William of Ockham, Dialogus,
part 1, book 1

Text and translation by John Scott.

Copyright © 1999, The British Academy

Capitulum 1	Chapter 1
Discipulus Quoniam occasione dissensionis quam in Christianitate conspicio de assertionibus hereticalibus et catholicis ac etiam de personis hereticis et orthodoxis sum indagaturus quamplurima, in primis duxi querendum ad quos, theologos videlicet vel canonistas, pertinet principaliter diffinire que assertio catholica, que heretica est censenda.	Student: Since I am going to investigate very many matters in the context of the disagreement I see in christianity about heretical and catholic assertions and also about heretical and orthodox persons, I have reckoned that it should first be asked to whom it chiefly belongs, that is to theologians or to canonists, to decide what assertion should be considered catholic and what heretical.
Is it for canonists, or for theologians, to decide what is heresy?
Magister Ad interrogationem propositam respondetur quod verbum diffiniendi plures habet significationes, de quibus due videntur ad propositum pertinere. Contingit enim aliquid diffinire auctoritate officii, et sic diffinire que assertio heretica et que catholica est censenda ad summum spectat pontificem et concilium generale. Aliter contingit diffinire per modum doctrine, quo modo magistri in scholis questiones diffiniunt et determinant. Et sic accepto verbo diffiniendi, circa propositam questionem diversimode sentiunt literati.	Master: The reply to the question you put forward is that the word "decide" has several meanings, two of which seem relevant to the point at issue. For it is possible to decide something by the authority of one's office, and to decide in this way what assertion should be considered heretical and what catholic pertains to the highest pontiff and a general council. In another way, it is possible to decide by means of teaching, in the way masters in the schools decide and determine questions. With the word "decide" taken in this latter way, those who are learned have different opinions about the question put forward.
Discipulus Ad presens accipio verbum diffiniendi secundo modo. Et sic accepto vocabulo, diversas sententias cum motivis earum audire desidero.	Student: I take the word "decide" in the second way for the moment. And with the word taken thus, I want to hear the different opinions and the arguments for them.
Magister Quorundam est opinio quod ad canonistas principaliter spectat que assertio est catholica, que heretica iudicare. Pro qua tribus rationibus videntur posse moveri, quarum prima est hec. Ad illam scientiam principaliter spectat discernere que assertio catholica, que heretica est censenda, que principaliter tractat de approbatione veritatum catholicarum et reprobatione heresum damnatarum. Huiusmodi est scientia canonistarum et non theologia. ergo etc.	Master: Some people are of the opinion that it pertains chiefly to canonists to judge what assertion is catholic and what heretical. They seem able to be moved by three arguments for this opinion, of which the first is this. To determine what assertion should be considered catholic and what heretical pertains chiefly to that science which principally treats of the approval of catholic truths and the disapproval of condemned heresies. This is the science of the canonists and not theology. Therefore, etc.
Secunda ratio est hec. Ad illam scientiam pertinet diffinire que assertio catholica, que heretica est censenda cui fides quantum ad credibilia principalius adhibetur. Sed quantum ad ea que sunt fidei magis credendum est canonistarum scientie quam theologie, quia magis credendum est ecclesie, per quam edita est canonistarum scientia, quam evangelio, teste Augustino, qui videtur asserere maiorem esse auctoritatem ecclesie quam evangelii, quia "nec evangelio", inquit, "crederem, nisi auctoritas ecclesie compulisset." Ergo ad scientiam canonistarum magis pertinet diffinire que assertio catholica, que heretica est censenda quam ad theologiam.	The second argument is this. To decide what assertion should be considered catholic and what heretical pertains to that science in which faith with respect to what is worthy of belief is more chiefly shown. But with respect to matters of faith the science of the canonists should be believed more than theology, because the church, through which the science of the canonists is produced, should be believed more than the gospel, as Augustine attests, who seems to assert that the authority of the church is greater than that of the gospel, since he says that "he would not believe the gospel unless the authority of the church had compelled him." To decide what assertion should be considered catholic and what heretical, therefore, pertains more to the science of the canonists than to theology.
Tertia ratio est hec. Ad illam scientiam principaliter spectat discernere que assertio catholica, que heretica est censenda cuius auctor habet symbolum fidei ordinare et articulos fidei rite distinguere. Sed hoc spectat ad summum pontificem, qui auctor est scientie canonistarum. Ergo ad scientiam canonistarum, et per consequens ad ipsos principalius quam ad theologos, pertinet diffinire que assertio catholica, que heretica debeat reputari.	The third argument is this. To determine what assertion should be considered catholic and what heretical pertains chiefly to that science the author of which has the power to appoint the creed of the faith and duly to distinguish the articles of faith. But this pertains to the highest pontiff, who is the instigator of the science of the canonists. It pertains to the science of the canonists, therefore, and consequently more chiefly to them than to theologians, to decide what assertion should be regarded as catholic and what as heretical.
Capitulum 2	Chapter 2
Magister Porro alii indubitanter tenent quod ad theologos spectat non per modum diffinitionis authentice sed per modum doctrine principaliter diffinire que assertio catholica, que heretica sit censenda; et quod ad canonistas non pertinet, nisi inquantum eorum scientia aliqua ad fidem spectantia a theologia dignoscitur mendicare. Hanc autem suam assertionem rationibus confirmare nituntur.	Master On the other hand, others hold it as beyond doubt that it pertains to theologians to decide, not by way of an authoritative decision but chiefly by way of teaching, what assertion should be considered as catholic and what as heretical, and that it does not pertain to canonists, except in so far as their science is known to beg some things pertaining to faith from theology. They try to confirm this assertion of theirs with arguments.
Quarum prima hec est. Ad illius scientie tractatores propter quam solummodo dicitur quecunque assertio catholica vel heretica principaliter pertinet diffinire per modum doctrine que assertio est catholica que heretica reputanda.. Sed propter theologiam solummodo quecunque assertio est catholica vel heretica nuncupanda; illa enim sola assertio que est consona theologie est vere catholica. Illa vero sola que theologie noscitur adversari heretica esse dignoscitur. Si enim aliqua assertio quibuscumque decretis summorum pontificum vel etiam generalium conciliorum aut etiam legibus imperatorum inveniretur adversa, si theologie nullatenus obviaret, quamvis pro falsa, erronea vel iniqua posset haberi, non tamen deberet inter hereses computari. Ergo ad theologie tractatores principaliter pertinet diffinire per modum doctrine que assertio catholica, que heretica est censenda.	The first of them is this. To decide by way of teaching what assertion should be regarded as catholic and what as heretical pertains chiefly to the experts on that science on sole account of which any assertion is said to be catholic or heretical. But it is solely on account of theology that any assertion whatsoever should be called catholic or heretical. For only that assertion which is consonant with theology is truly catholic, and only that [assertion] which is known to be opposed to theology is known to be heretical. For if some assertion were found to be opposed to any decrees of the highest pontiffs or also of general councils or of imperial laws too, it should nevertheless not be counted among the heresies, even if it could be considered as false, erroneous or unjust, if it were not in conflict with theology. Therefore it pertains chiefly to those who treat of theology to decide by way of teaching what assertion should be considered as catholic, what as heretical.
Secunda ratio est hec. Ad illius scientie tractatores in qua explicite et complete traditur regula fidei orthodoxe principaliter pertinet diffinire per modum doctrine que assertio catholica, que heretica est censenda. Huiusmodi autem est scientia theologie non scientia canonistarum. Multa enim ad fidem nostram spectantia in theologia reperiuntur explicite de quibus in scientia canonistarum mentio non habetur. Nihil autem spectans ad regulam fidei in eorum scientia poterit reperiri nisi quod a theologia recipiunt. Ergo ad theologos talis diffinitio principaliter noscitur pertinere. Ad canonistas autem non spectat nisi in quantum aliqua theologica noscuntur a theologis mendicare.	The second argument is this. To decide by way of teaching what assertion should be considered as catholic, what as heretical, pertains chiefly to the experts on that science in which the rule of orthodox faith is explicitly and completely handed on. Such is the science of theology, however, not the science of the canonists. For many things pertaining to our faith which are not mentioned in the science of the canonists are found explicitly in theology, but nothing pertaining to the rule of faith can be found in their science except what they receive from theology. Therefore such a decision is known to pertain chiefly to theologians; it does not pertain to canonists, however, except in so far as they are known to beg some theological matters from theologians.
Tertia ratio est hec. De assertionibus quas scientia superior et inferior tractare noscuntur habet scientia superior principalius iudicare. Sed de quibusdam assertionibus catholicis et hereticalibus theologia, que est superior, et scientia canonistarum, que est inferior, aliquo modo pertractant. Ergo ad theologiam pertinet principalius de assertionibus catholicis et hereticalibus iudicare, et per consequens ad theologos principalius pertinet diffinire per modum doctrine que assertio catholica, que heretica est censenda.	The third argument is this. The superior science has the power more chiefly to make a judgement about assertions which a superior and an inferior science are known to investigate. But theology, which is the superior, and the science of the canonists, which is the inferior, investigate in some way certain catholic and heretical assertions. It pertains more chiefly to theology, therefore, to make a judgement about catholic and heretical assertions, and consequently it pertains more chiefly to theologians to decide by way of teaching what assertion should be considered as catholic, what as heretical.
Quarta ratio est hec. Ad illius scientie tractatores per quam plures assertiones catholice explicite sub forma propria pertractare approbantur principalius spectat discernere que assertio catholica, que heretica est habenda, non ad illam in qua pauce veritates catholice explicite approbantur. Huiusmodi est theologia, non scientia canonistarum, quia in scientia canonistarum pauce veritates catholice sub forma propria pertractantur. Ergo talis diffinitio ad theologos principaliter noscitur pertinere.	The fourth argument is this. To determine what assertion should be considered as catholic, what as heretical, pertains more chiefly to the experts in the science that is shown to treat explicitly under their own form the greater number of catholic assertions, not to that [science] in which few catholic truths are explicitly approved. Such a [science] is theology, not the science of the canonists, because few catholic truths are investigated under their own form in the science of the canonists. Therefore such a decision is known to pertain chiefly to theologians.
Quinta ratio est hec. Ad tractatores illius scientie per quam, antequam esset canonistarum scientia, viri catholici et fideles assertiones catholicas approbaverunt et hereses damnaverunt principalissime pertinet diffinire que assertio catholica, que heretica est censenda. Huiusmodi autem est theologia. Nam antequam canones ederentur apostoli aliique discipuli Christi, tanquam viri catholici, veritates catholicas approbaverunt, predicaverunt ac occulte et publice docuerunt doctrinasque hereticales et auctores earum confutaverunt, reprobaverunt et etiam damnaverunt. Unde et beatus Paulus, sicut legitur ad Titum 3, hereticum hominem post primam et secundam correctionem devitandum docuit. Prima etiam ad Timotheum 4 asserit manifeste doctrinam "prohibentium nubere, abstinere a cibis quos Deus creavit ad percipiendum cum gratiarum actione fidelibus" ad spiritum erroris et doctrinam demoniorum, et per consequens ad pravitatem hereticam, pertinere. Ergo ad theologiam et per consequens ad theologos principaliter pertinet diffinitio talis.	The fifth argument is this. To decide what assertion should be considered as catholic, what as heretical, pertains most chiefly to the experts on that science by which believing catholics approved catholic assertions and condemned heresies before there was a science of canonists. That science, however, is theology. For before canons were produced the apostles and other disciples of Christ, as catholics, approved, preached, and in private and public taught catholic truths and refuted, rejected and condemned heretical teachings and their authors. And so, as we read in Titus 3[:10], blessed Paul taught that a heretic should be avoided after a first and second admonition. He also asserts openly in 1 Tim. 4[:3] that the teaching of those "forbidding to marry, to abstain from meats, which God hath created to be received with thanksgiving by the faithful" clearly belongs to the spirit of error and the teaching of demons and, consequently, to heretical wickedness. Therefore such a decision pertains chiefly to theology and, consequently, to theologians.
