Capitulum 1 |
Chapter 1. |
Discipulus Volo hic istum tertium finiri et ad quartum me transferre. Intendo enim inquirere quomodo de pertinacia debeat quis convinci. Ante omnia tamen cupio scire quomodo "pertinax", diffinitione exprimente quid nominis, diffinitur. Ex tali namque diffinitione, ut puto, multae difficultates debent solvi, nec sine ipsius noticia potest sciri qualiter de pertinacia debeat quis convinci. |
Disciple I want to finish this third [book] here and to move on to the fourth. For I intend to ask how someone ought to be convicted of pertinacity. First of all, however, I want to know how "pertinacious" is defined by a definition expressing the meaning of the word. For I think that such a definition should resolve many difficulties and that without such a conception it can not be known how someone ought to be convicted of pertinacity. |
"Pertinacious" defined |
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Magister "Pertinax" a quibusdam diffinitur sic: pertinax est qui persistit in eo quod debet dimittere. Istam diffinitionem declarant dupliciter. Primo, auctoritate Isidori dicentis quod pertinax dicitur quasi impudenter tenax. Ille autem est impudenter tenax qui tenet quod debet dimittere. Ergo et pertinax est ille qui tenet et persistit in illo quod debet dimittere. Secundo, sic: perseverantia et pertinacia opponuntur et contrarias debent diffinitiones habere. Sed perseverans dicitur ille qui persistit in illo quod non debet dimittere. Ergo pertinax dicitur ille qui persistit in illo quod debet dimittere. |
Master "Pertinacious" is defined by certain people thus: a pertinacious person is one who persists in that which he ought to put aside. They explain that definition in two ways. Firstly, on the authority of Isidore who says that a pertinacious person is described as if he were shamelessly tenacious; he is shamelessly tenacious, however, who holds onto what he should put aside; and that person is pertinacious, therefore, who holds onto and persists in that which he should put aside.Secondly thus: perseverance and pertinacity are opposed and ought to have contrary definitions; but that person is said to be persevering who persists in that which he should not put aside; that person is said to be pertinacious, therefore, who persists in that which he should put aside. |
Discipulus Miror quod isti volunt probare diffinitionem pertinacis de pertinace, cum diffinitio de diffinito probari non possit. |
Disciple I wonder that they want to prove the definition of "pertinacious" from one who is pertinacious, since a definition can not be proved from the thing defined. |
Magister Non intendunt probare proprie loquendo diffinitionem "pertinacis" de pertinace, sed volunt declarare et per declarationes manifestare quodammodo diffinitionem "pertinacis". |
Master They do not intend strictly speaking to prove the definition of "pertinacious" from one who is pertinacious but they want to explain it and by explanations to make the definition of "pertinacious" in some way clear. |
Discipulus De talibus difficultatibus nolo me intromittere multum ad praesens, sed aliud movet me contra diffinitionem praedictam, quia secundum eam omnis errans est pertinax. Omnis enim errans aliquamdiu est in errore. Sed nullus unquam debet esse in errore, immo omnis errans debet errorem dimittere. Ergo omnis errans est pertinax. |
Disciple I do not want to get much involved with such difficulties now, but something else moves me against the aforesaid definition because according to it everyone erring is pertinacious. For everyone erring is in error for some time; but no one should ever be in error; on the contrary everyone erring should put aside his error. Everyone erring, therefore, is pertinacious. |
Magister Dicunt per aequivocationem te decipi. Est enim debitum necessitatis et est debitum congruitatis. In praedicta autem diffinitione debet accipi secundum quod importat debitum necessitatis, ut iste sit sensus: pertinax est ille qui persistit in aliquo quod de necessitate debet dimittere. Esto ergo quod omnis errans debito congruitatis deberet omnem errorem dimittere, quod non est verum, non tamen omnis errans de necessitate salutis omni tempore debet errorem suum dimittere. |
Master They say that you are misled by an ambiguity, for there is a duty of necessity and a duty of congruity. In the aforesaid definition, however, it should be taken in a way that implies the duty of necessity, so that this is its sense: that person is pertinacious who persists in something which he should of necessity put aside. Even if, therefore, everyone erring were bound, by the duty of congruity, to put aside every error - which is not true - yet it is not the case that everyone erring should of necessity for salvation put aside his error at every time. |
