Part 1, Book 6, chapters 1-15

The 33 manuscripts which contain all or portions of the First Part of Ockham's Dialogus may be classified into 4 basic groups:

The asterisks indicate manuscripts being fully collated for our proposed critical Latin text of 1 Dial. 6.

The main reason for inclusion into a specific group is the quantitative and/or qualitative preponderance in a given manuscript of readings peculiar to the group to which the manuscript has been assigned.

The complicated nature of medieval manuscript copying (and the consequent difficulties in tracing affiliations) is well exemplified by our manuscript Na. This witness has been dated by Cenci to the 14th century, but independent examination by Prof. Doyle of Durham University has not fully confirmed such an assumption. My own analysis indicates that the manuscript's reproduction of the First Part of Dialogus evidently relied on exemplars of groups A, B and C, and the utilization of these sources did not appear to be rationally co-ordinated. Thus in 1 Dial. 1.3 where groups A and B usually describe the authors of the Canon Law as "viri acutissimi", and groups C and D as "viri eruditissimi", Na has "viri eruditissimi acutissimi". In the same chapter where group B has "indices" and some exemplars of group C "determinares", Na has "indices et determinares" (while groups A and D normally prefer "intimares"). In 1 Dial. 2.21 Na has the same major omissions that we find only in group B manuscripts, while in 1 Dial. 5.34 it commits an error of transcription (adding a superfluous "Discipulus" in the middle of a sentence of the Master) which subsequently influenced the text of group D. In most other contexts Na follows the tradition of group A rather closely (with frequent points of convergence to Lc and Vd). All this suggests a very random process of recopying, and the gaps noticeable throughout (as in 1 Dial. 6.1) indicate a lack of interest in proper editing. Na is surely the most radical instance of what can be observed in many other manuscripts. Va for example (copied in 1437) is a B group text with multiple but not comprehensive integrated corrections from a C group exemplar. Sometimes (as in Pb and Lb) we may even catch these corrections "in statu nascendi" as marginal and interlinear glosses. On the other hand, C group manuscripts also share a significant number of unique readings with the B group tradition, and the same kind of relationship may be discerned between groups C and D. There consequently seems little point in making a principled distinction between "conflated' and "pure" texts, since every witness has been verifiably subjected to a measure of re-editing, sometimes marginal, sometimes quite intense. In the final analysis the best we can do is to identify and eliminate as many of these accretions as we can.

The classic exemplar of the C tradition (Ba, a mid-15th century manuscript) shares some very specific readings with Va (cf. the apparatus for 1 Dial. 6.1-15 at chs. 1 /twice/, 5, 14 /four items/) which otherwise are only known to exist in the D tradition, and cannot be found in any other exemplars of B or C. This demonstrates that important elements of the D textual tradition were available by 1437. If we focus on the extant manuscripts of the D tradition (leaving aside the Br fragment which John Scott links to Vc) we may recognize three sub-groups: (1) We (2) Av Ox (3) Vc Vf. We is a multiple copy hands compilation of the later 15th century put together on the basis of distinct sources, but with overwhelming though not quite total affinities to Av Ox Vc Vf. Both the Av Ox and Vc Vf groups go back to the same original through at least one intermediary, and common place names in Av Ox Vc Vf (cf. 1 Dial. 5.22-24) associate this original with the March of Ancona. Each sub-group has been edited further, and the immediate ancestor of Av Ox has provided chapter headings analogous to those of Ly. Vc and Vf are products of the 1470's (Vc was the copy of Pope Sixtus IV), while Av and Ox are slightly earlier (Ox existed in 1444). Their common "Ancona" original, with its Table of Contents and Admonition to the Reader, would thus appear to be at least contemporary to the early Council of Basel, if not even earlier. The textual archaeology of tradition D intimates that either its original relied on an exemplar of A which (unlike other such) had very little in common with tradition B, or else that the "Ancona" editor of D deliberately chose not to draw on tradition B for assistance.

None of these groups is able on its own to provide an exclusive basis for reconstructing the original whence stem all our witnesses. Furthermore, the fact that (unlike the case of Summa Totius Logice or of other purely philosophical and theological Ockham works) we do not possess a single manuscript of Dialogus which may securely be dated to the author's lifetime (our oldest is Bb, a mid-14th century group A exemplar which belonged to the Basel Dominicans), raises special issues of authenticity. All groups to a more or less evident extent share a common text in the incipits and explicits of individual books of the First Part, as well as of the treatise as a whole. The systematic reference therein to "Dialogi" (plural) rather than to Ockham's preferred "Dialogus" (singular) strongly suggests that the original of all our surviving manuscripts was edited sometime after Ockham's death by someone who (as other contexts indicate) was not always totally familiar with Ockham's intentions. There is no need to doubt that the reproduced text is substantially faithful to Ockham's unavailable autograph. But the presence therein of occasional additions, corrections, or improvements going back to the very beginning of its textual history should perhaps make us more vigilant as to yet further "improvements" demonstrably attributable in the various groups to a number of subsequent editors. The most curious of these is doubtless the "Frankfurt prologue" and its homologue in We, which I discovered in 1975 and 1991 respectively. The text has been edited by my Australian colleagues.

Group A contains the oldest manuscripts, but these have some defective peculiarities and significant verbal omissions. Group B represents the 14th century tradition which evolved into the printed editions (Paris 1476 and Lyons 1494) and is therefore the one most familiar to historical practitioners of Dialogus. It is also the group to which belonged the lost manuscript by reference to which Pierre d'Ailly composed his abbreviation of Dialogus. This group's text also has many defects. Groups C and D have a number of good late exemplars, but their tradition cannot be traced back much further in time than the beginning of the 15th century, and the frequent excellence of the provided text needs to be balanced by concerns for authenticity which cannot in all instances be positively resolved. We can demonstrate that Simon de Plumetot corrected his group B Dialogus exemplar (Pb, originally copied in 1389) by reference to a group C text sometime in the second or third decade of the 15th century. We know that Henry of Zoemeren's Epithoma Dialogi (c. 1460) was also based on a group C text. But we lack any evidence for the early existence of this tradition and cannot always fully identify the "good" readings shared by C and D with Ockham's authentic words. It should also be pointed out that the textual excellence of group D is not uniform or consistent, as the apparatus of 1 Dial. 6.1-15 clearly reveals. In many cases its "common text" has not been adopted, either because it is obviously defective or because it is superfluous (sometimes awkwardly so, as in chapter 14). While group D is particularly strong (though not infaillible) in the recording of Biblical, Canon Law, and Patristic citations , and is frequently our best general witness, it needs to be supplemented and corrected by the other groups if the original text of Ockham's published Dialogus is to be adequately or nearly adequately recaptured.

The initial chapters of 1 Dial. 6 have therefore been reconstructed on the foundation of a full collation of the 11 "best" and most reliable exemplars of our 4 manuscript groups, with occasional references to other witnesses. The two printed editions of the 15th century have also been fully collated. The "reliability" pattern which emerges in this first published segment of book 6 is quite interesting, but cannot as yet be fully conclusive for the entire book, and even less for the entire treatise. The manuscript which is closest to our critical text in these opening chapters is We (with an 87% rate of variants convergence), closely followed by An (86%), Fi, Vc, Vc, Bb (all at 85%), more distantly by Ox (83%, not counting a large textual omission at 1 Dial. 6.15), with Va, Vd, Vg and Ba trailing somewhat (all between 74% and 78%), and the historic Trechsel Lyons printed edition bringing up the rear at 72%. We should note however that many defective variants are unique to each discrete witness, whose value in confirming or denying most standardized readings is not drastically impaired by such erroneous idiosyncracies. Nor should we forget that, on balance, variant units and/or clusters only affect some 15% of the total text. A "reliability" rate differential of merely 13-15% between "best" and "worst" within that narrow 15% is hence contextually minimal.

The anonymous 14th century scribe who copied our witness Vg recorded book 6 of the First Part as the "secunda pars" of this treatise. This is a useful perspective. For it is here, in this massive sixth book, that Ockham's conflict with Pope John XXII begins to spill over into issues of immediate practical relevance to the dissident Franciscans of Munich. Is the Pope above the law? If not, how should one proceed to verify whether he is a criminal? How should one punish him if it turns out that he is? The very title of book 6 is pregnant with political passion. The tensions and not always restrained fury of this historic confrontation still reverberate through these pages, and Ockham's powerful dialectic continues to fascinate and to inspire nearly seven centuries after the events to which it was applied.

The material presented by Ockham in this first segment of 1 Dialogus 6 had been utilized for doctrinal reconstructions in A.S. McGrade's The Political Thought of William of Ockham, at p. 19 n.38, p. 88 n.23, p. 94 n.38, and p. 107 n. 78. It had been utilized for the same purpose in my Political Ockhamism, at p. 28 n.21, p. 35 n.34, p. 50 n.128, p. 96 n. 229, p. 98 n. 233, p. 158 n.249, p. 238 n.7, p. 261 n. 98, p. 263, p, 268, and pp. 290-292. A new perspective may be added to these earlier analyses. It is now an indisputable fact that Ockham knew the theories of Jean Quidort ("Johannes Parisiensis", "John of Paris"), and quoted him verbatim in the Dialogus. The French Dominican thus joins Marsilius of Padua as a major source of the radical anti-papal doctrines discussed in 1 Dial. 6.6-9.

For the general context and meaning of 1 Dial. 6.1-15, see my Fragments of Ockham Hermeneutics, pp. 92-99. My colleagues John Kilcullen and John Scott have kindly reviewed an earlier version of 1 Dial. 6. 1-10, for which I am most grateful.

Explicit liber quintus prime partis dialogorum, docens quis potest heretica labe maculari. Incipit liber sextus partis eiusdem, de punitione hereticorum et specialiter pape effecti heretici investigans.

Here ends the fifth book of the first part of the dialogues, teaching who may be defiled by heretical stain. The sixth book of the same part begins, investigating the punishment of heretics and especially of the Pope who has become a heretic

De punitione hereticorum et specialiter pape effecti heretici

On the punishment of heretics and especially of the Pope who has become a heretic

Capitulum 1

Chapter 1

Discipulus: Solutiones predictarum rationum per memetipsum satagam invenire et ideo qui possunt hereticari te interrogare desistam, nonnulla de puniendis hereticis amodo quesiturus. Porro quia istud opus volui fieri principaliter propter dissensionem inter sanctissimum patrem et dominum, dominum Ioh. papam 22-um et quosdam qui ipsum de heretica pravitate diffamant, cum quibus in hoc convenio quod papa potest heretica labe respergi licet predictum dominum virum catholicum reputem et fidelem, ideo principaliter in hoc libro sexto qualiter et a quo sit papa si efficiatur hereticus feriendus investigare curabo. Verumptamen quia papa valet de heresi tam mendaciter quam veraciter infamari, primo inquiram de papa super crimine heresis mendaciter diffamato, secundo de papa vere heretica labe fedato. In primis autem cupio scire an papa habeat iudicem superiorem in terris, unde de hac re unam vel plures assertiones cum suis motivis velis michi referre.

Student: I shall endeavour to discover the solutions of the preceding arguments by myself and therefore I shall cease to question you about potential heretics. I now duly intend to raise questions concerning the punishment to be inflicted on heretics. Moreover, since I wanted this work to be composed principally on account of the discord between the Most Holy Father and Lord, the Lord Pope John XXII, and certain persons who are spreading rumours of his heretical wickedness (I agree with them that a pope may be spattered with heretical stain but consider the aforementioned Lord to be a faithful and catholic man), I shall consequently in this sixth book undertake above all to investigate in what manner and by whom a pope is to be struck down should he become a heretic. However, since a pope may be defamed of heresy both falsely and truthfully, I shall initially inquire about a pope mendaciously slandered of the crime of heresy, and secondly of a pope truly polluted by heretical stain. But first of all I would like to know whether the pope has a superior judge on earth. Would you then report to me one or more positions on this issue along with their supporting argumentations.

Magister: Circa interrogationem tuam discrepant literati, quibusdam dicentibus quod papa non habet superiorem in terris, aliis dicentibus quod licet nulla persona in terris sit superior papa universalis tamen ecclesia et etiam concilium generale est supra papam. Asserentium autem papam non habere superiorem in terris quidam dicunt quod qui semel est canonice ad papatum assumptus nisi renuntiaverit spontanea voluntate papatui nunquam poterit nisi per divinam potentiam papatu iuste privari etiam si efficiatur hereticus. Alii dicunt quod quamvis papa non habeat superiorem in terris quamdiu est papa si tamen efficiatur hereticus ipso facto iure divino non humano est papatu privatus et inferior factus catholicis.

Master: The learned disagree about your question. Some say that the pope has no superior on earth. Others contend that while no specific person is the pope's superior on earth, the universal church and also the general council are nevertheless above the pope. Now of those who claim that the pope has no superior on earth, some say that once a man has been canonically elevated to the papal office he may never (save by divine power) be justly deprived of the papacy, even if he becomes a heretic, unless he resigns of his own free will. Others say that although a pope has no superior on earth so long as he remains pope, should he happen to become a heretic he is instantly deprived of the papacy by divine law (not by human law) and becomes inferior to catholics.

Discipulus: Allega primo pro assertione in qua diversi conveniunt scilicet quod papa non habet iudicem superiorem in terris.

Student: Begin with representations for the assertion with which these [latter] opposite parties agree, namely, that the pope has no superior judge on earth.

Magister: Hoc auctoritatibus et rationibus nonnulli probare conantur. Hoc enim Innocentius papa ut habetur 9 q. 3 c. Nemo sentire videtur, ait enim: "nemo iudicabit primam sedem iustitiam temperare desiderantem, neque enim ab augusto neque ab omni clero neque a regibus neque a populo iudex iudicabitur". Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod etiam universalis ecclesia non est papa superior cum clerus et populus qui secundum predicta verba Innocentii papam nequeant iudicare ecclesiam universalem constituant. Ex quo sequitur quod etiam concilium generale non est supra papam. Item, Symachus papa ut habetur eisdem causa et questione c. Aliorum, ait: "aliorum hominum causas Deus voluit terminare per homines sedis istius presulem suo sine questione reservavit arbitrio". Ex quo habetur quod solus Deus est superior sedis apostolice.

Master: Many attempt to prove this by authorities and arguments. Indeed, Pope Innocent seems to hold this view for he states in 9 q. 3 c. Nemo [col. 610] that "no one is to judge the first see when it is establishing justice; the judge will be judged neither by the emperor, nor by all the clergy, nor by kings nor by the people". One gathers from these words that even the universal church is not the pope's superior, since it is made up of the very clergy and people who, according to the cited words of Innocent, are not competent to judge the pope. From which it follows that the general council is likewise not above the pope. Again: Pope Symachus states (we have it in c. Aliorum [col. 610] of the same canon law context): "God willed that the cases of other men were to be decided by men; He reserved without question the head of this see for His own judgment". From this one concludes that God alone is the superior of the Apostolic see.

Discipulus: Dicerent alii quod Symachus papa loquitur de aliis causis quam de causis heresis, et ideo, non obstantibus verbis eiusdem, papa habet superiorem in causis heresis.

Student: Others would say that Pope Symachus is speaking of cases other than cases of heresy and therefore, notwithstanding his words, the pope has a superior in cases of heresy.

Magister: Ista responsio impugnatur quia sicut ex dictis sanctorum patrum colligitur, ubi canon non excipit nec nos debemus excipere, cum ergo canon Symachi pape causam heresis nequaquam excipiat nec nos causam heresis debemus excipere. Hoc etiam patet quia verba indistincte prolata generaliter debent intelligi, ut papa in omni causa divino servetur arbitrio. Tertia auctoritas ad predictam assertionem est Antheri pape qui ut in predictis causa et quaestione c. Facta , ait: "facta subditorum iudicantur a nobis, nostra vero a Domino iudicantur". Papa ergo superiorem iudicem non habet in terris. Quarta auctoritas est Constantini imperatoris qui, ut legitur 12 q. 1 c. Futuram "presidens sancte synodo que apud Nicenam congregata est, cum querelam quorundam coram se conspiceret deferendam ait: 'vos a nemine diiudicari potestis quia Dei solius iudicio reservamini, dii etenim vocati estis et idcirco non potestis ab hominibus iudicari'". Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod clerici non possunt a laicis iudicari et per consequens multo fortius caput clericorum scilicet summus pontifex nequit ab alio iudicari.

Master: This response is challenged because, as one gathers from statements by holy fathers, where a canon makes no exception neither must we. Since the canon of Pope Symachus by no means excepts the case of heresy, we cannot except this case either. The same point is evident from the dictum that words stated indistinctly must be understood comprehensively, and hence the pope is to be reserved for divine judgment in every case. The third authority in support of the aforecited assertion is that of Pope Antherius (in the same context [col. 610-611] at c. Facta) who declares: "the deeds of subjects are judged by us, but our deeds are judged by the Lord". Therefore the pope has no superior judge on earth. The fourth authority is that of Emperor Constantine. We read in 12 q. 1 c. Futuram [col. 682] that "presiding over the holy synod which was gathered at Nicea, when he [Constantine] noticed that a dispute between some [bishops] was on the verge of being brought before him for judgment, he said: 'you may be judged by no one, because you are reserved for the judgment of God alone, for you are called 'gods' and thus you cannot be judged by men'". From these words we understand that clerks cannot be judged by laymen, and consequently all the more strongly the head of the clerks, namely the supreme pontiff, cannot be judged by another.

Quinta auctoritas ad idem est Gelasii pape qui ut habetur 9 q. 3 c. Ipsi loquens de apostolica sede ait: "ipsi sunt canones qui appellationes totius ecclesie ad huius sedis examen voluerunt deferre, ab ipsa vero nunquam prorsus appellare debere sanxerunt, ac per hoc illam de tota ecclesia iudicare, ipsam ad nullius commeare iudicium nec de eius umquam preceperunt iudicari iudicio". Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod de summo pontifice non licet toti ecclesie iudicare sed ipse habet de tota ecclesia iudicare. Cum ergo nec persona nec aliqua congregatio in terris sit superior tota ecclesia, nec papa qui est supra totam ecclesiam potest aliqua congregatio vel persona superior reperiri. Sexta auctoritas est Nicholai pape qui, ut habetur causa et questione predictis c. Patet, ait: "patet profecto sedis apostolice cuius auctoritate maius non est iudicium a nemine fore retractandum, neque cuiquam de eius liceat iudicio iudicare". Ex quibus habetur quod nemini licet de summo pontifice iudicare et per consequens non habet superiorem in terris.

The fifth authority in favour of the same assertion is that of Pope Gelasius. Speaking of the Apostolic see (we have this in 9 q. 3 c. Ipsi)[col. 611] he states: "these are the canons which willed the referral of appeals from the entire church to the scrutiny of this see, while decreeing that at no time was it ever allowed to appeal therefrom, and thereby these [canons] ordered that this see was to judge the whole church, while being called to the judgment of no one, nor was its own judgment ever to be subject to judicial review". From these words we understand that the whole church is not allowed to judge the pope, but it is his function to judge the whole church. Therefore since neither a person nor some congregation on earth is superior to the entire church, it is impossible to find a person or some congregation which is superior to the pope, who is himself above the entire church. The sixth authority is that of Pope Nicholas (we have it in the same context at c. Patet) [col. 609] who states: "It is unquestionably clear that the judgment of the Apostolic see (there is no greater authority) is to be reviewed by no one, nor is anyone allowed to judge its decision". From this we gather that no one has the right to judge the supreme pontiff, and consequently that he has no superior on earth.