Sexta ratio est hec. Ad tractatores illius scientie cui quantum ad illa que fidei sunt omnis alia scientia cedit principaliter per modum doctrine pertinet diffinire que assertio catholica, que heretica est censenda. Huiusmodi est scientia Scripture Divine, que theologia vocatur, ut ex decretis dist. 9, per totum, et specialiter c. Noli et c. Negare et c. Ego solis et c. Quis nesciat et c. Noli et c. Neque colligitur evidenter. Ergo ad theologos principaliter talis diffinitio spectat.	The sixth argument is this. To decide by way of teaching what assertion should be considered as catholic and what as heretical pertains chiefly to the experts on that science to which every other science yields in respect of matters of faith. That is the science of divine scripture, which is called theology, as is clearly gathered from the whole of dist. 9, in the decretals, and particularly c. Noli [col.17], c. Negare [col. 17], c. Ego solis [col. 17], c. Quis nesciat [col.17], c. Noli [col.18] and c. Neque [col.18]. Therefore it is to theologians that such a decision chiefly pertains.
Septima ratio est hec. Ad tractatores illius scientie cuius auctor immediatus est Deus, a quo est tota fides nostra, principaliter pertinet diffinitio antedicta. Talis autem est theologia, quia scriptores Scripture Divine nihil penitus conscripserunt ex humano ingenio sed ex inspiratione divina solummodo, teste beato Petro, qui, in canonica secunda sua c. 1 ait, "Spiritu Sancto inspirati locuti sunt sancti Dei homines." Propter quod docet beatus Petrus, ut patet ibidem, quod prophetia Scripture Divine, per quam totam Scripturam Sacram intelligit, nequaquam est interpretanda humano ingenio, dicens: "Omnis prophetia scripture propria interpretatione non fit. Non enim voluntate humana allata est aliquando prophetia." Ergo ad theologos principaliter pertinet diffinitio sepe dicta.	The seventh argument is this. The aforesaid way of defining pertains chiefly to the experts on that science the direct author of which is God, from whom comes all our faith. Theology, however, is such [a science], because the writers of divine scripture wrote absolutely nothing out of their human wit but out of divine inspiration only, as blessed Peter attests when he says in 2 Peter 1[:21], "The holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost". That is why, as is clear in the same place [2 Peter 1:20-1], blessed Peter teaches that the prophecy of divine scripture, by which he means the whole of sacred scripture, should not be interpreted by human wit. He says, "No prophecy of scripture is made by private interpretation, for prophecy came not by the will of man at any time." Therefore that oft-cited way of deciding pertains chiefly to theologians.
Octava ratio est hec. Ad tractatores illius scientie principaliter pertinet diffinitio sepe fata cui non licet aliquid addere nec auferre. Huiusmodi autem est theologia, Moyse in persona Dei dicente Deuteronomii 4 c., "Non addetis ad verbum quod vobis loquor neque auferetis ex eo." Cui concordat Salomon Proverbiorum 30, qui de sermone Dei loquens ait, "Ne addas quicquam verbis illius, et arguaris inveniarisque mendax". Hinc addentibus et auferentibus aliquid ex Scriptura Divina Spiritus Sanctus, per beatum Iohannem Evangelistam Apocalypsis c. ultimo terribiliter comminatur dicens, "Si quis apposuerit ad hec, apponet super illum Deus plagas quae sunt in libro isto. Et si quis diminuerit de verbis prophetie libri huius, auferet Deus partem eius de libro vite et de civitate sancta et de hiis que sunt scripta in libro isto." Ex quibus omnibus evidenter colligitur quod ad Sacram Scripturam nihil est addendum nec aliquid auferendum ex ea. Ergo ad theologos, tractatores Scripture Divine, principaliter pertinet diffinire per modum doctrine que assertio catholica, que heretica est censenda.	The eighth argument is this. That often spoken of way of deciding pertains chiefly to the experts on that science to which one is not permitted to add nor from which one is not permitted to remove anything. And theology is like this, since Moses, speaking in the person of God, says in Deut. 4[:2], "You shall not add to the word that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it." Solomon agrees with this in Proverbs 30[:6]. Speaking about the word of God he says, "Add not anything to his words, lest thou be reproved and found a liar." On this account the Holy Spirit through blessed John the evangelist makes a terrible threat against those who add anything to or take anything from divine scripture when he says in the last chapter of Revelations [22:18-9], "If any man shall add to these things, God shall add unto him the plagues which are in this book. And if any man shall take away from the words of the book of this prophecy, God shall take his part out of the book of life and out of the holy city, and from these things that are written in this book." We clearly gather from all these that nothing should be added to sacred scripture nor anything removed from it. To decide by way of teaching, therefore, what assertion should be considered as catholic, what as heretical, chiefly pertains to theologians, the experts on divine scripture.
Ecce ad interrogationem tuam assertiones contrarias recitavi et in fulcimentum utriusque partis rationes tetigi fortiores. Nunc ergo considera que probabilior tibi videtur.	You see that I have set out opposing assertions in response to your question and I have touched on quite strong arguments in support of each position. Therefore consider now which seems the more probable to you.
Capitulum 3	Chapter 3
Discipulus Quamvis ex rationibus pro assertione secunda adductis mihi tribueris occasionem multa querendi, fateor tamen quod ipsa mihi videtur consona veritati, licet ad rationes pro prima assertione nesciam satisfacere mihi metipsi. Unde peto ut tu ad eas respondeas.	Student Although you have given me occasion to make many inquiries by the arguments you adduced for the second assertion, yet I confess that it seems to me to be consonant with the truth, although I do not know how to satisfy myself with respect to the arguments for the first assertion. I ask, therefore, that you reply to them.
Magister Tu videris tibi ipsi contrarius. In principio enim petisti ut quid de tuis interrogationibus sentirem nullatenus indicarem; nunc autem poscis ut ad aliquas rationes respondeam. Ex quo conici potest quod desideras quatenus quid teneam in corde aperiam.	Master You seem to contradict yourself. For you asked at first that I not indicate what I thought about your questions; now, however, you ask me to reply to some arguments. It can be inferred from this that you want me to open to this extent what I hold in my heart.
Discipulus Quicquid petitio mea ex vi vocis insinuat nullo modo volebam quod quid in mente habeas intimares, sed petere intendebam ut responsiones aliorum vel que cogitari possunt ab aliis recitares, nullatenus exprimendo an eas rationabiles vel irrationabiles putes esse censendas.	Student Whatever my request implies by the force of my words, I was not in any way wanting you to make known what you have in your own mind but was intending to ask you to report the replies of others or what can be thought by others, not to express whether you think they should be considered reasonable or unreasonable.
Magister Ex quo tuam intentionem concipio faciam quod hortaris. In primis autem volo te scire quod aliquos cognosco theologos qui moderni temporis canonistas tanquam non intelligentes, presumptuosos, temerarios, fallaces, deceptores, cavillatores, et ignaros in cordibus suis valde despiciunt, reputantes quod sacrorum canonum intellectum ignorant. Pro quo tali ratione moventur. Sacrorum canonum dictatores viri eruditissimi in scientia rationali, morali et theologia fuerunt, nec per naturam absque predictis scientiis canones tam certe tamque profunde veritatis aliqualiter conscripsissent. Cum ergo canoniste moderni scientias antedictas ignorent, quamvis valeant canonum sacrorum retinere memoriam, ad intellectum tamen eorum nequeunt pervenire.	Master Because I understand your intention I will do what you urge me to do. First of all, however, I want you to know that I am aware of some theologians who in their hearts very much look down on canonists of the modern time as being unintelligent, presumptuous, heedless, deceitful, quibblers, scoffers and ignorant, reckoning that they do not know the meaning of the sacred canons. They are moved to this view by the following argument. Those who wrote the sacred canons were men very learned in rational science, moral science and theology and they would not in any way have written canons of such sure and profound truth just naturally without the above-mentioned sciences. Since modern canonists are ignorant of those sciences, therefore, even if they can retain their memory of the sacred canons, they are nevertheless unable to arrive at the meaning of them.
Discipulus Nostri temporis canonistas non reputo contemnendos, licet forte scire sacrorum canonum intellectum, illorum precipue qui ex theologia vel ratione naturali accipiuntur et non sunt pure positivi, magis ad theologos quam ad canonistas pertineat. Sed circa hoc queso hic nullatenus immoreris, quia forte postea de ista materia questionem habebo. Ad rationes ergo prefatas accedas?	Student I do not regard the canonists of our time as worthy of contempt, although perhaps it does pertain more to theologians than to canonists to know the meaning of the sacred canons, especially of those which are taken from theology or from natural reason and are not purely positive. But I ask you not to tarry over this here because perhaps I will have a question about this matter later. Would you therefore move on to the arguments you mentioned?
Magister Quia in hoc opere non sensum meum sed tuam voluntatem sequi promisi rationes predictas incipiam pertractare. Unde ad primam nonnulli respondent theologi dicentes quod ad theologiam non ad scientiam canonistarum principaliter spectat de approbatione veritatum catholicarum et reprobatione heresum damnatarum tractare. Cuius rationem assignant, dicentes quod assertio veritatis est approbatio veritatis. Qui enim aliquod dictum asserit esse verum approbat idem dictum tanquam verum. Assertio ergo veritatis est approbatio veritatis; approbatio autem veritatis est reprobatio contrarie falsitatis, quia qui aliquam approbat veritatem per consequens reprobat contrariam falsitatem, sicut qui precipit unum contrariorum per consequens prohibet aliud, ut notat glossa in decretis para. 1. Assertio igitur veritatum catholicarum per quandam consequentiam est reprobatio omnium heresum contrariarum. Cum ergo per theologiam principaliter veritates catholice asserantur, sequitur quod approbatio veritatum catholicarum et damnatio heresum principaliter ad theologiam pertineat.	Master Because I have promised not to follow my own inclination but your wish in this work I will begin to investigate those arguments. So, some theologians reply to the first [argument] by saying that it is to theology and not to the science of the canonists that it chiefly pertains to treat of the approval of catholic truths and the disapproval of condemned heresies. They argue for this by saying that the assertion of a truth is the approval of it. For he who asserts that some statement is true approves of the statement as true. The assertion of a truth, therefore, is the approval of it; the approval of a truth, however, is the disapproval of the opposing falsity, because he who approves some truth does, as a consequence, disapprove of the opposing falsity (just as he who commands one of [a pair of] contraries, as a consequence prohibits the other, as the gloss on para.1 [dist. 1, col.1] of the Decretum notes). By a certain consequence, therefore, the assertion of catholic truths is the disapproval of all opposing heresies. Since catholic truths are chiefly asserted by theology, it follows therefore that the approval of catholic truths and the condemnation of heresies should pertain principally to theology.
Discipulus Ista responsio videtur mihi probabilis. Vellem tamen scire quare dicunt isti quod talis approbatio et damnatio principaliter pertinent ad theologiam, ex quo insinuare videntur quod non tantum ad eam pertineant.	Student That reply seems probable to me. I would like to know, nevertheless, why they say that approval and condemnation of this kind pertain chiefly to theology, by which they seem to imply that they may not pertain only to it.