Discipulus Video quod isti diffiniunt "pertinacem" communius quam competat erranti in fide. Ideo appropria diffinitionem praedictam erranti in fide. |
Disciple I see that they define "pertinacious" more generally than would be appropriate to one erring in faith. Make the aforesaid definition then specific to one erring in faith. |
Magister Appropriatur sic. Pertinaciter errans in fide est qui persistit in heresi quam debet de necessitate salutis dimittere. |
[See Significant Variants, para. 14.] Master It is made specific thus. He errs pertinaciously in faith who persists in a heresy which he ought to put aside from the necessity of salvation. |
Discipulus Appropria eandem dubitanti pertinaciter contra fidem. |
Disciple Make the same [definition] specific to one doubting the faith pertinaciously. |
Magister Appropriatur sic. Pertinaciter dubitans contra fidem est qui persistit in dubitatione circa ea quae fidei sunt quam debet de necessitate salutis dimittere. |
Master It is made specific thus. That person pertinaciously doubts the faith who persists in doubt, which from the necessity of salvation he should put aside, about matters of faith. |
Discipulus Secundum praedicta omnes Iudaei et Gentiles essent pertinaces quia omnes tenentur errorem suum dimittere. |
Disciple According to the above remarks, all Jews and gentiles would be pertinacious because they are all obliged to put aside his error. |
Magister Ista est difficultas quae longum tractatum requireret propter illos qui nunquam de fide vera informati fuerunt; nec est defectus illorum quod informationem minime habuerunt si qui sunt tales. De aliis autem Gentilibus et Iudaeis isti dicunt aperte quod debent in numero pertinacium reputari. |
Master That is a difficulty which would require a long treatise because of those who have never been instructed in the true faith. Because they have not had any instruction it is not a failing of theirs if they are such as they are. They say plainly of other gentiles and Jews, however, that they ought to be reckoned among the number of the pertinacious. |
Capitulum 2 |
Chapter 2. |
Discipulus De ista difficultate nolo tecum ad praesens collationem habere, sed volo te interrogare de proposito principali, scilicet quomodo de pertinacia valeat quis convinci. |
Disciple I do not want to discuss that difficulty with you at the moment, but I want to ask you about the main subject, namely, how someone can be convicted of pertinacity. |
Magister Circa illa quae fidei sunt duplex potest pertinacia inveniri. Una mentalis, quando scilicet quis pertinaciter corde adhaeret haereticae pravitati vel pertinaciter dubitat de catholica veritate. Alia est pertinacia exterior quae facto vel verbo exteriori consistit. Prima pertinacia aliter quam per praesumptionem probabilem vel violentam convinci non potest a nobis quia in talibus non necessario interioribus exteriora respondent, imo unum saepe tenetur interius et aliud exterius similatur. |
Master Two kinds of pertinacity can be found in connection with matters of faith. One is mental, namely when someone pertinaciously clings in his heart to heretical wickedness or pertinaciously doubts catholic truth. The other is exterior pertinacity which consists in an outward deed or a word.We can not convict anyone of the first form of pertinacity except by a probable or a violent presumption, because in such cases what is on the outside does not necessarily correspond to what is within; indeed, often one thing is held within and another thing counterfeited on the outside. |
Discipulus Quamvis intentio mea fuerit interrogare de pertinacia exteriori solummodo, causa tamen exercitii dicas aliqua de pertinacia interiori et mentali, quis videlicet pertinaciter errat in mente? |
Disciple Although my intention was to question you only about exterior pertinacity, yet as an exercise [causa exercitii] would you say something about interior and mental pertinacity; who, that is to say, errs pertinaciously in his mind? |
Mental pertinacity |
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Magister Sunt quidam dicentes quod tripliciter potest quis errare pertinaciter in mente. Primo quidem si quis non obstantibus miraculis quae audivit fuisse facta pro fide confirmanda putat fidem esse falsam vel incertam. Secundo, si in genere credit totam fidem esse veram, alicui tamen errori in speciali, quem nescit explicite ad fidem pertinere, adhaeret tam fortiter quod quantumcunque sibi evidenter ostenderetur pertinere ad fidem, dictum errorem nullo modo dimitteret sed ante putaret fidem esse falsam. Sicut si in Veteri Testamento quando fideles credere trinitatem personarum cum unitate divinitatis explicite minime tenebantur, aliquis credens totam doctrinam Moysi et fidelium esse veram in speciali putasset quod tres personae non sunt unus Deus et suo errori tam fortiter adhaesisset quod ante doctrinam Moysi et prophetarum credidisset esse falsam quam tenuisset tres personas esse unum Deum. Iste licet in genere credidisset totam fidem Moysi et prophetarum esse veram, pertinax extitisset. Tertio, potest quis esse mentaliter pertinax in errore si alicui errori adhaeret et negligit quando et quomodo debet quaerere veritatem, quia talis non est paratus corrigi sed persistit in errore quem debet de necessitate salutis dimittere. |