Discipulus: Puto quod qui posset ad istas auctoritates rationabiliter respondere omnes alias eandem sententiam pretendentes sine difficultate dissolveret. Ideo ista sufficiant. Signa tamen ubi poterunt alie inveniri que sonare videntur quod papa non habet iudicem superiorem in terris.

Student: I think that one who could reasonably respond to these authorities would be able, without difficulty, to solve all the others claiming the same point. Therefore these are sufficient. Indicate however where additional authorities might be found which appear to suggest that the pope has no superior judge on earth.

Magister: Ad hoc poterit allegari auctoritas Nicholai pape di. 21 c. Nunc autem, et di. 22 c. Qua traditione et 2 q. 7 Petrus.

Master: The authority of Pope Nicholas in di. 21 c. Nunc autem [col. 71], and di. 22 c. Qua traditione [col. 75], and 2 q. 7 Petrus [col. 496], might be adduced to this end.

Discipulus: Pro eadem assertione rationes adducas.

Student: Provide arguments in favour of the same assertion.

Magister: Prima ratio talis est. Ille a quo non licet appellare non habet superiorem in terries, quia ab omni inferiori ad superiorem licite est appellare (2 q. 7 Placuit). Sed a papa appellare non licet (9 q. 3 c. Ipsi et c. Cuncta), ergo papa non habet iudicem superiorem in terris. Secunda ratio talis est. Ille qui est omnibus superior non habet superiorem quia non potest respectu eiusdem vel eorumdem esse superior et inferior. Sed papa est omnibus catholicis superior cum sit omnium caput, igitur non habet iudicem superiorem in terris. Tertia ratio talis est. Qui non potest ab aliquo accusari non habet iudicem superiorem. Sed papa non potest ab aliquo accusari quia pastor ab ovibus accusari non potest (6 q. 1 Oves et 2 q. 7 Petrus). Omnes autem catholici sunt oves cure et regimini pape commisse. Igitur ipsum accusare non possunt et per consequens a nemine potest iudicari.

Master: The first argument is this. He from whom it is not permitted to appeal does not have a superior on earth, because one is allowed to appeal from any inferior to a superior (2 q. 7 c. Placuit)[col. 501]. But it is not permitted to appeal from the pope (9 q. 3 c. Ipsi [col. 611]and c. Cuncta [col. 611]). Therefore the pope has no superior judge on earth. The second argument is this. He who is superior to everyone does not have a superior, because one cannot be both superior and inferior with respect to another. But the pope is superior to all catholics since he is the head of all, therefore he does not have a superior on earth. The third argument is this. He who cannot be the subject of someone's accusation does not have a superior judge. But the pope cannot be accused by someone, because the shepherd cannot be accused by the sheep (6 q. 1 Oves [col. 555] and 2 q. 7 Petrus [col. 496]). Now all catholics are sheep entrusted to the care and the rule of the pope. Hence they cannot accuse him and consequently he may be judged by no one.

Capitulum 2

Chapter 2

Discipulus: Noli multiplicare rationes pro hac parte, sed motiva dicentium quod papa habet superiorem in terris enarra.

Student: Do not multiply arguments in favour of this view, and propound the reasons of those who say that the pope has a superior on earth.

Magister: Quod papa etiam manens papa habeat iudicem superiorem in terris nonnulli multis rationibus probare nituntur. Modi tamen ponendi sunt diversi. Quidam enim dicunt quod imperator vel aliquis alius iudex et princeps secularis aut populus seu multitudo aliqua est iudex ordinarius pape. Alii vero dicunt quod nec ecclesia universalis nec aliqua alia congregatio aut persona habet potestatem requirendi vel cohercendi papam nisi in duobus casibus. Primus est si papa fuerit de heresi graviter infamatus licet falso, secundus est si in aliquo crimine de quo scandalizetur ecclesia sit notorie deprehensus et ipse incorrigibilem se ostendat.

Master: Some try to demonstrate that the pope has a superior judge on earth even when he remains a pope, and they adduce many arguments. But they have different ways of putting this. For some say that the emperor or another judge and secular ruler, or the people or some multitude, is the normal judge of the pope. While others say that neither the universal church nor any other congregation or person has the power of summoning or coercing the pope except in two cases. The first is if the pope were seriously if falsely slandered of heresy, the second is if he were notoriously involved in some crime which would scandalize the church and showed himself to be incorrigible.

Discipulus: Prosequere primo primam opinionem quia quamvis putem eam hereticam, qualiter tamen assertores ipsius eam fundare conantur, et quomodo ad rationes et auctoritates in contrarium respondere nitantur gratia exercitii ut acutius veritatem intelligam scire desidero.

Student: Proceed initially with the first opinion, for although I believe it to be heretical I would nevertheless like to know (for the sake of argument and so as to understand the truth more acutely) how its proponents attempt to underpin it and how they try to respond to the arguments and authorities which oppose it.

Magister: Pro predicta assertione potest primo sic argui. Ille qui nullam habet iurisdictionem coactivam imperatori aut regi vel alii principi aut populo est subiectus, quia qui nulli alteri est prepositus alicui est subditus, aliter enim nullum ordinem ad alios homines nec superioritatis nec inferioritatis haberet. Vbi autem non est ordo ibi est confusio. Confusio enim inter homines inveniri non debet. Qui ergo quantum ad iurisdictionem coactivam nulli est prepositus quantum ad iurisdictionem coactivam alicui est subiectus. Sed papa ex ordinatione Christi super alios nullam habet iurisdictionem coactivam. Igitur quantum ad iurisdictionem coactivam alicui est subiectus et nonnisi imperatori aut regi vel principi. Igitur alicui predictorum est papa subiectus et ita aliquis predictorum est iudex ordinarius pape.

Master: One may first argue for the aforestated opinion in this way. He who possesses no coercive jurisdiction is subject to the emperor, to the king, or to another prince or people, because whoever does not rule over another is subject to someone. For otherwise he would have no order of status (either of superiority or inferiority) with respect to other men. But where there is no order of status confusion reigns, and confusion must not exist among men. Therefore he who is the coercive ruler of no one is subject to someone as to coercive jurisdiction. But the pope by Christ's dispensation has no coercice jurisdiction over others, therefore in this matter he is subject to someone, and only to emperor, king, or prince. Therefore the pope is subject to one of these, and hence one of them is the normal judge of the pope.

Capitulum 3

Chapter 3

Discipulus: Quamvis asserere quod papa super alios non habet iurisdictionem coactivam sit hereticum reputandum, ut arbitror, dic tamen quomodo predicti assertores hoc probare nituntur.

Student: Although it must be considered heretical, I believe, to assert that the pope does not have coercive jurisdiction over others, state nevertheless how the aforementioned theorists attempt to prove this.

Magister: Hoc auctoritatibus scripture divine et sanctorum moliuntur ostendere. Primo autem auctoritate Christi dicentis apostolis Matth. 20: "scitis quia principes gentium dominantur eorum et qui maiores sunt potestatem exercent in eos, non ita erit inter vos, sed quicumque voluerit inter vos maior fieri sit vester minister et qui voluerit inter vos primus esse erit vester servus". Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod maioritas et primitas illius qui est maior et primus inter omnes discipulos Christi cuiusmodi sunt omnes christiani in ministrando et serviendo consistit et per consequens iurisdictionem coactivam super alios nullatenus habet.

Master: They try to point this out by the authorities of holy writ and of saints. And indeed to begin with by the authority of Christ saying to the apostles in Matthew 20(:25-27): "Ye know that the princes of the gentiles exercise dominion over them, and they that are great exercise authority upon them. But it shall not be so among you: but whosoever will be great among you, let him be your minister; and whosoever will be chief among you let him be your servant". [Marsilius of Padua, Defensor Pacis, II.iv.13] From these words we understand that the greatness and primacy of him who is great and first among all the disciples of Christ (all Christians are such disciples) consists in ministry and service, and consequently that he in no way possesses coercive jurisdiction over others.

Discipulus: Ministerium et servitium pape consistit in regendo et gubernando gregem sibi commissum, quod nequaquam facere posset nisi iurisdictionem coactivam haberet, nec obviat quod papa debet esse minister et servus nam etiam iudex temporalis puniendo malefactores minister est iuxta sententiam Apostoli ad Rom. 13.

Student: The ministry and service of the pope consists in ruling and governing the flock entrusted to him, which he could by no means do unless he possessed coercive jurisdiction. Nor is the pope's duty to be minister and servant an obstacle, for even a temporal judge when punishing wrongdoers is a "minister" according to the pronouncement of the Apostle in Romans 13[:4].

Magister: Hanc responsionem dicunt Christum excludere, cum sic ministerium et servitium imponit maiori et primo inter suos discipulos quod ei exercendi potestatem in alios interdicit dicens: "qui maiores sunt potestatem exercent in eos, non ita erit inter vos etc." Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod Christus ministro et servo aliorum christianorum potestatem exercendi in alios interdicit et ita ab eo iurisdictionem coactivam excludit, quia inutilis et superflua est iurisdictio coactiva que non debet potestatem in maleficos exercere. Cum vero dicis quod iudex temporalis est minister secundum Apostolum respondetur quod male allegas Apostolum quia non dicit Apostolus quod potestas est minister subditorum sed dicit quod est minister Dei. Christus autem voluit quod primus inter christianos esset minister non solum Dei sed etiam aliorum.

Master: They say that Christ excludes this explanation since he assigns ministry and service to the greater and first among his disciples in such manner as to forbid him the exercise of power over others, saying "they that are great exercise authority upon them, but it shall not be so among you etc." From these words one infers that to the minister and servant of other Christians Christ forbids the exercise of power over others, and thus excludes coercive jurisdiction from him, because coercive jurisdiction which must not exercise power over wrongdoers is useless and superfluous. Moreover when you say that a temporal judge is a minister according to the Apostle, the answer is that you misunderstand the Apostle, because the Apostle does not say that "power" is the minister of subjects, he rather says that it is the minister of God. But Christ wanted the first among Christians to be not only a minister of God but also of others.

Discipulus: Probantne aliter quod papa non habet iurisdictionem coactivam super alios.

Student: Do they prove in some other way that the pope does not possess coercive jurisdiction over others?

Magister: Hoc etiam probant sic. Papa non habet maiorem iurisdictionem coactivam quam habuit Christus cuius est vicarius. Sed Christus non habuit in quantum homo mortalis iurisdictionem coactivam. Tum quia iurisdictio coactiva sine divitiis vel adiutorio habentium divitias convenienter exerceri non potest et per consequens inutiliter retineretur. Christus autem omnes divitias necessarias ad iurisdictionem coactivam exercendam quo ad dominium penitus abdicavit, victu et vestitu contentus. Adiutorio etiam divitum ad eandem iurisdictionem exercendam minime utebatur. Ergo coactivam iurisdictionem in quantum homo mortalis non habuit. Tum quia, ipso testante, ministrare venit non ministrari ergo non venit iurisdictionem coactivam exercere ergo eam non habuit, tum quia Christus opus quod sibi Pater imposuit, consummavit, ipso testante qui ait Ioh. 17: "opus consummavi quod dedisti michi ut faciam". Christus autem iurisdictionem coactivam nequaquam exercuit ergo iurisdictionem coactivam a Patre non accepit inquantum erat homo mortalis, quia si eam accepisset et nequaquam exercuisset de malitia vel negligentia fuisset merito arguendus quia officium sine opere tenuisset.

Master: They also prove it as follows. The pope does not have greater coercive jurisdiction than did Christ whose vicar he is. But Christ as a mortal man did not have coercive jurisdiction, since, to begin with, coercive jurisdiction without an abundance of riches or the assistance of the wealthy cannot be adequately exercised and consequently would be uselessly retained. Christ, however, completely abdicated ownership of all possessions necessary for exercising coercive jurisdiction, and was content with bare access to food and clothing. Nor did he use the help of the rich to exercise such coercive jurisdiction. Therefore he did not have coercive jurisdiction as a mortal man. Furthermore, as he himself witnessed, he came to ministrate and not to be ministrated to, therefore he did not come to exercise coercive jurisdiction and thus he did not possess it. And finally, Christ completed the task which God the Father had entrusted to him, as he witnesses when he states in John 17[:4] : "I have finished the work which Thou gavest me to do". Yet Christ by no means exercised coercive jurisdiction, therefore he did not as a mortal man receive coercive jurisdiction from God the Father, because had he received it and never exercised it, he might justly have been accused of wicked conduct or negligence, since he would have held an office without performance.

Discipulus: Hic errant aperte quia evangelica testatur historia quod Christus iurisdictionem exercuit coactivam cum Christus de templo vendentes et ementes violenter eiecit ut legitur Matth. 21 Mar. 11 Luc. 19 et Joh. 2.

Student: In this instance they are clearly wrong, because the Gospel story witnesses that Christ exercised coercive jurisdiction when he violently expelled buyers and sellers from the temple, as we read in Matthew 21[:12], Mark 11[:11], Luke 19[:45], and John 2[:15].

Magister: Ipsi asserunt te hic errare propter duo. Primo quia eiicere vendentes et ementes de templo et alia facere que tunc Christus exercuit ad iurisdictionem coactivam non pertinent, nec Christus tunc officium prelati vel summi sacerdotis exercuit sed officium hostiarii tunc assumpsit teste Magistro Sententiarum qui ut habetur libro 4 di. 24 ait: "hoc officium, scilicet hostiariorum, Dominus in sua persona suscepit quando flagello de funiculis facto vendentes et ementes de templo eiecit. Ipse enim se hostiarium significans dicit 'ego sum hostium, per me si quis introierit etc.'". Predictum ergo officium quod Christus tunc exercuit ad hostiarios spectat. Hostiarii autem ex officio suo nullam iurisdictionem coactivam noscuntur habere. Ergo per illud exemplum probare non potes quod Christus iurisdictionem habuit coactivam. Secundo dicunt te errare quia Christus in quantum summus sacerdos si habuit iurisdictionem non habuit eam nisi respectu fidelium et in eum credentium quia ad eum de hiis que foris erant in quantum summus sacerdos non pertinuit iudicare. Christus autem tunc eiecit infideles de templo, igitur hoc non fecit in quantum sacerdos sed in quantum hostiarius cuius est absque iurisdictione non solum malos fideles sed etiam infideles de templo eiicere. Ex hiis concludunt quod Christus in quantum sacerdos nunquam iurisdictionem exercuit coactivam, ergo non habuit.

Master: They contend that it is you who are wrong here, and for two reasons. First: because to expel buyers and sellers from the temple and to do the other things which Christ performed at that time are matters not relevant to coercive jurisdiction. On that occasion Christ did not exercise the function of a prelate or high priest but assumed the office of a janitor, as witnesses the Master of the Sentences [Peter Lombard] who states in book 4 chapter 24 [of the Sentences]: "this office, namely that of janitors, the Lord assumed in his person when, having made a whip of thin cords, he expelled the buyers and sellers from the temple. Indeed he explains his janitor function when he says 'I am the door. If someone enters through me etc. [John 10:9]'" Therefore the aforestated office which Christ then exercised pertains to janitors. But janitors are known to possess no coercive jurisdiction by their function. Thus you cannot prove by this example that Christ had coercive jurisdiction. Second: they say you are wrong because even if Christ had possessed coercive jurisdiction as high priest, he would not have had it except with respect to the faithful and to those who believed in him, for it would not have been his function as high priest to pass judgment on religious outsiders. And at the time Christ had [also] expelled unbelievers from the temple. Therefore he did not do this as a priest but as a janitor, to whom it pertains (with no jurisdiction attached) to expel from the temple not only sinful believers but also those who are not of the faith. From these points they conclude that Christ as a priest never exercised coercive jurisdiction, therefore he did not have it.

Discipulus: Licet Christus habuerit iurisdictionem coactivam eam tamen nequaquam exercuit quia inter suos discipulos non erant malefici in quos debuit iurisdictionem coactivam exercere, nec tamen propter hoc caruit iurisdictione tali, sicut si rex non haberet subditos nisi bonos non propter hoc iurisdictione careret.

Student: Although Christ did have coercive jurisdiction he by no means exercised it, because there were no wrongdoers among his disciples against whom he would have had the duty to use coercive jurisdiction. This did not mean that he lacked such jurisdiction. After all, if a king only had law-abiding subjects he would not on that account lack jurisdiction.

Magister: Istud excludunt per hoc quod nonnulli discipuli Christi graviter deliquerunt apostatantes a fide quam susceperant. Ioh. enim 6 sic legitur: "multi discipulorum eius abierunt retro". Non ergo propter defectum materie sed propter iurisdictionis coactive carentiam Christus in delinquentes potestatem aut vindictam nequaquam exercuit. Ex hiis concludunt quod Christus in quantum summus pontifex iurisdictionem non habuit coactivam. Ergo nec papa iurisdictionem obtinet coactivam, quod etiam auctoritatibus probare nituntur. Origenes enim super illud Matth. 20 "reges gentium etc." ait: "scitis quia principes gentium dominantur eorum, id est non contenti tantum regere suos subiectos violenter eis dominari nituntur. Inter vos autem qui estis mei non erunt hec quoniam sicut omnia carnalia in necessitate sint posita spiritualia autem in voluntate sic et qui principes sunt spirituales id est prelati principatus eorum in dilectione debet esse positus non in timore". Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod totus principatus prelatorum ecclesie et per consequens summi pontificis in voluntate et dilectione non in timore debet consistere. Igitur diligi debent non timeri. Qui autem iurisdictione coactiva utuntur a malis timentur, teste Apostolo ad Rom. 13 qui ait: "si autem malefeceris time" scilicet potestatem. Ergo prelati ecclesiarum iurisdictione coactiva uti non debent.

Master: They reject your response in this way. A number of Christ's disciples gravely misbehaved, becoming apostates from the faith they had accepted. For we read in John 6[:66] that "many of his disciples went back". It is therefore not due to an absence of punishable deeds but because of his lack of coercive jurisdiction that Christ never exercised power or retribution upon the delinquents. From which they conclude that Christ as high priest did not possess coercive jurisdiction. Therefore neither does the pope obtain coercive jurisdiction. They attempt to prove this contention by further authorities. Thus, Origen on the text of Matthew 20[:25-26] "the princes of the gentiles etc." states: " 'Ye know that the princes of the gentiles exercise dominion over them', that is to say not satisfied with merely governing their subjects they attempt to violently dominate them. 'But it shall not be so among you' who are mine. For just as all material things are in the realm of necessity while spiritual things are of free will, so those who are spiritual princes, that is prelates, must possess a rulership based on love and not on fear". [Marsilius, II.iv.13] From these words we gather that the whole rulership of the prelates of the church (and consequently of the supreme pontiff) must consist in love, not in fear. Therefore they must be loved, not feared. But those who use coercive jurisdiction are feared by evildoers, witness the Apostle in Romans 13[:4], who states: "But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid" namely, of authority. Therefore the prelates of churches must not use coercive jurisdiction.

