being discussed should be sufficient. Therefore proceed to a presentation of the supporting reasons.

Magister: Prima ratio est talis. Qui debent sibi mutuum auxilium, consilium et favorem impendere, et sibi mutuam defensionem tenentur. Omnes autem catholici debent sibi mutuum auxilium consilium et favorem impendere. Tum quia omnes catholici sunt membra unius corporis, membra autem pro se invicem sollicita sunt (1 Cor. 12). Tum quia episcopi quorum unus non est prelatus alterius auxilium mutuum sibi debent impendere, teste Innocentio secundo qui, ut dicitur dis. 90 c. Precipimus, ait: "precipimus, ut episcopi, ad solum Deum et salutem populi habentes respectum, omni tepiditate semota, ad pacem firmiter tenendam mutuum sibi consilium et auxilium prebeant, neque hoc alicuius amore vel odio pretermittant. Quod si quis in hoc Dei opere tepidus fuerit inventus, dampnum proprie dignitatis incurrat". Cui etiam concordat Alexander papa, qui, ut legitur 3 q. 1 c. Nulli, ait: "qui autem ex vestro fuerit collegio, et ab auxilio vestro se subtraxerit, magis schismaticus quam sacerdos esse probabitur. 'Ecce' (inquit propheta), 'quam bonum et quam iucundum habitare fratres in unum'. Illi vero non habitant in unum, qui fratrum se solatio subtrahunt". Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod episcopi et sacerdotes quorum etiam unus alteri minime est subiectus, auxilium mutuum sibi debent impendere, et per consequens sibi debent defensionem mutuam congruentem prestare. Ex quo sequitur quod socius socium debet defendere.

Master: The first reason is this. Those who owe each other the provision of mutual assistance, counsel, and benefit, also owe each other mutual defense. But all catholics owe to each other the provision of mutual assistance, counsel, and benefit, because all catholics are members of one body, and members are mutually concerned for each other (1 Corinthians 12). [1 Corinthians 12:25] This also holds because bishops of which one is not the ruler of the other must provide mutual assistance to each other, witness Innocent II who states, as recorded in dis. 90 c. Precipimus: "we command that bishops, focusing on God alone and on the salvation of the people, putting aside all lack of enthusiasm, should provide to each other mutual counsel and assistance for the firm maintenance of peace, nor forego this for the love or hate of another. Should someone be found to be lukewarm in this work of God, he will incur the loss of his own office". [col. 315] Pope Alexander also agrees with this, and states, as we read [col. 506] in 3 q. 1 c. Nulli: "but he who is of your society yet withdraws from your assistance, will be demonstrably more schismatic than priest. The prophet says 'behold, how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity'. [Psalms 132:1] But they do not dwell together in unity who withdraw themselves from the consolation of brethren". These words make us understand that bishops and priests, even those among them who are not subject to another, must provide each other with mutual assistance, and consequently must provide each other with the appropriate mutual defense. From which it follows that a partner must defend a partner.

Secunda ratio est talis. Magis tenetur socius socium sibi non inferiorem patientem iniuste defendere quam viri ecclesiastici teneantur defendere sceleratos qui eis minime sunt subiecti. Sed viri ecclesiastici sceleratos et impios ad ecclesiam fugientes, licet eis nullatenus sint subiecti, defendere tenentur. Ergo multo magis socius socium innocentem debet defendere. Minor probatur auctoritate Gregorii qui, ut habetur 23 q. 5 c. Reos, ait: "reos sanguinis defendat ecclesia", ubi dicit glossa: "omnes fugientes ad ecclesiam tenetur defendere ut 17 q. 4 Reum et hoc verum est sive rei sint sive non".

The second reason is this. A partner is more obligated to defend a partner suffering unjustly who is not his inferior, than ecclesiastical persons are obligated to defend miscreants who are not subject to them. But ecclesiastical persons are bound to defend the wicked and impious that flee to the church for safety, even though they are in no way their subjects. Therefore all the more must a partner defend an innocent partner. The minor premiss is proved by the authority of Gregory who states, as is recorded in 23 q. 5 c. Reos: "the church defends those guilty of shedding blood", [col. 932] where the gloss [cols, 1338-9] explains: "it is obligated to defend all those who flee to the church for safety, as in 17 q. 4 Reum, [col. 817] and this is true whether they are guilty or not".

Discipulus: Hoc dicit Gregorius quia viri ecclesiastici ecclesiam tenentur defendere, et ideo tenentur prohibere ne fugientibus ad ecclesiam violentia fiat.

Student: Gregory says this because ecclesiastical persons are obligated to defend the church, and therefore they are obligated to prevent violence being done to those who flee to the interior of a church.

Magister: Tu aliam causam assignas quam Gregorius quare rei sunt ab ecclesia defendendi, nam Gregorius causam assignans sui dicti immediate post verba predicta subiungit: "ne effusionis sanguinis fiat particeps", ex quibus verbis colligitur quod ideo viri ecclesiastici debent defendere reos ad ecclesiam fugientes ne homicidii fiant participes. Quia qui non resistit cum potest, consentit, iuxta sanctorum patrum sententias. Ergo consimiliter qui non defendit socium iniuriam patientem, cum possit, iniurie crimen incurrit.

Master: You assign a different reason than does Gregory as to why the guilty must be defended by the church. Indeed Gregory explains his statement by immediately adding this comment to the words just cited: "so that it not be a participant in the shedding of blood". [col. 932] One gathers from these words that the reason why ecclesiastical persons must defend criminals who flee to the church for safety is so as not to participate in a homicide. For he who does not resist when he can is a consenting party according to the rulings of the holy fathers. Similarly therefore, he who does not when he can defend a partner suffering an injury commits the same crime.

Unde ex hoc tertia ratio sic formatur. Quilibet catholicus ad hoc tenetur sine quo etiam in crimine participat criminoso. Sed qui non defendit, cum potest, socium iniuriam patientem participat in crimine iniuriam inferenti. Ergo socius socium, cum potest, tenetur defendere. Maior est manifesta. Minor auctoritatibus sanctorum patrum patenter ostendi videtur. Ait enim Eleutherius papa, ut habetur 2 q. 7 c. Negligere: "negligere, cum possis perversos perturbare, nichil aliud est quam fovere. Nec caret scrupulo societatis occulte qui manifesto facinori desinit obviare". Eadem sententia etiam verbaliter ponitur dis. 83 c. Error, et 23 q. 3 c. Qui potest ponitur sub hiis verbis: "qui potest obviare et perturbare perversos, et non facit, nichil est aliud quam favere impietati eorum. Nec caret scrupulo societatis occulte qui manifesto facinori desinit obviare". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod qui non resistit iniuriam facienti eidem communicat in crimine atque favet.

And on this basis one may construct a third reason as follows. Every catholic is bound to what he must do so as not to be a party to some criminal's misdeed. But he who does not when he can defend a partner suffering an injury, participates in the crime of the individual who causes the injury. Therefore a partner is obligated to defend a partner when he can. The major is obvious. The minor premiss appears clearly demonstrated by authorities of the holy fathers. For Pope Eleutherius, as is recorded in 2 q. 7 c. Negligere, says: "to neglect to confound the wicked when you can do this is nothing else than to give them support. Suspicion of involvement in secret conspiracy is not out of place where someone who can, fails to act against an obvious crime". [col. 501] The same judgement, verbally identical, is recorded in dis. 83 c. Error, [col. 293] and in 23 q. 3 c. Qui potest we have it in the following words: "he who can resist and confound the wicked, and fails to do this, does nothing else than to give support to their impiety. Suspicion of involvement in secret conspiracy is not out of place where someone who can fails to act against an obvious crime". [col. 898] One gathers from these words that he who does not resist someone who commits a harmful misdeed is his accomplice in crime and his supporter.

Discipulus: Verba que allegasti de prelatis tantummodo debent intelligi secundum quod notat glossa 2 q. 7 Negligere.

Student: The words that you have presented in argument must only be understood as applying to rulers according to the note of the gloss to 2 q. 7 Negligere.

Magister: Hec tua responsio dupliciter impugnatur. Primo quia glossa hoc non asserit sed tantummodo dicit quod ista "videtur de prelatis tantum loqui". Secundo quia perturbare perversos contingit dupliciter. Uno modo ipsos pro sua perversitate pena congrua puniendo, et sic perturbare perversos regulariter solummodo pertinet ad iudices vel prelatos. Alio modo saltem eis cum expedit verbis monitoriis resistendo. Et istud spectat ad omnes, glossa ibidem aperte insinuante quod quilibet tenetur perturbare "id est prohibere et removere a malo, et hoc cum commode potest illud facere, alias non peccat qui sic non prohibet", et subdit: "secundum hoc quilibet tenetur prohibere iniuriam a proximo," et per consequens proximum saltem verbis si potest debet defendere, licet non sit prelatus ipsius.

Master: This response of yours is rejected in two ways. First of all because the gloss does not assert as much, but merely states that this source "appears only to speak of prelates". [col. 709] Secondly, because there are two ways of confounding the wicked. One way is to punish them for their wickedness by an appropriate penalty, and to confound the wicked in this way pertains as a rule only to judges or to prelates. Another way is to resist them by verbal warnings, at least when this is expedient. And this is a method available to all, with the contextual gloss openly insinuating that everyone is obligated to confound "that is, to forbid the doing of evil and to dissuade people from it, and to do so when one conveniently may, otherwise there is no sin in a failure to prohibit in this way", [col. 709] and the gloss adds: "according to this, everyone is obligated to prevent the doing of harm to a neighbour", [col. 709] and consequently he must defend the neighbour at least verbally, if this is possible, even though he is not the neighbour's prelate.

Quarta ratio est hec. Ille tenetur, si potest, defendere socium iniuriam patientem, qui tenetur corripere et corrigere iniuriam inferentem, nam corrigendo iniuriari volentem defendit quantum in se est ipsum qui esset passurus iniuriam. Sed alii quam iudices vel prelati, si possunt, tenentur corrigere iniuriari volentem. Ergo si commode possunt, debent defendere illum qui est passurus iniuriam. Maior evidens esse videtur. Minor multipliciter videtur posse probari. Primo auctoritate beati Augustini qui in libro 'De verbis Domini' (et ponitur 23 q. 4 c. primo) ait: "tollerandi sunt quidem mali pro pace, nec corporaliter ab eis recedatur sed spiritualiter. Spiritualiter autem exire est facere quod pertinet ad correctionem malorum, quantum licet pro gradu cuiusque, salva pace". Ubi dicit glossa super verbo 'pro gradu': "id est pro dignitate, et officio cuiuscunque. Aliter enim debent prelati corrigere delinquentes, et alio modo socii. Prelatus corrigit increpando et verberando, ut infra, eadem questione, capitulo Forte. Socius vero admonendo et reprobando factum eius". Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod non solum prelati sed etiam alii tenentur corrigere delinquentes et iniurias aliis facientes, quod etiam idem Augustinus, ut habetur 23 q. 5 c. Non putes, sentire videtur. Ait enim: "non putes, te tunc amare vicinum tuum, quando eum non cedis". Et infra: "aut tunc amare vicinum tuum, quando non corrigis eum. Non est ista caritas sed languor". Ex quibus verbis habetur quod vicinus vicinum tenetur corrigere. Item, Anacletus, ut habetur 24 q. 3 c. Tam sacerdos, ait: "tam sacerdos quam reliqui fideles omnes summam debent habere curam de hiis, qui pereunt". Ergo ad omnes spectat corrigere iniuriam inferentes.

Here is the fourth reason. He is obligated to defend (if he can) a partner suffering harm, who is bound to rebuke and correct the individual inflicting the harm, for in correcting the one wanting to do harm he is defending as much as he can the person who would have experienced the harm. But people other than judges or prelates are obligated to correct (if they can) an individual wanting to inflict harm. Therefore, if they conveniently can, they must defend the person who would be experiencing the harm. The major premiss appears evident. The minor premiss appears capable of being proved in many ways. First, by the authority of blessed Augustine who states in the book 'On the words of the Lord' (as recorded in 23 q. 4 c. 1): "the bad must certainly be tolerated for the sake of peace, and withdrawal from their company must be spiritual, not physical. Spiritual withdrawal consists in doing what is relevant for the correction of bad people, in accordance with everyone's rank in the state, peace being maintained". [c. Tollerandi col. 899] Here the gloss notes [col. 1296] on the words "in accordance with rank": "i.e. in accordance with the status and office of everyone. For prelates must correct delinquents in one way and partners in another. A prelate corrects by violent reproaches and physical blows, as further on in the same question, c. Forte, [c. 902] while a partner issues warnings and verbal rejections of a partner's deed". From these words one is given to understand that not just prelates but others also are obligated to correct delinquents and those who harm others. Augustine himself appears to be of this sentiment, as 23 q. 5 c. Non putes [col. 940] records. For he states: "don't think that a refusal to withdraw from your neighbour is an indication of your love for him", and further on: "or that you are loving your neighbour precisely when you are refraining from correcting him. This is not love but idleness". One concludes from these words that a neighbour is obligated to correct a neighbour, Again, Anacletus states (we have it in 24 q. 3 c. Tam sacerdos): "both the priest and all the rest of the faithful must have the highest concern for those who are dying spiritually". [col. 994] Therefore it is everyone's business to correct those who do harm.

Discipulus: Scis quod multi hiis diebus tenent doctrinam Thome de Aquino. Quare dic quid ipse sentit de hac re, an scilicet ad omnes spectat corrigere delinquentes.

Student: You know that there are many these days who follow the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas. Therefore state his feeling on this issue, namely whether it is the business of everyone to correct delinquents.

Magister: Ipse tenet quod sic. Nam 2a 2e, q. 33, articulo 3 dicit sic: "duplex est correctio. Una quidem que est actus caritatis, qui specialiter tendit ad emendationem fratris delinquentis per simplicem admonitionem. Et talis correctio pertinet ad quemlibet caritatem habentem, sive sit subditus sive prelatus". Et articulo quarto dicit sic: "correctio fraterna, que est actus caritatis, pertinet ad unumquemque respectu cuiuslibet persone ad quam caritatem debet habere, si in eo aliquid corrigibile inveniatur".

Master: He maintains the affirmative. For here is what he says in 2a 2ae q. 33 article 3: "correction is twofold. Indeed there is one which is an act of love, and which is particularly concerned with the amendment of a delinquent brother by way of a simple admonition. And such a correction pertains to anyone who possesses charity, whether he is a subject or a ruler". [Summa Theologie, II-II, 33, 3, Responsio] And in article 4 he says: "fraternal correction, which is an act of love, pertains to anyone with respect to any person towards whom he must have charity, if something is discovered in the latter which requires to be corrected". [Summa Theologie, II-II, 33, 4, Responsio]

Discipulus: Non adducas plura ad probandum quod omnes tenentur corrigere iniuriari volentem, sed adhuc proba quod socius tenetur socium iniuriam patientem defendere.

Student: Do not present further material for the purpose of proving that all are obligated to correct someone wanting to do harm, but prove once again that a partner is obligated to defend a partner suffering harm.

Magister: Quinta ratio pro assertione predicta est hec. Ad eundem spectat malum proximi removere, si potest, ad quem spectat bonum eiusdem, si potuerit, procurare. Sed quilibet tenetur bonum proximi procurare, quia aliter caritatem ad ipsum minime habet. Ergo quilibet tenetur malum alterius removere, si potest, et ita tenetur removere malum iniuriam patientis. Sed sepe hoc non fit nisi ipsum defendendo. Ergo quilibet tenetur alium defendere si potest.

Master: Here is the fifth reason in support of this assertion. It pertains to the same person to avert evil from his neighbour, if he can, whose business it is to provide good to this neighbour, if possible. But everyone is obligated to provide good to a neighbour, for otherwise one does not demonstrate love towards him. Therefore everyone is bound to avert evil from someone suffering harm. Frequently this cannot be done except by defending the sufferer, therefore everyone is obligated to defend another if he can.

Sexta ratio est hec. Non minus indiget in periculo constitutus contra volentem iniuriari defendi quam esuriens cibari et sitiens potari. Sed quilibet qui potest tenetur esurientes cibare et sitientes potare si per alium eis minime subvenitur. Ergo quilibet tenetur alium defendere, si potest, si non appareat alius qui velit et possit eum defendere.

Here is the sixth reason. An individual in peril does not need less defense against someone wanting to harm him than a hungry person needs food and a thirsty person needs drink. But everyone capable of doing so is obligated to feed the hungry and to give drink to the thirsty, if there is no one else available to help. Therefore everyone capable of this is obligated to defend another if no other individual emerges willing and able to do it.

Discipulus: Adducas exempla pro assertione eadem.

Student: Present examples in favour of the assertion we are discussing.

Magister: Primum exemplum est de Abraham qui, ut legitur Genes. 14, quamvis non haberet iurisdictionem super captivantes Loth fratrem suum et alios, tamen non solum Loth defendit sed etiam irruit super captivantes eosque percussit et reduxit Loth cum substantia eius.