Master Some people say that there are three ways someone can err pertinaciously in his mind. The first is if, for example, notwithstanding the miracles that he has heard have been done to confirm the faith, someone thinks that the faith is false or uncertain. The second is if in general he believes that the whole faith is true yet he adheres so strongly to some particular error, which he does not know pertains explicitly to the faith, that no matter how clearly it were shown to him that the said error does pertain to the faith he would in no way put it aside but would sooner think that the faith is false. It is just as if, when the faithful in the Old Testament were not bound to believe explicitly in a trinity of persons together with a unity of divinity, someone believing that the whole teaching of Moses and the faithful is true had thought in particular that three persons are not one God and had clung so strongly to his error that he would have believed the teaching of Moses and the prophets to be false before he would have held that three persons are one God. Although he would have believed in general that the whole faith of Moses and the prophets is true, he would have been pertinacious.Thirdly, someone can be mentally pertinacious in error if he clings to some error and neglects when and how he ought to seek the truth, because such a person is not ready to be corrected but persists in an error which he ought to put aside from necessity of salvation. |
Discipulus Inter negligentiam et pertinaciam differentia reperitur. Sed iste ultimus est negligens. Ergo non est pertinax. |
Disciple A difference is found between negligence and pertinacity; but that last-mentioned person is negligent; therefore he is not pertinacious. |
Magister Respondetur quod quamvis negligentia et pertinacia distinguantur, tamen aliquis est negligens etiam pertinax, nec est inconveniens quod aliqua negligentia sit pertinacia reputanda. |
Master It is replied that although negligence and pertinacity are distinguished, someone negligent is nevertheless also pertinacious and it is not inappropriate that some negligence should be considered to be pertinacity. |
Discipulus Potestne aliquis dubitare pertinaciter contra fidem? |
Disciple Can someone pertinaciously doubt the faith? |
Magister Dicitur quod tot modis quis potest pertinaciter dubitare contra fidem quot modis potest errare pertinaciter contra fidem. |
Master It is said that someone can doubt the faith pertinaciously in as many ways as he can err pertinaciously against the faith. |
Discipulus Nunquid potest alio modo distingui de pertinaci propter pertinaciam interiorem? |
Disciple Can a distinction concerning the pertinacious person be made in another way, on account of interior pertinacity? |
Magister Aliter distinguitur de tali pertinaci saltem quantum ad verba, quia sicut secundum beatum Augustinum quidam est haereticus scienter et quidam est haereticus nescienter, ita quidam est pertinax scienter, ille scilicet qui putat fidem Christianam pro aliqua sui parte esse falsam, et quidam est pertinax nescienter, qui scilicet credit in genere totam fidem Christianam esse veram, in speciali tamen alicui errori pertinaciter contra fidem adhaeret. |
Master A distinction is made concerning the pertinacious person in another way, at least as far as it concerns words, because just as, according to blessed Augustine, one person is knowingly a heretic and another person is unknowingly a heretic, so one person is knowingly pertinacious - namely he who thinks that the christian faith is in some part false - and another is unknowingly pertinacious - namely he who believes in general that the whole christian faith is true but clings pertinaciously to some particular error against the faith. |
Is it possible to be a heretic knowingly? |
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Discipulus Quomodo quis potest scienter pertinax esse? Videtur enim quod hoc contradictionem includit. Si enim est scienter pertinax scit se esse pertinacem; sed hoc includit contradictionem, quia qui errat putat esse verum circa quod errat, eo quod errare est approbare falsum pro vero. Nullus ergo scit se errare. Et ita nullus est scienter pertinax quia nullus scit se esse pertinacem in errore. |