Hoc etiam Chrysostomus ibidem sentire videtur, ait enim: "principes mundi ideo sunt ut dominentur minoribus suis et eos servituti subiciant et expolient et usque ad mortem eis utantur ad suam utilitatem et gloriam. Principes autem ecclesie fiunt ut serviant minoribus et ministrent eis quecunque acceperunt a Christo ut suas utilitates negligant et illorum procurent". Ex quibus verbis patet distinctio inter principes seculares et principes ecclesiarum, quia principes seculares suis subditis dominantur, principes autem ecclesie minoribus serviunt et ministrant. Ergo in eos iurisdictionem coactivam exercere non valent. Hiis etiam Ambrosius concordare videtur qui, ut recitatur 23 q. 8 c. Convenior , ait: "dolere potero, flere potero, gemere potero, adversus arma milites Gothosquoque lacrime mee mea arma sunt, talia enim munimenta sunt sacerdotis, aliter nec debeo nec possum resistere". Ex quibus verbis habetur quod sacerdos orationibus et lacrimis debet malis resistere et non per potentiam temporalem, et per consequens non habet iurisdictionem coactivam.

Chrysostomus also appears to express a similar opinion about this text [Matthew 20:25-27], for he states: "the rulers of the world exist to dominate their lesser brethren, subject them to slavery, despoil them, and use them unto death for their own service and glory. But the rulers of the church are created to serve the small and ministrate unto them all that they have received from Christ, to the point of neglecting their own utilities so as to promote those of the lesser brethren". [Marsilius, II.iv.13] From these words a distinction between secular rulers and the rulers of churches clearly emerges, for secular rulers dominate their subjects, while rulers of churches serve and ministrate to lesser brethren. Therefore they have no authority to exercise coercive jurisdiction over them. Ambrose too seems to be in agreement with these views. He states (we have this in 23 q. 8 c. Convenior)[col. 960] : "I may grieve, I may weep, I may groan, against arms, soldiers, and Goths my tears are my weapons, for those are the defences of the priest. I neither can nor ought to resist by other means". [Marsilius, II.v.5] From these words we learn that a priest must resist evildoers by prayers and tears, and not by temporal force, and consequently that he does not have coercive jurisdiction.

Quod etiam Chrysostomus in libro suo Dialogorum qui De dignitate sacerdotali intitulatur lib. 2 cap. 3 super illud Apostoli 2 Cor. 1 "non quia dominamur fidei vestre" apertissime sentire videtur. Ait enim: "hii qui foris sunt iudices malignos quosque cum subdiderint ostendunt in eis plurimam potestatem et eos invitos a priorum morum pravitate compescunt, in ecclesia vero non coactum sed acquiescentem oportet ad meliora converti quia nec nobis a legibus data est talis potestas ut auctoritate sententie cohibeamus homines a delictis". Clarius dici non posset quod ecclesia non habet iurisdictionem coactivam, cum in ecclesia nullus debeat ad meliora cogi nec aliquis debeat cohiberi per iudicialem sententiam a delictis. Item, ad habentem iurisdictionem coactivam spectat negotiis secularibus implicari quia ad ipsum pertinet contentiones et lites dirimere. Contentiones autem lites et rixe inter negotia secularia computantur (Extra Ne clerici vel monachi secularibus negotiis se immisceant c. 1). Sed ad summum pontificem non pertinet secularibus negotiis implicari, teste Apostolo 2 Tim. 2 qui ait: "nemo militans implicat se negotiis secularibus". Ergo ad summum pontificem ex ordinatione Christi non pertinet iurisdictio coactiva.

Chrysostomus likewise seems to accept this, and most openly too, in his volume of dialogues which is entitled Concerning the priestly dignity. In book 2, chapter 3 thereof, commenting on the Apostle's text from 2 Corinthians 1[:24] "not for that we have dominion over your faith" he states: "Outsider judges demonstrate potent authority against their evildoing subjects, and force them against their will to abandon the wickedness of their prior behaviour, but in the church it is required that we convert to better actions a person who is not coerced but consenting, for indeed neither are we given by the laws such power as to restrain men from crimes through the authority of a legal judgment". [Marsilius, II.v.6] It cannot be stated more clearly that the church does not possess coercive jurisdiction, since in the church no one must be forced to do better actions nor can someone be restrained from crimes by a judicial sentence. Furthermore: he who has coercive jurisdiction needs to be involved in secular affairs, for it is his task to settle disputes and lawsuits, and disputes, lawsuits and quarrels are classified as secular issues (Extra, Ne clerici vel monachi secularibus negotiis se immisceant, c. 1). But is it not the business of the supreme pontiff to be involved in secular affairs, as the Apostle witnesses (2 Timothy 2[:4]) who states: "No man that warreth entangleth himself with the affairs of this life". [Marsilius, II.v.1] Therefore coercive jurisdiction does not pertain to the pope by Christ's dispensation.

Item, papa non habet maiorem iurisdictionem ex ordinatione Christi quam habuit beatus Petrus. Sed beatus Petrus et alii apostoli iurisdictionem coactivam a Christo minime acceperunt. Ergo nec papa habet iurisdictionem coactivam ex ordinatione Christi. Maior est manifesta. Minor probatur auctoritate beati Bernardi qui in libro ad Eugenium papam ait: "non monstrabunt, puto, qui hoc dicerent ubi aliquando quispiam apostolorum iudex sederit hominum", et parum post: "stetisse denique lego apostolos iudicandos, sedisse iudicantes non lego et illud non fuit". Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod apostoli iudices hominum non fuerunt. Ergo beatus Petrus iurisdictionem non habuit coactivam. Hoc etiam quod apostoli iudices hominum non fuerunt beatus Gregorius sentire videtur. Tractans enim illa verba Apostoli "secularia igitur iudicia si habueritis etc." in Moralibus, ait: "hii terrenas causas examinent qui exteriorum rerum sapientiam perceperunt, qui autem spiritualibus dotati sunt terrenis non debent negotiis implicari ut dum non coguntur inferiora bona disponere valeant bonis superioribus deservire". Cum ergo apostoli maximis bonis spiritualibus fuerint dotati ipsi non erant circa causas hominum et lites aliqualiter occupati, quod glossa super illud ad Cor. "secularia igitur iudicia si habueritis etc." aperte sentire videtur, ait enim: "contemptibiles id est aliquos sapientes qui tamen sunt minoris meriti constituite ad iudicandum. Apostoli enim circumeuntes talibus non vacabant. Sapientes igitur qui in locis consistebant fideles et sancti non qui huc atque illuc propter evangelium discurrebant talium negotiorum examinatores esse voluit". Hiis verbis ostenditur quod apostoli causis hominum terminandis minime insistebant. Ex quo infertur quod non acceperant iurisdictionem coactivam a Christo, quia omne officium iniunctum eis a Christo diligentissime perfecerunt.

Again: the pope does not possess greater jurisdiction by Christ's dispensation than did blessed Peter. Yet blessed Peter and the other apostles did not receive coercive jurisdiction from Christ. Therefore neither does the pope have coercive jurisdiction by Christ's dispensation. The major premiss is self-evident. The minor is proved by the authority of blessed Bernard, who states in the book to Pope Eugenius: "They will not show, I think, those who would say this, where at some time any of the apostles sat as a judge of men", and a little further: "in short I read that the apostles had stood up to be judged, I do not read that they had sat as judges, and this never was". [Marsilius, II.v.3] From these words we understand that the apostles were not judges of men. Therefore blessed Peter did not possess coercive jurisdiction. That the apostles were not judges of men also appears to be the opinion of blessed Gregory. For commenting on these words of the Apostle, viz. "if then ye have judgments of things pertaining to this life" [1 Corinthians 6:4], he states in the Ethics: "those who have acquired the wisdom of external things examine earthly causes, but those spiritually gifted must not be involved in worldly affairs, so that by not being forced to manage inferior goods, they may devote themselves to superior ones". [Marsilius, II.v.2] Therefore as the apostles were gifted with the greatest of spiritual goods, they were not in any way occupied with the causes and lawsuits of men. This appears to be the evident opinion of the gloss on the following passage in Corinthians "if then ye have judgments of things pertaining to this life", which states: " 'set them to judge who are least esteemed' that is to say, some wise and yet less worthy men. For the apostles on their rounds did not concern themselves with such matters. Thus he [Paul] wanted wise, holy and faithful men who were local residents to be the scrutineers of such affairs, and not those who traveled hither and thither for the sake of spreading the gospel". [Marsilius, II.v.2] These words show that the apostles did not focus on settling the worldly affairs of men. From which one deduces that they did not receive coercive jurisdiction from Christ, because they carried out with utmost diligence every office imposed on them by Christ.

Discipulus: In scriptura divina habetur aperte quod beatus Petrus iurisdictionem habuit coactivam cum ex potestate officii Ananiam et Saphiram morti tradiderit, teste beato Gregorio in Dialogo qui, ut recitatur 23 q. 8 c. Petrus ait: "Petrus qui Tabitam mortuam orando suscitavit, Ananiam et Saphiram mentientes morti increpando tradidit, neque enim orasse in eorum extinctione legitur sed solummodo culpam quam perpetraverant increpasse.Constat ergo quod aliquando talia ex potestate exhibentur aliquando ex postulatione dum et istis increpando vitam abstulit et illi reddidit orando". Ex quibus verbis habetur quod beatus Petrus ex potestate usus est iurisdictione coactiva.

Student: Holy writ clearly informs us that blessed Peter possessed coercive jurisdiction, since he inflicted death on Ananias and Sapphira by official authority, as blessed Gregory witnesses in the Dialogue (this is recited in 23 q. 8 c. Petrus)[col. 956-957] where he states: "Peter who resuscitated the late Tabita by praying, cursed the lying Ananias and Sapphira to their deaths. Nor do we read that he prayed for their end but only that he inveighed against the fault they had committed. And so it happens that sometimes such effects are the result of power and sometimes of prayer, since he both took away the life of the latter by harshly complaining and gave it back to the former by praying". From these words we gather that blessed Peter used coercive jurisdiction with authority.

Magister: Ad hoc respondent quod verba Gregorii male intelligis. Non enim asserit Gregorius quod beatus Petrus ex potestate officii sui predictos Ananiam et Saphiram morti tradiderit. Tunc enim iudex in causa sanguinis extitisset, quod universis clericis noscitur interdictum. Sed beatus Petrus non ex potestate officii sed ex potestate faciendi miracula, quam Deus persone non officio papatus concesserat, morti tradidit supradictos. Nonnunquam autem facit quis absque oratione miracula. Et ita ex hoc probari non potest quod Petrus iurisdictionem habuit coactivam.

Master: To this they answer that you misunderstand the words of Gregory. For Gregory does not claim that blessed Peter procured the deaths of the aforesaid Ananias and Sapphira by the power of his office. In that case he would have become judge in a capital case which is known to be forbidden to all clerks. But blessed Peter procured the deaths of the aforesaid not through the power of office but through the power of effecting miracles, which God had granted to his person and not to the papal office. For sometimes one may effect miracles without prayer. And therefore it cannot be proved from this that Peter possessed coercive jurisdiction.

Capitulum 4

Chapter 4

Discipulus: Circa hanc rationem primam te nimium dilatasti, ideo compleas alias rationes, nam de potestate pape in tractatu secundo de doctrina domini pape magis diffuse tractabimus.

Student: You have spent too much time on this first argument. Therefore complete the other ones, for we shall be examining papal authority more extensively in the second treatise, which will deal with the doctrine of the Lord Pope [John XXII].

Magister: Secunda ratio ad probandum quod imperator vel princeps alius secularis aut populus sit iudex ordinarius pape talis est. Papa non est magis exemptus a iurisdictione imperatoris quam fuit Christus in quantum fuit homo mortalis, sed Christus in quantum fuit homo mortalis subiectus fuit iurisdictioni imperatoris, ergo et papa modo similiter, et per consequens imperator est iudex ordinarius domini pape. Maior istius rationis probatione videtur nullatenus indigere, quia vicarius non est maior illo cuius est vicarius, sicut nec servus maior est domino nec discipulus est maior magistro. Minor probatur auctoritate Christi dicentis ad Pilatum Ioh. 19: "non haberes potestatem adversum me ullam nisi tibi esset datum de super, propterea qui tradidit me tibi maius peccatum habet". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod Pilatus iurisdictionem habuit coactivam super Christum, quia de potestate coactiva intelliguntur verba Christi cum ad verba Pilati dicentis "mihi non loqueris, nescis quia potestatem habeo crucifigere te et potestatem habeo dimittere te" respondit. Constat autem quod Pilatus loquebatur de potestate coactiva ergo Christus locutus est de eadem.

Master: Here is the second argument proving that the emperor or some other secular prince or people is the normal judge of the pope. The pope is not more exempt from the emperor's jurisdiction than Christ was in his capacity as mortal man. But Christ in so far as he was a mortal man was subject to the jurisdiction of the emperor, therefore the pope is similarly subject, and consequently the emperor is the normal judge of the lord pope. The major of this argument hardly seems to require proof, since a vicar is not greater than the one whose vicar he is, just as a servant is not greater than his lord nor a disciple greater than his master. The minor is proved by the authority of Christ who states to Pilate in John 19[:11]: "thou couldest have no power at all against me except it were given thee from above: therefore he that delivered me unto thee hath the greater sin". [Marsilius, II.iv.12] From these words we gather that Pilate had coercive jurisdiction over Christ, because Christ's statement must be understood as referring to coercive power, since he is replying to the utterance of Pilate who had said [John 19:10]: "speakest thou not unto me? Knowest thou not that I have power to crucify thee, and I have power to release thee?" But it is plain that Pilate spoke of coercive power, therefore so did Christ.

Discipulus: Duplex est potestas cohercendi, scilicet ordinata et usurpata. Christus autem concessit Pilatum habuisse potestatem usurpatam quam tamen Pilatus forte credidit ordinatam sed in hoc erravit.

Student: The power to coerce is twofold, namely lawful and usurped. And Christ conceded that Pilate possessed the latter. It is possible indeed that Pilate may have believed his power to be lawful, but he was mistaken on this point.

Magister: Istam responsionem nituntur excludere. Primo auctoritate beati Augustini qui super verba predicta ait: "discamus ergo quod dixit quod et Apostolum docuit, quia non est potestas nisi a Deo, et quia plus peccat qui innocentem occidendum potestati livore tradidit quam potestas ipsa si eum timore alterius potestatis maioris occidit. Talem quippe Deus dederat illi potestatem ut esset etiam ipse sub Cesaris potestate". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod sub tali potestate Cesaris et Pilati erat Christus in quantum homo mortalis, de quali potestate loquitur Apostolus ad Rom. 13 cum dicit : "non est enim potestas nisi a Deo". Sed Apostolus non loquitur de potestate usurpata sed ordinata cum dicat aperte "qui resistit potestati Dei ordinationi resistit", que verba de potestate ordinata non usurpata debent intelligi. Nam qui potestati usurpate resistit nequaquam Dei ordinationi resistit, quia tunc secundum Apostolum sibi dampnationem acquireret quod est erroneum, tunc enim nec invasori papatus nec alicui tyranno liceret resistere. Loquitur ergo Apostolus de potestate ordinata non usurpata, ergo Christus sic locutus est de potestate et ita concessit quod Pilatus super ipsum potestatem habuit ordinariam. Insinuat tamen quod ista potestate ordinaria abutebatur cum dicit "qui tradidit me tibi maius peccatum habet" quasi diceret "tu habes peccatum dando sententiam in me neque confessum neque legitime convictum de crimine digno morte, quia tamen ex timore hoc facis et alii me tibi ex malitia et invidia tradiderunt ideo illi maius peccatum habent". Et ita Pilatus potestatem ordinariam super Christum in quantum erat homo mortalis habuit.

Master: They attempt to exclude this response. First by the authority of blessed Augustine who, commenting on the cited words, states: "Let us therefore understand what Christ said, which he also taught the Apostle, that 'there is no power but of God' and that someone who maliciously delivers to authority an innocent to be killed commits a greater sin than the man in authority, who put such an innocent to death because he feared another's stronger power, inasmuch as God gave him power to be even himself under the power of Cesar". [Marsilius, II.iv.12] We infer from these words that Christ as a mortal man was under the very power of Cesar and Pilate of which the Apostle speaks in Romans 13[:1] when he says "there is no power but of God". Yet the Apostle does not speak of usurped but of lawful power, since he clearly states "whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God"[Romans 13:2]. These words must be understood of a power which is legitimate and not usurped. For one who resists usurped power by no means resists the ordinance of God, since he would then according to the Apostle "receive" to himself "damnation"[Romans 13:2], which is untrue. Under such circumstances one would not be allowed to resist a usurper of the papal office, nor indeed any tyrant. Therefore the Apostle does speak of legitimate and not of usurped power. Therefore Christ [also] spoke of power in this way and thus conceded that Pilate possessed normal authority over him. But when Christ states "he that delivered me unto thee hath the greater sin" he implies that Pilate was misusing this normal authority, as if he were saying "you are sinning in condemning me when I have neither confessed nor been legitimately convicted of a crime worthy of death. But because you are doing this out of fear, while others have delivered me to you out of malice and envy, theirs is the greater sin". And thus Pilate possessed normal authority over Christ in so far as the latter was a mortal man.

Quod Theophilus super illud Ioh. 18 "a temetipso hoc dicis an alii tibi dixerunt de me" sentire videtur, dicens: "ac si diceret Christus scilicet 'si hoc ex teipso loqueris pande signa mee rebellionis aut si ab aliis percepisti inquisitionem fac ordinariam'". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod Pilatus potestatem habuit ordinariam inquirendi de criminibus Christo impositis. Qui autem habet potestatem inquirendi ordinarie de aliquo infamato habet iurisdictionem coactivam super eundem. Ergo Pilatus habuit super Christum iurisdictionem coactivam. Item, Bernardus in epistola ad archiepiscopum Senonensem ait: "cum", inquit, "Romani presidis potestatem Christus super se quoque fateatur celitus ordinatam etc." Ex quibus verbis elicitur quod potestas Pilati non fuit usurpata sed celitus ordinata. Et ita super Christum iurisdictionem habuit coactivam, quam tamen in Christum exercere minime potuisset iuste nisi Christus coram eo legitime, quantum iudici constare potest, fuisset convictus de crimine. Si autem Christus per testes qui secundum leges repelli non possunt fuisset de crimine dampnationis dignissimo ordine iudiciario servato convictus, Pilatus Christum condempnando non peccasset, quia fuisset per falsos testes deceptus. Iudex autem iudicans secundum allegata amore iustitie non peccat, licet condempnet innocentem.