Master: The first example is that of Abraham. We read in Genesis 14 [:14-16] that although he did not have jurisdiction over the captors of his brother Loth and others, he nevertheless not only defended Loth but also attacked the captors, struck them down, and brought home Loth and Loth's property.

Secundum est de Moyse qui Hebreum percussum ab Egyptio defendit, et occidit Egyptium, ut legitur Exod. 2, de quo scribit Ambrosius, ut habetur 23 q. 3 c. Non inferenda, dicens: "cum vidisset Hebreum ab Egyptio iniuriam accipientem, defendit ita, ut Egyptium prosterneret". Et tamen super Hebreos aut Egyptios tunc Moyses nullam iurisdiciariam habuit potestatem. De quo etiam ubi prius Exod. 2 scribitur quod septem filias sacerdotis Madian a pastoribus defensavit, cum tamen neque super puellas neque super pastores iurisdictionem haberet.

The second example is that of Moses, who defended the Hebrew struck by the Egyptian, and killed the latter as we read in Exodus 2 [:11-12] . Ambrose writes of Moses in 23 q. 3 c. Non inferenda, and states: "when he saw a Hebrew being harmed by an Egyptian he defended him by utterly defeating the latter". [col. 898] And yet at that time Moses possessed no power of jurisdiction over Hebrews or Egyptians. It is also written of Moses in Exodus 2 [:16-17] that he defended the seven daughters of the priest of Madian from nomadic herders, and yet he possessed jurisdiction neither over the girls nor over the herders.

Tertium exemplum est de Raab meretrice que, ut habetur Iosue 2, exploratores filiorum Israel abscondendo defendit.

The third example is that of Raab the prostitute. We have it in Joshua 2 [:4] that she defended the spies of the sons of Israel by hiding them.

Quartum est de beato Petro qui etiam arma movendo Christum defendere satagebat (Matth. 26), nec videtur de voluntate defendendi reprehensus a Christo, sed quia hesitare videbatur an Christus aliter quam per arma poterat defensari, propter quod Christus ipsum acriter increpando dixit: "an putas quia non possum rogare Patrem meum et exhibebit michi modo plus quam duodecim legiones angelorum".

The fourth example is that of blessed Peter, who attempted to defend Christ even by the use of weapons (Matthew 26 [:51, and cf. John 18:10] ). It does not seem that Christ rebuked him for the original intention, but only because Peter appeared to doubt whether Christ could be defended otherwise than by weapons. This is the reason why Christ strongly chastised Peter by stating: "thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father, and He shall presently give me more than twelve legions of angels?" [Matthew 26:53]

Quintum exemplum est de discipulis Damasci qui, ut legitur Act. 9, beatum Paulum submittendo illum in sporta contra Iudeorum insidias defendebant. Alia quamplura exempla quod alii quam prelati in periculo positos defendebant tam in scriptura divina quam in aliis scripturis auctenticis scribuntur aperte.

The fifth example is that of the disciples of Damascus who, as we read in Acts 9 [:25] , defended blessed Paul against the plots of the Jews by letting him down by the wall in a basket. There are many other examples clearly recorded in Holy Writ and in other official works, which show that people who were not prelates defended those who were in danger.

Capitulum 44

Chapter 44

Discipulus: Nolo plures allegationes audire pro assertione predicta, et ideo dic quomodo possunt obiectiones quas feci dissolvi.

Student: I do not want to hear any more arguments in support of the assertion under discussion; therefore indicate how the objections which I made can be resolved.

Magister: Prima auctoritas Augustini quam allegas non loquitur specialiter de iniuriantibus aliis, sed de delinquentibus in communi. Quia tamen assertores predicti consimiliter dicunt de omnibus peccantibus corrigendis et de passis iniuriam defendendis, ideo ad auctoritatem Augustini predictam respondent dicentes quod in prima parte loquitur Augustinus de hiis qui auctoritatem iudiciariam non habentes corrigendo secrete apud delinquentes nequaquam proficerent, sed eos deteriores efficerent. In hoc enim casu non debet aliquis iurisdictionem nullatenus habens corrigere delinquentes. Consimiliter ubi aliquis attemptando defendere patientes iniuriam ipsos defendere non posset et ad deteriora inferentes iniuriam provocaret, deberet defensionem subtrahere. Sed sicut subditi peccant mortaliter si timore temporalia aut humanum favorem perdendi aut propter personale periculum evitandum vel ob aliquod terrenum habendum, socios vel prelatos cum probabiliter putant quod possunt eos a peccato retrahere, negligunt secreto corrigere, ita peccant mortaliter qui cum convenienter possunt, ex timore vel cupiditate defensionem in periculis constitutis vel patientibus iniuriam non impendunt.

Master: The first authority of Augustine, which you allege, mentions all types of delinquents and not specifically those who harm others. Nevertheless, since the theorists you are objecting to state the same position with respect to the need of correcting all sinners as to the need of defending individuals who suffer harm, they consequently respond to the aforementioned authority of Augustine by saying that in its first segment Augustine is speaking about those individuals who do not possess judicial authority, and whose secret correction, far from benefiting delinquents, would make the latter even worse. Indeed in such a situation someone not possessing jurisdiction must refrain from correcting delinquents. Similarly, where someone by attempting to defend those suffering harm would not in fact be able to defend them successfully, and would provoke the perpetrators of the harm into committing even worse deeds, he would have the duty to refrain from providing defense. And yet just as subjects sin mortally (if they neglect to secretly correct partners or prelates when they think it probable that they might influence these against the commission of evil) for fear of losing temporal possessions or human favour, or so as to avoid personal danger or to acquire some earthly possession, so likewise those sin mortally who (because of fear or desire for gain) do not provide defense when they conveniently can to people threatened by dangers or suffering harm.

Discipulus: Estne aliquis doctor modernus qui teneat quod non corrigentes in casu predicto peccantes peccent mortaliter.

Student: Is there some modern doctor who holds that those who fail to correct sinners in the situation we are discussing commit a mortal sin.

Magister: Thomas de Aquino hoc sentit expresse. Dicit enim 2a 2e, q. 33, articulo 2: "pretermittitur fraterna correctio cum peccato mortali quando scilicet 'formidatur.. iudicium vulgi et carnis excrutiatio vel peremptio', dum tamen hec ita dominentur in animo quod fraterne caritati preponantur. Et hoc videtur contingere quando aliquis presumit de aliquo delinquente probabiliter quod posset eum a peccato retrahere, et tamen propter timorem vel cupiditatem pretermittit". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod etiam pro morte vitanda non debet quis dimittere corrigere delinquentem si probabiliter credit quod potest eum per secretam correctionem retrahere a peccato. Ex quo concluditur quod quilibet catholicus debet si potest corrigere inferentem iniuriam, et per consequens defendere iniuriam patientem.

Master: This is the express belief of Thomas Aquinas. For he states in 2a 2e q. 33 article 2 that: "it is a sin to refrain from fraternal correction when, namely 'one fears mass opinion and the torture or destruction of one's flesh', [Augustine, De Civitate Dei, I, 9 (PL 41, col. 22)] if these fears are so dominant in one's mind that they are placed ahead of brotherly love. And this appears to be the case when someone surmises with probability that he can restrain some delinquent from the commission of a sin, and yet refrains from doing so because of fear or desire for gain". [Summa Theologie II-II, 33, 2, Ad primum] One gathers from these words that a person must not refrain from correcting a delinquent even in order to avoid death, if the person has a probable belief that he can restrain the subject from sin by secret correction. From which one concludes that every catholic must correct a perpetrator of harm if he can, and thus that every catholic must defend someone who suffers harm.

Discipulus: Quid dicitur ad hoc quod accepi in illa obiectione, videlicet, cuius est defendere iniuriam patientem eius est reprimere, et per consequens plectere iniuriam inferentem.

Student: What is the answer to my assumption in this objection, namely that he who must defend one who suffers harm has the duty to prevent the harm and thus to punish the perpetrator thereof.

Magister: Ista negatur tanquam falsa, quia ad plures pertinet defensio patientium et in periculis positorum, ad quos tamen, quamvis pertineat reprimere iniuriantes cum moderamine inculpate tutele ad eos tamen non spectat plectere iniuriam facientes, quemadmodum cuilibet licet vim vi repellere cum moderamine inculpate tutele (dis. 1 Ius naturale) ad quem tamen non semper pertinet illatam iniuriam vindicare.

Master: This assumption is rejected as false. For it is the business of many to defend suffering and endangered individuals and yet, even if these defenders may restrain harm doers by implementing blameless protection, it does not pertain to them to punish the harm doers. In the same way, everyone is entitled to repel force with force by implementing blameless protection (dis. 1 Ius naturale), [col. 2] but it does not always pertain to everyone to inflict punishment for harm done.

Discipulus: Dic ad secundam obiectionem.

Student: Respond to the second objection.

Magister: Ad illam potest dici quod quamvis videns clericum verberari non incurrat excommunicationis sententiam si ipsum, quamvis posit, non defendat, tamen peccat mortaliter si ipsum non defendit cum possit, quod non tantum habet veritatem de clerico verberato sed etiam de laico verberato iniuste, quia ex caritate fraterna quilibet, cum convenienter potest, tenetur alii in omni periculo subvenire, et hec responsio ex glossa super preallegato capitulo Quante colligitur, que ait: "videtur peccare omnis qui non defendit alium si potest (23 q. 3 Non inferenda et c. ultimo), et si non possit aliter defendere, saltem defendat clamore", et infra: "si ego qui non habeo aliquam potestatem, video, quod aliquis vult verberare clericum, sive percutere, sine meo consilio, vel auxilio, non credo quod sim excommunicatus si non prohibeo illum, licet alias forte peccem quia ipsum non defendo cum possim". Ex quibus verbis colligitur primo quod sunt diversi modi defendendi, cum aperte dicatur quod potest quis defendere clamore, et eadem ratione contingit defendere verbis monitoriis monendo inferentem iniuriam quod desistat, quod etiam glossa ibidem asserit manifeste, dicens: "alia est prohibitio sociorum et aliorum, quia illi solummodo admonendi sunt verbis sed non factis vindicando" videlicet iniuriam illatam, licet factis si possint teneantur defendere saltem expositum periculo occultando. Sicut enim secundum Augustinum, ut habetur 23 q, 4 c. Ipsa pietas, quilibet tenetur alium se volentem occidere liberare et de periculo si potest etiam violenter extrahere, ita tenetur quilibet alium quesitum occidi de periculo liberare, si potest, saltem, si non potest aliter, occultando. Sunt ergo diversi modi defendendi alium in periculo constitutum.

Master: The response to this might be, that although one who sees a clerk being battered does not incur the penalty of excommunication if he does not defend him though he could, he nevertheless commits a mortal sin if he does not defend the clerk when able to; which is true not only with respect to a battered clerk but also in the case of an unjustly battered layman, for everyone who conveniently can is bound by brotherly love to assist someone else in any danger. This response one gathers from the gloss to the c. Quante argued earlier [1 Dial. 6.41] which states: "it seems that everyone sins who does not defend another when he can (23 q. 3 Non inferenda [col. 898] and last chapter of the question), [c. Ostendit col. 898] and if he cannot defend otherwise let him at least defend by shouting". And further on: "if I, who have no official power at all, see that someone wants to batter or to strike a clerk without my counsel or assistance, I do not believe that I would be excommunicated if I do not stop him, although from another perspective I might perhaps commit a sin because I do not defend the clerk when I can". [col. 1919] From these words one gathers, to begin with, that there exist different methods of providing defense, since it is clearly stated that someone may provide a defense by shouting; and by the same token one could provide defense by admonitory words, warning the harm doer to desist. Actually the gloss obviously asserts this in the context just cited, stating: "different is the prohibition provided by partners and others, because these may only warn by words but not punish by overt actions", punish that is to say for the harm done, although they are obligated to offer an active defense (if they can) at least to the extent of hiding the person exposed to danger. For just as (according to Augustine, and this is recorded in 23 q. 4 c. Ipsa pietas) [col. 909] everyone is obligated to extricate another who wants to commit suicide [in a collapsing building], and if possible to remove him from danger even by the use of force, so likewise is everyone who can bound to liberate from danger someone who is the deliberate target of an assassin, at the very least by hiding him if no other possibility exists. Therefore there are different methods of defending someone who is in danger.

Secundo ex verbis glosse colligitur quod videns clericum verberari et non defendens si potest, peccet, tamen excommunicationis sententiam non incurrit. Et per hoc respondetur ad rationem glosse superius allegatam, quia per illam rationem non concluditur quod non defendens clericum, si potest, non peccat, sed quod non incidit in excommunicationis sententiam.

Secondly, one gathers from the words of the gloss that someone who sees a clerk being battered and does not defend him if he can, commits a sin but doers not incur a sentence of excommunication. And by this point one responds to the reason of the gloss argued earlier, [1 Dial. 6.42] because that reason does not lead to the conclusion that someone who does not defend a clerk (if he can) does not commit a sin, but that he does not incur a sentence of excommunication.

Discipulus: Videtur quod ista ratio non concludit quod non incidit in excommunicationis sententiam, nam iudex vel iurisdictionem habens non defendendo clericum, cum potest, incidit in excommunicationis sententiam, et tamen nullo predictorum modorum participat clericum verberanti, quia nec locutione, nec oratione, nec in crimine, nec eius mandato clericus verberatur, nec auctoritatem prestat, quia plus est auctoritatem prestare quam non defendere.

Student: It seems that this reason does not conclude that he does not incur a sentence of excommunication. For a judge or someone who possesses jurisdiction incurs a sentence of excommunication when he has the possibility of defending a clerk and does not, and yet he does not collaborate with him who is battering the clerk in any of the aforementioned ways: indeed, not in speech or in utterance, nor in the actual crime, nor is the clerk battered by his order, nor does he sanction the deed by his authority, for it is more significant to provide authority than to refrain from providing defense.

Magister: Potest dici quod glossa innuit quod iudex et superior non defendendo auctoritatem prestat, et ideo incidit in excommunicationis sententiam.

Master: It is possible to say that the gloss implies that a judge and superior provides authority by omitting to defend, and therefore falls into a sentence of excommunication.

Discipulus: Hec sententia non videtur sufficiens, quia si iudex non defendendo auctoritatem prestat, eadem ratione socius non defendendo causam vel occasionem prestat. Qui autem causam prestat vel occasionem, ita punitur sicut faciens, sicut qui occasionem dampni dat dampnum dedisse videtur (Extra, De iniuriis et dampno dato, Si culpa). Ergo si iudex qui non defendit clericum verberatum sententiam excommunicationis incurrit, et quilibet alius qui non defendit clericum, cum potest, excommunicationis sententia innodatur.

Student: This solution does not seem sufficient, because if a judge provides authority by omitting to defend, then by the same token a partner by not defending provides a reason or an opportunity. And one who provides reason or opportunity is subject to the same punishment as the doer, just as he who provides the opportunity for a loss appears responsible for the loss itself (Extra, de iniuriis et dampno dato, Si culpa). [col. 880] Therefore if a judge who does not defend a battered clerk incurs the penalty of excommunication, then likewise anyone else who does not defend a clerk when he can is involved in a penalty of excommunication.

Magister: Tu tangis unum motivum fundamentale quorundam dicentium quod quilibet qui potest debet defendere impugnantes papam hereticum, quamvis nesciat papam esse hereticum.

Master: You are touching on a fundamental motive of some, who say that anyone who can do so must defend the opponents of a heretic pope, even if he does not know that the pope is a heretic.

Discipulus: Ex quo istud est unum de motivis illorum, maiorem tractatum de isto usque ad illam materiam censeo differendum. Tamen nunc dic breviter quomodo per glossam predictam ad hoc respondere contingat.

Student: Since this is one of their motives, I believe that a more extensive treatment of it should be postponed until the entire issue comes up for discussion. But do state briefly at this time how one responds to this on the basis of the gloss we are analyzing.

Magister: Potest dici quod quamvis sive iudex sive alius qui clericum non defendat, si potest, mortaliter peccat, ex lege tamen nature neuter sententiam excommunicationis incurrit, quia pena excomunicationis solummodo ex iure positivo infligitur. Pene autem iuris positivi sunt restringende et nullatenus ampliande. Et ideo, salva lege positiva, sententia excommunicationis lata per canonem contra non defendentes clericum ad pauciores quantum permittit canon debet extendi. Cum ergo canon predictus Quante salvari possit intelligendo ipsum tantummodo de potestatem et iurisdictionem habentibus, qui gravius peccant non defendendo quam alii, de aliis non debet intelligi, licet alii non defendentes clericum, cum possunt, peccant mortaliter.

Master: It can be said that although either a judge or someone else who does not defend a clerk (if he can) commits a mortal sin, neither of them for all that incurs the penalty of excommunication by the law of nature, because the penalty of excommunication is only inflicted by positive law. And the penalties of positive law must be limited, not expanded. Therefore, without prejudice to positive law, a sentence of excommunication established by a canon against those who do not defend a clerk covers as few persons as the canon allows. And since the canon in question (Quante) may retain its validity if one understands it as applying only to those who possess power and jurisdiction (for they sin more seriously than others when they do not provide defense), it must not be understood of others, although these others who do not defend a clerk when they can commit a mortal sin.