Magister Ad istam tuam questionem respondent isti dicentes quod ad scientiam canonistarum pertinent libri decretorum et decretalium ac alie constitutiones et epistole summorum pontificum, licet in predictis libris minime sint inserte. In predictis autem libris et in nonullis constitutionibus et epistolis summorum pontificum quedam veritates catholice asseruntur et nonnulle hereses reprobantur, licet tam ille veritates quam hereses sint pauce respectu illarum que in theologia habentur. Et ideo non tantum ad theologiam sed etiam ad scientiam canonistarum spectat aliquas veritates catholicas approbare et aliquas hereses reprobare, licet paucas. Ad theologiam autem spectat omnes veritates catholicas approbare et omnes hereses reprobare. Quare licet principaliter ad theologiam tales approbatio et reprobatio ad theologiam pertineant, pertinent tamen nihilominus secundario ad scientiam canonistarum.	Master They reply to that question of yours by saying that the books of the Decretum and Decretals, and other statutes and letters of the highest pontiffs (even if they have not been inserted in the above books), pertain to the science of the canonists. However, in those books and in some statutes and letters of the highest pontiffs some catholic truths are asserted and some heresies disapproved of, although both the truths and the heresies are few in comparison with those that are found in theology. And therefore it pertains not only to theology but also to the science of the canonists to approve some catholic truths and to disapprove of some heresies, though few. It pertains to theology, however, to approve all catholic truths and to disapprove of all heresies. Therefore although such approval and disapproval pertain chiefly to theology, they do nevertheless pertain secondarily to the science of the canonists.
Aliam autem rationem adducunt, dicentes quod theologia, veritates catholicas approbando et hereses reprobando, a canonistarum scientia nihil omnino recipit vel mendicat. Canonistarum autem scientia, veritates catholicas approbando et hereses reprobando, a theologia omnia mendicando procedit. Quare hec ad theologiam principaliter et universaliter, ad canonistarum vero scientiam secundario quodammodo et particulariter tantum pertinere noscuntur.	They bring forward another argument too, saying that in approving catholic truths and in disapproving of heresies theology receives or borrows nothing at all from the science of the canonists. The science of the canonists, however, proceeds in the approving of catholic truths and the disapproving of heresies by borrowing everything from theology. Therefore these activities are known to pertain chiefly and universally to theology but to the science of the canonists secondarily, to a certain extent and only in particular cases.
Capitulum 4	Chapter 4
Discipulus Hec responsio mihi videtur probabilis. Quare rationem secundam pertracta.	Student This reply seems likely to me. Therefore investigate the second argument.
Magister Ad secundam rationem respondetur quod quantum ad ea que fidei sunt magis credendum est theologie quam cuicunque alii scientie, nullisque scriptoribus quarumcunque scientiarum ita oportet credere sicut scriptoribus sacre theologie. Auctoritas vero beati Augustini, que adducitur, ut nonnulli dicunt, frequenter, a multis contra intellectum beati Augustini pessime allegatur. Ad cuius intellectum dicunt esse sciendum quod nomen ecclesie equivoce in locis variis scripturarum accipitur. Aliquando enim accipitur pro loco corporali divinis officiis deputato, aliquando pro aliquo speciali collegio clericorum, aliquando pro toto collegio omnium clericorum, aliquando pro aliqua multitudine speciali cleri et populi, aliquando pro tota congregatione fidelium simul in hac vita mortali degentium, aliquando vero nomen ecclesie non solum totam congregationem catholicorum viventium sed etiam fideles mortuos comprehendit.	Master The reply to the second argument is that in respect of matters of faith theology is more deserving of belief than any other science and that it is not appropriate to believe any of the writers of any other sciences like the writers of sacred theology. As to the text of blessed Augustine, which, they say, is adduced frequently, it is brought forward by many people very wrongly against blessed Augustine's meaning. To understand this they say that it should be known that the word "church" is interpreted ambiguously in different written works. For sometimes it is interpreted as the physical place set aside for the divine services, sometimes as some particular body of clerics, sometimes as the whole body of all clerics, sometimes as some particular gathering of the clergy and people, sometimes as the whole gathering of believers living together in this mortal life, and sometimes the word "church" takes in not only the whole gathering of catholics who are alive but also those believers who are dead.
Et isto ultimo modo accipit ecclesiam beatus Augustinus in libro contra Manicheos et recitatur 11 dist. c. Palam. Qui ait, "Palam est quod in re dubia ad fidem et certitudinem valeat catholice ecclesie auctoritas. Que ab ipsis fundatissimis sedibus apostolorum usque ad hodiernum diem succedentium sibimet episcoporum serie et tot populorum consensione firmatur." Ubi ecclesia catholica episcopos et populos a tempore apostolorum usque ad hodiernum diem sibimet succedentes importat.	It is in this last way that blessed Augustine takes "church" in his book against the Manichees which is recorded in dist. 11, c. Palam [col.25]. He says, "It is well known that in a doubtful matter the authority of the catholic church prevails for faith and certainty; from those first founded sees of the apostles right up till today it remains strong through the series of bishops succeeding each other and through the agreement of so many peoples." Here "the catholic church" refers to the bishops and peoples succeeding each other from the time of the apostles right up till today.
Et sic accipit nomen ecclesie Augustinus cum asserit quod non crederet evangelio nisi eum ecclesie auctoritas compelleret. Ista enim ecclesia scriptores evangelii et omnes apostolos comprehendit, sicut probatum est. Quare ex auctoritate Augustini sane intellecta inferri non potest quod magis sit credendum Romano pontifici, canonum conditori, quam evangelio. Et per consequens per eam probari non potest quod maior fides exhibenda sit sacris canonibus quam sancto evangelio. Concedunt tamen quod magis credendum est ecclesie, que est multitudo catholicorum omnium qui fuerunt a temporibus prophetarum et apostolorum usque modo, quam evangelio, non quia de evangelio sit aliqualiter dubitandum, sed quia totum maius est sua parte. Ecclesia igitur que est maioris auctoritatis quam evangelista est illa ecclesia cuius auctor evangelii pars esse dignoscitur. Non est autem mirum si maior est auctoritas totius quam partis. Et ideo maior est auctoritas totius congregationis, comprehendentis evangelistas et omnes alios orthodoxos usque ad hec tempora, quam unius vel etiam plurium personarum congregationis eiusdem.	And in this way Augustine takes the word "church" when he asserts that he would not believe the gospel if the authority of the church did not force him to. For, as has been proved, "church" in that sense includes the writers of the gospel and all the apostles. It can not be inferred on the basis of the authority of Augustine properly interpreted, therefore, that the Roman pontiff, the maker of the canons, should be believed more than the gospel. And consequently it can not be proved by that [text] that greater trust should be shown in the sacred canons than in the holy gospel. Nevertheless they grant that the church which is the multitude of all catholics who have existed from the times of the prophets and the apostles up till now, is worthy of greater belief than the gospel, not because there should be any doubt at all about the gospel, but because the whole is greater than any of its parts. Therefore the church which is of greater authority than an evangelist is that church of which the author of the gospel is known to be part. And it is not astonishing if the authority of the whole is greater than that of a part. And therefore the authority of the whole gathering, including the evangelists and all other orthodox [believers] right up to these times, is greater than that of one person or even of many people from that gathering.
Quod autem conditor canonum non sit maioris auctoritatis quam evangelium sed multo minoris ipsimet canonum conditores testantur aperte. Urbanus enim papa, ut habetur 25, q. 1. c. Sunt quidam, ait, "Sciendum vero summopere est quia inde novas leges potest condere," pontifex supple Romanus, "unde evangeliste aliquid nequaquam dixerunt. Ubi vero aperte Dominus vel eius apostoli et eos sequentes sancti patres aliquid sententialiter diffinierunt, ibi non novam legem Romanus pontifex dare potest, sed potius quod predicatum est usque ad animam et sanguinem confirmare debet. Si enim quod docuerunt apostoli et prophete destruere, quod absit, niteretur, non sententiam dare sed magis errare convinceretur". Ex his verbis colligitur evidenter quod conditor canonum multo minoris auctoritatis est quam evangelium sacrosanctum. Contra quod novam legem nequaquam condere potest, sed ipsum defendere usque ad animam et sanguinem obligatur; contra quod si novam legem dare presumeret esset de errore per catholicos convincendus. His Fabianus papa concordat, qui, ut habetur 11 q. 3. c. Qui omnipotentem, ait, "Qui omnipotentem Deum metuit nec contra evangelium Christi nec contra apostolos nec contra prophetas vel sanctorum patrum instituta agere aliquid ullo modo consentit." Ex quibus verbis patenter habetur quod conditor canonum, si omnipotentem metuit, nihil contra evangelium presumit statuere. Et ita non maioris sed minoris auctoritatis quam evangelium esse dinoscitur.	That the maker of the canons is not of greater authority than the gospel, however, but of much less [authority] the makers of the canons themselves clearly attest. For as we find in 25, q. 1, c. Sunt quidam [col.1008], Pope Urban says, "It should indeed be especially known that he," supply, the Roman pontiff, "can establish new laws on a point where the evangelists have not said anything. But where the Lord or his apostles and the holy fathers who followed them have implicitly decided something, there the Roman pontiff can not give a new law, but rather should confirm at risk of life and blood what has been proclaimed. For if he were to strive to destroy what the apostles and prophets taught -- may it never happen -- he would be convicted not of offering an opinion but more of erring." We clearly gather from these words that the maker of the canons is of much less authority than the sacred gospel. He can not establish any new law against it, but is obliged to defend it even at the cost of life and blood; if he were to presume to give a new law against it, he should be convicted of error by catholics. Pope Fabian agrees with this. As we find in 11, q. 3, c. Qui omnipotentem [col. 669], he says, "He who fears God almighty does not agree in any way to do anything against the gospel of Christ, the apostles, the prophets or the determinations of the holy fathers." We clearly find from these words that if the maker of the canons fears the Almighty, he presumes to establish nothing which is against the gospel. And so he is known not to be of greater but of less authority than the gospel.
Quod ex plurimis capitulis in libro decretorum insertis clarius luce constat, sicut ex dist. 9, c. Noli et c. Ego solis et c. Quis nesciat et c. Noli et c. Neque et ex dist. 11 c. Consuetudinem et ex dist. 14, c. Sicut et ex causa 11 q. 3, c. Si is qui preest. Alie auctoritates quamplurime, quas longum esset recitare, hoc idem asserunt manifeste, et propter easdem rationes dicunt quod tota multitudo Christianorum nunc vita mortali viventium non est maioris auctoritatis quam sit sanctum evangelium, quia multitudo viventium evangelium debet usque ad animam et sanguinem defensare.	This is even clearer and more certain from many chapters inserted in the Decretum, as in dist. 9, c. Noli [col.17], c. Ego solis [col. 17], c. Quis nesciat [col.17], c. Noli [col.18] and c. Neque [col.18], dist. 11, c. Consuetudinem [col.25], dist. 14, c. Sicut [col.33] and 11, q. 3, c. Si is qui preest [col.671]. Very many other texts, which it would take long to record, plainly assert the same thing, and for the same reasons say that the whole multitude of Christians now living in this mortal life is not of greater authority than the holy gospel should be, because the multitude of those living ought to defend the gospel at the risk of life and blood.
Capitulum 5	Chapter 5
Discipulus Ad istam secundam rationem mihi videtur quod responsionem rationabilem recitasti. Nunc autem referas mihi queso quomodo ad rationem tertiam respondetur.	Student It seems to me that you have reported a reasonable reply to the second argument. And now I ask that you relate to me how reply is made to the third argument.