Theophilus appears to hold this opinion. Commenting on the text of John 18[:34] "Sayest thou this thing of thyself, or did others tell it thee of me?" he states: "it is as if Christ were saying 'if you are uttering this of yourself, reveal the evidence of my rebellion, but if you have been informed by others, proceed to a normal inquisition'". [Marsilius, II.iv.5] From these words we gather that Pilate possessed a normal authority to investigate the crimes imputed to Christ. But he who possesses a normal power of investigation with respect to someone who has been slandered in this way, has coercive jurisdiction over him. Therefore Pilate had coercive jurisdiction over Christ. Furthermore: Bernard in his letter to the archbishop of Sens states: "since", he says, "Christ acknowledges that the authority of the Roman ruler over him has likewise been legitimized by heaven etc." [Marsilius, II.iv.12] From these words we deduce that the power of Pilate was not usurped but legitimized by heaven. And he thus possessed coercive jurisdiction over Christ, which, however, he could not have justly exercised over Christ unless Christ were legitimately convicted of a crime in his presence, as far as this could have been apparent to a judge. For if Christ had been convicted of a crime most worthy of condemnation in the context of a formally correct trial, and on the basis of evidence given by witnesses unimpeachable under the laws, Pilate would not have sinned in pronouncing a sentence of condemnation against Christ, since he would have been deceived by false witnesses. And a judge who rules on the basis of the evidence and is motivated by the love of justice does not sin even if he condemns an innocent person.

Capitulum 5

Chapter 5

Discipulus: Pro ista ratione que adduxisti ad presens sufficiant, et ideo aliam rationem adducas.

Student: What you have advanced in support of this argument suffices for the moment, therefore present another one.

Magister : Ad probandum quod imperator est iudex ordinarius pape tertia ratio talis est. Ille est iudex ordinarius pape a quo papa habet super alias ecclesias principatum. Sed hoc habet papa ab imperatore, quod probant per privilegium Constantini imperatoris concessum Romano pontifici, quod est superius allegatum. Ergo imperator est iudex ordinarius summi pontificis.Quarta ratio talis est. Imperator fuit iudex ordinarius beati Petri, ergo est iudex ordinarius pape. Consequentia est evidens quia papa non est magis exemptus quam fuit beatus Petrus. Antecedens probatur quia omnes apostoli quantum ad hoc quod essent subiecti vel non subiecti iurisdictioni imperatoris fuerunt pares, sed beatus Paulus fuit subiectus iurisdictioni imperatoris quia ad Cesarem tanquam ad superiorem appellavit, ergo beatus Petrus fuit subiectus eidem.

Master: Here is the third argument which proves that the emperor is the normal judge of the pope. The pope's normal judge is one from whom the pope has rulership over the other churches. But the pope has this from the emperor, a fact they prove by the privilege conceded to the Roman pontiff by Emperor Constantine (this was argued in a prior context)[1 Dial. 5.18] Therefore the emperor is the normal judge of the pope. The fourth argument is this. The emperor was the normal judge of blessed Peter, therefore he is the normal judge of the pope. The conclusion is obvious, because the pope does not enjoy a greater exemption than did blessed Peter. The proof of the antecedent is that all the apostles were equal on the issue of their subjection or lack of subjection to the emperor's jurisdiction. Since blessed Paul was subject to the jurisdiction of the emperor (he did appeal to Cesar as to a superior)[Acts 25:11], it follows that blessed Peter was [also] subject to it.

Discipulus: Dicetur istis quod Paulus appellavit non quia erat subiectus iurisdictioni imperatoris sed quia volebat caute insidias Iudeorum evadere.

Student: One can say to them that Paul appealed not because he was subject to the jurisdiction of the emperor but because he wished to circumspectly evade the snares of the Jews.

Magister: Hoc impugnatur sic. Secundum beatum Ambrosium ut habetur 22 q. ultima c. Cavete "non solum in falsis verbis sed etiam in simulatis operibus mendacium est", ubi notat glossa quod "factis mentitur sicut verbis". Beatus Paulus igitur si non erat vere subiectus imperatori facto mentiebatur cum simulaverit se subiectum iudicio Cesaris appellando. Tale autem crimen est beato Paulo minime imponendum. Ergo beatus Paulus vere fuit imperatori subiectus. Hanc etiam conclusionem per exemplum ostendunt. Nam sicut legitur in cronicis Iohannes 12 "erat venator et totus lubricus, adeo quod etiam publice feminas tenebat. Propter quod quidam cardinalium et Romanorum scripserunt occulte Ottoni principi Saxonum ut scandalo ecclesie compatiens sine mora Romam properaret. Hoc papa percipiens Iohanni diacono cardinali tamquam huius facti consiliario nasum et alteri Iohanni subdiacono qui literas scripserat manum amputari fecit. Hic cum frequenter per imperatorem et clerum de sua correctione fuisset monitus, non correctus, presente imperatore de papatu destitutus, communi voto Leo papa eligitur". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod imperator est iudex ordinarius pape. Aliter enim imperator predictum papam nullatenus deposuisset.

Master: Here is how one attacks this last point. According to blessed Ambrose (we have it in 22 q. 5 c. Cavete)[col. 888] "the lie resides not only in false words but also in pretended actions", where the gloss notes that "one lies by deeds as well as by words"[s.v.operibus col.1282]. Therefore if blessed Paul was not in truth subject to the emperor, he was lying in deed when he pretended to be a subject appealing to the judgment of Cesar. But such a crime is hardly to be ascribed to blessed Paul. Therefore blessed Paul was truly subject to the emperor. They also demonstrate the same conclusion by an example. For as we read in the Chronicles: "John XII was an utterly lascivious womanizer to the point of public involvements with them. Because of that some cardinals and Romans secretly wrote to Otto prince of the Saxons that he should hurry to Rome without delay out of commiseration for the scandal of the church. When the pope learned of this, he ordered the amputation of cardinal deacon John's nose (as he had counseled this recourse to Otto) and the amputation of another John's hand (this one was a subdeacon who had written the letter). The pope did not correct himself although he had been frequently warned about his correction by emperor and clergy. He was deprived of the papacy in the presence of the emperor, and by a common vote Pope Leo is (sic) elected".[MGH SS XXII, Martini Chronicon, 431] One gathers from these words that the emperor is the normal judge of the pope. Indeed the emperor would otherwise never have deposed the aforementioned pope.

Discipulus: Dicerent aliqui quod imperator iniuste processit nec dictus papa fuit vere depositus sed de facto fuit papatu tantummodo spoliatus.

Student: Some might say that the emperor acted unjustly and that the said pope was not truly deposed, but merely stripped of the papacy as a matter of fact.

Magister: Hec responsio impugnatur, quia si papa Iohannes remansisset verus papa ille qui sibi successit ipso vivente non fuisset verus papa sed papatus invasor, ex quo sequitur quod omnia que egit nullius fuissent roboris vel momenti sed debebant omnia in irritum revocari, quod tamen minime fuit factum. Imo quod successor ipsius Iohannis ipso vivente fuit verus papa tota tenet ecclesia. Ergo papa Iohannes 12 vere fuit depositus.

Master: This response is challenged, for if Pope John would have remained a true pope, the one who succeeded him in his lifetime would not have been a true pope but a usurper of the papacy, from which it follows that everything which he did would have lacked firmness or significance, and everything would have required annulment. But this was not done. To the contrary: the entire church holds that the person who succeeded John in the latter's lifetime was a true pope. Therefore Pope John XII was truly deposed.

Capitulum 6

Chapter 6

Discipulus: Puto quod fortiores rationes pro opinione predicta fecisti, ideo ad assertionem contrariam te converte, et quod nec imperator nec aliquis secularis sit iudex ordinarius pape nitaris ostendere. Hanc enim assertionem puto consonam veritati.

Student: I think you have produced rather strong arguments for the aforementioned opinion. Apply yourself therefore to the contrary assertion, and try to show that neither the emperor nor any secular person would be the pope's normal judge, for I believe this assertion is consonant with the truth.

Magister: Quod nec imperator nec aliquis secularis sit iudex ordinarius pape auctoritatibus et rationibus nonnulli probare nituntur. Est autem prima ratio talis. Imperator non est iudex ordinarius illius qui non habet superiorem in terris, sed papa non habet superiorem in terris ergo etc. Maior probatione non indiget quia iudex est superior illo cuius est iudex. Minor est probata superius per plures auctoritates et rationes.

Master: Many attempt to prove by authorities and arguments that neither the emperor nor any secular person would be the pope's normal judge. And this is the first argument: the emperor is not the normal judge of one who has no superior on earth; but the pope has no superior on earth, therefore etc. The major requires no proof because a judge is superior to the person who's judge he is. The minor was proved above[1 Dial. 6.1] by many authorities and arguments.

Discipulus: Prius ostensum est generaliter quod papa non habet superiorem in terris. Nunc autem specialiter proba quod imperator vel aliquis laicus vel populus non est iudex ordinarius ipsius.

Student: Earlier it was declared in general that the pope has no superior on earth. Now however demonstrate specifically that the emperor, or some layman or people, is not the normal judge of the pope.

Magister: Quod specialiter imperator non sit iudex ordinarius pape ostenditur primo sic. Inferior non est iudex ordinarius sui superioris, sed imperator est inferior papa et eius iurisdictioni subiectus, ergo etc. Maior est manifesta, unde dicit Nicholaus papa ut habetur di. 21 c. Inferior: "sole clarius exhibuimus non posse quemquam qui minoris auctoritatis est eum qui maioris est potestatis iudiciis suis addicere aut propriis diffinitionubus subiugare". Minor vero sanctorum auctoritatibus comprobatur. Ait enim Gregorius Nazianzenus ut habetur di. 10 c. Suscipitis, scribens imperatoribus Constantinopolitanis: "suscipitis ne libertatem verbi libenter accipitis quod lex Christi sacerdotali vos subiicit potestati, atque istis tribunalibus subdit. Dedit enim et nobis potestatem, dedit principatum multo perfectiorem principatibus vestris". Item Felix papa ut habetur eadem di. c. Certum ait: "certum est hoc rebus vestris esse salutare ut cum de causis agitur Dei iuxta ipsius constitutum regiam voluntatem sacerdotibus Christi studeatis subdere non preferre", et infra: "neque eius sanctionibus velle dominari cuius Deus voluit clementie tue pie devotionis colla submittere". Hoc idem habetur di. 96 c. Duo sunt et c. Si imperator. Ex quibus et multis aliis habetur quod imperator est inferior papa.

Master: That the emperor specifically would not be the normal judge of the pope is shown first of all in this manner: an inferior is not the normal judge of his superior; but the emperor is inferior to the pope and subject to his jurisdiction, therefore etc. The major is obvious whence Pope Nicholas states (we have it in dis. 21 ch. Inferior)[col. 70]: "We have shown with more clarity than the light of the sun that one of lesser authority cannot sentence by his judgments or bind by his own definitions someone who is of greater power." The minor on the other hand is confirmed by the authority of saints. For Gregory of Naziance says, writing to the Constantinopolitan emperors (we have it in di. 10 c. Suscipitis )[col. 20]: "Do you not acknowledge the freedom of the Word ? Accept freely that the law of Christ places you under priestly power, and subjects you to these tribunals. For he also granted a power to us, granted a rulership far more perfect than your own." Again: Pope Felix states (we have it in the same di. c. Certum )[col. 20]: "When God's causes are broached it is certainly advantageous to your interests that, in accordance with His command, you strive not to make the royal will paramount but to subject it to the priests of Christ", and further down: "nor should there be a wish to override the sanctions of one to whose clemency God willed to subordinate the neck of your pious devotion." The same point is made in di. 96 c. Duo sunt[col. 340] and in c. Si imperator[col. 341]. From these canons and many others we have it that the emperor is inferior to the pope.

Quod etiam multis rationibus nonnulli probare nituntur. Primo quia qui iurat alii fidelitatem est inferior illo cui iurat. Imperator prestat iuramentum fidelitatis pape (di. 63 Tibi Domino) ergo etc. Secundo quia imperator est inferior illo qui habet potestatem transferendi imperium de gente in gentem. Hanc potestatem habet papa (Extra De electione Venerabilem) igitur etc. Tertio quia imperator est inferior illo qui potest eum excommunicationis sententia innodare. Hoc autem papa potest (di. 96 Duo sunt) ergo etc. Quarto quia qui potest deponi ab alio est inferior eo. Imperator autem potest deponi a papa (15 q. 6 c. Alius) ergo etc. Quinto quia imperator est inferior illo qui in temporalibus et spiritualibus potest subditos imperatorum et regum legitimare. Hoc potest papa (Extra Qui filii sint legitimi c. Per venerabilem) igitur etc.

And some attempt to prove this by numerous arguments [OP II, 687. John of Paris, De potestate regia et papali, ch. 11]. First: because he who swears fealty to another is inferior to the one he swears to; but the emperor provides an oath of fealty to the pope (di. 63 c. Tibi domino)[col. 246], therefore etc. Second: because the emperor is inferior to one who has the power of transferring the empire from nation to nation; and this power the pope possesses (Extra, De electione c. Venerabilem)[col. 79], therefore etc. Third: because the emperor is inferior to one who can bind him by a sentence of excommunication; and this the pope can do (di. 96, c. Duo sunt)[col. 340], therefore etc. Fourth: because he who can be deposed by another is that person's inferior; but the emperor may be deposed by the pope (15 q. 6 c. Alius)[col. 756], therefore etc. Fifth: because the emperor is inferior to one who can legitimize the subjects of emperors and kings in temporal and spiritual affairs; and this the pope can do (Extra, Qui filii sint legitimi c. Per venerabilem)[col. 714], therefore etc.

Capitulum 7

Chapter 7

Discipulus: Omittas istam materiam et alias rationes adducas ad probandum quod imperator non est iudex ordinarius pape.

Student:Ignore this material and bring in other arguments to prove that the emperor is not the normal judge of the pope.

Magister: Secunda ratio principalis ad hoc talis est. Imperator non est iudex ordinarius illius qui imperialibus legibus est solutus, quia leges superioris subiectos astringunt nisi specialiter per superiorem sint exempti. Papa autem legibus imperialibus minime est astrictus (di. 10 c. 1 et c. Quoniam) ergo imperator non est iudex ordinarius pape. Tertia ratio est haec. Imperator non est iudex ordinarius aliorum clericorum inferiorum ergo multo magis non est iudex ordinarius pape. Consequentia est evidens. Antecedens vero per innumeros sacros canones posset ostendi. Vnde in concilio Carthaginensi ut habetur 11 q. 1 c. Placuit, sic legitur: "placuit ut quicumque ab imperatore cognitione publicorum iudiciorum petierit honore proprio privetur". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod imperator non est iudex ordinarius clericorum igitur etc. Quarta ratio est haec. Ille non est iudex ordinarius pape ad quem a papa appellare non licet. Sed non licet appellare a papa ad imperatorem (9 q. 3 c. Ipsi et c. Cuncta). Igitur imperator non est iudex ordinarius pape. Quinta ratio est haec. Imperator non est iudex illius cui Christus iura imperii commisit.Christus autem commisit iura imperii beato Petro et eius successoribus (di. 22 c. 1) ergo imperator non est iudex ordinarius pape.

Master: Here is the second main argument to this effect. The emperor is not the normal judge of one who is unfettered by imperial laws, since the laws of a superior constrain the subjects unless they are specifically given immunity by the superior. But the pope is not at all bound by imperial laws (di. 10 c. 1[col. 19] and c. Quoniam)[col. 21]. Therefore the emperor is not the normal judge of the pope. The third argument is this: the emperor is not the normal judge of other clerks of inferior rank; therefore all the more is he not the normal judge of the pope. The deduction is obvious, while the antecedent may be shown by countless holy canons. From which we read thus in [the acts of] the council of Carthage (we have it in 11 q. 1 c. Placuit)[col. 629]: "It was resolved that whoever should petition of the emperor a decision in public lawcourts will be deprived of his proper office." One gathers from these words that the emperor is not the normal judge of clerks, therefore etc. The fourth argument is this: he to whom an appeal from the pope is not permitted is not the normal judge of the pope; but it is not allowed to appeal from the pope to the emperor ( 9 q. 3 c. Ipsi[col. 611] and c. Cuncta[col. 611]), therefore the emperor is not the normal judge of the pope. The fifth argument is this: the emperor is not the judge of one to whom Christ entrusted the rights of the empire. Christ however entrusted the rights of the empire to blessed Peter and to his successors (di. 22 c. 1)[col. 73], therefore the emperor is not the normal judge of the pope.

Capitulum 8

Chapter 8

Discipulus: Licet non dubitem nullum mortalium esse superiorem summo pontifice, tamen cupio scire quomodo ad rationes hoc probantes adversarii respondere conantur.

Student: Although I would not doubt that none among mortals is superior to the supreme pontiff, I want to know all the same the manner in which opponents attempt to answer the arguments which demonstrate this.

Magister: Non omnes qui tenent imperatorem esse superiorem et iudicem ordinarium pape in modo ponendi concordant, et ideo non eodem modo ad rationes prescriptas respondent.

Master: Not all who hold that the emperor is the pope's superior and his normal judge agree on how to formulate the point and therefore they do not reply to the aforewritten arguments in the same way.

Discipulus: Dic illos diversos modos ponendi.

Student: State those various formulations.

Magister: Sunt quidam dicentes quod papa in spiritualibus imperatori minime est subiectus sed quantum ad iurisdictionem temporalem est sibi subiectus quantum est ex ordinatione Christi, quia, ut dicunt, Christus quantum ad temporalem iurisdictionem nullum apostolum a iurisdictione temporali imperatorum exemit sed omnes voluit in huiusmodi principibus secularibus esse subiectos, in cuius signum ipse solvit pro propria persona tributum. Alii autem dicunt quod imperator in quantum gerit personam populi christiani in omnibus tam spiritualibus quam temporalibus est superior papa et iudex ordinarius eius.

Master: There are some who say [John of Paris, ch. 13] that the pope is in no way subject to the emperor in spiritual affairs yet is subject to him as to temporal jurisdiction on the basis of Christ's dispensation, because, they say, Christ, as to temporal jurisdiction, did not exempt any apostle from the emperor's temporal jurisdiction, but wanted them all to be subordinated in such matters to secular rulers, indicating this [Matthew 17:23-26] by his own personal payment of tribute. Others however say [Marsilius, I.xv.4; II.viii.7-8; II.x.8] that the emperor, in so far as he represents the Christian people, is the pope's superior and his normal judge in all areas, spiritual as well as temporal.

Discipulus: De iurisdictione temporali pape et imperatoris pertranseas quia in tractatu De dogmatibus Joh. 22-i de hoc plures tibi questiones movebo.

Student: Move right through this discussion of the temporal jurisdiction of pope and emperor, for I shall raise a number of questions with you about the issue in the treatise Concerning the doctrines of John XXII.

Magister: Tu forsitan aliter accipis iurisdictionem temporalem quam isti.

Master: Perhaps you construe temporal jurisdiction differently from them.

Discipulus: Accipio iurisdictionem temporalem pro illa cui aliquis est subiectus ratione prediorum que de imperatore tenet.

Student: I understand temporal jurisdiction to mean what someone is subject to by reason of the estates which he holds from the emperor.

Magister: Aliter accipiunt ipsi.

Master: These opponents interpret it differently.

Discipulus: Quomodo.

Student: In what way ?

Magister: Dicunt quod iurisdictio temporalis non solum respicit predia et temporales divitias sed etiam personas, quia omnes persone in dominio alicuius principis commorantes sive sint divites sive pauperes iurisdictioni principis sunt subiecte ita quod si deliquerint eos debet condigna animadversione punire nisi per principem vel superiorem alium sint exempte.

Master: They say [Marsilius, I.xvii] that temporal jurisdiction affects not only properties and wordly riches but also persons; for all persons who reside within the dominion of some ruler, whether they be rich or poor, are subject to the ruler's jurisdiction, so that if they break the law he has the duty to punish them with appropriate measures, unless they have been exempted by him or by some other superior.