Discipulus: Dic ad tertiam obiectionem.

Student: Respond to the third objection.

Magister: Ad tertiam respondetur quod hec non est vera 'nullus tenetur ad illud pro quo potest ex pacto pecuniam recipere'. Si quis enim videret alium in articulo extreme necessitatis ex fame, posset licite vendere sibi panem, et tamen si alius non haberet unde emeret vel etiam nollet, teneretur sibi gratis dare panem pro vita sustentanda. Si tamen in necessitate constitutus extrema haberet unde emere sibi necessaria vite ab aliis, a quibus posset emptione sibi acquirere necessaria vite, iste non teneretur sibi gratis necessaria exhibere. Sic in proposito licet recipere pecuniam pro defensione socii si socius potest et vult dare pecuniam, vel apparet alius qui potest et vult eum defendere, vel ipse potest defendere semetipsum. Si autem ipse non potest semetipsum defendere, vel non potest aut non vult dare pecuniam pro defensione sua, alius tenetur eum defendere absque pecunia. Poterit tamen postea petere ab eo pecuniam et alius sibi dare tenebitur.

Master: The answer to the third objection is that there is no truth in the proposition that 'no one is obligated to do something for which he may be remunerated by contract'. Indeed were someone to see another in a situation of extreme necessity due to hunger, he would be entitled to sell him a loaf of bread, and nevertheless if the latter had no means of paying or even refused to pay, the former would be obligated to give him the loaf of bread for nothing in order to save his life. But if the individual in extreme necessity did have the means of acquiring the necessities of life from others from whom he might proceed to buy these necessities, then the former would not be bound to provide him with necessities for nothing. The analogy holds for the problem under review. One is permitted to receive money for defending a partner if the partner is able and willing to pay, or if someone else appears who is able and willing to defend him, or if the partner is able to defend himself. But if a partner is unable to defend himself, or is unable or unwilling to pay money for his defense, the other person is bound to defend him for nothing. However he may subsequently demand money from the partner and the latter is obligated to reimburse his benefactor.

Ad quartam respondet glossa dis. 83 dicens: "patet hic quod medicus gratis tenetur curare pauperem infirmum, quia plus debet valere apud eum vita illius quam propria pecunia ut 86 dis. c. Non satis. Sed quid si infirmus dives est et nichil vult dare medico. Nunquid gratis tenetur eum curare. Videtur quod non, cum nemo de suo cogatur facere beneficium, ut 10 q. 2 c. Precarie, cum etiam medicus licite potest recipere mercedem, ut 14 q. 5 c. Non sane, dico quod tenetur eum curare suis impensis, et si convaluerit repetat expensas, quia utiliter gessit negotium eius".

The gloss to dis. 83 [col.400] responds to the fourth objection by stating: "it is clear in this context that a doctor is obligated to heal gratis a poor person who is ill, because the life of the ill person must have greater weight in the doctor's judgement than his own pecuniary interest, see dis. 86 c. Non satis. [col. 300] But what if the ill person is rich and doesn't want to pay the doctor. Must the latter cure him for nothing. It appears not, since no one is forced to provide a benefit from his own property, see 10 q. 2 c. Precarie, [col. 620] since, also, the doctor is entitled to receive a reward, see 14 q. 5 c. Non sane, [col. 742] I say that the doctor is obligated to heal the patient at his own expense, and should the patient recover the doctor may claim his expenses because he effectively dealt with the patient's problem".

Discipulus: Ista videtur michi fortis allegatio pro assertione prefata, quod scilicet quilibet tenetur in periculo constitutum defendere et iuvare, cui tamen repugnare videtur quod glossa allegat dicens 'nemo de suo cogitur facere beneficium (10 q. 2 Precarie)'. Unde quomodo ad hoc respondetur expone.

Student: This appears to me a strong argument in favour of the assertion we are discussing, namely that everyone is obligated to defend and to assist someone who is in danger. But it appears that the gloss does not agree with this position when it states in argument that "no one is entitled to provide a benefit from what belongs to him (10 q. 2 c. Precarie)". [col. 400] Do explain how one responds to this.

Magister: Dicitur quod illa auctoritas truncate allegatur, quia verba illius capituli 10 q. 2 Precarie sunt hec: "cum ratio et usus obtineat neminem cui non vult contra utilitatem et rationem cogi de proprio facere beneficium", que longe aliam sententiam continent quam dicere quod nemo de suo cogitur beneficium facere. Sepe enim lege divina pariter et nature ac etiam lege humana cogitur quis de suo beneficium facere, aliter enim nemo eleemosynam de suo facere alii teneretur, quod legi divine et nature ac etiam humane noscitur obviare. Nemo tamen contra utilitatem suam et contra rationem cogitur de proprio beneficium facere. Non enim dare eleemosynam de proprio est contra rationem nec contra utilitatem spiritualem eleemosynam facientis, licet quandoque sit contra utilitatem temporalem. Sic etiam defendere socium gratis absque mercede temporali non est contra utilitatem saltem spiritualem nec contra rationem, et ideo sepe cogitur quis lege nature et divina tale beneficium aliis gratis impendere.

Master: One responds by saying that this authority is argued in mutilated fashion, because the actual words of the chapter 10 q. 2 Precarie are as follows: "since both reason and custom hold that no one who does not want to should be forced against reason and interest to provide a benefit from what belongs to him". [col. 621] These words imply a conclusion much different than to simply say that no one is forced to provide a benefit from his property. For one is often forced to provide a benefit from one's property equally by divine and by natural law and also by human law. Indeed no one would otherwise be obligated to give alms to another from his property, an eventuality known as contrary to divine law, natural law, and human law also. But no one is forced to provide a benefit from his property against his interest or against reason. Surely to give alms from one's property is neither against reason nor against the spiritual interest of the almsgiver, although it may sometimes be against his temporal interest. Similarly, to defend a partner for nothing without temporal reward is not against one's interest (spiritual at least), nor against reason, and therefore one is frequently forced by divine and natural law to provide such a benefit to others for nothing.

Discipulus: Ista responsio videtur apparens. Ideo dic qualiter ad quintam instantiam respondetur.

Student: This response seems apparent. State therefore how one responds to the fifth instance.

Magister: Respondetur quod regulare est neminem teneri suis stipendiis militare pro persona privata. Fallit tamen in casu, quia si aliquis militando potest salvare vitam alterius qui non potest sibi reddere stipendium, debet propriis stipendiis pro eo militare salvando vitam eiusdem. Si enim miles in bello viderit socium ab adversariis fortiter impugnatum et in mortis periculum constitutum, debet, si potest, non sperando ab ipso stipendium ipsum de periculo liberare.

Master: The answer is that as a rule no one is bound to perform military service at his own expense on behalf of a private person. But the rule occasionally fails, because if someone by performing military activity can save the life of another who cannot pay him remuneration, he is obligated to perform military service at his own expense on behalf of that person so as to save his life. If for instance a soldier involved in battle were to see a partner strongly pressed by enemies and in mortal danger, he would if he could be obligated to liberate the partner from danger without hope of receiving remuneration from him.

Discipulus: Miles recipit stipendium a principe pro principe et aliis sibi fidelibus defendendis quando potest. Quare debet absque stipendio recipiendo a socio ipsum quando expedierit defensare.

Student: The soldier receives a salary from the ruler in order to defend when possible the ruler and the latter's faithful. Therefore he must defend a partner whenever required without expecting to receive remuneration from the partner.

Magister: Sicut miles recipit stipendium a principe etiam pro aliis comilitonibus quando expedierit defendendis, ita quilibet recipit preceptum a Deo et a lege nature pro sociis quando necesse fuerit defendendis. Non minus autem obligatur quis ex precepto divino et lege nature quam ex stipendio recepto a principe. Quare sicut miles tenetur comilitones defendere quando convenienter potest, ita quilibet tenetur socium defendere quando convenienter potest.

Master: Just as the soldier receives a remuneration from the ruler which also applies to a defense of his fellow soldiers when the situation warrants, so does everyone receive a command from God and the law of nature to defend partners whenever necessary. And a precept of God and of the natural law obligates one no less than a salary received from the ruler. Therefore just as a soldier is bound to defend his fellow soldiers when he conveniently can, so is everyone bound to defend a partner when he conveniently can.

Discipulus: Dic qualiter ad obiectionem ultimam respondetur.

Student: State how one responds to the final objection.

Magister: Respondetur quod quamvis per leges nemo cogatur benefacere, tamen sepe per leges cogitur quis bonum facere. Lex enim neque divina neque humana cogit benefacere, quia sicut dicit Augustinus post verba que allegasti: "benefacere nemo potest nisi elegerit, nisi amaverit, quod est in libera voluntate". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod sicut voluntas non potest cogi ita nemo potest cogi benefacere. Potest tamen quis cogi bonum facere, et quandoque quidem absolute, quandoque autem conditionaliter. Et sic per leges divinas et humanas cogitur quis conditionaliter benefacere, scilicet (si voluerit vitare penam temporalem vel eternam) socium, cum potest, defendere.

Master: The answer is that although no one is forced by the laws to provide a benefit, one is nevertheless frequently forced by the laws to perform a good act. Indeed, neither divine nor human law orders the provision of benefits, since Augustine states right after the words which you used in argument that "no one can provide a benefit unless he chooses to, and out of love, which is the preserve of free will". One gathers from these words that just as the will cannot be coerced, neither can anyone be forced to provide a benefit. But someone may be forced to perform a good act, the obligation being indeed absolute at certain times and merely conditional at others. And thus divine and human laws force one to the conditional provision of a benefit, namely, to defend a partner when possible, if one wishes to avoid both a temporal and an eternal penalty.

Discipulus: Istam responsionem rationabilem arbitror, cui tamen glossa super illo verbo 'cogimini' repugnare videtur, cum dicit: "qui enim ex timore benefacit, reputatur non facere". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod aliquis potest benefacere ex timore, et ita aliquis saltem timore conditionaliter cogitur benefacere, quemadmodum cogitur bonum facere.

Student: I consider this to be a reasonable response. But the gloss on the words "you are forced" [the words are in the canon Ad fidem col. 939] appears to conflict with it when it states: "for he who provides a benefit out of fear is deemed to have done nothing". [col. 1348] One gathers from these words that someone may provide a benefit out of fear, and thus someone is conditionally forced to provide a benefit at least out of fear, just as he is forced to perform a good action.

Magister: Respondetur quod glossa intentionem textus Augustini expressius habuisset si dixisset: "qui ex timore bonum facit reputatur non facere", sicut Augustinus, ut habetur Extra, De regulis iuris, dicit: "qui ex timore facit preceptum, aliter quam debeat facit, et ideo iam non facit". Potest tamen dici quod glossa posuit 'benefacere' pro 'bonum facere'. Non est autem dubium quin leges cogant bona facere et ideo sepe metu legum nonnulli bona faciunt et ita timore benefaciunt, accipiendo 'benefacere' pro 'bonum facere'. Sed Augustinus aliter accipit 'benefacere', quia pro meritorie et ex bona voluntate facere.

Master: The answer is that the gloss would have grasped the intention of Augustine's text more precisely had it stated: "he who performs a good action out of fear is deemed to have done nothing". Just so does Augustine state (as recorded in Extra, De regulis iuris): "he who carries out a command out of fear acts otherwise than he should, and therefore is deemed here to have done nothing [meritorious]". [col. 928] It may nevertheless be said that the gloss used the expression 'to provide a benefit' as an equivalent of the expression 'to do a good action'. And there is no doubt that the laws force individuals to perform good actions. Therefore some persons frequently perform good actions from fear of the laws, and thus they provide a benefit out of fear, taking 'to provide a benefit' as the meaningful equivalent of 'to do a good action'. But Augustine understands the expression 'to provide a benefit' differently: as the doing of something from good will and with merit.

Capitulum 45

Chapter 45

Discipulus: Allegationes quas supra in diversis capitulis adduxisti ad probandum quod catholici, qui possunt, de necessitate tenentur papam hereticum impugnantes defendere, tantummodo de scientibus et credentibus papam esse hereticum videntur concludere: quod illi soli, videlicet, qui sciunt aut credunt papam esse hereticum tenentur de necessitate salutis impugnantes ipsum, si possunt, defendere. Non autem videntur ostendere quod nescientes papam esse hereticum teneantur defendere ipsum de pravitate heretica impugnantes. Ideo quid de hoc sentiunt literati propala.

Student: The arguments which you advanced earlier in various chapters in order to prove that the catholics who can do this are necessarily obligated to defend the opponents of a heretic pope, appear to be conclusive only with respect to those who know and believe the pope to be a heretic. They imply, namely, that only those who know or believe the pope to be a heretic are bound of necessity of salvation to defend, if they can, the opponents of such a pope. But the arguments do not seem to demonstrate that catholics who do not know the pope to be a heretic are obligated to defend those who oppose him for heretical wickedness. Reveal therefore what the learned feel concerning this issue.

Magister: Rationes ille, saltem multe, non tantum de scientibus papam esse hereticum sed etiam de nescientibus, tamen dubitantibus, videntur procedere. Unde nonnulli putant quod, sicut si aliquis de facto a papa catholico appellaret ipsi heresim imponendo, antequam constaret appellationem huiusmodi non esse legitimam esset appellationi deferendum eiusdem, ita si aliqui impugnant papam hereticum, alii catholici nescientes ipsum esse hereticum et ignorantes an impugnantes ipsum veraciter et iuste impugnent, tenentur, si possunt, taliter impugnantes defendere.

Master: The reasons in question, many of them at least, seem to hold not only with respect to those who know the pope to be a heretic, but also with respect to those who do not actually know this but harbour doubts about it. Whence some learned individuals think that just as, if someone were to appeal in effect from a catholic pope by charging him with heresy, his appeal would have to be legally honoured before it became clear that such an appeal was not legitimate, so by analogy if some oppose a heretic pope, other catholics who do not know the pope to be a heretic and are ignorant as to whether the pope's opponents are opposing him with truth and justice, would be obligated to defend such opponents if they can.

Discipulus: Secundum ista que dicis hic est locus congruus pertractandi conclusionem tertiam illorum qui tenent quod licet appellare a summo pontifice, quam supra cap. 17 recitasti, et nunc iterum replicasti. Ideo pro illa conclusione primo satagas allegare.

Student: According to what you are saying, this is the proper context in which to deal with the third conclusion of those who hold that it is permitted to appeal from the supreme pontiff, a conclusion which you recited earlier in chapter 17 [1 Dial. 6.17] and have now reiterated. Therefore, to begin with, try to argue in support of this conclusion.

Magister: Quod deferendum sit appellationi a papa catholico pro causa heresis interiecte antequam constet ipsam non esse legitimam multis modis videtur posse probari. Primo autem sic. Non minus est deferendum appellationi pro causa heresis interiecte quam aliis appellationibus pro gravaminibus spiritualibus et levibus interiectis, quia appellatio pro causa fidei interiecta spectat ad ius publicum et utilitatem communem, ergo non minori privilegio gaudere debet quam appellatio interiecta pro utilitate privata. Sed aliis appellationibus est deferendum quamvis non constet quod non sunt legitime eo quod causa allegata non est probata. Ergo multo fortius appellationi a papa pro causa heresis interiecte est deferendum dummodo non constet quod non est legitima.

Master: It seems possible to prove in many ways that an appeal from a catholic pope issued for cause of heresy must be legally honoured before it becomes clear that the appeal is not legitimate. And the first proof is this. One must defer no less to an appeal issued for a cause of heresy than to appeals issued for spiritual grievances and grievances of a lighter nature, because a appeal issued for the cause of faith pertains to public law and the common utility, therefore it must not enjoy a lesser privilege than an appeal issued for a private cause. But one must defer to other appeals so long as it does not appear that they are illegitimate due to the argued case not having been proved. Therefore much more strongly must one defer to an appeal from the pope issued for cause of heresy, so long as it does not appear that it is illegitimate.

Discipulus: Tardiores exemplis apertis sepe moventur, ideo pone exemplum apertum de appellatione a papa catholico interiecta.

Student: Those with slower wits are frequently influenced by obvious examples, therefore provide an obvious example of the issuing of an appeal from a catholic pope.

Magister: Sicut in principio istius materie tibi apertius indicavi tenentes istam assertionem quod appellationi a papa catholico est deferendum antequam constet appellationem non esse legitimam nolunt ad strictissimam significationem 'appellationis' artari, sed utuntur nomine 'appellationis' quo poterunt largius, scilicet pro provocatione largissime sumpta, imo etiam, si usus permittit, pro recusatione. Intendunt igitur quod appellationi seu provocationi a papa catholico, vel etiam recusationi, quando allegatur causa que si esset probata deberet legitima reputari, tali appellationi vel recusationi est omnino deferendum.