Magister Ad rationem tertiam respondent nonnulli dicentes quod summus pontifex debet sacrarum literarum habere noticiam et etiam in sacris canonibus debet esse peritus. Et ideo symbolum ordinare et articulos fidei recte distinguere spectat ad ipsum, precipue cum consilio et consensu concilii generalis. Sed in symbolum ordinando et articulos fidei distinguendo et, eadem ratione, in diffiniendo authentice que assertio est catholica et que heretica reputanda, theologie principaliter debet inniti; secundario autem in sacris canonibus poterit se fundare. Et ideo ex ista ratione concludi potest quod ad theologos spectat principaliter diffinire docendo, non legem aliis imponendo, que assertio inter catholicas, que vero inter hereticas debeat numerari.	Master Some people reply to the third argument by saying that the highest pontiff ought to have knowledge of sacred letters, and also ought to be learned in the sacred canons. And therefore it pertains to him, especially with the advice and agreement of a general council, to appoint a creed and rightly to distinguish the articles of faith. But in appointing a creed and distinguishing the articles of faith, and, by the same argument, in pronouncing validly what assertion should be regarded as catholic and what as heretical, he should rely chiefly on theology; secondarily, however, he can base himself on the sacred canons. And it can be concluded from that argument, therefore, that it pertains chiefly to theologians to decide by teaching, not by imposing a law on others, what assertion should be counted as catholic, what on the other hand as heretical.
Discipulus Puto quod quicunque intelligens hec que scripsisti perlegerit tenebit indubie quod ad canonistas non pertinet de multis assertionibus iudicare an catholice vel heretice sint censende. Et de quibuscunque assertionibus canoniste discernunt an inter catholicas vel hereticas debeant numerari necesse est eos ad theologiam recurrere si voluerint ad profunda resolvere, presertim cum nulla assertio vere catholica vel heretica sit habenda nisi quia theologie consonat aut repugnat. Quare non arbitror quod aliquis literatus aliqualiter opinetur quod ad canonistas qui non sunt theologi pertineat principaliter diffinitio sepe fata.	Student I think that anyone with understanding who reads what you have written will hold it as indubitable that it does not pertain to canonists to judge of many assertions whether they should be considered catholic or heretical. And that when canonists determine of any assertions whether they should be counted as catholic or heretical, it is necessary for them to have recourse to theology if they want to resolve [the question] deeply, especially since no assertion should be considered truly catholic or heretical except on the grounds that it agrees with or conflicts with theology. I do not think, therefore, that anyone learned should in any way opine that the sort of decision we have often been talking about should pertain chiefly to canonists who are not theologians.
Capitulum 6	Chapter 6
Magister Multa nimis ignoras. Scio enim quosdam canonistas qui theologos deridere presumunt cum investigare nituntur de multis assertionibus an debeant inter hereses computari, dicentes quod talis investigatio ad canonistas, non ad theologos noscitur pertinere.	Master There is a lot you do not know! I know some canonists who presume to scoff at theologians when they try to investigate many assertions [to determine] whether they should be counted among the heresies, saying that such an investigation is known to pertain to canonists not to theologians.
Discipulus De hoc quod dicis vehementer admiror, quia dictum huiusmodi nullam videtur probabilitatem habere. Narra tamen si pro se aliquam rationem huiusmodi assertores allegant.	Student I am absolutely astonished at what you say because such a statement seems to have no probability. Nevertheless tell me if those who assert such a thing bring forward any reason for it.
Magister Audivi quod ex hoc moventur tantummodo quod theologi, cum ipsi vel alii de heresi accusantur vel alios accusare conantur, libellos accusationis, responsionis, appellationis, et huiusmodi componere nesciunt nec formare, sed ad canonistas oportet eos habere recursum. Quare dicunt quod ad canonistas non ad theologos spectat discernere que assertio catholica vel heretica est censenda.	Master I have heard that they are moved only by the fact that when theologians or others are accused of or try to accuse others of heresy they do not know how to compose or prepare the writs of accusation, reply, appeal, and the like, but must have recourse to canonists. They say, therefore, that it pertains to canonists not to theologians to determine what assertion should be considered as catholic, what as heretical.
Discipulus Ista ratio mihi apparet tam frivola quod responsione non indiget. Aliud est enim discernere que assertio catholica queve heretica est putanda, aliud est scire formulas actionum et modum agendi contra hereticos in iudicio ac etiam modum in iudicio defendendi de heresi accusatos. Primum ad theologos, secundum ad iuristas noscitur pertinere. Quemadmodum aliud est cognoscere denarios veros a falsis, aurum ab auricalco, equos sanos ab egris, arma fortia et fabrefacta ab aliis, et aliud est scire, si aliquis de aliquo predictorum voluerit in iudicio aliquem accusare et accusatus se nisus fuerit defensare, quomodo libelli accusationis, responsionis, appellationis, et huiusmodi quibus uti in iudicio fuerit oportunum confici debeant et formari. Primum ad monetarios, aurifabros, fabros ferri et fabricatores armorum spectare dinoscitur. Secundum vero ad iuristas non est dubium pertinere. Unde per istam rationem probare contingeret quod ad iuristas pertinet discernere quod aurum est verum, quod falsum, qui sunt artificialiter panni facti, qui aliter, que edificia sunt utilia quibuscumque, que inutilia et, ut concludam breviter, de omnibus mechanicis et rebus naturalibus universis que in usum veniunt hominum haberent principaliter iuriste discernere qualia essent secundum naturam suam vel artem, cum de omnibus huiusmodi contingat in iudicio litigare. In quo casu necesse est litigatores pro libellis accusationis, responsionis, appellationis, et huiusmodi, ad iuristas habere recursum. Constat autem quod sepe iuriste periti de rebus minimis an sint tales quales debeant esse secundum naturam vel artem a qua fiunt nesciunt iudicare. Quomodo tamen de talibus rebus recuperandis vel defendendis in iudicio oporteat formare libellos et alia que spectant ad formam agendi et defendendi coram iudice non ignorant.	Student That argument seems so frivolous to me as not to need a reply. For it is one thing to determine what assertion should be thought of as catholic or what as heretical, and it is another to know the formulae for law suits, the way of proceeding against heretics in court, and also the way of defending in court those accused of heresy. The first is known to pertain to theologians, the second to lawyers. Similarly, it is one thing to know true money from forgeries, gold from brass, healthy horses from sick ones, strong and skilfully made arms from others, and it is another thing to know, if someone wanted to accuse someone in court of any one of the above and the accused strove to defend himself, how the writs of accusation, reply, appeal, and the like which it would be suitable to use in court should be prepared and composed. The first is known to pertain to moneyers, goldsmiths, makers of iron and forgers of arms. There is indeed no doubt that the second pertains to lawyers. By that argument, therefore, it would be possible to prove that it pertains to lawyers to determine what is true gold and what false, which garments have been skilfully made and which otherwise, which buildings are useful to anyone at all and which not useful, and, to conclude briefly, lawyers would chiefly have the power to determine, in connection with all the works of mechanical art and all natural objects that fall to the use of humans, what kind of thing they were, according to their nature or to art, since it is possible to litigate in court about everything of this kind. In such a case it is necessary for those litigating to have recourse to lawyers for writs of accusation, reply, appeal, and the like. It is certain, however, that learned lawyers often do not know how to judge of the smallest things whether they are such as they should be according to their nature or the art by which they are made. Yet they are not ignorant about how it is appropriate to prepare writs for recovering or defending such things in court and about other matters which pertain to the form of acting and defending before a judge.
Magister Ecce interrogationem tuam primam iuxta formam quam mihi prefixisti breviter pertractavi. Nunc autem propone aliam, vel quiescere me permittas.	Master Now look, I have briefly investigated your first question in the form you fixed for me in advance. So now propose another one, or allow me to be quiet.
Capitulum 7	Chapter 7
Discipulus Quia aliqui canoniste putant, ut dicis, quod ad ipsos principaliter spectat inter assertionem catholicam et hereticalem discernere, cum tamen mihi videantur falcem suam mittere in messem alienam si hoc attemptare absque theologia presumpserint, eo quod nec absque theologia capitula in decretis inserta que de heresibus eloquuntur intelligere queant, dic mihi, obsecro, parum a principali proposito disgrediendo, quid sentiunt literati de intellectu eorum que in decretis habentur, ad quos videlicet principalius et profundius pertinet illorum intellectum cognoscere?	Student Some canonists, as you say, think that it pertains principally to them to discriminate between a catholic and an heretical assertion, yet since they would seem to me to be putting their scythe into someone else's harvest if they presumed to attempt this without theology, in that without theology they would be unable to understand the chapters inserted in the decretals which speak about heresies, tell me, I pray, by departing a little from our original plan, what the learned think about the meaning of those things that are found in the decretals, to whom, that is, does it more chiefly and profoundly pertain to know their meaning?
Who best understands the content of canon law?
Magister Circa questionem tuam inveniuntur opiniones contrarie. Canoniste enim sentire videntur quod ipsi non solum habent memoriam maiorem eorum que in libris iuris canonici inseruntur sed etiam illa clarius et magis profunde intelligunt, et quis sit intellectus ipsorum ad ipsos spectat principaliter iudicare, saltem per modum doctrine. Pro hac autem opinione videntur tali ratione posse moveri. Iuxta sententiam sapientis, "Unusquisque bene iudicat de his que novit, et horum bonus est iudex." Canoniste autem magis noscunt illa que in eorum libris traduntur quam alii. Ergo ad ipsos de intellectu eorum principaliter pertinet iudicare.	Master Opposing opinions are found about your question. For canonists seem to think that they not only have a greater memory of those things that are inserted in the books of canon law but also that they understand them more clearly and deeply, and that it pertains chiefly to them to judge, at least by way of teaching, what their meaning is. They seem able to be moved by the following argument for this opinion. According to the maxim of a wise man, "Everyone judges well those things which he knows, and of these he is a good judge." But canonists know more than others those things that are handed on in their books. It pertains chiefly to them, therefore, to judge their meaning.
Iterum, pro ista opinione alia ratio potest adduci. Quia ad nullos magis spectat aliquorum notitia quam ad tractatores illius scientie que ipsa considerat, ergo ad nullos magis spectat noticia illorum que in iure traduntur canonico quam ad tractatores canonici iuris; cuius modi sunt canoniste. Ad ipsos ergo principaliter spectat de intellectu illorum discernere.	Again, another argument can be brought forward for that opinion. For knowledge of any matters pertains to no one more than to the experts on that science which considers them. Knowledge of what is handed on in the canon law pertains to no one, therefore, more than to experts on canon law. These are canonists. It chiefly pertains to them, therefore, to determine the meaning of those things [in the canon law].
Capitulum 8	Chapter 8
Magister Sed aliis ista opinio minime placet. Dicunt enim quod ad canonistas spectat de multis que reperiuntur in libris eorum maiorem habere memoriam. De pluribus autem et tenaciorem memoriam et profundiorem intellectum theologos, si perfecti fuerint, oportet habere. Nonnulla vero secularium legum periti et profundius intelligunt et non minori commendant memorie. Quedam autem naturali prediti ratione et in philosphia eruditi morali ac scientie rationalis nequaquam ignari et plenius intelligunt et non minus memorie noscuntur imprimere. Nulla vero canoniste intelligunt profundius, licet propter maiorem multorum memoriam quis sit aliquotiens intellectus quorundam promptius valeant explicare, ad quem alii tardius, licet profundius, cum magno labore et studio pervenirent.	Master But this opinion does not please others. For they admit that it pertains to canonists to have a greater memory of many things that are found in their books. Of more things, however, theologians, if they are excellent, ought to have both a more tenacious memory and a deeper understanding. Those skilled in secular laws do indeed understand some things more deeply and entrust them to a not inferior memory. Some things, however, those gifted in natural reason, learned in moral philosophy, and not ignorant of rational science both understand more fully and are known to imprint not less on their memory. Canonists, in fact, understand nothing more deeply, even if on account of a greater memory of many things they can more readily explain at different times what the meaning of something is, a meaning at which others would arrive more slowly, although more deeply, and with great labour and study.