Discipulus: Video quid per iurisdictionem temporalem intelligunt sed ignoro que spiritualia vocant.

Student: I see what they understand by temporal jurisdiction but am ignorant of what they refer to as spirituals. [See also 3.2 Dial. 2.4]

Magister: Spiritualia vocant ea que religioni christiane sunt propria, que in nulla alia secta sunt reperta nec ad legem nature sunt spectantia, sicut que pertinent ad sacramenta ecclesiastica dispensanda et ad causas fidei terminandas, et in criminibus que directe contra christianam religionem committuntur. De huiusmodi enim imperator nisi sicut ceteri christiani se intromittere non debet, quia imperator christianus ratione sue dignitatis maiorem potestatem vel iurisdictionem nullatenus habet quam habuerunt imperatores pagani, illis enim imperatores christiani successerunt, et ideo idem ius cum illis et non aliud ratione imperii possidere noscuntur. Quia igitur de huiusmodi spiritualibus se intromittere ad imperatores paganos minime pertinebat, nec ad imperatorem christianum in quantum imperator est talia spectant.

Master: They call spirituals those matters which are particular to the Christian religion, which are found in no other sect nor belong to the law of nature, such as what pertains to the administration of ecclesiastical sacraments and to final decisions about causes of faith , and what is associated with crimes that are committed directly against the Christian religion [John of Paris, ch. 12]. The emperor ought not to involve himself in such issues save to the extent that other Christians do. For a Christian emperor does not at all on the basis of his office enjoy greater power or jurisdiction than pagan emperors did. Christian emperors are their successors and thus are known on account of the empire to have a right identical to that of their predecessors and not some different right. Therefore since it in no way pertained to pagan emperors to involve themselves in spirituals of this kind, neither are such the concern of a Christian emperor in his capacity as emperor [ Ockham, De imperatorum et pontificum potestate, ch. 12].

Discipulus: Ergo secundum istos si papa homicidium, furtum, adulterium, et consimilia crimina que imperatores et reges pagani punire solebant committeret, imperator ipsum punire valeret.

Student: Therefore according to these opponents if a pope were to commit murder, theft, adultery and similar crimes, which pagan emperors and kings were wont to punish, the emperor would be in a position to punish him ?

Magister: Hoc nonnulli concedunt licet dicant quidam eorum quod non deberet eum deponere nisi incorrigibilis probaretur.

Master: Many concede this [John of Paris, ch.13; Marsilius, II.viii.7-8], although some of them say that the emperor ought not to depose him unless the pope were proved to be incorrigible [John of Paris, ch. 13].

Discipulus: Modo opinionem istorum intelligo quamvis eam inter hereses reputem numerandam, de qua tecum in tractatu De dogmatibus Io. 22-i prolixius disputabo. Nunc autem dic qualiter ad rationes et auctoritates pro assertione contraria isti respondent. De secundo vero modo ponendi nihil dicas ad presens.

Student: Now I understand their point of view (though I would reckon it should be listed among the heresies) and propose to debate this opinion with you at length in the treatise Concerning the doctrines of John XXII. And now state the manner in which these opponents respond to the arguments and authorities in favour of the contrary assertion. Say nothing for the moment however about the second formulation.

Magister: Ad primam negant minorem cum accipitur quod imperator est inferior papa et eius iurisdictioni subiectus quantum ad iurisdictionem temporalem ex ordinatione Christi, et ideo in huiusmodi papa non est iudex imperatoris licet forte aliquando fuerit iudex imperatoris in quantum commissarius vel delegatus populi Romani.

Master: Their response to the first argument is to deny the minor which holds that by Christ's dispensation, and as to temporal jurisdiction, the emperor is inferior to the pope and subject to his jurisdiction. In matters of this kind, therefore, the pope is not the judge of the emperor; although he could possibly at some moment have been the judge of the emperor as a trustee or delegate of the Roman people.

Discipulus: Ista sunt verba mirabilia at inaudita nec ea intelligo, sed si potes fac me illa intelligere et tunc de eis certius iudicabo.

Student: These words are astounding and unheard of, nor do I understand them; but make me understand them if you can, and then I shall appraise them with greater certainty.

Magister: Ut ea intelligas debes scire quod secundum istos imperator et quilibet rex temporalis licet a Deo quodammodo mediate iurisdictionem suam habeat temporalem, quia secundum Apostolum ad Romanos 13 "non est potestas nisi a Deo", tamen immediate iurisdictionem suam habet a populo, imperator a populo Romano, rex Francie a populo suo, rex Castelle a populo suo et sic quilibet rex a populo suo habet iurisdictionem suam, nisi sit aliquis rex cuius populus alicui alteri sit subiectus qui possit populo dare regem quemadmodum imperatores quondam diversis populis reges dederunt quia illi populi imperatori et populo Romano subiecti fuerunt. Imperator igitur suam iurisdictionem a populo Romano obtinuit. Populus autem Romanus ex causa rationabili sicut imperatorem instituit ita eum potuit destituere eiusque iurisdictionem minuere et augere. Ex quo sequitur quod populus Romanus ex causa rationabili potuit imperatorem in aliquo casu alterius cui committeret iurisdictioni subiicere, quare potuit pape causam imperatoris delegare, in quo casu papa tanquam delegatus seu commissarius auctoritate populi Romani super imperatorem iurisdictionem potuit obtinere, quam iurisdictionem beatus Petrus a Christo non suscepit et ideo papa in quantum successor beati Petri eam minime habet.

Master: In order to understand these words you must realize that in the view of these opponents the emperor and any temporal king, even if he somehow holds his temporal jurisdiction by divine mediation (for according to the Apostle in Romans 13[:1] "there is no power but of God"), nevertheless holds his jurisdiction immediately from the people [ Marsilius, I.ix.2; I.xv.2]: the emperor from the Roman people, the king of France from his people, the king of Castile from his people; and thus every king has his jurisdiction from his people unless there is a king whose people is subject to someone else who has authority to give the people a king, as emperors once upon a time gave kings to various peoples because these peoples were subject to the emperor and to the Roman people. The emperor , therefore, obtained his jurisdiction from the Roman people; but the Roman people just as it had appointed the emperor could for reasonable cause have removed him from office [ Marsilius, I.xv.2; I.xviii], and diminished or increased his jurisdiction [ Marsilius, I.xii.3]. It follows from this that the Roman people for reasonable cause could have in some case subjected the emperor to the jurisdiction of another, to whom it would have committed this jurisdiction ; the Roman people could therefore have delegated the cause of the emperor to the pope, in which case the pope as delegate or trustee could have obtained jurisdiction over the emperor by authority of the Roman people. This jurisdiction blessed Peter did not receive from Christ, and thus the pope in no way possesses it in his capacity as the successor of blessed Peter.

Discipulus: Nunc verba predicta intelligo, quamvis ipsa putem erronea, et ideo ad rationes factas accede.

Student: Now I understand the aforementioned words though I would believe them to be wrong. Proceed therefore with the opponents' responses to the arguments.

Magister: Propter diversas opiniones antequam narrem quomodo ad rationes explicite respondetur oportet illas opiniones exprimere.

Master: Due to the variety of adversarial opinions it behooves me to express them before outlining how the arguments are explicitly dealt with.

Discipulus: Dic que sunt ille opiniones.

Student: State the nature of these opinions.

Magister: Sicut tactum est prius sunt quidam dicentes quod Romanus pontifex nullam iurisdictionem habet vel potestatem ex ordinatione Christi ultra alios quoscunque presbiteros sed omnem dignitatem suam et potestatem ultra alios habuit ab imperatore vel ab ecclesia seu concilio generali. Alii dicunt quod beatus Petrus pro se et suis successoribus dignitatem papalem et primatum super omnes alios fideles recepit a Christo, sed ista dignitas et primatus ut dicunt consistit tantummodo in ordinando et preficiendo episcopos presbiteros et doctores populo christiano, nullam habens ex ordinatione Christi iurisdictionem coactivam annexam sicut nec habet res temporales annexas. Sed sicut papatus temporalia a fidelibus orthodoxis accepit ita a communitate fidelium solummodo habuit iurisdictionem coactivam. Omnis enim communitas potest aliquem sibi preficere qui habeat potestatem maleficos cohercendi. Ecclesia autem fidelium ad hoc officium papam sibi prefecit, in nullo tamen iurisdictionem imperatorum diminuendo etam paganorum, quia hoc non potuit eo quod omnes catholici tunc temporis imperatoribus infidelibus subiecti fuerunt.

Master: As we touched upon earlier there are some who say that the Roman pontiff has no more jurisdiction or authority by Christ's ordination than other priests of whatever category [Marsilius, II.xv; 1 Dial. 5.17], but that he received every single dignity of his and power beyond that of the other priests from the emperor [1 Dial. 5.18] or from the church [1 Dial. 5.15]or the general council [Marsilius, II.xxii; 1 Dial. 5.19]. Others say that blessed Peter did receive from Christ for himself and for his successors the papal dignity and primacy over all the other faithful; but, they say, this dignity and primacy only consists in the ordination and appointment of bishops, priests, and doctors for the Christian people, and has no annexed coercive jurisdiction from Christ's dispensation just as it has no annexed temporal possessions. But just as the papacy received temporal goods from the orthodox faithful so did it obtain coercive jurisdiction exclusively from this community. For every community may appoint someone over itself with power to coerce evil-doers; and for that purpose the church of the faithful appointed the pope over itself, while in no way diminishing the jurisdiction even of pagan emperors: it could in fact not do this given that at the time all catholics were subjected to unbelieving emperors.

Discipulus: Ego omnino vellem exire istam materiam de iurisdictione imperatoris et ad alium differre tractatum, et tu semper plus et plus trahis ad ipsam, unde istis omnibus omissis breviter narra quomodo ad auctoritates et rationes inductas respondetur.

Student: I should entirely like to move away from this material concerning the emperor's jurisdiction and defer it until another treatise, but you consistently pull towards it more and more. Hence, putting aside all these problems, give a brief account of the manner in which opponents respond to the authorities and arguments which have been put forward.

Magister: Sunt quidam unam responsionem dantes generalem ad omnes auctoritates asserentes quod papa habet iurisdictionem super imperatores et reges et quod quantum ad iurisdictionem est superior eis, dicentes quod tales auctoritates non continent veritatem et ideo sunt nullatenus admittende. Alii autem intellectum sanctorum patrum reputant consonum veritati sed dicunt quod nonnulli clerici ambitione et avaritia excecati verba eorum nimis large contra mentem eorum interpretati sunt.

Master: There are some who give a single general response to all the authorities which claim that the pope has jurisdiction over emperor and kings, and that he is superior to them as to jurisdiction. They say that such authorities do not contain the truth and are therefore in no way admissible. Others however believe that the understanding of the holy fathers is consonant with the truth, but they say that many clerks, blinded by ambition and avarice, have interpreted their words too broadly and against the fathers' intended meaning.

Discipulus: Istorum responsiones volo audire.

Student: These are the people whose responses I want to hear.

Magister: Isti ad evidentiam responsionum suarum dicunt esse sciendum quod penitentia unum est de ecclesiasticis sacramentis et ideo pertinet ad prelatos. Quare ad ipsos spectat in foro conscientie penitentium peccata cognoscere et ipsis debitam penam iniungere. Et propter istam potestatem quam sacerdotes in foro conscientie habere noscuntur omnes christiani eis sunt subiecti. Extra autem forum conscientie nullam habent iurisdictionem a Christo immediate, sed illam habent a communitate fidelium vel ab illo in quem communitas fidelium suam transtulit potestatem.

Master: For the purpose of clarifying their responses they say that one must grasp the fact that penance belongs to the ecclesiastical sacraments and therefore pertains to prelates. Consequently it is their function to learn the sins of penitents in the forum of conscience {the confessional} and to impose upon them an appropriate penalty. And because of this power which priests are known to possess in the forum of conscience all Christians are subject to them; while outside of the forum of conscience priests have no jurisdiction from Christ immediately, but they obtain it from the community of believers or from the one to whom the community of believers has transferred its power.

Capitulum 9

Chapter 9

Discipulus: Adhuc tu trahis me ad materiam quam nollem hic tractari et ideo quomodo ad auctoritates et rationes inductas respondetur narra succincte.

Student: Again you are pulling me towards material which I would be unwilling to have reviewed in the present context. Give therefore a succinct narration of the manner in which these opponents respond to the authorities and arguments which have been advanced.

Magister: Ad primam auctoritatem Gregorii Nazianzeni respondetur quod per tribunal et principatum prelatorum intelligit potestatem quam in foro conscientie super penitentes noscuntur habere. Ista vero potestas quia spiritualis est et ordinatur ad vitam eternam consequendam multo perfectior est omni iurisdictione temporali coactiva regum et principum que principaliter instituta est ad temporalia disponenda. Ad auctoritatem Felicis pape respondetur quod regia voluntas in fide catholica addiscenda et sacramentis ecclesiasticis suscipiendis debet sacerdotibus esse subiecta si sacerdotes fidem retinent orthodoxam nichil contra iustitiam imperantes. Si vero a catholica deviaverint veritate vel sibi quam de iure non habent usurpaverint potestatem reges in huiusmodi nullatenus sunt subiecti. Verba ergo Felicis pape sane intelligenda sunt et non sunt ex ambitione clericorum cupientium in populis et in clero contra doctrinam beati Petri apostoli dominari in preiudicium regum et principum exponenda. Consimiliter respondetur ad c. Duo sunt et ad c. Si imperator. Nam dicunt isti papam a concilio generali et universali ecclesia aliquam potestatem habere super principes ultra illam quam habet a Christo et in quantum est successor beati Petri.

Master: The answer to the first authority (that of Gregory of Naziance) is: that by the tribunal and rulership of prelates he means the power which they are known to possess over penitents in the forum of conscience. Indeed this power, because it is spiritual and ordained for the purpose of acquiring life eternal, is much more perfect than any coercive temporal jurisdiction of kings and princes which was primarily instituted for the administration of wordly affairs. The answer to the authority of Pope Felix is: that the royal will should be subject to priests in the matter of learning the catholic faith and receiving ecclesiastical sacraments, if the priests maintain orthodox faith and do not command anything contrary to justice. But if they should deviate from catholic truth or usurp for themselves a power which they legally do not possess this would in no way be binding upon kings. Therefore the words of Pope Felix must be understood sensibly, and are not to be expounded by reference to the ambition of clerks who wish to dominate over peoples and clergy contrary to the doctrine of the blessed apostle Peter [1 Peter 5:2-3] and with prejudice to kings and princes. A similar answer is given to c. Duo sunt and c. Si imperator. For these opponents say that the pope possesses from the general council and the universal church a certain authority over rulers which goes beyond the one he has received from Christ and in his capacity as the successor of blessed Peter.

Ad primam vero rationem inductam ad probandum quod imperator est inferior papa respondetur primo quod maior non est universaliter vera sed capit instantiam quando aliquis sponte iurat alii fidelitatem. Talis enim ante iuramentum non est semper inferior illo cui iurat quamvis per iuramentum quodammodo seipsum inferiorem illo efficiat. Ad minorem vero dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo quod imperator nunquam iuravit fidelitatem pape nisi spontanea voluntate et ideo suis successoribus legem consimilem per tale iuramentum nequaquam imposuit. Aliter respondetur quod ex ordinatione Romanorum a quibus imperator suam habuit iurisdictionem potuit imperator pape iurare et in hoc tenuisset papa non vicem beati Petri nec in hoc fuit vicarius Christi sed in hoc fuisset commissarius Romanorum. Ad secundam similiter respondetur quod papa non transtulit imperium a Grecis in Germanos in quantum vicarius Christi et successor beati Petri quia ratione vicariatus illius et successionis huiusmodi non habet maiorem auctoritatem super imperium quam super regnum Francorum vel Anglorum. Sicut igitur in quantum vicarius Christi et successor beati Petri non potest transferre regnum Francorum de una domo ad aliam, ita ratione vicariatus et successionis non potuit de gente in gentem transferre imperium Romanorum. Transtulit igitur imperium de gente in gentem auctoritate Romanorum qui sibi ex causa rationabili potestatem huiusmodi contulerunt. Ad tertiam respondetur tripliciter. Sunt enim quidam dicentes quod cum excommunicatio sit potius iurisdictionis quam ordinis, papa in quantum vicarius Christi et successor beati Petri neminem excommunicare potest, sed potestatem excommunicandi habet ab universali ecclesia que in eum talem transtulit potestatem. Alii autem dicunt quod non papa sed imperator in imperio et rex in regno suo potestatem habet excommunicandi.

Now as to the initial argument advanced to prove that the emperor is inferior to the pope, the answer is, first of all, that the major is not universally true but becomes relevant when someone spontaneously swears fealty to another, for prior to the oath he is not always inferior to the one to whom he swears it, though by the oath he does in some sense make himself inferior to this other. While the minor of the argument is addressed in two ways. One approach is that the emperor never swore fealty to the pope save by his own spontaneous will, and therefore by such an oath he did not at all impose upon his successor a similar legal obligation. Another response is that the emperor could have sworn fealty to the pope by ordination of the Romans from whom the emperor had received his jurisdiction, and in this transaction the pope would not have represented blessed Peter nor been the vicar of Christ, but in this he would have been the trustee of the Romans. A similar response is given to the second argument: that the pope did not transfer the empire from the Greeks to the Romans in his capacity as the vicar of Christ and the successor of blessed Peter; since by reason of this vicarship and of the given succession the Pope did not possess greater authority over the empire than over the kingdom of the Franks or that of the English. Therefore, just as he cannot transfer the kingdom of the Franks from one house to another in his capacity as vicar of Christ and successor of blessed Peter, so by reason of the vicarship and succession he could not have transferred the empire of the Romans from nation to nation. He therefore transferred the empire from nation to nation by the authority of the Romans who for reasonable cause granted to him a power of this kind. There is a threefold response to the third argument. For there are some who say that since excommunication is more a function of jurisdiction than of order, the pope can excommunicate no one in his capacity as the vicar of Christ and the successor of blessed Peter, but he has the power to excommunicate from the universal church which transferred such power to him. Others say however that it is the emperor in the empire and the king in his kingdom who has the power to excommunicate, not the pope.

Discipulus: Istas opiniones puto erroneas sed tamen secundam magis abhorreo. De ipsis tamen in alio tractatu tecum collocutionem habebo. Nunc autem dic tertiam responsionem.

Student: I consider these opinions to be erroneous, and find the second one particularly repugnant. Nevertheless I shall discourse with you about them in a different treatise. Now however let us have the third response.

Magister: Tertia responsio est quod papa in quantum vicarius Christi habet potestatem excommunicandi, sed penam maiorem nullatenus inferendi. Dicunt enim quod ista est ultima pena quam possunt ecclesiastici exercere. Isti igitur dicunt quod papa in hoc est imperatore superior sed tamen in aliis est inferior ipso scilicet in omni iurisdictione temporali. Ad quartam rationem respondetur quod papa non potest deponere imperatorem ratione papatus sicut nec ratione papatus potest deponere regem Francie. Sed sicut Zacharias papa regem Francorum auctoritate populi regni illius deposuit, et ita illi principaliter deposuerunt, et ut testatur glossa 15 q. 6 c. Alius: "dicitur deposuisse qui deponentibus consensit", et ita papa auctoritate Romanorum posset imperatorem deponere. Ad quintam rationem respondetur quod papa ratione papatus non potest illegitimos in temporalibus legitimare. Si autem hoc fecit licite de facto, ratione alicuius alterius potestatis que non est annexa papatui hoc fecit.