Master: As I clearly indicated to you at the beginning of our discussion concerning this subject matter, [1 Dial. 6.18] those who hold the assertion that an appeal from a catholic pope must be deferred to before it becomes manifest that the appeal is illegitimate, do not wish to be bound to the most precise meaning of "appeal", but use the term "appeal" in as wide an acceptance as they can, namely as referring to a challenge in the widest sense, indeed one that includes a demurrer, if usage allows. Their intention is thus to maintain that when a cause is argued which would be considered legitimate if proved, one must entirely defer to such an appeal from or demurrer against a catholic pope.

Tali modo loquendi supposito, ponatur quod aliquis appellat a papa vel recusat eum, allegando et se velle probare firmiter offerendo quod papa tenuit et asseruit fidem christianam esse falsam et fictam, et ideo papa non potest nec debet officium papatus exercere. Quo posito, dicunt isti quod tali appellationi seu provocationi vel recusationi, quantumcunque causa allegata sit falsa, quia tamen est talis que si esset probata deberet legitima reputari, antequam allegans eam fuerit de calumpnia convictus vel in probatione defecerit, aut per aliam exceptionem legitimam vel alium modum congruum appareat repellendus, tam papa quam alii catholici debent tali appellationi vel recusationi deferre circa talem appellantem vel recusantem, antequam eum malitiose constiterit processisse nichil penitus innovando. Imo pro tempore illo a iurisdictione summi pontificis est exemptus.

On the basis of such terminology, let us assume that someone appeals from or demurs against a pope, arguing and firmly advancing an intention to prove that the pope held and asserted the Christian faith to be false and a sham, concluding that this pope neither can nor must continue to exercise the papal office. On this assumption, these theorists say that even if the case argued by the appellant is false, nevertheless since it is a case which would be considered legitimate if proved, the pope and all other catholics (before the individual arguing the case is convicted of slander or fails to prove his contention or appears worthy of rejection because of some other legitimate consideration or some other appropriate process) must defer to this appeal, challenge, or demurrer with respect to the challenger or the one offering a demurrer, and must not proceed to any modification of the situation before it has been established that the appellant acted with malice. Indeed for the time being such an appellant is exempt from the jurisdiction of the supreme pontiff.

Hoc exemplo posito, probatur quod modo predicto tam summus pontifex quam alii tali appellationi vel recusationi deferre tenentur, et primo sic. Secundum leges favore religionis multa statuuntur contra rationem, quod sane intellectum consonum veritati dinoscitur, quia religio christiana maiori favore dinoscitur esse digna quam quecunque causa privata. Ex quo concluditur quod verba iuris in favorem religionis amplianda sunt et nullatenus restringenda, et per consequens omnia iura canonica et civilia in favorem edita appellantis interpretanda sunt largissime quando appellans pro religione christiana et fide catholica se asserit appellare. Constat autem secundum iura canonica et civilia quod appellationi illius qui pro re alia quam pro fide appellat, si talem causam allegat que si esset probata deberet legitima reputari, iudex a quo appellat et alii deferre tenentur. Ergo per eadem iura probatur quod appellans a papa allegans quod papa tenet et asserit fidem christianam esse falsam, papa et alii appellationi eius vel recusationi deferre tenentur, quia si hec causa esset probata deberet legitima reputari. Si enim talis appellans probaret legitime papam tenere fidem christianam esse falsam, papa nec super ipsum nec super alium iurisdictionem haberet.

Having laid out this example, one proves that both the supreme pontiff and others are obligated to defer in the manner just stated to such an appeal or demurrer. The first proof is this. According to the laws many privileges are enacted in favour of religion, which seem contrary to reason, but are ultimately recognized as compatible with truth when properly understood, because the Christian religion is known to be worthy of greater favour than any private cause. From this one concludes that the words of the law should be broadened in favour of religion and in no way restricted, and consequently that all canon and civil laws enacted in favour of the appellant should be understood in the broadest sense when the appellant asserts that he is appealing in the interest of the Christian religion and the catholic faith. But according to canon and civil laws it is established that the judge from whom appeal is made, and others, are bound to defer to the appeal of one who appeals for a cause other than a cause of faith, if he argues a case which if it were proved would be considered legitimate. Therefore by the same laws one proves that when an appellant from the pope argues that the pope holds and asserts the Christian faith to be false, the pope and others are bound to defer to his appeal or demurrer, since if this case were proved it would have to be considered legitimate. Indeed, if such an appellant were to prove legitimately that the pope holds the Christian faith to be false, the pope would have jurisdiction neither over the appellant nor over any other Christian.

Secunda ratio talis est. Appellationi vel recusationi illius deferendum est (antequam constet eum frustratorie seu malitiose procedere) cui licet pro causa quam allegat ab alio appellare vel alium recusare, quia sicut omni appellationi vel recusationi legitime deferendum est ita etiam omni appellationi et recusationi quam non constat esse illegitimam deferendum est. Sed catholico licet a papa appellare vel papam recusare si papa asserit fidem christianam esse falsam. Ergo si pro causa hac quis appellat a papa vel eum recusat pro iudice, antequam constet talem appellationem vel recusationem non esse legitimam tali appellationi vel recusationi deferendum est. Sed non potest constare talem appellationem vel recusationem non esse legitimam nisi constiterit causam allegatam esse falsam. Ergo antequam constet causam allegatam esse falsam deferendum est appellationi vel recusationi huiusmodi.

The second reason is this. One must defer to an appeal or demurrer of someone who is allowed to appeal from or enter a demurrer against another in the case which he is arguing before it is established that he has proceeded with calculated hindrance or malice. Because just as one must defer to every legitimate appeal or demurrer, so must one likewise defer to every appeal or demurrer which has not been shown to be illegitimate. But a catholic is allowed to appeal from or enter a demurrer against the pope if the pope asserts that the Christian faith is false. Therefore if someone appeals from the pope for this cause, or enters a demurrer against him as judge, such an appeal or demurrer must be honoured before its illegitimacy is established. But it cannot be established that such an appeal or demurrer is illegitimate unless it were established that the cause alleged was false. Therefore prior to it being established that the cause alleged is false, one must defer to an appeal or demurrer of this kind.

Tertia ratio talis est. Si appellationi vel recusationi huiusmodi est minime deferendum, aut hoc est quia causa assignata si esset probata non deberet legitima reputari, aut quia ille a quo appellatur vel qui recusatur est talis persona a qua pro causa tali appellare non licet, vel quia appellans vel recusans est talis persona cui specialiter est interdictum a iure ne pro tali causa appellet, vel quia appellans vel recusans infra tempus statutum a iure non appellat vel non recusat, vel suam appellationem vel recusationem nequaquam prosequitur, vel quia in forma appellationis aliqua que deberent inferri obmittuntur. Quia si aliqua appellatio vel recusatio repellitur, aut est repellenda propter causam non legitimam si etiam esset probata, vel propter defectum appellationis aut prosecutionis, aut propter obmissionem temporis a iure statuti, vel propter conditionem persone a qua appellatur vel recusatur, vel propter conditionem persone appellantis vel recusantis.

The third reason is this. If such an appeal or demurrer is not to be honoured, this is (1) because the cause alleged in the appeal or demurrer, if proved, would not have to be considered legitimate; or (2) because he from whom appeal is made or against whom demurrer is entered is a person from whom one is not allowed to appeal in such a cause; or (3) because the appellant or the one entering a demurrer is the kind of person especially forbidden by law to appeal for such a cause; or (4) because the appellant or the one entering a demurrer does not appeal or enter a demurrer within the time frame specified by the law, or does not follow up on his appeal or demurrer; or (5) because some elements which ought to have been included are omitted in the form of the appeal. For if a particular appeal or demurrer is rejected, it must be rejected either because a cause would not be legitimate even if proved, or because of a defect in the appeal or the ensuing procedure, or because of a lapse in the time frame specified by the law, or because of the position of the person who is being appealed from or against whom demurrer is entered, or because of the position of the person appealing or entering a demurrer.

Sed propter primum non est dicendum quod tali appellationi vel recusationi est minime deferendum, quia causa assignata (quod papa videlicet tenet et asserit fidem christianam esse falsam) est talis que si esset probata deberet ab omnibus catholicis sufficiens et legitima reputari. Nec propter secundum, quia a papa si asserit et tenet fidem christianam esse falsam licet appellare, imo est ab omnibus catholicis evitandus. Nec propter tertium est tali appellationi vel recusationi minime deferendum, quia ponatur quod appellans seu recusans sit bone fame quando appellat vel recusat et talis contra quem nichil obici possit, imo ponatur quod sit rex vel episcopus aut talis opinionis et fame quod contra personam non possit exceptio legitima allegari. Nec propter quartum est tali appellationi vel recusationi minime deferendum, tum quia sicut probatum est, tali appellanti vel recusanti non potest currere tempus, cum non sit simpliciter necesse appellare pro tali causa, tum quia ponatur quod infra tempus statutum a iure appellet vel recuset et appellationem vel recusationem prosequitur. Nec propter quintum est tali appellationi vel recusationi minime deferendum. Tum quia in hoc casu in favorem fidei christiane non est necesse servare subtilitates iuris, tum quia ponatur quod talis appellans vel recusans nichil de contingentibus et subtilitatibus iuris obmittat. Patet igitur quod nulla ratio potest allegari quare tali appellationi sit minime deferendum, quia nec ex parte cause assignate, nec ex parte appellantis, nec ex parte persone a qua appellatur, nec ex parte temporis, nec ex parte forme appellationis. Et ita dicendum est secundum istos quod tali appellationi seu recusationi est deferendum omnino.

But the first option does not entitle one to say that one must not defer to such an appeal or demurrer, since the cause alleged, if proved (namely that the pope holds and asserts the Christian faith to be false) is such as ought to be considered sufficient and legitimate by all catholics. The second option is no better, because it is permitted to appeal from a pope if he asserts and holds that the Christian faith is false; indeed such a pope must be avoided by all catholics. Nor must one refrain from honouring such an appeal or demurrer because of the third option, since the assumption is that the appellant or the one entering a demurrer is of good reputation at the moment of his appeal or demurrer and the sort of person against whom nothing can be objected; indeed assume him to be a king, or a bishop, or of such reputation or fame that no legitimate exception can be leveled against his person. Nor does the fourth option entitle one to refrain from honouring such an appeal or demurrer, because, as was demonstrated, [1 Dial. 6.24, 30] prescription cannot run against an appellant or someone entering a demurrer, since it is normally unnecessary to appeal for such a cause, and because one may assume that the appeal is made or the demurrer entered within the time frame specified by law, and subsequently followed through. Nor does the fifth option entitle one to refrain from deferring to such an appeal or demurrer, because in this case the Christian faith is privileged in that it is unnecessary to observe the subtleties of the law, and because one may assume that the appellant in question or the person who enters a demurrer does not omit any of the subtleties and contingencies of the law. It is thus clear that no reason can be argued as to why one ought not to defer to such an appeal. There is no reason from the perspective of the cause alleged, nor is there one from that of the appellant, nor from the point of view of the person from whom the appeal is made, nor from the perspective of the time frame, nor from that of the form of the appeal. And so it must be stated according to these theorists that such an appeal or demurrer is to be completely honoured.

Discipulus: Potest dici quod ratio potest reddi quare tali appellationi seu recusationi est minime deferendum ex parte cause, quia causa est falsa, eo quod papa est catholicus secundum casum.

Student: One could say that a reason might be offered as to why such an appeal or demurrer must not be honoured from the perspective of the cause: since the cause is false, in that according to this case the pope is a catholic.

Magister: Ista responsio frivola reputatur, quia falsitas cause non impedit quominus appellationi vel recusationi sit deferendum antequam falsitas sit probata vel offerens se probaturum causam in probatione defecerit. Aliter enim nunquam esset aliqua appellatio reprobanda cui iudex vel alius rationabiliter detulisset, quod tamen constat esse falsum. Si enim iudex iustam contra aliquam profert sententiam, si ille duxerit appellandum allegans quod sententia est iniqua, iudex quamvis sciat appellationem esse iniquam et causam esse falsam, quia tamen adhuc non est probata causa esse falsa, nec dum appellans in probatione defecit, iudex appellationi sue deferre tenetur, qui tamen postquam de iniqua appellatione fuerit convictus exigente iustitia est graviter puniendus.

Master: This is deemed to be a frivolous response, because the falsity of the cause hardly prevents the obligation of honouring an appeal or demurrer before this falsity is demonstrated or before one offering to prove the cause will have failed in the task. For otherwise no appeal which had been reasonably deferred to by a judge or someone else could ever be rejected, and this is surely a false contention. If indeed a judge pronounces a just sentence against someone and that someone decides to appeal by claiming that the sentence is unjust, then the judge must defer to the appeal even though he knows the appeal is unjust and the cause is false, because the latter has not yet been demonstrated to be false in the context of the appeal, nor has the appellant as yet failed to provide the needed proof. But once the appellant shall have been convicted of issuing a criminal appeal, justice demands that he be severely punished.

Discipulus: Alias rationes adducas.

Student: Resume the presentation of further reasons on behalf of the main point we are discussing.

Magister: Quarta ratio pro assertione predicta talis est. Illius appellationi vel recusationi est deferendum qui appellat vel recusat ex causa que si esset probata deberet legitima reputari, cuius accusatio et testimonium contra superiorem in eadem causa debet admitti. Sed qui voluerit papam de supradicta heresi accusare vel contra eum testificari, si alias est persona idonea, eius est accusatio et etiam testificatio admittenda. Ergo si ex eadem causa duxerit appellandum, vel eundem superiorem duxerit recusandum, eius appellationi vel recusationi est deferendum. Maior videtur manifesta quia exeque levibus causis vel equalibus contingit contra aliquem appellare et recusare ipsum de quibus contingit eum accusare vel contra eum testimonium ferre. Sepe etiam licet aliquem iudicem recusare quando recusans ipsum accusare vel testificari contra ipsum non debet. Minor etiam videtur certa, quia constat quod papa potest de heresi accusari secundum iura, et per consequens contingit contra ipsum super heresi testimonium ferre, quod maxime veritatem habet si papa tenet fidem christianam esse falsam.

Master: A fourth reason for the assertion under scrutiny is this. One must defer to the appeal or demurrer of a person who appeals or enters a demurrer for a cause which would have to be considered legitimate if proved, and whose accusation and testimony against a superior in the same cause must be admitted in court. But if someone wanted to accuse the pope of the aforementioned heresy, or to testify against him, and was otherwise a person of good standing, then both his accusation and his testimony would have to be admitted in court. Therefore if he decided to appeal for the same cause or decided to enter a demurrer against the same superior, his appeal or demurrer would have to be honoured. The major premiss seems obvious because one may appeal or enter a demurrer against someone for causes equally as light as or equal to the causes for which one may accuse that someone or testify against him. Indeed it is frequently permitted to enter a demurrer against a given judge when the person entering the demurrer must not accuse the judge or testify against him. The minor premiss also appears to be certain, because it is established that the laws allow the pope to be accused of heresy, and that consequently one may testify against him in the matter of heresy, a fact true above all if the pope holds the Christian faith to be false.

Quinta ratio est hec. Ille cuius appellationi vel recusationi merito non defertur, de appellatione iniqua seu frustratoria vituperandus censetur, quia solummodo appellationi vel recusationi frustratorie vel inique est minime deferendum. Sed qui appellat vel recusat papam pro iudice se gerente se offerens probaturum quod papa tenet et asserit fidem christianam esse falsam, ante examinationem cause et antequam convincatur de falsi criminis impositione vel in probatione defecerit, non est vituperandus iuxta sententiam sapientis qui, ut habetur Ecclesiastici 11, ait: "priusquam interroges, ne vituperes quemquam". Ergo tali appellationi vel recusationi antequam ostendatur iniqua, est deferendum.

The fifth reason is this. He whose appeal or demurrer is deservedly not honoured is believed to merit strong criticism for issuing an unjust or prevaricatory appeal, for it is only a prevaricatory or unjust appeal or demurrer which must not be honoured. But a person who appeals from or enters a demurrer against a pope functioning as a judge, and offers to prove that the pope holds and asserts the Christian faith to be false is not to be severely criticized before his cause shall have been examined and before he is convicted of the imposition of a false crime or fails to prove his contention. This is supported by the opinion of the wise man who states in Ecclesiasticus 11[:7] : "castigate no one whom you have not yet questioned". Therefore such an appeal or demurrer must be honoured before it is shown to be unjust.

Sexta ratio talis est. In dubiis via securior est tenenda (Extra, De regulis iuris, Estote et Extra, De homicidio, Ad audientiam). Sed deferre appellationi vel recusationi pape ex causa predicta est via securior, nam ex hoc quod tali appellationi vel recusationi defertur nullum periculum imminet, neque fidei christiane neque summo pontifici, si est innocens. Si autem talibus appellationibus vel recusationibus est minime deferendum, magna pericula possent fidei catholice imminere. Posset etiam papa absque metu stricti iudicii et pene condigne in catholicis fidei corrumpere puritatem. Ergo securiorem viam sequendo in favorem fidei christiane, est talibus appellationibus et recusationibus deferendum.