Si autem aliqui canoniste in scientia rationali et in philosophia morali, iure civili, et theologia plene essent instructi ad illos principalissime pertineret ea que in libris habentur eorum et tenaciori memoria retinere et de ipsorum intelligentia promptius et perfectius iudicare.	However, if any canonists were fully instructed in rational science, moral philosophy, civil law, and theology, it would most chiefly pertain to them both to retain in a more tenacious memory what is found in their books and to judge its meaning more readily and excellently.
Ad evidentiam autem predictorum dicunt isti esse notandum quod libri canonistarum non sunt nisi quedam collectiones ex auctoritatibus Biblie et originalium theologorum sanctorum et ex quibusdam legibus imperialibus et ex constitutionibus ac diffinitionibus sive determinationibus conciliorum et summorum pontificum in quibus quedam pure theologica explicantur et declarantur, sicut in illis quibus hereses condemnantur et veritates catholice approbantur, ut patet Extra, De summa trinitate et fide catholica, c. 1. et c. Damnamus et Extra, De hereticis, c. Cum Christus et in pluribus aliis capitulis in decretis insertis. Quedam vero pure moralia traduntur in eis, que nulla possunt ratione convelli, sicut in capitulis decretorum et decretalium patet innumeris. Quedam autem precipiuntur in eis et prohibentur que sunt pure positiva, ex humana dependentia voluntate, que pro necessitate et utilitate possunt rationabiliter variari seu penitus abrogari, ut patet Extra, De consanguinitate et affinitate, c. Non debet et dist. 14, c. Sicut quedam.	Now to make the foregoing clear they say that it should be noted that the books of the canonists are only collections of biblical texts, texts from the books of holy theologians, texts from some imperial laws and from the statutes and decisions or determinations of councils and highest pontiffs in which some purely theological matters are explained and declared, as in those by which heresies are condemned and catholic truths approved. This is clear in Extra, De summa trinitate et fide catholica, c. 1 [col.5] and c. Damnamus [col.2], in Extra, De hereticis, c. Cum Christus [col.779], and in many other chapters inserted in the decretals. Certain purely moral matters which can be undermined by no reason are handed down in them too, as is clear in innumerable chapters of the Decretum and Decretals. And certain things are commanded and forbidden in them which are purely positive, depending on human will, and which can, for necessity and utility, reasonably be varied or wholly repealed, as is clear in Extra, De consanguinitate et affinitate, c. Non debet [col.703] and in dist. 14, c. Sicut quedam [col.33].
Ex his dicunt quod de theologicis in libris canonistarum inventis tam quantum ad memoriam quam quantum ad intellectum theologi, si sunt perfecti, canonistas excedunt, licet nonnumquam non oporteat theologum illorum verborum habere memoriam sub quibus sententia pure theologica in capitulo determinationis ecclesie explicatur.	From these points they say that, if they are excellent, theologians surpass canonists both with respect to memory and to understanding of theological matters found in the books of the canonists, although it is sometimes not necessary for a theologian to have a memory of the words themselves under which a purely theological opinion is explained in a chapter containing the church's determination.
Quo ad leges autem imperiales que in libris reperiuntur prefatis, sicut patet 2. q. 6. c. Propter superfluam et in aliis capitulis multis sequentibus et alibi in multis locis, nec quantum ad memoriam nec quantum ad intellectum sunt canoniste preferendi civilis iuris peritis.	With respect to imperial laws which are found in the afore-said books, however, canonists are not to be preferred to those skilled in the civil law, either with respect to memory or with respect to understanding, as is clear in 2, q. 6, c. Propter superfluam [col.472] and in many other of the following chapters and in many places elsewhere.
Quantum vero ad pure moralia que nulla possunt ratione mutari, si universalia sunt, nec in memoria nec in intellectu possunt canoniste naturali preditos ratione et in philosophia instructos morali et perfectos in scientia rationali excedere quoquomodo.	With respect to purely moral matters, however, which can not be changed for any reason, if they are universal, canonists can not in any way surpass either in memory or in understanding those gifted in natural reason, instructed in moral philosophy and excellent in rational science.
De illis vero que particularia sunt et tamen nequaquam dispensationem recipiunt canoniste maiorem possunt habere memoriam ac etiam de intellectu eorum promptius iudicare, sed ad alios profundius quia per priora principia, licet tardius et cum maiori labore, pertinet de intellectu discernere eorumdem.	About other matters that are particular and yet not dispensable, canonists can have a greater memory and can even judge their meaning more readily, although it pertains to others to determine their meaning more deeply, although more slowly and with greater effort, because [they do so] through deeper principles.
Illa autem que pure positiva sunt et ex causa poterunt variari, canoniste magis memoriter retinent sed non habent profundius iudicare.	However, canonists do retain with a better memory those things that are purely positive and can be changed for a reason, but they do not have the power to judge them more deeply.
Capitulum 9	Chapter 9
Discipulus Istam secundam opinionem pro parte libenter attendo quia quantum ad illa que dicit de theologicis et legibus imperialibus ac pure moralibus universalibus videtur omnino rationabilis estimanda. Sed quantum ad moralia particularia et pure positiva que in libris solummodo canonistarum sunt tradita non apparet probabilitatem habere. Nullus enim non dico profundius sed nec aliquo modo potest iudicare de illis que non novit. Cum igitur talia ad noticiam tractatorum aliarum scientiarum nequaquam pertineant ad ipsos nullo modo pertinet iudicare de illis. Veruntamen vellem scire si pro illa assertione rationes alique apparentes valeant cogitari.	Student For my part I willingly give heed to that second opinion because it seems that it should be considered to be completely reasonable with respect to what it says about theological matters, imperial laws, and universal purely moral matters. But with respect to purely positive moral particulars that are passed on only in the books of the canonists it does not seem to have plausibility. For no one can judge, I do not say more deeply, but in any way, those things that he does not know. Since such things do not pertain to the knowledge of those who treat of other sciences, therefore, it does not pertain in any way to these people to judge them. Nevertheless I would like to know if any plausible arguments can be thought of for that assertion.
Magister Assertionem prefatam nonnulli ratione et exemplo probare nituntur. Ratione sic. Scientia superior de traditis in scientia inferiori subordinata sibi certius potest et profundius iudicare quam scientia inferior. Sed scientia canonistarum quantum ad multa moralia particularia et que valent variationem recipere est scientia inferior subordinata theologie, et quantum ad multa talia subordinata est philosophie morali, sicut particularia subordinantur universalibus. Ergo de talibus potest theologia et philosophia moralis certius quam canonistarum scientia iudicare.	Master Some people try to prove that assertion by argument and by example. The argument is as follows. A superior science can judge more certainly and deeply of those things passed on in an inferior science which is subordinate to it than can that inferior science. But with respect to many moral particulars which can admit change the science of the canonists is an inferior science subordinate to theology, and with respect to many such matters is subordinate to moral philosophy, just as particulars are subordinate to universals. About such matters, therefore, theology and moral philosophy can judge more certainly than can the science of the canonists.
Secundo sic: de illis agibilibus particularibus que variari possunt illa scientia potest certissime iudicare contra quam nihil valet in particulari ordinari vel statui et per quam si aliquid fuerit inique statutum debet omnimode reprobari. Huiusmodi autem respectu agibilium particularium et que mutari possunt in iure canonico repertorum noscitur esse tam theologia quam vera philosophia moralis. Ergo de illis vel theologia vel philosophia vera moralis habet certissime iudicare. Maior evidentiam apertam videtur habere; minor tali ratione probatur.	A second argument is as follows. Of those particular possible acts that can be changed that science can judge most certainly against which nothing is able to be ordained or decreed in a particular case and through which anything that has been unjustly decreed ought to be wholly condemned. With respect to particular possible acts that can be changed and that are found in the canon law both theology and true moral philosophy are known to be [sciences] of this kind. Of those matters, therefore, either theology or true moral philosophy has the power to judge most certainly. The major [premise] seems to be clearly evident; the minor [premise] is proved by the following argument.
Constitutio ecclesiastica non est maioris dignitatis aut firmitatis quam ecclesiastica consuetudo. Sed omnis consuetudo tam veritati Divine Scripture quam iuri naturali (quod non solum in lege et in evangelio sed etiam in vera philosophia morali habetur) cedit, si ei inveniatur adversa, et per consequens si aliqua consuetudo fuerit theologie vel vere philosophie morali contraria est omnimode reprobanda. Ergo si quecunque constitutio ecclesiastica alteri predictarum scientiarum probata fuerit adversari est damnanda. Ex quo infertur quod de omnibus talibus habet theologia et philosophia vera moralis certissime iudicare.	An ecclesiastical statute is not of greater dignity or firmness than an ecclesiastical custom. But every custom gives way as much to the truth of divine scripture as to natural law, which is found not only in the law and in the gospel but also in true moral philosophy, if it is found to be opposed to it, and, as a consequence, if any custom were contrary to theology or to true moral philosophy it should be wholly condemned. If any ecclesiastical statute, therefore, has been proved to be opposed to one of those sciences it should be condemned. It is inferred from this that theology and true moral philosophy have the power to judge all matters of this kind most certainly.
Hec ratio confirmatur auctoritate beati Cypriani qui, ut habetur dist. 8 c. Consuetudo, ait, "Consuetudo que apud quosdam irrepserat impedire non debet, quo minus veritas prevaleat et vincat. Nam consuetudo sine veritate vetustas erroris est." Ex qua auctoritate et aliis que in eadem distinctione ponuntur, scilicet c. Veritate et c. Si consuetudinem et c. Qui contempta veritate et c. Frustra et c. Si solus, colligitur quod omnis consuetudo veritati contraria, ubicunque reperiatur, sive in theologia sive in philosophia morali, est penitus postponenda. Ex quo sequitur quod omnis constitutio ecclesiastica si veritati fuerit inimica debet respui et damnari.	This argument is confirmed by a text of blessed Cyprian who says, as we read in dist. 8, c. Consuetudo [col.15], "A custom which had crept up on certain people should not prevent the truth from prevailing and triumphing. For a custom that lacks truth is the long continuance of an error." From this text and others located in the same distinction -- namely, c. Veritate [col.14], c. Si consuetudinem [col.14], c. Qui contempta veritate [col.14], c. Frustra [col.15] and c. Si solus [col.15] -- we gather that every custom opposed to the truth, wherever [truth] be found, whether in theology or in moral philosophy, should be completely disregarded. It follows from this that every ecclesiastical statute should be rejected and condemned if it is inimical to the truth.