Master: The third response is that as the vicar of Christ the pope has the power to excommunicate but in no way that of imposing a greater penalty. For they say that excommunication is the final penalty which ecclesiastical persons may inflict [ John of Paris, ch. 13]. In this, say these opponents, the pope is superior to the emperor, yet in other matters, namely in any temporal jurisdiction, he is inferior to the emperor. The answer to the fourth argument is that the pope by reason of his papal office cannot depose the emperor, just as he cannot in his capacity as pope depose the king of France. But in the same manner that Pope [Zacharias] deposed the king of the Franks by authority of the people of that kingdom and thus it is they who primarily performed the deposition, and, witness the gloss to 15 q. 6 c. Alius, Zacharias "is said to have deposed who gave his consent to those who were deposing" [s.v. deposuit, col. 1083] just so might the Pope depose the Emperor by authority of the Romans. The answer to the fifth argument is that in temporal affairs the Pope as such cannot legitimize those who are illegitimate. Should he however legally have done this de facto, he would have done it by reason of some other power which is not connected to the papacy.

Discipulus: Responde ad secundam rationem principalem.

Student: Respond to the second main argument.

Magister: Ad secundam rationem respondetur quod papa ratione papatus non est solutus legibus imperialibus que divinis legibus non repugnant licet aliunde forsitan sit solutus. Ad tertiam rationem principalem respondetur quod clerici nisi sint exempti auctoritate regum vel concilii generalis pertinent ad forum secularium potestatum. Ad quartam rationem respondetur quod in temporalibus licet appellare a papa ad imperatorem nisi per universalem ecclesiam sit exemptus. Ad quintam dicitur quod Christus commisit Petro iura imperii terreni, hoc est potestatem super malos in spiritualibus, non in temporalibus.

Master: The answer to the second argument is that by reason of his office the pope is not free of those imperial laws which are not incompatible with the laws of God, although he may perhaps have been released therefrom from another quarter. The answer to the third principal argument is that clerks belong to the forum of the secular powers unless they have been exempted by the authority of kings or of the general council. The answer to the fourth argument is that in temporal matters one may appeal from the pope to the emperor unless the former has been exempted [from the normal appeal process] by the universal church. To the fifth argument one says that Christ did entrust to Peter the rights of the earthly empire, that is to say, power over the bad in spiritual matters, not in temporal affairs.

Capitulum 10

Chapter 10

Discipulus: Michi placet quod expedivisti te breviter de rationibus supradictis, tum quia in alio tractatu super ipsas redibo, tum quia non audivi quod frater M. de Cesena et sequaces sui quorum dicta contra dominum papam principaliter examinare propono dogmatizant vel sentiunt quod papa non habeat iurisdictionem coactivam vel quod imperatori subiectus sit. Ideo ad secundam assertionem quam recitasti in secundo capitulo huius sexti te converte et motiva illius enarra.

Student: I am pleased by your abbreviated account of the aforementioned arguments since I shall be reviewing them again in another treatise, and because I have not heard that brother M. of Cesena and his followers (whose statements against the Lord Pope I primarily intend to examine) officially teach or believe that the pope does not possess coercive jurisdiction or is subjected to the emperor. Therefore move on to the second assertion which you recited in the second chapter of this sixth book and give an account of its foundations.

Magister: Illa assertio continet duas partes quarum prima est quod si papa esset de heresi graviter diffamatus ecclesia universalis et concilium generale et etiam aliqua alia congregatio vel persona potestatem inquirendi et cohercendi ipsum haberet.

Master: The assertion in question has two components of which the first is that if the pope were seriously defamed of heresy the universal church and the general council as well as some other congregation or person would have the power to question and to coerce him.

Discipulus: Circa hanc partem peto ut disseras primo an ecclesia universalis si papa esset de heresi graviter diffamatus super ipsum potestatem haberet.

Student: With respect to this component I would request that you initially discuss whether the universal church would have power over the pope if he were gravely defamed of heresy.

Magister: Circa hoc ut dixi est una assertio quod sic, aliorum autem est assertio quod non, scilicet dicentium quod licet papa effectus hereticus ecclesie sit subiectus (quia eo ipso quod fit hereticus fit non papa), si tamen falso fuerit de heresi diffamatus non est subiectus ecclesie nec ecclesia in hoc casu habet potestatem aliquam super ipsum.

Master: I have said that on this issue there is an assertion which is affirmative while the assertion of others is negative. The latter say that although a pope who becomes a heretic would be subject to the church, since he would become a non-pope by the very fact of becoming a heretic, yet should he be falsely defamed of heresy he is not subject to the church nor does the church in that case have any power over him.

Discipulus: Motiva utriusque assertionis auscultabo libenter. Primo autem allega motiva secunde assertionis.

Student: I shall gladly listen to the reasons of each assertion. Lay down first of all the reasons of the second assertion.

Magister: Primum motivum est tale. Nulla falsa infamia potest persone vel collegio aut congregationi iurisdictionem aut potestatem conferre. Sed papa de heresi minime diffamatus non est de iurisdictione ecclesie nec subest ei. Igitur nec papa falso de heresi diffamatus ecclesie est subiectus. Secundum motivum est tale. Ille qui in aliqua causa est aliis superior non est in eadem causa inferior illis, quia in eadem causa idem respectu eiusdem vel eorumdem non potest esse superior et inferior. Sed papa manens verus papa in causa fidei est omnibus aliis superior, quia si omnes christiani sibi in causa fidei erronee dissentirent omnes de iure licet de facto non posset cohercere deberet. Ergo papa propter nullam falsam infamiam fit subiectus ecclesie in causa heresis. Tertium motivum est tale. Si papa de heresi diffamatus iudicio ecclesie esset subiectus, ecclesia posset iudicare de ipso. Hoc autem non potest fieri quia cum ecclesia universalis simul conveniri non possit oportet generale concilium convocari ad diffiniendum de causa pape. Sed nullus potest absque papa generale concilium convocare, nec ipse potest compelli per aliquem generale concilium congregare, quia si aliquis posset eum compellere generale concilium congregare ille esset superior papa, et ita aliqua persona esset superior papa quod non est verum ut dicunt. Ecclesia ergo universalis de papa iudicare non potest, et ita papa quantumcunque fuerit de heresi diffamatus ecclesie minime est subiectus.

Master: The first reason is this. No false defamation can grant jurisdiction or power to a person, college, or congregation; but a pope not defamed of heresy does not belong to the jurisdiction of the church and is not subject to it: therefore a pope falsely defamed of heresy is not subject to the church either. The second reason is this. He who is superior to others in some cause is not inferior to them in the very same cause, since in that one cause the same person cannot be both superior and inferior in relation to the identical participant or participants. But a pope who remains a true pope is superior to everyone else in the cause of faith, for if all Christians erroneously dissented from him in the cause of faith he would have the duty in law to coerce them all even if in fact he could not. Therefore no false defamation makes the pope subject to the Church in a cause of heresy. The third proof is this. If a pope defamed of heresy were subject to the judgment of the church, the church could proceed to judge him. This however cannot come to pass, for since the universal church cannot be gathered together there is need to convoke a general council so as to decide the cause of the pope. Yet no one may convoke the general council without the pope, nor can the pope be compelled by someone to congregate the general council. For if someone could compel him to assemble the general council that someone would be superior to the pope, and thus a particular person would be superior to the pope, which is not true, they say. Therefore the universal church cannot pass judgment concerning the pope, and thus the pope no matter how much he would have been defamed of heresy is in no way subject to the church.

Predicta assertio etiam auctoritatibus et exemplis videtur posse probari. Plures vero auctoritates hoc expresse sonantes supra primo c. huius sexti sunt inducte. Hoc etiam alia auctoritate simul et exemplo probatur. Nam prout recitatum est supra ubi inquisitum est an papa possit hereticari, Nicholaus papa ut legitur di. 21 c. Nunc autem ait: "tempore Diocletiani et Maximiani augustorum Marcellinus episcopus urbis Rome qui postea insignis martyr effectus est, adeo compulsus est a paganis ut templum eorum ingressus grana thuris super prunes imponeret, cuius rei gratia collecto numerosorum episcoporum concilio et inquisitione facta, hoc idem pontifex se egisse confessus est. Nullus tamen eorum proferre sententiam in eum ausus est dum ei sepissime omnes dicerent 'tuo ore iudica causam tuam non nostro iudicio' et iterum 'noli audiri in nostro iudicio sed collige in sinu tuo causam tuam' et rursum 'quoniam ex te' inquiunt 'iustificaberis aut ex ore tuo condempnaberis' et iterum dicunt 'prima sedes non iudicabitur a quoquam'". Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod beatus Marcellinus fuit de heresi diffamatus, nec mirum cum actum hereticalem commiserit. Ex quo enim idolis immolavit fuit de apostasia perfidie vehementer suspectus, quare potuit de heresi graviter diffamari. Hoc tamen non obstante nemo episcoporum fuit ausus in ipsum proferre sententiam. Ergo quantumcunque papa fuerit de heresi diffamatus nullius est subiectus iudicio.

It appears that the aforementioned assertion may also be demonstrated by authorities and examples. Indeed many authorities proclaiming exactly this are provided above in the first chapter of this sixth book. This is also proved by another authority together with an example. For as was recited earlier, where we inquired whether the pope can lapse into heresy [1 Dial. 5.2], Pope Nicholas states (we read it in di. 21 c. Nunc autem)[col. 71]: "In the time of the senior emperors Diocletian and Maximinus, the bishop of the city of Rome, Marcellinus, who later became a glorious martyr, was coerced by the pagans to such an extent that he entered their temple and placed grains of incense upon live coals. A council of numerous bishops was convened on account of this and an inquiry was held, whereupon the same Pontiff admitted he had done the deed. While none of them dared to pass sentence upon him, still they all would say to him repeatedly 'judge your case from your own mouth, not in terms of our judgment' and once more 'do not proceed with a hearing in our court but reserve judgment of your own case' and again 'in that way (they state) you will be justified by yourself or condemned from your own mouth' and once again they say 'the first see will not be judged by anyone'". We are given to understand from these words that blessed Marcellinus was defamed of heresy, nor was this surprising since he had committed an heretical act. For having sacrificed to idols he was strongly suspected of the perfidy of apostasy and therefore could be gravely defamed of heresy. Yet in spite of this none of the bishops dared to pass sentence upon him. Therefore no matter how much the pope has been defamed of heresy he is subject to the judgment of no one.

Discipulus: Ista ratio non videtur concludere quod papa de heresi diffamatus non sit subiectus ecclesie universali et concilio generali, quia auctoritas Nicholai non loquitur de ecclesia universali et concilio generali, sed de quibusdam episcopis qui convenerunt ad inquirendum de causa pape Marcellini.

Student: This argument does not appear to conclude that a pope defamed of heresy is not subject to the universal church and the general council, because the authority of Pope Nicholas does not speak of the universal church and the general council but of certain bishops who came together to inquire about the cause of Pope Marcellinus.

Magister: Dicunt alii quod auctoritas predicta Nicholai manifeste declarat quod papa de heresi diffamatus etiam ecclesie universali et concilio generali minime est subiectus, quia secundum beatum Hilarium "intelligentia dictorum ex causis est assumenda dicendi". Ad intelligendum ergo verba predicta que Nicholaus papa recitat recurrendum est ad causam dicendi. Causam autem quare episcopi qui convenerant ad inquirendum de facto pape dixerunt "tuo ore iudica causam tuam non nostro iudicio" ipsimet assignant dicentes "prima sedes non iudicabitur a quoquam". In verbis istis insinuant aperte quod summus pontifex etiam in casu illo in quo fuerunt, scilicet si summus pontifex fuerit de heresi diffamatus, a nullo est penitus iudicandus, et ita nec ab ecclesia universali nec a concilio generali est papa diffamatus de heresi iudicandus quia ex quo ipsi quorum verba approbantur a canone minime distinxerunt nec nos debemus distinguere. Secundo probatur eadem assertio per exemplum de Symacho papa de quo legitur in decretis di. 17 para. Hinc in hec verba: "episcopi vero in synodo residentes congregata auctoritate eiusdem Symachi dixerunt 'Symachus papa sedis apostolice presul ab huiusmodi opinionibus impetitus quantum ad homines respicit sit immunis et liber cuius causam totam Dei iudicio reservamus'". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod Symachus papa iudicio synodi non erat subiectus licet fuerit de heresi diffamatus quia ut notat glossa ibidem iste opiniones quibus fuerat Symachus impetitus causam heresis contingebant, ait enim: "primo fuit" scilicet Symachus "accusatus de heresi, sed cum appareret calumnia accusantis postea fuit absolutus ut hic dicitur".

Master: Others say that the aforementioned authority of Pope Nicholas obviously declares that a pope defamed of heresy is in no way subject even to the universal church and the general council, because according to blessed Hilary "the meaning of statements is to be derived from the reasons for uttering them."[Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate ,Bk. iv, ch. 14: PL 10, col. 107] Therefore in order to understand the aforementioned words which Pope Nicholas recites reference must be made to the reason for uttering them. But the reason why the bishops, who had come together to inquire into the matter of the pope, said "judge your case from your own mouth, not in terms of our judgment" they explain themselves by stating that "the first see will not be judged by anyone." In these words they openly suggest that a supreme pontiff even in that situation in which they were (namely that of a supreme pontiff defamed of heresy) is absolutely not to be judged by anyone. Thus a pope defamed of heresy is to be judged neither by the universal church nor by the general council because the very persons whose words are given canonical approval did not make any distinctions here and therefore neither must we. Secondly, the same assertion is proved by the example of Pope Symachus concerning whom we read these words in the Decretum (at di. 17 para. Hinc)[ col. 52]: "The bishops meeting in a synod gathered together by authority of the same Symachus stated 'Let Pope Symachus the head of the apostolic see assaulted by such opinions, be exempt and free in the eyes of men; we reserve his entire cause to the judgment of God.'" One gathers from these words that Pope Symachus was not subject to the judgment of the synod even though he had been defamed of heresy, because as the gloss notes in the same context, the opinions by which Symachus had been assaulted touched on a matter of heresy. Indeed the gloss states: "at first he" that is, Symachus "was accused of heresy, but when the accuser's slander became apparent Symachus was subsequently declared innocent as is mentioned here." [ s.v. immunis, col. 72]

Capitulum 11

Chapter 11

Discipulus: Ad presens sufficiant iste allegationes pro assertione predicta et ideo motiva assertionis contrarie non differas allegare.

Student: These representations in support of the aforestated claim are sufficient. Proceed therefore to outline the reasons for the opposite point of view.

Magister: Quod papa si de heresi diffametur sit subiectus iudicio universalis ecclesie nonnulli conantur ostendere. Primo sic. Ille qui potest accusari et iudicari de heresi est subiectus iudicio universalis ecclesie si fuerit de heresi diffamatus. Papa autem potest de heresi accusari et iudicari (di. 40 Si papa) ergo etc. Secundo sic. Qui potest ab aliquo reprehendi pro heresi est subiectus in eadem causa iudicio universalis ecclesie. Sed papa potest pro heresi ab aliquo reprehendi. Hoc probatur per exemplum de beato Petro quem beatus Paulus quia non ambulabat ad veritatem evangelii reprehendit ad Gal. 2. Ergo papa si fuerit de heresi diffamatus iudicio universalis ecclesie est subiectus. Tertio sic. Minor iudicio superioris est subiectus. Sed papa est minor universali ecclesia sicut orbis maior est urbe ergo etc.. Quarto sic. Nulli corpori sufficienter est provisum nisi membra putrida que totum corpus valent inficere possint abscindi. Sed tota ecclesia militans unum corpus est teste Apostolo ad Rom. 12. Ait: "unum corpus sumus in Christo". Istius autem corporis papa est membrum quoddam. Ergo non est sufficienter provisum ecclesie nisi papa possit abscindi per ecclesiam si hereticam incurrerit pravitatem. Cum ergo Christus non defecerit in necessariis ecclesie militanti sequitur quod per ecclesiam militantem papa si efficiatur hereticus potest abscindi et per consequens si fuerit de heresi diffamatus iudicio universalis ecclesie est subiectus. Quinto sic. Ille qui est de aliquo crimine denuntiandus ecclesie, iudicio universalis ecclesie si fuerit diffamatus est subiectus. Sed papa potest pro crimine heresis denuntiari ecclesie, Christo dicenti Matth. 18: "si autem peccaverit in te frater tuus", et post: "si non audierit eos dic ecclesie". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod cum papa censendus sit frater, ipse potest pro crimine potissime heresis denuntiari ecclesie, ergo si fuerit de crimine heresis diffamatus iudicio ecclesie est subiectus.

Master: Some attempt to show that should a pope be defamed of heresy he would be subject to the judgment of the universal church. Firstly as follows. One who can be accused and judged of heresy is subject to the judgment of the universal church should he be defamed of heresy. But the pope can be accused and judged of heresy (di. 40, Si papa)[col. 146] . Therefore etc. Secondly thus: he who can be censured for heresy by someone is subject in the same cause to the judgment of the universal church. But the pope can be censured for heresy by someone. This is proved by the example of blessed Peter, whom blessed Paul rebuked because "he was not walking uprightly according to the truth of the gospel" (Galatians 2[:14]). Therefore should a pope be slandered of heresy he is subject to the judgment of the universal church. Thirdly: The inferior is subject to the judgment of the superior. But the pope is inferior to the universal church, just as the whole world is greater than a single city, therefore etc. Fourthly thus: No body has been sufficiently provided for unless decaying members which might infect the whole body can be amputated. But the whole of the church militant is one body, as the Apostle witnesses in Romans 12[:5]. He states: "we are one body in Christ". And of this body the pope is a definite member. Hence the church is not sufficiently provided for unless the pope may be cut off by the church should he fall into heretical wickedness. Therefore since Christ did not fail to secure necessary options for the militant church, it follows that the pope may be cut off by the militant church if he becomes a heretic, and consequently he is subject to the universal church should he be slandered of heresy. Fifthly thus: one who must be denounced to the church for some crime is subject to the judgment of the universal church should he be slandered. But the pope may be denounced to the church for the crime of heresy. Christ stated in Matthew 18[:15,17]: "moreover if thy brother shall trespass against thee", and then: "if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church". From these words one gathers that since the pope is to be viewed as a brother, he can be denounced to the church for a crime, above all that of heresy. Therefore should he be slandered of the crime of heresy he is subject to the judgment of the church.

Capitulum 12

Chapter 12

Discipulus: De ecclesia universali an sibi summus pontifex sit subiectus que dixisti sufficiant. Nunc autem sententias peritorum de concilio generali, an super papam de heresi diffamatum iurisdictionem vel potestatem obtineat aperire digneris.

Student: What you have stated about the universal church (i.e. whether the supreme pontiff is subject to it) is sufficient. Now, if you please, explain the views of the learned about the general council, viz., whether it holds jurisdiction or power over a pope slandered of heresy.