[See Significant Variants, para. 15.] Disciple How can someone be knowingly pertinacious? This seems to contain a contradiction, for if he is knowingly pertinacious, he knows that he is pertinacious; but this contains a contradiction, because he who errs thinks that to be true about which he is in error, in that to err is to regard the false as true. No one therefore knows that he errs; and thus no one is knowingly pertinacious because no one knows that he is pertinacious in error. |
Magister Ista sententia "pertinacis scienter" non debet referri ad pertinaciam errantis, ut aliquis sciat se pertinaciter errare, sed debet referri ad contrarietatem suae pertinaciae vel erroris ad fidem Christianam, ut dicatur scienter pertinax quia scit assertionem circa quam errat esse contrariam fidei Christianae, quemadmodum dicitur quis scienter haereticus non quia sciat se esse haereticum sed quia scit assertionem suam esse contrariam fidei Christianae. Sicut igitur ille vocatur scienter haereticus qui scit assertionem suam quae in rei veritate est haeresis esse contrariam fidei Christianae, et ille dicitur ignoranter sive nescienter hereticus qui assertionem suam nescit esse contrariam fidei Christianae sed putat esse consonam fidei Christianae, sic ille dicitur scienter pertinax in errore haereticali qui scit assertionem quam putat veram esse contrariam fidei Christianae. Ille autem dicitur ignoranter sive nescienter pertinax in errore haereticali qui nescit assertionem suam esse contrariam fidei Christianae. |
Master That phrase "knowingly pertinacious" should not be related to the pertinacity of the person erring - in the sense that someone knows himself to err pertinaciously - but should be related to the opposition between his pertinacity or error and the christian faith - in the sense that he is said to be knowingly pertinacious because he knows that the assertion about which he is in error is opposed to christian faith. In the same way someone is said to be knowingly a heretic not because he may know he is a heretic but because he knows that his assertion is opposed to the christian faith. Just as he is called knowingly a heretic, therefore, who knows that his assertion, which in truth of fact is a heresy, is contrary to christian faith and he is called ignorantly or unknowingly a heretic who does not know that his assertion is opposed to christian faith but thinks that it is consistent with christian faith, so he is called knowingly pertinacious in heretical error who knows that an assertion which he thinks is true is opposed to christian faith. But he is called ignorantly or unknowingly pertinacious in heretical error who does not know that his assertion is opposed to christian faith. |
Capitulum 3 |
Chapter 3. |
Discipulus Distinctionem inter scienter pertinacem et nescienter pertinacem et similiter inter scienter haereticum et nescienter haereticum modo aliter quam prius intelligo, et ideo quamvis prius putaverim nullum esse scienter pertinacem aut scienter haereticum, nunc mihi videtur quod omnis pertinax in errore et omnis haereticus est scienter pertinax et scienter haereticus et nullus penitus nescienter Quod potest tali ratione probari. Ad hoc quod aliquis sit catholicus et fidelis sufficit fides implicita. Hoc per exemplum de Cornelio centurione de quo habetur Actuum 10 c. patere videtur. Qui antequam de Christo fidem haberet explicitam fuit fidelis quia iustus et timens Deum et per consequens fidem habuit saltem implicitam. Et ita fides implicita sufficit ad hoc quod aliquis sit catholicus et fidelis. Sed quicunque non est scienter pertinax neque scienter haereticus modo praeexposito habet fidem implicitam quia, ex hoc ipso quod non putat se errare contra fidem Christianam, credit totam fidem Christianam esse veram, licet in aliquo speciali erret. Qui autem credit totam fidem Christianam veram habet fidem implicitam. Ergo est catholicus et fidelis et per consequens non est pertinax neque haereticus. Confirmatur haec ratio quia qui credit totam fidem Christianam esse veram habet fidem de omni veritate pertinente ad fidem Christianam; qui autem habet fidem de omni veritate pertinente ad fidem Christianam non est haereticus et per consequens non est pertinax. Sed quicunque non est scienter pertinax neque scienter haereticus credit totam fidem Christianam esse veram; ergo habet fidem de omni veritate pertinente ad fidem Christianam, et per consequens nullo modo est haereticus nec pertinax. |