The sixth reason is this. In doubtful matters one must uphold the safer solution (Extra, De regulis iuris, Estote, [col. 927] and Extra, De homicidio, Ad audientiam). [col. 798] But it is a safer solution to honour an appeal or demurrer against the pope from the aforementioned cause, since there is no imminent danger either to the Christian faith or to the supreme pontiff (if he is innocent) from the honouring of such an appeal or demurrer. If on the other hand such appeals or demurrers must not be honoured, great dangers might arise for the catholic faith. Indeed a pope who did not fear the eventuality of a strict judgement and the ensuing appropriate penalty might corrupt the purity of the faith among catholics. Therefore one must opt for the safer solution in favour of the Christian faith, and honour such appeals and demurrers.

Discipulus: Videtur quod talis via non est securior, quia summo pontifici, si talibus esset appellationibus et recusationibus deferendum, multiplicia et magna imminerent dispendia. Posset enim quilibet papam catholicum tanquam hereticum recusare, ex quo fama summi pontificis multipliciter lederetur, et ipse suam innocentiam declarando modis variis vexaretur.

Student: It appears that this is not the safer solution, because the pope would be instantly affected by multiple and great inconveniences if such appeals and demurrers were to be honoured. For anyone might enter a demurrer against a catholic pope on the pretext that he was a heretic; from this the reputation of the supreme pontiff would be damaged in multiple fashions, and he would be occupied needlessly in having to declare his innocence in various ways.

Magister: Ista responsio impugnatur, quia talis via non est securior, quod sic probatur. Illa via que est in favorem fidei christiane et non in probabile dispendium summi pontificis innocentis est securior quam illa via que potest vergere in notabile dispendium fidei orthodoxe et in periculosum favorem pape pravitate heretica maculati. Sed deferre huiusmodi appellationibus et recusationibus interiectis ex causa predicta, antequam legitime constet causam esse falsam, est in favorem fidei christiane et non est in probabile dispendium vel periculum summi pontificis innocentis, quia summo pontifici innocenti plurime vie patent omne periculum evadendi. Non deferre autem huiusmodi appellationibus et recusationibus potest vergere in notabile dispendium fidei orthodoxe, et in favorem pape heretici. Poterit enim libere papa hereticus pravitate heretica corrumpere orthodoxos si nemo contra eum est super crimine heresis audiendus. Deferre ergo huiusmodi appellationibus et recusationibus est via securior et ideo est tenenda.

Master: This response is rejected because the solution it advocates is not safer, which is proved as follows. The solution, which favours the Christian faith and does not create a probable inconvenience for an innocent pope is safer than the solution, which can lead to a significant cost to the Christian faith and dangerously favour a pope besmirched by heretical wickedness. But to honour such appeals and demurrers (which stem from the aforementioned cause) before it becomes legitimately established that the cause is false, favours the Christian faith and is not a probable inconvenience or danger to an innocent pope, because a supreme pontiff who is innocent has many available methods whereby he can evade all danger. But not to honour such appeals and demurrers may lead to a notable cost for the Christian faith and favour the heretic pope. Indeed a heretic pope might freely corrupt the orthodox with heretical wickedness if no one could be heard in court against him on the crime of heresy. Thus it is a safer solution to defer to such appeals and demurrers, and therefore the solution should be followed.

Discipulus: Ista ratio dupliciter videtur deficere. Primo quia, sicut dixi, deferre appellationibus et recusationibus huiusmodi potest vergere in personale periculum summi pontificis innocentis, quia quilibet poterit eum diffamare et multipliciter fatigare. Secundo deficit quia quamvis non sit talibus appellationibus et recusationibus deferendum, non tamen poterit papa hereticus libere pravitate heretica corrumpere orthodoxos, quia si aliqui qui sint minime repellendi eum accusare voluerint de heretica pravitate eis non debet audientia denegari.

Student: There are two apparent defects in this reason. It is defective, first of all, because, as I stated, to honour such appeals and demurrers may create a personal danger for the supreme pontiff who is innocent, since anyone might proceed to slander him and vex him in many ways. Secondly, it is defective because even if such appeals and demurrers are not to be honoured, a heretic pope could not for all that freely corrupt the orthodox with heretical wickedness, because if some persons who should not be excluded wanted to accuse him of heretical wickedness, an audience in court could not be denied to them.

Magister: Prima instantia tua frivola multis apparet, quia sicut, quemadmodum notatur glossa Extra, De presumptionibus, c. Quia verisimile non est: "de nemine presumendum est, quod bona sua iactet, supra De renuntiatione, c. Super eo, et supra De restitutione spoliatorum, c. Sollicite", ita de nemine presumendum est quod gratis confusioni et totius amissioni honoris ac pene pravitatis heretice se exponat. Sed qui appellaret a papa vel ipsum tanquam hereticum recusaret, eidem imponendo quod fidem christianam asserat esse falsam, se confusioni perpetue et amissioni totius honoris et pene pravitatis heretice exponeret. Talis enim propter tanti criminis impositionem tante persone omnibus predictis esset dignissimus. Ergo de nemine qui fuerit bone discretionis et fame est presumendum quod tale quid velit mendaciter imponere summo pontifici. Quare quantumcunque talibus appellationibus et recusationibus deferatur, probabile periculum nequaquam imminet summo pontifici innocenti, quia nullatenus oportet probabiliter formidare quod unquam aliquis tantum crimen summo pontifici innocenti audebit imponere. Et si contingeret quod semel vel bis aliqui ad tantam devenirent insaniam quod mendaciter tale crimen imponerent summo pontifici innocenti et propter hoc appellarent ab ipso vel recusarent eundem, non essent propter hoc tales appellationes vel recusationes regulariter repellende. Quia sicut in legibus statuendis ita in interpretatione legum ea que frequenter et non que raro accidunt sunt pensanda. Quare cum raro vel nunquam accidat quod aliquis appellando vel recusando papam sibi imponat quod fidem abnegaverit christianam, cum ista sit causa que si esset probata deberet legitima reputari, concluditur quod iura que asserunt quod est appellationibus et recusationibus deferendum in quibus assignatur causa que si esset probata deberet legitima reputari, ad appellationem et recusationem pape in qua pro causa assignatur quod papa fidem christianam asserit esse falsam sunt omnimode extendenda.

Master: Your first instance appears frivolous to many due to the following consideration. Just as (and this is noted by the gloss [col. 789] to Extra, De presumptionibus, c. Quia verisimile non est) [col. 355] "it is to be presumed of no one that he will throw away his goods, see above De renuntiatione, c. Super eo, [col. 104] and above, De restitutione spoliatorum, c. Sollicite", [col. 280] so is it likewise to be presumed of no one that he will expose himself gratuitously to embarrassment, complete loss of honour, and the penalty of heretical wickedness. But he who would appeal from the pope or enter a demurrer against him as a heretic, alleging that he had asserted the Christian faith to be false, would expose himself to perpetual embarrassment, to the loss of all honour, and to the penalty of heretical wickedness. Such an individual would be hugely worthy of all the aforesaid because of the imposition of a weighty crime to an eminent person. Therefore one must presume of no one who was of sound mind and reputation that he would want to maliciously insinuate something of the sort about the supreme pontiff. Thus, no matter however much one defers to such appeals and demurrers, a probable danger will never threaten a supreme pontiff who is innocent, because it in no way behooves to entertain a probable fear that someone would ever dare to impose such a weighty crime on a supreme pontiff who was innocent. And if it should happen that some people did lapse into such tremendous insanity once or twice, and proceeded to mendaciously impose such a crime on an innocent pope, appealing from him or entering a demurrer against him on that basis, such appeals or demurrers would not normally have to be rejected on this account. For in the enactment of laws no less than in their interpretation we must be oriented towards those circumstances which occur frequently and not towards those which occur but rarely. Thus, since it rarely or never happens that someone in appealing or entering a demurrer against the pope imposes on the latter a denial of the Christian faith (which is a cause that, if proved, would have to be considered legitimate) one concludes that the laws, which assert that one must honour appeals and demurrers in which a cause is alleged which, if proved, would have to be considered legitimate, must always be extended to an appeal or demurrer against the pope in which the cause alleged is that the pope asserts the Christian faith to be false.

Secunda instantia tua per rationem quartam autem superius factam refellitur, ubi ostensum est quod cuilibet licet accusare papam de heretica pravitate et eius appellationi et recusationi pro causa heresis est omnimode deferendum, cum minus sit appellare vel iudicem recusare quam accusare eundem.

Your second instance is rejected by reference to the fourth reason advanced earlier, where it is demonstrated that anyone is permitted to accuse the pope of heretical wickedness, and that his appeal or demurrer in the cause of heresy must always be honoured, since it is a lesser matter to appeal from or to enter a demurrer against a judge than to level an accusation against him.

Capitulum 46

Chapter 46

Discipulus: Ex quo allegasti pro assertione dicente quod deferendum est appellationi seu recusationi pape antequam constet talem appellationem vel recusationem non esse legitimam, quia causa videlicet allegata non est probata licet sit talis que, si esset probata, deberet legitima reputari, peto ut pro assertione contraria aliquas allegationes adducas.

Student: Since you have argued in support of the assertion which states that one must honour an appeal or a demurrer against the pope before it is established that such appeal or demurrer is not legitimate (namely, because the cause alleged has not been proved, even if it is such that would be considered legitimate if proved), I now ask you to provide some arguments in support of the contrary assertion.

Magister: Quod nescientes et dubitantes talem appellationem vel recusationem esse legitimam eidem deferre non debeant, maxime si papa sciens causam esse falsam non defert eidem videtur posse probari primo sic. Preceptis pape oportet non solum in certis sed etiam in dubiis obedire, cum etiam in dubiis precepto regis sacrilegi miles debeat obedire, teste Augustino qui, ut legitur 23 q. 1 c. Quid culpatur, ait: "vir iustus, si forte etiam sub rege, homine sacrilego, militet, recte potest illo iubente bellare, si, vice pacis ordinem servans, quod sibi iubetur, vel non esse contra Dei preceptum, certum est, vel utrum sit, certum non est, ita, ut fortasse reum faciat regem iniquitas imperandi, innocentem autem militem ostendat ordo serviendi". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod miles regi sacrilego in dubiis obedire tenetur. Ergo multo magis in dubiis est obediendum summo pontifici. Ex quo concluditur quod dubitantes talem appellationem vel recusationem esse legitimam si papa non defert ei et aliis mandat ne deferant, ipsi ei obedire debent.

Master: It appears that one may initially prove as follows that those who do not know and those who doubt that such an appeal or demurrer is legitimate have no obligation to honour it, above all if the pope does not defer to the cause knowing it to be false. It is appropriate to obey the pope's commands not only in matters which are certain, but also in matters which are doubtful, since a soldier must obey the command of a sacrilegious monarch even in doubtful matters, witness Augustine (we read this in 23 q. 1 c. Quid culpatur) who states: "a just man, even if he perhaps performs military service under a king who is a sacrilegious individual, can wage war with rectitude at the latter's command, maintaining discipline for the sake of peace, if it is certain that the order he receives is not against God's precept, or if it is not certain that this order is against God's precept, so that even if the injustice of a command would perhaps make the king guilty, the maintenance of discipline would on the other hand show the soldier to be innocent". [col. 893] We gather from these words that a soldier is obligated to obey a sacrilegious monarch in doubtful matters. Therefore all the more must one obey the supreme pontiff in doubtful matters. From which one concludes that those who doubt the legitimacy of the discussed appeal or demurrer must obey the pope if the latter does not honour it and commands others not to honour it.

Secundo sic. Nulli clerico licet ante tempus sententie ab episcopo suo discedere (8 q. 4 Nonne). Ergo multo magis propter nullam appellationem vel recusationem ante decisionem cause licet catholicis ab obedientia pape recedere. Ergo post recusationem vel appellationem huiusmodi est in omnibus obediendum pape sicut prius. Ergo si papa precipit tali appellationi vel recusationi nequaquam deferre, dubitantes talem appellationem vel recusationem non esse legitimam ei non tenentur deferre. Aliter oporteret catholicos nescientes papam esse hereticum ab obedientia ipsius recedere, quod nullatenus est tenendum.

The second proof is this. No clerk is permitted to withdraw from his bishop before sentence shall have been passed on the latter (8 q. 4 Nonne). [col. 599] Therefore all the more no appeal or demurrer entitles catholics to withdraw from obedience to the pope before a decision in the case. Therefore after such an appeal or demurrer one must continue to obey the pope in all things just as before. Therefore if the pope orders that such an appeal or demurrer should not be honoured, those who doubt the legitimacy of the appeal or demurrer are not obligated to honour it. Otherwise it would be appropriate for catholics who do not know that the pope is a heretic to withdraw from his obedience, which is not a tenable position.

Capitulum 47

Chapter 47

Discipulus: Non puto quod fortiores rationes quam sint iste due pro assertione predicta valeant inveniri. Ideo plures nequaquam adducas sed dic quomodo respondetur ad istas.

Student: I do not think that stronger reasons than these two can be found in support of the aforementioned assertion. Therefore refrain from providing additional ones, and state how one responds to those, which have just been advanced.

Magister: Ad primam respondetur de dubiis distinguendo. Nam sicut distinguitur de ignorantia, prout legitur 1 q. 4 # Notandum, quod alia est ignorantia facti, alia iuris, et ignorantia facti alia est eius quod oportet scire et alia eius quod non oportet scire, et similiter ignorantia iuris alia est iuris naturalis, alia civilis, sic est dubitatio facti et dubitatio iuris. Et alia est dubitatio facti quod oportet scire, alia est facti quod non oportet scire. Et similiter alia est dubitatio iuris quod quis scire tenetur et alia est iuris quod quis non tenetur scire.

Master: The answer to the first reason is founded on a distinction concerning doubtful matters. For just as there are distinctions to be made with respect to ignorance, and we read this in 1 q. 4 # Notandum [col. 422] (there is an ignorance of fact, and another of law, and as to ignorance of fact there is ignorance of a fact which it is appropriate to know, and there is another ignorance, that of a fact which it is not appropriate to know; and similarly as to ignorance of law, there is ignorance of natural law and ignorance of civil law), so likewise there is doubt about fact and doubt about law. And one kind of doubt is with respect to fact which it is appropriate to know, while another kind is with respect to fact which it is not appropriate to know. And similarly there is doubt about law which one is bound to know, and another kind of doubt, about law which one is not obligated to know.

Per hoc respondetur ad primam rationem, quod quedam sunt dubia que oportet scire et quedam sunt dubia que non oportet scire. In dubiis autem que non oportet scire est obediendum superiori, et in tali casu loquitur Augustinus in verbis superius allegatis. In dubiis vero que oportet scire non est semper obediendum superiori. Si enim rex vel alius preciperet adorare Machometum vel servare legem Iudeorum, quamvis subditus dubitaret tale preceptum esse contra legem Dei et iniquum nullatenus excusaretur a peccato obediendo, quemadmodum Iudei et alii minime excusantur licet nesciant se malefacere. Sic dicunt in proposito, quod si aliquis dubitat an sit obediendum pape precipienti quod tali appellationi vel recusationi minime deferatur, dubitat de illo quod oportet scire et nullatenus dubitare. Quilibet enim capax rationis scire tenetur quod magis favendum est legi divine quam cuicunque mortali, et ideo occurrendum est magis ubi imminet periculum legis divine quam ubi imminet periculum hominis cuiuscunque mortalis. Quare quilibet scire tenetur quod in derogationem et subversionem legis divine nulli oportet obedire prelato. Tenetur etiam quilibet scire quod si non esset deferendum appellationi vel recusationi huiusmodi antequam constaret eam non esse legitimam, posset legis divine subversio imminere. Posset enim libere papa hereticus absque resistentia legem divinam subvertere, et introducere sectam catholice fidei adversantem, quare quilibet scire tenetur quod tali precepto est minime obediendum. Et ideo si dubitans obediat, a peccato minime excusatur quia dubitat ubi dubitare non debet.

On the basis of these points the answer to the first reason is that there are some doubtful matters which it is appropriate to know, and other doubtful matters which it is not appropriate to know. Indeed in those doubtful matters which it is not appropriate to know, one's superior must be obeyed, and this is the case Augustine describes in the words we earlier produced in argument. [1 Dial. 6.46] But in the doubtful matters which it is appropriate to know, one's superior must not always be obeyed. For if a king or someone else were to order the adoration of Mohammed or the observance of Jewish religious law, then even if a subject doubted whether such an order was disreputable and against the law of God, he would in no way be excused from mortal sin if he obeyed the order, in the same fashion that Jews and others can hardly be excused even though they do not know that they are doing wrong. A similar understanding holds, they say, with respect to the issue we are discussing: that if someone doubts whether one must obey a pope who orders that such an appeal or demurrer not be honoured, he is doubting concerning a matter it is appropriate to know, and concerning which doubt is unacceptable. For everyone capable of reasoning is bound to know that one must favour the divine law over any mortal whatsoever, and therefore one must become actively involved to a higher degree in a situation where danger threatens the divine law than where it threatens any mortal man whatsoever. Thus, everyone is bound to know that it is inappropriate to obey any prelate whatsoever to the prejudice and subversion of the divine law. Everyone is also bound to know that if such an appeal or demurrer did not have to be honoured before its illegitimacy was confirmed, the subversion of divine law might become an imminent threat. For a heretic pope might freely subvert the divine law with no resistance being offered, and establish a sect inimical to the catholic faith. That is why everyone is bound to know that such a command must not be obeyed. And therefore if the doubter obeys it he is not excused from sin, because he is doubtful where he must not doubt.