Magister: Sunt nonnulli dicentes quod concilium generale super papam de heresi diffamatum nullam habet iurisdictionem omnino, quod pluribus rationibus nituntur ostendere. Est autem prima ratio talis. Ecclesia universalis non habet iurisdictionem super papam de heresi diffamatum, sicut nituntur per rationes prius adductas ostendere. Ergo multo fortius concilium generale non habet iurisdictionem super papam de heresi diffamatum. Secundo sic. Nulla congregatio specialis in quacunque causa habet iurisdictionem super papam, cum in omni causa quelibet congregatio particularis papa inferior sit censenda. Concilium autem generale est quedam congregatio particularis seu specialis, quia omnes christianos minime comprehendit. Ergo concilium generale non habet iurisdictionem super papam. Tertio sic. Illa congregatio que potest contra fidem errare non habet iurisdictionem super papam de heresi mendaciter diffamatum. Generale autem concilium potest contra fidem errare, sicut nonnulli per plures rationes probare nituntur, ergo etc. Quarto sic. Illa congregatio que in causa heresis est inferior papa etiam de heresi diffamato non est in eadem causa papa superior. Sed totum concilium generale preter papam est in causa heresis papa inferius, quia si totum concilium generale preter papam etiam de heresi mendaciter diffamatum contra fidem erraret ipse omnes de iure punire deberet. Ergo in causa heresis papa concilio generali est superior.

Master: There are a few who say that a general council has no jurisdiction whatsoever over a pope slandered of heresy, which they attempt to show by multiple arguments. And the first argument is this. The universal church does not have jurisdiction over a pope defamed of heresy, a point they attempt to show by reasons presented earlier [1 Dial. 6.10]. Therefore all the more compellingly does the general council not have jurisdiction over a pope defamed of heresy. Secondly thus: there is no case where a special congregation possesses jurisdiction over the pope, since whatever congregation is particular must be deemed inferior to the pope in any case. But the general council is a certain special or particular congregation because it does not include all Christians. Therefore the general council does not have jurisdiction over the pope. Thirdly thus: that congregation which can err against the faith does not have jurisdiction over a pope falsely accused of heresy. But the general council can err against the faith, as a number [of scholars] attempt to prove by many arguments [1 Dial. 5.25]. Therefore etc. Fourthly thus: that congregation which is inferior to the pope in a case of heresy even if he himself is defamed of heresy, is not superior to the pope in the very same case. But the entire general council minus the pope is inferior to the pope in a case of heresy, because if the entire general council minus the pope (even one falsely slandered of heresy) were to err against the faith, the pope would have the lawful duty of punishing them all. Therefore in a case of heresy the pope is superior to the general council.

Discipulus: Totum concilium generale preter papam non potest contra fidem errare quia Deus qui promisit fidem catholicam usque ad finem seculi duraturam non permitteret.

Student: The entire general council minus the pope cannot err against the faith, for God, who promised that the catholic faith would last until the end of time, would not allow it.

Magister: Ista responsio impugnatur, tum quia esto quod totum concilum generale preter papam erraret nequaquam fides christiana desineret, quia salvaretur in papa et in multis aliis. Fides autem in solo papa posset salvari quemadmodum tempore passionis Christi in unica muliere remansit. Tum quia unus potest ad se trahere totum concilium generale, et unus potest toti residuo concilii generalis contradicere, sicut notatur di. 31 c. Nicena. Ergo multo fortius papa qui est principalis et caput concilii generalis potest toti residuo contradicere et per consequens residuo minime est subiectus. Quinto sic. Illa congregatio que nullam auctoritatem habet nisi a papa, et que absque papa congregari non potest, nullam habet iurisdictionem super papam nisi papa sponte eius iudicio se submittat. Sed concilium generale nullam habet iurisdictionem seu potestatem aut auctoritatem nisi a papa, nec potest absque eius mandato aliqualiter celebrari. Igitur papa nisi voluntarie se submittat iudicio concilii generalis minime est subiectus.

Master: This answer they impugn. To begin with, because even if the entire general council minus the pope were to fall into error, the Christian faith would by no means disappear, since it would remain in the pope and in many others. Indeed the faith may be saved in the pope alone, just as it remained in a single woman at the time of Christ's passion. Further: a single person may attract to his position the whole of the general council, and a single person may contradict the entire remainder of the general council, which is noted in di. 31 c. Nicena[col. 114]. Therefore all the more potently can the pope (who is the head and mainstay of the general council) contradict the entire remainder thereof, and consequently he is not subject to this remainder. The fifth argument is this. That congregation which has no authority except from the pope, and which cannot come together to meet without the pope, has no jurisdiction over the pope unless the latter spontaneously submits himself to its judgment. But the general council has no jurisdiction or power or authority save from the pope, nor can it in any way be celebrated without his permission. Therefore the Pope is not subjected to the judgment of the general council unless he freely submits to it.

Capitulum 13

Chapter 13

Discipulus: Quomodo allegatur in contrarium manifesta.

Student: Indicate how one might argue for the contrary position.

Magister: Quod papa iudicio generalis concilii sit subiectus quidam moliuntur ostendere. Primo sic. Ecclesia universalis iurisdictionem obtinet super papam de heresi diffamatum. Igitur et ista congregatio que vicem gerit universalis ecclesie iurisdictionem habet super papam de heresi diffamatum. Concilium autem generale gerit vicem universalis ecclesie, ergo etc. Secundo hoc probatur sic. Diffamatus de aliquo crimine est iudicio concilii generalis subiectus si eidem concilio super obiecto crimine respondere tenetur. Papa autem diffamatus de heresi generali concilio respondere tenetur. Vnde et in decretis 2 q. 7 para. Item cum Balaam sic legitur: "Symachus papa in Romana synodo dignitate sua expoliatus, prius statui pristino reddi decernitur, ut tunc veniret ad causam, et si ita recte videretur accusantium propositionibus responderet. Digna res visa est maximo numero sacerdotum atque mereretur effectum. Et cum postmodum ordinaretur quomodo esset accusandus, prefatus papa, ut causam diceret, occurrebat, sed ab emulis est impeditus". Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod Symachus papa qui fuit de heresi accusatus sicut notatur in glossa di. 17 para. Hinc, coram synodo respondere debebat. Ergo in causa heresis concilium generale est super papam de heresi diffamatum.

Master: There are some who strive to demonstrate that the pope is subject to the judgment of the general council. First in this way. The universal church holds jurisdiction over a pope slandered of heresy. Therefore that congregation which represents the universal church also has jurisdiction over a pope defamed of heresy. But the general council represents the general church, therefore etc. Secondly this is proved as follows. A person slandered of some crime is subject to the judgment of the general council if he is bound to answer to this same council in the matter of the crime he stands accused of. But a pope defamed of heresy is obligated to answer to the general council. Hence we read the following in the Decretum at 2 q. 7 para. Item cum Balaam[col. 497-498]: "Pope Symachus was stripped of his dignity in a Roman synod. It was initially resolved that he be reinstated in his original position, and then deal with his case, and should this be deemed acceptable he would respond to the points of his accusers. This was seen as a worthy procedure to a majority of priests and was carried out. And when it was subsequently being decided how he was to be accused, this pope presented himself to state his case, but was impeded by enemies". From these words we understand that Symachus who was accused of heresy (as noted in the gloss to di. 17 para. Hinc)[s.v.immunis col.72] was obligated to answer before the synod. Therefore in a case of heresy the general council is above a pope defamed of heresy.

Tertio sic per glossas super decretis hoc probatur. Ait enim glossa di. 19 c. Anastasius: "papa tenetur requirere consilium episcoporum quod verum est ubi de fide agitur et tunc synodus maior est papa". Hiis verbis patenter asseritur quod in causa fidei synodus maior est papa . Item glossa di. 15 c. Sicut dicit in hec verba: "videtur ergo quod papa non possit destruere statuta concilii quia orbis est maior urbe unde requirit papa consensum concilii (di. 19 c. Anastasius) arg. contra di. 17 para. Hinc etiam et Extra De electione c. Significasti ubi dicitur concilium non posse pape legem imponere et 35 q. 9 c. Veniam sed intellige quod hic dicitur circa articulos fidei". Ex quibus verbis colligitur quod circa articulos fidei synodus maior est papa et sibi legem potest imponere, et per consequens in causa fidei synodus iurisdictionem habet super papam. Item glossa di. 21 c. Nunc autem ait: "queritur quare isti episcopi non deposuerunt papam cum esset confessus de heresi ut di. 40 c. Si papa, dicit Hug. quia paratus erat corrigi, licet enim papa vel alius sit hereticus si tamen paratus est corrigi non deponitur ut 24 q. 3 c. Dixit Apostolus, vel ideo non debebant ipsum deponere quia coactus fecit". Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod episcopi potestatem habent deponendi papam de heresi accusatum licet non debeant ipsum semper deponere quia aliquando non est dignus deponi. Causam tamen pape habent audire et ita potestatem obtinent super ipsum.

Thirdly this is proved in like manner by glosses on the canons. For the gloss on di. 19 c. Anastasius [s.v.concilio col.87] states: "the pope is obligated to request the advice of the bishops, which is true where the issue is one of faith, and in that case the synod is greater than the pope". By these words it is openly asserted that in a case of faith the synod is greater than the pope. Further: the gloss on di. 15 c. Sicut [s.v.presumit col.55] states in the following words: "it appears therefore that the pope cannot destroy the statutes of the council, because the world is greater than the city, whence the pope requests the consent of the council (di. 19 c. Anastasius)[col. 64]. The contrary argument is found in di. 17 para. Hinc etiam[col. 52-53] and in Extra De electione, c. Significasti [col. 49-50], where it is stated that a council cannot impose law on the pope, and in 35 q. 9 c. Veniam [col. 1285], but understand that this is said here of the articles of faith." From these words we gather that the synod is greater than the pope on the issue of articles of faith, and may impose a law upon him, and consequently that the synod has jurisdiction over the pope in a case pertaining to the faith. Next: the gloss of di. 21 c. Nunc autem [s.v.Marcellinus col.98] states: "it is asked why these bishops did not depose the pope who had admitted to heresy (as in di. 40 c. Si papa)[col. 146]. Huggucio says: because he was ready to be corrected. For although the pope or someone else is a heretic, if he is ready to be corrected he is not to be deposed (as in 24 q. 3 c. Dixit Apostolus)[col. 998]. Or at least they should not have deposed him since he had been acting under duress." From these words we understand that bishops have the power of deposing a pope accused of heresy, although they should not always depose him because sometimes he does not deserve to be deposed. But it is their function to hear the case of the pope and accordingly they hold power over him.

Capitulum 14

Chapter 14

Discipulus: Allegationes prescripte me fere ad perplexitatem inducunt. Durum enim michi videtur asserere quod oves super pastorem, membra super caput, filii super patrem, discipuli super magistrum, subditi super prelatum, iurisdictionem aut potestatem vel auctoritatem obtineant presertim cum iniqua et falsa infamia iurisdictionem non debeat nec possit tribuere. Et ideo grave apparet dicere quod papa de heresi mendaciter diffamatus propter talem infamiam cuiuscunque vel quorumcunque subdatur iudicio, maxime cum impossibile minime videatur quod tota fides catholica in papa solo remaneat saltem pro aliquo tempore brevi. Ex alia parte zelus fidei christiane me subtiliter angit ne dicam nullam debere fieri inquisitionem aut iudicium de papa super crimine heresis diffamato, quia cum probabiliter teneam papam posse hereticam incurrere pravitatem, si de ipso nulla posset inquisitio fieri tota fides posset periclitari. Vnde si aliqui istam perplexitatem nituntur dissolvere mihi revela.

Student: The aforewritten representations nearly bring me to confusion. That sheep acquire jurisdiction or power or authority over the shepherd, bodily members over the head, sons over the father, students over the master, subjects over the ruler, seems to me a harsh claim, especially since a malicious and false defamation must not, indeed cannot, confer jurisdiction. And therefore it appears momentous to assert that a pope mendaciously slandered of heresy becomes subject to the judgment of any person or persons on account of that kind of defamation, above all since it does not seem impossible that the whole of the catholic faith could survive in the pope alone, at least for some brief period of time. On the other hand zeal for the Christian faith makes me feel keenly distressed to admit that there must be no examination or judgment of a pope defamed of the crime of heresy, for since I hold the probable contention that a pope may lapse into heretical wickedness, if no examination of him were possible the whole faith might be endangered. Hence reveal to me whether some are endeavouring to clear up this confusion.

Magister: Est quaedam assertio quod propter nullam infamiam falsam habet ecclesia iurisdictionem super papam. Si tamen papa fuerit de heresi taliter diffamatus quod sine scandalo ecclesie vel periculo fidei tolerari non posset non solum universalis ecclesia aut concilium generale sed etiam episcopi habent potestatem inquirendi de ipso, quem si deprehenderint manifeste hereticum ipsum debent cohercere vel aliis denuntiare pravitatem eiusdem.

Master: There is a particular contention that no false defamation grants the church jurisdiction over the pope. If, however, the pope were to be slandered of heresy in a manner which could not be tolerated without scandal for the church or danger to the faith, then not only the universal church or the general council, but also bishops would have power of inquiry over him. If the latter were to discover that the pope was an obvious heretic, they would have the duty to arrest him or to denounce his wickedness to others.

Discipulus: Ista assertio contradictionem videtur includere. Vna enim pars alteri apparet repugnare. Si enim nulla persona super papam de heresi diffamatum habet iurisdictionem nulla persona valebit de ipso de iure inquirere quia non ad inferiorem nec ad parem sed ad superiorem iurisdictionem habentem officium inquisitionis spectare dinoscitur.

Student: This assertion appears to include a contradiction. One of its elements seems to conflict with the other. For if no person possesses jurisdiction over a pope defamed of heresy, then no person would be competent to legally inquire about him, for it is known that the office of inquisition pertains to a superior holding jurisdiction, and not to an inferior or to an equal.

Magister: Ad illam obiectionem respondetur quod sicut inquisitio ad superiorem spectat ita etiam citatio pertinet ad superiorem. Non enim par vel inferior potest regulariter suum superiorem citare, sed citare est iurisdictionem habentis. Et tamen hoc non obstante potest in casu quis iurisdictionem minime habens super alium citare eundem. Si enim probabiliter dubitatur an iudex habeat iurisdictionem super aliquem ipsum debet et potest citare, et citatus ire tenetur et ostendere quod citatio non tenet . Quod si non fecerit poterit ipsum alius excommunicare et propter contumaciam iudex qui nullam habuit iurisdictionem super ipsum incipit iurisdictionem super eum habere quantum ad hoc quod ipsum potest excommunicationis sententia innodare (Extra De appellationibus, Si duobus).

Master: The answer to this objection is that a summons pertains to a superior as much as an inquisition does. Indeed an equal or an inferior cannot normally issue a summons to a superior, for summoning belongs to one who has jurisdiction. And yet this does not prevent someone without jurisdiction over another from summoning him under certain circumstances. For if there is probable doubt whether a judge has jurisdiction over someone, the judge must and can summon him, and the person summoned is obligated to appear and to show that the summons does not hold. Were the person not to obey the summons, the other might excommunicate him, and for willful disobedience to a judicial order a judge who had no jurisdiction over that person begins to acquire such jurisdiction over him, in that he can now bind him by a sentence of excommunication (Extra, De appellationibus, Si duobus)[col. 412].

Sic, ut dicunt, de inquisitione dicendum: quod licet inquirere regulariter ad superiorem pertineat, si tamen probabiliter dubitatur de aliquo, qui non potest recurrere ad superiorem an habeat super alium iurisdictionem et potestatem inquirendi, et non aliter nisi inquirendo (an scilicet super alium habeat iurisdictionem) ad veritatem poterit pervenire,licebit sibi de ipso inquirere ut cognoscat an ille ad eius iurisdictionem pertineat. Sic dicunt esse in proposito, quia eo ipso quod papa de heresi tam graviter diffamatus est quod talis infamia absque scandalo ecclesie et periculo fidei dissimulari aut tolerari non posit, prelati possunt probabiliter dubitari an papa sit catholicus vel hereticus, quia de diffamato dubitandum est ante inquisitionem et examinationem cause an fama veritati innitatur, et per consequens dubitandum est an diffamatus crimen super quo diffamatur commiserit. Si autem prelati probabiliter dubitant an papa de heresi diffamatus sit catholicus vel hereticus, sequitur quod probabiliter dubitant an papa sit de iurisdictione ipsorum effectus. Nam si fama est falsa non est de iurisdictione ipsorum, quia papa manens papa propter falsam infamiam non est de iurisdictione quorumcunque. Falsa enim infamia nullam iurisdictionem tribuit. Si autem fama continet veritatem papa talis diffamatus est vere hereticus. Si autem est vere hereticus est de iurisdictione catholicorum. Sicut igitur prelati catholici probabiliter dubitant an papa de heresi diffamatus sit catholicus vel hereticus, ita dubitant probabiliter an sit de iurisdictione ipsorum effectus. Ex quo autem probabiliter dubitant an sit de iurisdictione ipsorum effectus, si ad veritatem aliter quam inquirendo nequeunt pervenire an papa sit de iurisdictione ipsorum effectus, ipsi tenentur de ipso inquirere an scilicet papa de heresi diffamatus sit eorum iurisdictioni subiectus. Hoc autem non possunt inquirere nisi inquirendo an papa de heresi diffamatus sit hereticus vel catholicus. Ergo in hoc casu prelati catholici habent potestatem inquirendi de papa super heresi mendaciter diffamato, licet in rei veritate iurisdictionem non habeant super ipsum. Sicut potest quis alium citare cuius tamen in rei veritate non est iudex.

And they say that a similar view is to be held regarding an inquisition. That although to inquire normally belongs to a superior, if there is doubt about some person, then a potential judge (who cannot have access to a superior to find out whether he possesses jurisdiction and power of inquiry over the other person, and cannot discover the truth except through a prior inquisition as to whether he possesses jurisdiction over the other) will have the right to hold an inquiry about the other person in order to know whether this person belongs to his jurisdiction. They say that this perspective applies to the issue under discussion. Since by the very fact that a pope is so seriously defamed of heresy that such slander cannot be tolerated or concealed without scandal to the church or danger to the faith, prelates may have probable doubt as to whether the pope is a catholic or a heretic. For one must doubt about someone thus slandered (before an inquisition and examination of the case) whether rumour represents truth, and one must consequently wonder whether the person slandered committed the crime of which he is being defamed. If, however, prelates have probable doubt whether a pope defamed of heresy is a catholic or a heretic, it follows that they have probable doubt as to whether the pope has become subject to their jurisdiction. Indeed if the rumour is false he is not under their jurisdiction, because a pope who remains pope does not pertain to anybody's jurisdiction due to a false rumour. Forsooth a false rumour conveys no jurisdiction. But if the rumour is truthful, then such a defamed pope is truly a heretic. And if he is truly a heretic, he pertains to the jurisdiction of catholics. Therefore just as catholic prelates have probable doubt whether a pope defamed of heresy is a catholic or a heretic, they have probable doubt whether he has become subject to their jurisdiction. And since they have probable doubt on this last point, if they cannot arrive at the truth of the matter otherwise than by an inquisition, they are bound to proceed with his case and to inquire, namely, whether the pope slandered of heresy is subject to their jurisdiction. But this they cannot formally investigate unless they inquire whether the pope defamed of heresy is a heretic or a catholic. Therefore in this case catholic prelates have the power to inquire about a pope mendaciously slandered of heresy, even if in truth they do not have jurisdiction over him. Just as someone may summon another whose judge in truth he is not.