Disciple Now I understand differently from before the distinction between a knowingly pertinacious and an unknowingly pertinacious person and likewise [the distinction] between a knowingly heretical and an unknowingly heretical person. And therefore although I thought before that no one was knowingly pertinacious or knowingly a heretic, now it seems to me that everyone pertinacious in error and every heretic is knowingly pertinacious and knowingly a heretic and absolutely no one is unknowingly so. This can be proved by the following argument. For someone to be catholic and faithful it is enough that he has implicit faith. This seems to be clear from the example of the centurion Cornelius, about whom we read in Acts 10. He was faithful before he had explicit faith concerning Christ because he was just and feared God and as a result did have at least implicit faith. And thus implicit faith suffices for someone to be catholic and faithful. But whoever is not knowingly pertinacious or knowingly a heretic in the way set out earlier has implicit faith because, from the fact that he does not think that he is erring against the christian faith, he believes that the whole christian faith is true even if he errs in some particular. Now he who believes that the whole christian faith is true has implicit faith. He is, therefore, catholic and faithful and as a result is neither pertinacious nor a heretic. This argument is confirmed because he who believes that the whole christian faith is true has faith in every truth pertaining to the christian faith; he who has faith in every truth pertaining to the christian faith, however, is not a heretic and as a result is not pertinacious. But whoever is not knowingly pertinacious nor knowingly a heretic believes that the whole christian faith is true; he has faith, therefore, in every truth pertaining to christian faith and consequently is in no way a heretic or pertinacious. |
Magister Istae obiectiones principaliter inducuntur ad probandum quod nullus est nescienter haereticus. |
Master Those objections are brought forward mainly to prove that no one is unknowingly a heretic. |
Discipulus Ita est. |
Disciple That is so. |
Magister Dimittamus ergo loqui de pertinace et sufficiat de haeretico facere mentionem. |
Master Let us therefore put aside speaking about someone pertinacious and let it be enough to talk about a heretic. |
Discipulus Placet quia qui potest videre quomodo quis potest esse nescienter haereticus non dubitabit quin valebit quis esse pertinax nescienter. |
Disciple This is acceptable because he who can see how anyone can be unknowingly a heretic will not doubt that someone will be able to be unknowingly pertinacious. |
Magister De nescienter haeretico distinguitur. Quidam enim sunt vel esse possunt nescienter haeretici quia scienter et explicite arbitrantur aliquas assertiones sub forma propria scriptas in scriptura divina ad fidem Christianam nullatenus pertinere. Tales fuerunt Manichei qui, secundum Isidorum prout recitatur 24. q. 3. c. Quidam autem, Testamentum Vetus respuerunt et Novum ex parte tantummodo receperunt et ita putabant se catholicos et fideles Christianos et ideo fuerunt nescienter haeretici quia assertiones contentas in Veteri Testamento asserverunt ad fidem Christianam minime pertinere. Quidam autem sunt nescienter haeretici qui nullam assertionem pertinentem ad fidem Christianam sub forma propria in scriptura divina repertam dubitant esse veram quia totam scripturam divinam recipiunt, sed tamen aliquas assertiones sequentes ex illis non credunt esse veras quia non putant quod sequantur propter hoc quod aliter intelligunt Scripturas Divinas quam sensus Spiritus Sancti flagitat a quo scriptae sunt. Quidam autem credunt irrevocabiliter contrarias assertiones esse veras; ideo haeretici sunt censendi qui tamen in genere credunt totam fidem Christianam esse veram. |
Master A distinction is made among those who are unknowingly heretics. For some people are or can be unknowingly heretics because they knowingly and explicitly think that some assertions written in divine scripture in those exact words do not pertain to christian faith. The Manichees were like this; according to Isidore, as is reported in 24. q. 3. c. Quidam autem [col.1001], they rejected the Old Testament and accepted the New only in part and in this way thought that they were catholic and faithful christians; and they were unknowingly heretics, therefore, because they maintained that the assertions contained in the Old Testament do not pertain to christian faith. Certain people are unknowingly heretics, however, who do not doubt that any assertion pertaining to the christian faith and found in divine scripture in those exact words is true because they accept the whole of divine scripture, but they do not believe, on the other hand, that some assertions that follow from them are true, because they do not think that they do follow from them, for the reason that they understand the divine scriptures in a sense other than the holy spirit, by whom they are written, demands. Some people irrevocably believe, moreover, that assertions contrary [to catholic faith] are true; they should be considered heretics, therefore, even though they believe in general that the whole christian faith is true. |