Hinc Gratianus dist. 8, para. Dignitate ait, "Dignitate vero ius naturale similiter prevalet consuetudini et constitutioni. Quecunque enim moribus accepta sunt vel scriptis comprehensa si naturali iuri fuerint adversa, vana et irrita sunt censenda." Et dist. 9 para. 1 ait, "Liquido igitur apparet quod consuetudo naturali iuri postponitur. Quod autem constitutio naturali iuri cedat multiplici auctoritate probatur." Et para. ultimo ait, "Cum ergo in naturali iure nihil aliud precipiatur quam quod Deus vult fieri nihilque vetetur quam quod Deus prohibet fieri, denique cum in canonica scriptura nihil aliud quam quod in divinis legibus inveniatur, divine vero leges natura consistant; patet quod quecunque divine voluntati seu canonice Scripture contraria probantur eadem et iuri naturali inveniuntur adversa. Unde quecunque divine voluntati seu canonice scripture seu divinis legibus postponenda censentur, eisdem naturale ius preferre oportet."	Hence Gratian says in dist. 8, para. Dignitate [col.13], "But natural law is superior in dignity to custom and statute alike. For anything which is either accepted as custom or is contained in writing should be considered void and useless if it is opposed to natural law." And he says in [the last paragraph of dist. 8, and] paragraph 1 of dist. 9 [col.16], "It is quite clear, therefore, that custom is esteemed less than natural law; and that a statute should give way before natural law is proved by many texts." And in the last paragraph [of dist. 9] [col.18] he says, "Since nothing is commanded in natural law, therefore, except what God wants to happen, and nothing is forbidden except what God prohibits to be done, and finally since there is nothing in canonical scripture except what is found in the divine laws, the divine laws must endure by nature; it is clear that whatever is proved to be contrary to the divine will or to canonical scripture that same thing is also found to be opposed to natural law. So it is necessary to prefer natural law to anything which it is considered should be esteemed less than the divine will, canonical scripture or divine laws."
Ex his patenter habetur ut apparet istis quod quecunque in iure canonico theologie vel iuri naturali, quod non solum in theologia sed etiam in philosophia morali (eo quod incepit ab exordio rationalis creature, ut habetur dist. 6 para. His ita respondetur) continetur, invenirentur contraria, per alteram scientiarum dictarum essent penitus reprobanda. Ergo utraque de talibus habet certissime iudicare et eo certius scientiarum huiusmodi tractatores haberent de talibus iudicare quam canoniste quo principiis certioribus, dignioribus, prioribus et universalioribus uti noscuntur.	It seems to them that we clearly learn from the above that anything in canon law that was found to be contrary to theology or to natural law, which is contained not only in theology but also in moral philosophy (in that it [natural law] began with the first rational creature, as we find in dist. 6, para. His ita respondetur [col.11]), would be wholly to be condemned by one of those sciences. Therefore each of them has the power to judge such matters most certainly, and the experts on such sciences would have the power to judge such matters more certainly than canonists in that they are known to use more certain, worthier, earlier and more universal principles.
Secundo principaliter isti assertionem suam exemplo moliuntur ostendere, referentes quod cum commentator librorum beati Dionysii de multis capitulis a suis emulis, qui papam et cardinales muneribus corruperant, accusatus cogeretur in consistorio respondere, ipse tanquam purus philosophus et theologus omnino iuris ignarus a papa petiit advocatum. Cui papa respondit, "Absit ut tibi, qui inter omnes mundi clericos literatior reputaris, hanc confusionem faciamus ut alius pro te loquatur: pro te ipso loquaris." Qui cernens malitiam recepta copia obiectorum et acceptis ad deliberandum trium dierum induciis quarta die respondit ad omnia legum civilium et iurium canonicorum quamplurium contra ipsum allegatorum, in quibus adversarii suam intentionem insolubiliter, ut putabant, fundaverant, per theologiam et rationem naturalem, ita patenter pro se intellectum assignans quod iudicio omnium intelligentium cuncteleges et iura que contra ipsum fuerant allegata pro ipso liquido concludebant. Unde, ut fertur, cardinales sibi contrarii postmodum eius emulos arguentes dixerunt, "Vos dixistis istum episcopum nescire leges et iura. Ipse scit principia, radices et causas omnium legum et iurium." Ex quibus isti concludunt quod ille theologus, qui et magnus philosophus, multo certius, profundius et clarius iudicavit de intellectu iurium quorum antea nullam habuerat omnino memoriam quam theologie et rationis naturalis ignari qui tamen ab infantia in illis fuerant enutriti.	Secondly (principally), they try to make their assertion known by an example, recounting that when a commentator on the books of blessed Dionysius, having been accused in connection with many articles by his rivals, who had corrupted the pope and cardinals with gifts, was forced to reply in consistory, he, as a pure philosopher and theologian completely ignorant of the law, asked the pope for an attorney. The pope replied to him, "Let it not be that we create this shame for you, who are regarded as more learned than all the other clerics in the world, that another speaks for you. You may speak for yourself." When he perceived this malice he accepted a copy of the objections and received a recess of three days for deliberation. On the fourth day he replied through theology and natural reason to all of the many civil and canon laws brought against him on which his adversaries had, indissolubly as they thought, based their accusation, so clearly assigning them meaning in his favour that all the laws that had been alleged against him were, in the judgement of all who understood, plainly conclusive in his favour. Whence, as is reported, the cardinals who had been opposed to him afterwards accused his rivals, saying, "You said that this bishop does not know the [civil and canon] laws. He knows the principles, roots and causes of all the [civil and canon] laws." From this they conclude that this theologian, who was also a great philosopher, judged more certainly, deeply and clearly about the meaning of the laws, of which he had had absolutely no memory before, than those ignorant of theology and natural reason who had nevertheless been nourished from their infancy in those matters.[The story is probably about Grosseteste. See David Luscombe, "William of Ockham and the Michaelists on Robert Grosseteste and Denis the Areopagite", in The Medieval Church: Universities, Heresy and the Religious Life (ed. Peter Biller and Barrie Dobson), Studies in Church History. Subsidia Series, Boydell and Brewer, Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1999.]
Capitulum 10	Chapter 10
Discipulus Nunc adverto quod assertiones que apparent prima facie false non sunt penitus contemnende. Assertionem enim pro qua fortiter allegasti in principio omnino irrationabilem arbitrabar, nunc autem non videtur mihi omni probabilitate carere. Unde ad rationem contra eam quam tetigi qualiter ipsius respondeant defensores enarra.	Student I now perceive that assertions that seem prima facie to be false should not be completely despised. For at first I thought that the assertion for which you strongly argued was completely irrational, yet now it does not seem to me to lack all plausibility. Tell me, therefore, how its defenders reply to the argument against it which I touched on.
Magister Rationem illam valde despiciunt, dicentes quod est illorum qui naturam, originem et ordinem scientiarum ignorant. Aiunt enim quod quemadmodum aliquis optime iudicat de mechanicis et aliis que tamen facere nescit, sicut multi qui pingere, scribere, arma et naves ac alia artificialia fabricare ignorant melius quam ipsi artifices iudicare noscuntur, ita scientie superioris tractatores causas et principia illorum que in scientiis inferioribus considerantur certius et clarius valent iudicare de illis si eis proponantur quam ille scientie inferiores. Unde et habentes perfectam notitiam scientie subalternantis que cognoscit principia scientie subalternate certius iudicant de conclusionibus et etiam principiis scientie subalternate quam habens tantummodo notitiam scientie subalternate. Ita theologi et veri philosophi propositis illis que in iure tractantur canonico profundius et certius poterunt iudicare de illis quamvis sepe cum maiori labore.	Master They strongly disdain that argument, saying that it is maintained by those who do not know the nature, origin and order of the sciences. For they say that just as someone judges best mechanical and other [works] which nevertheless he does not know how to make, as for instance many men who do not know how to paint, write, or construct arms, ships and other works made by artisans are known to judge them better than the artisans themselves, so experts on a superior science are able to judge more surely and clearly the causes and principles of those matters that are considered in inferior sciences, if those matters are put to them, than the inferior sciences themselves. So too those who have perfect knowledge of a subalternating science which understands the principles of a subalternated science judge more certainly about the conclusions and even the principles of that subalternate science than do those who have knowledge only of the subalternate science. Thus theologians and true philosophers will be able to judge more profoundly and surely, although often with greater effort, about propositions which are treated in canon law.
Discipulus: Video quod ratio mea concludit de scientia solummodo que non est alteri subalternata nec subordinata. Nam, ut evidenter aspicio, de scientia cui alia scientia superior precipit, sicut est de frenefactiva respectu equestris, et de illis que architectonice subiciuntur, de quibus in libro ethicorum et in libro politicorum fit mentio, et de scientia cuius principia in scientia superiori traduntur, apparentiam non videtur habere. Et ideo de theologia et scientia canonistarum dinoscitur colore carere, quia scientia canonistarum a theologia recipit sua principia, teste Innocentio 3 qui, ut habetur Extra, De accusationibus, c. Qualiter et quando, asserit manifeste quod ex auctoritatibus novi et veteris testamenti processerunt postea canonice sanctiones. Quamvis igitur de istis possem querere multa, quia tamen canoniste aliarum scientiarum terminos ignorantes eorum intellectum non caperent, cupio autem ut in hoc opere quantum potueris sic terminos proprios aliarum scientiarum a theologia et scientia canonistarum evites quod omnia canoniste intelligant. Idcirco illa que dicta sunt de ista materia sufficiant, nec curo quod ad rationes pro prima opinione respondeas, quia modo valde mihi debiles videntur et qualiter responderi potest ad eas per predicta satis apparet.	Student I see that my argument is conclusive only for a science which is not subalternate or inferior to another. For I clearly see that it does not seem to have plausibility about a science for which another, superior science lays down rules, as with bridle-making in respect of horsemanship, and about those [sciences] that are subordinate to an architectonic [science], of which mention is made in the books of Ethics and Politics, and about a science whose principles are transmitted in a superior science. And therefore in connection with theology and the science of the canonists [my argument] is known to lack colour because the science of the canonists receives its principles from theology, as Innocent III attests in Extra, De accusationibus, c. Qualiter and quando [col.745] where he clearly asserts that canonical ordinances sprang at a later date from the texts of the New and Old Testaments. Therefore although I could ask many [questions] about these matters, yet because canonists, being ignorant of the terms of other sciences, would not understand them, I want you in this work to avoid as much as you can terms which are proper to sciences other than theology and the science of the canonists so that canonists may understand everything. Let what has been said about this matter suffice, therefore. I am not solicitous for you to reply to the arguments for the first opinion because they now seem to me very weak and it is clear enough from the above how a reply can be made to them.
Magister Considero quod si predictam materiam exquisitius indagares ad multas assertiones quas aliquando falsissimas reputasti posses faciliter inclinari. Unde si aliquid circa predicta adhuc animum tuum angit, si placet tibi, propone.	Master I consider that if you were to investigate the above material quite carefully you could easily be favourably disposed to many assertions which you once regarded as completely false. So if anything concerning the above matters still vexes your mind, put it forward if you wish to.
Capitulum 11	Chapter 11
Discipulus Si circa predicta omnia que volvo in animo tibi proponerem, et tu ad omnia responderes sicut cepisti, librum maximum faceremus. Ideo illis omissis ad aliam interrogationem memoratis annexam accedo. Sepe audivi quod assertio alicuius est catholica, ipse tamen non est catholicus, et nonnumquam assertio alicuius hereticalis ostenditur et tamen ipse inter hereticos minime computatur. Ex quo videtur quod ad alios poterit pertinere que assertio est catholica et que heretica iudicare et ad alios quis hereticus et quis catholicus est censendus discernere. Quamobrem interrogo an ad theologos vel canonistas spectet inter hereticos et orthodoxos discernere.	Student If I were to put forward to you everything about the above matters that I am reflecting on in my mind, and you were to reply to it all in the way you have begun, we would produce a very large book. So putting those things aside I come to another question linked to those discussed above. I have often heard that someone's assertion is catholic, yet he himself is not catholic, and that sometimes someone's assertion is shown to be heretical and yet he himself is not counted among the heretics. It seems from this that it can pertain to some people to judge what assertion is catholic and what heretical and to others to determine who should be considered a heretic and who a catholic. For this reason I ask whether it pertains to theologians or to canonists to distinguish between those who are heretical and those who are orthodox.