Capitulum 15

Chapter 15

Discipulus: Ex predictis michi est data occasio multa querendi. Ante omnia tamen expostulo ut ostendas quibus rationibus vel auctoritatibus possit assertio supradicta muniri.

Student: The aforesaid has given me the opportunity to investigate many issues. But before all else, I beseech you to show by what arguments and authorities the position just outlined may be defended.

Magister: Per rationes fundatas in scriptura divina et dictis sanctorum patrum predicta assertio videtur posse probari, quam tamen primo exemplo patentissimo, ut nonnullis apparet, quidam demonstrare nituntur. Nam sicut allegatum est supra, beato Marcellino papa de heresi diffamato eo quod actum hereticalem idolatrie videlicet commisisset, plures episcopi convenerunt et inquisitionem de ipso fecerunt. Inquisitione autem facta quia papam non deprehenderunt hereticum ipsum iudicare nolebant sicut nec poterant. Ex quo datur intelligi quod de papa de heresi diffamato catholici potestatem habent inquirendi et debent inquirere an fama contineat veritatem.

Master: It seems possible to prove the aforesaid claim by arguments founded on holy writ and on the declarations of saintly fathers. And some attempt to initially demonstrate it by what appears to many as a most obvious example. For as was argued earlier, when blessed Pope Marcellinus was defamed of heresy because he had committed a heretical act (namely idol worship), a fair number of bishops gathered together and performed an inquisition about him. Once the inquisition had been completed they did not want to judge him, as indeed they could not, since they had not found the pope to be a heretic. From which we understand that catholics have the power to inquire concerning a pope defamed of heresy, and must inquire whether the rumour reflects the truth.

Discipulus: Notorium fuit quod beatus Marcellinus commiserat idolatriam et per consequens quod esset hereticus, et ita non est simile de beato Marcellino et de papa mendaciter de heresi diffamato.

Student: That blessed Marcellinus had committed idolatry and consequently that he was a heretic was a notorious fact, and there is thus no similarity between blessed Marcellinus and a pope mendaciously defamed of heresy.

Magister: Istam responsionem excludunt, dicentes quod quamvis esset notorium apud infideles et etiam apud quosdam catholicos quod beatus Marcellinus sacrificasset idolis, tamen hoc non erat notorium apud episcopos qui ad concilium convenerunt nec erat notorium apud quoscunque quod ipse erat hereticus, et ideo dubitabant episcopi an esset hereticus, et forte magis credebant quod non esset hereticus, sicut nec fuit hereticus. Quia tamen nesciverunt veritatem et ipse fuit de heresi diffamatus convenerunt catholici et inquisierunt sollicite veritatem. Si enim veritatem scivissent superfluo inquisivissent. Inquisierunt enim de facto pape et ita de papa infamato de heresi est inquisitio facienda.

Master: They reject this response, saying that although it was widely known among unbelievers and even among certain catholics that blessed Marcellinus had sacrificed to idols, it wasn't at all widely known among the bishops who had gathered in council nor widely known among anybody that he was a heretic. And so the bishops were in doubt as to whether he was a heretic; perhaps they leaned towards the belief that he was not a heretic, as indeed he wasn't. But since they did not know the truth, and he had been slandered of heresy, catholics gathered together and anxiously inquired into the truth. Had they indeed known the truth such inquiry would have been superfluous. So they inquired about what the pope had done, and thus an inquisition about a pope slandered of heresy is mandatory.

Discipulus: Adhuc instatur contra dictum exemplum, quia beatus Marcellinus non fuit infamatus de heresi sed de idolatria tantummodo, et ita exemplum propositum nequaquam concludit intentum illorum.

Student: There is a further point against this specific example. Blessed Marcellinus was not defamed of heresy but only of idol worship, and thus the proferred example does not prove their contention.

Magister: Istam instantiam excludunt dicentes quod eo ipso quod fuit diffamatus de idolatria fuit diffamatus de heresi, quia omnis idolatra de quo nescitur an timore mortis vel sponte immolaverit idolis de heresi est suspectus, et ita diffamare aliquem de idolatria antequam constet ipsum idolatrare solummodo timore mortis est ipsum infamare de heresi. Cum ergo beatus Marcellinus commiserit idolatriam antequam rediit et penitentiam egerit et confitebatur se idolatrasse timore mortis tantummodo, nesciebatur an pravitatem hereticam incurrisset. Et ita constat quod beatus Marcellinus fuit de heresi diffamatus. Item ut dicunt isti esto quod beatus Marcellinus non fuerit de heresi diffamatus, habent intentum per dictum exemplum quod catholici potestatem habent inquirendi de papa de heresi diffamato, nam non est maior ratio quod catholici habeant potestatem inquirendi de papa de crimine idolatrie diffamato quam de papa super crimine heresis diffamato. Cum ergo catholici habeant potestatem inquirendi de papa super crimine idolatrie diffamato, sequitur quod habent potestatem inquirendi de papa super crimine heresis diffamato.

Master: They reject this point, saying that he had been defamed of heresy by the very fact he had been slandered of idol worship, because every idol worshipper concerning whom it is unknown whether he sacrificed to idols in fear of death or voluntarily, is suspect of heresy. And thus to slander someone of idolatry before clarifying that he worshipped idols solely in fear of death is to defame him of heresy. Therefore since blessed Marcellinus had committed idolatry, it was unknown (prior to his return to the fold, performance of penance, and confession that he had worshipped idols solely in fear of death) whether he had lapsed into heretical wickedness. And so it is a certain fact that blessed Marcellinus was defamed of heresy. Further: they claim that even if blessed Marcellinus had not been defamed of heresy, they can by the proferred example establish their contention that catholics have the power to inquire about a pope defamed of heresy. For there is no greater reason that catholics should have the power to inquire about a pope defamed of the crime of idol worship than that they should have the power to inquire about a pope defamed of the crime of heresy. Therefore since catholics have the power to inquire about a pope defamed of the crime of idolatry, it follows that they have the power to inquire about a pope defamed of the crime of heresy.

Discipulus: Dicerent aliqui quod certum fuit beatum Marcellinum idolatrasse et ideo potuerint catholici merito inquirere de facto eius, sed si papa aliquis esset diffamatus de heresi non esset propter hoc certum ipsum sensisse hereticam pravitatem, et ita non est simile de beato Marcellino et de papa super crimine heresis diffamato.

Student: Some might respond that the idol worship of blessed Marcellinus had been a confirmed fact, and therefore catholics could justifiably inquire about his deed. But if some pope were defamed of heresy it would not on this account be certain that he had endorsed heretical wickedness, and there is hence no similarity between Pope Marcellinus and a pope defamed of the crime of heresy.

Magister: Istam instantiam dicunt esse nullam, quia inquisitio non debet esse de certis sed de dubiis. Qui enim scit certiorari non debet et per consequens superfluo inquirit quis nisi inquirat propter sua vel aliorum dubia excludenda. Sicut ergo fuit certum et notorium episcopis qui convenerant ad concilium beatum Marcellinum idolatrasse, de hoc non inquisierunt, sed inquisierunt quod erat eis ignotum, an scilicet solo timore mortis idolatravit. Ita si papa aliquam heresim predicaret et hoc esset notorium de hoc non esset inquisitio facienda sed esset inquisitio facienda an pertinaciam errori adiungeret, et ita de papa super crimine heresis diffamato est inquisitio per catholicos facienda.

Master: They say that this is a worthless point, because an inquisition must be of things doubtful not of things certain. For one who knows does not require to be informed, and consequently one inquires needlessly unless the purpose is to eliminate one's doubts or those of others. Therefore, since it had been certain and well known to the bishops who gathered in council that blessed Marcellinus had worshipped idols, they did not inquire about it, but they inquired about what was unknown to them, namely whether he had worshipped idols solely in fear of death. Thus if the pope were to preach some heresy and this fact was widely known, the inquisition should not be directed towards the fact itself, but should focus on whether the pope had combined obstinacy with error. And thus catholics must inquire about a pope defamed of the crime of heresy.

Quam etiam assertionem pluribus rationibus isti confirmare nituntur, quarum prima talis est. Ad unumquemque prelatum et pastorem spectat cognoscere que sunt oves sue et qui sunt sibi subiecti. Aliter enim exempli pastoris summi dicentis Ioh. 10 "ego sum pastor bonus et cognosco meas" erit nullatenus imitator, nec preceptum Salomonis implebit dicentis Prov. 27 "diligenter agnosce vultum pecoris tui tuosque greges considera". Debet ergo prelatus cognoscere qui sint subiecti sui. Ergo quando dubitatur de aliquo an sit subiectus alicuius prelati idem prelatus astringitur, ne forte subditus suus per negligentiam pereat et secum alios pertrahat in interitum, diligenter inquirere et investigare an ad gregem suum pertineat. Sed si papa de heresi graviter diffamatus sit prelati debent probabiliter dubitare an papa taliter diffamatus sit de iurisdictione ipsorum effectus, quia dubitare habent an sit hereticus, licet non statim debeant credere ipsum esse hereticum. Ergo in hoc casu tenentur inquirere an papa taliter diffamatus sit de iurisdictione ipsorum. Hoc autem nequaquam facere possunt nisi inquirendo an sit effectus hereticus. Ergo tenentur inquirere an papa taliter diffamatus hereticam incurrerit pravitatem.

They also attempt to confirm this statement by many arguments of which the first is this. It concerns every prelate and pastor to know which sheep are his own, and who are subject to him. For otherwise he would in no way imitate the example of the supreme shepherd stating in John 10[:14]: "I am the good shepherd and know my sheep", nor would he fulfill the directive of Solomon stating in Proverbs 27[:23]: "be thou diligent to know the state of thy flocks and look well to thy herds". Therefore the prelate must know the identity of his subjects. And so when there is doubt as to whether someone is the subject of a certain prelate, that prelate is bound to diligently inquire and to investigate whether the person belongs to his flock, so as to prevent his possible subject from perishing due to negligence and dragging others into destruction along with himself. But if the pope is seriously defamed of heresy, prelates must have probable doubt whether such a slandered pope might not have become subject to their jurisdiction, for they must wonder if he is a heretic even if they must not immediately believe that he is a heretic. Therefore in this case they are bound to inquire whether a pope thus slandered is under their jurisdiction. But this they cannot do unless they inquire if he has become a heretic. Therefore they are bound to inquire whether a pope defamed in this way has lapsed into heretical wickedness.

Secunda ratio est hec. Ad illum spectat scire qui sunt subditi sui ad quem spectat corrigere omnium subditorum suum excessus. Sed ad prelatos catholicos spectat corrigere omnium subditorum suorum excessus ut sacri canones protestantur aperte. Ergo ad ipsos spectat scire de omnibus qui sunt subditi sui. Ergo ad ipsos pertinet inquirere de illis de quibus dubitatur an sint sibi subiecti utrum in rei veritate sint subditi sui vel non. Si autem papa de heresi graviter diffamatur, probabiliter dubitatur an sit subiectus catholicorum quia probabiliter dubitatur an sit hereticus. Ergo ad catholicos pertinet inquirere an papa de heresi diffamatus sit eis subiectus. Tertia ratio est hec. Prelati catholici tenentur ex officio suo oves suas contra luporum rabiem custodire. Ergo tenentur subditos suos contra hereticorum insidias conservare, et per consequens quando nuntiatur prelatis catholicis per publicam famam quod aliquis nititur gregem suum invadere et corrumpere per hereticam pravitatem, debent diligenter inquirere veritatem, ipso Domino precipiente Deut. 13: "si audieris in una urbium tuarum quas Dominus Deus tuus dabit tibi ad habitandum dicentes aliquos egressi sunt filii Belial de medio tui et averterunt habitatores urbis tue atque dixerunt 'eamus et serviamus diis alienis' quos ignoratis quere sollicite et diligenter, rei veritate perspecta, si inveneris certum esse quod dicitur et abhominationem hanc opere perpetratam statim percuties habitatores urbis illius in ore gladii etc." Ex quibus verbis datur intelligi quod si a providis et honestis papa vel quicunque alius publice diffamatur quod velit catholicos a fide avertere orthodoxa, est veritas diligenter inquirenda. Ergo de papa super crimine heresis graviter diffamato est inquisitio facienda.

The second argument is this. One who is involved in the correction of all his subjects' deviations needs to know who his subjects are. But as the holy canons clearly declare, it is the catholic prelates who are involved in the correction of all their subjects' deviations. Therefore it pertains to these prelates to know who are their specific subjects. It also pertains to such prelates to inquire whether those who have a doubtful status as their subjects are in truth their subjects or not. If, however, a pope is seriously defamed of heresy, there is probable doubt whether he is the subject of catholics because there is probable doubt whether he is a heretic. Therefore it pertains to catholics to inquire whether a pope defamed of heresy is subject to them. Here is the third argument. Catholic prelates have an official obligation to protect their sheep from the ferocity of wolves. Therefore they are bound to preserve their subjects from the snares of heretics. Consequently when public rumour advises catholic prelates that someone is attempting to invade their flock and corrupt it by heretical wickedness, they must scrupulously inquire into the truth of this. The Lord Himself commands it in Deuteronomy 13[:12-15] : "If thou shalt hear say in one of thy cities, which the Lord thy God hath given thee to dwell there, saying, certain men, the children of Belial, are gone out from among you, and have withdrawn the inhabitants of their city, saying, Let us go and serve other gods, which ye have not known; then shalt thou enquire, and make search, and ask diligently; and behold, if it be true, and the thing certain, that such abomination is wrought among you; thou shalt surely smite the inhabitants of that city with the edge of the sword, etc." From these words we understand that if the pope or anyone else is publicly defamed by provident and honourable men [saying] that he intends to alienate catholics from orthodox faith, then the truth must be diligently investigated. Therefore an inquisition about a pope seriously defamed of the crime of heresy must take place.

Discipulus: Prelati non habent inquirere nisi de illis quos constat esse subditos suos, et ita de papa non habent inquirere.

Student: It is not the business of prelates to inquire about any except those who are their confirmed subjects, and so it is not their business to inquire about the pope.

Magister: Respondetur tibi quod quilibet prelatus debet inquirere de omnibus qui gregem suum invadunt, sive sint subditi sive non, saltem ad resistendum eisdem, quemadmodum rex debet omnes repellere qui regnum suum invadunt quantumcunque sint de alio regno, et quilibet etiam nullam habens iurisdictionem debet pro patria omnes invadentes pro posse repellere quamvis nullam super eis iurisdictionem obtineat. Et ex hoc quarta ratio sic formatur. Non minus sollicite debent prelati catholici gregem suum contra spirituales inimicos defendere et ea que ad defensionem pertinent exercere quam reges et principes et eorum subditi debent regna sua et principatus ac patriam contra hostes suos defendere ac tueri. Sed reges et principes et subditi eorum debent terras suas contra invadentes iniuste defendere, licet de eorum iurisdictione nequaquam existant. Ergo multo animosius debent prelati contra inimicos spirituales greges suos defendere et ea facere que ad defensionem spiritualem spectare noscuntur. Sed ad defensionem noscitur pertinere investigare sollicite qui sunt isti hostes spirituales qui gregem nituntur invadere, maxime si est publica fama per viros honestos et providos suscitata quod aliqui volunt dominicum gregem invadere. Si ergo papa per viros providos et honestos de heresi publice diffamatur catholici debent diligenter inquirere veritatem.

Master: The answer to your point is that every prelate must inquire about all those who assault his flock whether they are his subjects or not, at least for the purpose of resisting them. By the same token a king must repel all those who attack his kingdom (even if they are from another kingdom), and anyone (even someone possessing no jurisdiction) must for the sake of the homeland resist all invaders as much as he can, even though he has no jurisdiction over them. And from this there develops a fourth argument. Catholic prelates must defend their flock against spiritual enemies, and perform all things relevant to such defense with a care no less anxious than that which is incumbent upon kings, princes and their subjects, who must defend and protect their kingdoms, princedoms and countries against their enemies. But kings, princes and subjects must defend their lands from unjust invaders even if the latter are not under their jurisdiction. Therefore much more vigorously must prelates defend their flocks against spiritual enemies and perform those activities which are known to be relevant to spiritual defense. But to investigate with anxious care the identity of the spiritually hostile forces which are attempting to penetrate the flock is known to have defensive relevance, above all if a public rumour has been created by honourable and provident men that certain individuals want to attack the Lord's flock. Therefore if the pope is publicly defamed of heresy by provident and honourable men, catholics must diligently inquire into the truth.

Quinta ratio talis est. Cui periculosum est renuntiare iuri suo , ei periculosum est non inquirere ad quos extenduntur iura sua quando dubitatur de aliquibus an extendantur ad ipsos. Sed prelatis catholicis est periculosum renuntiare aut cedere iuri suo quod in causa Dei susceperunt a Deo teste beato Cypriano qui ut recitatur 7 q. 1 c. Quam periculosum ait: "quam periculosum sit in divinis rebus ut quis cedat iuri suo et potestati scriptura sancta declarat cum Esau primatus suos inde perdidit, nec recipere postmodum potuit quod semel cessit". Ergo periculosum est prelatis catholicis non querere sollicite ad quos extenduntur iura eorum in causis Dei, quando de aliquibus dubitatur an sint potestati catholicorum subiecti. Si autem papa publice per viros providos et honestos de heresi diffamatur probabiliter dubitandum est an sit potestati catholicorum subiectus. Ergo de hoc in hoc casu debent catholici diligenter inquirere veritatem, et ita habent de papa taliter diffamato inquisitionem facere diligentem.

The fifth argument is as follows. One who courts danger when renouncing his right is also in danger if he does not inquire to whom his rights extend when there is doubt as to whether some persons are included within the purview of these rights. But it is dangerous for catholic prelates to renounce or to abandon the right which they received from God to advance His cause, as witnesses blessed Cyprian who states (this is recited in 7 q. 1 c. Quam periculosum)[col. 569]: "how dangerous it is in matters divine for someone to renounce his right and power holy scripture declares. For Esau thereby lost his primacy, nor could he afterwards regain what he had once abandoned". Therefore it is dangerous for catholic prelates not to inquire with anxious care to whom their rights extend in the affairs of God, when there is doubt whether some persons are subject to the power of catholics. But if the pope is publicly defamed of heresy by provident and honourable men, doubt must arise as to whether he is subject to the power of catholics. Therefore under such conditions catholics have the duty to inquire attentively about the truth of the matter, and hence they must proceed to a scrupulous inquisition about a pope defamed in this manner.

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, DIALOGUS
Part 1, Book 6, chapters 1-15

Text and translation by George Knysh
as at July 2000

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, DIALOGUS Part 1, Book 6, chapters 1-15

Text and translation by George Knysh as at July 2000

WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, DIALOGUS
Part 1, Book 6, chapters 1-15

Text and translation by George Knysh
as at July 2000