Discipulus: Omnino videtur irrationabiliter dictum quod quilibet tenetur scire quod tali precepto pape non sit obediendum, cum pauci vel nulli hoc teneant. Ea autem que quilibet scire tenetur noscuntur esse communia quedam que paucis sunt ignota. Ergo non quilibet tenetur scire quod non est obediendum tali precepto summi pontificis. Quod etiam ratione videtur posse probari, quia spectantia ad mores que quilibet scire tenetur vel pertinent ad ius naturale vel ad ius divinum. Ea vero que sunt de iure positivo non quilibet scire tenetur. Sed non obedire tali precepto non pertinet ad ius naturale, quia tunc naturaliter esset notum, nec spectat ad ius divinum quia ius divinum in scripturis sacris habetur. In tota autem scriptura divina nulla de hoc fit mentio, ergo non spectat ad ius divinum.

Student: It seems totally unreasonable to say that everyone is bound to know that such a command of the pope must not be obeyed, since few or none hold this position. But the matters that everyone is bound to be aware of are understood to be points of common knowledge, of which few are ignorant. Therefore not everyone is bound to know that one must not obey such a command of the supreme pontiff. This also appears capable of being proved by the following reason. Propositions relevant to morals which everyone is bound to know pertain either to natural law or to divine law, while those propositions which stem from positive [human] law not everyone is bound to know. But not to obey such a command does not pertain to natural law because in that case it would be naturally known; nor does it pertain to divine law, because divine law is contained in the Scriptures, and there is no mention of this proposition in the whole of Holy Writ, therefore it does not pertain to divine law.

Magister: Respondetur quod sicut natura humana est corrupta per peccatum, ita etiam cognitio humana in multis per varia vitia quo ad multa penitus est amissa, et ideo si nulli vel pauci tenent quod non est obediendum tali precepto pape hoc ex corruptione accidit vitiorum. Pauci enim vel nulli inveniuntur qui velint pro veritate indignationem incurrere summi pontificis. Si autem summus pontifex hoc teneret, omnes vel multi de hoc nullatenus dubitarent. Si etiam vellent ad conscientiam suam recurrere, invenirent esse tenendum quod nulli mortali est obediendum in subversionem legis divine, et per consequens quod tali precepto pape cum possit esse in subversionem legis divine non est obediendum quoquo modo.

Master: The answer is that just as human nature has been corrupted by sin, so likewise in many people human understanding has been completely lost as to many matters due to the operation of various vices. And therefore if none or few hold that one must not obey such a precept of the pope, this is due to the corruption of vices. For few people or none at all are to be found who are willing to incur the wrath of the supreme pontiff for the sake of truth. If on the other hand the supreme pontiff were to hold this, all or many would hardly harbour any doubts about it. But if they had the will to consult their consciences, they would discover the obligatory position that no mortal is to be obeyed in subversion of the divine law, and consequently that one must in no way obey such a command of the pope since it may be in subversion of the divine law.

Cum vero dicis quod spectantia ad mores que quilibet scire tenetur, vel pertinent ad ius naturale vel ad ius divinum, dicitur quod verum est aliquo modo. Quia vel sunt principia aut conclusiones iuris naturalis vel divini, aut sequuntur simul ex iure naturali et divino. Et ita est de ista assertione 'non est obediendum huiusmodi precepto pape', quia sequitur ex his que sunt de dictamine iuris naturalis et ex aliquibus contentis in iure divino. Quia per rationem naturalem scitur quod quilibet debet preferre legem quam reputat divinam omni mortali. Per legem autem divinam scitur quod lex christiana est lex divina. Ergo per rationem et legem divinam simul scitur quod lex christiana est omni homini preferenda, et per consequens nulli precepto pape in derogationem vel subversionem legis christiane est aliqualiter obediendum, et ita spectat quodammodo ad ius naturale et ad ius divinum.

However, when you say that propositions relevant to morals that everyone is bound to know pertain either to natural law or to divine law, one agrees that this is true in a certain sense. For they are principles or conclusions of natural or divine law, or follow simultaneously from natural and divine law. This is the status of the assertion 'one must not obey such a command of the pope', because it follows from premisses dictated by natural law and from certain points contained in the divine law. For we know by natural law that anyone must place the law he deems divine above every human individual. And we know by divine law that the Christian law is divine law. Therefore by combining reason and divine law we know that the Christian law must be placed ahead of every man, and consequently that no command of the pope which detracts from or subverts the Christian law must in any way be obeyed, and so this proposition pertains somehow to both natural and divine law.

Cum vero dicis quod non pertinet ad ius naturale quia tunc esset naturaliter notum, respondetur quod non est verum, quia multa spectant ad ius naturale tanquam conclusiones que non sunt naturaliter nota. Cum autem dicis quod de hoc in iure divino nulla fit mentio, respondetur quod de hoc non fit mentio vocaliter in iure divino, in iure tamen divino sicut conclusio virtualiter continetur.

But where you say that it does not pertain to natural law because in that case it would be naturally known, the answer is that this is not true, because many propositions pertain to the natural law as conclusions, which are not naturally known. And when you say that there is no mention of this proposition in the divine law, the answer is that there is no explicit verbal mention of it in the divine law, and yet it is contained in the divine law implicitly, as a conclusion.

Discipulus: Dic quomodo respondetur ad secundam rationem.

Student: State how one responds to the second reason.

Magister: Dicitur quod non est generaliter verum quod nulli clerico licet ante tempus sententie ab episcopo suo discedere, teste glossa 2 q. 7 c. Sacerdotes, que ait: "si prelati sunt heretici, vel excommunicati, vel non servant canones, vel simoniaci, vel notorii fornicatores, tunc potest recedi ab eis ante sententiam, (19 d. c. Nulli, 16 q. ult. c. Sane, 32 dis. c. Nullus". Ex quibus verbis patet quod licet clericis in casu ante tempus sententie late ab homine ab episcopo suo vel prelato recedere, et ideo etiam quandoque a papa ante sententiam latam ab homine licet discedere.

Master: The answer is that it is not generally true that no clerk is permitted to withdraw from his bishop prior to sentence having been passed on the latter, witness the gloss [col. 686] to 2 q. 7 c. Sacerdotes [col. 484] which states: "if the prelates are heretics, or excommunicated, or do not observe the canons, or are simoniacs or notorious fornicators, then one may withdraw from them prior to sentence being passed, 19 dis. c. Nulli, [col. 61]16 last q. c. Sane, [col. 805] 32 dis. c. Nullus". [col. 117] It is clear from these words that clerks are permitted in certain cases to withdraw from their bishop or prelate before the passing of a human sentence on the latter, and so it is likewise permitted sometimes to withdraw from the pope before the passing of a human sentence on him.

Discipulus: Ista responsio non videtur apparens, quia quamvis clerico liceat quandoque ante tempus sententie late ab homine ab episcopo suo vel prelato recedere, hoc tamen non licet ante tempus sententie late a iure. Unde si prelati sunt heretici vel excommunicati vel simoniaci vel notorii fornicatores, licet sententia non sit lata contra eos ab homine, est tamen sententia lata a iure. Sed propter appellationem seu recusationem alicuius nulla est sententia lata contra papam, neque a iure neque ab homine. Ergo non obstante tali appellatione vel recusatione est pape obediendum sicut prius. Et ita si precipit ne appellationi vel recusationi huiusmodi deferatur, obediendum est.

Student: This response does not seem to be apparent, because although a clerk is sometimes permitted to withdraw from his bishop or prelate before a human sentence has been passed on the latter, he is nevertheless not permitted to do so before the law itself has imposed a sentence. Thus, if prelates are heretics or excommunicated or simoniacs or notorious fornicators, although human sentence has not yet been passed on them, the law itself has certainly sentenced them. But no sentence has been passed on the pope, either by law or by man, as the result of someone's appeal or demurrer. Therefore notwithstanding such an appeal or demurrer, the pope must be obeyed as before. And thus if he commands that such an appeal or demurrer is not to be honoured, he must be obeyed.

Magister: Dicitur quod secundum iura et dictamen recte rationis, ante sententiam latam ab homine vel a iure non licet alicui simpliciter a suo prelato recedere. Verumptamen, sicut sepe per appellationem vel recusationem suspensa est iurisdictio alicuius et potestas, vel quantum ad aliquam causam determinatam vel quantum ad omnem causam, ita propter appellationem vel recusationem potest potestas pape suspendi quo ad quedam precepta, ne videlicet aliquid precipiat ante decisionem cause in preiudicium appellantis vel etiam recusantis. Et quemadmodum propter appellationem vel recusationem huiusmodi est suspensa potestas pape quo ad precepta in preiudicium appellantis, ita omnes subditi pape scientes appellationem vel recusationem huiusmodi interiectam, licet nesciant causam esse legitimam, absoluti sunt ab obedientia pape quo ad precepta in preiudicium appellantis vel recusantis. Et ideo sicut tunc papa non debet precipere aliquid in preiudicium appellationis vel recusationis huiusmodi, ita subditi sui quo ad hoc sibi nullatenus obedire tenentur.

Master: One responds that according to the laws and to the dictate of right reason, a person is not simply allowed to withdraw from his prelate prior to the passing of a sentence by man or by law. Nevertheless, just as an appeal or demurrer frequently suspends someone's jurisdiction or authority, either with respect to some particular case or with respect to all cases, so may an appeal or demurrer suspend the pope's authority with respect to certain commands, namely so that he might not order something which would prejudice the appellant or the person issuing a demurrer prior to the case being decided. And just as such an appeal or demurrer suspends the authority of the pope with respect to commands which prejudice the appellant, so likewise all subjects of the pope who know that such an appeal or demurrer has been issued (although they do not know if the cause is legitimate) are absolved from papal obedience with respect to commands which prejudice the appellant or the person who issued a demurrer. And therefore just as the pope must not order at this time something which prejudices such an appeal or demurrer, so are his subjects in no way bound to obey him in this context.

Capitulum 48

Chapter 48

Discipulus: Miror quod dicitur potestatem pape posse suspendi per appellationem vel recusationem cuiuscunque, cum nullus habeat suspendi nisi ab homine vel a iure. Papa autem ab homine suspendi non potest, cum nullus sit eo superior. Nec potest suspendi a iure, quia quicunque suspensus est a iure vel est suspensus a iure naturali vel a iure divino vel a iure positivo. Sed potestas pape per huiusmodi appellationem vel recusationem non est suspensa a iure naturali cum appellationes et recusationes non sint a iure naturali sed ab inventione humana. Nec est suspensa a iure divino propter idem, nec a iure positivo quia in toto iure positivo de tali suspensione nulla penitus mentio reperitur.

Student: I am surprised by the statement that anyone's appeal or demurrer can suspend the pope's authority, since no one can be suspended except by man or by law. But the pope cannot be suspended by man, since no one is his superior. Nor may he be suspended by law, because whoever is suspended by law is suspended either by natural law or by divine law or by positive law. But the authority of the pope is not suspended by natural law as a result of such an appeal or demurrer, since appeals and demurrers are of human establishment and so do not stem from natural law. Nor is it suspended by divine law, for the same reason. Nor is it suspended by positive human law, since no mention whatsoever of such a suspension can be found in the entire positive law.

Magister: Isti de vocabulo 'suspensionis' nolunt contendere, et ideo qualitercunque accipiatur in iure, ipsi in hoc casu utuntur nomine 'suspensionis' secundum quod importat potestatem in alium ex causa minime exercendam. Et isto modo dicunt potestatem pape aliquo modo suspensam per talem appellationem vel recusationem, quia scilicet papa de necessitate salutis tenetur non exercere potestatem in appellantem vel recusantem in preiudicium appellationis vel recusationius ipsius. Et ista suspensio est a iure nature, quia ex dictamine naturali. Dictat enim ratio naturalis quod si aliquis appellat vel recusat iudicem ex causa que si esset probata deberet legitima reputari, iudex antequam appellans vel recusans de malitia convincatur non debet potestatem exercere in ipsum in preiudicium appellationis vel recusationis ipsius. Et cum dicis quod appellationes et recusationes non sunt a iure naturali sed ab inventione humana, respondetur quod ex hoc non sequitur quod talis suspensio non sit a iure naturali. Peccata enim non sunt a iure naturali, cohibitio tamen peccatorum est a iure naturali pro statu nature corrupte, licet non pro statu nature institute. Similiter posset dici quod talis suspensio est a iure divino quia ex iure divino potest ostendi quod papa non debet in talem potestatem in sue appellationis vel recusationis preiudicium exercere.

Master: These theorists have no wish to quarrel about the term "suspension", and therefore whatever may be its technical meaning in legal parlance, in the present instance they are using the word "suspension" to indicate that for cause authority must not be exercised over another person. And in this way they say that the authority of the pope is suspended in a certain manner by such an appeal or demurrer, namely because the pope is bound by necessity of salvation not to exercise his authority over the appellant or the person entering a demurrer so as to prejudice his appeal or demurrer. And this suspension is by the natural law, because it proceeds from a natural dictate. For natural reason decrees that if anyone appeals from or enters a demurrer against a judge for a cause which if proved would have to be considered legitimate, the judge must not exercise authority over him in prejudice of his appeal or demurrer before the appellant or the person entering the demurrer is convicted of malice. And when you argue that appeals and demurrers do not stem from natural law but are humanly established, the answer is that it does not follow from this that such a suspension is not authorized by natural law. Sins, for instance, are not from natural law, but their repression is authorized by natural law in the state of corrupt human nature, though not in the original state of human nature. One might likewise say that such a suspension is from divine law because it can be shown by divine law that the pope must not exercise such authority in prejudice of the given person's appeal or demurrer.

Capitulum 49

Chapter 49

Discipulus: Apparet quod isti per talem suspensionem non aliud intelligunt nisi quod papa tali appellationi vel recusationi deferre tenetur, ideo obmittamus verbum 'suspensionis' et conare probare quod papa tali appellationi vel recusationi deferre tenetur, videlicet appellantem vel recusantem propter appellationem vel recusationem nullatenus molestando ante decisionem cause.

Student: It appears that these theorists do not understand by this suspension anything else except that the pope is obligated to honour such an appeal or demurrer. Therefore let us put aside the term "suspension", and attempt to prove that the pope is bound to honour this appeal or demurrer, namely by not disturbing the appellant or the person entering the demurrer on account of the appeal or demurrer prior to a decision of the case.

Magister: Quod papa teneatur tali appellationi vel recusationi deferre videtur posse probari primo sic. Papa in hiis que sunt ad alterum non debet dominium vel potentiam contra iustitiam vel misericordiam exercere, iuxta illud beati Petri: "neque ut dominantes in cleris". Sed si papa appellationi vel recusationi huiusmodi non deferat, erga appellantem vel recusantem nec iustitiam nec misericordiam sed dominium et potentiam exerceret. Quod non iustitiam patet, quia ad iustitiam minime spectat appellationi vel recusationi non deferre antequam constet eam non esse legitimam. Nec etiam misericordiam, constat, quia nullam facit taliter appellanti vel recusanti, appellationi vel recusationi minime deferendo. Exercet ergo potentiam et dominium absque ratione, imo contra rationem. Ergo dampnabiliter peccat.

Master: It seems possible to prove that the pope is bound to honour such an appeal or demurrer. Here is the first proof. The pope must not exercise lordship or power against justice or mercy in those issues which affect the interests of others, in conformity with the statement of blessed Peter: "neither as being lords over God's heritage". [1 Peter 5:3] But if the pope did not honour such an appeal or demurrer he would be exercising neither justice nor mercy, but rather lordship and power towards the appellant or the person entering the demurrer. That he would not be exercising justice is clear, since it hardly pertains to justice not to honour an appeal or demurrer before its illegitimacy has been established. Nor does he exercise mercy, as is obvious, since he manifests none towards the appellant or the person entering the demurrer by not honouring the appeal or demurrer. Therefore he exercises power and lordship without reason, and indeed against reason. Therefore he sins grievously.