Is it for canonists, or for theologians, to decide who is a heretic?
Magister Aliqui canoniste sentire videntur quod ad ipsos principaliter spectat inter hereticos et catholicos iudicare. Pro qua opinione potest sic argui. Ad illos spectat principalius diiudicare hereticos, et per consequens inter hereticos et catholicos iudicare, qui de hereticis exquisitius et magis ex intentione considerant. Huiusmodi sunt canoniste. Unde et in libro decretalium specialis titulus satis prolixus de hereticis est insertus. In decretis etiam de hereticis sepe diffuse tractatur. In theologia autem de hereticis raro fit mentio. Unde et nomen heretici in uno loco solummodo Biblie, scilicet ad Titum 3 invenitur. Quare ad canonistas principaliter pertinet hereticos secernere ab orthodoxis.	Master Some canonists seem to think that it pertains chiefly to them to judge between heretics and catholics. It can be argued as follows for that opinion. To distinguish heretics, and consequently to judge between catholics and heretics, pertains more chiefly to those who reflect on heretics more carefully and with more deliberation. Such people are the canonists. So it is that a sufficiently long special title on heretics has been inserted in the book of Decretals. There is also treatment, often copious, of heretics in the Decretum. However, mention is rarely made of heretics in theology. So the word "heretic" is found in only one place in the bible, namely in Titus 3[:10]. It pertains chiefly to canonists, therefore, to separate heretics from the orthodox.
Sed alii opinionem predictam reputant omnino falsam, dicentes quod ad theologos spectat quis reputari debeat catholicus quis hereticus iudicare, sed canoniste habent ostendere qua pena, postquam aliquis fuerit hereticus factus, debet secundum canonica iura puniri. Quemadmodum iudex secularis, licet nesciat aliquem convincere esse hereticum, postquam tamen fuerit sibi tanquam hereticus ab ecclesia derelictus, non ignorat qua pena secundum iura civilia sit plectendus. Iudex igitur ecclesiasticus, si aliquis coram eo fuerit tanquam hereticus accusatus, habet primo consulere theologos quomodo oportet talem convincere et postmodum per canones debet eum condigne pene subiicere.	But others regard the above opinion as completely false, saying that it pertains to theologians to judge who should be regarded as a heretic and who a catholic, but that canonists have the power to show with what penalty someone should be punished according to canon law after he has become a heretic. Similarly, although a secular judge does not know how to convict someone as a heretic, yet after such a person, abandoned by the church as a heretic, has come to him he is not ignorant of the punishment that should be inflicted on him according to civil law. Therefore, if someone has been accused as a heretic before an ecclesiastical judge, the latter first has to consult theologians about how he must convict such a person and then ought to subject him through the canons to a worthy punishment.
Quod autem theologi principaliter inter hereticos et orthodoxos discernant isti ostendunt, dicentes quod nullus est habendus hereticus nisi qui heresi pertinaci animositate adheret. Sed ad theologos non solum que assertio est inter hereses numeranda sed etiam que adhesio debet pertinax estimari principaliter spectat discernere. Ergo, etc.	Moreover, they show that theologians chiefly distinguish between heretics and the orthodox, saying that no one should be considered a heretic except him who adheres to a heresy with pertinacious vehemence. But it chiefly pertains to theologians to determine not only what assertion should be numbered among the heresies but also what adherence should be considered pertinacious. Therefore, etc.
Capitulum 12	Chapter 12
Discipulus Licet mihi videatur probabile quod ad theologos pertinet principaliter iudicare que assertio catholica que heretica est censenda, adhuc tamen ignoro an ad ipsos principaliter spectet quis pertinaciter quis non pertinaciter adheret pravitati heretice diffinire. Et ideo nescio an ad eos principaliter pertineat inter hereticos et orthodoxos distinguere, quia error absque pertinacia errantem non reddit hereticum. De hoc igitur velis disserere?	Student Although it seems probable to me that it pertains chiefly to theologians to judge what assertion should be considered catholic and what heretical, yet I still do not know whether it chiefly pertains to them to decide who clings pertinaciously to heretical wickedness and who not pertinaciously. And therefore I do not know whether it chiefly pertains to them to distinguish between heretics and the orthodox, because an error [held] without pertinacity does not render the errant a heretic. So would you like to discuss this?
Magister De hoc quidam canoniste a theologis discordare videntur, dicentes quod ad canonistas principaliter pertinet iudicare quis est pertinax iudicandus. Ad quod ponendum rationibus infra scriptis videntur posse moveri, quarum prima talis est. Nullus errans contra fidem catholicam est pertinax iudicandus nisi qui correctus a suo prelato suum defendit errorem. Ad quos ergo spectat considerare quomodo errantes corripi debeant a prelatis ad illos principaliter spectat discernere quis est pertinax iudicandus. Sed canoniste principaliter tractant quomodo errantes corripi debeant a prelatis, quia ipsorum est scire quando et quomodo debeant prelati contra errantes procedere, quod ad theologos minime spectat. Canoniste enim, non theologi, de accusationibus, denunciationibus, inquisitionibus heretice pravitatis et etiam de citationibus, interrogationibus et examinationibus hereticorum et aliis que spectant ad iudiciarium ordinem circa errantes servandum cognoscunt. Ergo ad canonistas pertinet principaliter scire quis est pertinax et hereticus iudicandus.	Master Some canonists seem to differ from theologians about this, saying that it pertains chiefly to canonists to judge who should be judged as pertinacious. In maintaining this they seem able to be moved by the arguments written here, of which the first is as follows. No one erring against catholic faith should be judged as pertinacious unless he defends his error after being corrected by his prelate. To those, therefore, to whom it pertains to examine how errants should be corrected by their prelates it chiefly pertains to determine who should be judged as pertinacious. But canonists chiefly treat of how errants should be corrected by their prelates because it is up to them to know when and how prelates should proceed against those who err, something that does not pertain to theologians. For it is canonists not theologians who know about accusations of, denunciations of and inquisitions into heretical wickedness and also about citations, interrogations and examinations of heretics and about other matters which pertain to the observing of the order of legal proceedings as they concern those who err. Therefore it chiefly pertains to canonists to know who should be judged as pertinacious and heretical.
Secunda ratio est hec. Pertinacia est quedam contumacia, secundum quod Gregorius innuit, ut habetur dist. 15 c. Non licuit, et beatus Augustinus, ut legitur 24, q. 3, c. Qui in ecclesia. De contumacia autem principaliter tractant canoniste, cum contumacia attendatur vel respectu non venientis vel respectu non restituentis vel respectu non respondentis aut obscure respondentis vel respectu non exibentis, que omnia citationem presupponunt ad hoc quod quis contumax reputetur. De citationibus autem et his que ad iudiciarium ordinem pertinere noscuntur non theologi sed canoniste considerant. Ergo ad ipsos principaliter spectat scire quis est pertinax et hereticus iudicandus.	The second argument is this. Pertinacity is a certain contumacy, according to what Gregory, as we find in dist. 15, c. Non licuit [wrong reference], and blessed Augustine, as we read in 24, q. 3, c. Qui in ecclesia [col.998] imply. It is canonists, however, who chiefly treat of contumacy, since contumacy applies either with respect to not coming or with respect to not restoring or with respect to not replying or to replying obscurely or with respect to not showing, all of which presuppose a citation in connection with which someone may be regarded as contumacious. It is not theologians, however, but canonists who reflect on citations and matters which are known to pertain to the order of legal proceedings. Therefore it pertains chiefly to them to know who should be judged pertinacious and heretical.
Tertia ratio est hec. Ad quem spectat alicuius criminis punitio ad eumdem spectat eiusdem criminis cognitio, quia crimen incognitum puniri non debet. Sed ad canonistas principaliter spectat quomodo pro pertinacia quis debeat puniri. Ergo ad eosdem spectat principaliter scire quis est pertinax iudicandus.	The third argument is this. To the same person to whom the punishment of any crime pertains, cognizance of that crime pertains, because an unrecognised crime should not be punished. But how someone should be punished for pertinacity pertains chiefly to canonists, Therefore it pertains chiefly to them to know who should be judged as pertinacious.
Capitulum 13	Chapter 13
Discipulus Narra assertionem contrariam cum motivis eiusdem.	Student Set down the opposing assertion with its arguments.
Magister Alii dicunt quod ad theologos spectat scire principaliter quis pertinax est habendus.	Master Others say that it pertains chiefly to theologians to know who should be considered pertinacious.
Primum autem motivum eorum est tale. Ad theologos pertinet principaliter tractare de illis criminibus que directe committuntur in Deum quia, cum theologia sit de Deo sicut de principali subiecto, ipsa habet considerare crimina que committuntur in ipsum. Pertinacia autem pravitatis heretice directe in Deum committitur. Ergo ad theologos pertinet principaliter de pertinacia perscrutari.	Their first reason is the following. It pertains chiefly to theologians to treat of those crimes that are directly committed against God because, since theology has God as its principal subject, it has the function to reflect on those crimes which are committed against him. The pertinacity of heretical wickedness, however, is committed directly against God. Therefore it pertains chiefly to theologians to investigate pertinacity.
Secundum motivum est tale. Eadem est scientia contrariorum. Nam idem est iudex sui et obliqui. Fides autem et heretica pravitas sunt contraria. Ad theologos vero principaliter pertinet considerare de fide. Ergo ad eosdem spectat considerare de heretica pravitate et per consequens de pertinacia, sine qua heretica pravitas minime reperitur.	The second reason is as follows. The science of [each of two] contraries is the same. For the same person is the judge of his own [subject] and its opposite. Now faith and heretical wickedness are contraries. But it pertains chiefly to theologians to reflect on faith. Therefore it pertains to the same people to reflect on heretical wickedness, and, as a consequence, on pertinacity, without which heretical wickedness is not found.
Tertium motivum est hoc. Quando scientia superior et inferior considerant de eodem, noticia illius principalius spectat ad scientiam superiorem quam ad inferiorem, quia superior cognoscit per causas superiores et per priora principia. Sed de pertinacia heresis considerat tam theologia quam scientia canonistarum. Ergo cum theologia sit scientia superior, scientia vero canonistarum sit scientia inferior, sequitur quod ad theologiam principalius spectat de pertinacia considerare. Maior est certa ut videtur; minor ostenditur. Nam quod de pertinacia consideret scientia canonistarum est notum et ipsi concedunt. Quod vero theologia consideret de eadem patet aperte, cum Apostolus ad Titum 3 doceat hereticum devitandum, et in evangelio pertinaciam Iudeorum nolentium credere Christo ipsamet veritas reprehendat.	The third reason is this. When a superior and an inferior science reflect on the same thing, knowledge of that thing pertains more chiefly to the superior science than to the inferior, because the superior knows for superior reasons and by deeper principles. But both theology and the science of the canonists reflect on the pertinacity of heresy. So since theology is the superior science, while the science of the canonists is the inferior one, it follows that it more chiefly pertains to theology to reflect on pertinacity. It seems that the major [premise] is certain; the minor is shown. For it is known, and they grant, that the science of the canonists should reflect on pertinacity. But that theology should reflect on the same subject is quite clear, since the Apostle teaches in Titus 3[:10] that a heretic should be avoided, and in the gospel Truth himself rebukes the pertinacity of the Jews who refuse to believe in Christ.
Discipulus In toto evangelio de pertinacia mentio non habetur. Quomodo ergo dicunt isti quod Christus Iudeorum pertinaciam in evangelio reprehendit?	Student In the whole of the gospels there is no mention found of pertinacity. So how do they say that Christ rebuked the pertinacity of the Jews in the gospel?