Capitulum 4 |
Chapter 4 |
Discipulus Ad quid valet ista distinctio? |
Disciple What is the force of that distinction? |
Magister Per istam distinctionem putant nonnulli demonstrative probare quod obiectiones tuae non concludunt. |
Master Some people think to prove demonstratively by that distinction that your objections are not conclusive. |
Discipulus Quomodo? |
Disciple How? |
Magister Ex primo membro probant quod aliqui possunt esse nescienter haeretici sic: qui credit in genere quod tota fides Christiana est vera et tamen credit Vetus Testamentum vel Evangelium Lucae multa continere erronea, eo quod Vetus Testamentum vel Evangelium Lucae putat ad fidem Christianam nullatenus pertinere, vere est haereticus, praesertim si est pertinax. Aliter enim posset quis absque haeretica pravitate dicere quod omnia evangelia ad fidem non pertinent Christianam. Sed talis non est scienter haereticus quia non credit se in aliquo contrariari fidei Christianae. Ergo aliquis potest esse haereticus nescienter, quemadmodum Manichei fuerunt haeretici nescienter quia putaverunt se esse veraciter Christianos et omnes alios Christianos qui Vetus Testamentum receperunt arbitrabantur haereticos contra fidem Christianam errantes. |
Master By the first part [of the distinction] they prove as follows that some people can unknowingly be heretics: he who believes in general that the whole christian faith is true and yet believes that the Old Testament or the Gospel of Luke contains many errors, because he thinks that the Old Testament or the Gospel of Luke does not pertain to christian faith, is properly a heretic, especially if he is pertinacious. (For otherwise anyone could say without heretical wickedness that all of the gospels do not pertain to christian faith.) But such a person is not knowingly a heretic because he does not believe that he is opposed to the Christian faith in anything. Someone can be unknowingly a heretic, therefore, just as the Manichees were unknowingly heretics because they thought that they were truly christians and considered that all other christians who accepted the Old Testament were heretics erring against christian faith. |
Discipulus Dic quomodo ad obiectiones superius tactas respondetur. |
Disciple Tell me how reply is made to the objections touched on above. |
Magister Obiectiones illae fundantur in aequivocatione de fide implicita. Est enim una fides implicita vera omnem assertionem pertinacem respectu cuiuscumque haereticae pravitatis excludens. Et ista fides implicita sufficit ad hoc quod habens eam sit catholicus et fidelis. Alia est fides implicita falsa, qua scilicet creditur hanc esse veram, "fides Christiana est vera", sed alia fides quam illa quae est vere Christiana pro Christiana habetur. Et talem fidem habuerunt Manichei quia credebant fidem Christianam esse veram, sed illam fidem vocaverunt Christianam quae in rei veritate non est Christiana, immo est contraria fidei Christianae. Et sic est de omnibus haereticis nescienter quod licet credant hanc esse veram, "fides Christiana vel fides ecclesiae universalis est vera", tamen fidem reputant Christianam quae in rei veritate non est Christiana licet credant eam esse Christianam. Et ideo quamvis nescienter haeretici sunt. |
Master Those objections are based on the ambiguity of "implicit faith". For there is a true implicit faith which excludes every pertinacious assertion of any heretical wickedness at all. And that implicit faith is sufficient for the one having it to be catholic and faithful. There is another false implicit faith, by which, that is, it is believed to be true that "the christian faith is true", but another faith than that which is truly christian is held to be christian. The manichees had such faith because they believed that the christian faith is true; but they called christian that faith which in point of fact is not christian; indeed it is opposed to the christian faith. And so it is with all who are unknowingly heretics, that although they believe that it is true that the christian faith or the faith of the universal church is true, yet they regard as christian a faith which in point of fact is not christian, although they believe that it is christian. And they are therefore heretics, although unknowingly so. |
Discipulus Nunquid aliqui credentes fidem Christianam esse veram habent falsam fidem? |
Disciple Do some people who believe that the christian faith is true have false faith? |