Secundo sic. Si papa non tenetur tali appellationi vel recusationi deferre, aut hoc est quia nulli appellationi vel recusationi pro causa heresis interiecte deferre tenetur, aut quia scit talem appellationem vel recusationem esse iniquam et causam assignatam esse falsam. Non propter primum, quia si causa assignata esset vera, puta quod teneret fidem christianam esse falsam, tali appellationi vel recusationi deferre deberet. Nec propter secundum, quia falsitas cause non impedit quominus debeat quis appellationi vel recusationi deferre, dummodo sit talis que si esset probata deberet legitima reputari. Relinquitur ergo quod papa tali appellationi vel recusationi deferre tenetur.

Here is the second proof. If the pope is not bound to honour such an appeal or demurrer, this is either because he is not bound to honour any appeal or demurrer issued or entered for cause of heresy, or because he knows this appeal or demurrer to be criminal and the cause alleged to be false. The first possibility does not fit, because if the cause alleged were true, that is to say if the pope were to maintain that the Christian faith was false, he would be obligated to honour the relevant appeal or demurrer. The second possibility also does not fit, because the falsity of a cause does not prevent one from being required to honour an appeal or demurrer, so long as this cause if proved would have to be considered legitimate. It remains therefore that the pope must honour such an appeal or demurrer.

Tertio sic. Iudex debet illi appellationi vel recusationi deferre quamvis sciat eam esse iniquam et causam assignatam esse falsam cui alii deferre tenentur. Sed alii a papa tali appellationi vel recusationi deferre tenentur, ergo etiam papa debet deferre eidem. Ad hoc etiam possunt allegari rationes supra cap. 45 inducte.

Here is the third proof. A judge must honour an appeal or a demurrer, even if he knows it to be criminal and the cause alleged to be false, if it is an appeal or demurrer, which others must honour. But there are people other than the pope who must honour this appeal or demurrer. Therefore the pope likewise must honour it. The reasons provided earlier in chapter 45 may also be argued in support of this contention.

Capitulum 50

Chapter 50

Discipulus: Post predicta ad interrogationem quam supra proposui, an scilicet nescientes papam esse hereticum teneantur impugnantes papam de heretica pravitate defendere, volo redire. Porro quia fundamenta emulorum summi pontificis discutere cupio diligenter, unum autem de fundamentis eorum est quod appellantes, recusantes, accusantes et testificantes contra papam de heretica pravitate, ac adherentes et faventes eisdem sunt a cunctis catholicis etiam nescientibus papam esse hereticum defendendi, ideo posco ut ostendas quomodo possit probari quod impugnantes papam de heretica pravitate sunt tuendi a cunctis catholicis quibus non constat legitimis documentis quod taliter impugnantes inique procedunt. Volo autem sub nomine 'impugnantium' comprehendere appellantes, recusantes, accusantes, testificantes contra papam et adherentes et prebentes favorem, auxilium, et consilium supradictis et impugnationi eorum. Volo etiam uti nomine 'defensionis' largissime, scilicet pro defensione que fit quocunque modo, verbo vel facto vel taciturnitate vel omissione, secundum quod dicitur aliquis alium defendere qui eum non prodit vel non manifestat.

Student: After what we have just discussed, I would like to return to the question which I had earlier proposed: [1 Dial. 6.45] namely, whether those who do not know that the pope is a heretic are obligated to defend the opponents of a pope who impute heretical wickedness to him. Moreover, since I would like to discuss carefully the fundamental theses of the supreme pontiff's enemies, and one of their fundamental theses happens to be that appellants from the pope, people who enter a demurrer against him, accusers of the pope, and witnesses against the pope concerning heretical wickedness, as well as their supporters and abettors, must be defended by all catholics (even by those who do not know that the pope is a heretic), I therefore request you to show how it can be proved that those who oppose the pope by alleging that he has lapsed into heretical wickedness are to be protected by all catholics who do not conclude on the basis of legitimate examples that these opponents are involved in a criminal act. By the way, I would like to include under the designation of "opponents": appellants, those who enter demurrers, accusers, witnesses against the pope, and those who support and who provide favours, assistance and counsel to the aforementioned in their opposition activities. I would also like to use the term "defense" in the widest sense, namely for a defense provided by whatever method, by word, by deed or action, or by silence and inaction, for instance when someone who does not betray or surrender another is said to be defending him.

Magister: Sic acceptis vocabulis 'impugnationis' et 'defensionis', quod omnes catholici teneantur defendere impugnantes papam etiam catholicum de pravitate heretica antequam constet legitimis documentis eos malitiose procedere, ostenditur primo quadam ratione que facta est prius cap. 44, que talis est. "Qui occasionem dampni dat dampnum dedisse videatur" (Extra, De iniuriis et dampno dato, Si culpa). Ergo similiter qui occasionem persequendi vel molestandi vel iniuriandi dat, persecutionem vel molestiam vel iniuriam intulisse videtur. Sed non defendens impugnantes papam de heretica pravitate, cum potest, occasionem persequendi vel molestandi vel iniuriandi dat, quia si defenderet, ex quo potest, persecutionem vel molestiam vel iniuriam illatam vel inferendam excluderet. Ergo talis non defendens predictos predicta intulisse videtur vel dinoscitur. Sed nullus debet impugnantibus papam de heretica pravitate antequam constiterit eos malitiose procedere, persecutionem aut molestiam vel iniuriam irrogare. Ergo quilibet qui potest eos tenetur defendere.

Master: Using the terms "opposition" and "defense" in the senses which you have suggested, one may proceed to demonstrate that all catholics are bound to defend the opponents of a pope (even of a catholic pope) to whom these opponents impute heretical wickedness, prior to it being established by legitimate examples that they acted with malice. One shows this to begin with by way of a certain reason, which was advanced earlier in chapter 44. Here it is: "he who provides the opportunity for a loss appears responsible for the loss itself" (Extra, De iniuriis et dampno dato, Si culpa). [col. 880] Therefore in the same way, he who provides the opportunity for persecution or disturbance or harm appears responsible for persecution or disturbance or harm. But he who does not defend, when he can, those who oppose the pope for cause of heretical wickedness, provides an opportunity for persecution or disturbance or harm, because if he offered defense, as he could, persecution or disturbance or harm done or to be done would be excluded. Therefore this person in failing to defend papal opponents appears or is known to have inflicted the damage described. But no one must inflict persecution or disturbance or harm on opponents of the pope who impute heretical wickedness to the latter before it shall have been established that they acted with malice. Therefore everyone who can is obligated to defend them.

Discipulus: Dare occasionem dampni vel persecutionis aut iniurie aut nocumenti contingit dupliciter, scilicet aut positive aliquid agendo vel loquendo, vel negative, scilicet aliquid omittendo. Qui primo modo dat occasionem dampni dampnum dedisse videtur, et reprehensibilis reputatur. Qui autem dat occasionem dampni vel persecutionis vel nocumenti vel molestie sive iniurie aliquid omittendo, non videtur dampnum vel molestiam intulisse, nec culpabilis est censendus. Tunc enim quicunque non iuvaret alium vel non ditaret, et ex hoc accideret dampnum alterius, videretur dampnum dedisse et esset reprehensibilis iudicandus, quod est nimis durum.

Student: There are two ways in which one may provide an opportunity for loss or persecution or harm or injury, namely either in an affirmative manner by doing or saying something, or in a negative manner by omitting something. He who provides opportunity for a loss in the first way appears to have caused the loss itself, and is believed to be blameworthy. But he who provides opportunity for a loss, or for persecution, or injury or disturbance or harm by omitting something, does not appear to have caused a disturbance or a loss, nor is he to be reckoned as guilty. For otherwise, whoever would not help another, or enrich him (with the latter suffering a loss from the omission) would appear to have caused the loss and would have to be judged blameworthy, which is too harsh.

Magister: Ista responsio assertionibus sanctorum patrum obviare videtur, quia ipsi intelligunt quod non solum dampnum dat qui occasionem dampni dat aliquid faciendo vel loquendo, sed etiam qui occasionem dampni dat aliquid omittendo, et quod inde tenetur saltem in conspectu Dei. Hoc auctoritatibus multis videtur posse probari. Gregorius enim nonus, ut legitur Extra, De iniuriis et dampno dato, Si culpa, ait: "si culpa tua datum est dampnum vel iniuria irrogata, seu aliis irrogantibus opem forte tulisti, aut hec imperitia tua seu negligentia evenerunt, iure super hiis satisfacere te oportet. Nec ignorantia te excusat, si scire debuisti, ex facto tuo iniuriam verisimiliter posse contingere vel iacturam". Ex quibus verbis colligitur evidenter quod non solum dampnum intelligitur dare qui verbo vel facto occasionem dampni dat sed etiam qui per negligentiam aliquid omittendo occasionem dampni dat intelligitur dampnum dare, et ex hoc culpabilis iudicatur. Item, qui occasionem mortis dat solummodo aliquid omittendo reus homicidii iudicatur, teste Ambrosio qui, ut habetur dis. 86 Pasce, ait: "quisquis enim pascendo hominem servare poteris, si non paveris, occidisti". Ergo consimiliter qui occasionem dampni vel nocumenti dat solummodo aliquid omittendo huiusmodi dampnum vel nocumentum dare videtur, et exinde reus et culpabilis est censendus.

Master: This response appears to conflict with the assertions of the holy fathers, because they understand that not only he causes a loss who provides opportunity for a loss by doing or saying something, but also he who provides opportunity for a loss by omitting something, and that in consequence he is responsible at least in the eyes of God. It appears that this may be proved by many authorities. Indeed Gregory IX, as we read in Extra, De iniuriis et dampno dato, Si culpa, states: "if by your fault a loss is caused or harm is done, or perhaps if you assisted others doing harm, or if these came about as a result of your incompetence or your negligence, it is appropriate that you give legal satisfaction as to these losses. And ignorance does not excuse you, if you ought to have known that from your action a harm or a loss might possibly ensue". [col. 880] From these words one evidently gathers that not only is he understood as causing a loss who provides an opportunity for a loss by word or deed, but also he is understood to cause a loss who provides an opportunity for the loss through his negligence, in omitting something, and is consequently judged to be guilty. Again, he who provides an opportunity for death merely by omitting something is judged guilty of homicide, witness Ambrose who states (we have this in dis. 86 Pasce): "for whoever, for if you, might have saved a man by feeding him, you killed him if you did not provide nourishment." [col. 302] Similarly therefore he who provides opportunity for a loss or injury merely by not doing something appears to cause this loss or injury, and hence is to be reckoned as guilty and accountable.

Discipulus: Quamvis allegationes iste magnam apparentiam videantur habere, non video tamen quod generaliter qui occasionem dampni dat aliquod omittendo sit culpabilis iudicandus, cum etiam absque culpa possit quis occasionem dampni dare aliquid faciendo (23 q. 5 c. De occidendis). Et ita ex hoc quod aliquis non defendat papam de heretica pravitate impugnantes, quamvis ex hoc quod non defendit sequatur dampnum vel nocumentum eorum, non potest inferri quod talis non defendens sit culpabilis reputandus.

Student: Although these arguments appear to have great plausibility, I nevertheless do not see that in general he who provides an opportunity for a loss by not doing something must be judged accountable, since it is possible for someone to remain faultless even when he provides opportunity for a loss by a positive action (23 q. 5 c. De occidendis). [col. 932] And thus from the fact that someone does not defend opponents of a pope who impute heretical wicked ness to the latter, one cannot infer that the person denying such defense is to be reckoned accountable, even if his denial results in a loss or injury to these opponents.

Magister: Istam responsionem vel obiectionem nonnulli nituntur excludere. Ad cuius evidentiam predicte regule, scilicet 'qui occasionem dampni dat etc.', intellectum exponunt. Et primo quidem quando aliquis dat occasionem dampni solummodo aliquid omittendo, secundo quando quis dat occasionem dampni aliquid faciendo vel loquendo. Quantum ad primum dicunt quod si aliquis occasionem dampni dat solummodo aliquid omittendo, aut tenetur illud facere, et tunc ex tali omissione tenetur et culpam incurrit. Hinc in Exodo legitur, et recitatur Extra, De iniuriis et dampno dato, c. Si bos : "si bos alienus cornupeta esset ab heri et nudiustertius, et non custodivit eum dominus suus, reddet bovem pro bove", ubi dicit glossa super verbum 'non custodivit': "supple, et alterius bovem occiderit, unde tenetur, quia culpa sive negligentia ipsius dampnum datum est, qui debuit diligentiam adhibere". Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod ideo dominus bovis non custodiendo tenetur si bos suus dampnum fecerit, quia debuit diligentiam adhibere ex quo scivit bovem suum cornupetam. Si autem aliquis dat occasionem dampni solummodo aliquid omittendo, si non tenebatur facere quod omisit, qualecunque dampnum acciderit ex occasione data, ille qui occasionem dampni dedit est immunis a culpa. Quod Exodi 21 lex divina insinuare videtur, ubi sic legitur: "si bos cornu petierit virum aut mulierem, et mortui fuerint, lapidibus obruetur et non comedentur carnes eius dominusque bovis innocens erit, quod si bos cornupeta fuerit ab heri et nudius tertius et contestati sunt dominum eius nec reclusit eum, occideritque virum aut mulierem, et bos lapidibus obruetur et dominum illius occident". Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod si ex non reclusione bovis quando dominus ipsum recludere non tenetur mors viri vel mulieris accidit, domino non recludenti minime imputatur. Et ita qui occasionem dampni dat aliquid omittendo quod facere non tenetur culpabilis minime iudicatur.

Master: Some attempt to exclude this response or objection. In order to clarify the exclusion, they explain the meaning of the rule we are discussing, namely 'he who provides opportunity for loss etc.' And first they explain it in the context of someone providing opportunity for a loss merely by not doing something; secondly, in the context of someone providing opportunity for a loss by doing or saying something. As to the first, they say that if someone gives opportunity for a loss merely by not doing something, one possibility is that he was bound to do what he omitted to do, and in that event heis bound and incurs blame for such an omission. Hence one reads in Exodus [21:36], and this is recited in Extra, De iniuriis et dampno dato, c. Si bos: "if it be known that the ox hath used to push in time past, and his owner hath not kept him in; he shall surely pay ox for ox". [cols. 878-9] Here the gloss comments thus on the words "hath not kept him in": "add, and he killed the ox of another, and is bound on that account, because the loss was incurred through the fault or negligence of him who was obligated to demonstrate care". [col. 1852] From these words we are given to understand that the reason why the owner of the ox whom he has not kept in is bound if his ox causes a loss, is because he had the duty to demonstrate care since he knew that his ox used to push in time past. But if someone provides opportunity for a loss merely by not doing something, if he was not bound to do what he omitted to do, then whatever loss resulted from the provided opportunity, he who provided the opportunity would be exempt from fault. This is what divine law suggests in Exodus 21[:28-29] , where we read as follows: "if an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be quit. But if the ox were wont to push with his horn in time past, and it hath been testified to his owner, and he hath not kept him in, but that he hath killed a man or a woman; the ox shall be stoned, and his owner shall also be put to death". From these words we are given to understand that if the death of a man or a woman results from the fact than an ox has not been kept in when its owner is not obligated to keep him in, then the owner who has not kept his ox in is not blamed for the accident. And thus he who provides opportunity for a loss by omitting to do something which he was not obligated to do is not judged to be accountable.

Secundo dicunt quod si quis dat occasionem dampni aliquid faciendo, aut dat operam rei licite aut rei illicite. Si rei illicite, omne dampnum quod sequitur ei imputatur. Si dat operam rei licite aut adhibet diligentiam quam debet, et sibi nullum dampnum quod sequitur imputatur. Aut non adhibet diligentiam debitam et tunc dampnum quod sequitur ei imputatur.

Secondly, they say that if someone provides opportunity for a loss by doing something, either he does something which is permitted, or he does something which is not permitted. If he does something which is permitted or demonstrates due care, then no ensuing loss will be blamed on him. But if he does not demonstrate due care, then a resulting loss will be blamed on him.

Discipulus: Ista valde rationabilia michi videntur, sed non video quomodo ad propositum debeant applicari.

Student: These comments appear quite reasonable to me, but I do not see how they must be applied to the issue we are discussing.

Magister: Nonnullis apparet quod demonstrative potest ostendi quod impugnantes papam de heretica pravitate sunt a catholicis defendendi. Ut tamen ratio eorum magis appareat, probant primo istam conclusionem: quod videlicet taliter impugnantes papam de heretica pravitate si queruntur vel ducuntur ad mortem sunt a morte corporali per catholicos, si valuerint, liberandi. Et ex ista conclusione inferunt quod ab omni persecutione et periculo sunt a catholicis eruendi.

Master: It appears to some that one may demonstrate conclusively that opponents of the pope imputing heretical wickedness to him are to be defended by catholics. But in order to show the truth of their contention more evidently, they initially prove the following conclusion: namely, that these opponents who impute heretical wickedness to the pope are to be liberated by catholics able to do this if the opponents are pursued or led to their death. And from this conclusion they infer that these opponents are to be forcefully protected from every persecution and danger.

Discipulus: Proba primo quod tales sunt a morte corporali liberandi.

Student: Start by proving that such are to be liberated from physical demise.