Magister Ad hoc respondent quod licet de hoc nomine pertinacia vel pertinax nulla in evangelio mentio fiat, tamen de re significata sepe fecit Christus sermonem.	Master They reply to this that although in the gospel no mention is made of this word "pertinacity" or of "pertinacious", yet Christ often spoke about what is signified [by them].
Discipulus Ubi?	Student Where?
Magister Ioannis 15 ubi ait de Iudeis, "Si non venissem et locutus non fuissem eis, peccatum non haberent. Nunc autem excusationem non habent de peccato suo." Ubi Christus declarat Iudeos fuisse in suis erroribus pertinaces quia sibi credere noluerunt. Unde subdit, "Si opera non fecissem in eis, que nemo alius fecit, peccatum non haberent. Nunc autem et viderunt et oderunt me et patrem meum." Ubi eos pertinaces ostendit quia operibus credere noluerunt. Maliciam et pertinaciam Iudeorum indicat manifeste cum, ut habetur Matthei 11, exprobrat civitatibus que sibi credere renuerunt.	Master At John 15[:22] where he says about the Jews, "If I had not come and had not spoken to them, they would not have sin, but now they have no excuse for their sin." Here Christ makes it clear that the Jews were pertinacious in their error because they refused to believe him. For that reason he adds below [v.24], "If I had not done among them the works that no other man hath done, they would not have sin. But now they have seen and hated both me and my father." He shows here that they are pertinacious because they refused to believe in his works. He clearly indicates the evil and pertinacity of the Jews when he reprimands the cities which refused to believe him, as we find in Matthew 11[:21-24].
Capitulum 14	Chapter 14
Discipulus Quantum adhuc intelligo plus mihi placet assertio ista secunda, et ideo indica quomodo isti ad rationes contrarias respondere nituntur.	Student As much as I understand, that second assertion still pleases me more. Indicate, therefore, how they try to reply to the opposing arguments.
Magister Ad primam nonnulli respondent dicentes quod licet in genere theologi principaliter debeant scire quis est pertinax iudicandus, tamen aliquem modum specialem errantem de pertinacia convincendi magis ex intentione propter aliquas circumstantias considerant canoniste, licet de tali modo si inter canonistas dubitatio et dissensio oriretur ad theologos applicando theologica et universalia ad particularia spectaret profundius et certius iudicare, licet forte cum investigatione et deliberatione prolixa et magna. Unde dicunt quod sunt multi modi deveniendi in notitiam pertinacie alicuius errantis contra fidem, quorum aliqui respiciunt ordinem iudiciarium, puta si errans citatus ad iudicium venire recusat, si veniens renuit respondere, si subterfugere iudicium et examinationem malitiose molitur. Tales autem modos convincendi hereticos quantum ad circumstantias multas ordinem iudiciarium respicientes magis explicite tractant canoniste quam theologi. In genere tamen et quantum ad multos alios modos convincendi de pertinacia magis spectat ad theologos de pertinacia pertractare.	Master Some reply to the first [argument] by saying that although in general it is chiefly theologians who ought to know who should be judged pertinacious, yet in some circumstances canonists reflect more purposefully on some particular way of convicting an errant of pertinacity, although if doubt and disagreement about this way were to arise among canonists it would pertain to theologians, by applying theological and universal [principles] to these particulars, to judge more profoundly and surely, although perhaps after a drawn out and long investigation and consultation. So they say that there are many ways of arriving at knowledge of the pertinacity of someone erring against the faith, some of which have regard to the order of legal proceedings, for instance, if an errant called to trial refuses to come, if he comes but refuses to reply, if he wickedly tries to evade the trial and examination. Now, canonists deal more explicitly than theologians with ways like this of convicting heretics with respect to many circumstances that pertain to the order of legal proceedings. Yet in general and with respect to many other ways of convicting of pertinacity it pertains more to theologians to deal with pertinacity.
Discipulus Potest aliquis convinci de pertinacia extra iudicium?	Student Can anyone be convicted of pertinacity outside a court?
Magister Nemo convincitur auctoritate officii extra iudicium vel sine iudicis auctoritate; aliquis tamen extra iudicium convincitur quantum ad hoc quod eius malitia per evidentiam rei ad notitiam pervenit aliorum in tantum ut liceat absque temeritate ipsum pertinacem hereticum reputare.	Master No one is convicted by the authority of office outside a court, or without the authority of a judge; nevertheless, someone is convicted outside a court in so far as his evil comes so much to the knowledge of others on the evidence of the facts that it is permissible without temerity to regard him as a pertinacious heretic.
Discipulus Dic ad formam rationis illius prime.	Student Speak to the form of that first argument.
Magister Ad formam dicitur quod cum accipitur quod nullus errans contra fidem est pertinax iudicandus nisi qui correctus a suo prelato suum defendit errorem, quod hoc est manifeste falsum, quia sunt alii modi extra omne iudicium deprehendendi errantem in pertinacia manifesta. Nam qui iuraret se in perpetuum aliquam heresim defensurum, de qua in decretis et tota scientia canonistarum nulla fit mentio sed in theologia duntaxat, theologi non canoniste talem deprehenderent in pertinacia manifesta.	Master In respect of its form it is said that when it is taken [as a premise] that no one erring against the faith should be judged as pertinacious except he who defends his error once he has been corrected by his prelate, this is manifestly false, because there are other ways outside any court of detecting someone in error due to obvious pertinacity. For theologians, not canonists, would detect as obviously pertinacious him who swore that he would defend forever some heresy of which no mention is made in the decretals or in the whole of the science of the canonists but only in theology.
Ad secundam rationem dicitur quod omnis contumacia est pertinacia, sed non omnis pertinacia est contumacia, stricte accepto vocabulo contumacie, reputanda, et ideo licet canoniste de contumacia principaliter considerarent non sequitur quod de pertinacia principaliter perscrutentur, quia sepe scientia superior de universalibus et inferior de particularibus tractat. Nec Gregorius et Augustinus dicunt quod omnis pertinacia est contumacia, licet intelligant quod sepe heretici pro contumacia sint iudicialiter condemnandi.	To the second argument it is said that all contumacy is pertinacity, but that not all pertinacity should be regarded as contumacy, when the word "contumacy" is taken strictly. And therefore even if it were canonists who chiefly reflect on contumacy, it does not follow that they should chiefly investigate pertinacity, because often a superior science deals with universals and an inferior one with particulars. Neither do Gregory and Augustine say that all pertinacity is contumacy, although they mean that heretics should often be judicially condemned for contumacy.
Ad tertiam rationem respondent quod ad quem spectat alicuius criminis punitio ad eundem spectat eiusdem criminis aliqualis cognitio, saltem generalis et confusa vel accepta ab alio, sed non oportet quod ad ipsum principaliter spectet eiusdem criminis perscrutatio scientialis vel subtilis cognitio et profunda. Ad iudicem namque secularem spectat ultima punitio heretici a suo errore resilire nolentis postquam fuerit seculari relictus iudicio, et tamen ad secularem iudicem non spectat principaliter scire quis est hereticus reputandus. Iudices etiam seculares falsarios monetarum et mechanicos contra artes suas falsa opera facientes condigna pena plectere debent, et tamen monetarii et mechanici falsitatem monete et operum aliorum acutius quam iudices deprehendunt. Sic licet canoniste considerent quomodo pertinaces in errore contra fidem oportet iuste puniri, theologi tamen multo certius errantes in pertinacia deprehendunt, quemadmodum suspensores furum melius sciunt quam iudices quomodo debent suspendi latrones, gravitatem tamen latrocinii minus cognoscunt.	They reply to the third argument that he to whom the punishment of any crime pertains to him too some kind of cognizance, at least of a general and confused kind or of a kind which is received from another, of the same crime pertains; but it is not necessary that a scientific investigation or a subtle and profound cognizance of the same crime pertains chiefly to him. For the ultimate punishment of a heretic who refuses to retreat from his error after he has been relinquished to a secular court pertains to a secular judge, and yet it does not pertain chiefly to a secular judge to know who should be regarded as a heretic. Secular judges also ought to punish with an appropriate penalty those who forge money and artisans who make forgeries against [the interest of] their own art, and yet moneyers and artisans detect more acutely than judges forged money and other goods. So although canonists reflect on how those who are pertinacious in error against the faith must be punished justly, theologians do nevertheless detect much more surely those who err in pertinacity, just as those who hang thieves know better than judges how thieves ought to be hanged, yet know less the seriousness of the villainy.
Capitulum 15	Chapter 15
Discipulus Dic breviter que sunt illa secundum istos assertores que habent canoniste de hereticis indagare.	Student Say briefly what things, according to those who assert [this position], canonists have the power to investigate about heretics.
What do canonists know about heretics?
Magister Dicunt isti quod canoniste non solum habent disserere qua pena secundum iura canonica oporteat hereticos castigare, sed qualiter sit contra hereticos iudicialiter procedendum, quomodo scilicet formandi sunt libelli accusatorii et alii, et quomodo producendi sunt testes, et alia que ad iudiciarium ordinem spectant oportet eos cognoscere. Propter multas etiam hereses que in libris eorum reperiuntur damnate possunt de multis discernere an sint heretici iudicandi, licet de hoc valeant theologi profundius iudicare. Licet enim in Biblia de hereticis sub isto nomine raro mentio habeatur, sancti tamen Biblie tractatores de hereticis sepe per principia in Scriptura Sacra tradita quomodo sit aliquis hereticus cognoscendus magnos tractatus efficiunt, de quibus in libris canonistarum plurima inseruntur. Preter que et determinationes ecclesie in Scriptura Divina fundatas fere omnia alia de hereticis in libris eorum inventa non quis sit habendus hereticus sed quomodo sit contra hereticos in iudicio procedendum et qua debeant pena feriri declarant. Quod in titulo De hereticis, qui in libro decretalium est insertus, patenter apparet. Predicta autem, quia sunt positiva particularia et ex inventione pendent humana, non sunt de consideratione theologorum qui principaliter talia non considerant. Per regulas tamen universales ad ipsos pertinet iudicare, ubi deficeret prudentia canonistarum, an leges ecclesiastice de hereticis certis modis plectendis et modo procedendi contra eosdem Scripturis sint adverse Divinis, quia si leges huiusmodi contrariarent Scripture Sacre non essent aliqualiter tolerande.	Master They say that canonists have the power to examine not only with what penalty according to canon law it is proper to punish heretics, but how judicial proceedings should be taken against them, that is, it is necessary for them to know how writs of accusation and other writs should be composed, how witnesses should be produced, and other things which pertain to the order of legal proceedings. On account also of the many heresies which are found condemned in their books they can determine about many matters whether they should be judged to be heretical, although about this matter theologians can judge more profoundly. For although heretics are rarely found mentioned in the bible under that name, commentators on the holy bible, following the principles handed down in sacred scripture, do nevertheless often produce large tractates about heretics, on how anyone should be recognised as a heretic, many things from which are inserted in the books of the canonists. Apart from these and the determinations of the church based on divine scripture, almost everything else about heretics found in their books makes clear not who should be considered a heretic but how judicial proceedings should be conducted against heretics and with what punishment they ought to be struck. This is quite clear in the section, De hereticis, which is found in the book of decretals [book 5, title 7]. However, because these things are positive particulars which depend on human invention they are not reflected on by theologians, who do not reflect mainly on such things. Nevertheless, where canonistic jurisprudence is deficient, it pertains to theologians to judge by universal rules whether the ecclesiastical laws about punishing heretics in certain ways and about the way of proceeding against them are contrary to the divine scriptures, because if such laws were opposed to sacred scripture they should not in any way be tolerated.
Explicit liber primus.	The first book ends.

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