Magister Nullus propter hoc quod credit fidem Christianam esse veram habet falsam fidem, sed credens quandam fidem esse Christianam quae in rei veritate non est Christiana habet falsam fidem. Sic Arrius in hoc quod credidit quod fides Christiana est vera et quod evangelium continet veritatem non habuit falsam fidem, sed credendo quod Filius Dei non est aequalis Patri et quod hoc pertinet ad catholicam fidem habuit falsam fidem. |
Master No one has false faith for the reason that he believes that the christian faith is true; but in believing that a particular faith is christian which in point of fact is not christian he has false faith. Thus Arius did not have false faith because of the fact that he believed that the christian faith is true and that the Gospel contains the truth, but he had false faith in believing that the Son of God is not equal to the Father and that this pertains to catholic faith. |
Discipulus Adhuc non sunt illa argumenta soluta quia fundantur in hac propositione, "omnis fides implicita vera sufficit ad hoc quod habens eam sit catholicus et fidelis". |
Disciple Those arguments are still not refuted because they are based on the proposition that every true implicit faith is sufficient for the one having it to be catholic and faithful. |
Magister De fide distinguitur, quia quaedam ponitur fides infusa quam etiam parvuli baptizati habere dicuntur, et de hac posset concedi propositio quam assumis; secundum illam nullus esset haereticus nescienter. Alia est fides acquisita, quae est credulitas quaedam qua quis absque dubitatione alicui assertioni adhaeret. Et sic est propositio falsa, quia non omnis talis fides implicita vera sufficit ad hoc quod habens eam sit catholicus et fidelis. Quamvis enim nullus sit infidelis propter quamcunque fidem veram, tamen poterit habens unam fidem veram esse infidelis propter aliam fidem falsam. |
Master: A distinction is made about faith, because there is a certain infused faith which even baptised children are said to have; and about this [faith] the proposition which you assume could be granted; according to this no one would be unknowingly a heretic. Another faith is that which is acquired and this is a credence by which anyone adheres without doubting to some assertion. And in this sense the proposition is false because not every such implicit and true faith is sufficient for the one having it to be catholic and faithful. For although no one is unfaithful because of any true faith, yet someone having a true faith could be unfaithful because of some other false faith. |
Discipulus Tantummodo quantum ad istam materiam indica quid dicitur ad illam propositionem: qui credit totam fidem Christianam esse veram habet fidem de omni veritate pertinente ad fidem Christianam. |
Disciple Point out, with respect to that subject only, what is said to the proposition that he who believes that the whole christian faith is true has faith in every truth which pertains to christian faith. |
Magister Hoc negatur de fide quae reddit aliquem catholicum, nisi, credens totam fidem Christianam esse veram, nullam fidem reputet Christianam nisi illam solam quae vere est Christiana. |
Master This is denied about the faith that makes someone catholic, unless, while believing that the whole christian faith is true, he considers no faith to be christian except that alone which truly is christian. |
Capitulum 5 |
Chapter 5. |
Discipulus Postquam tecum collationem habui de pertinacia interiori volo aliqua interrogare de pertinacia exteriori, quando scilicet propter ea quae apparent exterius debent catholici aliquem errantem contra fidem tanquam pertinacem habere, et quomodo de pertinacia in iudicio debeat quis convinci. In primis autem cupio scire an uno modo tantum vel pluribus possit constare aliquem errantem contra fidem esse pertinacem. |
Disciple Now that I have had a discussion with you about interior pertinacity, I want to ask some things about exterior pertinacity. When, for example, because of some outward appearance should catholics hold someone erring against the faith to be pertinacious, and how should anyone be convicted in court of pertinacity? First of all, however, I want to know whether it can be established in one way only or in several ways that someone erring against the faith is pertinacious. |
Magister Plures modi ponuntur quibus possunt catholici praesumptionem accipere violentam de aliquo quod est pertinax in errore. |
Master Several ways are described by which catholics can accept the violent presumption of someone that he is pertinacious in error. |
Discipulus Primo tractemus unum modum, postea alium. |
Disciple Let us first deal with one way; later with another. |
Twenty ways of extablishing from external behaviour a presumption that a person is a heretic |