Magister: Hoc ostenditur auctoritate Salomonis que allegata est supra, qui ait: "erue eos qui ducuntur ad mortem etc." Hoc etiam Augustinus, ut legitur 23 q. 4 c. Ipsa pietas, videtur asserere manifeste, dicens quod si duo fuerint in domo ruitura, si possumus ambos liberare tenemur, quia ut dicit ibidem: "nisi faceremus,non immerito crudeles iudicaremur". Si etiam duo fuerint in aliqua domo ruitura et neuter vult exire, sed unus vult necare seipsum si alter fuerit liberatus, illum unum a morte liberare debemus. Similiter si multi essent in domo ruitura et si unus solus liberaretur omnes alii seipsos precipitio vellent occidere, illum unum eruere debemus. Igitur quilibet tenetur alium etiam invitum et nolentem liberare a morte, si potest, etiam si ob talem liberationem unius alii vellent seipsos occidere. Ergo multo fortius, si quis invite et iniuste trahitur ad mortem, alii qui possunt eum a morte liberare, tenentur. Ex quo sequitur quod qui possunt debent quesitos ad mortem defendere, et ita si quis vult impugnantes papam de heretica pravitate querere ad mortem, catholici qui possunt, vel armis resistendo si competit ipsorum personis, vel querentes eos ad mortem verbis monitoriis aut increpatoriis aut supplicatoriis et aliis modis quibus possunt, a tanta nequitia compescendo, vel quesitos ad mortem occultando vel non tradendo, eos debent defendere.

Master: This is shown by the authority of Solomon (which was earlier cited in argument), [1 Dial. 6.43] who states: "forbear to deliver them that are drawn unto death etc." Augustine likewise (as we read in 23 q. 4 c. Ipsa pietas) obviously appears to assert this when he says that if two people were in a house about to collapse, we are bound to liberate both if we can, because, as he states in that context: "unless we did this, we would deserve to be judged cruel". [col. 909] Indeed if there were two people in a house about to collapse, and neither wanted to leave it, but one of them wanted to kill himself if the other was liberated, we would be obligated to rescue the latter from death. Similarly, if there were many people in a house about to collapse and all the rest threatened to kill themselves on the spot if a single one of them was liberated, we would be obligated to extract the latter. Thus everyone is bound, if he can, to liberate another from death even if the latter is reluctant and unwilling, and even if others would want to kill themselves in the event of such a liberation of this one person. Much more strongly therefore, if someone is unjustly and unwillingly being taken to his death, others who have the power to do it are obligated to liberate him from death. It follows from this that those who have the power to do this must defend people wanted for death. And thus if someone seeks to inflict death on the opponents of a pope who attribute heretical wickedness to the latter, catholics who have the power to do it must defend the opponents, either by armed resistance if this is appropriate to their persons, or by restraining from such a crime those who seek to inflict death on the opponents of the pope (doing this by verbal warnings, reproaches, or pleas, and by other methods available to them, or by hiding or not surrendering the papal opponents wanted for death).

Discipulus: Per istam rationem quicunque videret latrones et homicidas ac alios malefactores dampnatos a iudice duci ad mortem eos si posset liberare deberet.

Student: By this argument whoever saw thieves, killers, and other judicially condemned criminals being led to their death would be obligated to liberate them if possible.

Magister: Ad istam instantiam respondetur quod secus est de illis qui servato ordine iudiciario condempnantur ad mortem et de illis qui absque cause cognitione propter hoc quod volunt superiorem impugnare pro causa pro qua licet superiorem impugnare mortis periculo exponuntur. Primi enim non sunt liberandi a morte quia semper presumitur pro his que fiunt a iudice et pro sententia eius, nisi fuerit legitime reprobata vel per appellationem vel per alium modum congruentem suspensa. Et ideo tales dampnati non sunt a morte liberandi nisi a sententia iudicis legitime appellatum existeret. Tunc enim liberandi essent ab illo qui posset. Secundi vero liberandi sunt ab illis qui convenienter possunt. Et ideo si papa mandaret aliquos capi et duci ad mortem propter hoc quod eum de pravitate heretica impugnare nituntur, liberandi essent, quia in hoc casu presumendum esset pro impugnantibus papam et non pro papa.

Master: The answer to this point is that there exists a significant difference between individuals condemned to death by the process of judicial order, and individuals who are exposed to mortal danger without their cause having been heard in court, merely because they want to oppose a superior in support of a cause for which it is permitted to oppose a superior. Indeed the former are not to be liberated from death, because there always exists a presumption in favour of the actions of a judge and in favour of his judgement, unless it has been legitimately rebuked or suspended by an appeal or some other appropriate method. And therefore such condemned criminals must not be liberated from death unless a legitimate appeal has been issued from the sentence of the judge. In that case they must indeed be liberated by those who have the power to do so. The second category of persons, however, must be liberated by those who conveniently can. And therefore if the pope were to order that some individuals be arrested and executed because they are attempting to oppose him by imputing heretical wickedness to him, these individuals must be liberated, since in this case the presumption would be in favour of the opponents of the pope and not in favour of the pope.

Quod autem presumendum esset pro impugnantibus papam ostenditur. Quia sicut unusquisque presumitur bonus nisi probetur contrarium, ita de quolibet presumendum est quod bene agit illa que agit nisi contrarium constiterit per legitima documenta. Et ideo si quis facit illud quod bene fieri potest, presumendum est quod bene facit antequam contrarium constiterit, quia ea que bene et male fieri possunt, in meliorem partem interpretanda sunt. Cum ergo possibile sit quod aliquis rite et iuste ac veraciter impugnet papam de heretica pravitate, presumendum est de quolibet impugnante papam de heretica pravitate quod rite et iuste faciat antequam constet contrarium. Pro impugnantibus ergo papam de heretica pravitate presumendum est, antequam legitimis documentis constiterit quod malitiose impugnant et inique.

Here is how one shows that presumption would be in favour of the papal opponents. Since everyone is presumed to be a good person unless the contrary is proved, so must one presume of anyone that the quality of their actions is good unless the contrary is established by legitimate examples. And therefore if someone does something that can be done well, it must be presumed that he does it well before the contrary is established, because those things that may be done either well or badly must be interpreted in the better sense. Therefore, since it is possible for someone to oppose the pope by imputing heretical wickedness to him, and to do this properly and justly and truthfully, it must be presumed of anyone who opposes the pope with an imputation of heretical wickedness that he is doing this properly and justly, before the contrary shall have been established. Therefore there must be a presumption in favour of those who oppose the pope with an imputation of heretical wickedness before it shall have been established by legitimate examples that their opposition is malicious and criminal.

Quod autem non sit presumendum pro papa qui ante iudicium preciperet taliter impugnantes neci tradi vel etiam carceri mancipari aut alias dure tractari, probatur. Nam non est presumendum pro illo qui iudicium subterfugit, imo presumendum est contra illum (Extra, De presumptionibus, Nullus et 11 q. 1 Christianis et 3 q. 9 Decernimus et dis. 74 Honoratus). Sed papa qui mandaret taliter impugnantes ipsum neci tradi vel dure tractari, iudicium subterfugeret. Ergo non esset presumendum pro illo sed contra ipsum.

And here is how one proves that presumption must not be in favour of a pope who would order prior to judicial process that such opponents be slain or even thrown into jail or otherwise harshly treated. For presumption must not be in favour of someone who avoids judicial process, but must rather be against him (Extra, De presumptionibus, Nullus, [col. 254] and 11 q. 1 Christianis [col. 629] and 3 q. 9 Decernimus [col. 531] and dis. 74 Honoratus). [col. 264] But a pope who would command that such opponents of his be slain or harshly treated would be avoiding judicial process. Therefore presumption would have to be against him and not in his favour.

Discipulus: Iste allegationes dupliciter videntur deficere. Primo quia pro illo est minime presumendum qui iudicium subterfugit quando tenetur stare iudicio. Papa autem non tenetur stare iudicio. Ergo si iudicium subterfugit non est propter hoc presumendum contra ipsum. Secundo deficiunt quia non est presumendum pro illo qui presumitur ex invidia et non ex caritate procedere. Sed qui papam de heretica pravitate impugnaret presumendum esset quod non ex caritate sed ex invidia impugnaret, quemadmodum presumitur accusationem fieri potius causa invidie quam caritatis (6 q. 1 c. Si omnia in textu et glossa et 2 q. 6 Decreto in glossa et 2 q. 7 Si quis episcopus, ubi canon notat accusationem illaudabilem actionem). Ergo pro impugnantibus papam de heretica pravitate nullatenus est presumendum, sed presumendum est contra eos sicut contra detractores.

Student: These arguments appear to fail in two respects. Firstly, because presumption must not be in favour of someone who avoids judicial process when that someone is obligated to appear in court. But the pope is not obligated to appear in court. Therefore if he avoids judicial process, presumption must not be against him on that account. Secondly, these arguments fail because presumption must not be in favour of someone who is presumed to act out of envy and not out of love. But he who opposes the pope by imputing heretical wickedness to him must be presumed to be opposing the pope out of envy and not out of love, just as one presumes that an accusation is rather made out of envy than out of love (6 q. 1 c. Si omnia, both in the text [col. 555] and in the gloss, [col. 799] and 2 q. 6 Decreto [col. 469] in the gloss, [col. 659] and 2 q. 7 Si quis episcopus, where the canon notes that an accusation is an act not worthy of praise). [col. 500] Therefore one must in no way presume in favour of papal opponents who impute heretical wickedness to the pope, but one must presume against them as against slanderers.

Magister: Ad primam istarum instantiarum nonnulli respondere nituntur dicentes quod papa tenetur stare iudicio si apparuerint aliqui, qui legitima exceptione repelli non possunt, qui eum voluerint de pravitate heretica accusare. Cum enim, ut dicunt, constet aperte quod papa potest de heresi accusari, patenter infertur quod aliqui sunt qui valent papam de heresi accusare. Ex quibus sequitur evidenter quod papa in tali casu iudicio stare tenetur, et ideo si iudicium subterfugit reddit se suspectum, et est contra ipsum merito presumendum.

Master: Some attempt to respond to the first of these instances by saying that the pope is obligated to appear in court if certain people come forward who cannot be pushed aside by way of a legitimate exception, and indicate a willingness to accuse the pope of heretical wickedness. They say that since it is clearly established that the pope may be accused of heretical wickedness, there is an obvious inference that some people exist who may accuse the pope of heresy. It evidently follows from these considerations that in such a case the pope is obligated to appear in court, and therefore if he avoids judicial process he becomes a suspect and a deserved presumption is formed against him.

Ad secundam dicitur quod non est semper presumendum quod impugnans papam de heretica pravitate, sive appellando, sive recusando, sive accusando, sive testificando, causa invidie moveatur. Nec est semper presumendum quod accusatio ex invidia non ex caritate procedat. Imo nisi apparuerit aliquod indicium invidie speciale, presumendum est quod accusatio ex caritate fiat, cum accusare etiam prelatum, circumstantiis debitis observatis, ad rectitudinem et Dei timorem pertineat, teste Gregorio qui, ut legitur 2 q. 7 c. Sicut, ait: "sicut laudabile discretumque est reverentiam et honorem exhibere prioribus, ita rectitudinis et Dei timoris est, si qua in eis sunt que indigent correctione, nulla dissimulatione postponere, ne totum (quod absit) corpus morbus invadat, si languor non fuerit curatus in capite". Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod non est presumendum statim accusationem prelati fieri ex invidia, sed ex zelo boni communis.

The reply to the second instance is that one must not always presume that an opponent of the pope who imputes heretical wickedness to him (either by appealing from him, or by entering a demurrer against him, or by accusing him, or by testifying against him) is motivated by envy. Nor must one always presume that an accusation proceeds from envy and not from love. Indeed, unless some specific evidence of envy emerges, one must presume that the accusation is made out of love, since to accuse even a prelate, appropriate circumstances being taken into account, pertains to righteousness and to fear of God, as witnesses Gregory who states (we read this in 2 q. 7 c. Sicut): "just as it is worthy of praise and notice to demonstrate respect and honour to one's leaders, so is it a matter of righteousness and fear of god not to procrastinate or to cover up if there are things about them which need correction, lest, God forbid, disease should invade the whole body if a feebleness will not have been healed in its head". [col. 499] From these words we are given to understand that one must not immediately presume that an accusation is leveled at a prelate from envy rather than from a zeal for the common good.

Ad allegationes tuas respondet glossa 2 q. 7 c. Si quis episcopus, super illo verbo "illaudabilis" dicens: "vel dic illaudabilem quo ad vulgi opinionem. Nam presumitur alias quis bono zelo accusare, ut Extra, De dolo et contumacia, c. Veritatis est verbum. Ex caritate enim debet provenire accusatio (Extra, De accusationibus, c. Si quis episcopus) et qui accusat publice salutis custodiam gerit, ut Cod., De famosis libellis, lege una". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod non semper presumendum est accusationem fieri ex invidia. Imo si accusans fuit hactenus bone fame, nec apparet quod fuerit inimicus accusati, nec facile litigans, nec vilis aut levis persona, sed omni suspicione carens, presumendum est quod bono zelo accusare proponat. Et consimiliter est dicendum de impugnantibus papam de heretica pravitate. Non est enim verisimile quod aliquis bone fame et opinionis, mansuetus et humilis, litigia minime querens, discretus et providus, se velit periculis infinitis exponere papam de pravitate heretica impugnando, nisi conscientia urgeatur. Quare presumendum est antequam contrarium appareat quod impugnans papam de heretica pravitate, et per consequens confusioni perpetue, imo pluribus mortibus et mortis periculis se exponens, zelo fidei orthodoxe quam vite corporali videtur facto proponere moveatur. Et ideo omnes impugnantes papam de heretica pravitate, antequam constiterit legitimis documentis quod malo zelo moventur, sunt a catholicis qui possunt, defendendi, qui etiam eis zelo fidei orthodoxe prout statui et officio cuiuslibet congruit, tenentur impendere consilium, auxilium, et favorem. Et similiter si taliter impugnantes fuerint deprehensi malo zelo moveri, quia vel de falsitate convincuntur vel in probatione eorum que imponunt pape deficiunt, sunt acerrime puniendi et videtur quod essent curie seculari tradendi. Patet igitur secundum istos quod si impugnantes papam de heretica pravitate queruntur ad mortem, sunt a catholicis defendendi. Ex quo infertur quod etiam sunt ab omni persecutione et periculo liberandi, quia consimilis ratio videtur quod sint liberandi a maiori periculo et minori.

Your arguments are answered by the gloss [col. 708] of 2 q. 7 c. Si quis episcopus, which states on the words "not worthy of praise": "or say that it is not worthy of praise in the opinion of the vulgar. For elsewhere one is presumed to accuse from good zeal, as in Extra, De dolo et contumacia, c. Veritatis est verbum. [col. 296] Indeed an accusation must proceed from love (Extra, De accusationibus, c. Si quis episcopus) [col. 231-2] and he who accuses publicly acts as the custodian of security, as in Codex, De famosis libellis, lege una". We gather from these words that one must not always presume that an accusation is made from envy. Indeed if the accuser was heretofore a person of good reputation, nor did it appear that he was an enemy of the accused, nor someone who went to court at the slightest pretext, nor a shallow or contemptible person, but beyond all suspicion, one would have to presume that he intended to make the accusation from good zeal. And the same must be said of opponents of the pope who impute heretical wickedness to him. For it is hardly likely that someone of good fame and reputation, someone gentle and humble, who avoided judicial conflicts, someone distinguished and provident, would want to expose himself to infinite dangers by imputing heretical wickedness to the pope, unless prompted to do so by his conscience. Therefore it must be presumed, before the contrary becomes apparent, that someone who opposes the pope for heretical wickedness, and consequently exposes himself to infinite embarrassment, indeed to many deaths and dangers of death, is motivated by zeal for orthodox belief which he in fact places ahead of his physical life. And so all opponents of the pope who impute heretical wickedness to him must be defended by catholics capable of providing this service, before it is established by legitimate examples that these opponents are motivated by evil emulation. Catholics are also obligated, out of zeal for orthodox faith, to the extent this is appropriate to everyone's status and function, to provide these opponents with advice, assistance, and favour. And similarly, should these opponents be found to have been motivated by evil emulation, either because they were convicted of falsehood or were unable to prove the matters which they imputed to the pope, they must be harshly punished, and it appear that they must be surrendered to secular justice. It is thus clear, according to these theorists, that if opponents of the pope who impute heretical wickedness to him are being pursued so as to be put to death, they must be defended by catholics. From which one infers that they must also be liberated from all persecution and danger, because it appears that the same reason justifies them being liberated from both a greater and a lesser peril.

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, DIALOGUS
Part 1, Book 6, chapters 36-50

Text and translation by George Knysh
August 2002 (revised May 2004)

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, DIALOGUS Part 1, Book 6, chapters 36-50

Text and translation by George Knysh August 2002 (revised May 2004)

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, DIALOGUS
Part 1, Book 6, chapters 36-50

Text and translation by George Knysh
August 2002 (revised May 2004)