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Magister Primus modus quo potest quis de pertinacia deprehendi est si facto vel verbo monstrat se non firmiter credere fidem Christianam esse veram et sanam, puta si dicit fidem Christianam esse falsam vel dubiam, vel ad sectam aliam se convertit, utpote si facit se circumcidi vel Mahometum adorat. De tali enim licet cuilibet iudicare quod pertinaciter errat vel dubitat contra veritatem et quod est scienter haereticus manifestus. Et si convictus fuerit vel confessus in iudicio quod tale quid dixerit vel fecerit sine ulteriori examinatione est tanquam pertinax et haereticus condemnandus. |
Master The first way by which someone can be detected being pertinacious is if he shows by deed or by word that he does not firmly believe that the christian faith is true and sound; for instance, if he says that the christian faith is false or doubtful or if he converts to some other sect, namely has himself circumcised or worships Mahommed. Anyone is allowed to pronounce of such a person that he pertinaciously errs or doubts against the faith and that he is knowingly a manifest heretic. And if he has been convicted or has confessed in court that he said or did such a thing he is to be condemned as pertinacious and a heretic without further questioning. |
Discipulus Potestne inveniri casus in quo talis possit de pravitate haeretica excusari? |
Disciple Can a situation be found in which such a person can be excused of heretical wickedness? |
Magister Unus solus casus quantum ad fidei abnegationem excipitur, scilicet si metu mortis fidem negaverit dicendo fidem Christianam esse falsam vel dubiam. Duo vero excipiuntur quantum ad factum haereticale. Primus est si quis metu mortis actum haereticalem commiserit, puta si pro morte vitanda quis adoraverit Mahometum. Et isto modo excusatur beatus Marcellinus, quod immolando idolis non fuit effectus haereticus, licet mortale peccatum commiserit. Secundus casus est si absoluta coactione quis coactus fuerit actum haereticalem committere, in quo casu etiam ab omni peccato excusatur. |
Master Only one situation of denying the faith is excepted and that is if someone in fear of death has denied the faith by saying that the christian faith is false or doubtful. There are, however, two exceptions with respect to an heretical act. The first is if someone has committed an heretical act out of fear of death, if, for example, someone has adored Mohammed in order to avoid death. It is in this way that blessed Marcellin is excused, because he did not become a heretic by sacrificing to idols, even though he committed a mortal sin. The second exception is if someone is forced by unrestricted force to commit an heretical act; in this situation he is excused too of all sin. |
Discipulus Vellem scire rationem quare talis debet statim haereticus et pertinax reputari, cum ita possit quis ambitione vel cupiditate tractus verbo et facto ostendere se non tenere firmiter fidem Christianam esse veram, quam tamen in mente tenet esse veram, sicut potest quis hoc simulare metu mortis. |
Disciple I would like to know the reason why such a person should [not] be regarded at once as a heretic and pertinacious since anyone influenced by ambition or greed can show in this way by word or deed that he does not firmly hold that the christian faith is true yet hold in his mind that it is true, just as anyone can pretend this out of fear of death. |
Magister Ratio assignatur quia cum quis extra metum mortis aliquid dicit aut facit plus habet de voluntario quam quando dicit aut facit aliquid metu mortis inductus. Et ideo nulla cupiditas vel ambitio excusat de pertinacia in licito iudicio hominem quemcunque facto vel verbo monstrantem se fidem Christianam firmiter non tenere. Et eodem modo dicitur quod nec amor nec odium nec aliquid praeter timorem mortis potest quemcunque in hoc casu excusare quin sit haereticus reputandus, nisi dicatur quod per gravia illata tormenta vel metum eorum in hoc casu quis valeat excusari. |
Master The reason given is that when someone says or does something other than from fear of death it is more voluntary than when he says or does something persuaded by fear of death. Greed or ambition, therefore, does not in licit judgement excuse of pertinacity any man showing by deed or word that he does not firmly hold the christian faith. In the same way it is said that neither love nor hate nor anything except fear of death can excuse someone in this situation of being regarded as a heretic, unless it is said that someone can be excused in this situation because of the inflicting of severe tortures or fear of them. |
Discipulus Nunquid modo praedicto est dicendum de omni scienter haeretico? |
Disciple Should the same thing said about everyone who is knowingly a heretic? |
Magister: De omni scienter haeretico sunt intelligenda praedicta. |
Master These remarks should be understood of everyone who is knowingly a heretic. |
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